

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSIONS

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27 and 49

(79th Congress)

**A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO**

PART 5

DECEMBER 31, 1945, AND JANUARY 2, 3, 4, AND 5, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



**UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946**

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

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JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

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COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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Sworn statement presented to committee.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	Pages	Pages	Pages	Vol.	Pages	Pages	Pages
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen.	1311-1329		2722-2744					
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col.	496-499		3120-3124					
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col.	1830-1842							
White, William R., Brig. Gen.			1989-2007					
Wichiser, Rea B.			2456-2478					
Wilke, Weslie T.	1334-1340							
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm.		279-288					389-410	1723-1911
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen.						187-189		
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen.	247-259		1345-1381					
Wilson, Erle M., Col.			910-931					
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col.			3663-3665					
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm.				1083-1090				
Wong, Ahoon H.			3677-3683					
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR						105-106	376-386 541-553 597-602	
Woodward, Farnsley C., Lt. (jg), USN							442-450	
Woolley, Ralph E.			3750-3773					
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr.		379-382						
Wynan, Theodore, Jr., Col.			3357-3586					
York, Yee Kam.	1525-1538							
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN	1683-1705							3233-3259, 3303-3354
Zucca, Emil Lawrence			2580a-2596					

[5461]¹

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Murphy, and Gearhart.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[5462] — The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel informed the Chair that they first wish to put in some documents as part of the record before going ahead with the testimony.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

We have laid some of the documents before the members of the committee this morning. Some of the others we will refer to can be spread upon the transcript or made exhibits.

I would like to call attention to the very large bulky volume which is at the bottom of the pile of material before the members of the committee. That contains the testimony of General Short given in prior proceedings. We thought we would make that available in that form to each member of the committee for study and we are preparing a similar volume containing all the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel which will be distributed as soon as it is received from the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. What number will that be?

Mr. GESELL. That is not going to be given a number, I simply wanted to call attention to it. It occurred to us that each member of the committee would be particularly anxious to read that testimony before General Short appears as a witness.

At page 4477 of the transcript, when we were last presenting material covering responses to various committee member requests, I made reference to a draft of November 16 [5463] of the August 17 statement which the United States Government delivered to the Japanese. We have now obtained a photostat copy of that and I would like to offer it to be included with the other material as Exhibit 22-A.²

The CHAIRMAN. 22-A?

Mr. GESELL. 22-A.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 22-A.")

Senator FERGUSON. Have you marked these in any way?

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

² See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1694.

Mr. GESELL. No, they are not marked and that is not among the material before you. It is just another draft of that message, Senator, which we have presented several drafts on.

At page 1824 of the transcript there was a request by Senator Ferguson for the number of messages sent by Ambassador Grew to the State Department between November 26 and December 7, 1941. The State Department advises us that there were 58 telegrams, numbers 1853 to 1910, inclusive, and 15 dispatches, numbers 5993 to 6006, inclusive, and 6008, sent during that period. We have examined this material and it appears to be, for the most part, administrative documentation, the dispatches and telegrams, and if the actual documents are desired by Senator Ferguson we can arrange to have them photostated by the Department of State. Some of them, of course, are already in the record.

[5464] At page 1728 there was a request by Senator Ferguson for any information received by Ambassador Grew from the State Department as to the probability of the United States coming into armed conflict with the Japanese Government if Japan was at war with the British in the Pacific. The State Department informs us that they cannot find any record of any such information being sent by the Department of State to Ambassador Grew.

At page 1831 to 1835 of the transcript there was a request by Senator Ferguson for any instructions sent by the Department of State to Ambassador Grew concerning the destruction of codes. The State Department has informed us that on December 7 there were in existence standing instructions to all American diplomatic and consular offices authorizing the destruction of codes and confidential files in case of necessity.

On December 5, 1941, the State Department sent Ambassador Grew the telegram, which includes instructions concerning burning of codes, which appears in the transcript at page 1967. It will be recalled that Mr. Grew stated in the transcript, at page 1966, that he did not think he had ever received that telegraph.

On December 18, 1941, after the Swiss Government had undertaken to represent the United States interests in Japan, the State Department sent a telegram to the American Legation [5465] at Bern, Switzerland, to be transmitted to the American diplomatic and consular offices in Japan and the Far East.

Paragraph 7 of this message refers specifically to the question of the destruction of records, and reads as follows:

Officers shall destroy all seals, codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, confidential files, et cetera. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses, who shall prepare affidavits concerning the destruction.

I will ask to have the entire dispatch, which constitutes an additional dispatch on this matter of code burning, designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 90.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 90.")

Mr. GESELL. At page 1853 of the transcript there is a request by Senator Ferguson for any records of conversations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Grew while the latter was in this country. The State Department informs us that they cannot locate in their files any record of any such conversations.

At page 1951 of the transcript, there is a request by Congressman Keefe for memoranda dated December 1, 1941, prepared by Stanley K. Hornbeck. These have been obtained from the War Department files and delivered to Mr. Keefe.

[5466] At page 1996 of the transcript there is a request by Senator Ferguson for the time when Ambassador Grew destroyed his codes. In that connection we have several exhibits which we will ask to have all marked under the next exhibit number, number 91.

First there are two dispatches dated December 15, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to the Department of State concerning the burning and destruction of codes, ciphers, and cipher devices. I will simply state that we have not photostated the entire dispatches since they contain considerable reference to code designations. We simply left that part of the dispatch blank.

Senator LUCAS. What was the date of that?

Mr. GESELL. That is a dispatch of December 15, 1941.

Another dispatch dated February 16, 1942, regarding destruction of confidential material in the reporting section of the Embassy in Tokyo. Another dispatch dated March 25, 1942 regarding destruction of confidential material in Embassy files. These dispatches show no destruction of confidential codes prior to December 8 Japanese time or December 7 our time.

Those simply will be offered as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. All in one?

Mr. GESELL. I should think so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be so marked. They are all attached?

[5467] Mr. GESELL. Yes.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 91.")

Mr. GESELL. At transcript page 2002 Senator Ferguson asked whether Ambassador Grew had any knowledge of the withdrawal of United States shipping from Japanese areas. No record can be found in the Department of State files of the sending of any information regarding the re-routing of the shipping to Ambassador Grew.

At transcript page 2014 a request by Congressman Keefe for affidavits in connection with the burning of codes in the Embassy at Tokyo. In this connection we would like to point out that the material already previously introduced in Exhibit 90 shows that an affidavit was required only in connection with the burning of fee stamps; also as shown by the telegram dated December 5 to Ambassador Grew.

The photostats of Ambassador Grew's dispatches concerning code burning include certificates of the witnesses so that the material I offered a moment ago answers that request as well.

[5468] Mr. GESELL. At page 2045 of the transcript a request by Congressman Gearhart for any instructions sent to American consuls in Japan during the last 3d of November and the first 7 days of December directing the destruction of codes and code machines.

The State Department has found nothing in its files on this other than the telegram of December 5 and December 15 previously referred to and, of course, the standing instructions which were in effect for burning in the event of necessity.

At transcript page 2046 a request by Senator Ferguson for Army messages to the military attaché at Tokyo concerning the burning

of codes. I simply want to note that that material was placed in the transcript at page 2223.

At transcript page 1881 a request by Senator Ferguson for Ambassador Grew's reports to the State Department on his return to the United States in 1942. I believe other members of the committee expressed some interest in those reports as well.

We have examined approximately 30 written dispatches delivered by Ambassador Grew to the State Department upon his return in 1942 and except for two having to do with the destruction of confidential files and ciphers, which we have just introduced, the reports do not to us appear to be per- [5469] tinent. They relate almost entirely to administrative matters. We can arrange to have those documents photostated and made available if any of the members of the committee wish.

At transcript page 1630 a request by Senator Ferguson for material relating to the proposal of Prime Minister Hiranuma in the spring of 1939. That is also discussed at pages 1947 and 1948. That, I believe, is the so-called peace proposal made by Baron Hiranuma prior to the outbreak of the war in Europe.¹

We have obtained from the State Department a series of seventeen documents relating to that subject, which I will transmit today to Senator Ferguson's office for his inspection. I won't take the time of the committee to read the list of the documents. There are some seventeen in number.

Senator LUCAS. What is the date of that?

Mr. GESELL. Those documents preceded the breaking out of war in Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1939?

Mr. GESELL. In 1939, yes. They went up, I think, until August 1939.

In the transcript at page 1288, a request by Senator Lucas for the official report of Prime Minister Churchill's speech of January 27, 1942, before the House of Commons.

We offer that report, a photostat of that, as the next exhibit, number 92, furnished by the Library of Congress, [5469-A] photostating pages 591 to 618 of volume 377 of the Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 92.")

[5470] Senator FERGUSON. What was the date of that speech? Was that January 27?

Mr. GESELL. That is the January 27, 1942, speech.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Mr. GESELL. I believe a text of that speech is already in the transcript and this is simply the official record of the speech.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think the record ought to be clear on this last statement. I do not think the whole speech was in before, just certain transcripts out of it at the time.

Mr. GESELL. Perhaps I was mistaken on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if that is true probably the whole speech ought to be made a part of the record and not simply as an exhibit.

Mr. GESELL. Very well, then, we will have that spread upon the transcript after making a double check. It is a substantial typing job. I am probably in error.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

¹ See Exhibit No. 177, subsequently introduced.

Mr. GESELL. At page 4930 there was read into the record a series of intercept messages during the period of January 1 to July 1, 1941 indicating varying degrees of knowledge by the Japanese or suspicions by the Japanese that [5471] their codes were being read.

The Army has completed the search and there are four additional messages which have turned up, which were submitted to us by the Army under date of December 19 and I will ask to have these messages spread upon the transcript to complete that part of the inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

Mr. GESELL. I can advise the committee at this time that the Navy has completed its search, but that its search has not disclosed any messages which the Army search has not disclosed, so we now believe we have the complete documentation on that subject.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[5472]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C. Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 19 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

Completion of the search of Signal Intelligence Service files has disclosed four additional messages, here inclosed, during the period 1 January-1 July 1941, which may be pertinent to the question of the extent of Japanese suspicions that their code messages were being read.

/s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE,
BB

Lt. Col. GSC.

From: Tokyo (Matuoka)
To: Panama (Koshi)
23 January, 1941
(J17-K6)
#004

(Chief of Office Routing)

The statement issued by the president of the Japanese Association and others during (April ?) of last year, regarding the manipulation of the books in your office, was apparently based on communications between your office and mine.

This raises a very serious question of security. How did [5473] the contents of these official communications leak out to the above persons? Please investigate this matter immediately and submit a report.

We questioned Matumoto concerning this matter recently, and he explained that it was of your doing. Please explain.

JD-1: 568 14073 23 January, 1941 Navy trans. 1-29-41 (S)

From: Tokyo (Matuoka).
To: Chicago (Riyojji).
7 February, 1941.
(J17K6).
#002.

(Secret)

If it is impossible to remove the code safe and transfer the telegraphic duties to the official residence, there is no way out (in view of the fact that certain circumstances require giving the codes added protection) except for your office to discontinue secret communication. You will have to rely on the nearest office to handle your secret communications.

For this reason, will you transfer the following codes to the Embassy in Washington for safekeeping, at the earliest opportunity:

"G"
"I"
"ho"
"hen"
"oite"

(H-1)*
(KO)
(PA-K2)*

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[5474] "Tu" (J17)*
"So" (New Orleans Only) P-1)*

Please have the Embassy send us a receipt.

Relay copies of this message, as a "Minister's Instruction" to Los Angeles and Portland; also to Washington for information.

*Insert by translator.

JD-1: 956 14610 7 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-14-41 (S).

From: Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
April 14, 1941.
Purple.
#407.

Intelligence wires emanating from our offices in the Near East and Egypt to our offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately paraphrased before transmitting their contents to the German and Italian authorities. This procedure is advisable in order that there be no danger of giving the German and Italian authorities clues in decoding our codes. Therefore, in intelligences of this type emanating from the area, the "I" ^a code and the "SO" ^b code should be discontinued, using only the more efficient "O" ^c code. In communicating other secret matters I would like to have you use the "TSU" ^d code and other appropriate codes. Please follow this procedure.

[5475] Relayed to Italy and Turkey.

^a An auxiliary code.

^b P-1.

^c PA (K-2).

^d J series codes.

(J-18 (K7) now under study.)

Army 16312 Trans. 4-16-41 (W)

From: San Francisco (Muto).
To: Tokyo.
May 28, 1941.
J-18.
#86. (Part 1 of 2)

(Strictly Secret)

While the Nichi Shin Maru, of the Pacific Whaling Steamship Company, was coming into Port Costa (approximately 20 miles from San Francisco) in order to take on petroleum, under suspicion of carrying contraband drugs the interior of the ship was searched by customs officials about noon on the ____^b. In order to burn them, should the need arise, Naval "SA" code,^a secret Naval documents in the custody of the captain, secret wireless telegraphy documents in the custody of the Chief Radio Operator, meteorological codes belonging to the Central Meteorological Bureau, planning board codes, and other secret document, [5476] under pretext of passing inspection were taken away. As soon as I had been informed of this by telephone, I immediately filed a protest with the local customs officials and demanded the return of these documents. They replied that they had decided to return these documents at a later date to the fishing vessel after an investigation had been made into the facts of the case.

^a Unable to identify this code at present. (NL) fully available. Now cancelled.
^b 29th.

Army 18037 Trans. 6-11-41 (2)

[5477] Mr. GESELL. At pages 4102 and 3 of the transcript Senator Ferguson asked whether the British notified the United States prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor that they were fully alerted at Singapore.

The Army has submitted in response to that request two documents: First, a copy of a December 1, 1941, UP dispatch from Singapore as appearing in the New York Times and, second, a photostat of a 2

December report, received in the War Department, G-2, April 12, 1942, from the United States military observer in Singapore, concerning the status of the alerts. The net effect of that is that there was newspaper publicity about Singapore being alerted but that the official report, while sent on the 2d of December, did not reach here until April 12, 1942.

I will ask to have both the official report and the UP dispatch placed in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

Copy No. 6-1

For Record Section Only

[5478] Secret

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attache Report: Malaya

(Stamp:) REC'D-G-2 APR 13 1942

Subject: ALERTING OF MALAYAN COMMAND I. G. No. 6900

Source: BRITISH—OFFICIAL

Reliability: EXCELLENT.

Summarization of Report:

1. System of Alerting.

2. Present State of Alert.

1. *System of Alerting.*

a. States of Alert in the Malayan Command are prescribed as three "degrees of readiness", each degree being indicated by a code word.

(1) The 3rd, or lowest degree of readiness is designated by the code word "AWAKE". When this code word is transmitted by Command Headquarters to the H. Q. III Indian Corps, Singapore Fortress; Australian Imperial Forces, Malaya, and to Sarawak and Borneo it has the following meaning: "The international situation is getting worse and you should make certain, as far as possible without causing public uneasiness, that all your precautionary measures are ready to be brought into operations at very short notice. Civil authorities have been informed accordingly."

[5479] (a) Commanders will take the following action upon receipt of the code message "AWAKE": "Ensure that all schemes are in readiness for instant action and will take such precautionary measures as may be possible covertly or under the guise of an exercise. Officers and other ranks on leave within Malaya will be recalled, but no movement of units to war stations without previous reference to Command Headquarters".

(2) The second degree of readiness is indicated by the code word "SEAVIEW". Upon receipt of this code message the following will ensue:

(a) Beach defenses will be manned on a skeleton basis and a constant night watch maintained.

(b) A. A. defenses fully deployed.

(c) Fixed defenses fully deployed.

(d) Commanding General III Indian Corps will secure the northern frontier.

(e) All other regular forces will be at not more than 12 hours notice to take up initial positions.

(f) Mobilization of Impressed civilian motor transport to be put into effect as far as required for [5480] mobilization of Volunteers when and if ordered.

(g) Booms across rivers will be put into place.

(h) Off shore and river patrol vessels to be fully manned and on patrol.

(i) Operations room and Headquarters all organizations will be manned continuously on a skeleton basis.

(3) The first degree of readiness is called for by the code message "RAFFLES". Upon its receipt, the following steps will be taken:

(a) All forces will be deployed and ready for action.

(b) All airfield defense schemes will be brought into operation.

(c) Operations rooms and Headquarters all units fully manned.

(d) War Code for communications go into effect 12 hours after origin of message "RAFFLES".

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b. Other precautionary measures.

(1) Mobilization of Volunteer forces is called for by the code word "OILCAN" followed by the date of mobilization in words. Upon receipt, Volunteer force commanders prepare to mobilize on the date indicated. They report completion of mobilization to Headquarters Malayan Command.

(2) Guarding of vulnerable points. This is [5481] called for by the code message ARMOUR. Full precautions against sabotage is called for by this message. All military vulnerable points will be constantly guarded. Troops will leave barracks only on duty and will be under arms at all times.

(3) The code message "BROWNOUT" calls for the following:

(a) Permanently dismantle all advertisement lighting.

(b) Extinguish street and all other outside lighting.

(c) Shade interior lighting and lights on vehicles.

(d) Institute complete blackout on sounding of air raid signals.

(4) Internment of enemy aliens will probably take place in 3 stages, i. e.:

(a) First phase, indicated by code message "COLLAR". This calls for arrest and detention of dangerous Japanese known to police.

(b) Second phase, indicated by code word "TROUSERS". All male Japanese will be interned.

(c) Third phase, "COLOUR". All Japanese will be interned.

(5) Complete closing of Thailand frontier is [5482] indicated by code word "BUNKER". Minor degrees of frontier restriction are indicated by other code words.

2. Present State of Alert in Malaya.

a. Malaya was placed in the second degree of readiness by the code message "SEAVIEW" on Monday, December 1, 1941.

b. Guarding of vulnerable points, prevention of sabotage, and restriction of troops to barracks, etc. was called for by the message "ARMOUR" on the preceding day, November 30, 1941.

/S/ B. A. TORMEY.

Distribution:

6 copies to AC of S, G-2, Major, General Staff. WD.

3 copies to AC of S, G-2, HPD.

1 copy to file.

(Stamp:) 1st Ind(?) U. S. Military Observer, Singapore, 12/4, 1941(?) To: AC of S, G-2, WD.,

Approved:

/S/ FRANCIS G. BRINK,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.

[5483] [Extract from The New York Times, 1 December 1941, page 9, column 2.]

SINGAPORE PLACED UNDER EMERGENCY—VOLUNTEERS CALLED OUT—NEW FORCES LANDED IN BURMA TO MEET JAPANESE THREAT

AUSTRALIANS TO CONFER—BRITISH NAVAL AID TO U. S. IN FAR EAST STRESSED BY FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY

SINGAPORE, Monday, Dec. 1 (UP).—The Governor today signed a proclamation declaring that a state of emergency existed in the Straits Settlements, British Crown Colony. He called out the volunteer army, air and naval forces.

The proclamation was issued by Governor Sir Shenton Thomas after he had conferred with Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, chief of the British forces in the Far East.

[5484] Mr. GESELL. Senator Lucas requested certain information concerning the Philippines, to wit, the following:

The total number of airplanes in the Philippines on 7 December 1941, that request being made at pages 3993 and 4404 of the transcript; the number of bombers at Clark Field when the Japanese attacked, that request being made at page 3994 of the transcript, and any report on the number of bombers lost at Clark Field in that attack, that request being made at page 4405 of the transcript.

The War Department has submitted the best information which is available bearing on these requests at the present time in the War Department, in the form of a memorandum three pages in length containing the information in detail and I think the best procedure for handling it, again, would be to have it spread upon the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

[5485]

27 DECEMBER 1945.

Memorandum for L & L Division

Att: Lt. Col. Duncombe

Subject: Information re Philippine Plane Situation

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Lt. Col. Duncombe to Lt. Col. Root, dated 18 December 1945, concerning request of Senator Lucas on pages 3993 and 4404 of the transcript for the number of planes in the Philippines on 7 December 1941, and on pages 3994 and 4404 for the number of bombers on Clark Field and the number of bombers lost there.

2. Information bearing on the above requests, supplied by the Army Air Forces, is inclosed herewith. No more definite information is at present available in the War Department.

3. Inclosure No. 1, a report by the Office of Statistical Control, AAF, regarding the status of aircraft in the Philippines 1-31 December 1941, indicates that 317 planes were on hand as of 1 December. Inclosure No. 2, an extract from the "History of the Fifth Air Force and Its Predecessors, December 1941 Installment" indicates that, of the total of 35 B-17's on hand, 20 to 23 were at Clark Field on 8 December prior to the attack. The 8 December cable from the Philippines on plane losses, noted in inclosure No. 1, states that 17 heavy bombers remained after the attack, but does not disclose how many of the bombers lost were lost at Clark Field.

/S/ E. E. Root,
Lt. Col. GSC
Current Group, OPD

[5486] 2 Incls—

Copy Status of Aircraft in Philippines 1-31 Dec 41.

Copy Table III, pages 8 & 9, "History of Fifth Air Force and Its Predecessors, Part I, December 1941 Installment" (on file at AAF Historical Office).

Restricted

Status of aircraft in Philippines, 1-31 December 1941

Model	On hand as of 1 Dec 1941	Losses* during month	On hand as of 31 Dec 1941	Model	On hand as of 1 Dec 1941	Losses* during month	On hand as of 31 Dec 1941
B-17.....	35	21	14	O-46.....	7	7	-----
B-10.....	12	11	1	O-49.....	3	3	-----
B-18.....	18	16	2	O-52.....	10	10	-----
A-27.....	8	8	-----	OA-9.....	1	1	-----
P-26.....	15	15	-----	C-39.....	1	-----	1
P-35.....	51	51	-----	C-49.....	1	1	-----
P-39.....	13	13	-----				
P-40.....	141	141	-----	Total.....	317	299	18
O-19.....	1	1	-----				

*Due to the lack of adequate aircraft reporting facilities [5487] during the early part of the war, the cause of these losses and the dates on which they occurred are both incomplete and inaccurate. However, after extensive research and based on the few cable reports which were transmitted, the following observations are made:

1. Cable from Philippines dated 8 December 1941 states: "After attack now have 15 P-35's, 17 heavy bombers and 50-55 P-40's; no losses other types". This would indicate that 18 B-17's, 36 P-35's, and 86-91 P-40's were lost before or on 8 December 1941.

2. Cable from Philippines dated 12 December 1941 states: "Must conserve to maximum the 27 P-40's for reconnaissance to make a show of strength." This would further indicate that approximately 23-28 P-40's were lost between the 9th and 12th of December 1941.

3. We have no way of determining how or when the balance of the losses were incurred.

Office of Statistical Control
18 December 1945 AFSSC-2B

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[5488] A True Copy as found in *History of the Fifth Air Force (and its Predecessors)*. Part I, December, 1941, Installment.

(S) RICHARD L. WATSON, Jr.
Maj. A. C.

FEAF DISPOSITIONS ON DEC. 7, 1941

TABLE III.—*Status and location of aircraft (44)*

C. O.	Unit	Location	Type	Number operat.
Major O. L. Grover.....	24 Pur. Grp.....			
Lt. W. B. Putman.....	Hq. & Hq. Sq.....	Clark		
Lt. H. G. Thorne.....	3rd Pur. Sq.....	Iba.....	P-40E.....	18
1st Lt. Boyd Wagner.....	17th Pur.....	Nichols.....	P-40E.....	18
1st Lt. J. H. Moore.....	20th Pur.....	Clark.....	P-40B.....	18
1st Lt. Sam Marett.....	21st Pur.....	Del Carmen.....	P-35.....	18
1st Lt. W. E. Dyess.....	34th Pur.....	Nichols.....	P-40E.....	18
Total pursuit.....				90
Cpt. J. Y. Parker.....	2nd Obs.....	Clark.....	O-46, 52, 79.....	10-12
Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank.....	19th Bomb G Group.....			
Captain MacDonald.....	Hq. & Hq. Sq.....	Clark.....		
Major C. E. Combs.....	93rd Sq.....	Del Monte.....	B-17D.....	12
Major E. O. O'Donnell.....	14th Sq.....	Del Monte.....	B-17D.....	
Major Wm. Fisher.....	28th Sq.....	Clark.....	B-17D.....	18
Major H. Gibbs.....	30th Sq.....	Clark.....	B-17D.....	
NOTE: Two planes out of com- mission at Clark, also three planes of 93rd and 14th Squad- ron at Clark.				
6th Pursuit (Phil. Air Force):	6th Sq.....	Batangas.....	P-26.....	12
Captain Jesus A. Villamour.				
Miscellaneous.....		{ Clark.....	B-18.....	10
		{ Nichols.....		
		{ Neilson.....	B-10.....	3
		{ Cabantuan.....		
		Clark.....	A-27.....	2
		Del Monte.....	B-18.....	2

[5489] Total first line Operational Aircraft Dec. 7th (19 Bomb. 24th Pursuit 2nd Obsv.)..... 135 or 137
All other operational tactical planes..... 29

Grand total operational..... 164 or 166

44. This table has been compiled from the History 24th Pur. Grp. * * * and Journal 19 Bomb Gp. * * * Gen. Marshall in his biennial report gives the number of P-40's as 107. The discrepancy is due to the fact that table III above, is of planes operational on Dec. 8th, and excludes planes not erected or out of commission.

Copy

[5490] Mr. GESELL. At page 3273 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson requested that the records be checked for any memorandum by General Marshall concerning our preparedness, similar to the memoranda for the President of 5 November and 27 November 1941 signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. A search of the War Department files for the year 1941 has disclosed no such memorandum.

At pages 4178-79 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked what codes the so-called winds messages had been sent in. Both messages—SIS Nos. 25432 and 25392—were sent not in the "Purple" code, but in the code known as "J-19".

At pages 3758 and 3760 of the transcript, Congressman Keefe asked when the first Army troops were sent to Iceland, and when the Army

relieved the Marines there. Records of the Adjutant General in connection with the memorandum we have received from the War Department indicate the following:

The first Army unit on Iceland was the 33d Pursuit Squadron, which arrived 6 August 1941.

The first Army ground troops arrived 16 September 1941.

The Marines in Iceland were not relieved at the time the Army ground troops arrived; by a Presidential directive of 22 September 1941 they were placed under General Bonesteel, the Army commander.

At page 4235 of the transcript Congressman Murphy asked [5491] for the initials of Colonel Bundy, head of the Plans Section of the War Plans Division in 1941. The Army Register for 1940 gives Colonel Bundy's name as Charles W. Bundy.

On December 22, 1945, the War Department advised as follows with respect to a request appearing at page 4104 of the transcript made by Senator Ferguson, who asked when the Batavia message from Thorpe for Miles (CRO222) was received in G-2—that is the so-called Batavia "winds" message. The Army has submitted to us a photostat of page 2 of the December 5, 1941, register of incoming cables of the G-2 record section, indicating that the message in question was received in that section at 8:16 a. m., 5 December 1941.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 93.")

Mr. GESELL. On December 10, 1945, the War Department made its reply to a request by Senator Ferguson and Senator Brewster concerning the original Opana plot. These requests were made at pages 372 and 373 of the transcript and at other points.

In response to these requests they have made available to us the following information which we have available for Senator Brewster's and Senator Ferguson's inspection:

Letter dated 24 November 1945 from the Adjutant General, Headquarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, inclosing the original radar plot of the Opana station, and various related original records.

Letter dated 21 November 1945 from the Adjutant General, Headquarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, in- [5492] closing 4 original plots of radar stations in operation on Oahu, 7 December 1941, as plotted at the information center and covering the period from 10:43 a. m. to 12 p. m., local Hawaiian time, 7 December 1941.

Letter dated 18 November 1945 from Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, with 6 inclosures.

At page 4051 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson inquired about orders relating to the relief of General Short in addition to the cable of 16 December 1941 read into the record at pages 4050 and 4051 of the transcript.

Two photostats of two cables on this subject, dated December 17, 1941, and January 6, 1942, have been made available to us by the Army and I will ask to have them spread upon the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

2076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[5493]

[Telegram]

From: War Department
Bureau: Secretary, GS
OCS: WBS

DECEMBER 17, 1941.

Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

For general Short only stop Chief of Staff believes it important that you remain in Hawaii during the presence there of the President's Commission stop Orders for you will issue later stop Regards end

BRYDEN.

I hereby certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

[S] W. B. Smith,
W. B. SMITH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

[Telegram]

From: War Department
Bureau: A. G. O.
AG 210.31 (1-5-42) OD-F.
JED-hrm-hg-1509-1.

JANUARY 6, 1942.

Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

[5494] Secretary of War relieves Major Generals Walter C. Short O dash 1621 US Army and Frederick L. Martin O dash 2507 US Army present assignment and duty in Hawaiian dept effective upon departure of Roberts Commission then assigns them to western defense command presidio of San Francisco, Calif to proceed that station and report to CG for duty stop travel directed necessary military service stop FD 1401 P 1 dash 06 comma 15 dash 06 A 0410 dash 2

ADAMS.

Official:

/S/ J. E. DALY,
Adjutant General.

[5495] Mr. GESELL. I would like to read at this time a memorandum submitted to us by the War Department under date of December 21, 1945, in response to a request made by counsel's office for certain information which will be apparent. The memorandum reads as follows:

In response to your request, the records of the Signal Intelligence Service have been searched to ascertain if Japanese messages were intercepted which contained the word "haruna" (specified in the messages at page 215 of Exhibit 1 as the word to be used to signal compliance with Tokyo's orders for destruction of codes). The records disclose that messages containing the single word "haruna" were transmitted from the following places on the dates listed (the date on which the intercept reached S. I. S. is also given in those instances where it is shown by the records.

This memorandum, the full text of which will be put into the record, discloses that the word "haruna", which was the code word, was sent by Japanese offices on December 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 located at the following points:

Panama, New York, New Orleans, Havana, Hollywood, Vancouver, Portland, Menado, Surabaya, Seattle, Ottawa, San Francisco, Chicago, Washington, Dublin, Songkhla.

I will ask to have the whole memorandum put in. I thought that that would be of benefit to the committee to show that [5496]

that word "haruna" was in fact implemented and followed up and transmitted from these various points.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that put in as part of the transcript?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, I think we should put that whole thing in the record and have the whole memorandum spread of record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator LUCAS. As a matter of information, Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel if that is a record showing that the messages went to these various places just indicated?

Mr. GESELL. It was the reverse, Senator. The Japanese sent out a circular message which asked for the destruction of codes and said, "When you have destroyed the codes, send the word back to show that you have done it," and on these various dates these various points reported to Tokyo that they had destroyed their codes.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether all of these had been intercepted and deciphered prior to the time of the attack? Is there any showing of that?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, there is a showing to the extent available, Senator Ferguson. Apparently the records in not every instance are complete as to whether or not they were intercepted and received, but there appear to be in that group [5497] nine which were intercepted and received prior to that time and then a group of five on December 8, 10, 12, and 17 which were not received until later.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Mr. GESELL. That will all appear in the full body of the memorandum in the transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

(The document referred to follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 21 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

In response to your request, the records of the Signal Intelligence Service have been searched to ascertain if Japanese messages were intercepted which contained the word "haruna" (specified in the messages at page 215 of Exhibit 1 as the word to be used to signal compliance with Tokyo's orders for destruction of codes). The records disclose that messages containing the single word "haruna" were transmitted from the following places, on the dates listed (the date on which the intercept reached S. I. S. is also given in those instances where it is shown by the records):

[5498]

Message sent by Japanese office at—	Date transmitted by Japanese	Date intercept received by SIS	Message sent by Japanese office at—	Date transmitted by Japanese	Date intercept received by SIS
Panama.....	2 Dec.....	4 Dec.....	Surabaya.....	3 Dec.....	(?)
New York.....	2 Dec.....	3 Dec.....	Seattle.....	4 Dec.....	5 Dec.
New Orleans.....	2 Dec.....	3 Dec.....	Ottawa.....	4 Dec.....	6 Dec.
Havana.....	2 Dec.....	3 Dec.....	San Francisco.....	4 Dec.....	8 Dec.
Hollywood.....	2 Dec.....	5 Dec.....	Chicago.....	6 Dec.....	8 Dec.
Vancouver.....	2 Dec.....	5 Dec.....	Washington.....	6 Dec. 8:21 p. m.	10 Dec.
Portland.....	3 Dec.....	4 Dec.....	Dublin.....	?	12 Dec.
Manado.....	3 Dec.....	?	Songkhla.....	7 Dec.....	17 Dec.

/S/ Harmon Duncombe,
BB
HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

2078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[5499] Mr. GESELL. Another request made by counsel related to obtaining the intercept, if any, from Washington to Tokyo transmitting Secretary Hull's message of November 26, 1941. That intercept has been obtained and we would like to have it marked as Exhibit 94.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 94.")

Mr. GESELL. I would now like to read into the record a memorandum from the War Department dated December 31, 1945, reading as follows:

At page 4114 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for (a) the information which G-2 had between 26 November and 12 noon 7 December 1941 indicating that Japanese ships were moving southward, and (b) the War Department copy of the 6 December 1941 cable from Ambassador Winant to the State Department concerning Japanese ship movements.

All the documents found in the G-2 files relating to the first request are contained in Inclosures No. 1-1d. In addition, MID was on the distribution for the ONI Intelligence Reports for 26 November (#65), 27 November (#66), 29 November (#68), 29 November (#70), 1 December (#71), and 3 December 1941 (#72-41)—all contained in Exhibit 85. Also, attached as Inclosure [5500] No. 2, is a 26 November 1941 Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of War concerning a possible Japanese convoy movement toward Indo-China.

A thorough search of the War Department files has disclosed no evidence that a copy of the Winant cable was received in the War Department. However, Inclosure No. 3 shows that the 6 December despatch from CINCAF to CNO (Exhibit 66), containing similar information, was received by the Executive Officer, War Plans Division of the War Department at 1710, 6 December 1941, and the G-2 comment in item 1d. of Inclosure No. 1 shows that the contents of that despatch were known to G-2.

That is a very comprehensive memorandum covering that request and I think the best way of handling it would be not to read the various enclosures but to have them appear in the transcript immediately following this memorandum.

(The document referred to follows:)

[5501]

SECRET

Controlled Information

Re: Operations of Friendly Powers

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT., AT 11:05 A. M. DECEMBER 1, 1941

From London: Filed 4:22 p. m. December 4, 1941

Received in I. H. 8:15 a. m. December 5, 1941 No. 1275

1. *Libya*: Authentic information here indicates the British have at this time approximately 180 tanks ready for battle in Libya after reinforcements were rushed to the Desert. British estimates have placed Axis tank strength at the outbreak of hostilities at 500 light tanks, 400 of which were tanks of nine tons or over. Estimates on their strength, admitted to be pretty much guesswork, were at the beginning of the present let-up in fighting around 120 tanks in combat trim.

2. *Far East*: Japanese movement for the present appears to be all out-bound, supposedly moving southward. The Commander-in-Chief at Hong Kong is the only late news from the Far East also reports there are no signs evident of Japanese concentration on Hong Kong.

3. *Russia*: British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps is protesting to the Soviet Government on the very incomplete information given the British Military Mission in Russia. The Mission Chief, still in Kuibishev, is being given nothing more [5502] than official Red Army communiques.

ROYCE

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT. AT 8:45 A. M.
DECEMBER 2, 1941

From London: Filed 1:40 p. m.

Received in I. B.: 11:30 a. m. December 2, 1941 No. 1249

The following is the December 1st estimate by the War Office of Japanese dispositions:

Central China Army-----	8 Divs.—4, 3, 13, 6, 15, 22, 84, 40.
	Ind. Brigs.—11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20.
South China Army—Canton-----	3 Divs.—104, 48, 18.
Swatow-----	1 Ind. Brig.—19th.
Formosa Army-----	3 Div.—28, 116, one unidentified.
Hainan Army-----	1 Div. unidentified.
Indo-China Army (north)-----	1. Div.—Guards.
(south)-----	3 Divs.—5, 38, 88 (from Formosa).
Navy—	
Hainan-----	4 large cruisers.
Saigon-----	1 small submarine.

[5503] The 2nd and 3rd China fleets moving South made up of 4 heavy and 12 light cruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 52 destroyers, and 18 submarines.

Air Force Distribution:

Formosa-----	71 pursuit
	24 light bombers
	42 heavy bombers
	9 reconnaissance
	10 seaplanes

Total-----	156
South China and Hainan-----	103 pursuit
	100 light bombers
	129 heavy bombers
	14 seaplanes

Total-----	346
French Indo-China-----	64 pursuit
	58 light bombers
	55 heavy bombers
	9 reconnaissance

Total-----	186

[5504] Air Ministry's note as to Indo-China airforce states that 157 of these planes are in the south and the plane strength may be reinforced in the near future. The light bombardment planes seem to be equipped with extra gas tanks for distant reconnaissance.

ROYCE.

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT. AT 12:53 P. M.
DECEMBER 2, 1941

From Manila, P. I. Filed 11:29 a. m. December 1, 1941

Received in I. B. 4:05 p. m. December 2, 1941 No. 1038

A reliable American source reports that since November 10th, 6 Japanese Divisions (100,000 men) have landed at Haiphong. Also:

150 medium bombers
350 fighters
450 light tanks
50 medium tanks
200 75 mm. guns.

Source states figures taken from ship manifests.

Source states 6 Japanese Divisions on Formosa, and 3 light cruisers and 20 Japanese destroyers at Saigon.

ENGLEHART.

2080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[5505] G-2 Comment:

Doubtful that Japanese transports have manifests which could be checked as indicated. The troops reported disembarked at Haiphong (in this 20-day period) are almost three times the unloading capacity of the port (ONI estimate), although on November 25th the Consul at Hanoi stated that within the last few days troop landings had mounted to 4,000 a day. On November 29th, however, the Consul at Hanoi reported "past few days no great increase in number of Japanese troops." Consular reports from Saigon, on the other hand, since November 21st, have indicated heavy arrivals to include the end of the month. G-2 accepts this radiographic report with reserve, and believes that the bulk of this force about 80,000 may have been landed in Southern rather than Northern Indo-China. (With 25,000 in Northern Indo-China the total is about 105,000.) Estimated also that not more than 3 divisions are on Taiwan, 3 on Hainan, and 2 on transports located December 1, in Camranh Bay (N. E. of Saigon).

[5506]

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Intelligence, Division G-2

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Subject: Japanese Troop Movements.

1. The following information has just been received from the State Department:

a. Taingtao, Shantung Province, North China, December 1. In the past ten days an average of 3 loaded troop transports has left this port daily. The men are believed to be from the Yangtze Valley, as they wore summer uniforms, whereas all troops in this area are in winter uniforms. (Note: This is estimated to imply a movement of 15,000-30,000 men, that is, one or two divisions. It probably supplements to some extent the previous sea-borne movements reported.)

b. Canton, December 2. Large land troop movements continue through Canton. Estimated 8,500 men passed eastward through the city up to noon today. It is now believed that these movements are local and indicate operations to the north and east of Canton, rather than preparations for overseas movement. [5507]

2. It is recommended that the foregoing be *not* brought specifically to the attention of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. They are details of the general picture that is already known.

In the absence of Colonel Kramer.

(S) TJB
T. J. B.

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT. AT 4:29 P. M.
DECEMBER 6, 1941

From Singapore: Filed 5:13 p. m. December 5, 1941
Received in I. B.: 1:35 a. m. December 7, 1941 No. 96

Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due west, were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchant ships; these were seen at 106° 8' E., 8° N.; this was the first report.

The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers were seen following the same course at 106° 20' E., 7° 35' N.

Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force.

BRINK

G-2 Comment: It is G-2's opinion that these are the same convoys reported in ONI's December 6 from "C in C China" [5508] through "C in CAF."

SECRET

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement.

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from 10 to 30 ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.

[5509] I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field.

OCS/18136-125 10

[s] sgd
Secretary of War.

ART 411 (P COMINST, 1939)

Paraphrased versions of translations of *secret* messages may be prepared on the authority of the flag or commanding officer in cases where necessary. . . . They shall have the same classification as the original messages, and shall be safeguarded accordingly as prescribed by navy regulations. Their possession shall be vouched for by signed receipts retained by the communication officer, to whom they should be surrendered for destruction when no longer required.

NOTE: This is the only copy of this secret message being distributed in the Navy Department. When no longer required, it should be returned to the Navy Department Communication Officer, Room 2625, for destruction and return of receipt.

DEC. 6, 1941.

Received from the Navy Department Communication Officer one paraphrased copy of CINCAF dispatch (secret) with [5510] reference numbers 061255 CR 0151.

/s/ C. R. GARLING,
Maj. GSO.

Orig -----
Action -----
Cog ----- Army
Record Copy:
Delivered at 1710, by

/s/ H. S. HALL.
NAVCOM-15

[5511] Mr. GESELL. Now there is before each member of the committee a mimeographed statement of four pages in length entitled "Information from Documentary Evidence on Messages at pages 14-29 of Exhibit 2." These are the messages in the so-called set of military intercepts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that this paper?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; that is it. Exhibit 2 of the military intercepts at pages 14-29 are the various intercepts which were translated on the days of the 5th and 6th of December, and some of them translated subsequently.

The committee has expressed interest in what documentary information there is as to those various messages, as to when they were intercepted, when they were enciphered, when they were decoded, and when they were translated. The documentary material is summarized in this memorandum, which I think should also be spread upon the transcript at this point.

This is prepared along the lines of the memorandum which has already been submitted to the committee concerning the 14-part, 1 o'clock messages, and will facilitate subsequent testimony before the committee concerning these messages.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be spread upon the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

[5512] INFORMATION FROM DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON MESSAGES AT PP. 14-29 OF EXHIBIT 2

NOTE.—Information based on documents in Navy files indicated by "(N)"; information based on documents in Army files indicated by "(A)".

SIS 25817, dated 18 November, translated 6 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 14).

Intercepted at Army Station 2, San Francisco, 18 November (A). Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS on or before 21 November (A).

Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 3 December (A).

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25773, dated 18 November, translated 5 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15).

Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, 18 November (N & A).

Airmailed to Navy; received by Navy, 21 November (N).

Sent by Navy to Army SIS.

Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 3 December (A).

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25694, dated 20 November, translated 4 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15).

Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, [5513] 20 November (N).

Airmailed to Navy; received by Navy 24 November (N).

Sent by Navy to Army SIS.

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25823, dated 29 November, translated 5 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 29 November (N).

Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS, 1 December (A).

Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 1 December (A).

Decoded by Navy, 3 December (N).

Translated by Navy (N).

SIS 26351 (Part 1) and SIS 26352 (Part 2), dated 24 November, translated 16 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, pp. 16-17).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 25 November (A).

Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS, 26 November (A).

Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 16 December (A).

Decoded by Army SIS, 16 December (A).

Translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25880, dated 28 November, translated 8 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 18).

[5514] Intercepted by Navy Station 8, Bainbridge Island, 28 November (A).

Airmailed to Navy; received by Navy, 2 December (N).

Sent by Navy to Army SIS.

Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 7 December (A).

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25928, dated 28 November, translated 8 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 19).

Intercepted by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., 28 November (A).

Received by courier by Army SIS, 29 November (A).

Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 7 December (A).

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 26053, dated 1 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 20).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 2 December (N).

Airmailed to Army SIS, received by Army SIS, 4 December (A).

Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 4 December (A).

Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 8 December (N).

Decoded by Navy, 9 December (N).

Translated by Navy (N).

SIS 27065, dated 2 December, translated 30 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 21).

Decoded and translated by Army SIS. The translated [5515] message contains the notation: "This message was received here on December 23."

This decode and translation was based on a copy of the Japanese coded text received by Army SIS on 23 December, by airmail from Station 5, Hawaii (A). It had been mailed from Station 5 on or after 11 December (A). The files also contain a copy of the coded text, which is marked "dupe" ("duplicate") and therefore appears to have been received by Army SIS later than the airmailed copy noted above; the "dupe" copy is on a Mackay Radio (Honolulu office) form, and appears to have been the basis of the airmailed version forwarded by Station 5.*

SIS 26065, dated 3 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 21).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 4 December (N).

Airmailed to Army SIS (A).

Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 5 December (A).

Decoded by Navy, 8 December (N).

Translated by Navy (N).

[5516] *SIS 26145*, dated 3 December, translated 11 December, sent in code system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, pp. 22-24).

Intercepted by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., 3 December (N).

Received by Army SIS by courier.

Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 4 December (A).

Decoded and translated by Navy (N).

*A transmission of the message was intercepted by Navy Station 8, Bainbridge Island, at 1131 GMT on 2 December (N). This version, received by the Navy on 6 December by airmail, was badly garbled and was not further processed (N).

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SIS 26066, dated 3 December translated 10 December, sent in code system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 24).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 4 December (N).

Airmailed to Army SIS.

Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 5 December (A).

Decoded by Navy, 8 December (N).

Translated by Navy (N).

SIS 26161, dated, 4 December, translated 12 December, sent in code system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 25).

Intercepted at Army Station 2, San Francisco, 5 December (A).

Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS 8 December (A).

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 26029, dated 5 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 26).

Intercepted by Army station 2, San Francisco, 6 December (N).

Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS, 8 December (A).

Sent by Army SIS to Navy.

Decoded by Navy, 9 December (N).

Translated by Navy (N).

[5517] *SIS 26158*, dated 6 December, translated 12 December, sent in code system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 26).

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

This decode and translation was on the basis of a Japanese coded text received by Army SIS by radio from Army Station 5, Hawaii, apparently on 11 December. The files do not show whether the Japanese text was obtained by intercepting the transmission or from the commercial cable company (the date on which it was obtained is now shown).*

SIS 25877, dated 6 December, translated 8 December, sent in code system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, pp. 27-28).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0022 GMT, 7 December (7:22 p. m., Washington time, 6 December) (A).

Sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time sent by teletype. Another copy, sent by courier by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., was received by Army SIS not later than 7 December (time now shown), and is marked "dupe" (A), indicating that the teletype copy had arrived previously.

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

[5518] *SIS 25874*, dated 6 December, translated 8 December, sent in code system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 29).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0542 GMT, 7 December (12:42 a. m., 7 December, Washington time) (A).

Sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time sent by teletype. Another copy, sent by Station 2 by airmail, was received by Army SIS at 2:33 p. m., 8 December, and is marked "dupe" (A), indicating that the teletype copy had arrived previously.

Mr. GESELL. Now I come to the somewhat confused question of Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck. We have had a number of requests concerning his memoranda, and I will try, if I can, to make clear to the committee the present situation as to those memoranda.

There was first a request by Congressman Keefe, to which I have already referred, asking for memoranda dated December 1. Those were made available to him, and I believe were read into the record by him at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Just one. The other one was not.

Mr. GESELL. I believe there was one that was read, you are right, Congressman Murphy, and the other was not.

*The Army files also contain a copy intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, which was received by the Navy by airmail on 8 December (N), and sent by the Navy to Army SIS.

There was a request by Senator Ferguson for Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum read at the Joint Board meeting of November 8, which should be included among the documents relating to the [5519] November 5 joint memorandum, and we have obtained Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum of October 31, 1941, which I would like to introduce at this time and have spread upon the transcript in response to that request.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one dated October 31?

Mr. GESELL. October 31, 1941. That is before the members of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that the one I hold here, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. GESELL. I think so, Congressman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Dated October 31, 1941?

Mr. GESELL. That is the one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Which is headed "Memorandum by Doctor Hornbeck"?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it does not show to whom it was distributed?

Mr. GESELL. No. It was read at the Joint Board meeting.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. GESELL. The people attending that meeting appear in the other documentation. I think it is tied in. I think it was not addressed because he simply had it before him to read, apparently.

(The document referred to follows:)

[5520] MEMORANDUM BY DOCTOR HORNBECK OCTOBER 31, 1941

I believe that there is warrant for an opinion that for several days the Japanese have been see-sawing in an effort to come to a decision. While watching the situation in Europe and on the Atlantic, they have been putting additional troops at the rate of about "1,000 per day" and some equipment into Indo-China and have been carefully watching to see whether we say or do anything indicative of any determined objection on our part. They have been given no indication of any intention on our part to place any effective obstacle in the way of their continued penetration of Indo-China. It is my feeling that, in the absence of such indication, they have about made up their minds to go ahead more strongly. It is my further feeling that if such an indication were given by us now, the interjection of that indication might substantially influence the situation and cause the Japanese further to postpone coming to a decision.

Another line of action, not exclusive of the line above suggested, open to us is to rush aid, especially planes and pilots, with or without parallel action by the British, to the Chinese. This would, of course, involve a difficult decision and it is perhaps politically impracticable, but it is not physically impossible.

Another course open to us is—to do nothing.

I am convinced that it would be highly inadvisable politically to make to Chiang Kai-Shek any evasive, noncommittal [5521] or merely hortatory reply.

If we are not prepared and willing to follow one or the other or both of the first two courses outlined above, it would, in my opinion, be best that we at this moment preserve silence.

If we do not follow one or the other or both of those courses, we should expect to see the situation in the Far East deteriorate rapidly. If we will follow one or the other or both of those courses there is a chance that Japan will continue to hesitate and that Chinese resistance will continue, temporarily at least, at its present level of defensive effectiveness.

That there is risk in making firm representations to the Japanese no one can deny or should try to deny, but that there is greater risk in not making such

representations I for one am and long have been convinced. By taking the risk which such action would entail, we at least have the chance of further restraining Japan. By not taking that risk we would permit it to become almost a certainty that Japan will strike hard at the Chinese and Chinese power to resist (to say nothing of morale) will be substantially diminished.

If, having taken the risk, we should find armed hostilities between Japan and ourselves thrust upon us, there would then exist a situation than which a good many other conceivable situations might be worse.

[5522] With Japan as comparatively weak as she is today and with this country as comparatively strong as it is today, we need not fear unduly the military outcome—or even the immediate consequences—of such a conflict. This country is physically capable now of waging a properly conducted war with Japan and at the same time carrying on in the Atlantic all operations which it would be advantageous for us to make our business up to such time as production of materials on our part may make it practicable for the British, with or without us as associates in war, to take the offensive in the struggle with Germany.

Mr. GESELL. Now there was also a request made by Senator Ferguson for certain specific memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck bearing various dates. One of those was for any memorandum dated November 27, 1941.

That memorandum of Dr. Hornbeck has been located by the Department of State. It is dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations." When it was found in the files there were attached to it two subsequent memoranda, apparently provoked by some reference to this memorandum that appeared in Mr. Drew Pearson's column. Accordingly, we have had reproduced all of the memoranda, not only Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum of November 27, but his subsequent comments on it. That is the document the top page of which is dated November 2, [5523] 1944, memorandum of Dr. Hornbeck to the Special Assistant to the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we have that?

Mr. GESELL. That is before the members of the committee. I ask that all of these memoranda be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[In handwriting:] Not to be removed from file except with permission of Chief.
(Signature illegible.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

NOVEMBER 2, 1944.

The memorandum at the bottom of this file, a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, dated November 27, 1941, entitled "problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities," indexed as 711.94/2512 PS/GD., Confidential File, is a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation.

For purposes of the record there is now being superimposed a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, of date February 28, 1944, in which certain pertinent facts are stated and an analysis is made of the contents and true purport of the memorandum of November 27, 1941.

(s) SKH

SA/H;SkH:MZS

[5524] FEBRUARY 28, 1944.

On Sunday evening, February 20, Mr. Drew Pearson made in his radio broadcast certain statements regarding Mr. Stanley Hornbeck. Among these, as reported to Mr. Hornbeck on February 21 by the State Department's recorder,

was a statement that: "On November 22, 1941 Hornbeck drafted a memorandum stating Japan would not attack this country. Just fifteen days later she did attack Pearl Harbor."

On February 27, Mr. Pearson made in his column of that day certain statements regarding Mr. Hornbeck. There, *inter alia*, he stated that: "* * * on November 22, 1941, just 15 days before Pearl Harbor, he wrote an important memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan never would attack the United States."

Such charges warrant attention. What are the facts?

Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22, 1941 any memorandum of estimate or prediction. He did on November 27 write a memorandum giving an estimate of "probabilities." Knowledge of the existence of such a memorandum was at some time before the end of August 1942 imparted by someone who had knowledge thereof to some member or members of the press. There appeared in a Washington newspaper in August 1942 under the dateline "By United Press" an article purporting to compare the record of prophecy of Mr. Grew with that of Mr. Hornbeck—unfavorable to the latter. In the course of that article there was given an account of "Hornbeck's 5-1 odds," as follows:

"In contrast to that record (citations of occasions on which Mr. Grew had advised the United States to guard against a possible surprise attack) was the viewpoint of the State Department adviser on political relations, Stanley Kuhl Hornbeck. Hornbeck was of the opinion, even after the truculent statements of Japan's two ambassadors, Kichisaburo Nomura and Sabusu Kurusu, that Japan was bluffing.

"Hornbeck's idea was that Japan would not dare attack the United States, that it was bogged down in China and that the most that need be feared was an intensified campaign against the Burma Road.

"In mid-November, Hornbeck told consultants that if the situation was viewed as a gambling proposition the odds should be 5 to 1 that the United States and Japan would still be at peace a month later. He said it was even money that the United States and Japan would not be at war some months later."

The contents of that story indicate that there was a "leak," with apparently prejudicial purpose, somewhere and at some time antedating the moment of the publication of the UP article under reference. It may be presumed that Mr. Pearson [5526] has had knowledge of that article or has been told by someone somewhere a story identical with or similar to the story on which the statements in that article were based.

Now what are the facts regarding a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck is alleged to have written to the Secretary of State on November 22?

To begin with, Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22 *any* memorandum of the type indicated. With regard to a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck did write (on November 27), see *infra*.

Mr. Hornbeck had over the years frequently advanced the view that the United States and Japan were moving toward an armed collision and that, unless Japan changed her course or was deflected or brought to a standstill by an encounter with some other country, such a collision was bound some day to occur. During the "exploratory conversation" of the year 1941, Mr. Hornbeck took the position that the only "peaceful settlement" which Japan was seeking was a settlement on her own terms wherein she might have the assent of the United States to her program of conquest in the Far East. By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that month, the British Government and the American Government served on Japan a strong warning against further extending of her courses of aggression. From then on it was generally recognized that Japan might embark on acts of [5527] force against Great Britain or the United States or both. Officers of the Department of State were in constant touch with officers of Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, exchanging factual data and discussing the possibilities of the situation.

On September 3, in the light of all information at that time available to him, Mr. Hornbeck expressed an opinion that Japan would not attack the United States within the next three months.

On November 3, Mr. Hornbeck advised that the last remaining United States landed armed forces in China be promptly withdrawn.

On November 20, Messrs. Nomura and Kurusu presented to the Secretary of State the last of various proposals advanced by the Japanese Government or agents thereof during 1941 or an agreement between Japan and the United States. Six days later, on November 26, the Secretary of State gave to Messrs.

Nomura and Kurusu papers which became the last of the statements of counter-proposal made by the American Government during the course of the "exploratory conversations" which had been going on for several months.

On the next day, November 27, Mr. Hornbeck wrote an informal memorandum entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of Situation and Certain Probabilities." That memorandum began with a statement, "The Japanese Government has [5528] made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations." He then stated that Mr. Kurusu's mission had had two principal objectives, and that Mr. Kurusu had achieved neither of those objectives. He then moved into the field of "forming conclusions as to what is probable". He stated that in his opinion, "The Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify their operations toward 'bringing China to her knees'"; he expressed the opinion that, "The Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have *forthwith* armed conflict with the United States"; and he said that, "were it a matter of placing bets", he would give odds of 5 to 1 that the United States and Japan would *not* be at "war" on or before December 15, he would wager 3 to 1 that the United States and Japan would not be at "war" on or before the 15th of January, and he would wager even money that the United States and Japan would not be at "war" on or before March 1. "Stated briefly", he said, "the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate verge of 'war' in the Pacific." Continuing, he said: "The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both." And, in conclusion, he said: "There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards [5529] the interests of the United States, by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of 'concessions' by us in return for 'pledges' (qualified and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at *war* in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific. The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington."

Examination of the whole content of the memorandum of November 27, 1941 shows that its author was offering not a long-range forecast but an estimate of situation in terms of short-range *probabilities*; that he nowhere suggested that Japan would not (or that she "would never") attack the United States; that, although he was of the opinion that the Japanese Government was not intending "to have armed conflict *forthwith* with the United States", he clearly perceived—and so indicated, as he had done many times before—that the situation was rapidly moving toward such conflict. In suggesting odds of 5-to-1 against "war" within the next *three* [5530] *weeks*, at 3-to-1 against "war" within the next *seven weeks*, and at 1-to-1 against "war" within the next fourteen weeks; in affirming that within that period "there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic"; and in refraining from even a tentative prognostication *beyond* that period, he implied that he considered that the sands were fast running out. In stating, in conclusion: "The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington", he both admitted and affirmed that in the situation then prevailing in American-Japanese relations almost anything *might* before long happen.

All this is a far cry from the purport of the charge that "On November 22 (*sic*), 1941, just fifteen days before Pearl Harbor he (Hornbeck) wrote an important memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan would never attack the United States."

Especially to be noted regarding this whole matter is the fact that Mr. Hornbeck's memorandum under reference was written not on November 22 (which was during the period while the question of reply to be made to the Japanese proposals of November 20 was under consideration) but on November 27 (which was after the American Government had reached its [5531] decision and the Secretary of State had—on November 26—made this Government's reply).

(NOTE.—The memorandum of November 27, 1941 is in the confidential files of the Department of State under index number 711.94/2512.)

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

PROBLEM OF FAR EASTERN RELATIONS—ESTIMATE OF SITUATION AND CERTAIN PROBABILITIES

The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations.

Mr. Kurusu's mission has had two principal objectives: (1) to obtain, if possible, from the United States, terms of agreement favorable to Japan; (2) to ascertain, if possible, what action, positive or negative, the United States might, may or will take in the event of certain moves by Japan.

The American Government has now given clear indication that it has no intention of making "concessions" to Japan which would be inconsistent with the declared principles and the general objectives of American foreign policy and that it does not intend to condone or give countenance to policies and practice, past and present and future, or ag- [5532] gression on Japan's part.

(Handwritten note): Tallied to PA/H on Dec. 4, 1941 and returned to file on November 8, 1944. (Signature illegible).

Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the first objective of his mission.

The Japanese Government has given, during the course of the "exploratory conversations", clear evidence that it is not that Government's intention at the present time to disassociate Japan from the Tripartite Alliance; or to give up its objective of conquering China, conquering other regions in the Far East, and establishing a "new order" and a "co-prosperity sphere" in eastern Asia and the western and southern Pacific. It has persevered in distribution and disposal of its armed forces on a pattern clearly designed for offensive rather than merely defensive operations. It has shown that it clearly intends to persevere in pursuit of its general and its particular objectives by the methods of threat of force or use of force—which means continuance of contribution to instability rather than stability of situation in the Pacific and eastern Asia.

The United States has not shown what action it will take on the positive side in the event of Japan's taking one or another of several possible steps. Mr. Kurusu may have gained certain impressions, but he cannot be sure. Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the second major objective of his mission.

The business of prophesying involves a procedure of [5533] examining facts and, as among various developments conceived to be possible, forming conclusions as to what is probable.

A prophecy is an expression by an individual or a group of individuals of an opinion as to what is going to happen.

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify their operations toward "bringing China to her knees". They have hoped that out of the conversations with the American Government they would extract something which would facilitate their effort toward that objective. Even now, they have not entirely abandoned hope of getting from us either positive or negative action helpful to them in pursuit of that objective.

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have *forthwith* armed conflict with the United States. The Japanese Government, while launching new offensive operations at some point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked by the United States. It therefore will not order or encourage action by its agents (foremost among which are its armed forces) which, if taken, would lead toward use by the United States of armed force by way of retaliation or resistance. So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are concerned [5534] there is less reason today than there was a week ago for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make "war" on this country. Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before December 15 (the date by which General Gerow has affirmed that he would be "in the clear" so far as consummation of certain disposals of our forces is concerned); would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before the 15th of January (i. e., 7 weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before March 1 (a date more than 90 days from now, and after the period during which it has been estimated by our strategists that it would be to our advantage for us to have "time" for further preparation and disposals). These ventures into the field of speculative prediction are posited on an assumption that our definition of "war"

must be the same in reference to activities and events in the Pacific that it is in regard to activities and events in the Atlantic; the indicated wagers are offered on an assumption that, although there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic, there will not be a recognized "state of war" such as to disrupt substantially or put an end to the present program of our Army and Navy for disposal [5535] within the periods mentioned of equipment and men for "defensive" and general purposes—Stated briefly, the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate verge of "war" in the Pacific.

Japan has her disposals so made that she might now move against Russia or move against the Dutch East Indies or move against Thailand or launch some new operations in and against China. *But*, a move against Russia would be a major operation involving very substantial hazards for Japan; and it would be a move from which, once begun, it would be hard for Japan to withdraw. A move by Japan against the Dutch East Indies would involve for Japan a risk of armed embroilment with Great Britain and possibly the United States; it would involve a risk of developing into a major operation.

A move by Japan now against Thailand would be a move which need not require great effort or involve great risk; if made, it would have a twofold objective, on the one hand and exploration of British and American reaction, and on the other hand a possible gaining of advantageous position in connection with and for operations against the Burma Road and therefore toward bringing closer to an end the "China incident". A move on Japan's part via Indochina into Yunnan and toward putting the Burma Road out of commission (especially by continuous air attack) would involve little risk of embroilment with Great Britain or the United States, [5536] would not necessarily involve a major effort, and could be halted or be withdrawn from at any time should developments in the general situation render such action advisable in the opinion of Japan's military leaders.

The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both.

If, when and as Japan makes either or both of those moves, Japan will ipso facto be further disclosing what are her political and military policies and will be further extending herself as regards military disposals and effort and as regards burden and draft upon her national capacity (economic, social, political and military); she will be weakening her position in the event of there coming, later, armed conflict between herself and the United States; she will be exposing herself to naval and air attack on flank and from rear, if and when, by the United States; and she will be adding to the number of her enemies and the weight of a public opinion adverse to her in the United States and the British Empire.

There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the United States by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms [5537] of "concessions" by us in return for "pledges" (qualified and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific.

The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington.

/s/ SKH

PA/H: SKH: FLB

Mr. GESELL. Now there was also a request made and an interest expressed in memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck relating to the question of the basing of the fleet. We have now in hand three memoranda which seem to have some relation to that subject.

The first is a memorandum dated July 12, 1940, which contains a handwritten note on the front page with the initials of Captain Schuirmann and Admiral Stark saying:

Hornbeck is anxious to have you read this. The high ranking officer [5358] mentioned is Admiral Richardson.

I think the paper is slightly academic.

That memorandum apparently refers to a conversation between Admiral Richardson and Dr. Hornbeck of July 11, 1940. I would like to have it marked as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. May we get that exhibit number?

Mr. GESELL. Number 95.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 95.")

Mr. GESELL. The next is a very substantial document of 50-some pages in length, which is before the members of the committee, bearing the date July 16, 1940, the second sheet of which gives the title of the memorandum as follows: "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and Certain Problems of U. S. Far Eastern Policy. July 4, 1940."

I would like to call the committee's attention to the fact that from page 7 to page 15 is a detailed discussion of the question of the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. We have reproduced the entire memorandum feeling we should not take any portion of it out of context. This memorandum is not signed by Dr. Hornbeck but we believe it is Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum, since in the Navy Department files it appears with his other memoranda and, as best can be told from surrounding circumstances, it is in his style.

[5539] The CHAIRMAN. What do you want to do with it?

Mr. GESELL. That will be Exhibit 96, Senator, if you please.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 96.")

Mr. GESELL. Now I have here a series of memoranda of which the top one is dated September 21, 1940, prepared by Dr. Hornbeck and made available by the Department of State, also relating to the question of the fleet dispositions, which we will have marked Exhibit 97.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 97.")

Mr. GESELL. Now, in addition, there are a number of Hornbeck memoranda which relate to other topics bearing various dates, December 1940, November 20, 1941, May 20, 1941, November 30, 1941, and others as well, obtained from the Navy files or Army files and State Department files.

These memoranda we have bunched together and are sending to Congressman Keefe in response to his request for all memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck. I believe that the ones we have here cover the matters in which the committee has expressed particular interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have that memorandum before us in this file?

[5540] Mr. GESELL. You have all the ones we introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean the one you sent to Congressman Keefe.

Mr. GESELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not let us all have that?

Mr. GESELL. We thought perhaps he would send those around. We will try to reproduce them, if you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought maybe you had them here.

Mr. GESELL. No, we haven't any copies. We have not been able to find anything in them that is pertinent, but perhaps they may be of background value.

The CHAIRMAN. We will see how that will work out after you pass them out.

Mr. GESELL. Now our attention was called to a matter which we felt we should immediately bring to the committee's attention.

The committee will recall that the G-2 estimates were introduced when General Miles was on the stand in the pink volume designated Exhibit 33. Among those was an estimate dated October 2, 1941. Examination of the memorandum in its photostatic form—that was the memorandum to the Chief of Staff, October 2, 1941, subject: Japanese-American Relations, signed by Hayes A. Kroner, Colonel, General Staff—discloses there is written on a copy, which is apparently the copy distributed to Secretary Stimson, a note in his handwriting, [5541] and in order to make the record complete I would like to read that note into the record now, and offer the photostat of that particular memorandum as a related exhibit to exhibit 33, that is, Exhibit 33-A.

The note reads:

Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them strongly. I believe, however, that during the next three months while we are re-arming the Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an explosion by the Japanese army. Put concretely this means that while I approve of stringing out negotiations during that period, they should not be allowed to ripen into a personal conference between the President and P. M.—

I think that means Prime Minister and not a New York newspaper.

I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held would produce concessions which would be highly dangerous to our vitally important relations with China.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 33-A.")

Senator LUCAS. Who was responsible for that memorandum?

Mr. GESELL. Col. Hayes A. Kroner, who was General Miles' chief assistant, and Secretary Stimson wrote what I have just read.

The CHAIRMAN. That handwriting is the handwriting of Secretary Stimson and not Colonel Kroner?

[5542] Mr. GESELL. That is right. It is on his copy which was distributed to him. He was one of the distributees.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I try to get this straight a moment? This is the memorandum that came out of the Secretary of War's files?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And you found that note written only on his paper?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not in any of the other papers in other files?

Mr. GESELL. That is right, Senator. So that the record is clear on it we offer the actual document with his handwriting in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that printed or made an exhibit?

Mr. GESELL. Made an exhibit. I read the portion that we want in the record. Copies of that are before each member of the committee. You will find one among your set.

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel undertake to say it is in the handwriting of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson?

Mr. GESELL. Yes. As Exhibit 48-A, simply to complete the documentation, I would like to introduce the memorandum from the Chief

of Staff to General Gerow concerning the subject matter of exhibit 48 which General Marshall made [5543] available after his testimony. It is of no particular importance, but simply fills out the documentation.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 48-A.")

[5544] Mr. GESELL. Also, we would like to offer as the next exhibit, Exhibit 98, a memorandum from the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, to the President, dated November 26, 1941, concerning the Japanese convoy movements toward Indochina.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have that?

Mr. GESELL. Yes. That is before the members of the committee. (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 98.")

Mr. GESELL. Now, there has been distributed to the committee, but we noted that we have failed to introduce it as an exhibit, a mimeographed statement of two pages entitled "Telephone calls from outside through White House switchboard on 11/25-26, 11/27, and 11/28/41 as compiled from operators' notes available." I think it might be well to have that memorandum spread upon the transcript so it becomes a matter of record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

[5545] TELEPHONE CALLS MADE FROM OUTSIDE THROUGH WHITE HOUSE SWITCHBOARD ON 11/25, 11/26, 11/27, AND 11/28/41 AS COMPILED FROM OPERATOR'S NOTES AVAILABLE

Nov. 25.

730A VP Wallace cld Secy Wickard—OK.
854A AG cld VP Wallace—LWC—OK 940A.
930A Judge Patterson cld Robert Lovett—OK.
1050A Judge Patterson cld McCloy—O of C—OK.
1045A Secy Ickes cld AG—LWC—OK 1130A
11AM Mr. Stettinius cld Jesse Jones—OK.
1205P Jesse Jones cld PMG—OK.
1215P Mr. Blandford cld Secy Wickard—OK.
1227P PMG cld Secy Hull—LWC—OK 330P
1245P Secy Wickard cld Mr. Blandford—OK.
1254P Mr. Blandford cld Wickard—OK.
100P Secy Jones cld Mr. Knudsen—at Lunch—N M.
154P Ad'm. Stark cld Gen. Marshall—LWC.
259P Mr. Stettinius cld Gen. Marshall—LWC.
345P Gen. Marshall cld Ed. Stettinius—OK.
405P PMG cld Secy Hull—OK.
415P Secy Knox cld PMG—OK.
420P General Marshall—cld Ad'm. Stark—OK.
425P Secy Stimson cld Secy State Hull—OK.
500P Ad'm. Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
510P General Marshall cld Ed. Stettinius—OK.
[5546] 510P James Forrestal cld Secy Stimson—Talked Judge Patterson—OK
515P James Forrestal cld Knudsen—OK.
520P Wayne Coy cld Judge Patterson—PP—OK.
530P PMG cld Secy Hull—LWC—530P OK.

Nov. 26.

707A Secy Stimson cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
915A Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
950A Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
1022A Mr. Forrestal cld Donald Nelson—OK.
1025A Mr. Forrestal cld Leon Henderson—OK.
1030A Mr. Forrestal cld Judge Patterson—OK.
1030A Ad'm. Stark cld. General Marshall, Miss Thomas talked—OK.
115P Secy Hull cld Ad'm. Stark—OK.

2094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

125P Ad'm. Stark cld General Marshall—NM.
 159P Secy Perkins cld Wells—LWC.
 235P Ad'm Stark cld Secy Hull—OK 345P
 253P Gov'r. McNutt cld Secy Stimson—OK.
 508P Secy Welles cld Secy Perkins—OK.
 530P James Forrestal cld Judge Patterson—OK.
 615P Ad'm Stark cld Secy Knox—OK.
 Nov. 27.
 852A Mr. Forrestal cld Sumner Welles—LWC—RTD Call 954A.
 853A Mr. Forrestal cld Secy Morgenthau—LWC—OK 11AM.
 [5547] 917A Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
 1025A James Forrestal cld Secy Welles—OK.
 1044A Secy Knox cld Ad'm. Stark—OK.
 1045A Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—LWC—11 AM OK.
 1048A Ad'm. Stark cld Secy Hull—LWC—OK 11A.
 1135A Secy Morgenthau cld Ben. Cohen—OK.
 1230P James Forrestal cld Jesse Jones—OK.
 1240P Judge Patterson cld Wayne Coy—LWC.
 302P Wayne Coy cld Mr. Stettinius—OK.
 337P Judge Patterson cld Mr. Forrestal—LWC.
 350P Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
 410P Jesse Jones cld James Forrestal—LWC.
 500P Secy Hull cld Ad'm. Stark—LWC—O of C, Capt. Sherman talked—OK.
 530P James Forrestal cld Judge Patterson—OK.
 545P James Forrestal cld Jesse Jones—OK.
 842P J. Rowe cld Miss McDonough—LWC—Mr. Rowe WCAM.
 900P Jesse Jones cld Secy Hull—OK.
 901P Jesse Jones cld AG—OK.
 Nov. 28.
 839A Ad'm. Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
 900A Judge Patterson cld Robert Lovett—OK.
 1032A Ag cld VP.—OK.
 1058A Jesse Jones cld Knudsen—OK.
 1129A Jesse Jones cld James Forrestal—OK.
 [5548] 1150A Judge Patterson cld Wayne Coy—LWC.
 1230P James Forrestal cld Don Nelson—
 1245P Secy Welles cld Ad'm. Stark—in Conf—NM.
 207P VP cld Secy Morgenthau—OK.
 217P VP cld Nelson Rockefeller—LWC.
 249P Ad'm. Stark cld Secy Hull—Talked to Mr. Stone—OK.
 411P Wayne Coy cld Dir. Smith—OK.
 525P Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—Talked with Hornbeck—OK.
 525P Secy Stimson cld Secy Knox—OK.

[5549] Mr. GESELL. In order to complete the documentation as we go along on the events of the 6th and 7th we would like also to introduce and have designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 99, a memorandum prepared by Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Hamilton, Department of State, dated September 26, 1944, stating their then recollection of what took place in Secretary Hull's office on December 7 concerning the Japanese intercepted messages. That has already been distributed to the committee at an earlier date.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 99.")

Mr. GESELL. It may be helpful to have it set forth in the transcript, for the convenience of the committee. It is a short memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be copied in the transcript.

(Exhibit No. 99 follows:)

[5550]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
 OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
 September 26, 1944.

Top Secret

There is attached a page from the *Congressional Record* of September 21, 1944, in which there is a statement by Congressman Church in respect to the delivery of

a message to the State Department on December 7, 1941, by Lieutenant Commander Kramer of the Navy Department.

Our recollection of the matter is as follows: At about 10 a. m. on December 7 Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ballantine came to the outer office of the Secretary of State to discuss the general situation of relations with Japan. They were shown by Mr. John Stone, a Foreign Service officer then serving as an assistant in the office of the Secretary, a document the contents of which were pertinent to the subject of what they were going to discuss with the Secretary and which had then been delivered to the outer office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, then on duty in the Navy Department. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was present in the room. The document contained no reference to any Japanese military movement. Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ballantine are positive that no statement was made in their presence by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, as alleged, to the [5551] effect that "this looks like a sunrise attack upon Pearl Harbor and a midnight attack upon the Philippines."

The conversation in the Secretary's outer office was intermittent and scattered among those present in the room. In other words, each person was not a party to all of the conversation. Mr. Hornbeck has a distinct impression that there was brought up Japanese naval disposition with specific mention of most recent advices of Japanese naval movements in the Gulf of Siam.

Mr. Hamilton recollects also that Lieutenant Commander Kramer remarked on that occasion, in reference to the matter of an appointment for the Japanese Ambassador to see the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on December 7, that the naming of the hour might mean that it was the hour for some Japanese movement. No mention was made of Pearl Harbor or of Hawaii or of the Philippines.

With regard to the statement that Lieutenant Commander Kramer then went to the White House and delivered the message, they have no knowledge whether this was a fact.

/s/ JWB.

FE: Ballantine: HST

/s/ M. M. H.

[5552] Mr. GESELL. Now, there is also a committee request for copies of the interrogation made by intelligence officers of the Japanese prisoner of war No. 1, a Japanese officer in charge of the midget submarine taken prisoner at Bellows Field December 8, 1941. We have made copies of that available to each member of the committee. This document was previously used as exhibit 68 in the Hewitt investigation. I would like to have it designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 100. Copies of it are available to the members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 100.")

Mr. GESELL. Also to make the record complete we have the question of the logs of the U. S. S. *Enterprise* and U. S. S. *Lexington*. Those logs were made available to Congressman Keefe and used by him in questioning Admiral Turner, I believe. We subsequently obtained them back and had them photostated. I think we would like at this time to introduce as Exhibit 101 a duplicate copy of the log of the U. S. S. *Enterprise* covering the period November 24, 1941, to December 16, 1941, and as Exhibit 102 a duplicate copy of the log of the U. S. S. *Lexington* covering the period of December 5, 1941, through December 8, 1941, and Exhibit 103 a duplicate copy of the action reports of the air group of the U. S. S. *Enterprise*, Serial No. 579 of December 15, 1941, and as Exhibit 104 a duplicate copy of the war diary [5553] of the U. S. S. *Lexington* for December 7, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 101, 102, 103, and 104, respectively.)

Mr. GESELL. The Navy Department has advised that according to the Office of Naval Records and Library there are no action reports

of the U. S. S. *Enterprise* and the U. S. S. *Lexington* previous to February 1942.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question on that last?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Is there anything in those exhibits which bears directly on things that the committee ought to know?

Mr. GESELL. Those exhibits cover the activities of the *Enterprise*, for example, in the period immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. They establish the time when the planes were launched from the *Enterprise*, which subsequently became engaged in combat with the Japs over Pearl Harbor. They will undoubtedly be useful to the committee when Admiral Halsey, who was in command of the *Enterprise* and who is on the list of witnesses, is a witness. I think they are useful background information.

Now, we have obtained clearance from the British for the so-called British estimates, and I would like to introduce that as the next exhibit, Exhibit 105, dated October 21, 1941, and [5554] November 21, 1941, respectively. They are before the members of the committee. I introduce them as one exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be what number?

Mr. GESELL. No. 105, Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 105.")

Mr. GESELL. I think that completes the partial report on the committee's requests for various material. In connection with some of the requests, we are going to be in a position to distribute in the next day or so material in response to those requests.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks the counsel for their diligence in making the interim report on the various requests made.

Are you ready now to proceed?

Mr. MITCHELL. We are ready to call Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stark.

[5555] **TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES NAVY¹**

(Admiral Stark was first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Stark, what is your present rank and station?

Admiral STARK. Admiral, United States Navy. I am on terminal leave.

Mr. MITCHELL. You served as Chief of Naval Operations from August 1, 1939, until March 25, 1942?

Admiral STARK. I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understand that you have a statement you would like to present to the committee at this time. Is that right?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Before you refer to the statement, I would like to offer in evidence as Exhibit 106 a file, which the committee has, giving Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Kimmel's replies.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 106.")

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral, if you will present your statement.

¹ See suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Adm. Stark in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2671 et seq.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me a moment, please, General Mitchell. It is noted here on the receipt to be signed for [5556] this document, "Please hand the bearer for delivery volume entitled 'H. R. Stark letters to Admiral H. E. Kimmel' which is superseded by the volume referred to above." It is understood that this covers all correspondence between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. MITCHELL. All papers that they were asked to surrender. That came about this way: The letter was written by Admiral Stark at one time and was replied to by Admiral Kimmel at another time, so we just put them together in one volume in chronological order.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sure the committee appreciates that very valuable assistance given by the counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. This does not contain all the correspondence between them, because they had some letters that were personal, that had no relation to the case. These are the letters that both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel agree, as I understand it, are the ones to be brought to the attention of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My purpose of inquiring was to know whether I could disregard the previous copies that were furnished and consider that this contains everything that is pertinent to this inquiry, as to the letters passing between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct, sir.

[5557] Senator FERGUSON. May I make an inquiry in order to straighten out a matter that is in my mind? Are there any new letters in this volume that are not in the two previous volumes?

Mr. GESELL. I think there are one or two new letters in there. In the main, they cover the material in the other two documents.

Senator FERGUSON. Sometime will counsel point out what the new ones are?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; we will do that after the recess.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand now, counsel for Admiral Stark and counsel for Admiral Kimmel agree that these are the letters that are pertinent and material to the inquiry?

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is the understanding.

Admiral, will you proceed with your statement, please?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I should like to ask the indulgence of the committee. This statement is rather long and there are a good many parts in it that have already appeared in the testimony, some of which I will not read, with the committee's permission.

Also it was made, with the exception of possibly four words which have been deleted, before any of the hearings before this committee.

In other words, this statement has been influenced not [5558] at all by what came out before this committee. It is the picture as I wanted to present it at this time, not knowing whether I would be the first witness or the last.

The CHAIRMAN. You will indicate, Admiral, such parts, when you read them in your statement, that you will leave out?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But the whole document will go in as your statement.

[5559] Admiral STARK (reading):

1. I served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1 August 1939 until 25 March 1942. During that time the position of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and that of Commander in Chief, United States

Fleet (CINCUS), were not combined, but were separate. The Commanders in Chief, United States Fleet, during the period from 1 August 1939 to 7 December 1941, were Admiral Claude C. Bloch (29 January 1938 to 6 January 1940), Admiral James O. Richardson (6 January 1940 to 1 February 1941), and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (1 February 1941 to 17 December 1941).

2. Navy Regulations, made pursuant to an act of Congress, charge the Chief of Naval Operations, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the general direction of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.

3. When I became Chief of Naval Operations, the situation in Europe was tense, and war broke out early in September. The President immediately (5 September 1939) proclaimed the neutrality of the United States and declared the existence of a national emergency (8 September 1939). He also authorized an increase in the enlisted strength of the Navy and Marine Corps to 145,000 and 25,000, respectively.

[5560]

DUTY TO PRESENT NAVY'S NEEDS TO CONGRESS

4. In November 1939, I appeared before the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee for the funds necessary to bring enlisted strength of the Navy and Marine Corps up to the numbers authorized by the President. The Department was also asking for funds to recommission 80 ships, including 68 destroyers and supporting units, to safeguard our neutrality. I pointed out that in spite of the Navy's feeling that our ships should always be 100 percent manned, we had been getting along for years with allowances which were only 85 percent of complement. The additional men for which funds were requested immediately were only enough to enable us to man the recommissioned ships and increase the allowances on all ships to an average of just over 89 percent. I told the Committee that it was essential that the fleet be at least 100 percent manned. I felt it highly desirable that we be 15 percent overmanned in order to provide a seagoing reservoir to assist in the manning of ships going into commission—both old and new. At that time, however, the Bureau of the Budget permitted us to request only sufficient increases in manpower to put new ships in commission and to maintain our allowances at about 90 percent of complement. In this connection, I told the Committee that the Department expected to ask for funds for enough men in the next regular appropriation bill to bring the fleet up to 100 percent of complement.

[5561] 5. In January 1940 I appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee in support of an increase of 25 percent in the size of the Navy. I would like to read an extract from the statement I made at that time:

The international situation has altered substantially. World conditions today presage a greater menace to our peace than was the case a year ago. The events which have taken place since then are so fresh in the mind of everyone that I do not need to detail them. I believe everyone will agree that the international situation has deteriorated and that there is no immediate prospect that it will improve. The situation is rife with possibilities of a general European war and, in conjunction with Far Eastern conditions, presents a threat of world conflagration.

In the world of today it seems only a fair and moderate statement to say that the best interests of our Nation will be served by keeping our own force sufficiently strong to be an effective deterrent against foreign aggression.

Although the building programs of other naval powers are not definitely known, and in some cases not even approximately known, it is a reasonable supposition that those nations now at war are building to the maximum augmented war-time capacity of their shipbuilding industries. All other considerations aside, if the United States does not take [5562] immediate action toward increasing the strength of its fleet, the end of the present war will find us in a relatively weak naval position.

Therefore, it is my considered opinion, as I believe it will be that of the great majority of our people, when the significance of the situation is understood, that a substantial expansion, approximately 25 percent, of our Navy should be planned and undertaken at once.

6. The bill, as passed by the House, provided only an 11 percent increase, and although I pressed the Senate Committee in April 1940 to restore the provision for a 25 percent increase, the bill as finally approved carried only 11 percent. While the result was not what we wanted, it did not substantially hamper our development, for it allowed us all we could start work on at that time with the facilities then available to us.

7. In May 1940, we asked Congress to authorize us to acquire as many planes as might be necessary to maintain the stock of useful naval planes at not less than 10,000. As a part of our request for a 25 percent increase in the Navy as a whole, we asked that the authorized number of naval aircraft be increased from 3,000 to 6,000. After that program was submitted, the international situation became much worse, and it was apparent that we would need even more naval aircraft. In presenting the program for 10,000 planes to the House and Senate [5563] Naval Affairs Committee, I said:

We have in the world today classic examples of the lack of preparedness and readiness which are being borne home to every thinking man and woman.

The importance of time, which I stressed when last before this committee and which every student of war appreciates, has also been brought home to us, as it has to those in their life and death struggle, and where in some cases there has already been written "too late".

We have been prone to criticize others, feeling that somehow or other we have been sitting over here in comparative security. That feeling, too, has been given some rude jolts in recent weeks and I believe that wishful thinking is finally being replaced by consideration of cold facts and the necessity that we ourselves take immediate steps toward greater preparedness in order that we too may not some day write "too late". The word "speed" has taken on new significance.

* * * * *

We can put our trust only in ourselves and it is self-evident we must be strong, both within and without, to have any real sense of security.

Nations desiring peace must be stronger than those desiring war.

[5564]

* * * The need for immediate and expedited rearmament has become more apparent. The handicap to a Navy engaged in continuous war operations at sea, of an inadequate naval air arm, has received, and continues to receive, tragic demonstration. The indispensability of naval aircraft constructed for, trained for, and organized for prompt and continuous action at sea with ships, and against ships and aircraft has challenged the attention of all.

* * * * *

The number of aircraft provided in this bill is adjusted to the initial war needs as they can be estimated at this time. Such a number is not obtainable in the immediate future unless available construction capacity is quickly and drastically expanded. Aviation expansion can only be accomplished by large appropriations, appropriations for procurement of aircraft, appropriations for

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aircraft facilities, and appropriations for increases in aircraft personnel and for their training.

* * * If we really wish to face at this time the needs of the future, as now indicated—authorization and appropriation must contemplate a greatly expanded aircraft procurement program, the establishment of facilities, and a [5565] personnel program that will provide before the event of war, not less than the naval aviation strength set forth in this bill. To meet these needs, we are placing the immediate stress on training.

Naval operations in the Atlantic in protection of the Western Hemisphere should be supported by such naval aircraft as can be ship-based by carriers, cruisers, and battleships, and by naval shore-based or tender-based aircraft strategically distributed, wherever it may be necessary to oppose enemy naval operations, or to oppose the approach overseas of enemy forces of any character.

In the Pacific, in addition to ship- and tender-based aircraft, it is necessary to provide naval aircraft distributed throughout the United States possessions, as well as along our west coast, and also to be ready to provide for a suitable distribution of naval aircraft off the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal.

8. This bill, as finally enacted, authorized us to acquire 10,000 naval aircraft. However, as the committee well knows, the passage of this bill did not give us overnight 10,000 planes. We next had to come back to Congress for funds with which to procure them.

9. Early in June, the House subcommittee held hearings on the bill to give us the money necessary to begin the acquisition of these planes. We also asked for money to implement [5566] the 11 percent increase authorized in the size of the Navy. At this time, we had 1,813 useful airplanes on hand and 933 on order toward our immediate goal of 10,000.

10. On June 16, 1940, France fell. The seriousness of the situation, which had not been fully appreciated in many quarters before, now became apparent. On June 18, I appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee and recommended a further increase in our Navy by some 200 combatant ships with an over-all tonnage increase of about 1,250,000 tons. This represented an increase in combatant tonnage of something over 70 percent. We also requested an additional 20 auxiliaries of 100,000 tons.

11. Congress granted the 70 percent increase and the funds to implement it, and thus the foundation was laid for the so-called two ocean Navy.

12. Hand in hand with the expansion of the fleet went the continued building up of facilities on shore to support the fleet and its air arm. Once funds were obtained the work was pushed, for example the big drydock at Pearl Harbor was finished some months ahead of time, fortunately in time to accommodate ships almost immediately after Pearl Harbor.

13. During my tour as Chief of Naval Operations I was under continual pressure from the successive commanders in chief of the fleet—Admirals Bloch, Richardson, and Kimmel—to bring personnel allowances up to 100 percent and to provide extra men [5567] for training to man new construction. The inevitable result of not having these extra men was to reduce the efficiency of existing ships in order to obtain the experienced men necessary to form basic crews for new construction. I explained some of the difficulties in getting more men for the expanding Navy and to increase allowances to 100 percent in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on February 10, 1941:

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary

and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the President just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost of effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have was obtained by my finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our needs as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything they agree to." However, the struggle is starting all over again and just remember we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome.

14. In July 1941, I wrote Admiral Kimmel as follows:

We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can [5568] and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man.

15. As late as November 15, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me as follows:

Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and fleet, efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and they continue. * * *

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize an additional 10,000.

16. As badly as I wanted to reply that we could and would give him what he wanted and what we knew he needed, I had to tell him on November 25, 1941, that:

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as we have to [5569] have special legislation to use our funds for this purpose. * * *

Believe it or not, the *Reuben James* set recruiting back about 15 percent. We are increasing our advertising campaigns extensively; not only that, but Navigation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees, however, constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it; but sentiment is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.

17. Another large program which was developed under my direction and which Congress approved in February 1942, was the 1,799 ships and other items for the British under Lend-Lease at a cost of approximately \$4,000,000,000. The ships included a large number of landing craft and escort vessels. I assured Congress at the time—and it was thoroughly understood by the British when this bill was passed—that we reserved the right to retain anything in this program which we felt we needed, and that final allocation would be made only when units were completed.

18. Everything I said and did to increase the size, strength and efficiency of the Navy as a fighting force was motivated by what I considered the absolute necessity of preparing as quickly as possible for war.

[5570] DUTY TO MAKE ADEQUATE AND REALISTIC WAR PLANS

19. Shortly after I became Chief of Naval Operations the War Plans Division began devoting their energies to bringing our war

plans up to date. Late in 1940 we completed work on the plan known as Rainbow No. 3, and copies were sent to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. In transmitting the plan to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic, on 12 December 1940 I wrote:

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet is informed that a plan designed for governing naval operations in case of war with Japan, Germany, and Italy, and entitled "RAINBOW 3" has been prepared. Two copies of this plan are forwarded to you by special officer messenger. While it is not to be considered as the policy of the United States Government to become involved in war under this plan, such a war appears at this time to be a possible eventuality. You are requested, therefore, to give a high priority to the preparation of your operating plans, and also to the preparation of your vessels, aircraft, and personnel.

2. The officer messenger carrying this plan, Commander J. L. McCrea, U. S. N., is authorized to remain in the Manila area for about nine days. He [5571] is prepared to present you the general views of the Chief of Naval Operations as to various political and strategical matters which have influenced the preparation of "RAINBOW 3." You are requested to make a study of the plan and to forward to the Department via Commander McCrea recommendations and suggestions for changes which may appear desirable to you at this time. It may be stated, however, that it does not seem practicable, under the existing situation, to effect material changes in the Assumptions of the plan.

3. One of the assumptions of the plan is that war would be fought with the United States, the British, and the Dutch Colonial Authorities as Allies. Staff conversations with the British, of a limited nature, have been undertaken in London and Washington, but so far as concerns an allied operating plan and command arrangements in the Far East, the only useful staff conversations would appear those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might be able to hold with the British and Dutch Supreme War Commanders in that region. It is believed that you may be able to hold such conversations with the British. There is a considerable doubt as to the extent [5572] of the conversations which may become possible with the Dutch, owing to their fear of repercussions in Japan.

Commander McCrea had left a copy of the plan at Pearl Harbor on his way to Manila, and returned via Pearl Harbor to get the reaction of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and his staff.

20. I avoided, wherever I could, giving specific and categorical instructions to the commanders in chief. War plans developed under my direction as Chief of Naval Operations were broad outlines of tasks and objectives, leaving the detailed operating plans to the commanders in chief, who were on the spot and familiar with the peculiar problems affecting their own forces. Rainbow No. 3 was such a plan.

21. In our planning, we assumed that if the United States was drawn into war, it would be alined with Great Britain and against the Axis Powers. We also knew that while our most immediate concern was with the war then in progress in the Atlantic and in Europe, we might also be faced—perhaps concurrently—with a war in the Pacific. With these thoughts in mind, we held extensive staff conversations with the British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversations was embodied in a document known as ABC-1, dated March 27, 1941.

[5573] 22. Based on the understandings arrived at in ABC-1, the Army and the Navy developed a Joint Basic War Plan, known as Rainbow No. 5, which was approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy.

[5574] You will note that I have crossed out the words "and by the President." That is the only change made in this statement.

23. In May 1941, the Navy's Basic War Plan, implementing Rainbow No. 5, was promulgated. The highest priority was assigned to the detailed planning which had to be done by the fleets to fill in the broader outlines of the Navy's Basic War Plan, referred to sometimes by the short title—WPL-46.

24. In connection with WPL-46, two things must be kept in mind. First, that the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the initial decisive theater. The Joint Army and Navy Plan, Rainbow No. 5, in the chapter entitled "Concept of the War," provided:

Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater, and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

Second, the plan was a realistic one; that is, it was predicated on the availability of forces actually in hand. There were not initially available to the Associated Powers all the facilities necessary to wage all-out war in both [5575] oceans. We were not able to give the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, all the ships and men he wanted; but neither were we able to put in the Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet the strength we knew they wanted.

25. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Kimmel), was fully advised of the situation confronting me as Chief of Naval Operations, for we had discussed it at length during his trip to Washington in the summer of 1941. On 7 November 1941, I called his attention again to the fact that we just didn't have the ships needed to go around when I wrote:

I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific Fleet—particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any* destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles

Admiral King at that time was Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet—

but he is up against it for DDs for escort—and defense against raiders.

26. Admiral Kimmel pointed out that he could not fight an all-out war in the Pacific with the forces allocated to him. [5576] On 15 November 1941, he wrote:

In repeated correspondence I have set forth to you the needs of the Pacific Fleet. These needs are real and immediate. I have seen the material and personnel diverted to the Atlantic. No doubt they are needed there. But I must insist that more consideration be given to the needs of the Pacific Fleet.

In case of war in the Pacific we shall have a problem difficult of solution under any circumstances; one requiring a major effort to bring the war to a successful conclusion. During preparation for such an effort we must be in a position to make Japanese operations costly and of limited effectiveness. The strength of this fleet limits our freedom of action and lack of modern equipment in ships we now have limits their effectiveness.

We must be in a position to minimize our own losses, and to inflict maximum damage to Japanese fleet, merchant shipping, and bases. We should have sufficient strength in this fleet for such effective operations as to permit cruising at will in the Japanese Mandated Island area, and even on occasions to Japanese home waters. We should have [5577] the strength to make any enemy operations against Wake a highly hazardous undertaking. To do these things substantial increase of the strength of this Fleet is mandatory.

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Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and fleet efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and they continue. Well qualified officers are in many instances, detached to fill billets much less important, in my opinion than those filled in this fleet. Battleship Captains must be chosen for proficiency regardless of seniority.

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize an additional 10,000.

If this fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness for offensive action, the foregoing requirements must be met; and it must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore establishment.

27. We are painfully aware of the situation. On 25 November, I replied:

[5578] This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's, I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule.

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now [5579] have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and still another of 20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way down to Cape Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.

* * * * *

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail some of the recent changes—Nimitz at that time was Chief of Bureau of Personnel—and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well as elsewhere; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only [5580] existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can with increasingly vexing problems.

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of men now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any of us.

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establish-

ment". I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which gives real interest. I thing I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, etc. etc.

[5581] 28. There were shortages and deficiencies in material and manpower, both for the Navy and the Army forces in Hawaii, beyond our ability to remedy, limited as we were by considerations of industrial capacity and time. However, the ships and planes available were allocated to the fleets and forces according to the tasks assigned to them in the War Plan. I considered, as did my principal advisers, that the forces allocated to the Pacific Fleet were adequate for the execution of the tasks assigned.

DUTY TO ORDER MOVEMENTS OF THE FLEET IN A MANNER NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE WAR PLAN

29. It seems appropriate at this point to say something about the movements of the United States Fleet during my tour of duty as Chief of Naval Operations. In October, 1939, the so-called Hawaiian Detachment was sent from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor. This detachment consisted of 8 heavy cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier and 18 destroyers plus certain auxiliaries. I felt that basing such a detachment at Pearl Harbor would demonstrate the weaknesses of that most important base and that the remedies for those weaknesses would thereby be facilitated. I wrote Admiral Bloch, then Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to that effect on 8 September, 1939. My letter reads in part as follows:

Again I urge you to keep your eyes toward the [5582] West for I feel most anything may happen any time.

Not only from a strategic, psychological standpoint do I believe the sending of a good detachment to Pearl Harbor to be worthwhile, but I also am hopeful it will show up the weakness in the habitability of that yard to support even a moderate sized force. I am out to plug every hole I can as soon as I can.

30. Moreover, basing a detachment on Pearl Harbor offered a valuable opportunity for training and for familiarizing officers and men with our various island possessions in the mid-Pacific area. I explained to Admiral Richardson on 15 March 1940 that:

My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out the regular schedule of gunnery firings and for training would be able to visit the various island possessions in the mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.

I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its [5583] presence there may have on the Orange (Japanese) foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

31. The Pacific Fleet held its spring maneuvers in the Hawaiian area in 1940, and after the maneuvers were completed, the fleet was ordered to remain in that area temporarily. At first it was thought that the delay in returning to the West Coast would be not more than two weeks, but the stay was extended from time to time. On 22 May 1940, Admiral Richardson wrote me, asking why the fleet was being

kept in the Hawaiian area and how long it would probably remain there. I answered him on 27 May as follows:

You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

* * * * *

[5584] Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask—suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

The above I think will answer the question "why you are there." It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. [5585] Like you, I have asked the question, and also—like you—I have been unable to get the answer.

[5586] I pointed out to Admiral Richardson that I hoped the time spent in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results, such as:

- (a) Solving the logistic problems involved including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.
- (b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.
- (c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.
- (d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.
- (e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.
- (f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.
- (g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

Admiral Richardson pointed out the deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as a Naval Base. These deficiencies were appreciated, both by the Navy Department and by the President, [5587] but it was decided as a matter of policy to keep the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area. During 1940 and 1941, many of the shortcomings of Pearl Harbor as a base, disclosed by the long stay of the Pacific Fleet, were remedied. The Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet for the year ending 30 June 1941, states:

(h) *Bases*

* * * * *

(3) *Hawaiian Area.*

Pearl Harbor. Many of the deficiencies of this base, disclosed by the prolonged stay of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in this area, listed in last year's report, either have been or are now in process of correction. The commissioning of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and the stationing of 3 patrol plane squadrons there has relieved the congestion, for planes of this type, at Ford Island. However, facilities for carrier groups are still inadequate and considerable congestion still exists.

It is probable that this condition, while being ameliorated by progress of current projects at Ford Island, will not be completely satisfactory until completion of the work at Barber's Point—sometime in the future.

Work on additional shops, the new drydocks, the net depot and target repair base at Bishop's Point is continuing and being accelerated as fast as delivery of material and availability of workmen permit. It is expected that, with the completion of the additional workmen from the mainland, the industrial capacity of the yard will be materially increased.

Remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is not being made, are:

(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to contaminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need.

(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor and for the important functions of shipping control and other requirements of the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situation in regard of such forces is as follows:

(1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types.

(2) District patrol and observation aircraft, [5589] though allocated in the aircraft expansion program, not yet available.

(3) Insufficient army anti-aircraft guns actually available.

(c) Provision of additional torpedo overhaul and storage facilities.

34. We recognized the deficiencies in small craft and local defense forces referred to by the Commander in Chief, but again it was a matter of not having enough vessels. I summed up this situation in a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated 10 February 1941:

I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vessels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars cannot buy yesterday."

Again, on 28 August 1941, I wrote Admiral Kimmel:

I note what you say about not resting until you get the patrol vessels you have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I." You know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we [5590] are constantly fighting material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar with the building program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on it. We are ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more critical daily and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary civilian needs."

35. That fleet gunnery improved during the stay at Pearl Harbor is demonstrated by Admiral Kimmel's letter of 12 August 1941:

I feel that gunnery in the Fleet is better than we have any right to expect considering the enormous changes in personnel and the lack of permanency of the officers. We have of course stressed battle procedures above everything else and you well know how much more experience and training it takes to be prepared for battle than for a target practice. * * *

Recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training have put our target practices on a much more realistic and practical basis. We feel that in the event of hostilities we will be forced to make very few changes, if any, in these directives. We are scheduling our services and area assignments in accordance with these directives now and I hear from all sides that it is [5591] considered much more satisfactory than anything we have ever had before.

36. About mid-1941, to meet the immediate needs in the Atlantic, we moved certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. This shift was contemplated by the Navy Basic War Plan, WPL-46.

37. In this connection, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, expressed concern in a letter to me dated 12 September 1941 regarding possible further transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic. He wrote:

The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan—a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced, and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive.

On 23 September 1941, I wrote Admiral Kimmel:

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month [5592] after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

38. We had pursued the policy of making no transfers of units from one fleet to another except as such transfers were provided for in WPL-46. The last transfers prior to 7 December 1941 of surface combatant units from the Pacific to the Atlantic were accomplished in June 1941. A comparison of the forces allotted the Pacific Fleet in the Navy Basic War Plan (May 1941) with the Administrative Organization of the Pacific Fleet published 1 October 1941 (13CN-41) shows that the forces—both surface units and aircraft—under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, immediately prior to 7 December 1941 were—with no substantial differences—in accordance with the Navy Basic War Plan.

39. In accordance with WPL-46, there were assigned to the Pacific Fleet 107 patrol planes suitable for long-range reconnaissance. Of this number, 24 planes of PATWING 4 were in the United States or Alaska just prior to 7 December. Of the remaining 83 patrol planes, approximately 60 were available in the Hawaiian area during the period immediately preceding the Japanese attack.

[5593]

**DUTY TO KEEP FLEET COMMANDERS INFORMED
OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS**

40. During my tour of duty as Chief of Naval Operations, my office maintained a close liaison with the State Department and the Army. The Central Division—a part of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—was charged with the duty of keeping in touch with activities of the State Department which affected the Navy. The head of the Central Division met frequently with representatives of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, and he kept me informed regarding important diplomatic and political developments in the Far East. I was a member of a liaison committee which was established by the State, War, and Navy Departments for the consideration of matters of mutual concern, the committee consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff (Army) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Navy). This committee usually met weekly, and in addition, I had many conferences with the Secretary of State. I consulted with General Marshall concerning military matters, and we worked very

closely together, either by telephone or by personal visits. My duties also required frequent consultation with the President.

41. In addition to the information gained from the above sources, I had available the information obtained by the [5594] Office of Naval Intelligence. A meeting was held in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy each morning which was attended by the heads of the various divisions of Operations and certain other key officers in the Navy Department. At these meetings the Director of Naval Intelligence gave a résumé of the information received since the last meeting on the military situation throughout the world, and other information such as that on international politics which he believed to be of value. He also brought to me at other times such information as he considered important. From time to time the Director of War Plans prepared estimates of the military situation in the Pacific for my information, and the information of the key officers of my staff.

42. It was my duty, of course, to keep the fleet commanders in Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic waters informed of significant developments in political and military matters of concern to them. It was always my purpose to give these commanders the best information and estimates of the situation available to me, not only through official letters and dispatches, but also by means of frequent and regular personal letters. I might point out, in passing, that there was nothing unusual in this so-called "personal" correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders in Chief—it was a long-established custom when I took office.

[5595] 43. Admiral Richardson became Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, on 6 January 1940. On 18 January, I wrote him in part as follows:

* * * I have a letter from Tommy Hart (Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet), Just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical one. As I have written Bloch (Admiral Bloch, retiring Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet), and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning. It is something, in my humble opinion, for which you should be mentally prepared. Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of course I will; that is my only reason for existing here. * * *

44. Throughout 1940, I continued to write these personal letters to Admiral Richardson two or three times a month and during some periods as often as once a week. On several questions raised by Admiral Richardson, my answers were in- [5596] definite and as unsatisfactory to him as they were to me. I was entirely sympathetic with his desire for information and for the answers to such questions as, "How long is the fleet to stay in the Hawaiian Area"?, or "Suppose the Japs to go into the East Indies, what are we going to do about it?" I, too, wanted the answers to those questions and to similar questions. I had asked them myself in the White House and in the State Department, but like Admiral Richardson, I was unable to get the answers. Moreover, my honest opinion was that no one knew the answers to such questions.

45. During this same period, Admiral Hart also had questions he wanted me to answer. I was up against the same situation—they were

not matters on which I had the final say, and I was unable to get answers for him. On 22 October 1940, I wrote Admiral Hart:

I wish there was something I could give you from the State Department but there isn't. I think I may say safely, however, that there will be no backdown anywhere by the United States in the Far East, unless there is a right-about-face in present day policy.

46. On 12 November 1940, I wrote Admiral Hart, giving him the current picture as I saw it, sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Richardson. It is an example of the estimates of the situation which I passed to the fleet commanders from time [5597] to time and reads in part as follows:

"The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore the fields of:

Command arrangements,

General objectives;

General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment.

"I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so.

I invite attention to the fact that this letter was written in November 1940.

"In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position of readiness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less [5598] gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract, might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.

"But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance of British, Dutch, and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

"(a) Occupy Guam, and reinforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and some air;

"(b) Establish naval control of Philippine Waters by destroying our naval and air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment in Halmahera;

"(c) Capture Luzon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;

"(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed from East to West.

"I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the [5599] most effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

"One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would support you, probably by sending a naval reinforcement to you at Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size and composition of such a reinforcement; but in making your recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.

"You may well appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse)."

47. In the last letter I wrote to Admiral Richardson as Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet—on 23 December 1940—I said:

There is little that I can add which is not repetition, but I shall repeat just the same that every 24 hours past is just one day nearer to actual hostilities and that your flag officers and captains should be completely in the frame of mind that we will be in the fighting business most any time, and purely as a guess on my own part, I would say at any time after the [5600] next 90 days. Our

heads and our hearts and every ounce of energy that we have should be devoted exclusively to the business of war and keeping fit—and I don't mean maybe.

48. Admiral Kimmel succeeded Admiral Richardson as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on 1 February 1941. On 13 January, just after his selection for Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I wrote Admiral Kimmel in part as follows:

* * * I am hoping J. O. (Admiral Richardson) will turn over the personal letters I have written him. They give all the slants here that I know and they show the urgency as I see it. In my humble opinion, we may wake up any day with some mines deposited on our front door step or with some of our ships bombed, or whatnot, and find ourselves in another undeclared war, the ramifications of which call for our strongest and sanest imagination and plans.

I have told the Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were heading straight for this war, that we could not assume anything else and personally I do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us or of our deliberately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of weeks or of days. I would like to feel that I could be perfectly complacent if some day someone opens [5601] the door of my office and reports that the war is on. I have been moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a situation and am terribly impatient at the slowness with which things move here, even though I know much has been accomplished, there still remains much to be done.

My estimate of the situation which I presented to the Secretary and Rainbow 3, both of which you should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts. Of course I do not want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to avoid it. I have fought this out time and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in the Atlantic at the same time; and to put it mildly, it will be one H— of a job, and that is one reason why I am thankful that I have your calm judgment, your imagination, your courage, your guts and your good head, at the seagoing end.

49. It was my constant endeavor to keep Admiral Kimmel informed of significant events of a political or military nature which affected the interests of the United States.

On 10 February 1941 I wrote:

I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly good ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the [5602] transportation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the Marines to Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate, will have to be provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an enemy atoll.

Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own advisors.

51. On 25 February 1941, I wrote:

I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter concerning a *visit* of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time *might* come when it will not. I gave you the information merely as a sort of advance notice.

The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war—to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East—I simply can not predict the outcome. Gallup polls, editorials, talk on [5603] the Hill (and I might add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having

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to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my later despatch concerning "Plan Dog." This would mean that any reinforcement to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a very serious matter for Britain.

52. Enclosed with this last letter was a memorandum for the President in which I had recommended against sending a detachment of the Pacific Fleet to the Philippines. In this memorandum, I said:

If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then [5604] be able to spare forces for the Atlantic.

* * * * *

I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 February from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out the portion which supports my view.

53. Admiral Kimmel, in a letter dated February 1941, had asked that the responsibility for sending him secret intelligence information be fixed in order that he would miss nothing of interest to the Fleet. In my reply of 22 March, I wrote:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CincUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly [5605] to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by dispatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moves over each route.

[5606] 54. On 26 April—a month before the promulgation of Rainbow No. 5—I wrote:

This is just to get you mentally prepared that shortly a considerable detachment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic.

You will recall from my last letter what that detachment was and what the President cut it to, but only for the time being, awaiting some further clue to the Japanese situation.

Not only do I anticipate the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs, 1CV, 4CLs and 2 squadrons of destroyers, but also by further reinforcements.

King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on any efficient scale.

I am enclosing a copy of his last order which implements the changed Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 and is now known as Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2 or WPL-49.

Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now rounding to and clamoring for an all out in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts with regard to this which were set down in my Memo about what is now known as Plan Dog and which will shortly be covered by Rainbow 5.

[5607] Action on the above, that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at any time, and in my humble opinion is only a matter of time.

No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference yesterday in the White House.

I am sending a copy as usual to Tommy Hart.

55. On 14 May 1941, I sent a letter to the commandants of 12 of the naval districts, including Panama and Hawaii, with copies to Admirals King, Kimmel and Hart, in which I said:

What will happen to the Pacific is anyone's guess; but here, too, there is only one safe course; that is to be prepared, so far as humanly possible. Though the danger of mines, raiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt air attack, may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany does—possibly preplanned joint action. Russia is still a ?

56. My letter to Admiral Kimmel of 24 May 1941 points up some of the problems we were facing with respect to *both* the Atlantic and the Pacific. I wrote:

You have probably been surprised over the movements of transports, Marines, hospital ships, etc., to [5608] the east coast, which you have, or will have shortly received. Please keep the following with regard to it highly secret, known only to your trusted few whom I assume you keep informed regarding such matters. In this I include Bloch.

Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an over all limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly reinforced. The Army of course will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines will bear the brunt.

I know your reaction will be "Why didn't we get the transports and assemble such a force months and months ago." My only answer to that is that such thoughts are water over the dam, and I am confronted with the problem *as is* and not one as I would like to have had it, and for which I would like to have been ready long ago. I simply could not get authority to acquire and prepare the necessary train.

King of course is active and operating in connection with Atlantic problems—our own and the British. He has nothing like what he would like to have or what we [5609] would like to give him if we had it to give. I do not contemplate *for the moment* ordering anything additional to the Atlantic except auxiliaries in connection with the Azores task and except possibly later four CA's as per Rainbow 5. However, I am not the final "Boss of this show."

The Force which we are preparing to go to North Ireland and Scotland on the outbreak of war is coming along in good shape so far as the Navy is concerned but the Army has neither the equipment, the ammunition nor the aircraft to defend these bases; fall again being the earliest date when they can do this for us. Meanwhile we will try and find some way of solving it with Marines and British help if we are in the war before that time. God knows what will happen if we are not in by that time though personally I give the British a longer time than do most people here in their ability to hold out. I most emphatically do not believe they can hold out indefinitely without *effective* aid from us. We are being pressed for ammunition and material from the South American Republics—not a happy situation—and not to mention British requests for more DD's etc.

57. Admiral Kimmel had raised the matter of the un- [5610] certainty of his information before his trip to Washington in mid-1941. Among other things he mentioned his uncertainty as to the future strength of his fleet. In a letter dated 26 May 1941, he said:

The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of

what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasions, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishings of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. [5611] Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training, by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

58. Admiral Kimmel brought this letter with him when he came to Washington. I considered the matters raised so important that I had the letter circulated among the principal [5612] officers of the Department and later assembled them for a full discussion of these problems with Admiral Kimmel. While there was no formal reply to this letter, I feel sure that when Admiral Kimmel left Washington, he was fully informed of the situation as we knew it.

59. On 24 July 1941, I wrote Admiral Hart, sending a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel. I told them that:

Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two hour talk with him; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss perfectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need for the rice and the minerals [5613] of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, *unless* we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If the Russians are well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia.

Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I do not know.

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a [5614] possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that I am.

[5615] 60. On 26 July 1941, following the Japanese move into Indochina, the President issued an executive order freezing Japanese assets in the United States in the same manner in which assets of various European countries were frozen on 14 June 1941. I sent a priority dispatch to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, commander in chief Asiatic Fleet, and commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, on July 25 reading as follows:

This is a joint despatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff U. S. Army. Appropriate aades deliver copies to Commanding Generals Hawaii, Philippines and Caribbean defense command and to General Chaney in London.

You are advised that at 1400 GCT July 26th United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan. It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material. It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products, cotton, and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk. Japanese assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement. It is not, repeat not, expected [5616] that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time. United States Flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan. CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date.

This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Navy and Army subordinates. SPENAVO inform CNS but warn him against disclosure.

61. The foreign policy of the United States has never been very clearly defined—certainly not fixed—and it must have been necessary for the President and the State Department to feel their way along carefully in many situations. It was impossible, however, for the Navy to plan on the basis of a well-known and clearly defined foreign policy, desirable as that might have been. In discussing our planning problems in a letter to Admiral Hart dated 9 February 1940, I wrote:

In view of the actual situation existing today in the Far East and elsewhere, we might well say that [5617] we need "Tension Plans" as well as "War Plans." But to prepare well considered "Tension Plans" we need a planning machinery that includes the State Department and possibly the Treasury Department as well as the War and Navy Departments. Of course, we have planning machinery for the Army and Navy which now provides for a better coordination of planning effort than has existed in the past. We do not, however, have regularly set up planning machinery that brings in the State Department. It is true that we have frequent consultation with the State Department, but things are not planned in advance, and often we do not receive advance information of State Department action which might well have affected our own activities.

It is also true, of course, that the State Department must in a country such as ours feel its way along to a large extent. This is unavoidable. In view of this the State Department is probably unable always to set up, in advance, concrete programs of their intentions.

* * * * *

Undoubtedly the disposition of your forces could be better guided if you could be kept advised in advance of actions contemplated by the State [5618] Department. Whenever it is possible to do so, we will keep you so advised, and whenever State Department policies for either temporary or longer contemplated periods can be set forth, I will keep you informed of them.

62. We had gone on record at the State Department with our views regarding an embargo on oil. I made it plain to the State Department—as I had in my letter to Admirals Kimmel and Hart—that I believed if Japan's oil supply were cut off, she would go to war to get it. I did not think that necessarily meant war with us, but with some power from which she could take oil.

63. In its official publication "Peace and War," the State Department confirms the fact that the State, War, and Navy Departments all understood this position. It states at page 88:

Throughout this period (1938-1940) the United States Government had under active consideration various ways and means which might be used to induce Japan to renounce its policies and programs of conquest and domination through the use of force or threat of force. Among other methods, this Government frequently had under consideration the question of applying economic pressure—advocated in many quarters [5619] as a means of checking Japanese aggression. It was the opinion of the responsible officials of the Government, including the highest military and naval authorities, that adoption and application of a policy of imposing embargoes upon strategic exports to Japan would be attended with serious risk of retaliatory action of a character likely to lead to this country's becoming involved in war. Practically all realistic authorities have been agreed that imposition of substantial economic sanctions or embargoes against any strong country, unless that imposition be backed by show of superior force, involves serious risk of war.

The President and the heads of the Army and the Navy and the Department of State were in constant consultation throughout this period in regard to all aspects of the military and diplomatic situation confronting the United States.

* * * * *

They were in agreement that prevailing public opinion in this country and, with the imminence of and finally the outbreak of war in Europe, the comparative military unpreparedness of this country were such as to render it inadvisable to risk, by resort to drastic economic measures against Japan, involvement in war.

[5620] The CHAIRMAN. The hour of 12:30 having arrived, we will recess until 2 o'clock, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. All right, sir.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[5621]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Admiral Stark, you may proceed with your statement.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Admiral STARK. The top of page 41, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. 64. On 28 August 1941, I wrote Admiral Kimmel:

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do I don't know.

I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the

American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely frank talks with them.

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

65. On 22 September 1941, I wrote Admiral Hart, sending [5622] Admiral Kimmel a copy of my letter. It shows not only the picture existing at that time in the Pacific, but also reminds us of our pressing and immediate problems in the Atlantic. I quote:

So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The President's speech of September 11, 1941 put the matter squarely before the country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this; in fact, our orders had been issued.

In addition to the incidents cited by the President, other and probably equally compelling reasons lay behind his decision. For some time, the British have found the problem of getting supplies across the Atlantic a difficult one. They have never had enough ships suitable for escort duty. Their forces are thinly spread and, as a result of casualties, the spreading has had to be thinner and thinner as the campaign has progressed. If Britain is to continue, she has to have assistance. She will now get it openly. King's forces, too, are thinly spread, working as he is from 20 South to the Iceland area.

In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys [5623] regularly from the United States to points in the Iceland area, where these convoys are picked up by the British and escorted to the British Isles. In addition to our own escort vessels, the Canadians are participating. Both forces (Canadian and our own) are operating under King's direction.

This will be a boon for the British. It will permit them to strengthen their forces elsewhere, both with heavy and light ships, particularly in critical areas through which convoys for the Near East via the Cape of Good Hope, must pass. It will further help the British to meet the ever-present threat of a raid on troop or merchant ship convoys by heavy units, in that it will narrow the area in which the British heavy units will be required to be responsible. Moreover, ships for other possible activities, such as duty in the Mediterranean, etc., will thus be released.

The area which we regard as "our ocean" is roughly outlined as follows: all west of a line 10° West Longitude to Latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line to a position 53° North, 26° West, thence south on 26°. Unless the Axis powers withdraw their men-of-war from this area, contacts are almost certain [5624] to occur. The rest requires little imagination.

That line, sir, runs up 26, which runs through the Azores and then it slopes up to the eastward of Iceland and then on north.

* * * * *

Iceland has, of course, in recent months, taken on much significance for us. Since the President's speech, it has taken on *added* significance. Since July, we have had 4500 Marines there, and on Monday last we landed some 6000 Army. While this Army convoy was enroute, the Germans had by far the strongest concentration of U-Boats that they have ever had in the North Atlantic. It was so strong and so active that it raised the very devil with a British-escorted convoy, the Germans claiming 28 ships sunk. About half that number is more nearly correct and admitted by the British. Our own Army troop convoys was in the immediate vicinity of the attack and had to be re-routed by despatch several times in an effort to avoid the area of action. At that, seven SS contacts were had. We should have gotten at least one SS, which was attacked under favorable circumstances.

As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of a satisfactory [2625] settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a settlement are, in my judgment, very slight. Admiral Nomura is working hard on his home government and while he appears to be making *some* progress, I am still from Missouri. It looks like a dead-lock; but I suppose as long as there is negotiation there is hope.

The press is making much at the moment of the way the Far Eastern situation has apparently quieted down. One can not help being impressed with the optimistic note of the editorial writers and columnists in this regard. For my own part, I feel that false hopes are being raised. While on the surface the Japanese ap-

pear to be making *some* effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I can not disregard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and waiting until the situation in Europe becomes more stabilized. If Russia falls, Japan is not going to be easily pried away from her Axis associations. She will no doubt grab any opportunity that presents itself to improve her position in Siberia. If Russia can hold out (which at the moment, hardly appears possible), I feel that there might be more hope of some sort of an agreement with Japan.

The same sort of false hopes are being raised [5626] in our press with reference to the German-Russian situation. There is no question but that the Greece and Crete incidents delayed Germany's move on their Eastern front. I think it quite probable that they intended to move against Russia earlier in the year. If the delay incident to the two campaigns noted above have introduced sufficient delay in their time table, which, coupled with Russian resistance, will permit the Russians to carry on some sort of a front this winter, then possibly those two debacles were not entirely without compensation. The Hun is after the Russ Army. It has proved far more of a stumbling block than Hitler had imagined. However, the Germans are making steady progress. The Russian losses in men and material are great, and production of essential war materials is being much lessened. When the Harriman mission returns from Moscow (Admiral Standley is our senior Navy member), we will probably get some real news. Harry Hopkins saw only Stalin. The Russian Military Mission that is now in the United States has presented very large requests for war materials, and it makes our own planning an ever changing affair.

[5627] You now have our reply to your official recommendation concerning the withdrawal of the Marines from China. We recognize the soundness of all your arguments, pro and con, and we put more weight on those questioning withdrawal. We feel that a complete withdrawal of our forces from China would create a reaction in that country and in Japan and in our own, that would be bad. So, for the moment at least, we will hang on. I know you will open it up again by letter or despatch if you consider it should be again reviewed; and it very well may be—there is little that is static in this old world at present.

I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I am not fully supported in the above view. Tommy Holcomb wants to withdraw, lock, stock and barrel.

Tommy Holcomb was major general of the Marine Corps, major general commandant.

I can easily see his point of view. He wants to avoid, if at all possible, "blood letting." In this, he is supported by Colonel Peck. That officer feels that all or none of the marines should come out. Peck is against leaving a "token force." He feels that to do so, we are inviting trouble and that the "token force" can be of little support to the local police. In that, I agree. But, something bigger is at stake. So far as China is concerned, we have [5628] "our foot in the door—the door that once was "open," and if I had the say so, it would remain there until I was *ready* to withdraw it—or until the door opened to such a point that I could gracefully withdraw if and when I saw fit. I agree that proper timing may be extremely difficult. You may be right that they should come now. I hope I am right in holding on. Ultimately, I hope we may both see alike. I don't enjoy not being 100 per cent with you.

You know how I have long felt about reinforcing the Philippines. The enclosed memorandum shows what is in the wind. Personally, I am delighted, and I am sure you will be, too. I think it should have a pronounced effect in prevention—or, if not, then in execution.

66. In sending a copy of the foregoing letter to Admiral Kimmel, I sought to also put at rest some fears he had expressed about the possibility of taking additional units from the Pacific to bolster our thinly spread forces in the Atlantic. I told him, in a letter dated 23 September 1941:

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt [5629] until next year.

In this same letter I also added:

I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying *that conversations with the Japs*

have practically reached an impasse. As I see it we can get nowhere towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of understanding just now—is—or—is not—a good thing—I hesitate to say.

Admiral Nomura—that is Ambassador Nomura—came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

67. I would like to point out that while I have stressed, in the extracts I have read, the information I gave the [5630] commanders in chief on political and military developments affecting the international situation, I also maintained a very great interest in seeing that the commanders in chief were adequately informed on technical matters affecting their forces. For example, on 26 July 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me a six-page letter, most of which had to do with material preparations for a Pacific war. It raised questions concerning such matters as additional transports, ordnance equipment for the Marines, ammunition handling and stowage facilities, the further development of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard to make major overhauls of large ships possible, additional personnel, the equipping of light craft with depth charges and listening gear, small craft for patrol purposes, the supply of communication, radio, radar, and sound equipment, and the many requirements for aviation.

68. I distributed extracts from this letter to the appropriate bureau chiefs and asked for their comments. As a result, a 22-page letter went out to Admiral Kimmel on 22 August 1941, giving him all the information on these matters available at that time. This is only one example of letters giving the commander in chief information concerning progress on material problems.

69. The fall of the Japanese Cabinet on 16 October 1941 marked the beginning of a critical stage in Far Eastern af- [5631] fairs. On that day I sent a secret priority dispatch to commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, which reads as follows:

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U. S.

In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

Second and third aedes inform appropriate Army and Navy District Authorities. Acknowledge.

70. It is noteworthy that also on 16 October, I diverted all our merchant shipping in the Far East to the south in order to get it out of the danger zone in case Japan attacked [5632] us. I kept it diverted until war broke. As a result, we lost only one merchant ship—and that was one on which we deliberately took a chance.

71. On the following day (17 October 1941), I wrote to Admiral Kimmel (with a copy to Admiral Hart), commenting on the dispatch

concerning the Cabinet change and enclosing an estimate regarding the change prepared by the head of the Central Division. In this letter I said:

Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in [5633] August, I said my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.

With regard to mercant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it.

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil attitude and Navy attitude, I hardly see any way around it. I think we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong.

Offhand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-contained task [5634] forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you my reaction.

The memorandum referred to reads as follows—that is a memorandum prepared by the central division, which I sent out so that I might get that division's point of view.

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action has not been taken.

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.

[5635] The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the extremists among the military not that it has opposed Japan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending on the course of the war in Russia.

[5636] The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power.

72. I invite attention to the fact that both the despatch and the letter speak of war against the United States only as a possibility. Based on the information available to me at the time (17 October 1941), I felt that such language was all the then existing situation warranted, and in my letter I told Admiral Kimmel that I had tempered the original draft of the message, because I did not think the Japs were going to sail into us. I recognized the possibility, however, and for that reason thought we should be "on guard."

73. On 22 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me, telling me of the action he had taken and the dispositions he had made following receipt of my despatch regarding the change [5637] in the Japanese cabinet.

74. On November—just a month before the attack—I O. K.'d the dispositions he had made, and added:

* * * The big question is—What next?!

* * * Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worse and worse"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go forever—particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

75. My letter was sadly prophetic. One month did see "most anything"—the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor—exactly one month from the date of this letter.

76. Also on 7 November, I wrote Admiral Hart as follows:

Events are moving rapidly toward a real showdown, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. The Navy is already in the war of the Atlantic, but the country doesn't seem to realize it. Apathy, to the point of open opposition, is evident in a considerable section of the press. Meanwhile, the [5638] Senate is dragging out the debate with reference to the arming of the merchantmen. Whether the country knows it or not, *we are at war*.

* * * You no doubt have noted in the press the conversations going on between the State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office. Mr. Kurusu's trip to the United States has its dramatic appeal, but I am dubious of it having any real influence.

And on 8 November, I again wrote Admiral Hart a letter which contained a paragraph quite similar to that quoted from my letter to Admiral Kimmel of 7 November. It read:

The Japanese situation looks almost like an impasse to me, and I wouldn't be surprised at anything happening in the next month or two. I imagine your picture of that is just about as close as mine. The two points of view appear to be simply irreconcilable. But of this, more should be in the open before long.

77. On 14 November, I wrote Admiral Kimmel:

The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan [5639] come of his visit. I note this morning in the Press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the

United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view.

And I enclosed an estimate of the Far Eastern situation which General Marshall and I had prepared for the President. I think the whole of that memorandum will bear reading:

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attaché. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The [5640] Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident." If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with [5641] poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, or favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of [5642] naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese [5643] operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

[5644] (b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening [5645] Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete co-ordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommended that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

"Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated [5646] consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

78. On 24 November, I sent the following despatch for action to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commandants 11th, 12th, 13th and 15th naval Districts, and for information to Special Naval Observer, London, and Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

I do not know whether the Committee is familiar with those Districts.

Starting south, the 11th at San Diego, the 12th at San Francisco, the 13th at Puget Sound, and we jump to Hawaii for the 14th, and back down to the Panama Canal for the 15th.

The Far Eastern, Manila, is the 16th.

This is the despatch which was sent for action:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines [5647] or Guam is a possibility.

Chief of Staff has seen this despatch, concurs and requests action aforesaid to inform senior Army Officers their areas.

Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

79. On November 25, I wrote Admiral Kimmel a letter which ends with these two paragraphs (the only part bearing on the dispatch of November 24):

I held this (the letter) up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. [5648] You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I wan't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be 'anything'.

80. This letter gave the background for the dispatch and indicated opinions which went to make up the dispatch. It must be understood that official dispatches, though sent in the name of and on the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations, often reflected not only his personal opinion but also a consensus of the opinions of his principal advisers; and at times in cases as represented here, those of the State and War Departments and of the White House. The letter points out that neither the President nor the Secretary of State would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. Some felt that such an attack would come in the Philippines because of the consequent embarrassment to us. While appreciating this, I did not give it the weight some [5649] of my advisers did, but stressed more strongly the attack in southeast Asia. They keynote that the letter and the dispatch were intended to convey was the possibility of "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction," and the necessity of being prepared for anything.

81. On November 27 Mr. Hull informed us that negotiations with the Japanese had ceased and that it was now up to the Army and Navy. I later learned that a note had been handed to the Japanese on November 26—the so-called ten-point note. I feel confident in stating that I did not see or know of this note at the time it was given to the Japanese Ambassador.

82. General Marshall and I completed and sent to the President a memorandum dated November 27, stressing that—

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. and that—

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided as long as consistent with national policy.

83. On November 27, I sent to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet and to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, for action, and to commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, and special naval observer, London, for information, the following priority dispatch:

[5650] This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Tai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPANAVO inform British. Continental districts Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage.

84. This message begins with the words "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." These words were carefully weighed and chosen after considerable thought and discussion with my principal advisors and with the Secretary of the Navy. The words "war warning" had never before been used in any of my dispatches to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. They were put at the beginning of the message to accentuate the extreme gravity of the situation. We considered the picture as we saw [5651] it and we felt that there was grave danger of Japan striking anywhere. We wanted our people in the Pacific to know it, and we used language which we thought would convey what we felt.

85. The message further stated that certain signs indicated an "amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." This indication from evidence we had, did not, in our opinion, rule out or preclude an attack elsewhere. Our dispatch of the 24th (only 3 days before) should be read in connection with the dispatch of the 27th. I warned against "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction."

86. We went to what we thought was an all-out on this dispatch of the 27th. We considered it an unequivocal war warning. Previously, we had talked about possibilities, but by this dispatch we intended to convey the thought that war was imminent. In fact, we gave most careful consideration before making this a war warning, for we had no definite information or evidence indicating an attack on the United States. We could not tell whether Japan in her next move would or would not attack United States territory. The only movement of which we had definite knowledge, indicated an amphibious expedition, with the Philippines, Thai, the Kra Peninsula, or Borneo as its potential objectives. We decided, [5652] however, that the situation was so grave that we should warn our forces to be prepared for the worst.

87. I had long shared the concern of the commanders in chief for the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and of the vital elements of the Naval Establishment in the Hawaiian area. After the successful attack by the British Fleet Air Arm on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, my concern increased, and on November 22, 1940, I wrote to the then commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Richardson, as follows:

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy

Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures.

I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to Hawaii with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies which will require remedial action here in Washington.

88. I asked that the matter be considered with the Army because "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy," approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and in effect during 1941, provided for coordination by the Army and Navy in meeting attacks against our coastal frontiers, of which the Hawaiian coastal frontier was one. Joint action states that in carrying out its functions, the Army will provide and operate or maintain among other things:

(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and fire-control installations.

(2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

[5654] (3) A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

The Navy, in carrying out its functions, will provide and operate, among other things:

(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast.

(b) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Army.

Joint action also states the functions of Army and Navy air components, and in order to minimize duplication, it provides:

(a) The functions assigned to the Army Air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal frontiers of continental United States and its [5655] overseas possessions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to assure freedom of action of the fleet.

(b) The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft tenders, or for operations from shore bases for observation, scouting and patrolling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping in the coastal zones. These aircraft may be required to operate effectively over the sea to the maximum distance within the capacity of aircraft development.

In accordance with joint action, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the commanding general, Hawaiian Department had entered into a "joint coastal frontier defense plan" for the Hawaiian coastal frontier dated April 25, 1941. Among other things, this agreement assigned responsibility for the aircraft warning service and antiaircraft and fighter defenses to the Army, while responsibility for distant reconnaissance [5656] was assigned to the Navy.

89. On receipt of the reply from Admiral Richardson—in reply to the letter in which I had asked his comment on how the War and Navy Departments could help them out there—and largely predicated on

it, I caused the Secretary of the Navy, on January 24, 1941, to send the following letter to the Secretary of War:

The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, promoted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned [5657] above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two—that is, air attack, both bombing and torpedo—of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problem encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

- [5658] (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
- (b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
- (c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
- (d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
- (e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a)—

that is, the location and the engagement of the enemy carriers and their destruction—

are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present [5659] system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" mobile twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on

hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of [5660] 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the question of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

[5661] (3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

90. Copy of this letter was sent to the then Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Kimmel. On February 18, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote:

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We [5662] are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces,—destroyers and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive.

91. In the meantime on 7 February 1941 the Secretary of War had replied to the letter of 24 January as follows:

In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to [5663] Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

"There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total projects calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. In-

quiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages [5664] and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eight-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

Copies of this reply were sent to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

92. Subsequent to the receipt of the letter of 7 February [5665] from the Secretary of War, the matter of antiaircraft defense and of planes for the defense of Hawaii was the subject of frequent conversations with General Marshall and I offered to transport planes via carrier whenever they could be made ready. On at least two occasions during 1941, I sent a carrier from the west coast to Pearl Harbor to ferry Army fighter planes.

93. You will note that the Secretary of War in his letter of 7 February stated that the equipment for the aircraft warning service had been ordered and would be delivered in Hawaii in June 1941, and that all arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. I was informed that this equipment was delivered in Hawaii about the middle of 1941.

94. On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor and Commander of Pacific Fleet Task Force Nine, made, with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area and entered into an agreement covering joint air operation. A copy of this agreement and estimate was forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District on 1 May 1941. The estimate, under the [5666] heading "Possible Enemy Action," reads in part as follows:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

On 20 June 1941, I sent a copy of this agreement entitled "Joint Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base" to the Commandants of all the naval districts and to the Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, calling their attention to the importance of the problems presented therein.

95. Admiral Kimmel left with me, during his trip to Washington in mid-1941, a memorandum dated 4 June, which reads as follows:

The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth [5667] Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied [5668] and the personnel drilled in its use.

There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

"There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands."

96. In mentioning the Army's responsibilities with respect to the defense of Pearl Harbor, I don't mean to minimize the problems which were facing the Army at that time. They, too, were faced with a shortage of equipment and men.

97. My war warning despatch of 27 November must be considered in the light of what had gone before. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were action addressees of the war warning despatch, and they were directed to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46" (Navy Basic War Plan).

98. I might mention that on 26 November, we sent to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, two despatches asking his [5669] reaction to the possibility of reinforcing Wake and Midway by Army units. These were routine matters having to do with the general strengthening of our Pacific bases—a matter we had long been pushing.

99. The same day that I sent the war warning, the Army also sent a despatch to its field commanders. In order that Navy coastal frontier commanders and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet might be informed of what had been sent their Army opposites, I sent the following priority despatch on 28 November to Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier and Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier for action and to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier for information:

* * * Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense Command:
 "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This [5670]"

policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

"Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.

[5671] "A separate message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

100. On 30 November, I sent a despatch to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, making Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet an information addressee, which reads as follows:

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition.

In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch. Instruct planes to be observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked.

Understand British Air Forces will search arc [5672] 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora.

If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur. British Mission here informed.

101. On 3 December, we sent to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District the following priority despatch:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

102. Also on 3 December, I sent a priority despatch to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District for action, and to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District for information, which reads as follows:

Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy purple, all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents. [5673] British Admiralty London today report Embassy London has complied.

103. I considered that the urgent destruction by the Japanese of their codes and ciphers and secret documents was one of the most telling items of information we had received, and our despatch informing Commanders in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts of this fact was one of the most important despatches we ever sent. We felt that war was just a matter of time.

104. On 4 December, because of Guam's highly vulnerable position, we sent her the following message:

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence, retaining

minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. Report crypto channels retained.

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District were all information addresses on this despatch.

105. We were also concerned lest Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, might feel that he needed specific authorization [5674] from us before he could authorize destruction of secret papers and codes in the outlying Pacific Islands. Accordingly, we sent him a despatch on 6 December which reads as follows:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

106. In the few days immediately preceding 7 December, Admiral Ingersoll (then Assistant Chief of Naval Operations), Admiral Turner (then head, War Plans Division), and I went over the information we had sent to the fleet commanders. We were all of the opinion that everything we could do had been done to get them ready for war, and that we had sent them sufficient information and directives.

107. During the night and early morning of 6-7 December, the Japanese transmitted to their Ambassador in Washington an answer to the ten-point note which had been handed to the Japanese on 26 November by Mr. Hull. The answer was in fourteen parts, the fourteenth part being received some time early Sunday morning, December 7. I was not acquainted with this despatch until I arrived at my office Sunday forenoon. I would like [5675] to invite attention to the meat of the fourteenth part of this message and compare it with the meat of my war warning message. The Japanese message concludes:

* * * Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Our war warning message stated:

* * * Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased * * *.

Thus, what we learned on the morning of 7 December only confirmed what we had sent out on 27 November.

108. During the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we had information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to present his Government's reply to the 10-point note to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. that same day. I was discussing this note and the time of its presentation with the head of the Central Division (Captain Schuirmann) when General Marshall called me on the 'phone to ask if I knew of it. I told him [5676] I did, and he asked me what I thought about sending the information concerning the time of presentation on to the various commanders in the Pacific. My first answer to him was that we had sent them so much already that I hesitated to send more. I hung up the 'phone, and not more than

a minute or two later I called him back, stating that there might be some peculiar significance in the Japanese Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at 1 p. m. and that I would go along with him in sending the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his communications were such that he could get it out quickly because our communications were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it. He replied that he felt he could get it through very quickly. I then asked him to include in the despatch instructions to his people to inform their naval opposites.

I am informed that this despatch* was sent "First Priority" to the Army Forces in the Far East (Philippines), Caribbean [5677] Defense Command (Canal Zone), Hawaiian Department, and the Fourth Army (San Francisco). I am told that the message was sent at 1217 EST (0647 Honolulu time) to the Hawaiian Department, but was not delivered in Hawaii until after the attack.

109. My presentation of the manner in which I discharged my responsibility to keep the fleet commanders fully informed of all significant military and political developments would not be complete without a reference to certain very secret information which we were receiving during this period. This information was gathered by the intelligence centers at the headquarters of Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District (Cavite), Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl Harbor), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (Washington). There was a considerable volume of this material received in Washington during 1941, but it increased substantially during the last half of the year. The volume was so great and the personnel qualified to handle it so limited that we shared the work with the Army—they processed the material one day, we did it the next.

110. To be useful, the diplomatic information obtained from this source required careful evaluation, a task which could be better performed here in Washington where the officers charged with this task had access to other sources of information, such as the State and War Departments.

111. After this information was evaluated and distilled— [5678] so to speak—we sent our conclusions and recommendations to the fleet commanders for their information and guidance.

112. I considered that the letters and despatches I sent to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet were sufficient to keep them informed on the important military and political developments in the Pacific as we knew them, and that they had received adequate information and directives to be on guard.

113. I have gone into considerable detail—though by no means mentioning all my letters and despatches—to indicate to the committee how I discharged my duties as Chief of Naval Operations with reference to the expansion of the entire naval establishment, its strength and efficiency; with reference to plans for the use of the fleet in war; with reference to assignment of forces available in accordance with war plans; and with reference to keeping the fleet commanders informed of important political and military developments affecting them.

*The text is quoted for the convenience of the committee:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum; also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately.

"Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication."

114. I have endeavored to stick to the record of events as they happened, rather than to give present impressions of what has happened, or of conjectures as to what might have happened if some things had been done differently.

115. My correspondence with the Commanders in Chief in the Pacific during the years 1940 and 1941 indicated that for almost two years before the attack on Pearl Harbor the lack [5679] of physical resources was fully known to all the Navy officers in critical positions, and that the danger of war with Japan and a possible surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and methods of meeting it had been fully considered.

116. By way of summary, I would like to point out that during the critical period October, November, and December 1941, I sent the following specific warnings to the Commanders in the Pacific:

(a) Secret dispatch, dated 16 October 1941, containing the statement:

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-America. * * * Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. * * *

(b) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, copy to Admiral Hart, dated 17 October 1941, containing the following words:

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

[5680] (c) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 7 November 1941, containing the paragraph:

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worse and worse"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever—particularly if one party cannot live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

(d) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 14 November 1941, in which I stated:

* * * I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view.

With this letter, I enclosed a memorandum for the President, prepared jointly by General Marshall and me, in which the following conclusion is stated:

War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, [5681] until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance.

and in which we recommended:

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

[5682] (e) Secret dispatch, dated 24 November 1941, stating that—

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

(f) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941, including the statement that neither the President nor Mr. Hull—

would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack.

(g) Secret dispatch, dated 27 November 1941, including the paragraph:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. * * * Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 (the war plan).

(h) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts [5683] at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

(i) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating:

Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy purple, all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today report Embassy London has complied.

(j) Secret dispatch, dated 4 December 1941, stating:

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. Report crypto channels retained.

(k) Secret dispatch, dated 6 December 1941, stating:

[5684] In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

That concludes the statement.

[5685] Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Stark, in 1940, when the discussion arose between Admiral Richardson, then Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and officials in Washington, about basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, according to the record we have to take, no question was raised by anybody prior to November 1940 about the safety of the fleet while in Pearl Harbor; is that in accord with your recollection?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall anything up until the letter which—

Mr. MITCHELL. Which you wrote?

Admiral STARK. Which I wrote at that time. There may have been.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Richardson gave the Secretary of the Navy a memorandum dated September 12 in which he listed all the objections he had to keeping the fleet based at Pearl Harbor, and in that list there was no suggestion about the dangers to the fleet while in Pearl Harbor. Can you remember any instance where the safety of the fleet was discussed before that? I mean, safety while in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. I do not, specifically. I have a rather hazy remembrance that before I wrote Admiral Richardson asking him to get data with Com. 14, with the Army, I had written Admiral Bloch, in fact, I think a letter to Admiral Richardson stated that I had gotten some information but it wasn't specific [5686] or complete enough for our purposes, and we wanted the entire situation gone over.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the first document in evidence we have in this case that anybody was worrying about the safety of the fleet while in Pearl Harbor is your letter of November 22, 1940, written to Admiral Richardson in which you referred to a dispatch that you had sent in October to Admiral Bloch asking him for a report on the question of safety.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What inspired you to write that letter, how did it happen that it occurred?

Admiral STARK. The incident at Taranto and the British success there in torpedoing ships at anchor in harbor.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that was an attack that the British made on the Italian fleet in the harbor with torpedo planes, was it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And bombers. Which was quite successful?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. Of course, we had long and often thought of an attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility and something which might some day be pulled. Our fleet exercises always contained an exercise of an attack in which the two sides, the attacking force wanted to get in, if it could, and the defending force, of course, would first want to get the [5687] attacking forces carriers. I mean, it has been much discussed. So, I am answering your question by saying that was the first time I am thinking of what documentary evidence I can recall at the moment. Whether or not I had mentioned it previously in some of my letters to Admiral Richardson, I would have to look it up.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Richardson didn't raise any question about the safety of the fleet as a reason for going back to the coast?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You agreed with him, didn't you, about the better training facilities?

Admiral STARK. I did agree with him, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You didn't raise any question at that time about the safety of the fleet?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was after the decision had been made to keep the fleet out there and a little time had passed that then you began to think about the problem; is that it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. When the fleet went out there for that fleet problem I had no thought, and so far as I know, no one else

had any thought whatsoever of the fleet remaining there. It all developed when we talked about bringing the fleet back. We had not, not having envisaged the [5688] fleet going out there, we had not sent many things which they would need to carry on their routine target practice, which was one of the things Admiral Richardson was worried about. The fleet had left with the idea of coming back. The people on the coast all expected the fleet to come back. The question of morale came up. Of reenlistments. In other words, personnel and morale and material conditions affecting training of the fleet, and also getting it ready for war quickly, that was what he was concerned about. Now, the drill out there, and so forth—and we did get them ready, but if he came back to the coast he could strip a ship more effectively and quicker than he could out there. It could be done out there. But those were his primary reasons.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, as the result of your letter to Admiral Richardson of November 22, 1940, you remember he undertook an inquiry.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. He went right out into the Army defenses and inspected those, did he not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We asked—the letter to him stated not only the fleet but the commandant of the naval district, and also the Army—so that all hands out there would be in on that estimate.

[5689] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, do you recall that it was as a result of an inquiry, started and conducted in that way, that Admiral Bloch made his report of December 30, which is in evidence here?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The report came in and our reply was largely predicated on it.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice here—

Admiral STARK. That is, our action, I should say.

Mr. MITCHELL. There has been handed me a copy of the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Director of Naval Districts Division, dated December 31, 1940, a memorandum signed by R. E. Ingersoll, Acting Chief of Naval Operations. I have never seen it before. Have you any knowledge of that?

Admiral STARK. I would like to see it.

(Short pause.)

Mr. MITCHELL. This is one of the papers that you have in the brown envelope.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the one we got today?

Mr. MITCHELL. In the same envelope.

[5690] Admiral STARK. I think I saw that. It had slipped my mind for the moment.

Mr. MITCHELL. That letter was written before Bloch's report came in, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. His report was dated the 30th of December, indorsed by Richardson at Hawaii on the 7th of January.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to put that in evidence and I will read it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is (reading):

2138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Director, Naval Districts Division.
Subject: Defense of Pearl Harbor by Army.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has for some time felt considerable concern over whether the Army's anti-aircraft defense of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, including vessels of the United States Fleet berthed there, is adequate in view of the probability of an early surprise attack by carrier aircraft if Japan decides to make war on the United States.

2. It is, therefore, requested that information be obtained concerning the details of the Army's Hawaiian defense plan in this regard. We should be informed as to their present and also the projected anti-aircraft defense, including such features as the following:

(a) Number, caliber, and proposed location of anti-aircraft guns, including machine guns.

(b) Use that is to be made of smoke screens from either fixed or mobile sources.

(c) Number and location of pursuit planes to be used for this purpose, with probable percentage of availability.

(d) The character and extent of the warning net to be used, from shore or floating stations, and the present percentage of availability of such stations.

(e) Whether or not the present defense elements have received adequate training.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Now, here is another letter dated January 9, 1941, that has not yet been offered in evidence, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of Staff. That is again signed by Admiral Ingersoll. Did you know of that at the time it was sent to the Chief of Staff?

Admiral STARK. January 9th?

Mr. MITCHELL. January 9th.

[5692] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I think I saw that. I think I have seen that despatch.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will read that into the record. [Reading:]

JANUARY 9, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations:
To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
Subject: Installation of Aircraft Detection Equipment.

1. The Navy Department considers that improvement of the antiaircraft defenses, and particularly of the aircraft detection components of those defenses, in the Hawaiian Islands is urgently necessary for the protection of the fleet units there present. It is believed that in the spring and summer of 1941 enemy air operations are much more likely to take place in the Hawaiian area and in Alaska than in Puerto Rico, Panama and the Continental United States.

2. For the foregoing reason the intended priority of permanent installation of the fixed anti-aircraft detection equipment being procured by the Navy is as follows: Midway, Johnston, Guam, Palmyra, Samoa, Wake, Guantanamo. It is requested that consideration be given to revising schedules of delivery so as to provide Army installations in the Hawaiian Islands and at Kodiak, Dutch Harbor and Sitka before completing installations at Panama and before proceeding with [5693] installations in Puerto Rico and the continental United States.

3. Confirmation is also requested of the understanding reached on 8 January 1941 in a conference between the Director of Naval Communications, the Chief Signal Office, and representatives of the War Plans Divisions of both services, that the Navy Department will be given priority in deliveries of seven sets of mobile equipment and at least eight of the eighteen sets of antiaircraft equipment for the use of Marine Defense Battalions.

4. It was learned in the conference on 8 January that delays are anticipated in obtaining steel for use in completing this equipment. It is recommended that the highest priority be given to production of this equipment and supplying the material needed. The Navy Department will be glad to cooperate in obtaining the necessary priorities.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Now, following that this Bloch report came in. You remember that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. In which he condemned the situation at Hawaii as inadequate for defense against an air attack?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

[5694] Mr. MITCHELL. And then you said in your statement today that you caused that letter to be written by Secretary Knox to Secretary of War Stimson?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. What part did you take in that?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Turner said that he did, too.

Admiral STARK. That letter was formed in the War Plans Division, gone over very carefully in the front office and then submitted to the Secretary for signature.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were in full accord with the conclusions in that letter?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; in complete accord with it.

Mr. MITCHELL. From that time on, following that letter to the Secretary of War, steps were taken by both the Army and the Navy to prime the defense, both naval and military, in Hawaii against a possible air attack, were they not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, we have had here in much of the correspondence between General Marshall and General Short, as to the latter's desire for more planes and guns and other equipment. What did the Navy do? What did you do toward supplying Admiral Kimmel with any additional equipment that he needed or that was available for defense against an air [5695] attack in the way of anti-aircraft equipment on the ground or fighter planes or reconnaissance planes, PBY's?

Admiral STARK. We increased—I have forgotten just how much, of course it is a matter of record—the number of squadrons he had out there capable of long distance reconnaissance. With regard to surface vessels, we were able to do very, very little for him and we—

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, were surface vessels of real significance in the detection of an incoming enemy carrier force?

Admiral STARK. They would have been helpful, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. They would have had a great deal of ground to cover, would they not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, they would have had a great deal of ground to cover but still you will note in his letters his constant request for them and my statement to him that we could not supply them.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I inferred from his letters that he was referring a good deal to patrols against submarines.

Admiral STARK. Yes, but they might have helped him in an emergency to use his eyes. For example, we told him that we did not have them and that he would have to detail such craft from his own fleet, which meant a detail of destroyers. I told him—I think it appears in one of these personal [5696] letters—that statement and we also sent him an official letter to that extent.

Mr. MITCHELL. Am I wrong in thinking that that patrol by surface craft was merely for the purpose of determining submarines approaching and vessels?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was all to be used in that, in the distance. It would have helped him for use in shore patrol, but he might have extended them.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you were familiar with the plans that were made from time to time thereafter affecting Hawaii, directed toward the coordination and the union of action between the Army and Navy forces in defense against an air attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember the Martin-Bellinger report?

Admiral STARK. Very clearly, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. In which they practically described the Jap attack as it afterwards occurred?

Admiral STARK. Well, we thought that report was so good when it came in that we distributed it as noted in the statement.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, in August 1941 there was a report or study by General Martin, the Army air commander, [5697] that went directly to the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Did you see that, that study of reconnaissance by Martin?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall having seen it at the time. I may have. I have seen it since.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that report showed very clearly that in order to insure against the complete thwarting of an air attack by the Japs it would be necessary to detect their carriers at sea the afternoon before and bomb them?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was the conclusion that Martin and Bellinger reached together, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Well, the conclusion was to spot them, if you could, before they could launch their planes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that is what I am leading up to.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, in order to be sure that your fleet was not going to be bombed from the air they agreed that you would have to catch the carriers before their planes were launched, did they not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And they figured out that the natural way for the Japs to come in there would be at daylight, that is, with the planes.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[5698] Mr. MITCHELL. And it would be necessary to run a reconnaissance out for seven or eight or nine hundred or a thousand miles and detect them the afternoon or the night before in order to damage them before their planes were launched, is that right?

Admiral STARK. It is always the objective to get the carriers before they can launch their planes.

Mr. MITCHELL. And it was also equally true, as they said, that actually if you could not do that, if you had to rely on catching the planes in the morning after they had left the carriers and had been launched at a distance up to two or three or four hundred miles, they could not be confident that the attack would not get home to some extent.

Admiral STARK. It is pretty difficult to stop all of an air attack once it gets started. You might break up its effectiveness somewhat but some planes, we have always felt, are very likely to get in.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, as a result of all those studies and all those plans, which indicated very clearly that unless you had a certain number of reconnaissance planes and a certain number of bombers you could not count on discovering the Japs before they had launched their planes, you were taking some hazards by having your fleet in Pearl Harbor, isn't that correct?

[5699] **Admiral STARK.** There is always a hazard to have a fleet on the firing line, sir, or in an exposed position and there has been ever since the war started.

Mr. MITCHELL. The number of planes that the Army had and the number of planes that the Navy had were admittedly known at both ends, both at Hawaii and in Washington by the Army and Navy to be inadequate to run a full reconnaissance over a 360-degree circle at a distance of seven or eight hundred miles, is that true?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And isn't it a fact that your PBY's, plus the bombers that were there for the Army, were so limited in number that the best you could put out, or that the commander out there could put out would be to run a sectional reconnaissance, taking one sector one afternoon or morning and another one another day?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. He did not have enough for a 360-degree search.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, even assuming that he left out the west and southwest, where your task forces were operating and Guam and Midway intervening and all that, and he even tried to cover the area to the north, which was apparently the dangerous area, there being little traffic up there, the commanders out there could not have run a reconnaissance that would [5700] cover more than a third of the area in one day, could they?

Admiral STARK. Well, I do not understand just what you mean by "a third of the way" or "a third of the area."

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am speaking of a sector. There is 180 degrees on the north side on a horizontal line.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am speaking of a reconnaissance to the north.

Admiral STARK. Yes. He did not have enough for that whole northern semicircle.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, could they have covered more than a third of that northern semicircle daily?

Admiral STARK. The air people have testified on that, as to what they could cover, or if they have not testified they can testify, considering the upkeep of their planes and their pilots, and so forth, and I hesitate to get into detail on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Martin said he needed 189 big four-motored planes to run a 360-degree reconnaissance daily out to a distance of 700 or 800 miles. That would mean half that number at least to run the 180-degree sector, would it not, and you did not have that many?

Admiral STARK. Kimmel had available, without regard to Army planes, approximately 60 operating planes at that time. [5701] He had 82, I believe, out there, of which 60 were operating. There are always a certain number laid up for repairs.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, he had a little less than a third of the planes that Martin reported he needed for the 360 degrees.

Admiral STARK. As I say, that has been studied both by the Army and the Navy. There has been testimony submitted, not before this court, but I believe before the Navy last summer, or perhaps before the Army, as to what could have been done and witnesses can be called for that. I would hesitate to pronounce an opinion.

Mr. MITCHELL. I was hoping possibly that you had given that subject some thought in 1941 when the question of the safety of the fleet was at stake and that maybe you had formed some ideas yourself about the extent of the hazards and the difficulty of their discovering the Jap carrier fleet in that way. Did you not give it some attention then?

Admiral STARK. Yes. What we did was to give them in distributing all we had to different areas, all that we felt that they needed—all that we felt that we could give them.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

Admiral STARK. They needed more.

Mr. MITCHELL. You gave them everything you had.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[5702] Mr. MITCHELL. But it was not quite enough.

Admiral STARK. No, it was not.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is just what I am getting to. I think I am not making any statement exactly as to what the record will show, but the impression one gains from it to date is that admittedly they were away short of the reconnaissance planes, fighting planes and anti-aircraft of Hawaii and that the chances of detecting a carrier force in time to destroy the carriers before the planes were launched was a rather slim chance, as Mr. Churchill said about the Chinese.

Admiral STARK. When you haven't got enough planes to search the entire area which you would like to search, whether it is planes or what not, you narrow down to where you think is the most likely area of travel and your next study is how can you cover that or how much of it you can cover. That had been studied out, I believe, and witnesses who have made that study can be available.

Mr. MITCHELL. I was trying to get your views on it.

Admiral STARK. I know it only by hearsay. I never made a personal study of the number of degrees they could cover, and so forth.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, were you troubled about the possibility of an air attack at Hawaii after the 1st of November 1941 as a possibility? Did it seem to you to be a real [5703] hazard?

Admiral STARK. We always recognized the possibility.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, when you had a fleet out there and you did not have an adequate antiaircraft defense why were you not worried about the safety of the fleet in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I stated in my letter that I was worried about it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that is in November 1940.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am bringing you down now to the period between November 27th and December 7, 1941. Had you lost your fear of an air attack?

Admiral STARK. No, I won't say that I was fearing an air attack. We recognized the possibility of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, had you changed your views?

Admiral STARK. And we recognized that we should be ready so far as what we had available to use.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, suppose you did not have enough and you thought there was a substantial hazard, didn't the question arise in your mind and those of your staff here as to what you ought to do, whether you ought to move the fleet east a ways or make arrangements to keep a smaller number of the vessels in the harbor at a time and things of that kind?

[5704] Admiral STARK. There are certain hazards which you have to anticipate. As to just what should be kept in port and what should be kept at sea of what was out there, that was clearly up to the man on the spot.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your idea was that having done everything you could for him and given him all the equipment that you could scrape up and he was still inadequately prepared to defend against an air attack, that the responsibility of just what he did to meet that situation was up to him, is that the idea?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. That was all we could do, except we were pressing continually to get more material.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I know, but I am talking now about on November 27th, when the clock had struck and the codes were being burned and war was a matter of days and you could not get any material in that length of time. You were up against a second problem, weren't you, of how to handle the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was then up to the Commander in Chief on the spot. I would not have presumed, sitting at a desk in Washington, to tell him what to do with his fleet. There were many factors involved, of which he was the only person who had the knowledge, and once I had started, if I had started, to give him directives, I would have been , [5705] handling the fleet. That was not my job.

Mr. MITCHELL. I was wondering why when you sent the warning message at that time, what does this "defensive deployment" mean that was in your message of November 27th? What does that mean as applied to the conditions that existed there?

Admiral STARK. My thought in that message about the defensive deployment was clear all-out security measures. Certainly, having been directed to take a defensive deployment, the Army having been directed to make reconnaissance, but regardless of the Army, our message to Admiral Kimmel, that the natural thing—and perhaps he did do it—was to take up with the Army right away in the gravity of the situation, the plans that they had made, and then make dispositions as best he could against surprise for the safety not only of the ships which he decided to keep in port but also for the safety of the ships which he had at sea. He had certain material which he could use for that and we naturally expected he would use it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the word "deployment," at least in the Army sense, is to scatter, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that what you meant when you applied it to the Navy command?

[5706] Admiral STARK. He should deploy what planes he had; submarines are splendid craft to see without being seen. They might have been employed. He could have used a light force if he had seen

fit and had them available. He had certain forces at sea. We were not handling them. That was his force. Just what deployment he was using them for, that also was up to him. He could search—I am not stating that he should and it is difficult to testify on this, particularly in the light of hindsight.

Mr. MITCHELL. I know.

Admiral STARK. It is awfully difficult to keep away from it.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am just trying to get a translation of the words "defensive deployment."

Admiral STARK. Well, a defensive deployment would be to spread and to use his forces to the maximum extent to avoid surprise and, if he could, to hit the other fellow and in conjunction with the Army, to implement the arrangements which had previously been made for just this sort of thing.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you think the possibilities of a successful surprise attack by the Japs in the way that it was done was increased by moving the shipping out of the northern ship lanes in October? Did that give the Japs a little better chance to get through without being observed?

[5707] Admiral STARK. It never occurred to me, I never thought of it in that light until I heard it brought up recently, because there were not many ships up there, not an awful lot anyway. It was easy to cross the lanes. A fleet that does not want to be seen and that has adequate air scouting does not have to be seen as a rule. They can steam darkened at night. Also, they can search out the night area that they propose to go through and I would not have said that it had any bearing.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were aware, of course, that the Jap espionage system in Hawaii was working without any real hindrance?

Admiral STARK. The Jap what, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. The Jap espionage system, their spies in Hawaii.

Admiral STARK. We had always felt—and again there are other witnesses available to you there who can tell you just what the Japs were doing. We had felt that not only in Hawaii but at practically all our given posts the Japs knew everything we were doing.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you told us here, and you, yourself, knew then in 1941, that the Japs not only had every opportunity to watch the movements in Hawaii and to know whether the forces there were alert or not alert, but they also had other means of communicating it to their superiors in Tokyo. They had access to the radio and to the cable companies?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Don't you think that really the key to this attack at Pearl Harbor was not only the fact that our forces were not alerted but that the Japs knew it?

Admiral STARK. You mean they knew our forces were not alerted?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. That would be conjecture. I do not know, sir. They may have, but I do not know. We have nothing, I believe, of record to show it. I think it is very likely.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have plenty in this record to show they were getting dispatches from Hawaii every day telling exactly what was going on and they were inquiring about the conditions there. Some

of these dispatches that we did get and decoded in time talk about aircraft reconnaissance and all that sort of thing.

Admiral STARK. That is true, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a fact, isn't it, that they must have known everything he was doing and had every means of reporting that fact to their government.

Admiral STARK. That is true, yes, sir. Just what they reported in the last hours I do not know, but what you say is [5709] quite true.

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not mean over the last hours but I mean over the last weeks.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. As a matter of fact, that was a considerable hazard normally in the Japs making an attack of that kind, a hazard to them, was it not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And in order to decide whether they would take it or not they would have to know something about the extent of preparedness at the other end, wouldn't they?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know here in Washington between November 27 and December 7, 1941, that our D. F. system, direction finder system, had lost track of all but two divisions of Jap carriers and that they did not pick them up again before the 7th?

Admiral STARK. I was familiar at that time in general with the general picture. It is a long time ago and what I heard recently that is so definite on that. Just how much I am colored by hindsight on that I do not know. I do distinctly recall their changes of call signs and that sort of material and also we asked—it shows in the record, I believe—the Army to make reconnaissance over the Mandates [5710] and we were not too sure at that time, in fact I say we were not too sure; the last information we had as to the carriers had come in some time previously as I recall.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, your report sheets that we have here about the location of carriers seem to differ a little bit from the ones that they were using out in Hawaii. Didn't you get your information from Hawaii or did you pick it up directly here in the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. The information that came in with regard to material of that sort came from the field. That is, it came from Hawaii and it came from the Philippines. We were dependent upon them for that information.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had about the same data to work on that they did?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, there are two in one of the old records that has not been presented yet here, there is evidence by one of the officers in charge of that work in Hawaii, of the direction finding reports and ship locations, that they lost track of the Jap carriers around the 26th or 27th of November and that he reported it to his chief.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did anything like that occur around that time? Did anybody call it to your attention, anything to [5711] that effect?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of it now.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready to suspend?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock on Wednesday morning. The chair desires to hold a brief executive session with the committee and everybody else will please retire from the room.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p. m., December 31, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 2, 1946.)

[5712]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Murphy, and Gearhart.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

[5713] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Counsel may proceed with Admiral Stark.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Stark, there is a letter from you to Admiral Richardson dated December 23, 1940, in which you offered the prediction that war with Japan would come at any time after the next 90 days and then I notice on October 17, 1941, there is a letter from you to Admiral Kimmel in which you state: "Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us."

What caused your change in view about the possibility or probability of war with Japan during that period?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was the information that developed as time went on.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, just what information was it that indicated any less tension with Japan up to October 1941 that led you to reach that conclusion?

Admiral STARK. Well, it is the information which is on file and which I have read, you may recall. I think, in my statement, I remember distinctly of having written it, that at one point in 1941 Japan seemed to have developed one of those waiting attitudes, that there was sort of a lull, and that may have accounted for that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was your view the same as that expressed [5714] here by Admiral Wilkinson, that you thought the Japs would nudge along slowly and grab what it could without a fight? Did you have the same view as Wilkinson about that?

Admiral STARK. Well, I had in mind and I think—well, I will say that I had in mind the possibility of Japan playing the same game that Hitler did, that is, one at a time. That was just one factor.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, when it came to November 24, 1941, and your warning of November 27 you changed back to the view then that war with Japan was only a matter of days.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is the message of November 27, 1941.

Admiral STARK. The message of the 27th or the 24th?

Mr. MITCHELL. Both of them I should have said.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am referring now to the two messages of November 24 and 27 which you sent to Admiral Kimmel, the warning messages in which you then appeared to have the view that war was only a matter of days.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was that based on?

Admiral STARK. Well, we had at that time the intercepts giving dead lines, which I think you will recall, the first being the 25th, the next the 29th. That furnished some [5715] background. We had the note of the Japanese of November 20, I believe it was, which was irreconcilable with our viewpoint.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have before you the intercepts which Japan had sent to their Ambassadors here, which said that unless they get an affirmative agreement from us to abandon China and start furnishing them oil that they would go ahead, or something would automatically happen?

Admiral STARK. Well, I had that also. I have forgotten just when the intercept came in. I may also state, since you included the message of the 27th, we had Mr. Hull's reaction to the Chiang Kai-Shek notes regarding the *modus vivendi*.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean you learned from him that he had abandoned the idea of the *modus vivendi* because of the objections of Chiang Kai-Shek that it would collapse China's army?

Admiral STARK. I may state with regard to the message from Chiang Kai-Shek that Mr. Hull called me up, I am not sure just when, it may have been the 25th or it may have been the 26th, I kept no record and I have tried to straighten that out, but he called me up stating how very much he was put out by the action of Chiang Kai-Shek in sending that despatch and rather broadcasting it and it worried him very greatly and I gathered that that, along with other reactions that he had, might lead him to abandon the *modus vivendi*, and then we had [5716] also his statement about that time that it was now up to the Army and Navy. It was the first time that Mr. Hull had stated definitely to me, indicated to me, that he considered there was no chance of a settlement through diplomatic intercourse with the Japs.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, in your warning messages of November 24 and 27, 1941, you had taken into account and evaluated all these Japanese diplomatic intercepts and the exchanges which showed the dead line and the refusal of Japan to go along unless we affirmatively agreed to their ideas, you took all that into account and evaluation?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, assuming for the present at least that you gave your commander at Pearl Harbor a sufficient warning of the imminence of immediate war generally with Japan in a few days, I am interested in knowing what your attitude was about the possibility of that war

involving an attack on Pearl Harbor. They are quite two different things, are they not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, the commanders at Hawaii were evidently of the opinion that there wasn't any chance of an air attack and what I am interested in bringing out is what the views and the attitude of the high command in the Navy Department [5717] were on that very point. Now, what was your personal view about the possibility of an air attack on Hawaii as of November 27 to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. I was not expecting an air attack on Hawaii at that time. I was surprised at that attack. I knew it to be a possibility, which I think is plain from the letters that I have written and our efforts to help them out there to be in position to guard against such an attack, but as to actually expecting an attack at that time, I did not. The evidence which we had and the only tangible evidence was that the action, the initial attacks by the Japs, would come in the Far Eastern area.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, did your view accord with that of your chief assistants in the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. I believe Admiral Ingersoll is to be one of the witnesses here and in his testimony of last summer it is my recollection that he stated that he also was surprised at that attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am referring not so much to his testimony given since as to their expressions at the time you had consultations with them.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, it is my recollection that he was surprised at that time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, before the attack did Admiral Ingersoll [5718] or any other of your assistants in their consultations with you make any expressions to you as to their views about an air attack before December 7? Was it the subject of discussion?

Admiral STARK. It was a subject of discussion so far as possibility is concerned. As I recollect, we went into all phases of it but we did not have anything definitely pointing toward an air attack. However, it was our intention to put the forces in the Pacific, to put Hawaii on guard against an air attack. It is my recollection that the words "in any direction" appearing in the message of November 24 was at my suggestion. In other words, we had some definite indications of an attack in certain directions, and which proved to be correct as regards the main campaign, but that did not preclude attack elsewhere, and by the words "in any direction" we intended to convey that it might come anywhere, but personally I did not expect an attack on such a broad scale by Japan in the initial stages, that is, not only all over the Far East but as far east as Hawaii. I knew it to be a possibility; and as regards submarines, I would not have been a bit surprised if some submarines had appeared, for example, off San Francisco or anywhere else in the Pacific, but we looked for the main effort in the Far East but it was our intention to convey to Hawaii the possibility of an attack there; that is, it was [5719] our intention, at least, to put them on guard against such an attack and we thought we had done so.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, if you had that in your mind when you wrote these messages of November 24 and November 27, why did you

say merely, "Including the Philippines and Guam" as a possibility, or mention even Borneo as a possibility? Why didn't you say something to the effect that an attack on Hawaii is a possibility?

Admiral STARK. Well, the Philippines and Borneo and that area in general and Guam was in our thoughts not only as a possibility but as a likely point of attack. I think perhaps my best answer to your question would be that we did not put Hawaii down as likely of attack as we did these other places.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I know but, still, if you thought that there was any possibility, if your intention was to put the commanders at Hawaii on alert against a local attack, why not say so in the messages? Doesn't the message really reflect your view, your personal opinion that Hawaii was really not in substantial hazard of any attack?

Admiral STARK. No, I would not go that—I would not say that, sir, because if we had thought that there was no possibility or no danger of that we would not have given them the directive which we did, which directive was intended to have them take up a position or take action against surprise; [5720] that is the directive to make a defensive deployment.

May I just refer to this message of the 27th for a minute and look at it?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. It will be noted that when we stated "Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days" we stated, which was from the information we had, that "the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo," and then we gave the directive. We gave the information which we had. We had nothing which we thought at that time—I may say certain messages have been developed since regarding which I assume you will ask me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. But at that time we had nothing, or at least I do not recall having anything which indicated an attack on Hawaii, while we did have rather definite information regarding an amphibious expedition and an attack in southeast Asia.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, who prepared this warning message of November 27th and the one of the 24th?

Admiral STARK. Those war warnings were initially prepared in War Plans, Admiral Turner.

[5721] Mr. MITCHELL. Who suggested that you mention Borneo as a possibility?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall who mentioned it. The NEI was always a possibility.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you were drawing those messages, did the people that helped you prepare them and yourself have any discussion as to whether Hawaii might be an object of attack?

Admiral STARK. Well, it is my recollection that we discussed all phases of the matter. I do not specifically recall just what the conversations were. I may state, though, that regardless of anything which I say now or hereafter in the development of this as you may ask me that I was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, the messages really reflect the view that you had that Pearl Harbor was not in substantial hazard, do they not, at the time they were drawn, that were in your mind?

Admiral STARK. Well, they were in my mind also and, as I stated, we had intended to convey that an attack there was a possibility and to that extent that we should be on guard. I also want to make that real plain.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you intended to do so, but what is there in your messages that said so?

[5722] **Admiral STARK.** There is nothing in the message, that is, there is no definite statement in the messages which we sent to Admiral Kimmel or, as I recollect, in any of the messages of that time, which mentioned Pearl Harbor as a possibility in so many words, but we did mention that we expected war, we mentioned that it might come in any direction and we directed a development, which we thought would put them on guard against such a possibility.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was that warning message of November 27 sent to the President before it was issued?

Admiral STARK. I did not put that in my statement because I could not swear, for example, that it was, but it is my rather clear recollection. If he were here I would have verified it with him, if I could have, and put it in. The message was of such importance that I went personally to see the Secretary of the Navy about it because it was an all-out.

We had nothing definite at that time to say that Japan was going to attack the United States. It was an inference on our part and I remember at the time that I thought I might be taking my hand off my number a little bit in going so far, but we had to make a decision. Time was creeping up on us, this thing had been going on for a long time. We had the State Department reaction, as I have mentioned before, that it was now up to us. I either told the President beforehand [5723] or immediately after. I do know that within 24 hours, if not before, that it had his full approval and that he gave us an O. K.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, my attention was attracted by the fact that this message you sent said nothing about not committing the first overt act and that appears to have been the point that the President was very much interested in, so it raises a question as to whether he saw it before it was sent. Your idea is that he saw it either before or afterwards, you are not sure which, is that right?

Admiral STARK. I think it was before but I would not like definitely to say so.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you a copy of the Army message before you at the time you sent your own?

Admiral STARK. We had discussed it; yes, sir. Gerow came over to my office, as I recollect, on the afternoon of the 27th with that message and I sent for Turner, probably also Ingersoll because Ingersoll generally was called in on everything of that sort, just as was Turner. As a matter of fact they usually came through Admiral Ingersoll first and—

Mr. STARK. Well, Gerow had been advised on the 26th that the President wanted this overt act business in the warning message and if he saw you don't you think he brought that to your attention?

[5724] Admiral STARK. I am certain that he did—you mean that who brought it to my attention?

Mr. MITCHELL. Gerow.

Admiral STARK. The President or Gerow?

Mr. MITCHELL. Gerow. You say you saw him and conferred with him about the warning messages and your messages before they were sent and Gerow certainly was impressed by the need for following the President's direction about that.

Admiral STARK. Well, the Army despatch differs in some particulars from our despatch. It was their despatch and I personally was not worried about an overt act in Hawaii, in the Hawaiian area so far as the Navy was concerned. You will recall, for example—I think it is in an exhibit here, I am not sure, but I recall Admiral Kimmel having told me about his orders to bomb a submarine which should come within certain areas in the Hawaiian area and I took no exception to that whatever.

[5725] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, your only statement in the message of November 27 which you think put the people in Hawaii on guard against an attack at Pearl Harbor was this direction to conduct an appropriate defensive deployment under WPL-46?

Admiral STARK. Preparatory.

Mr. MITCHELL. Preparatory?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now the main part of WPL-46 involved an offensive attack against the Jap Mandate, did it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Preparatory defensive deployment according to WPL-46 might well be construed to be some preliminary movement preparatory to carrying out that offense against the Japanese Mandated Islands, might it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. And was it not susceptible to that interpretation by the man who received the message?

Admiral STARK. It was, but along with it a defensive deployment which we regarded as taking a position as best he could with what he had for the defense of his fleet, whatever he had either at sea or in port, to the best of his ability and to guard against being caught unawares.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, your idea is when you told him to [5726] take defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out that WPL-46, which involved mainly offensive action against the Jap Mandate, you mean that in doing that he might incidentally be guarding himself against an air attack, is that the idea?

Admiral STARK. I would say it was more than incidental. I would say the defensive deployment was to guard against being caught by surprise, and the preparatory to carrying out WPL-46 we thought showed, in our minds, that war might eventuate at any time and that WPL-46 would then come into full sway. If he were to take these measures it would be the first measures to be followed in case of war by the implementation of the war plan.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, did this defensive deployment which you mentioned in the message of November 27 involve the movement of battleships in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I left that entirely to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am asking you whether your idea in carrying out this defensive deployment with a view for the preparation of WPL-46 called for the movement of any battleships out of the harbor of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I did not consider that particular point at that time, so far as I recall. It is very difficult to give any categorical answer as to what I believe is the purport of your question—if I do not will you correct me— [5727] as to whether he should have left the Fleet in Pearl Harbor or taken it out.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is not what I am asking you. I am asking you whether or not the directive for further deployment of the Fleet with the view to carrying out WPL-46, a defensive deployment, would reasonably call for the movement of battleships to sea—not an air attack movement but a deployment.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that I thought at that time of that particular detail. It was a matter entirely within his province.

There were many factors which would affect the movement of ships, with regard to what he had available in the air there at that time, and a number of other things. That was his job and I did not go into it.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had a map in your room somewhere in the Navy Department that showed the precise location of ships in the Pacific Fleet day by day, did you not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did not you have a ship movement division there that kept track of where the Fleet was?

Admiral STARK. Not in detail, sir. The ships were in the Hawaiian area, but their departures from Pearl Harbor, for example, to their target practice ground or other local maneuvers, and that sort of thing, to my best knowledge and [5728] belief we did not know. I know I did not know it. He was not required to report that. If he wanted to move the Fleet to the West coast, for example, he would not have done it without asking our permission, but if he wanted to go 100 miles in this or that direction, or if he wanted to go out for some special maneuver or for target practice, or what not, he would not have reported that to us.

Mr. MITCHELL. You did not then have a system of keeping track of the daily location of ships or of the fact that ships were or were not in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know that the battleships were in Pearl Harbor prior to the 7th, that they were collected there?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall at that time. I might say with regard to the previous answer that there were certain things laid down in the schedule calling for repairs of ships at a certain time which had to be dovetailed with the shore establishment, and those what might be called fixed positions we knew, but as for the general movement in and out of Pearl Harbor under his local arrangements, we did not know that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I believe on November 26, at the very same time that this message was sent or thereabout, orders were given to Admiral Kimmel to send two of his carriers to the west, the *Lexington* and *Enterprise*, that is, [5729] he was ordered to do it if he considered it feasible.

You knew that his 2 carriers had left to the west with their air screen? That was the movement that called for the shipment of 25 Army pursuit planes to Wake and 25 to Midway from Pearl Harbor, and was stripping Pearl Harbor to that extent of defenses against an air attack.

Now do you think that was a movement that you ordered, or at least suggested he take, was consistent with the idea that Pearl Harbor was in immediate or possible danger of an air attack?

Admiral STARK. With regard to the movement of those carriers, the order for carrying that out at that particular time was Admiral Kimmel's order, not the Department's. We had taken up the movement to which you refer, as I recall, a month or a little over a month before hand. Admiral Kimmel had made a plan as to how that movement was to be made also as I recall about 3 weeks prior to its being made in which he directed how it should be made. He stated, as I recall, in that order that he would implement it later on, which he did. But the order to go at that time was his own, and as I recall, we were told, in answer to the dispatch asking him as to the advisability, and other things, about the *Enterprise*, I believe it was, which left around the 28th.

Mr. MITCHELL. The *Lexington* left December 5.

[5730] Admiral STARK. Yes. I do not recall, and I recollect of no evidence of his reporting to us about the movement of the *Lexington* which left the 5th.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you knew that they were both designed to move to the west, that plans had been made to carry the planes out there.

Admiral STARK. Yes; but the date was set by him.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I know——

Admiral STARK. We had covered that over a month beforehand.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know that they had not departed prior to November 27? Did not you know that the movement was taking place right about the time that you were sending these warning messages out there?

Admiral STARK. Not until his message came in in reply to the one in which we asked his advice on the relief—on the movement of certain Army troops, nor do I recall that we ever were informed about the movement of the *Lexington*.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you knew that 25 Army pursuit planes to Wake and 25 to Midway were to be taken from Hawaii, did you not?

Admiral STARK. I think you are referring to the message of the 26th.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

[5731] Admiral STARK. In which we put up a proposal——

Mr. MITCHELL. It is on page 42 of your correspondence, I think. I guess I have the wrong place here. What dispatch have you before you, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. I have the dispatch 270038 and it bears the date of 26 November, which was the one I was looking for and to which I thought you referred.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you read that into the record, please?

Admiral STARK (reading:)

In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army

pursuit planes at Midway and the similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable.

This being to CincPac.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your dispatch to Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats. Essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips on regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes [5732] must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to the Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Navy bombs now at outlying positions to be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations. Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.

I note in the dispatch that we state "provided you consider this feasible and desirable," and he is also requested to "confer with the Commanding General" out there about it, and to advise us as soon as practicable.

Now Admiral Kimmel's answer to that, if you would like to have it——

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me inquire, does that dispatch appear in the exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 37 is the one it should be in.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is not in Exhibit 37, the basic Navy dispatch.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this dispatch appear in any of the exhibits?

Mr. MITCHELL. It does not. It is something we have put our hands on more lately. I am bringing it out this morning. It is the dispatch dated November 26 from the Chief of Naval [5733] Operations to Kimmel and provides for the removal of 25 pursuit planes from Hawaii to Wake and to Midway as on the 26th of November, the day before the warning message was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get the time of sending it, if they have it.

Mr. MITCHELL. The hour you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; when it arrived out there.

Admiral STARK. Our message number is 270038, which means 38 minutes after midnight on the 27th, Greenwich time.

Mr. MITCHELL. What time is that in Washington?

Admiral STARK. Well, Washington is five hours earlier, so the message actually went out on the 26th Washington time.

The CHAIRMAN. About 7 or 8 o'clock?

Admiral STARK. Well, 5 from 12 would be 7. I should say about half-past 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Morning or evening?

Admiral STARK. In the evening.

Mr. MITCHELL. The evening of the 26th?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Don't you think that the fact of your agreeing to take 25 pursuit planes out of Hawaii and sending them to Wake and Midway on the 26th indicated pretty plainly to the Commander at Hawaii that you did not think they were needed there for defense against an air attack?

[5734] Admiral STARK. We left that to him to balance against the needs.

Mr. MITCHELL. I know you left it to him, but I am trying to find out what your frame of mind was and what inferences he could fairly draw as to your attitude about it.

Admiral STARK. I do not know what he drew from our attitude except as was answered by his dispatch.

Mr. MITCHELL. He thought it was all right because he was not worrying about an air attack, and you thought it was all right because you were not worrying about an air attack, isn't that the plain fact about it?

Admiral STARK. Yes. It was toward strengthening that general area, and it strengthened it obviously against an air attack should it occur further westward in those outlying islands.

Mr. MITCHELL. It obviously strengthened Wake and Guam and it weakened the most important base you had—Hawaii.

Admiral STARK. This was Wake and Midway.

Mr. MITCHELL. I mean Wake and Midway, yes.

Admiral STARK. And we considered Midway in particular a very vital point because of its closeness to Hawaii. Wake stuck out in a sort of an area which we realized would be difficult to defend from the fleet standpoint, but we were sending planes to the Philippines via those two islands at [5735] that time. That movement was also important, and this was in connection with it.

Mr. MITCHELL. What did Admiral Kimmel reply? Would you read that, so we will have it in the record?

Admiral STARK. His message is dated 28 November 1941. The time group on it is 280627. That is 6:27 in the morning, which would be 1 o'clock our time, and 5½ hours earlier his time.

Mr. GESELL. That is the sending time?

Admiral STARK. It would be back on the 25th.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the sending time, is it?

Admiral STARK. I mean the 27th. That is the sending time, yes. He refers to our two dispatches 270038 and 270040; the last one I believe I have not read yet.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose you read 270040 before you read his reply?

Admiral STARK. 270040 dispatch reads as follows—

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Admiral STARK. That is the 27th also, just after midnight, our dispatch, which would have been about 7 o'clock in the evening of the 26th.

Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare [5736] in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommend armament.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that relate to the garrisons of some of these Islands to the west?

Admiral STARK. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now read his reply.

Admiral STARK. In his reply he refers to the two messages from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have read, and he states:

Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one squadron Marine planes. Afterwards proceeds Midway to land similar items.

Already arranged to send each those places leaving Pearl about 1 December essential ground material for temporary operation 12 B-17 Army bombers, but at present only 6 such planes of the 12 on Oahu in operating condition.

Acute shortage Army bombs precludes any shipment to outlying bases but Navy bombs now available there usable by Army with minor alteration.

Doubtful capability Army pursuit planes to operate over 20 miles offshore radically limits their usefulness for [5737] insular defense. Their use possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landed. Flexibility disposition thereby curtailed.

Additional AA guns required this area for Army and Marine defense battalions. Plans for Army troop reinforcement outlying bases being made however consider such use inadvisable as long as Marines available. All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval command.

Twelve Marine fighters leave 28 November in carrier for Wake. Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later. On December 1 sending twelve patrol planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. Will investigate more thoroughly feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes with Army pursuit.

Now I would like to state that, so far as I know or recall, the part of that dispatch which I read, which speaks about the 12 Marine fighters leaving on 28 November in a carrier for Wake was the only information sent to us giving the definite time of the movement of the *Lexington* group or the *Enterprise* group.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; he did refer in that message to a later shipment to be made without giving a date.

Admiral STARK. Well, the earlier shipment he informed us about probably were not carriers.

[5738] Mr. MITCHELL. What is that?

Admiral STARK. The *Wright* was out there with supplies, if you are referring to the first part of the dispatch.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the last part of it he says "we are going later to send some bombers out there."

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. How were they to be sent?

Admiral STARK. He says "on December 1 sending 12 patrol planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl." They would fly.

Mr. MITCHELL. They would fly?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[5739] Mr. MITCHELL. Did Admiral Kimmel—

Admiral STARK. Would you like my reply to that, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, if you have it available.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire: Is his reply in exhibit 37?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. These are new messages. We have not had them available for the committee before, or ourselves for that matter.

Admiral STARK. We have a file that we have had made up covering that which I am sure, if the committee so requires, the Navy Depart-

ment will be glad to furnish. It covers the dispatches I have just read and other matters bearing on the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest that copies be prepared for distribution to the committee. You may read them into the record now and they will become part of the hearings, but for convenience it might be well for the committee to have copies.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I think they should be made available in connection with the dispatches from October 17 on, when this thing started. There are dispatches from October 17 giving the reasons for these things. They are already in the record of the Navy Board at page 321 on—the Navy narrative.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, during the noon hour we will review the file and get them together.

[5740] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I might say that the narrative is not an official document.

Mr. MURPHY. I am just saying that they are available. They have been available.

The CHAIRMAN. The narrative is not an official document but it is available here.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Admiral, you have another document that you want to read?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, just to have the record clear on that matter—may I ask counsel if he would get the time from the witness now, so that it will be at this place in the record, as to when the Navy prepared the document that he is now reading from?

The CHAIRMAN. Will counsel inquire as to that?

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't know what he is reading from.

Senator FERGUSON. He indicated that the Navy had made up a file on this matter and other matters. I would like to get the time when the Navy made it up.

Mr. MITCHELL. Who made that file up for you?

Admiral STARK. I directed it be prepared, because the question of movement of these carriers came up in the hearings last summer, and I thought it possible it might come up again, and I wanted put together the dispatches in convenient form, which I have here.

[5741] Mr. MITCHELL. And who did the work?

Admiral STARK. I wanted it in convenient form for reference. The work was done by counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your counsel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It is my own. I mean, the Navy Department did not do this for me. I asked for these from the Navy Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

Does the document that the admiral now holds in his hands cover all of the messages that were sent by the admiral and received by Admiral Kimmel on this question?

Admiral STARK. I think it does; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. How many documents are there? You have read three of them.

Admiral STARK. Well, there is another dispatch, and then there is the order to which I referred where Admiral Kimmel laid the plans for this movement.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose you read the other dispatches?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask if this is something that you have had dug out from the Navy Department or whether the Navy has dug it out for you that they didn't dig out for us.

Mr. MITCHELL. He explained that it was dug out by his counsel.

[5742] The CHAIRMAN. Why didn't the Navy dig it out for us?

Admiral STARK. The Navy had not dug anything out for me, sir. I have done my own digging.

Mr. MITCHELL. I didn't ask him for it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, does that indicate that if we don't inquire about it that we are not getting it from the Navy?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that it necessarily indicates that. Probably Admiral Stark knew about it, and nobody else did, and nobody, certainly outside of the Navy, would have known about it. I can't explain why it wasn't included in these other documents, although it is included in the narrative story furnished by the Navy.

I think it advisable that all these be read into the hearings and made a part of the record.

Mr. MITCHELL. These dispatches—there is nothing secret about it—I understand that they were dug up in previous hearings. The significance of them didn't strike us very hard at one time, and now it has, so we are going into it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that the message of the 26th is on page 325 of volume 2 of the narrative; it is Exhibit 70 in the Hewitt Report, Document No. 24, Exhibit 70, in the Hewitt Report; it is Exhibit 38 at page 50 in the Naval Court of Inquiry. So there is nothing [5743] secretive about it. This matter has been in the hands of the committee for at least the last month.

[5744] The CHAIRMAN. Let us make it a part of the record here.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, in order that there is no question, I make the suggestion that the liaison man from the Navy who is handling these documents make a further search on behalf of the committee to ascertain whether or not there are any more documents bearing upon this question.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean on this question of shipping planes?

Senator LUCAS. Upon this one question.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you were about to make an observation, Mr. Mitchell, when I interrupted you.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I have forgotten what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral, suppose you read the rest of this file into the record now so that we will have it there and we can get mimeographs of it afterward.

Admiral STARK. If I may interject: I don't want any inference made from my remark about the Navy not digging out material for me that it has held back anything or not given me everything I have asked for, but I have done my own digging.

Shall I take this up in sequence?

Mr. MITCHELL. Take it up in sequence and omit the three you have already read.

[5745] Admiral STARK. The first dispatch here is 17 October 1941 and reads:

Because of the great importance—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From whom to whom?

Admiral STARK. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander in Chief Pacific.

Because of the great importance of continuing to reinforce the Philippines with long-range Army bombers you are requested to take all practical precautions for the safety of the air fields at Wake and Midway.

The next paper I have bearing on this is from the Commander in Chief United States Fleet to the Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, and Commander Patrol Wing Two.

Subject: Naval Air Station Wake and Naval Air Station Midway—Basing of Aircraft at.

1. In order to be able to meet emergency requirements for basing of aircraft at Wake and Midway, while minimizing logistic demands of these places for the present, the Commander in Chief desires that the following action be taken immediately:

(a) Make preparations at Wake for basing:

(1) 12 patrol planes.

(2) 12 Marine scout bombers or 12 Marine fighters.

(b) Make preparations at Midway for basing:

[5746] (1) 12 additional patrol planes (total 24).

(2) 18 Marine scout bombers or 19 Marine fighters.

2. These preparations shall include the following provisions and assumptions:

(a) When the aircraft movements are ordered, it shall be necessary only to fly the patrol planes and land planes (from a carrier in the latter case) to the designated places and it shall be practicable to operate on arrival without attendant transportation of material or personnel by ship.

(b) It shall be practicable to continue operations on this basis for a period of six weeks, at the end of which time relief may be expected, either by air exchange of planes and flight crews or by provision of additional support transported by ship, or by combination of the two.

(c) Preparations shall, accordingly, include transportation to Wake and Midway of:

(1) Necessary tools, spares and equipment for minor repairs, adjustments and checks.

(2) Necessary minimum number of ground personnel to meet the requirements of subparagraph 2 (b) above, assuming the full availability of Naval Air Station personnel and Marine defense personnel already present for non-technical manpower assistance.

(3) Necessary additional bombs, with necessary [5747] additional bomb handling equipment. (Note: With delivery of the 48 1,000-pound bombs approved for the patrol planes at Wake the bomb situation for patrol planes will be satisfactory at both Wake and Midway. The following additional bombs are needed for the Marine planes: Wake, 12 1,000-pound, 24 500-pound; Midway, 18 1,000-pound, 36 500-pound, 150 100-pound bombs each, of those already available at Wake and Midway, should be designated for the Marine planes. Aircraft machine gun ammunition already at Wake and Midway is sufficient).

(d) Patrol plane personnel at Wake shall base and subsist in excess accommodations available in Contractor's Camp No. 2 near the air station site. Patrol plane personnel at Midway shall base and subsist at the Naval Air Station with additional accommodations, if and as necessary, to be provided by the use of Contractor's space.

(e) Marine squadron personnel at Wake shall base and subsist adjacent to the land plane runways. Marine squadron personnel at Midway shall base and subsist on Eastern Island. At both places it is necessary to set up a suitable tent camp. The assistance of Marine defense personnel shall be used to accomplish this.

(f) Commander Patrol Wing Two shall provide, by patrol plane tender, the necessary personnel and material transportation [5748] for both patrol plane and Marine aircraft preparations.

3. By copy of this letter the Commandant 14th Naval District is directed to take immediate steps to:

(a) Make available the 48 1,000-pound bombs still due for patrol planes at Wake and the additional bombs for the Marine planes.

2 (b) (3) above.

(b) Provide for necessary stowage of bombs and ammunition for Marine land planes adjacent to land plane runways at Wake and Midway.

(c) Make available the Contractor's accommodations needed for patrol squadron personnel at Wake and Midway.

(d) Cover the bulk subsistence and potable water requirements of the personnel of the foregoing preparatory parties and anticipate the additional requirements resulting from actual aircraft basing.

(e) Expedite expansion of tank storage of aviation gasoline at Wake and anticipate the aviation gasoline and lubricating oil requirements at both Wake and Midway resulting from actual aircraft basing.

(f) Provide lumber needed for the tent camps of Marine aircraft personnel at Wake and Midway.

(g) Make available the needed assistance from Naval Air Station and Marine defense personnel for camp construction [5749] and, on arrival of aircraft, for aircraft operations.

Copies of this preparatory letter of Admiral Kimmel's were sent to:

COMBATFOR

COMSCOFOR

COMBASEFOR

COMAIRSCOFOR

COM-14

NAD, OAHU

C. O., MARINE AIR GROUP 21

Copy was not sent to Chief of Naval Operations. It was a local operation order of Admiral Kimmel to his own people on how to carry out that which he directed.

The next message is 270038, the message which I have already read.

The next message is 270040, wherein I stated Army has offered to make available some units and which I have also read.

The next message was the message from CINCPAC to OPNAV, 28 06 27, which was in reply to the two previous ones.

The next message, which I have not read, is 282054 from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander in Chief Pacific.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The date?

Admiral STARK. The 28th, sir. 2054, which would be 10 [5750] hours and a half earlier, which would be about 10 o'clock in the morning on the 28th. From Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Arrangements described in your 280624 appear to be best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transporting VMP221 from San Diego to Hawaii via *Saratoga* period War Department will instruct commanding general Hawaii department to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and army troops in support of landings period War Department will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti-aircraft defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon period Marine Corps will shortly receive sixteen thirty-seven mm. anti-aircraft guns and receive ammunition in February period Do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake period Request air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future period

That is from the Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC.

The next dispatch is a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel to his own people, namely, to the Commander of Task Force Two and to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and for information to Combat Wing Two, COMBATFOR, and COMBASEFOR.

It is dated the 28th of November, 0447, which would bring it, in our time, back to the 27th, about 6 o'clock:

[5751] Twelve planes marine fighter two eleven are to base Wake accordance myser 101825 of 10 November period *Enterprise* provide transportation

period After departure Pearl on 28 November form task force eight consisting of *Enterprise Chester Northampton Salt Lake City* and *Desron* six and past command task force two to Rear Admiral Draemel with orders task force two carry out normal operations in Hawaiian area period Proceed to arrive 200 miles 070 degrees from Wake period At 0700 on 3 December period Fly off marine planes that vicinity and upon receiving info that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl period Enroute to and from Wake pass through Point Afirm 400 miles south of Midway period Patrol planes from Midway and Wake will cover your route and provide security while at Wake period Communications radio condition nineteen guard MPM primary fox continuously period Comfourteen inform Wake that planes expected arrive there 0830 on 3 December and direct Wake report comfourteen by coded dispatch when planes available there period Comfourteen furnish this final arrival information to comtaskfor eight period Wake submarine patrol *Tambor Triton* will be advised period. *Narwhal* and *Dolphin* are enroute Pearl at 1200 GCT on 27 November they were about 300 miles east of Wake period

The next message is 040237, which is 4 December, 2 o'clock, [5752] 0237, Greenwich. We would be 5 hours earlier, which would be half-past nine, and the time in Hawaii would have been about 4 o'clock in the afternoon on the 3rd.

Myser 01825 of 10 November Marine Scoron two three one will base eighteen planes Midway period *Lexington* provide transportation period on five December after sortie Pearl form task force twelve under comcruscor for consisting of *Lexington Chicago Astoria Portland* desron five less desdiv ten period task force twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 130 degrees from Midway at 2230 October on seven December period from that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway period return operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway period comtaskfor nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover *Lexington* flying off position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane flight period communications radio condition nineteen guard continuously MPM primary fox period comfourteen inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on eight December and require Midway report arrival to comfourteen by coded dispatch period comfourteen pass this report to comtaskfor twelve period Midway submarine patrol will be advised period

That last message, I believe I didn't give you the heading. It is from CINCPAC, to COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, [5753] and COMPATWING 2, by mailgram, and info to COMBATFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMAIRBATFOR, *Lexington*, also by mailgram.

[5754] Mr. MITCHELL. That completes the file, does it?

Admiral STARK. That completes it so far as the correspondence on that particular subject.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, in order to complete the record on this item I call the committee's attention to a letter in Exhibit 106, which is already in evidence, which is the file marked, "Correspondence between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel", and that letter is a letter dated December 2, 1941 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark and it refers to these despatches.

I won't read it all, it is in evidence, unless you want it read into the record.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering, Mr. Mitchell. There is only one letter here and there were two written on that day by Kimmel on the same subject.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, this document is not paged. It is December 2, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it might go into the record at this point, unless the committee wants it read, as if read.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose I have the reporter transcribe it in the record without my reading it.

To get the thing cleared up here, the thing that the Congressman is asking about, I only see one letter.

Mr. MURPHY. There is only one in the exhibit, but there [5755] were two letters written. The second letter is referred to on page 528 of the narrative.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is it a letter relating to this subject?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, and covered in the previous inquiry.

Mr. MITCHELL. Both the same date?

Mr. MURPHY. Both the same date.

Mr. MITCHELL. Both the same subject?

Mr. MURPHY. Apparently. One is at page 528 of the narrative and the other is on page 524.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose both letters are printed here then.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will have both letters put in the transcript here, the one I have in Exhibit 106 and the other one of the same date which the Congressman has referred to.

Mr. GESELL. I think the other one is an official letter and would not be in this folder.

Mr. MITCHELL. This is one of these personal letters and not an official communication.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know, but it is in regard to the same subject.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then we will put them both in. I only want to mention one thing in this letter that is now being written into the record of December 2 that is rather suggestive.

[5756] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I—

Mr. MITCHELL. Could I finish this, please?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. On this question of moving marines and anti-aircraft equipment out to Wake and Midway, Admiral Kimmel says this:

On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands.

(The letters of December 2, 1941, referred to follow:)

[5757]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA

FLAGSHIP

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
December 2, 1941.

Ser. #8

Secret

DEAR BETTY:—

We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time

that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your despatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there.

Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP squadrons operating [5758] from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon the completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own power from Pearl to Midway.

During all the period that I have been in command the question of the development of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very difficult one. We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until we have a space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Commandant of the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this objective. As you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at Wake for as long as 28 days due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impossible situation. Present facilities at Wake must be improved, particularly as to storage of fuel oil, aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should not stop and the 1,000 defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work moving as rapidly as material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets the time for the completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, and so does he, that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot support more personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, we put six 5" guns and twelve 3" anti-aircraft guns, together with a number of machine guns on [5759] the island, well knowing that we did not have sufficient marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has been made in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the battery at Wake. In case the present situation should cease, we can readily withdraw the Marine fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon the facilities there and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of these planes.

The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of the four 7" guns to Midway. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, four of the 3"-50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the batteries already installed there, which comprise six 5"-51's and twelve 3" anti-aircraft. You will also note from our official letter submitted today that the defenses of Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are nevertheless not entirely inadequate.

Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organization of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest consideration. I know you appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief without any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when Army personnel [5760] is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is issued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army antiaircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of antiaircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber

machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if we expect ever to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands. Essential items include, as I have previously stated, provision to berth a ship at Wake, completion of air fields at Palmyra and Johnston and completion of fuel, gasoline, food and ammunition housing at all bases. I am proposing in official correspondence that: (a) the Army organize 3 defense battalions of approximately 800 men each; that steps be taken in Washington to supply [5761] them with guns, both surface and antiaircraft; supply them with .37 mm. or .50 caliber machine guns; to make up a well-balanced defense battalion; that prior to the time the equipment of these organizations is supplied that they drill with the 5-inch guns of the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl as long as the equipment is available here. If it is decided to supply these battalions with some other caliber of guns, that sufficient number of guns of the type to be used be shipped to Oahu to be utilized for training purposes; (b) that these Army defense battalions be held in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to presently occupied islands (2) to relieve battalions in presently occupied islands (3) to garrison islands to be occupied.

The Marine garrisons now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing.

That the Army organize three 18-plane pursuit squadrons and keep them in an expeditionary status; maintain the ground crews organized and ready to man them; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when ordered.

The Army has orders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning over to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The expedition [5762] tion is now due to leave here on December ninth.

The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. I will let you know more definitely what they send when I find out exactly.

I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army is sending some forces there.

In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.

I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some reason for injecting the Army into the picture.

I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take

over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an [5763] agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified.

We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing of the *Wharton* we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential Naval personnel from the West Coast to the Fleet. The other transports, to a total of six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego are in urgent need of transport training and will not be ready to come to Hawaii until some time in February. I can see very little chance for any overseas expedition even on a small scale until that date. Eventually this war will require a much greater number of transports and supply ships in the Pacific. We are working on an estimate of the requirements. This estimate, in addition to some thirty or forty transports and an equal number of supply ships must also include a thirty to fifty percent increase in the fighting strength of the Fleet before we can occupy the Marshall's and Caroline's in an advance across the Pacific.

With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations which injected the Army into the picture.

With kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

[5764]

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types of carrier planes.

P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area.

H. E. K.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S. In connection with the development of outlying bases by the Army, I must invite your attention to the fact that when the War Department issued orders to the Commanding General out here to develop these bases they authorized him to charter [5765] ships and to take all other necessary steps to insure the early completion of the project. He has already taken over three large inter-island vessels and has caused some army transports and other shipping to be diverted to the supply of Christmas and Canton. He has also chartered a number of smaller vessels such as tugs and sampans.

I feel he has done an excellent job. I feel that the Navy personnel in this area with equal authority would have their efforts much facilitated. I do not know the considerations which prompted the Navy to turn over the development of the island bases to the Army; I do know that it has complicated our problems considerably.

The Commanding General is keeping me informed of what he is doing but frequently the information is so late that I have been unable to plan adequate protection. I am sure it is no fault of his because he informs me as soon as he himself is informed. I have nothing but the highest praise for the way General Short has taken hold of this problem which was dropped in his lap.

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me I note that the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fiji and New Caledonia. This will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping and the field themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume the protection [5766] of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be involved in these affairs. I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive role that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.

With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at one time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are going to have seven cruisers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This without any consideration for such protection as may eventually be required from San Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-Pacific escorts may decrease if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila but it will still be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies in the Far East.

(S) H. E. KIMMEL.

[5767]
EG61/(16)
Serial 0114W
Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
2 Dec. 1941.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases.

References:

- (a) OpNav despatch 270038 of November 1941.
- (b) OpNav despatch 270040 of November 1941.
- (c) Cincpac despatch 28067 of November 1941.
- (d) OpNav despatch 282054 of November 1941.
- (e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941.
- (f) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of December 3, 1941.
- (g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of October 21, 1941.

1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use. Reference (b) advised that Army could make infantry available to reinforce defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, might occupy but that they could provide no antiaircraft units.

2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, had already taken to [5768] strengthen the air defenses of Midway and Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in progress. Reference (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is furnished in reference (f).

3. Reference (e) from the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which referred to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet's 280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advanced bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands.

4. Reference (g) contained a study by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel and equipment therefor.

5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so, it is assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battalions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is pertinent to note that transports, trained assault troops, etc., are not now available to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only short of antiaircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions were withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere.

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6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and considerations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department are mentioned below:

(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7'' and 5'' guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155-mm. guns from Hawaii and Marine 5'' guns might be replaced but the 155-mm. guns would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.

(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and .30 caliber machine guns.

(c) Army has a limited number of 37 mm. guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening the defenses here; particularly as a [5770] considerable increase in the number of such guns is expected in the near future. At present there is a marked shortage of ammunition for 37 mm.

(d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to send at least one squadron each to Midway and Wake.

(2) The fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine fighters or light bombers.

(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or submarines.

(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in flying over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles from land.

(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway.

(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to reenforce or relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped, and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established, habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no reflection upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable time [5771] to acquire the proficiency in this specialized work that the Marines already have.

(f) In emergency Army personnel might replace casualties or reenforce Marines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have other Marines available for that purpose.

(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, some deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist; and the recommendations of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been completely filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions have not been assembled.

(h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. Irrespective of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will continue at these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bring some difficult problems of command relationships. Such problems would not, of course, be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are not replaced.

(i) Twelve Marine fighting planes are now on Wake; a quadron of Marine light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. These planes are accustomed to long operations over water, and from carriers. The bombers have offensive power against surface ships or submarines.

(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on [5772] both Midway and Wake for temporary offensive operations of Army B-17 bombers, using Navy bombs. Only six such bombers on Oahu are now in operating condition.

(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the limits given in reference (g), are being transferred to the outlying bases as rapidly as available and the conditions at those bases made feasible.

(l) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army cooperation in certain respects had been made; and close cooperation and liaison will continue.

(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intended to withdraw civilian workers if hostilities develop. Plans have been made to incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable.

7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time:

(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent.

[5773] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.

(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because of less proficient personnel.

(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, marine planes are more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up the question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval Air Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any other activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. Defense itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the bases. The establishments are small and close coordination of all activities is mandatory, extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to joint participation by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished only by unity of command, which must be vested in the one officer qualified to insure that the base fulfills its purpose, whether under attack or not and no matter what organization operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy are paramount and unity of command must be vested in the Commanding Officer of the Station. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already [5774] brought out in his despatches, cannot too strongly emphasize this point.

9. The Commander-in-Chief recognizes that unforeseen events may rapidly develop that would necessitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, provided suitable equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements are in progress looking toward

(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800 men each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions);

(b) Training of such units with equipment, Army or Marine, available on Oahu;

(c) Army steps to obtain requisite armament comparable to that called for in reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases;

(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for transportation, on short notice, to Advanced Bases—planes to be transported by aircraft carrier and flown off near destination;

(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available for (1) relieving, supporting, or furnishing replacements for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or [5775] developments not now manned by Marines.

10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now have are, to a greater or lesser extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been evolved after much work and study. The international situation is such that active defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice. Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there is compelling necessity therefor; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for over all operations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important that further information on the subject be furnished the Commander-in-Chief.

12. If, during the progress of the war, enemy positions are taken and require garrisons they should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions. It

would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available for such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available, viz, the Marine Defense Battalions. If our progress in the war has brought more [5776] advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and experienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions; and the present Advanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable to enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but the Army should be ready and qualified to do so. In any event, the battalions projected into the new bases must have their full equipment without withdrawing that in the present bases.

13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different. Construction of Army airfields at Canton and Christmas Islands has brought those places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some defense at Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the Army has no suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two five inch guns with fire control equipment from the Fourth Defense Battalion to meet temporarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's policy regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel.

14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum requirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately within the next few days. [5777] The defenses contemplated will call for not more than two or three batteries of three inch AA guns, not more than two batteries of five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is expected that not more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive armament. It is probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less rather than more than that for Canton.

15. In view of the Commanding General's information that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands, no steps have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been made locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton would be replaced as soon as possible.

16. It seems appropriate here to express the growing concern of the Commander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics, keeping open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our Army is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and New Caledonia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made from time to time over establishment of American bases in the Gilberts, Bismarck Archipelago, and [5778] other places.

17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the building or logistics or defense installations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will become involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized that new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted that will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet in being behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific can not contribute very much toward victory over a power some thousands of miles to the westward.

18. To summarize: the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup in the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considered plans that should not now be changed. He intends to:

(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra;

(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances require;

(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army personnel at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement;

(d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local [5779] Army authorities to develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, on short notice, reenforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole or in part.

19. It is recommended that:

(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in existing Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see reference (g));

(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be maintained as mobile battalions in Pearl Harbor in accordance with existing plans; and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additional battalion be expedited;

(c) At least two additional defense battalions be organized and equipped at San Diego, with plans to use these battalions and those mentioned in (b) above for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls;

(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army takes over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Navy (see paragraph 8);

(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and South Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements;

(f) No plans be made for relieving Marine Defense Battalions; [5780-5781] or air units until Army has organized, equipped and trained for coordinated action suitable units for taking over.

20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: C. G., Haw. Dept. Com-14.

[5782] Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Senator, what did you have to say?

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to get the record clear on this Exhibit 106. Did I understand counsel to say that that only has the personal letters and not all official letters?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is it. That is a correspondence file and the official letters would have a way of starting out, "From the Chief of Naval Operations."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do we have any exhibit that has the official letters in them so that we would know where to find this other letter that Congressman Murphy talks about, being an official letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not think we have ever compiled a separate document with the official letters, have we? They have been put in from time to time in evidence but there has never been any compilation made of them as we have in the correspondence file.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask counsel whether this thick document here, which is a compilation of Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral Kimmel and his letters back, are to be regarded as official or personal?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, they are official but they are written in the personal style as distinguished from a formal communication. This is in the personal style. Those formal com- [5783] munications were phrased differently. They did not call each other "Dear Betty" and so on in them. They start out with, "From: Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC. Subject: So and so and paragraph so an so." They are more formal in style, but Admiral Stark obviously had a practice of communicating in this form with his commanders.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. Sometimes he would send a formal dispatch and then he would write a letter about it afterward.

The CHAIRMAN. They are mixed in here, I see. Here are some from the commander in chief to the Naval Operations and others addressed "Dear Betty" and "Dear Mustapha." I suppose that was a nickname given to Admiral Kimmel because it sounded like Mustapha Kemal of Turkey.

Mr. MITCHELL. That may be so.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; that was the reason for my addressing him in that way. That was an affectionate term I had of addressing him by Mustapha Kimmel.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you get the nickname Betty?

Admiral STARK. A lot of people have asked me that question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You might as well clear it up now.

Admiral STARK. When I went to the Naval Academy the history which we studied there had the statement of old General [5784] John Stark, who was one of my forebears, that "We win today or Betty Stark will be a widow tonight." The histories that I had always studied at home were, "We win today or Molly Stark will be a widow tonight."

I was called both Molly and Betty off and on for a number of months and finally dropped into the name of Betty and I have been known as Betty Stark ever since. Every time an upper classman came in my room when I was a plebe I had to get up and say, "We win today or Betty Stark will be a widow." I did the same thing when I went from the youngster floor; that is, the third-class floor, up to the fourth-class floor, I would stop and say, "We win today or Betty Stark will be a widow."

That name has stuck. It probably will be given to all Starks subsequent to my time. For example, Governor Stark of Missouri was known as Molly Stark, which is how names carry on as a rule in the Naval Academy.

The CHAIRMAN. You came very near being a widow at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, just so that we may keep this record straight: Now, in Exhibit 106, they are the personal letters and not the official letters, but I find, for instance, on July 10, 1941 a memorandum for [5785] Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral King, commander of all Naval Districts, signed "H. R. Stark." Now, would that be classified as a personal one or an official one, so that we get the record straight?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the record will show for itself. There are some communications interspersed in this Exhibit 106 that are in the formal form.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us proceed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Stark, did Admiral Kimmel ever inform you that he had made a decision not to conduct any air reconnaissance after November 27 around Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to some intercepts in exhibit 2. As I understand it, the intercepted and decoded Jap diplomatic messages and military messages that were decoded by the Army and Navy were delivered to you regularly, copies of them.

Admiral STARK. If you are referring to certain particular dispatches, I would like to see them. Generally—

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am talking about the practice. The record, I think, shows that the Army and Navy at Washington here had those means of decoding and translating the secret Jap messages and we have one volume here, Exhibit 1, that was what we call diplomatic intercepts, that were mes- [5786] sages between the Tokyo government and its diplomatic representatives abroad back and forth, and then we have in as Exhibit 2 another type of those messages that the Japs sent out to representatives abroad, that are of a military nature and not a diplomatic nature. You are familiar with that, are you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, there was a system for having these messages decoded and translated by sometimes the War Department, sometimes the Navy Department.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And a regular dissemination or distribution or delivery to certain officials. You were one of the officials to whom it was the practice to deliver copies of those intercepts, were you not?

Admiral STARK. I was; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you got them regularly?

Admiral STARK. I got them regularly. I would state with regard to that that when the book came to me, which usually came through my aide, there were clipped certain dispatches which they considered important that I should read. Those not clipped were considered not necessary for me to read. I always read those clipped. Those not clipped I might sometimes go through the file just to check up to see whether I [5687] was getting all that in my opinion was also important. I believe my aide generally went through all of them. The same book that I read Admiral Ingersoll read.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did it come to you in one of the pouches?

Admiral STARK. Locked; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Locked pouch?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And it was a book in which the messages were bound or tied together?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And when you say "clipped" you mean with little paper clips, that little paper clips were stuck on those that you were expected to read?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I will call your attention now to exhibit 2 commencing at page 12. That is an intercepted Jap message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, 1941, translated—

Admiral STARK. Did you say page 2, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 12, translated October 9, 1941. It is the message with which we are familiar, that divides the waters of Pearl Harbor into five areas and requests information as to the location of ships in those areas and you will note on pages 13, 14, and 15 there is a series of messages [5783] relating to that subject, all of them translated and available here in English form before December 7.

Did those messages come to your attention at or about the time they were received?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of having seen those particular messages. I believe that I did not see them. However, I may have seen them. They may have been brought to me and they may have slipped my mind, but I think I did not see them.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why do you believe you did not see them?

Admiral STARK. Because I have no recollection of them, and if I may go on I would like to comment on these messages.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

Admiral STARK. These messages are of a class of message which gives positions of ships in harbor, gives locations. The message, however, is distinctly different from the usual type of ship report, which simply would say, "So many ships," or give their names, in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch is different in that it calls for the location of a ship in the harbor in her particular berth.

I recall no such request from Tokyo to the field; that is, to the Japanese people, to report like that except for Pearl Harbor. There might have been. We did not see it. I believe there are one or two places where ships were reported, [5789] like in Puget Sound, in a certain berth or a dock, alongside of a dock, but this dispatch while of a class is of a character which is different.

In the light of hindsight it stands out very clearly, with what we can read into it now, as indicating the possibility or at least the groundwork for a Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor. That significance which we now have in the light of hindsight was not pointed out to me by anyone, nor do I have the slightest recollection of anybody ever having given that significance at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Whose hands would this message pass through in the Navy besides your own—in the Department I mean?

Admiral STARK. That message would come in and be decoded and translated and go to the office of naval intelligence, it being information. If naval intelligence had thought it important enough—and there were good men looking over those dispatches in intelligence—if they had thought it important or of unusual significance, they had full authority to send it out.

Mr. MITCHELL. Send it out to whom?

Admiral STARK. Send it out to the field. This particular dispatch would have been of particular interest, if they had so considered it, to Admiral Kimmel. They could have simply sent it out as it was. If they had thought it vital, they [5790] could have also brought it to what we call the front office; that is, to Ingersoll or myself, or come through Turner, but I have no recollection of this dispatch having been discussed, certainly not with regard to what in the light of hindsight we would now read into it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it is clear in the light of hindsight what it means, we will agree to that, but how about foresight? Don't you think this message, because of the very things you point out, would have been or ought to have been a very significant thing to a careful intelligence man before the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. It is very difficult to separate hindsight from foresight. I can only say that it went through our people, it went through the Army, who were likewise vitally interested in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I do not recollect anyone having pointed it out. There was literally a mass of material coming in. We knew the Japa-

nese appetite was almost insatiable for detail in all respects. The dispatch might have been put down as just another example of their great attention to detail.

If I had seen it myself I do not know what I would have done. I might have said, "Well, my goodness, look at this detail," or I might have read into it because it is different, I might have said, "Well, this is unusual. I wonder why they [5791] want it?" I might have gone on, and diagnosed it or I might not. I simply do not know. We read it now in the light of what has happened.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it was of interest to the Army, but don't you think because it asked for ships and ship locations that it was a little more pertinent to the Navy Intelligence to analyze it and evaluate it than it was the Army people?

Admiral STARK. Well, both were analyzing, but it is of a naval color.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. It is also of an air raid color.

Mr. MITCHELL. What could it mean? Looking at it now and reading the words of it what could it mean other than the formation of a target plan? What do you conceive would be the purpose of the Japs in having the precise location by areas of the ship's location in each section in Pearl Harbor unless it was that?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I look at it now in the light of what I know—

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I did not ask you to do that. I am asking you what it could have meant? Read it and tell us what it could have meant if it did not mean that?

Admiral STARK. Well, it could have meant that they were just down to getting the detail. Whether a submarine might [5792] have come in, whether the small submarines might have come in, whether the so-called suicide, one-man submarine attack might have been in their minds, that might have been possible. I am thinking now in the light of hindsight. I did not see the messages.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that was of vital interest if it were all of those things to Admiral Kimmel, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes; if it could have meant that, if it had been clear at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. If it meant sabotage or small submarines or air attack or anything, and it must have meant one of them at the time, it was very important for him to know that, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. It meant they wanted to know what was in particular spots and its significance now is quite clear.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was your impression prior to December 7, 1941, as to whether Admiral Kimmel or the Navy out at Pearl Harbor had the equipment or the forces trained to decode and translate these diplomatic and military messages to which I have referred, these Jap messages?

Admiral STARK. I inquired on two or three occasions as to whether or not Kimmel could read certain dispatches when they came up and which we were interpreting and sending our own messages and I was told that he could. However, I want [5793] to make it plain that that did not influence me in the slightest regarding what I sent.

I felt it my responsibility to keep the commanders in the field and to see to it that they were kept informed of the main trends and of information which might be of high interest to them. Regardless of what dispatches I might have seen, they may have formed background for me but I saw that affirmative action was taken from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in the field on matters which I thought they should have.

[5794] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, if it was your responsibility, and you say it was, to keep him informed, was it not of vital importance that you know what means of information he had by himself? What sort of a system is it when the commander in chief of the Navy Department having the duty of keeping his field commanders well posted does not know whether the field commander has certain means of informing himself?

Admiral STARK. Well, I took the means to inform him.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you ignored the fact then that you felt he had it all anyway and gave him what you thought was worth while?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I worked on the principle that it was my responsibility and by official letter dispatch and personal letter endeavored to give him my thoughts.

Mr. MITCHELL. Don't you think if he already had copies of these intercepts that his forces had decoded out there that it was taking some chances for you to expose your code-breaking system by sending him copies over the wires of those same messages?

Admiral STARK. I had confidence in the security of our highest codes.

Mr. MITCHELL. More than you had in the Japs?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. So far as we know, they had not been broken.

[5795] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, as a matter of fact, notwithstanding somebody told you Admiral Kimmel had a decoding and decrypting outfit out there, you did send him from time to time not only the substance but practically verbatim copies of some of these Jap intercepts, did you not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Who was it that told you that they had a system out in Honolulu or Pearl Harbor of decoding and decrypting Jap messages?

Admiral STARK. Admiral Turner.

Mr. MITCHELL. What did he say he had done to try to find out about it?

Admiral STARK. He did not say. As I said, I remarked to him—I remembered on one or two occasions not of having talked with Admiral Turner but I recall last summer that I was under the impression Kimmel could translate these messages. I do not mean that he could have translated all of them. The volume was very great at times. It is my understanding that people, who I believe you have down on the call, can give you far more than I can.

There was a mass——

Mr. MITCHELL. Who was it in the Navy Department——

Admiral STARK. May I finish?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

[5796] Admiral STARK. There was a mass of material that came in and a portion of it was decoded into the book, part of that which we

thought was worth while was, and furthermore it was clipped, that which was really important.

Mr. MITCHELL. Who was it in the Navy Department here that did know whether Admiral Kimmel had the decrypting and decoding of the code available to him?

Admiral STARK. People who were doing the same work for us in the Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. To find the truth out it was only necessary to go to them and ask them, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Well, when Admiral Turner told me he could do it I did not consider it necessary to go any further.

Mr. MITCHELL. How is that?

Admiral STARK. I say when Admiral Turner told me that he could do it, I mean Admiral Kimmel could do it, I did not consider it necessary to go any further.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Kimmel came here on a visit at one time, and he wrote a letter in which he said how important it was that he should know all about the diplomatic negotiations, and that sort of thing.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did not you know at that time, and in the discussion did not it come to light that he did not have any [5797] difficulty in decoding these diplomatic top messages?

Admiral STARK. No; he did not mention that. I do remember distinctly his wanting everything which was pertinent. We had conferences on everything he wanted, and I told him all I knew, the main trends at that time, and I continued to tell him.

I might make this observation at this time and that is that the intercepts formed only a part, though a very vital part, of information which we here in Washington had.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understand that, Admiral. I am driving at the question of how it came about that Admiral Kimmel came here, and the letter that he presented personally, asking that he be informed of all of these political developments and diplomatic developments, and you thought he had a code decrypting outfit there that would break these messages, why the subject was not mentioned? Why he should be asking for these things if he had a system of his own of getting them?

Admiral STARK. Well, there was more than just the material that came from Japan, much more, and that is their interpretation, such as you could get from the State Department, Mr. Hull, from the White House, from the Army and other sources, the Treasury, that we had and which we welded together as our responsibility and sent them out. Our picture was [5798] complete, and I felt it was our job to send him that. Of course I would have far rather sent him too much than too little. I felt I was keeping him informed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you haven't any recollection, in your conference when he was here about that subject, of ever having mentioned the subject of having a crypt analytical unit out in Honolulu?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not recall it.

Mr. MITCHELL. You say that between November 27 and December 7 you had some conferences with people in your department over the situation as to whether any other messages were needed by way of warning.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. In any of those discussions did any of your people or yourself mention or bring the question up as to whether Pearl Harbor was at any risk from an air raid?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I have stated before, we went into the picture continuously.

Mr. MITCHELL. I asked you before with reference to the preparation of the November 27 message. Now I am talking about the conference you say you had after that, between the 27th and the 7th of December, in which you reviewed the warnings you sent. That is what I am asking about now.

Admiral STARK. No; I do not recall that we particularly [5799] mentioned an air raid after we had sent out our messages. We did go into what we received subsequent to that time. We felt that we had received nothing which would change or strengthen the messages which we sent out on the 24th and 27th, except the fact that the Japs were destroying their means of communication with their representatives in the American, British, and Dutch Governments.

Mr. MITCHELL. Can you tell us when the last time was that any communication was exchanged between you and Admiral Kimmel that mentioned the question of an air raid? We have this record that you initiated yourself of November 22, 1940, bringing out the necessity for investigating that problem and that was followed by the Clarke Report, the Knox-Stimson letter, and great activity for months on the Army and Navy part in reviewing the situation, estimating the danger, how it would happen and how to defend against it.

The last official document I have seen of that kind was the Martin Report of August 21. Now I am wondering if there is anything you know of a communication between you and Admiral Kimmel that took place after September, October, November, or December, up to the 7th, that mentioned the air attack possibility. We have read a letter this morning of December—

Admiral STARK. I was going to say talking about anti-aircraft. [5800]

Mr. MITCHELL. December 2, or 1, it was, a letter from Admiral Kimmel, in which he mentions the fact that he thought the anti-aircraft defenses of Hawaii were inadequate and he complained about it, and they had not been remedied.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I wondered whether you could lead us to any other communication in which you raised the point, or he raised it. There may be some. It is a hard question to answer, but I am looking for a pointer in some document that maybe we have not noticed.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall at present.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you look it up?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And come back later, if you will, please, and see if we can dig up anything more on that subject.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I want to say I do not recall anything except our general discussion and pressure to increase the antiaircraft defenses. I will look into what I have got and see if I can find anything.

Mr. MITCHELL. How late did that take place in the year, about?

Admiral STARK. It was mentioned in what we read this morning.

[5801] Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

Admiral STARK. That you mentioned a minute ago. I think I know what you want, sir, and I will endeavor to find it.

[5802] Mr. MITCHELL. I want to find out when the idea vanished completely from the people's mind here and in Pearl Harbor, if I can, the idea of an air attack.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished your observation on what you were trying to find out?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in connection with—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Have you finished your observation on what you were trying to find out about when the idea vanished?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; I have finished. I wanted to find out when the idea of an air attack vanished from people's minds, that was lively for a while.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I would like to suggest that there is a reference in the letter of November 25 to it.

Mr. MITCHELL. November 25?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the Stark-Kimmel communications?

Mr. MURPHY. In the Stark-Kimmel communications, in the postscript.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I remember that letter, and I would like to state that the idea of an air raid had not vanished from our minds.

[5803] Mr. MITCHELL. I am looking for documentary proof of that fact.

Admiral STARK. After the White House meeting on the 25th, in a postscript to a letter to Admiral Kimmel—I better get the document. My remembrance is I told him that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised. I will read that. It is the letter of the 25th of November.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is in Exhibit 106.

Admiral STARK. Shall I read that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; we would like to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

Admiral STARK (reading):

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still [5804] rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where do you find anything in that that talks about a surprise attack on Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. That does not talk about an air raid on Hawaii.

Mr. MITCHELL. That what?

Admiral STARK. It does not mention an air raid on Hawaii.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I am asking about.

Admiral STARK. I will endeavor to see if I can find anything subsequent to the date you gave.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to suggest there is one more paragraph that was not read. The paragraph says that was the only thing to be prepared for.

Admiral STARK. The final paragraph in that postscript was in my statement, in which I stated:

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything".

Mr. MITCHELL. What are you reading from there?

Admiral STARK. I am reading from the postscript of that [5805] letter of the 25th of November, which was also in my statement and in which I stated that the letter and the dispatch were intended to convey to be ready for anything.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, if you will just read that again, you will see when you are talking about "anything" you are talking about what we are going to do and not what the Japs are going to do, if you read that carefully. It is what we are going to do. We may do anything or nothing.

Admiral STARK. No; but I state, "The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for"—in other words, the dispatch and this postscript I had hoped would convey the thought that anything might happen and we should be prepared for anything, and I think that is what it states.

Mr. MITCHELL. It states we will be prepared for anything we may want to do. That is the plain English of it, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. I would take it, when I say "we"—"We have got to be prepared for anything," that means the men in the field.

Mr. MITCHELL. You are referring to the last sentence in the postscript?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, let me read it. It may be wasting time to discuss English.

I won't go into the pros or cons [5806] of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for—

that is to say, prepared for anything we may decide to do. That is not in preparation against anything the Japs may want to do, is it?

Admiral STARK. My thought here, when I said—

we may do most anything—

I was telling the men in the field we might do anything, and as I stated—

that's the only thing I know to be prepared for.

In other words, they should be prepared for anything.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think it was Lord Bacon who said that the man who wrote the document was the poorest man to interpret it, because he was always thinking of what he meant to say instead of what he did say.

Admiral STARK. I will have to stand by what other people think of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, let me turn your attention to the mysterious document known as the winds message for a moment. You are familiar now with the Jap decoded secret messages appearing on the bottom of page 154 of Exhibit 1, are you? You just look at them at the bottom of page 154. That is the message from Tokyo to Washington, a diplomatic intercept, dated November 19, 1941, and translated November 28, 1941. It [5807] states:

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese Language shortwave news broadcast", and in which certain Japanese words were "east wind rain", "north wind cloudy", "west wind clear", if used in the broadcast meant diplomatic relations were in danger or broken, and to burn the codes.

Did you see that message prior to December 7, that is, the message setting up that code system?

Admiral STARK. My recollection is not clear on the winds message. I undoubtedly saw it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, when you saw the winds message, the question is whether this is the one message that everybody knows was received, and there is another real question as to whether any such code message was ever later sent out. I would like to be clear as to what you are referring to.

Admiral STARK. I probably saw this message setting up the code at the time it was received.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you say "probably," you heard it talked about recently?

Admiral STARK. I heard it pretty well covered.

Mr. MITCHELL. You cannot remember what you knew prior to [5808] December 7?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. We talked about it a lot since.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know prior to December 7 that any naval monitoring stations had been alerted to try to intercept such message?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not know—I did not get your question.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know prior to December 7, 1941, that any Navy monitoring station had been alerted to try and listen in on Japanese weather broadcasts?

Admiral STARK. I undoubtedly knew that.

Mr. MITCHELL. You undoubtedly knew it?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. If you knew that then you must have seen this message.

Admiral STARK. I said I assumed that I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you say you undoubtedly knew it, you assume you knew it, but do you know now that you knew it then?

Admiral STARK. I know now.

Mr. MITCHELL. But you cannot really support your memory before and after the 7th of December to say what you did know about this code system prior to that date?

Admiral STARK. I am anticipating your next question which I suppose will be as to whether I knew of its implementation.

[5809] **Mr. MITCHELL.** Yes, I haven't gotten to that yet.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will in a minute.

Admiral STARK. When this message came in it was undoubtedly brought to my attention. I state I must have seen it. I do not recollect particularly the details of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you have any present recollection that you did see this code system message prior to December 7?

Admiral STARK. Well, that is not clear, sir. I have seen it so much since then—

Mr. MITCHELL. It is hard to tell.

Admiral STARK. I assume I undoubtedly saw it at the time, but it is one of those things. My mind has not been burdened with it for over the 4 years in question.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you have the same answer with respect to the message at the top of page 155, which was on the same date and used an abbreviated system, with the Japanese words "east, north or west" instead of "east wind rain, north wind cloudy and west wind clear," which was to be used in general intelligence broadcasts. Do you remember ever seeing that prior to December 7?

Admiral STARK. I assume I saw it. I do not remember the details of the "Higashi" and "Kita," and the rest that went with it.

[5810] Mr. MITCHELL. Prior to December 7, 1941, was there ever brought to your attention any copy or any information about the implementing message sent out by the Japs in a weather broadcast which used the significant words that were set up in this code?

Admiral STARK. No, there was not, sir. I am sure of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. How about a message sent out under the second code system set up at the top of page 155 of Exhibit 1, which was an abbreviated system to be used in general intelligence broadcasts?

Prior to December 7, was any implementing message under that brought to your attention?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever hear, prior to December 7, of any implementing message under this winds code system, or a message thought to be that, having been received and decoded in the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The Federal Communications station was alerted I think by the Army to try to listen in on these Japanese weather broadcasts to see what they could get, and their report shows the two messages between November 28 and December 7 that did not quite fit the exact wording of the [5811] code system but came pretty close to it in regard to a possible war with Russia. Did you see those? Were they brought to your attention?

Admiral STARK. I do not recollect. I have heard it discussed since in all its detail. I do not recollect the Russian situation at that time.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will next call your attention to what we have been calling here the 14-part and 1 p. m. message. It appears of record here that on December 6 there was intercepted and decoded here in Washington a pilot message sent from the Jap Government to their ambassadors here stating there would come shortly a longer message containing their answer to the American Government's position, and then it appears on the evening and before midnight December 6-7, the first 13 parts of that message were translated, decoded, and made available to certain officials here, and on the next morning, the 14th

part and 1 p. m. part, which directed the presentation of the message to our Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on the 7th, were translated and disseminated. When did any part of that message first come to your attention?

Admiral STARK. It first came to my attention Sunday forenoon when I came to the office in the Navy Department. I had no information of it prior to that time.

[5812] Mr. MITCHELL. Nobody endeavored to reach you, that you know of, Saturday evening, about the early 13 parts?

Admiral STARK. Nobody reached me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where were you, if you know?

Admiral STARK. I don't know, sir. I thought I was home but if they had tried to reach me I should have been there. Also if I were not there word would have been left where I was. Also the duty officer was generally informed of my whereabouts. Unfortunately, Mrs. Stark has destroyed her date calendar of that time. I have tried to run down two or three blinds. There was a party given in the Navy yard that night for Governor Edison, ex-Secretary of the Navy. I knew that I had been there on a party with him. I wrote the Commandant at that time. He said that he had completely forgotten they had given the party and his wife said she was sure I wasn't there, in any case. So that blind went by the board.

Mr. MITCHELL. The record shows that Secretary Knox had it that night; your Chief of Naval Intelligence had it that night.

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Mr. MITCHELL. And Knox called up and made an appointment with Stimson and Hull the next morning. You didn't hear anything about that?

[5813] Admiral STARK. No, sir, not a word.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the afternoon of the Saturday before, during office hours, this pilot message came in, which was the preliminary message from the Japs to their ambassadors stating that they were going to send this message along.

Did you see that?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of having seen or heard of the pilot message. The first information that I had on the subject was Sunday forenoon.

Mr. MITCHELL. I noticed in your statement about this incident you make no mention of the hour you got in the office or the hour you first saw this 13- or 14-part message Sunday morning. Have you no recollection about the hour?

Admiral STARK. I can only guess on that and I did guess last summer. I usually got down to the office Sunday mornings around 10:30 and I just assumed that I had gotten there somewhere around 10:30 or 11 o'clock. I was lazy on Sunday mornings unless there was some special reason for getting up early. I usually took a walk around the grounds and greenhouse at the Chief of Naval Operations' quarters and didn't hurry about getting down and my usual time, as I recall, was about 10:30 or 11. What time it was on this particular Sunday morning I couldn't go beyond that.

Mr. MITCHELL. I believe there are some officials in [5814] your Department, who have not yet been called as witnesses, whose job it was to deliver and consider messages of that type, who think

you got there at 9 o'clock and saw a part of this message as early as that and the balance of it, the fourteenth part, at least by 1:30.

Would that be contrary to the fact if they should so testify?

Admiral STARK. They have told me the same thing and they are also estimating. You will have those people before you. And as regarding the 1 o'clock message I think you will have, probably, from one of the witnesses who kept some track of his time, the fact that he got to my office, and he can testify, about 10:40, with the 1 o'clock message, but I have no recollection.

Mr. MITCHELL. The records show, the White House phone records show that General Marshall called you at 11:30 about it, he had written out a message to Pearl Harbor, to the Army commander there about this 1 p. m. business.

Do you recall that?

Admiral STARK. That is the one thing on that morning which stands out very clearly in my memory, was General Marshall's call to me about that message. At that time I was talking over that message with Admiral Schuirmann, as to what it might mean. He pointed out, he said, we don't [5815] know what the significance of it is, but it might mean something, and he said he thought it would be a good thing to inform the people in the Pacific.

My first reaction was that we had sent so much out that—and as there was no deduction from the message, as to what it meant, at least we had made none at that time, that it would be just as well not to send it. A few days previous, when we had a discussion whether to send out anything more, the question came up, be careful not to send too much, it might create the story of "wolf."

That was my first conversation with General Marshall.

I put the phone up and, as I recall it, I put it up and stopped, and in a matter of seconds, or certainly only a few minutes, and thought, well, it can't do any harm, there may be something unusual about it, General Marshall states he doesn't know what the significance is, but there might be something, and I turned back and picked up the phone, he had not yet sent the message, and I said, perhaps you are right, I think you had better go ahead and I would like to have you make sure that it goes to the naval opposites where this message was going, which was throughout the commands in the broad Pacific.

I also asked General Marshall, knowing that the time was rather short, whether or not he would get it out quickly. [5816] I told him our own system under pressure was very fast. And he said, no, that he was sure he could get it out quickly also. And with that I did nothing more.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was your system?

Admiral STARK. Radio.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had a powerful sending apparatus, did you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; very.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, if we are right in our assumptions as to the fact that you had this 1 p. m. message in your hands an hour before Marshall did, that is at least 10:30—you are not willing to concede that, are you?

Admiral STARK. My remembrance, as I said, was 10:40. When you say "at least 10:30," I think you will find testimony to that effect by a witness, and if he states that, and I think he probably has good

supporting data, I accept it, that it was delivered to my office and then after that was given, by whomever he gave it, to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is it fair to say that if Marshall hadn't spotted that message and started to send word out to Pearl Harbor that you probably wouldn't have sent anything?

Admiral STARK. I don't know that I would. I think that might be a fair deduction.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now didn't you have somebody more than [5817] Schuirmann in there discussing this 1 p. m. business?

Admiral STARK. Well, sir—

Mr. MITCHELL. Didn't Commander Kramer—

Mr. GESELL. I believe one witness says there were 15 officers in there.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Schuirmann.

Admiral STARK. Admiral Schuirmann. I said when Marshall called I was talking it over with Schuirmann.

Mr. MITCHELL. After you got the 1 p. m. message wasn't there some discussion in your office then about it?

Admiral STARK. There may have been. I don't recall it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Commander Kramer—

Admiral STARK. I can give you what I know by hearsay.

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't want that. I just want whether any of these officers spoke to you about it.

Admiral STARK. I don't recollect it that morning. I recollect it since.

Mr. MITCHELL. There were some younger officers that spotted the 1 p. m. business and made some suggestion about it being daylight at Honolulu?

Admiral STARK. I am certain nobody mentioned Honolulu with reference to a daylight attack. I am positive of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, this was what we lawyers call a last clear chance. These people were not ready at Pearl Harbor; [5818] the Jap Fleet was piling in; here was a chance to get a message to them that might have saved them; it reached your hands, we will say, at 10:40; the chance wasn't taken.

Does that sum up the situation as you see it?

Admiral STARK. Well, I gather from your—

Mr. MITCHELL. You might have intervened and done something.

Admiral STARK. I gather from your question you are now pointing that dispatch directly at Pearl Harbor. It didn't mention Pearl Harbor. It gave no inference with regard to Pearl Harbor any more than it did the Philippines or the Netherlands East Indies.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are you right about that? 1 p. m. here was dawn at Pearl Harbor and 1 p. m. here was in the middle of the night in the Philippines.

Admiral STARK. I would say that dawn at Pearl Harbor was about an hour—that can be checked by the Naval Observatory—before the time specified in the message; and as regards midnight in the Philippines, as to whether that would mean anything, that could have been an attack at night. Taranto was an attack just a few minutes after midnight.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why not send a message to all three of those places saying something is liable to happen at 1 p. m. Washington time?

Admiral STARK. In the light of hindsight, if we had read [5819] into that message that it meant an attack at that hour, and had sent it

out, of course, it would have been helpful. I wish such an inference could have been drawn.

Mr. MITCHELL. The fixing of an exact hour to deliver the diplomatic message and rout out the Secretary of State on a Sunday at 1 p. m., wasn't it obvious that there was some special significance, having in mind the history of the Japs striking first and declaring war afterwards?

Admiral STARK. If so, Mr. Mitchell, I would like to say that so far as I know the Secretary of War didn't read that inference into it, the Secretary of State didn't read that inference into it, the Secretary of the Navy didn't read that inference into it, General Marshall and his staff didn't read that inference into it, and nobody mentioned it to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are you quite right about General Marshall? The first thing he did was to spot that message and he wouldn't even allow his answer to be typed, he put it into longhand and told them to encode it without typing it.

Admiral STARK. May I read his dispatch?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, we are all familiar with it.

Admiral STARK. I would like to read this:

Just what significance the hour set may have been we do not know.

[5820] Mr. MITCHELL. Of course, you didn't know.

Admiral STARK. (reading):

But be on the alert accordingly.

Mr. MITCHELL. That means, to you, being alerted at 1 p. m. Washington time, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; but I would like to invite attention also to the fact that we had thought that they were on the alert. I am not attempting to argue the fact, sir, that I don't think it would have been a good thing to have gotten this message out, drawn the inference and sent it. I wish we could have. We didn't.

Mr. MITCHELL. You didn't know they weren't on the alert?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. On the contrary, we felt they were.

Mr. MITCHELL. You don't know what time Stimson and Hull got this 1 p. m. message, do you, or saw it?

Admiral STARK. I think, if I may say so, Kramer can tell you that. And if Kramer says that message was delivered to my office at 10:40, I accept it.

Mr. MITCHELL. It has been suggested to me that Kramer may have told you about the text of that message before delivery of the document. Do you recall that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think I will not ask the admiral any [5821] more questions. Do you want to go on with the committee examination or take it up at 2 o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN. Inasmuch as we want to have an executive session we might suspend now until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[5822]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The chair understands counsel wishes to ask some further questions.

Mr. GESELL. A few additional questions, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Mr. GESELL. First, Admiral Stark, with respect to the events of the 6th and 7th. With respect to your whereabouts on December 6th, did you have a duty officer at your home on the evening of the 6th?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. If someone had wanted to reach you in a hurry could they have gotten you?

Admiral STARK. I left word at home when I went out as to where I could be reached; also before leaving the Department the duty officer in Operations was informed if I would be out.

Mr. GESELL. Was it generally known that the duty officer knew your whereabouts in the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. I think so. Also it was a general Navy custom or at least it was a departmental custom, they would probably have called one of my aides.

Mr. GESELL. Was there anyone at your home on the 6th who could have taken the calls if you were absent?

Admiral STARK. Yes. There was always a servant available at the telephone. [5823]

Mr. GESELL. Well, did your servant, or did the duty officer at the Navy Department, or did any of your aides ever telephone that anyone had sought to reach you at any time on the 6th?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. GESELL. Now, with respect to the 7th, I think we want to have a little clearer idea of when you got to your office. Admiral Wilkinson testified that you reached your office at least by 9:15 that morning because his recollection is that at 9:15 he discussed the first thirteen parts of the message with you or handed them to you. Do you recall that you were at your office that early?

Admiral STARK. I do not. I may have been but I do not recall just what time I got down that Sunday morning. I made a guess when I was asked at the hearing before the Naval Court of Inquiry last summer about half past 10.

Mr. GESELL. Your best recollection is that you got there at half past 10?

Admiral STARK. Well, that was about the usual time and I had no reason to think otherwise. I may have gotten in earlier.

Mr. GESELL. Whenever it was you got there was your first order of business the 14-part message?

[5824] **Admiral STARK.** I do not recall that.

Mr. GESELL. Well, do you recall when you saw the fourteen part message first?

Admiral STARK. I saw it after I got in the office. Just what time I do not recall.

Mr. GESELL. You do not recall how soon after you got to your office that you saw it?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. GESELL. Now, do you recall anyone telling you that the 1 o'clock message was in before you were shown the text of the 1 o'clock message?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not.

Mr. GESELL. You do not recall that Captain Kramer or anyone else passed oral word into your office that the 1 o'clock message was in?

Admiral STARK. I not only do not recall it, I think I had no such word.

Mr. GESELL. Now, during the 6th and the 7th prior to the attack, did you have any conversations with anyone at the White House, President Roosevelt or anyone else?

Admiral STARK. I may have; I do not recall.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall any conversation that you had with anyone at the White House concerning the 14-part message and the 1 o'clock message?

[5825] Admiral STARK. No; I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any conversations prior to the attack concerning those messages with Secretary Knox?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that I did. I may have. I simply don't remember.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, there are two or three other points, picking up some loose ends at this time, which are somewhat unrelated and I will just go right down them with you.

General Marshall indicated that he was not certain what the length of time was which the Navy had in mind as being the minimum necessary for it to get ready for combat in the Pacific. Did you have some date in mind and, if so, did you state your estimate of that at any time?

Admiral STARK. I am not sure of your question unless you mean the delay that we wanted in connection with the Philippines?

Mr. GESELL. I believe that is it; yes.

Admiral STARK. If that is what you refer to and I believe he testified I wanted somewhat longer.

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Admiral STARK. And if I go a little further, I believe he testified that he thought by 10th December or something of that sort he would be ready and that I wanted that into Feb- [5826] ruary.

Mr. GESELL. I was not clear about that. He was not clear how long you wanted and that is what I am trying to get now.

Admiral STARK. That is to what you refer?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I was asking for 3 months. I based that request on the Army air schedule which, as I recall, they anticipated completing their quota of planes out there in February or March and, of course, the Army can give you that testimony.

Mr. GESELL. And when you say you were asking for three months who were you asking for three months? To whom were you talking?

Admiral STARK. Largely Mr. Hull, in endeavoring to keep the negotiations going if possible until the Army schedule was completed.

Mr. GESELL. Did Mr. Hull keep you advised of the progress of the negotiations with the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. Mr. Hull kept me I think rather closely advised as to the progress of negotiations. It was his habit frequently, sometimes day after day, to call me up in the late afternoon and let me know if there was any progress.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, you said, I think, in your prepared statement something to the effect that you do not recall seeing the 10-point note of November 26th at or about the time that it was delivered. [5827]

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. The evidence here shows that that note was intercepted in the regular course and was among the Japanese intercepts; in other words, the text of the note being transmitted by the Japanese representatives here to Tokyo.

Admiral STARK. That is true. I think that was on the 28th.

Mr. GESELL. Do you think you saw it then on the 28th?

Admiral STARK. I could not be sure. I would like to say with regard to that 10-point note, while not recollecting having seen it at that time, that I had discussed in the State Department a memorandum by Mr. Morgenthau and expressed my opinion on it and confirmed it in writing. The note of the 26th, the 10-point note, as I recall contained nothing, or at least very little or only minor differences from the note of the Secretary of the Treasury and also did not contain anything which I had objected to in the other note, so in general I knew of the substance of that note but as to having seen it in its actual form when it went out or whether I saw it on the 28th I could not say.

Mr. GESELL. With respect to the basing of the fleet in [5828] Pearl Harbor we have had a great deal of discussion concerning whether or not the fleet should have been based out there in 1940. Did you state any opinion or take any position as the days grew more critical in 1941 as to whether or not the fleet should be based at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. In my opinion when the situation was tense and critical the fleet should have been in Pearl Harbor; that is, should have been based in that area.

Mr. GESELL. Commencing in your opinion at about what date, Admiral Stark?

Admiral STARK. Well, I never tried to narrow that down. It would be purely a guess. If I may go back a little bit, I do not want that confused with the fact that when the fleet first stayed out there I pointed out, and pointed out very clearly, in conversations with the President the advantages from the standpoints which Admiral Richardson mentioned of the fleet's return.

Mr. GESELL. We are talking now about a wholly different thing.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I know we are.

Mr. GESELL. You testified that you were in agreement with Admiral Richardson on his position that he took in 1940.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Now what I am asking you is what view you [5829] took, if any, with respect to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor as the days became critical in 1941?

Admiral STARK. Well, the fleet was then based at Pearl Harbor. I would say that by the time Admiral Kimmel had command of the fleet we had practically wiped out of our minds, or at least we no longer considered and talked about bringing the fleet back.

Mr. GESELL. And you have stated that it was your opinion that at least by the last quarter of 1941 the place for the fleet was in the Hawaiian waters?

Admiral STARK. In my opinion that was a covering position in the Pacific.

Mr. GESELL. Now, what information did you have in the latter part of 1941 as to the preparedness of the fleet for combat? Was it ready for war or was it not ready for war?

Admiral STARK. In my opinion it was. Of course, no commander in chief is ever satisfied, even those we had in Europe, they were not satisfied. I know of no one who was ever satisfied but generally speaking I have quoted from Admiral Kimmel's annual report. I did not mention that he also—I think it was in the same letter—he said that his shooting was good judged by any standards, which showed that the fleet was performing satisfactorily in target practice, and he also said the morale was good.

[5380] Mr. GESELL. So that it was your opinion that the fleet was ready for war at that time and was that opinion shared by other officers advising you?

Admiral STARK. I think so. Now, when you say "ready for war" it is subject to two interpretations there. It was ready for war in accordance with the war plans. It was not ready for an advance into the western Pacific, which would have required a large train and which we did not have.

Mr. GESELL. It still had no train and was not ready for offensive action?

Admiral STARK. It was ready for offensive action in the way of raids as envisaged by the war plans and it had a train of certain dimensions but it did not have the great fleet of supply vessels required to take it and maintain it in the western Pacific.

Mr. GESELL. Now, what about this dispatch that the President sent concerning the placing of three reconnaissance or patrol vessels in the China Sea, in the South China Sea waters? We have in evidence the dispatch, which I believe you were the issuing officer of, which was sent at the direction of the President asking that three patrol vessels be put out there. Do you remember that?

Admiral STARK. Very well.

Mr. GESELL. Before we discuss the circumstances I want [5331] to get one thing clear in my mind. Was that ever done? Were those vessels put out there or weren't they?

Admiral STARK. They were not. The ship *Isabel* I think got out there just about the time the attack broke, was out a few hours and came back. That, to my recollection, Admiral Hart told me. The other vessels were not sent out.

Mr. GESELL. Now, did the President give the direction for the sending of that dispatch to you personally?

Admiral STARK. He did.

Mr. GESELL. Will you state to the committee what discussion you had with him at that time, please, sir?

Admiral STARK. Well, if I may read the dispatch, I think the dispatch speak for itself as to why it was.

Mr. GESELL. We have the dispatch in mind I think, Admiral. I don't mind your reading it as part of your answer, but what I am anxious to have in addition to that is any conversation you may have had with President Roosevelt concerning the surrounding circumstances.

Admiral STARK. Well, of course, at that time I was discussing with the President, as we were discussing in the Department, what might

happen; that is, as to where this expedition going south was likely to hit. His thought was the Kra Peninsula. I was in complete agreement with that. The Philippines was a possibility and the other places which have [5832] been mentioned, the East Indies, and just where it would go we did not know and these three small vessels were to assist in that determination.

Mr. GESELL. I think we have fairly well in mind the points where the vessels were.

Admiral STARK. Well, if you have fairly well in mind the points where the vessels were you will see where the President put them they were well placed to get information either positive or negative and it was for that reason and for the reasons as stated in the dispatch, to get information, that he directed that be done; and I would like to state and just take out of the dispatch what the reasons were.

He says "to form a defensive information patrol; to accomplish a purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in the West China Sea and Gulf of Siam," and then he himself designated where those vessels were to be placed and they were well placed for the purposes for which he wanted them.

Mr. GESELL. Well, did he indicate to you in any way why he wanted the information, other than the general desire to have information concerning Japanese movements?

Admiral STARK. No, that is all. We are all after information. We were scouting by air, and I simply think that he thought that was additional precautions. He was intensely [5833] interested in every move at that time, as we all were.

Mr. GESELL. Now, you attended these various war council meetings which were held immediately preceding these warning messages, did you not, with General Marshall and the Secretaries of War and Navy and President Roosevelt?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall President Roosevelt stating at one of those meetings that he thought it was possible that there would be a surprise attack before the following Monday?

Admiral STARK. I think he stated "as early as the following Monday." Yes, I recall that.

Mr. GESELL. You heard General Marshall's testimony concerning those meetings, did you not?

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I have that answer again? I had difficulty in hearing the Admiral.

Admiral STARK. I said yes, sir, I recall it. I think that he stated "possibly as early as next Monday." I have forgotten just exactly what his exact words were, but that is my impression.

Mr. KEEFE. When did that occur?

Admiral STARK. That was the Monday after the 25th, I believe it was at that time.

Mr. GESELL. I believe we computed that on a calendar which was furnished us, which is in evidence and I think it [5834] showed December 1 as the Monday.

You heard General Marshall testify concerning those meetings, did you?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Did you hear or read Secretary Hull's testimony concerning those meetings?

Admiral STARK. I am not sure that I did.

Mr. GESELL. Well, have you anything to add to what General Marshall said concerning what took place at those meetings? Have you a more detailed recollection of the discussions?

Admiral STARK. No, nothing more than I mentioned in the postscript of my letter to Admiral Kimmel which was mentioned this morning. We went over the situation and we looked at the charts and were wondering when they were going to strike and where.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any discussion of Hawaii in those meetings as a possible point where they would strike?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that there was.

Mr. GESELL. You participated in the drafting and preparation of the joint memorandum signed by yourself and General Marshall to the President of November 27, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Well, General Marshall and I were responsible for it.

[5835] Mr. GESELL. Right.

Admiral STARK. That was formed up by the two war plans divisions.

Mr. GESELL. Can you tell us under what circumstances that was written? It is still a little vague on the record why that particular memorandum was written.

Admiral STARK. Primarily we wanted to gain time. I was extremely anxious to gain time and Marshall was, too. We stood together on that. We had going out in December—and again the Army could give you perhaps more accurate information—but as I recall twenty-odd thousand troops and that meant a lot in the Philippines. The air program as I recall involved about 600 planes, Army. It meant a good deal to us to get them out there. Also the Philippine Scouts were being trained.

I might mention a point which I think has not been brought out before, that I directed Admiral Hart to lay his mines in the Philippines for protecting Manila Bay, it was either June or July. At that time I considered the situation such that we had better get that job done and not be suddenly confronted with it. But the primary reason for that was to gain time and that is what the memorandum sought to stress.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, what you were doing was stressing how much you could tolerate in the way of activity [5836] by Japan before you felt some action had to be taken by this country?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Can you tell us when that memorandum was delivered to the President? I notice it is typed on the stationery of the Navy Department. It is dated November 27. General Marshall did not get back until late that night and did not get to his office until the morning of the 28th. Now, he has identified his signature on the message as being his own signature, so with that before us the question of when the memorandum was delivered to the White House is now before us and I wondered if you could help us on that.

Admiral STARK. I am sorry I cannot. We have gone over the dates, I have personally, and tried to recall that 4-year-ago picture, particularly of the 25th, 26th, and 27th, with regard to the Chiang

Kai-shek note, with regard to the joint board meeting of the 26th, with regard to just when Mr. Hull first informed us. I believe he has testified that he came to that conclusion on the 25th or the 28th. He mentioned the Army and Navy taking over.

In my statement I said that he informed me on the 27th and, as I stated, that statement was completely written before hearings here started and I may be wrong on that. I may have gotten it from him on the 26th. I was in very close touch with [5837] him and whether or not, when he called me greatly perturbed about the Chiang Kai-shek note, he told me at that time he was going to throw it over, or whether he did later on the 27th, whether he called me on the 25th or the 26th I do not know. Now, Marshall left the joint board meeting on the 26th and whether he signed it on the 28th or not, I do not know.

Now, to come back to the White House part of that question, we have done our best to try and find that out, but we have been unable to. We do know that it was in the White House, we have ascertained that, but just when the President got it I do not know.

[5838] Mr. GESELL. Well, now, one other question closely related to that perhaps has to do with this question of overt act.

You testified this morning that the Navy message of November 27 did not contain any direction that Japan should commit the first overt act. However, we have in evidence here a dispatch sent by you under date of November 28 transmitting an Army message, but in addition to reciting the text of the Army message it has some additional Navy direction in it, and included in that direction is a direction concerning the overt act in these terms "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act." That indicates that sometime between your message of the 27th and your message of the 28th this idea of an overt act came forward.

Your dispatch was not sent to Admiral Kimmel except for his information?

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Mr. GESELL. It was sent to the west coast department, but I wondered if that in any way refreshed your mind as to the conferences and discussions on this question of the overt act.

Admiral STARK. At this time I could not say positively as to just why we put that in. I do know, for example, that we used to worry somewhat about the location of the Japs [5839] around our naval ammunition depot, for example, up in Puget Sound. The same was true in Los Angeles harbor. It may possibly have been if they had gotten this message they may have corraled some of the people who were close by, some that they had suspected. It was only the continental districts, as I recall it, that were covered in that dispatch.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

Admiral STARK. Who were ordered not to make an overt act. The Army had issued a similar warning to those people, and it may have been to go along with that.

I could not answer the question definitely, but I know it is there.

Now as far as going along with the Army, that might not necessarily hold, because we did not go along with them in the Hawaiian Islands, and again it might hold because their problem in the Hawaiian Islands

was quite different from ours. With the large Japanese population we were thinking more in terms of the high seas.

Mr. GESELL. You attended the meeting at Argentina, the Atlantic conference meeting, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did you at that time, or at any other time prior to December 7, receive any information or advice to the effect that the United States Government had undertaken [5840] to declare war against Japan in the event Great Britain was attacked in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. Never.

Mr. GESELL. I think that completes the questions I have.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just one that I would like to ask you, Admiral.

This morning you spoke about the fact that the Navy Department was not volunteering any help to you in preparation for your testimony. I understand you did not mean that the Navy was delinquent in any way.

Admiral STARK. I qualified that later. I thought it was possible that an inference might have been drawn that the Navy Department might have been withholding something from me.

Mr. MITCHELL. What you meant was that they were not volunteering aid to you but they were giving you everything that you asked for.

Admiral STARK. That is correct; they were giving me everything that I asked for, and helping me out wherever they could, or they detailed to help me, and Lieutenant Commander Richmond was detailed to help me, and Lieutenant Johnson, and in general the department has been cooperative in giving me help where I have asked for it. But in attempting to prepare myself for this investigation, I have done it [5841] largely on my own memory as to what I wanted to bring out.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you had any difficulty or lack of cooperation in the office of the counsel of the committee in giving you everything that you wanted?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, everything has been fine, and I might say it has been all right with the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, the Pacific Fleet was sent out to the Hawaiian area early in 1940, was it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ostensibly on maneuvers, is that true?

Admiral STARK. That is true; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course the Government had spent a large sum of money in blasting through the land to get into what is now Pearl Harbor, with a view of making it a suitable base for the fleet over the years.

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now apparently the fleet was kept out there longer than Admiral Richardson either knew or thought that it would be kept, and he kept prodding you to find out why it was kept out there, and in the letter he wrote you prior to his visit to Washington in October 1940, and in many of these letters, he wanted to know why he was out there, why the fleet was out there, and in a good many of your letters, at least one or two of them, you wrote back that you did not [5842] know why it was out there, that you wished you did know why it was out there.

How long did that lack of information on your part as to what the Navy was doing out there remain?

Admiral STARK. I think I might say, Mr. Chairman, if I may suggest to you, where you stated I said I did not know why they were out there, I did not know how long they were going to remain there. The reason for their being there, which I wrote Admiral Richardson, was that their presence there might act as a deterrent against Japanese aggression in the Pacific.

When they went out there I thought they were coming back, and Admiral Richardson did, and I might say so far as I know the President had no other thought when those maneuvers began.

But when it came time for them to come back, in view of the conditions in the Pacific it was decided to keep them there for a while. We did not know how long.

The CHAIRMAN. I might have misquoted you, because I am referring to your letters from memory. I do not have them before me. I overlooked bringing them down this morning. I remember in one or two of your letters you stated you did not know how long they were to be kept there, and I got the impression you stated also in your early correspondence with Admiral Richardson that you did not know why they were being [5843] kept there.

If I am mistaken about that I want to be corrected.

Admiral STARK. Here is a letter in which I reply to Admiral Richardson, and I quote:

"Why are you in the Hawaiian area?" Answer: This was my answer, "You are there because the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies."

[5844] The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that letter?

Admiral STARK. 27 May.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, Admiral Richardson was not convinced of the wisdom of your course, because when he came back here in October he and the President evidently engaged in a very earnest argument as to the wisdom of the policy of keeping the Navy out there as a deterrent. Were you present at any of the conferences between the President and Admiral Richardson?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I was not. Admiral Richardson went over himself.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Richardson talk with you about his conference with the President?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; he gave me, as I recall, a short memorandum on the subject of the discussion, so that I would have it.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in October. By that time, had you reached an agreement with the attitude of the President, the Secretary of State and others, to keep the fleet in the Hawaiian area or Pearl Harbor was a wise course, as a possible deterrent against Japan?

Admiral STARK. It was one of those things which at that time, as I recall, was carrying along because, if I also recall correctly—and I will check this, and if it is not [5845] correct I will ask for a change in the record—as I recall at one time we had about come to the conclusion we might bring the fleet back in the fall or for Christmas in that year, I am not certain, and that later we decided not to do it but to keep it there, and after that time, about the last of 1940, it just became a fixed policy to retain the fleet there.

The CHAIRMAN. Inasmuch as the fleet was out there, no matter what the purpose for which it was originally sent, to have withdrawn it back to the Pacific Coast had possibilities of misinterpretation on the part of Japan and on the part of our own people, did it not?

Admiral STARK. It might have. Also sending it back again might have been more difficult. I testified this morning I thought that was the place for the fleet when things were tense might also have its disadvantages.

The CHAIRMAN. That was my next question. If it had never been sent to Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, had not remained out there, if it had remained on the Pacific Coast where Admiral Richardson testified there were better facilities for reaction and training, and one thing and another, it did not have anything to do with the safety of the fleet, but if it had been kept on the Pacific coast until things became tense and then sent to the Pearl Harbor region or the Hawaiian area, what would have been the effect of such a movement as that at the time [5846] when things did become critical?

Admiral STARK. Of course, no one knows, but it might have been difficult diplomatically to do it. It might have been interpreted by the Japs as a move for our getting ready for war out there in the Pacific, and it might possibly have precipitated something.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, everybody understood, I suppose, including the Japanese, that the Hawaiian Islands were American territory and Pearl Harbor was an American base and we had a right to send our fleet out there whenever we saw fit.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Without giving an explanation.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the critical situation as it developed and tenseness of relations between the two countries, to have kept the fleet back at the Pacific Coast and then have sent it out there in the midst of one of these tense situations you think might have given rise to the feeling that it was a threat against Japan and therefore, in a sense, might have been a sort of moral overt act?

Admiral STARK. It might have been; yes, sir. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that when we first decided not to bring the fleet back—and I was talking to the President about the advantages, from a matériel and personnel standpoint of bringing it back, [5847] balanced against the political reasons, I can remember just as though it happened seconds ago; the silence—I was with the President alone—and the tense thought that he gave to it then for a few minutes, and he finally looked up and he said—and you may have heard him say the same thing—“Well, I hardly know, but,” he said, “when I am in doubt and I am not sure just what is best, I am inclined to sit tight,” and he said, “I think we better do that for the present.” That continued.

The CHAIRMAN. That was with reference to keeping the fleet out there?

Admiral STARK. That was with reference to keeping it out or bringing it back, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall, as a naval officer, that a similar situation existed in the Far East back in 1932 following the Shanghai incident, I believe, when the American fleet was kept out there in

those Pacific waters, following the Japanese attack upon China, or following her invasion of Manchuria, and following the Shanghai affair, that the fleet was out there and was kept there, according to Secretary Stimson, who was at that time Secretary of State, for a similar purpose, that it would have its moral effect upon Japan. Do you recall anything about that?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall the fleet, as we usually [5848] refer to the fleet, being out there at that time. We had an Asiatic squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. It may not have been a full fleet, but it was a detachment of the Navy.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and it may have been kept in Chinese waters at that time rather than possibly used for a cruise south in the wintertime, or something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you referred this morning to a couple of letters or dispatches that you sent to Admiral Kimmel between the 24th and 27th of November, with reference to the sending of certain airplanes from Hawaii to Midway and Wake.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get very clearly in my mind whether they were sent.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; they were sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they the planes that were on the *Lexington* that was supposed to be headed west while the *Enterprise* was headed east from the Philippines?

Admiral STARK. No. There were two detachments of Marine fighters, I believe, that were sent. One carrier took some to Wake and one to Midway. The dates of the sailing of those carriers were fixed by Admiral Kimmel. We gave no specific dates for it. We knew of one of the sailings, which was in answer to another dispatch of ours, and as to the other we were [5849] not informed.

I would like to state in that connection, if I may, I do not know whether or not there has been the impression created in the committee that by doing that the defenses in that area were decreased. Pearl Harbor was mentioned. If you look at the map you will find, of course, that Midway is—I have forgotten—1,000 or 1,200 miles farther westward, and Wake is still farther. That was a general area of defense. Anything we could find in those areas, from scouting or otherwise, lent itself just that much to the defense of Oahu. So it was strengthening the general island position there. That was particularly true with regard to the patrol squadrons, of which I think one squadron was sent to Wake, and two to Midway. It enlarged the scouting area. It might have decreased it temporarily in a concentrated way around Oahu, but as against that there was the getting of information, or the possibility of getting it, farther west, and also of defending those carriers.

Incidentally, originally General Marshall asked us to watch for and to give them any warning we could, because we were ferrying planes to the Philippines via those two outposts.

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to the purpose for sending them to Wake and Midway, in view of what happened it may have been better if they had all been there?

[5850] Admiral STARK. We would have lost fewer of them; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The fewer ships and planes were at Pearl Harbor, the fewer we would have lost?

Admiral STARK. That would have been incidental to what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have been incidental to what happened, but still it would have probably happened.

Now, in regard to the overt act, of course it was in view of the fact that both you and General Marshall, as heads of the Army and Navy, were seeking to gain time and to postpone any conflict as long as possible, it was perfectly consistent with that attitude not to commit an overt act on the part of the United States and not precipitate a war which you were seeking to avoid or postpone as long as possible, would it not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Regardless of the omission of this phrase in your telegram in regard to an overt act, were the commanders in the field, in the Pacific area, Panama, and on the Pacific coast and the Philippines and Pearl Harbor, sufficiently aware of that general attitude of our Government so that they knew it?

Admiral STARK. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Without having it especially called to their attention in a message on any particular date?

Admiral STARK. I think so. They all knew we wanted to [5851] avoid war in the Pacific if possible. Each one of them was a very responsible man, and I think none would have created an overt act if they could have avoided it. On the other hand, each one unquestionably would have defended himself.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Admiral STARK. The message which Kimmel sent, which is in one of his letters backing up a dispatch about bombing submarines within a certain area, I think was thoroughly justified, and I would not have called it an overt act I think if a submarine was found there without any business.

The CHAIRMAN. You were assuming that everybody in authority, while holding off actual hostilities, if they had to come, was to prepare, as well as it was possible under all the circumstances, for any eventuality whenever it did come?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in your message to Admiral Kimmel on the 24th, which has been read into the record several times, you say, "The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation, coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility."

Did you know at that time, at the time you sent that [5852] first paragraph of your message, what the movement of the Japanese naval and military forces was?

Admiral STARK. The movement of which we had knowledge was the movement south, the amphibious movement.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew at the time you sent this message of the 24th of November that they were moving south?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With a considerable naval and military force?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you say, "An aggressive movement is indicated in any direction." That would include the whole 360° of the circle, would it?

Admiral STARK. It included the broad Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it included any direction from Tokyo?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would mean anywhere they could come?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That might be an offensive movement against us?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. My thought was it covered widely a movement against us anywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, you go on to state, "The Chief of Staff has sent this dispatch and requests action addressees", and so forth. This dispatch of yours of November 24 does not [5853] seem to correspond with any similar correspondence dispatched on that date. Was it to be distributed to the Army officers?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I showed that dispatch to Marshall and he agreed with it. I generally took things of that sort up with him, and he with me, and we put that memorandum in about showing it to Army opposites.

The CHAIRMAN. On the next day you wrote Admiral Kimmel a letter. It went by the ordinary course of sending letters. Do you know when that letter was received?

Admiral STARK. I think we have that. As I recall, it was about 5 December, but I think the letter shows it.

The CHAIRMAN. At any rate it was not received until after you sent the message of the 27th of November?

Admiral STARK. It was received on the 3d of December.

The CHAIRMAN. On the 3d?

Admiral STARK. Yes. That was about 6 days after he had received the war warning of the 27th, or about 9 days after he received the war warning of the 24th.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, on the 27th you sent your other message, in which you start out by saying: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." Did you understand and did you intend that that language should make this message of the 27th more acute and emphasize more the danger than the one of the 24th in which you said that the Japanese might start an [5854] aggressive movement in any direction?

Admiral STARK. I consider the message of the 27th much stronger. I never had heard of the words "war warning" in any message before anywhere, at any time.

[5855] The CHAIRMAN. This may be speculative, but if you had not seen fit to send the message of the 27th and had relied on the message of the 24th, would you have regarded the terms of that message of the 24th sufficient to require that the Naval Forces in Pearl Harbor and in the Hawaiian area be constantly on the alert for any movement in any direction?

Admiral STARK. Well, it showed the possibility and to that extent—and again I may say it is difficult to get away from hindsight—

The CHAIRMAN. I know.

Admiral STARK. But my feeling is that if I had received a message that the Japs might make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, I would say, well, we better look out and be ready for it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the purpose you had in sending this message of the 24th?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; but we made a much more positive message on the 27th, because on the 24th we stated that favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful; there was left a loophole there that there still might be a change, through negotiations, to obtain a settlement in the Pacific. We closed that loophole in the message of the 27th.

But even so I think the message of the 24th showed the imminence of trouble anywhere.

[5856] The CHAIRMAN. In your message of the 24th you say that the Japs are liable "to make an aggressive movement in any direction", and after saying in the 27th message that "this message is to be considered a war warning," you say "negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased. An aggressive movement by Japan is expected within the next few days."

In that language you did not say "in my direction."

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you intend for that to implement your message of the 24th or did you intend to withdraw the suggestion that they might make an aggressive movement in any direction?

Admiral STARK. No, we did not intend to withdraw it, and I think the two messages tie up together. Probably it might have been better if we had put it in. I put it in personally in the message of the 24th and I do not recall discussing it with the message of the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it regarded in Naval circles as logically following a warning given to a commanding officer anywhere that a nation is liable to make an aggressive movement against us, is the mere sending of such a message to an officer of that kind within any possible area of attack regarded in Naval circles as a warning that they should be [5857] on the alert?

Admiral STARK. I thought so at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't that be the rule in any Navy?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And any commanding officer in a responsible position, like Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, or any other commanding officer, would know what that meant if he received such a message?

Admiral STARK. I think so, yes, sir. It is something that doesn't happen very often.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you used the words in your message of the 24th, in the middle paragraph "the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo," did you mean or intend that to be interpreted as in any way modifying your message of the 24th that an aggressive movement might be in any direction?

Admiral STARK. No, we did not.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you, your purpose in sending this message was to emphasize the greater possibility, in your mind, of an attack on the Philippines or Thai or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, than elsewhere, particularly even the Hawaiian Islands?

[5858] Admiral STARK. Our purpose was the imminence of war, that so far as looking toward stabilization of peace in the Pacific negotiations were through, and then we gave the information we had, and the only direct information we had, of what the Japanese were doing, that is, that the information we had indicated that southern movement.

I think it should be read in connection with the message of the 24th.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that that movement was in progress?

Admiral STARK. We had definite information of that and we gave that information.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know what else was to be done or was in process of being done by the Japs?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know anything about the 6 carriers that had sneaked out from the Island north of Japan and were going through this unfrequented lane?

Admiral STARK. We had no information on that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that obviously this moving of this big contingent of ships and men down through the China Sea toward the south was for the purpose of deceiving you and everybody else with respect to their immediate action against Pearl Harbor, by the sending of this force of 6 airplane carriers and the three hundred-some-odd planes; is that your interpretation?

[5859] Admiral STARK. I don't think it was deceit. That was a carefully planned campaign, that expedition south.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they didn't go to pains to conceal that?

Admiral STARK. They couldn't very well.

The CHAIRMAN. No, but they didn't go to any pains to conceal it, but rather ostentatiously let it be known that they were heading that way, while at the same time sending this other force to the north to make the attack on Pearl Harbor if the situation justified it when they got there; is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, that may have been in their thoughts.

The CHAIRMAN. The truth is that they just outsmarted everybody didn't they?

Admiral STARK. Well, they certainly concealed their intentions so far as we were concerned of any definite indication of any attack on Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an unusual situation when an assassin intends to attack someone, he knows what he is going to do, but the other fellow does not.

Admiral STARK. We play that in our war games.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the part of the war games, not to let the other fellow know what you are going to do?

[5860] Admiral STARK. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And a nation planning a sudden surprise attack has the advantage over the nation that may be thinking one may occur but doesn't know where or when it will occur, any more than a man going along a highway knows that a man is concealed in the

corner of a fence and is going to shoot him. He may have his pockets full of guns but unless he knows the man is there he won't have them ready. Is that a fair simile?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have your suspicions aroused by the fact that this task force, or this force of airplane carriers, was missing, that for several days there was no report about them, or did that come to your attention?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall any suspicion directly bearing on that. We, in locating the Japanese Fleet, you might put certain ships on what you might call a pinpoint. You would know where they are. In other cases you would get them in an area by your cuts from them and radio intelligence. If they went to a navy yard, just as when our ships go to a navy yard, their radios are bottled up, the shore station may do it for you, and there are people down the line who will testify more directly on just how they evaluated that information, but the ship going into a home port, for [5861] example, you might not hear from her for a while, and they might assume that she was still there until they did hear from her again.

And, of course, at this particular time they had changed call signs. I remember that feature of it very well. And it takes time to pick up and identify again.

But as to whether or not we discussed at that particular time these 6 carriers I have no remembrance of it. I do have a distinct remembrance of our request of the Army to take a look at the Marshalls and the Carolines and their fitting up two planes to do that for us about that time, and which I recall not in connection, perhaps, with these 6 carriers, but with two other carriers that we had rumors were in there. We wanted to get anything we could of anything in the eastern Marshalls or further to the westward. And that reconnaissance, due to bad weather, and other things, was held up, we didn't get it. It wouldn't have been helpful, except as negative information.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Japs have better facilities for locating our ships than we had for locating theirs?

Admiral STARK. Well, we had, I would say, very little, if any, but there again the people in Naval Intelligence might give you something on that, of locating ships in Japanese ports. That is, telling us what was in Tokyo Bay, or elsewhere, [5862] out there. But in Hawaii, in the Canal, in the Los Angeles area, in San Francisco area, in the Puget Sound area, the Japanese we felt were reporting regularly with regard to our movements.

In one or two places I think we got hold of their people who were doing that reporting. I am not too clear on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably they had a more universal spy system than we did?

Admiral STARK. They had an enormous spy system.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of your message to Admiral Kimmel of the 24th and the 27th, and General Marshall's dispatch to General Short of the same date, that is, the 27th, which he instructed him to convey to Admiral Kimmel, what was the duty of the naval commander there during the days following the receipt of that message on the 27th?

Admiral STARK. Well, my thought was, we assumed that there would be a conference between the senior Army and Navy commanders

there, that a conference would occur, and that they would implement their plans against surprise, and in the protection of the Island of Oahu, particularly of the Fleet, Pearl Harbor, for what ships were kept there, and the alerting of ships at sea, with the fact that Japan was expected to attack and the officers in charge of the ships at [5863] sea, of course, would be very much on the alert against surprise anywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that alertness include day and night?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of these instructions contained in the Army and Navy dispatches to Pearl Harbor, was it or was it not in compliance with or in violation of them not to have any reconnaissance, say on the 6th day of December, the day before the attack. The evidence shows there was no reconnaissance of any kind on that day. I am speaking now of the 6th.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We had assumed when we sent out dispatch that reconnaissance would be started and kept up.

The CHAIRMAN. That is from the 27th or the 24th?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would say from the 27th in any case.

The CHAIRMAN. 27th.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether it was kept up from the 27th until the attack?

Admiral STARK. I don't know just what they did at that time. Marshall's dispatch particularly directed reconnaissance. Ours directed the deployment. And just what action was taken there I don't know.

[5864] The CHAIRMAN. Deployment means the arrangements of whatever forces there are, the grouping or separation or movement in such a way as to facilitate the greatest possible defense in the event of an attack?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you didn't answer my question as to whether if there was no reconnaissance of any kind on the 6th that that would be considered as being in violation of the orders or in compliance.

Admiral STARK. I would say it would be not carrying them out.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very diplomatic way to answer my question. It was not in compliance with the instructions.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not?

Admiral STARK. It was not.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they did not obey the instructions that were received?

Admiral STARK. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, if they had no reconnaissance at all on that day, that was in disobedience?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you agree with—first, did you hear Admiral Turner's testimony in which he said that if [5865] they had been properly alerted, with the material and with the men they had, and the forces they had, if they had been alerted on the day of the attack, that the damage done to us might have been considerably lessened and the damage done to the Japanese might have been considerably increased and thereby lessening the success of the raid—what is your view on that?

Admiral STARK. I agree with that. That is, of course, on the assumption they might have scouted for that Japanese attack and might have missed it. But there was a chance of their getting it. And if they had located it, if the radar station which did pick it up, if that had been reported, there was a chance of the Army fighters being in the air, and other measures which could have been taken with antiaircraft batteries which, I think, unquestionably would have considerably lessened the damage which the Japs inflicted.

The CHAIRMAN. It is conceivable the planes might have gone up and missed the Japanese planes, but if they didn't go up they were sure to miss them.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It made it easy for the Japanese planes?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. If they had used everything they had they still might have missed that flight; depending on where they made their estimate as to where the [5866] Japanese might come in.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean if they had gone out it would have been possible to have gone out on a reconnaissance and not discovered the approaching Japanese airplanes?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, whose duty was it, whose obligation or responsibility was it to decide whether this Fleet should have been in Pearl Harbor at that particular time, or at any other particular time?

Admiral STARK. That was the Commander in Chief Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. That was Admiral Richardson's responsibility when he was Commander of that Fleet and it became Admiral Kimmel's after he took charge?

Admiral STARK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And the frequency of the visits of the fleet to Pearl Harbor and the length of its stay was altogether then within the control of the Commanding Officer out there?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And were there any general instructions from Washington about that, or was that left entirely to the Commanding Officer?

Admiral STARK. That was left to the Senior Officer there. There may have been a general understanding of the fact on the so-called employment schedule that ships periodically have [5867] certain periods assigned for repairs, but generally speaking, which I believe you refer to, the fleet going in or out, except for vessels that might be sent to the navy yard, or might be repairing there on a periodic overhaul, that was up to the Commander in Chief there.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all.

Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stark, how long have you been in the Navy, please, sir?

Admiral STARK. I have been in the Navy a little over 46 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you enter the Academy?

Admiral STARK. I entered the Academy in October 1899.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From what State?

Admiral STARK. From Pennsylvania.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And during what period of time did you serve as the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. From August 1939 to March 1942.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did your period of service as Chief of Naval Operations compare with the usual length of time that an officer served in that capacity?

Admiral STARK. The appointment as a rule is for 4 years. It sometimes happened that an officer's term was up before his 4 years—I mean, he retired before his 4 [5868] years was up. I did not serve out the full term of 4 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Have you at any time during your long period of service in the Navy been stationed at Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. Not stationed there; no, sir. I have been there with the fleet but I have never been stationed there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You never were in command there?

Admiral STARK. Never in command there; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you consider war with Japan inevitable?

Admiral STARK. Ultimately I considered it inevitable. Do you want me to enlarge on that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I would like you to be as specific as you can, sir, whether you ever considered war with Japan as inevitable.

Admiral STARK. I did, and, to come down to a specific term, I considered it inevitable the latter part of November. Mr. Hull had been working continuously, he had not given up hope, and as long as there was negotiations there was some hope. I couldn't say that it was inevitable until we had come practically to the final clinch. I considered it possible. I went on the basis, in everything I did, on the assumption that it was going to happen. It was the only safe, sane, sensible course to take and my record here, what I had to say before Congress and in everything I did, bears that out. [5869] But we might have reached an agreement in late 1941. I couldn't say we wouldn't until we knew that that agreement was practically unattainable. The chances grew more and more slender.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can understand that, but I am trying to ascertain as to whether you in your own mind ever reached the point that you considered war with Japan as inevitable.

Admiral STARK. Well, I did at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Admiral STARK. That was in late November.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 1941?

Admiral STARK. 1941; but I stated in some of my letters that I considered that we were heading straight for this war long earlier.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you reach the conclusion that we were heading straight for war with Japan? About what time? I don't mean the hour or minute or day. About what time?

Admiral STARK. I am thinking over the whole picture. When Japan jointed the Axis, which I believe was in September of 1940, there certainly was a distinct danger sign flying there. I thought—I didn't see how we could avoid sooner or later, the way things were shaping up, getting in this [5870] world conflict that put Japan on the other side of the fence from us. I have forgotten just the dates of my letters, but I continually stressed the fact I didn't see how we could avoid it, either by being forced into it or getting into it. I stated

in a letter of November 7—I made wrong estimates at other times—I happened to hit it then—that I didn't see how it could last, didn't see how we could avoid it more than another month.

I pointed out that there were two irreconcilable forces and one side couldn't live with the set-up. I also always thought that the China incident, so-called, was a stumbling block we could not get around until either Japan backed or we backed, and, as I wrote Admiral Kimmel, or Admiral Hart, I have forgotten which, I didn't think there would be any change here. I felt we were heading for it at least a year before we got into it.

As to the inevitability of it, by just saying, here, Mr. Hull, you might as well stop, don't try any more, of course we were playing for time, it was in the fall of 1941, it just looked like we couldn't keep out or from being attacked much longer.

[5871] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I can well understand, of course. You have made it quite clear that you wanted and the President wanted and General Marshall wanted and all responsible officials of the Government wanted to stay out of war if possible.

Admiral STARK. We were extremely anxious to avoid a two-front war.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I can well understand that, we all shared that view, but what I was trying to get at, you, the head of the United States Navy, holding that responsible position, whether you reached the conclusion in your own mind that war with Japan was inevitable?

Admiral STARK. Well, I believed we were going to get in it many, many months before we did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you say that in November 1941 that you reached the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable.

Admiral STARK. That is the time when we thought so and it is when we said it definitely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral Turner was your Chief of War Plans, wasn't he?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He has testified here that he reached the conclusion about June or July 1941 that war with Japan [5872] was inevitable and that he discussed it with you and I got the impression from what he said that you were in agreement with him.

Admiral STARK. Well, of course, as to just what "inevitable" means, I have tried to give different points of view I have had on that. About that time the freezing of assets took place, that was in July as a matter of fact, and, as I say, when Japan joined the Axis I had written I thought we were heading for this war and I thought that that would pull us all in together. I would not have differed with anyone who had told me at that time that they thought we were surely going to get into it, I would not have wanted to differ with them so far as getting ready for it was concerned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you recall that Admiral Turner did discuss that with you about that time?

Admiral STARK. Well, we discussed it more or less continuously.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ever think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. Again I knew an attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. We had stressed it in all our correspondence, we had

endeavored to build up against it, we had talked to them out there about it, we had approved their plans which also envisaged such a thing happening and we thought it might [5873] very well happen some day, but as to that particular time,—and I previously testified that I did not want anything that I might say to be construed as otherwise than the fact that at that time I was not expecting an attack on Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Even though you saw the 14-part message and the so-called pilot message and the 1 o'clock message you still did not think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor at the time it was made?

Admiral STARK. I was thinking of the situation so far as actual action was concerned further to the westward. On the other hand, I recognized the possibility clearly that they might hit there or elsewhere and on that possibility I had sent a message which I had thought would convey to them that possibility and that they would be on guard against it and I wrote to that effect also, about being on guard.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your message of November 24, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what was the purpose of that message?

Admiral STARK. The message of the 27th and the 24th?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, first take the message of November 24, 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[5874] The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was the purpose of that message?

Admiral STARK. The purpose of the message of the 24th?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of the 24th.

Admiral STARK. Was to show the situation regarding the negotiations, about which we had corresponded so much. We were not getting anywhere. It looked like a break-down. The break-down had not yet actually occurred. Also we had the definite information of the movement south, which looked like Japan was going to strike somewhere to the southward. Whether it might hit the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or Borneo, I think the despatch covered it. I will check it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Those points are mentioned in the November 27 message but they are not mentioned in the November 24 message.

Admiral STARK. Well, the message of November 24 states:

Naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

And that message was meant to show the critical situation then existing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did you intend the message of November 24, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel as a war warning message?

Admiral STARK. Well, I think if I had gotten it I would have considered that it was a war warning.

[5875] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your intention in sending it then?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral STARK. In the critical situation that something might break.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, your message of November 27, also sent out to Admiral Kimmel as well as Admiral Hart, was certainly intended as a war warning message because it so states in the opening expression of the message, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It is stronger.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, in these two messages, Admiral, the one of November 24, in which it is stated:

Indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is possible—

and in the message of November 27, 1941, among other things it states:

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Now, in neither of those messages is any direct reference made to Hawaii, is there?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; there is not.

[5876] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And all of the points mentioned in both of these messages are not within the area coming within the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel, are they?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. We in those despatches gave the information we had. In my opinion an attack elsewhere was not precluded by the fact that we had no tangible evidence of an attack elsewhere. It was for that reason that, take the message of the 24th, it was not only sent to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Force and the Pacific; it also went to the Canal and to the commandant of the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Districts, which are on the west coast.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, the message of November 27, 1941, also includes this language:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46.

That would be a direct order to the commander of the Pacific Fleet, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I believe, as you stated to the chairman in response to his question, at least that part of the order was not complied with by the commander, was it?

Admiral STARK. So far as the use; I said, so far as I knew with regard to the use of patrol planes he had not complied with it.

[5877] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, do you know of anything he did to comply with that part of the order?

Admiral STARK. I do not know what orders he had given to his two task forces which were sent out. I do not know what order he had given to his submarines. He may have given orders there. I do not know just what additional orders he may have given to his ships in Pearl Harbor with regard to antiaircraft batteries, and so forth.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the fact that practically all of his fleet was caught in the harbor 6 days after this message was sent to him would not indicate that he moved many of them out, would it?

Admiral STARK. Well, he had a considerable portion out in the two task forces.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How many battleships did he have out?

Admiral STARK. I think he had no battleships out.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How many cruisers did he have out?

Admiral STARK. The ships attached to the Pacific Fleet that were at sea or located at bases other than Pearl Harbor on the date of the attack—this is information from the Office of Naval Intelligence—there was 1 battleship not there, which was on the west coast, the *Colorado*, under repair. His 3 carriers were not in Pearl Harbor. He had 10 of his heavy cruisers that were out, 10 out of 12 if I re- [5878] call correctly. Three of his light cruisers were out and of his destroyers 24 were out.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many of those, if any, were moved out after he received your message of the 27th?

Admiral STARK. I think most of them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Left the harbor after he received your message?

Admiral STARK. I think so. He can testify to that but I think that they were in the two task forces, one of which left on the 28th as I recall and the other early in December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, most all these vessels that you have mentioned as not being in the harbor at the time of the attack were in the task forces, were they?

Admiral STARK. In the task forces; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Except for one battleship which was under repair on the Pacific coast?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Most of the others you have mentioned as not being in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were in the two task forces?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I think it is not generally understood that our fast ships, what might be called our fast striking forces were not much hurt at Pearl Harbor. I doubt if people realize how many ships were in Pearl Harbor that [5879] were not hurt. I told the President the morning after the attack, or the afternoon or night, I think it was the morning after, while there wasn't much comfort in the fact, but that I wanted him to understand that our fast striking forces were practically intact.

Now, I will just give you a list of ships which were not in Pearl Harbor at the time. It might be of interest to you to know what was there and was unhurt.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It would be.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just a moment, please.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, if I am not mistaken the committee has a mimeographed copy of the exhibit that he apparently is now using, that was distributed, which shows all these figures about that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think that is true, yes. It has already been put in evidence, has it?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, but I was going to suggest that it be put in right now and read into the record at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will just hand it to the reporter. I did not mean to interrupt your examination,

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The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am glad you did.
(The document referred to follows:)

[5880]

STATISTICAL SECTION,
DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Nov 6 1945.

Confidential

Names of Major Vessels in Pacific Ocean on December 7, 1941

I. SHIPS SUNK OR PUT OUT OF COMMISSION AT PEARL HARBOR

	<i>Date stricken or returned to duty</i>
BB <i>Arizona</i> -----	Stricken 12/1/42.
BB <i>Oklahoma</i> -----	Stricken 11/22/44.
BB <i>Pennsylvania</i> -----	Available for sea 1/28/43.
BB <i>Nevada</i> -----	Ready for sea 12/12/42.
BB <i>Tennessee</i> -----	Repaired and converted 5/10/43.
BB <i>California</i> -----	Repaired and converted 1/15/44.
BB <i>Maryland</i> -----	Repairs completed 2/21/42.
BB <i>West Virginia</i> -----	Repaired and converted 7/1/44.
CL <i>Helena</i> -----	Ready for sea 7/14/42.
CL <i>Honolulu</i> -----	Ready for sea 3/16/42.
CL <i>Raleigh</i> -----	Ready for sea 6/—/42.
DD <i>Cassin</i> -----	Repairs completed 2/19/44.
DD <i>Downs</i> -----	Repairs completed 12/1/43.
DD <i>Shaw</i> -----	Repairs completed 7/13/42.
CM <i>Oglala</i> -----	Ready for sea 12/7/42.
AG <i>Utah</i> -----	Stricken 11/13/44.
[5081] AV <i>Curtis</i> -----	Ready for sea 12/15/41.
AR <i>Vestal</i> -----	Ready for sea 12/17/44.
Total-----	18

II. SHIPS AT PEARL HARBOR BUT UNHURT IN THE ATTACK

CA <i>New Orleans</i>	DD <i>Dale</i>	DD <i>Henley</i>
CA <i>San Francisco</i>	DD <i>Aylwin</i>	DD <i>Bagley</i>
CL <i>Phoenix</i>	DD <i>Monaghan</i>	DD <i>Mugford</i>
CL <i>St. Louis</i>	DD <i>Conyngham</i>	DD <i>Ralph Talbot</i>
CL <i>Detroit</i>	DD <i>Reid</i>	DD <i>Jarvis</i>
DD <i>Phelps</i>	DD <i>Case</i>	DD <i>Patterson</i>
DD <i>Dewey</i>	DD <i>Cumings</i>	DD <i>Allen</i>
DD <i>Hull</i>	DD <i>Tucker</i>	DD <i>Chew</i>
DD <i>McDonough</i>	DD <i>Selfridge</i>	DD <i>Schley</i>
DD <i>Worden</i>	DD <i>Blue</i>	DD <i>Ward</i>
DD <i>Farragut</i>	DD <i>Helm</i>	

III. SHIPS ATTACHED TO PACIFIC FLEET BUT AT SEA OR LOCATED AT BASES OTHER THAN PEARL HARBOR

[5882] BB <i>Colorado</i>	CL <i>Concord</i>	DD <i>Flusser</i>
CV <i>Enterprise</i>	CL <i>Richmond</i>	DD <i>Lamson</i>
CV <i>Lexington</i>	CL <i>Trenton</i>	DD <i>Mahan</i>
CV <i>Saratoga</i>	DD <i>Balch</i>	DD <i>Clark</i>
CA <i>Northampton</i>	DD <i>Maury</i>	DD <i>Cushing</i>
CA <i>Chester</i>	DD <i>Craven</i>	DD <i>Perkins</i>
CA <i>Salt Lake City</i>	DD <i>Gridley</i>	DD <i>Preston</i>
CA <i>Chicago</i>	DD <i>McCall</i>	DD <i>Smith</i>
CA <i>Portland</i>	DD <i>Dunlap</i>	DD <i>Rathburne</i>
CA <i>Astoria</i>	DD <i>Benham</i>	DD <i>Dent</i>
CA <i>Minneapolis</i>	DD <i>Fanning</i>	DD <i>Talbot</i>
CA <i>Indianapolis</i>	DD <i>Ellet</i>	DD <i>Waters</i>
CA <i>Louisville</i>	DD <i>Porter</i>	DD <i>Itchfield</i>
CA <i>Pensacola</i>	DD <i>Drayton</i>	

[5883]

Numbers of vessels in Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941

Sunk or put out of commission at Pearl Harbor	Unhurt in the attack on Pearl Harbor	At sea or located at bases other than Pearl Harbor	Sunk or put out of commission at Pearl Harbor	Unhurt in the attack on Pearl Harbor	At sea or located at bases other than Pearl Harbor
BB..... 8		1	AVD.....	3	2
CV.....		3	AVP.....	2	3
CA.....	2	10	AV..... 1	1	1
CL..... 3	3	3	ASR.....	1	1
DD..... 3	27	24	AS.....	1	1
SS.....	5	17	AG..... 1	2	
CM..... 1			AR..... 1	1	
DM.....	8		AO.....	2	9
DMS.....	4	9	Misc.....	8	10
AM.....	6	3			
AD.....	2		Total..... 18	78	97

[5884] Admiral STARK. It shows that 10 of his 12 cruisers were out. The other 2 of the fast heavy cruisers were in, not damaged. There were 3 light cruisers not damaged. And of the destroyers in port there were about 27 that were not damaged. So practically out of his destroyers of, as I recall, somewhere around 55 or 60, there was only 1 damaged. I do not see anything about submarines here, so I assume no submarine was damaged. The battleships were the worst sufferers in proportion to their strength by far.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete the reading of that document?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then I believe you have already stated, Admiral, that you considered the messages of November 24 and especially the message of November 27 as adequate and sufficient war warning message to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. We thought so. We sent them for that purpose.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And in response to the question by the Chairman, if the naval forces there had been on the alert as you had expected to place them by your message and likewise the Army command there had been properly on the alert, you think the damages inflicted upon our forces would have been [5885] much less?

Admiral STARK. I think so; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, in talking about war being inevitable with Japan I gather that you mean to say that we were moving towards war and you felt that a conflict would actually come at some time?

Admiral STARK. I felt so.

Senator GEORGE. But you did not necessarily think that a conflict was imminent until late in 1941, that is, in October or November of 1941?

Admiral STARK. That is true; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You did not see, I believe you testified this morning, the intercepted Japanese message of September 24, the one referring to Pearl Harbor and the location of ships, the tie-up at docks, and so forth, in Pearl Harbor of the Fleet. I believe it is contained in Exhibit 2 at page 12.

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of ever having seen that dispatch until I saw it recently.

Senator GEORGE. Well, Admiral, that dispatch is more than a mere ordinary message or dispatch dealing with the movement of ships, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. It is; yes, sir.

[5886] Senator GEORGE. Decidedly so.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, did you ever hear that message of September discussed by anyone in your department or division?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I did not.

Senator GEORGE. So far as you know Admiral Ingersoll did not know anything of it or did not see it?

Admiral STARK. Admiral Ingersoll has told me that he did not see it.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I mean of your knowledge prior to December 7?

Admiral STARK. No; I have no recollection of ever having seen that message or of any conversation or reference with regard to it before December 7 and I also stated that it might be that my memory is faulty there, but I have no recollection of it whatsoever.

Senator GEORGE. Did you testify this morning that you did not see the 1 o'clock message, I believe it is designated as the 1 o'clock message of December 7, the one directing the delivery of the fourteen part message to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, until about 10:40 or something like that?

Admiral STARK. Until somewhere around, I would say not before, 10:40 and I am basing that on what I have since heard. [5887] My own recollection is not clear. I believe Captain Kramer will be able to give a rather definite time on that, which I will accept if he does.

Senator GEORGE. You did say that you did recollect the discussion of the 1 o'clock message or intercept when you were called by General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It is the only clear——

Senator GEORGE. It is the only really outstanding recollection that you have of it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, it is, because thinking the whole thing over afterwards that message is the only thing of that morning that stands out like a beacon light.

Senator GEORGE. Well, now, so far as you know no information reached Admiral Kimmel about that 1 o'clock message until after the attack?

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct. I know it is, yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You did not make an effort to send, except direct a request that Admiral Kimmel be notified in the Marshall message?

Admiral STARK. That is true; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. But you did not know that the Marshall message, the Chief of Staff's message, had not gone through?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not.

[5888] Senator GEORGE. You did not, however, take any steps to send directly to Admiral Kimmel a notice of that 1 o'clock message?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not parallel it.

Senator GEORGE. You did not parallel it.

Admiral STARK. And that is the thought I have often had since, that if I had paralleled it it might have gone through. I let it go the way

it was. That is, Marshall stated that he would get it through. I offered to get it through but I did not. I had no reason to believe that he would not get it through just as quickly.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, there was a time, as you have testified about and others, other officers in the Army and Navy, when the possibility and strong, maybe, probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was discussed in Army and Navy circles, that is in 1940 and up during some early months even of 1941 and in your correspondence with the commander of the Pacific Fleet you did discuss the possibility of an air attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And then there did seem to come a time when there was a lapse of interest in that point down here in Washington; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. I wouldn't say there was a lapse of interest. We initially pointed out what we thought was necessary [5889] and we took steps to correct the deficiencies as far as we could and my conversations with Marshall on that continued, not only with regard to radar and things for which the Army was responsible, but also craft and antiaircraft weapons. We continued to talk about that and the war plans covered what we had to give them and which were made available substantially as the war plans stated.

We had received and O. K.'d what we thought was a very splendid arrangement out there for meeting the situation and from then on, except to follow up on matériel, there was no particular mention, as I recall, about the continued danger. We had set it forth. We did not talk particularly about other types of attack which might occur, but I think you are right in stating that. I do not recall of it having been specifically mentioned. I will look through the record and see if I can find anything.

[5890] Senator GEORGE. I did not mean that you had lost all interest in the possibility of an air attack, but I have been unable to escape the conclusion that little emphasis was placed upon the possibility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor late in the year 1941. That is what I meant to say. Of course, you did not have adequate preparation at any of the outlying posts, especially you did not consider that you had all of the preparation that you needed at Pearl Harbor to repel an air attack or a combined attack.

Admiral STARK. That is true. I think I might say, Senator George, what we said earlier in the year still stood.

Senator GEORGE. I understand that. I understand you now to say that we are to take it that that still stood, that nothing happened to change that or no changes had been made and you were relying upon the plans as they had been developed.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And the conversations as they had gone on during the previous months.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you were making an effort to strengthen your defenses at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and we also had word about their carrying on their weekly drills, and so forth.

Senator GEORGE. I believe you have agreed, Admiral, [5891] and I recall also General Marshall's agreement, that while we did not

have as strong defenses at Pearl Harbor as we desired, as we expected to build up, that if the two services, that is, the Army and Navy, had been fully alerted during the week preceding December 7 the attack might have been diverted or might have been so broken up as to have saved the losses to the Navy in men as well as matériel, or substantial injury at that time.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, I just want to ask you a few questions about what seems to me to be the two important messages that you have sent out, that is the message of November 24—that did go to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And then the message of November 27 also went to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Then, there was a message of November 28 in which you quoted the full message of the Chief of Staff to the commanders of the Armed Forces. Did that go to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That reached him?

Admiral STARK. That went to him, as I recall, for information. [5892] The other two were for action.

Senator GEORGE. That went to "INFO." That means "Information"?

Admiral STARK. "Information", yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That did not go to him as a command message, or an action message?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There was subjoined to the quoted Army message a further statement which he was, of course, assumed or presumed to recognize and follow, was he not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And that cautioned against offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act?

Admiral STARK. That part of it for action was to the two naval coastal frontiers on the West coast. It was sent to Admiral Kimmel for information.

Senator GEORGE. I see. The whole of it was in the nature of information, as far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I might mention, Senator George, in that connection that the two action addressees in the dispatch automatically came under Admiral Kimmel in case of war, as shown in WPL-46, so we wanted Admiral Kimmel to know what we had told the naval coastal frontiers.

Senator GEORGE. I see. They automatically came under [5893] his control in the case of war?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Do you know what time Admiral Kimmel received that message?

Admiral STARK. Of the 28th?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. I do not know, sir. We obtained from naval communications the fact that that message was sent out at half past

2 on the morning of the 29th. That would mean Hawaiian time half past 2. He probably got that in the late afternoon or early evening on the 28th.

Senator GEORGE. Could you give us the time of receipt by Admiral Kimmel of the November 27 message, or at least the date of the receipt?

Admiral STARK. Well, we obtained the information from communications that that message went out, Greenwich Time 2801—or, rather, 0106 in the morning of the 28th. You take 10 hours and a half off from that and he probably got that the afternoon of the 27th.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, have you before you the several messages regarding codes and the destruction of codes?

Admiral STARK. I think they are in this file. I remember them.

Senator GEORGE. Beginning, I believe, December 2 or [5894] 3, the one I am referring to, and going through, maybe, to the 5th of December. I merely wish to ask you about those messages, whether they were addressed to or received by Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; they were sent to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart, the commandants of their two naval districts.

Senator GEORGE. That statement is generally true of all of those code destruction messages?

Admiral STARK. The next one was sent to CINC Asiatic and COM 16 for action, and to CINCPAC, Admiral Kimmel, and COM 14 for information. That is the one that speaks about Singapore, Manila, destroying purple machines, Batavia, and so forth.

Senator GEORGE. But the receipt by Admiral Kimmel either for action or for information—

Admiral STARK. It was for information, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Is indicated with respect to all of those messages referring to the destruction of codes?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral as to the message of November 27, which is the strongest war warning message that was sent to Admiral Kimmel, a portion of that message is also by way of information, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It was sent to him for action [5895] but the message does contain certain information.

Senator GEORGE. The message does contain certain informational matter?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. It contains, for instance, this statement, the factual statement that the negotiations with Japan had broken down, had ceased, and that Japan is expected "within the next few days, to commence an aggressive move," or to make an aggressive move, and then reference is made to the size of the Japanese forces that were being mobilized or put in action, and then this statement is made, "an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo" is specifically pointed out. That is by way of information, is it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. By way of information of what was in the minds here, in Washington, that you thought?

Admiral STARK. They gave them what we had.

Senator GEORGE. What you had?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In other words, that statement is based on the evaluation you made of all of the information that you received or that you had?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

[5896] Senator GEORGE. Then you come to the action—

Admiral STARK. I might state with regard to that, about all the information we had with regard to the rest of the Japanese Fleet, any information that we had concerning that was also known to the commanders in the chief in the Pacific, because they were the ones that sent us information on that.

In other words, the stations could cut in and locate and evaluate the information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese Fleet, that information which blew into the department came from Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart. So any other information that was available, that would have been available to us, they already had.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, the enumeration of the possible points of attack with no reference whatever to Pearl Harbor was calculated, was it not, to weaken the warning message, so far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned?

Admiral STARK. I can only say with regard to that, that that did not occur to me, and, so far as I know, did not occur to anyone else. We gave the war warning. It was sent to the two commanders in chief for action with a directive, and what information we had and what indications we had we sent along as information. Now, the reaction that it had in the minds of the commanders in chief is something to which they can testify. I can only state that we thought we had given them [5897] an unequivocal war warning to be on the alert against any possibility. Whether what we sent was sufficient or insufficient is something I would say for the committee to decide. We thought it was, and we intended to convey that.

Senator GEORGE. Your message of November 24 had definitely stated that action in any direction might be anticipated.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Might be expected.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. But in this message there is, of course, no mention of Pearl Harbor, and there isn't any message, in late November at least or early in December, that did specifically refer to Pearl Harbor, and the enumeration of possible points of attack which omitted Pearl Harbor might, will you not say, tend to weaken the force of the warning to a commander of a fleet who was at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I can only say we did not think so at the time. In the light of hindsight it may have.

Senator GEORGE. Now, the very concluding sentence in this war message is:

"Continental District Guam-Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage."

Isn't that also calculated to indicate a complete all-out defense or reconnaissance was meant to be undertaken by Admiral Kimmel, or might have led him to believe that he was not to take an all-out [5898] reconnaissance?

Admiral STARK. I do not think so:

Senator GEORGE. You did not think so?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not. If I had thought so I would have worded the message or caused it to be worded differently. About the only thing that Guam could do was to take action against sabotage. We knew that Guam could not hold out. And about the only thing the continental district could do was to take action against sabotage.

Senator GEORGE. I am not asserting, admiral, that these points that I am pointing out in this message were calculated in fact to weaken the effect of this warning message, so far as the commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was concerned, but I am asking you as an experienced officer in the Navy if the enumeration of certain points of possible attack with no reference to Pearl Harbor and with the reference that is contained here to Guam, Samoa, continental districts, and so forth, might not have the effect of leaving the Commander of the Pacific Fleet in some doubt as to what action he should take to defend his position?

Admiral STARK. I can only say we did not think so. I can also agree with you now that it might have, particularly in the light of hindsight. However, we did not think so. In mentioning those places we simply indicated the information we [5899] had. It was not necessary for us to tell Admiral Kimmel to be prepared against sabotage or destruction of codes, for example, which we also mentioned for Guam, because he would automatically take care of that, although we did, so far as the outlying islands were concerned, authorize it. We, in sending that message to him for action—not for information but for action—had thought it would activate his command, and we gave him the only information we had. If we had had any indication of an air attack from the movement of ships we would have given it. We had nothing. But the absence of that information, in my opinion, did not preclude the possibility of an attack.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, I believe that you said earlier in your testimony that you regarded the fleet reasonably secure at Pearl Harbor. Did you state that?

Admiral STARK. Reasonably secure?

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Based at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall having stated that they were reasonably secure. I stated that I would not have hesitated to put the fleet there. The fleet, even though it was a dangerous position or not a dangerous position, it was the furthest point westward that we could approach at that time.

[5900] I pointed that out shortly after Pearl Harbor in a meeting of Senators in which I was called about the position of the fleet and the danger to the west coast, and the question about bringing the fleet back to the west coast, and they were very much perturbed that the attack might come on the west coast. I remember the meeting very well. General Marshall was called before it. I pointed out the place of the fleet was as far west as we could put it, and we would continue to push it back until it accomplished its purpose of defeating Japan. But I would not state that the fleet was secure there, in view of the possibility of an attack. The fleet was never secure in the

possibility of war, unless it was back in the navy yards somewhere on the home coast.

Senator GEORGE. It was reasonably secure against submarine attack?

Admiral STARK. Against submarine attack in port quite secure; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That comes down to this last and final question, Admiral. What proportion of the fleet in the Pacific, that is, our entire naval forces in the Pacific, were concentrated at Pearl Harbor the first week in December, or late November and early December? What proportion of the entire naval forces in the Pacific area was concentrated there or based there?

[5901] Admiral STARK. Was based in Pearl Harbor?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, at Pearl Harbor. I am not asking what specific ships were there at that time, but what proportion of our entire naval strength was there.

Admiral STARK. Of our entire naval strength?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, in the Pacific.

Admiral STARK. In the Pacific?

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I could work that out as a percentage. I might state Admiral Hart at that time had two cruisers, and 13 destroyers—if that is not correct, I would have to refresh my memory on it—28 submarines, 28 or 29 patrol planes.

The CHAIRMAN. While you are looking that up I might say to one or two of the members of the committee who were absent Monday, the committee formally agreed to sit to 4:30 in the afternoon until Congress reassembles.

Admiral STARK. Senator George, I want to make sure I have got the question right.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. You do not mean the percentage of the whole Navy?

Senator GEORGE. No.

Admiral STARK. But the percentage of the ships that were in the Pacific?

[5902] Senator GEORGE. In the Pacific area.

Admiral STARK. The percentage that were in the Hawaiian area?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir. Now, admiral. I do not care to have you go to the trouble of making an accurate statement, or a mathematically accurate statement, but just about the proportion of the strength.

Admiral STARK. Of course, he had the very great proportion.

Senator GEORGE. Well, admiral, you may put it in the record if you wish to. I will be very glad to have you do so.

Admiral STARK. All right, sir. I can give it to you from memory—I thought I had it here—which would be fairly accurate, but I think it would be better to give you a detailed statement. For example, there were 13 heavy cruisers in the Pacific of which the Pacific Fleet had 12 and Hart had 1. There were 45 new submarines in the Pacific of which—well, I may be 2 or 3 out. It is just as well, I think, to give you this accurately. There were no battleships in the western Pacific.

Senator GEORGE. No battleships?

Admiral STARK. No battleships out there. There were 13 destroyers. In the southeast Pacific, there were 2 destroyers. I will give you the table in the morning.

Senator GEORGE. If you do that will be sufficient for my purposes.

[5903] Mr. MITCHELL. How do you make the comparison?

By so many destroyers in the Atlantic and so many destroyers in the Pacific, so many battleships figuring the weight in metal, or how would you give the relative strength of the fleet?

[5904] Admiral STARK. I have a table which has just that on it. I thought I had it with me. I think it shows it fairly accurately.

Mr. MITCHELL. You can present it then in the morning and we will put in the record.¹

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. When you come to strength it is a very difficult thing. Until we reinforced the Atlantic, for example, by three battleships, we had on paper three battleships in the Atlantic. They were battleships. Any aged cruiser in clear weather could take its range on them, outside of those three battleships' guns, and pound them to pieces, because they were old.

When you get in to the strength and penetrative effect of 12, 14, 16-inch guns, and so forth, it would be a pretty tough problem, and if any such evaluation as that were wanted I suggest the Navy Department, but I will give you the number of ships.

Mr. GEARHART. Along this line I wonder if the Admiral will give the figures so as to show the number and type of ships in the Asiatic Fleet and the number and type in the Pacific Fleet, and in giving the strength of the Pacific Fleet if you would indicate how much was in Pearl Harbor and how much was out of Pearl Harbor on December 7 it would be [5905] very interesting to me.

For instance, there were two task forces at sea, as you remember, under Admiral Halsey, and another admiral whose name I don't remember—Admiral Newton. Then there was one battleship, I think, on the Pacific coast in drydock or for overhauling.

Admiral STARK. That is correct; the *Colorado*.

Mr. GEARHART. So if we could have the figures reflecting not only the number of ships in the Pacific but where they were it would be very illuminating.¹

Admiral STARK. It is very easy to obtain. As a matter of fact, I think it is in the exhibits now. But I have one of my own and I will fix it up from the data furnished me by the Department and a table which I think will make it very plain.

Mr. GEARHART. In making this present request I don't want to interfere with the requests made by the Senator from Georgia.

Senator GEORGE. No, no, no.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they are practically identical anyway.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I merely wish to get a rough view of the relative strength.

[5906] That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I believe some of the witnesses here, Admiral, probably including General Marshall, have testified that a surprise attack by air was considered the chief danger to Pearl Harbor.

¹ See Mr. Hannaford's statement on p. 2492, *infra*.

Do you agree with that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. In this message of the 27th, in which you referred to the possibility, or maybe likelihood, of an attack on the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula, and Borneo, and so forth, when you were undertaking to tell what the Japanese were likely to do, based on your information—

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; we stated "our information indicated".

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Now, if it had then occurred to you that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was at all likely, you would have included that, perhaps?

Admiral STARK. If we had expected it at that time I certainly would have included it. If I had been expecting it.

Mr. CLARK. You did not expect it?

Admiral STARK. I was surprised. I was not expecting it. I was thinking of what was going on further west.

[5907] Mr. CLARK. Still the circumstances that existed then really created almost an ideal situation for such an attack, did they not?

Admiral STARK. As it existed, yes, sir; and we thought—

Mr. CLARK. I am referring to the diversionary movement southward by the Japanese, the fact that traffic had been diverted to the north and south across the Pacific, and so forth. Wouldn't that indicate to a strategist an opportune moment for a surprise air attack?

Admiral STARK. Of course, in a surprise attack the other fellow had the initiative, and he took it and it proved that his estimate was correct, that it was a good time.

Mr. CLARK. Now, may I ask you this, please, sir: At the time you were preparing this message as to what the Japs were doing, did you even then consider the likelihood of a surprise air attack, or had you dropped that consideration?

Admiral STARK. No, we hadn't dropped it. And with regard to the message of the 24th, my memory on that is very clear, although I didn't mention air attack, to include the words "in any direction," and if an attack had come on Hawaii, that would have been the most dangerous form.

It might have come that way. It might also have, of course, come from submarines. And, as I have already said, it might have come on the Pacific coast. I was thinking of [5908] the broad Pacific, not only Hawaii but our other points of possible attack, at that time.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I am completely ignorant of all matters military and some of my questions may sound rather silly to you, but I was trying to get at the time when you were framing this message to the man in charge of the fleet out there, as to what the Japs were doing and what the Japs were likely to do, at which time they were making this movement to the southward, and did lead you actually to believe that is where they were going to strike.

Why did you not then consider the likelihood at that time of a surprise air attack?

Admiral STARK. Well, I think we did consider it to the extent that we gave a directive to take a deployment preparatory to putting a war

plan into effect, a defense deployment. That was what we intended it. It was a direct order to that effect.

Mr. CLARK. Yes. I see that, admiral. I appreciate that.

Admiral STARK. Perhaps my background on that could be explained, for not having diagnosed the thing as it did happen, and which I didn't, by stating that I wasn't expecting, in view of the magnitude of the attack which might come, and we expected it to come and it did come, much farther west, that they would strike all over the Pacific, practically. [5909] That is, as far as Hawaii, at that time. I just didn't expect it. I was surprised. I don't know that I can add much to it. I knew it was a possibility. I thought we had gone at the thing from every angle before.

If we had not thought of it being a possibility we could have just sent that message to Hart for action, but we included Kimmel in it, and thought—we had intended to alert them against an attack, which we said might come anywhere, in the 24th and the war warning of the 27th.

Now—

Mr. CLARK. If you will pardon me just a moment, admiral. I thoroughly understand that. I heard you say it. My point was this, when in the later message you undertook to point out, as Chief of Naval Operations, where you thought they were likely to strike, and what you thought they were likely to do, you entirely omitted any likelihood or possibility of an air attack. Is that because you didn't think of it at that time or because you didn't think it likely or possible?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall a discussion of an air attack on Hawaii at that time. Now, I was thinking only in general terms other than information we had.

Mr. CLARK. You mentioned specific points where the attack might go.

[5910] Admiral STARK. We had information indicating that.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir. You knew, of course, that there was a movement that way and that there was a set-up there that would be almost ideal for a surprise air attack, did you not?

Admiral STARK. In Hawaii?

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral STARK. That there the situation was ideal?

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I wouldn't call it ideal. I think there was a great deal of risk involved.

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Assuming that the radar stations had been in full effect, that Marshall's order to make reconnaissance had been in effect, that everything had been manned, and so forth, I think they might have given a right good account of themselves.

Mr. CLARK. I agree entirely with that, but I had in mind the movement of Japanese forces south, and, of course, you didn't know it, but it seemed to have been a fact that there was a report or reports being made from Hawaii that there was not any reconnaissance down there, the Japs seemed to have known that, although the Navy here didn't seem to know it; but taking those circumstances into account, I was [5911] trying to find whether, as you framed that message, it

passed into your mind at all that there might be a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. I believe I have asked you that question.

Admiral STARK. I can only say that we always thought it possible but I was not looking for it at that time and I was surprised that it occurred.

Mr. CLARK. You were as much surprised as Admiral Kimmel was, of the air attack?

Admiral STARK. I was surprised at the air attack. I also was surprised that there were no steps, or that certain steps had not been taken to intercept it and be on the lookout for it.

Mr. CLARK. That brings me to another question that I would like to ask you, if it is a proper question:

As an experienced naval officer, having long and fine experience, if you had been in command at Pearl Harbor, with the equipment that was there, and had received the message that Admiral Kimmel did receive, of the 27th of November, exactly what would you have done?

Admiral STARK. Separating the answer from hindsight, it is so easy for me to say what I would have done which would have caught this attack.

Mr. CLARK. I don't think it is a question of hindsight. I am asking you this simple, plain question, leaving hindsight [5912] out of it.

Admiral STARK. Well, my thought is that I certainly would have started the radar going 24 hours a day.

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral STARK. That I would have made an estimate, and, I believe estimates had been made, as to where an attack, if it came by air, might come, from what direction. I would have known, of course, he did know, how many planes he had that were usable for reconnaissance at that time, long distance reconnaissance. I would have assumed that that would have been put into effect.

I don't know just how many submarines he had available at that time, but I certainly think I would have used them to supplement my other means for getting early information of a possible attack.

As to the light forces, I don't know just what I would have done with them. The carriers. I don't know what orders he had given them. They were on an expedition to the westward. He may have given them orders, either by radio or before they went out, about sweeping and assisting in reconnaissance. If the carriers had been available to him he might have sent them out in a certain direction, supplementing his other efforts. In other words, used what he had as best he could to avoid being caught aback.

[5913] Mr. CLARK. One other question. It may be that I am anticipating and if so counsel will advise me and I will wait.

With regard to this message that divided up the harbor into sections, which you say you are not sure you saw, have you looked at that since?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Was it clipped?

Admiral STARK. Was it what?

Mr. CLARK. Was it clipped?

Admiral STARK. I don't know. Most of those dispatches were burned, except the file copy. When you say have I looked at it since, I don't recall having seen the dispatch at all before. I have seen it. It has been photostated and copied from the file copy in the Navy Depart-

ment. It was one of those things that in going through the mass of material, it was one of those dispatches that was picked out.

Mr. CLARK. I didn't know whether the fact that it was or was not clipped might enable you to say whether you had seen it or not.

Admiral STARK. Well, there is nothing left clipped in the Navy Department now. I think all those dispatches have been burned except the file copy.

Mr. CLARK. Who exactly would be the one to determine— [5914] well, I will say, to clip the messages, as you referred to in your testimony?

Admiral STARK. They were clipped in Intelligence. And I think you have Captain McCollum down. There were two or three of them working there. McCollum, Kramer. Which one did the initial clipping I am not sure. And that booklet also would go on up to the head of Intelligence.

Mr. CLARK. Now, just one other thing. It appears in the record here that there are some intercepts that were intercepted but not decoded and made available.

In other words, some, what we call magic, appear.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Intercepted but intercepted prior to December 7 and not decoded until after that date. I was wondering whether after this situation reached the crucial stage, say the 24th, 25th, 27th of November, any effort was made to give priority to the decoding of these messages from Japan over the great mass of stuff that you have testified was intercepted.

Admiral STARK. I think that the people who actually handled that would be better qualified to answer that question than I could. My understanding is that they at times would look at a message and see right away that it wasn't particularly important and throw it aside and look for something more [5915] important and use the best judgment they had with the people they had available to get the maximum amount of important stuff into our hands. But they can tell you the procedure better than I. I am not familiar with just how they did it.

Mr. CLARK. You did not yourself initiate any movement or give any direction to give priority so far as possible to decoding the Jap intercepts after, say, the 27th of November?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not. There were people working on that who I think fully realized the situation.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, it is 4:25. I don't believe I can finish in 5 minutes with the admiral.

I would like to recess at this time until tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Not taking that as a precedent for any future recesses earlier than 4:30, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock to morrow morning.

(Pursuant to Senator Ferguson's request at p. 2068, supra, Exhibit No. 92 follows:)

[5916] Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Mr. James Stuart.)

Mr. STEPHEN (Camlachie). May I ask whether, if a Vote of Confidence is to be put on the Paper, it will be in the hands of Members today?

The **PRIME MINISTER** (Mr. Churchill). That will be for the next Sitting Day.

From time to time in the life of any Government there come occasions which must be clarified. No one who has read the newspapers of the last few weeks about our affairs at home and abroad can doubt that such an occasion is at hand.

Since my return to this country, I have come to the conclusion that I must ask to be sustained by a Vote of Confidence from the House of Commons. This is a thoroughly normal, constitutional, democratic procedure. A Debate on the war has been asked for. I have arranged it in the fullest and freest manner for three whole days. Any Member will be free to say anything he thinks fit about or against the Administration or against the composition of personalities of the Government, to his heart's content, subject only to the reservation which the House is always so careful to observe about military secrets. Could you have anything freer than that? Could you have any higher expression of democracy than that? Very few other countries have institutions strong enough to sustain [5917] such a thing while they are fighting for their lives.

I owe it to the House to explain to them what has led me to ask for their exceptional support at this time. It has been suggested that we should have a three days' Debate of this kind in which the Government would no doubt be lustily belaboured by some of those who have lighter burdens to carry, and that at the end we should separate without a Division. In this case sections of the Press which are hostile—and there are some whose hostility is pronounced—could declare that the Government's credit was broken, and, it might even be hinted, after all that has passed and all the discussion there has been, that it had been private intimated to me that I should be very reckless if I asked for a vote of Confidence from Parliament.

And the matter does not stop there. It must be remembered that these reports can then be flashed all over the world, and that they are repeated in enemy broadcasts night after night in order to show that the Prime Minister has no right to speak for the nation and that the Government in Britain is about to collapse. Anyone who listens to the fulminations which come from across the water know that that is no exaggeration. Of course, these statements from foreign sources would not be true, but neither would it be helpful to anyone that there should be any doubt about our position.

There is another aspect. We in this Island for a long [5918] time were alone, holding aloft the torch. We are no longer alone now. We are now at the centre and among those at the summit of 26 United Nations, comprising more than three-quarters of the population of the globe. Whoever speaks for Britain at this moment must be known to speak, not only in the name of the people—and of that I feel pretty sure I may—but in the name of Parliament and, above all, of the House of Commons. It is genuine public interest that requires that these facts should be made manifest afresh in a formal way.

We have had a great deal of bad news lately from the Far East, and I think it highly probable, for reasons which I shall presently explain, that we shall have a great deal more. Wrapped up in this bad news will be many tales of blunders and shortcomings, both in foresight and action. No one will pretend for a moment that disasters like these occur without there having been faults and shortcomings. I see all this rolling towards us like the waves in a storm, and that is another reason why I require a formal, solemn Vote of Confidence from the House of Commons, which hitherto in this struggle has never flinched. The House would fail in its duty if it did not insist upon two things, first, freedom of debate, and, secondly, a clear, honest, blunt Vote thereafter. Then we shall all know where we are, and all those with whom we have to deal, at home and abroad, friend or foe, will know where we are and where they are. It is because we are to [5919] have a free Debate, in which perhaps 20 to 30 Members can take part, that I demand an expression of opinion from the 300 or 400 Members who will have sat silent.

It is because things have gone badly and worse is to come that I demand a Vote of Confidence. This will be placed on the Paper to-day, to be moved at a later stage. I do not see why this should hamper anyone. If a Member has helpful criticisms to make, or even severe corrections to administer, that may be perfectly consistent with thinking that in respect of the Administration, such as it is, he might go farther and fare worse. But if an hon. Gentleman dislikes the Government very much and feels it in the public interest that it should be broken up, he ought to have the manhood to testify his convictions

in the Lobby. There is no need to be mealy-mouthed in debate. There is no objection to anything being said, plain, or even plainer, and the Government will do their utmost to conform to any standard which may be set in the course of the Debate. But no one need to be mealy-mouthed in debate, and no one should be chicken-hearted in voting. I have voted against Governments I have been elected to support, and, looking back, I have sometimes felt very glad that I did so. Everyone in these rough times must do what he thinks is his duty.

Mr. SHINWELL (Seaham). A free vote?

The PRIME MINISTER. A vote under all the conditions [5920] which hitherto have made the conduct of Parliamentary government possible. Surely the hon. Gentleman is not the man to be frightened of a Whip? The House of Commons, which is at present the most powerful representative Assembly in the world, must also—I am sure, will also—bear in mind the effect produced abroad by all its proceedings. We have also to remember how oddly foreigners view our country and its way of doing things. When Rudolf Hess flew over here some months ago he firmly believed that he had only to gain access to certain circles in this country for what he described as “the Churchill clique”——

Mr. THORNE (Plaistow). Where is he now?

The PRIME MINISTER. Where he ought to be—to be thrown out of power and for a Government to be set up with which Hitler could negotiate a magnanimous peace. The only importance attaching to the opinions of Hess is the fact that he was fresh from the atmosphere of Hitler's intimate table. But, Sir, I can assure you that since I have been back in this country I have had anxious inquiries from a dozen countries, and reports of enemy propaganda in a score of countries, all turning upon the point whether His Majesty's present Government is to be dismissed from power or not. This may seem silly to us, but in those months abroad it is hurtful and mischievous to the common effort. I am not asking for any special, personal favours in these circumstances, but I am [5921] sure the House would wish to make its position clear; therefore I stand by the ancient, constitutional, Parliamentary doctrine of free debate and faithful voting.

Now I turn to the account of the war, which constitutes the claim I make for the support and confidence of the House. Three or four months ago we had to cope with the following situation. The German invaders were advancing, blasting their way through Russia. The Russians were resisting with the utmost heroism. But no one could tell what would happen, whether Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov would fall, or where the German winter line would be established. No one can tell now where it will be established, but now the boot is on the other leg. We all agree that we must aid the valiant Russian Armies to the utmost limit of our power. His Majesty's Government thought, and Parliament upon reflection agree with them, that the best aid we could give to Russia was in supplies of many kinds of raw materials and of munitions, particularly tanks and aircraft. Our Forces at home and abroad had for long been waiting thirstily for these weapons. At last they were coming to hand in large numbers. At home we have always the danger of invasion to consider and to prepare against. I will speak about the situation in the Middle East presently. Nevertheless we sent Premier Stalin—for that I gather is how he wishes to be addressed; at least, that is the form in which he telegraphs to me—exactly what he [5922] asked for. The whole quantity was promised and sent. There has been, I am sorry to say, a small lag due to bad weather, but it will be made up by the early days of February. This was a decision of major strategy and policy, and anyone can see that it was right to put it first when they watch the wonderful achievements, un hoped for, undreamed of by us because we little knew the Russian strength, but all the more glorious as they seem—the wonderful achievements of the Russian Armies. Our munitions were of course only a contribution to the Russian victory, but they were an encouragement in Russia's darkest hour. Moreover, if we had not shown a loyal effort to help our Ally, albeit at a heavy sacrifice to ourselves, I do not think our relations with Premier Stalin and his great country would be as good as they are now. There would have been a lack of comradeship, and the lack of comradeship might have spread reproaches on all sides. Far from regarding what we did for Russia, I only wish it had been in our power—but it was not—to have done more.

Three or four months ago, at a time when the German advance was rolling onwards, we were particularly concerned with the possibility of the Germans forcing the Don River, the capture of Rostov and the invasion of the Caucasus, and the

reaching of the Baku oil wells before the winter by the Panzer spearheads of the German Army. Everyone who has been giving careful study and independent thought to this war, knows [5923] how deep an anxiety that was in all our breasts three or four months ago. Such an advance would not only have given the Germans the oil which they are beginning seriously to need, but it would have involved the destruction of the Russian Fleet and the loss of the command of the Black Sea. It would have affected the safety of Turkey, and it would, in due course, have exposed to the gravest dangers Persia, Iraq, Cyria and Palestine, and beyond those countries, all of which are now under our control, it would have threatened the Suez Canal, Egypt and the Nile Valley. At the same time as this menace defined itself with hideous and increasing reality as it seemed, General von Rommel, with his army of 10 German and Italian divisions entrenched in his fortified positions at and behind the Halfaya Pass, was preparing to make a decisive attack on Tobruk as a preliminary to a renewed advance upon Egypt from the West. The Nile Valley was therefore menaced simultaneously by a direct attack from the West and by a more remote but in some ways more deadly attack from the North. In such circumstances it is the classical rule of war, reinforced by endless examples—and some exceptions—that you prepare to fight a delaying action against one of the two attacks and concentrate, if possible, overwhelming strength against the other and nearer attack. We therefore approved General Auchinleck's plans for building up a delaying force in the vast region from Cyprus to the Caspian Sea, along what I may call the Levant— [5924] Caspian front, and preparing installations, airfields and communications upon which larger forces could be based, as time and transport allowed. On the other flank, the Western flank, we prepared to set upon Rommel and try to make a good job of him. For the sake of this battle in the Libyan Desert we concentrated everything we could lay our hands on, and we submitted to a very long delay, very painful to bear over here, so that all preparations could be perfected. We hoped to recapture Cyrenaica and the important airfields round Benghazi. But General Auchinleck's main objective was more simple. He set himself to destroy Rommel's army. Such was the mood in which we stood three or four months ago. Such was the broad strategical decision we took.

Now, when we see how events, which so often mock and falsify human effort and design, have shaped themselves, I am sure this was a right decision.

General Auchinleck had demanded five months' preparation for his campaign, but on 18th November he fell upon the enemy. For more than two months in the desert the most fierce, continuous battle has raged between scattered bands of men, armed with the latest weapons, seeking each other dawn after dawn, fighting to the death throughout the day and then often long into the night. Here was a battle which turned out very differently from what was foreseen. All was dispersed and confused. Much depended on the individual soldier and the [5925] junior officer. Much, but not all; because this battle would have been lost on 24th November if General Auchinleck had not intervened himself, changed the command and ordered the ruthless pressure of the attack to be maintained without regard to risks or consequences. But for this robust decision we should now be back on the old line from which we had started, or perhaps further back. Tobruk would possibly have fallen, and Rommel might be marching towards the Nile. Since then the battle has declared itself. Cyrenaica has been regained. It has still to be held. We have not succeeded in destroying Rommel's army, but nearly two-thirds of it are wounded, prisoners or dead.

Perhaps I may give the figures to the House. In this strange, sombre battle of the desert, where our men have met the enemy for the first time—I do not say in every respect, because there are some things which are not all that we had hoped for—but, upon the whole, have met him with equal weapons, we have lost in killed, wounded and captured about 18,000 officers and men, of whom the greater part are British. We have in our possession 36,500 prisoners, including many wounded, of whom 10,500 are Germans. We have killed and wounded at least 11,500 Germans and 13,000 Italians—in all a total, accounted for exactly, of 61,000. There is also a mass of enemy wounded, some of whom have been evacuated to the rear or to the Westward—I cannot tell how many. Of [5926] the forces of which General Rommel disposed on 18th November, little more than one-third now remain, while 852 German and Italian aircraft have been destroyed and 336 German and Italian tanks. During this battle we have never had in action more than 45,000 men, against enemy forces—if they could be brought to bear—much more than double as strong. Therefore, it seems to me that this heroic, epic struggle in the desert, though there have been many local reverses and

many ebbs and flows, has tested our manhood in a searching fashion and has proved not only that our men can die for King and country—everyone knew that—but that they can kill.

I cannot tell what the position at the present moment is on the Western front in Cyrenaica. We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great General. He has certainly received reinforcements. Another battle is even now in progress, and I make it a rule never to try and prophesy beforehand how battles will turn out. I always rejoice that I have made that rule. (AN HON. MEMBER: "What about the Skaggerak?") That was hardly a battle. Naturally, one does not say in a case like that that we have not a chance, because that is apt to be encouraging to the enemy and depressing to our own friends. In the general upshot, the fact remains that, whereas a year ago the Germans were telling all the neutrals that they would be in Suez by May, when some people talked of the possibility of a German [5927] descent upon Assiut, and many people were afraid that Tobruk would be stormed and others feared for the Nile Valley, Cairo, Alexandria and the Canal, we have conducted an effective offensive against the enemy and hurled him backward, inflicting upon him incomparably more—well, I should not say incomparably, because I have just given the comparison, but far heavier losses and damage—than we have suffered ourselves. Not only has he lost three times our losses on the battlefield, approximately, but the blue waters of the Mediterranean have, thanks to the enterprise of the Royal Navy, our submarines and Air Force, drowned a large number of the reinforcements which have been continually sent. This process has had further important successes during the last few days. Whether you call it a victory or not, it must be dubbed up to the present, although I will not make any promises, a highly profitable transaction, and certainly is an episode of war most glorious to the British, South African, New Zealand, Indian, Free French and Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen who have played their part in it. The prolonged, stubborn, steadfast and successful defence of Tobruk by Australian and British troops was an essential preliminary, over seven hard months, to any success which may have been achieved.

Let us see what has happened on the other flank, the Northern flank, of the Nile Valley. What has happened to Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Persia? There we must thank Russia. [5928] There the valour of the Russian Armies has warded off dangers which we saw and which we undoubtedly ran. The Caucasus and the precious oilfields of Baku, the great Anglo-Persian oilfields, are denied to the enemy. Winter has come. Evidently we have the time to strengthen still further our Forces and organisations in those regions. Therefore, sir, I present to you, in laying the whole field open and bare and surveying it in all its parts, for all are related, a situation in the Nile Valley, both West and East, incomparably easier than anything we have ever seen, since we were deserted by the French Bordeaux-Vichy Government and were set upon by Italy. The House will not fail to discern the agate points upon which this vast improvement has turned. It is only by the smallest margin that we have succeeded so far in beating Rommel in Cyrenaica and destroying two-thirds of his forces. Every tank, every aircraft squadron was needed. It is only by the victories on the Russian flank on the Black Sea coast that we have been spared the overrunning of all those vast lands from the Levant to the Caspian, which in turn give access to India, Persia, the Persian Gulf, the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal.

I have told the House the Story of these few months, and Hon. Members will see from it how narrowly our resources have been strained and by what a small margin and by what strokes of fortune—for which we claim no credit—we have [5929] survived—so far. Where should we have been, I wonder, if we had yielded to the clamor which was so loud three or four months ago that we should invade France or the Low Countries? We can still see on the walls the inscription, "Second Front Now." Who did not feel the appeal of that? But imagine what our position would have been if we had yielded to this vehement temptation. Every ton of our shipping, every flotilla, every aeroplane, the whole strength of our Army would be committed and would be fighting for life on the French shores or on the shores of the Low Countries. All these troubles of the Far East and the Middle East might have sunk to insignificance compared with the question of another and far worse Dunkirk.

Here, let me say, I should like to pay my tribute to one who has gone from us since I left this country, Mr. Lees-Smith, who, I remember, spoke with so much profound wisdom on this point at a moment when many opinions were in flux about it. His faithful, selfless and wise conduct of the important work

which he discharged in this House was undoubtedly of great assistance to us all, not only to the Government but to us all, in the various stages of the war. His memory as a distinguished Parliamentarian will long find an honored place in the recollection of those who had the fortune to be his colleagues.

Sometimes things can be done by saying, "Yes," and sometimes things can be done by saying "No." Yet I suppose there [5930] are some of those who were vocal and voluble, and even claimant, for a second front to be opened in France, who are now going to come up bland and smiling and ask why it is that we have not ample forces in Malaya, Burma, Borneo and the Celebes. There are times when so many things happen, and happen so quickly, and time seems to pass in such a way that you can neither say it is long or short, that it is easy to forget what you have said three months before. You may fail to connect it with what you are advocating at the particular moment. Throughout a long and variegated Parliamentary life this consideration has led me to try and keep a watchful eye on that danger myself. You never can tell. There are also people who talk and bear themselves as if they had prepared for this war with great armaments and long, careful preparation. But that is not true. In two and a half years of fighting we have only just managed to keep our heads above water. When I was called upon to be Prime Minister, now nearly two years ago, there were not many applicants for the job. Since then, perhaps, the market has improved. In spite of the shameful negligence, gross muddles, blatant incompetence, complacency, and lack of organising power which are daily attributed to us—and from which chidings we endeavor to profit—we are beginning to see our way through. It looks as if we were in for a very bad time, but provided we all start together, and provided we throw in the last spasm of our strength, it [5931] also looks, more than it ever did before, as if we were going to win.

While facing Germany and Italy here and in the Nile Valley we have never had any power to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East. My whole argument so far has led up to that point. It may be that this or that might have been done which was not done, but we have never been able to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East against an attack by Japan. It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged. We even had to stoop, as the House will remember, when we were at our very weakest point, to close the Burma Road for some months. I remember that some of our present critics were very angry about it, but we had to do it. There never has been a moment, there never could have been a moment, when Great Britain or the British Empire, single-handed, could fight Germany and Italy, could wage the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of the Middle East—and at the same time stand thoroughly prepared in Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and generally in the Far East against the impact of a vast military Empire like Japan, with more than 70 mobile divisions, the third navy in the world, a great air force and the thrust of 80 or 90 millions of hardy, warlike Asiatics. If we had started to scatter our forces over these immense areas in the [5932] Far East, we should have been ruined. If we had moved large armies of troops urgently needed on the war fronts to regions which were not at war and might never be at war we should have been altogether wrong. We should have cast away the chance, which has now become something more than a chance, of all of us emerging safely from the terrible plight in which we have been plunged.

We therefore have lain—I am putting it as bluntly as I can—for nearly two years under the threat of an attack by Japan with which we had no means of coping. But as time has passed the mighty United States, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, from reasons of its own interest and safety but also out of chivalrous regard for the cause of freedom and democracy, has drawn ever nearer to the confines of the struggle. And now that the blow has fallen it does not fall on us alone. On the contrary, it falls upon united forces and unified nations, which are unquestionably capable of enduring the struggle, of retrieving the losses and of preventing another such stroke ever being delivered again.

There is an argument with which I will deal as I pass along to surmise my theme. It is said by some, "If only you had organised the munitions production of this country properly and had had a Minister of Production (and that is not a question which should be dogmatised upon either way) it would have made everything all right. There would have been [5933] enough for all needs.

We should have had enough supplies for Russia, enough well-equipped squadrons and divisions to defend the British Islands, to sustain the Middle East and to arm the Far East effectively." But that is really not true. As a matter of fact, our munitions output is gigantic, has for some time been very large indeed, and it is bounding up in a most remarkable manner. In the last year, 1941, although we were at war in so many theatres and on so many fronts, we have produced more than double the munitions equipment of the United States, which was arming heavily, though of course a lap behind on the road. This condition will naturally be rapidly removed as the full power of American industry comes into full swing. But, Sir, in the last six months, thanks to the energies of Lord Beaverbrook and the solid spadework done by his predecessors and the passage of time—he particularly asks me to say that—(An Hon. MEMBER: "Who did?")—Lord Beaverbrook; I should have said it anyway—our munitions output has risen in the following respects: We are producing more than twice as many far more complicated guns every month than we did in the peak of 1917–18 war period, and the curve is rising. The guns are infinitely more complicated. Tank production has doubled in the last six months. Small arms production is more than twice what it was six months ago. Filled rounds of ammunition have doubled in the last six months. I could go on with the catalogue, but these are not doublings [5934] from early very small totals, they are doublings from the totals we boasted about, as far as we dared six months ago. There has been an immense leap forward. In aircraft production there is a steady increase not only in the numbers but also in the size and quality of the aircraft, though I must say there has not been all the increase which I had hoped for.

But all this has nothing to do with the preparations it was open to us to make in Malaya and Burma and generally in the Far East. The limiting factor has been transport, even assuming we had wished to take this measure and had had this great surplus. From the time that this present Government was formed, from the moment it was formed I may say, every scrap of shipping we could draw away from our vital supply routes, every U-boat escort we could divert from the Battle of the Atlantic, has been busy to the utmost capacity to carry troops, tanks and munitions from this Island to the East. There has been a ceaseless flow, and as for aircraft they have not only been moved by sea but by every route, some very dangerous and costly routes to the Eastern battlefields. The decision was taken, as I have explained, to make our contribution to Russia, to try to beat Rommel and to form a stronger front from the Levant to the Caspian. It followed from that decision that it was in our power only to make a moderate and partial provision in the Far East against the hypothetical danger of a [5935] Japanese onslaught. Sixty thousand men, indeed, were concentrated at Singapore, but priority in modern aircraft, in tanks, and in anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery was accorded to the Nile Valley.

For this decision in its broad strategic aspects, and also in its diplomatic policy in regard to Russia, I take the fullest personal responsibility. If we have handled our resources wrongly, no one is so much to blame as me. If we have not got large modern air forces and tanks in Burma and Malaya tonight no one is more accountable than I am. Why then should I be called upon to pick out scapegoats, to throw the blame on generals or airmen or sailors? Why, then, should I be called upon to drive away loyal and trusted colleagues and friends to appease the clamour of certain sections of the British and Australian Press, or in order to take the edge off our reverses in Malaya and the Far East, and the punishment which we have yet to take there? I would be ashamed to do such a thing at such a time, and if I were capable of doing it, believe me, I should be incapable of rendering this country or this House any further service.

I say that without in the slightest degree seeking to relieve myself from my duties and responsibility to endeavour to make continual improvements in Ministerial positions. It is the duty of every Prime Minister to the House, but we have to be quite sure that they are improvements in every case, and [5936] not only in every case but in the setting. I could not possibly descend to, as the German radio repeatedly credits me with, an attempt to get out of difficulties in which I really bear the main load by offering up scapegoats to public displeasure. Many people, many very well-meaning people, begin their criticisms and articles by saying, "Of course, we are all in favour of the Prime Minister because he has the people behind him. But what about the muddles made by this or that Department; what about that general or this Minister?" But I am the man that Parliament and the nation have got to

blame for the general way in which they are served, and I cannot serve them effectively unless, in spite of all that has gone wrong, and that is going to go wrong, I have their trust and faithful aid.

I must linger for a moment on our political affairs, because we are conducting the war on the basis of a full democracy and a free Press, and that is an attempt which has not been made before in such circumstances. A variety of attacks are made upon the composition of the Government. It is said that it is formed upon a party and political basis. But so is the House of Commons. It is silly to extol the Parliamentary system and then, in the next breath, to say, "Away with party and away with politics." From one quarter I am told that the leaders of the Labour party ought to be dismissed from the Cabinet. This would be a return to party Government pure and simple. From [5937] opposite quarters it is said that no one who approved of Munich should be allowed to hold office. To do that would be to cast a reflection upon the great majority of the nation at that time, and also to deny the strongest party in the House any proportionate share in the National Government, which again, in turn, might cause inconvenience. Even my right hon. Friend the leader of the Liberal party—(An HON. MEMBER: "Who is he?")—the Secretary of State for Air, whose help today I value so much and with whom, as a lifelong friend, it is a pleasure to work, even he has not escaped unscathed. If I were to show the slightest weakness in dealing with these opposite forms of criticism, not only should I deprive myself of loyal and experienced colleagues, but I should destroy the National Government and rupture the war-time unity of Parliament itself.

Other attacks are directed against individual Ministers. I have been urged to make an example of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who is now returning from his mission in the Far East. Thus, he would be made to bear the blame for our misfortunes. The position of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the head of the Council which he had been instructed to form at Singapore was rendered obsolete by the decision which I reached with the President of the United States to set up a Supreme Commander for the main fighting zone in the Far East. The whole conception of a Supreme [5938] Commander is that, under the direction of the Governments he serves, he is absolute master of all authorities in the region assigned to him. This would be destroyed if political functionaries representing the various nations—for it is not only this country which would be represented; others would have to be represented as well as ours—were clustered around him. The function of the Chancellor of the Duchy was therefore exhausted by the appointment of General Wavell to the Supreme Command. I may say that regret was expressed at his departure by the New Zealand and Australian Governments, and still more by the Council he formed at Singapore, which, in a localised and subordinate form, it has been found necessary to carry on. When I am invited, under threats of unpopularity to myself or the Government, to victimise the Chancellor of the Duchy, and throw him to the wolves, I say to those who make this amiable suggestion, I can only say to them, "I much regret that I am unable to gratify your wishes,"—or words to that effect.

The outstanding question upon which the House should form its judgment for the purposes of the impending Division is whether His Majesty's Government were right in giving a marked priority in the distribution of the forces and equipment we could send overseas, to Russia, to Libya, and, to a lesser extent, to the Levant-Casplan danger front, and whether we were right in accepting, for the time being, a far lower [5939] standard of forces and equipment for the Far East than for these other theatres. The first obvious fact is that the Far Eastern theatre was at peace and that the other theatres were in violent or imminent war. It would evidently have been a very improvident use of our limited resources—as I pointed out earlier—if we had kept large masses of troops and equipment spread about the immense areas of the Pacific or in India, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, standing idle, month by month and perhaps year by year, without any war occurring. Thus, we should have failed in our engagements to Russia, which has meanwhile struck such staggering blows at the German Army, and we should have lost the battle in Cyrenalca, which we have not yet won, and we might now be fighting defensively well inside the Egyptian frontier. There is the question on which the House should make up its mind. We had not the resources to meet all the perils and pressures that came upon us.

But this question, serious and large as it is by itself cannot be wholly decided without some attempt to answer the further question—what was the likelihood of the Far Eastern theatre being thrown into war by a Japanese attack? I have

explained how very delicately we walked, and how painful it was at all times, how very careful I was every time that we should not be exposed single-handed to this onslaught which we were utterly incapable of meeting. But it seemed irrational [5940] to suppose that in the last six months—which is what I am principally dealing with—the Japanese, having thrown away their opportunity of attacking us in the autumn of 1940, when we were so much weaker, so much less well-armed, and all alone, should at this period have plunged into a desperate struggle against the combined Forces of the British Empire and the United States. Nevertheless, nations, like individuals, commit irrational acts, and there were forces at work in Japan, violent, murderous, fanatical and explosive forces, which no one could measure.

[5941] On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make final victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation had not been falsified by the events. It fortified our British decision to use our limited resources on the actual fighting fronts. As time went on, one had greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet. However to strengthen the position as the situation seemed to intensify we sent the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* to form the spear-point of the considerable battle forces which we felt ourselves at length able to form in the Indian Ocean. We reinforced Singapore to a considerable extent and Hong Kong to the extent which we were advised would be sufficient to hold the island for a long time. Besides this in minor ways we took what precautions were open to us. On 7th December the Japanese, by a sudden attack, delivered while their envoys were still negotiating at Washington, crippled for the [5942] time being the American Pacific Fleet, and a few days later inflicted very heavy naval losses on us by sinking the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*.

For the time being, therefore, naval superiority in the Pacific and in the Malaysian Archipelago has passed from the hands of the two leading naval Powers into the hands of Japan. How long it will remain in Japanese hands is a matter on which I do not intend to speculate. But at any rate it will be long enough for Japan to inflict very heavy and painful losses on all of the United Nations who have establishments and possessions in the Far East. The Japanese no doubt will try to peg out claim and lodgments over all this enormous area, and to organise, in the interval before they lose command of the seas, a local command of the air which will render their expulsion destruction a matter of considerable time and exertion.

Here I must point out a very simple strategic truth. If there are 1,000 islands and 100 valuable military key points and you put 1,000 men on every one of them or whatever it may be, the Power that has the command of the sea and carries with it the local command of the air, can go around to every one of these places in turn, destroy or capture their garrisons, ravage and pillage them, ensconce themselves wherever they think fit, and then pass on with their circus to the next place. It would be vain to suppose that such an attack could be met by local defence. You might disperse 1,000,000 men over these [5943] immense areas and yet only provide more prey to the dominant Power. On the other hand, these conditions will be reversed when the balance of sea power and air power changes, as it will surely change.

Such is the phase of the Pacific war into which we have now entered. I cannot tell how long it will last. All I can tell the House is that it will be attended by very heavy punishment which we shall have to endure, and that presently, if we persevere, as I said just now about the Russian front, the boot will be on the other leg. That is why we should not allow ourselves to get rattled because this or that place has been captured, because, once the ultimate power of the United Nations has been brought to bear, the opposite process will be brought into play, and will move forward remorselessly to the final conclusion, provided that we persevere, provided that we fight with the utmost vigour and tenacity, and provided, above all, that we remain united.

Here I should like to express, in the name of the House, my admiration of the splendid courage and quality with which the small American Army, under General

MacArthur, has resisted brilliantly for so long, at desperate odds, the hordes of Japanese who have been hurled against it by superior air power and superior sea power. Amid our own troubles, we sent out to General MacArthur and his soldiers, and also to the Filipinos, who are defending their native soil with vigour and [5944] courage, our salute across those wide spaces which we and the United States will presently rule again together. Nor must I fail to pay a tribute, in the name of the House, to the Dutch, who, in the air and with their submarines, their surface craft, and their solid fighting troops, are playing one of the main parts in the struggle now going on in the Malaysian Archipelago.

We have to turn our eyes for a moment to the hard-fought battle which is raging upon the approaches to Singapore and in the Malay Peninsula. I am not going to make any forecast about that now, except that it will be fought to the last inch by the British, Australian and Indian troops, which are in the line together, and which have been very considerably reinforced. The Hon. Member for the Eye Division of Suffolk (Mr. Granville) had a very sound military idea the other day, when he pointed out the importance of sending reinforcements of aircraft to assist our ground forces at Singapore and in Burma. I entirely agree with him. In fact, we anticipated his suggestion. Before I left for the United States, on 12th December, the moment, that is to say, when the situation in Singapore and Pearl Harbor had disclosed itself, it was possible to make a swift redistribution of our Forces. The moment was favourable. General Auchinleck was making headway in Cyrenaica; the Russian front not only stood unbroken but had begun the advance in a magnificent counter-attack, and we were able to order a large number of measures, which there is no need to elaborate, but which will [5945] be capable of being judged by their results as the next few weeks and the next few months unfold in the Far East.

When I reached the United States, accompanied by our principal officers and large technical staffs, further important steps were taken by the President, with my cordial assent, and with the best technical advice we could obtain, to move from many directions everything that ships could carry and all air power that could be flown transported and serviced to suitable points. The House would be very ill-advised to suppose that the seven weeks which have passed since 7th December have been weeks of apathy and indecision for the English-speaking world. Odd as it may seem quite a lot has been going on. But we must not nourish or indulge light and extravagant hopes or suppose that the advantages which the enemy have gained can soon or easily be taken from him. However, to sum up the bad and the good together, in spite of the many tragedies past and future, and with all pity for those who have suffered and will suffer, I must profess my profound thankfulness for what has happened throughout the whole world in the last two months.

I now turn for a short space—I hope I am not unduly wearying the House, but I feel that the war has become so wide that there are many aspects that must be regarded—to the question of the organization, the international, inter-Allied or inter-United Nations organization, which must be developed to meet the fact that we are a vast confederacy. To hear some [5496] people talk, however, one would think that the way to win the war is to make sure that every Power contributing armed forces and every branch of these armed forces is represented on all the councils and organizations which have to be set up, and that everybody is fully consulted before anything is done. That is in fact the most sure way to lose a war. You have to be aware of the well-known danger of having "more harness than horse," to quote a homely expression. Action to be successful must rest in the fewest number of hands possible. Nevertheless, now that we are working in the closest partnership with the United States and have also to consider our Alliance with Russia and with China, as well as the bonds which unite us with the rest of the 26 United Nations and with our Dominions, it is evidence that our system must become far more complex than heretofore.

I had many discussions with the President upon the Anglo-American war direction, especially as it affects this war against Japan, to which Russia is not yet a party. The physical and geographical difficulties of finding a common working centre for the leaders of nations and the great staffs of nations which cover the whole globe are insuperable. Whatever plan is made will be open to criticism and many valid objections. There is no solution that can be found where the war can be discussed from day to day fully by all the leading military and political authorities concerned. I have, however, arranged [5947] with President Roosevelt that there should be a body in Washington called the Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee, consisting of the three United States

Chiefs of the Staff, men of the highest distinction, and three high officers representing and acting under the general instructions of the British Chiefs of the Staff Committee in London. This body will advise the President, and in the event of divergence of view between the British and American Chiefs of the Staff or their representatives, the difference must be adjusted by personal agreement between him and me as representing our respective countries. We must also concert together the closest association with Premier Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek as well as with the rest of the Allied and Associated Powers. We shall, of course, also remain in the closest touch with one another on all important questions of policy.

In order to wage the war effectively against Japan, it was agreed that I should propose to those concerned the setting-up of a Pacific Council in London, on the Ministerial plane, comprising Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch Government. Assisted by the British Chiefs of the Staff and the great staffs organisations beneath them, I was to try to form and focus a united view. This would enable the British Commonwealth to act as a whole and form part of plans—plans which are at present far advanced—for collaboration at the appropriate levels in the spheres of defence, foreign affairs [5948] and supply. Thus the united view of the British Commonwealth and the Dutch would be transmitted, at first, on the Chiefs of the Staff level, to the combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee sitting in Washington. In the event of differences between the members of the Pacific Council in London, dissentient opinions would also be transmitted. In the event of differences between the London and Washington bodies, it would be necessary for the President and me to reach an agreement. I must point out that it is necessary for everybody to reach an agreement, for nobody can compel anybody else.

The Dutch Government, which is seated in London, might be willing to agree to this arrangement, but the Australian Government desired and the New Zealand Government preferred that this Council of the Pacific should be in Washington, where it would work alongside the Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee. I have therefore transmitted the views of these two Dominions to the President, but I have not yet received, nor do I expect for a few days to receive, his reply. I am not, therefore, in a position to-day to announce, as I had hoped, the definite and final arrangements for the Pacific Council.

I should like to say, however, that underlying these structural arrangements are some very practical and simple facts upon which there is full agreement. The Supreme Commander has assumed control of the fighting areas in the South-West Pacific called the "A. B. D. A." area—A. B. D. A.—called after the [5949] countries which are involved, not the countries which are in the area but the countries which are involved in that area, namely, America, Britain, Dutch and Australasia. We do not propose to burden the Supreme Commander with frequent instructions. He has his general orders, and he has addressed himself with extraordinary buoyancy to his most difficult task, and President Roosevelt and I, representing, for my part, the British Government, are determined that he shall have a chance and a free hand to carry it out. The action in the Straits of Macassar undertaken by forces assigned to this area apparently has had very considerable success, of the full extent of which I am not yet advised. The manner in which General Wavell took up his task, the speed with which he has flown from place to place, the telegrams which he has sent describing the methods by which he was grappling with the situation and the forming of the central organism which was needed to deal with it—all this has made a most favourable impression upon the high officers, military and political, whom I met in the United States. This is all going on. Our duty, upon which we have been constantly engaged for some time, is to pass reinforcements of every kind, especially air, into the new war zone, from every quarter and by every means, with the utmost speed.

In order to extend the system of unified command which has been set up in the "A. B. D. A." area—that is to say, the South-West Pacific—where the actual fighting is going on, [5950] in order to extend that system to all areas in which the forces of more than one of the United Nations—because that is the term we have adopted—will be operating, the Eastward approaches to Australia and New Zealand have been styled the Anzac area, and are under United States command, the communications between the Anzac area and America are a United States responsibility, while the communications across the Indian Ocean and from India remain a British responsibility. All this is now working, while the larger constitutional, or semi-constitutional, discussions and structural ar-

rangements are being elaborated by telegrams passing to and fro between so many Governments. All this is now working fully and actively from hour to hour, and it must not, therefore, be supposed that any necessary military action has been held up pending the larger structural arrangements which I have mentioned.

Now I come to the question of our own Empire or Commonwealth of Nations. The fact that Australia and New Zealand are in the immediate danger zone reinforces the demand that they should be represented in the War Cabinet of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We have always been ready to form an Imperial War Cabinet containing the Prime Ministers of the four Dominions. Whenever any of them have come here they have taken their seats at our table as a matter of course. Unhappily, it has not been possible to get them all here together at once. General Smuts may not be able to come over from South Africa, [5951] and Mr. MacKenzie King could unfortunately stay only for a short time. But Mr. Fraser was with us, and it was a great pleasure to have him, and we had a three months' visit from Mr. Menzies, which was also a great success, and we were all very sorry when his most valuable knowledge of our affairs and the war position, and his exceptional abilities, were lost. For the last three months we have had Sir Earle Page representing the Commonwealth Government at Cabinets when war matters and Australian matters were under discussion and also, in similar circumstances upon the Defence Committee. As a matter of fact this has always been interpreted in the most broad and elastic fashion. The Australian Government have now asked specifically, "that an accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government should have the right to be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and the direction of policy." We have of course agreed to this. New Zealand feels bound to ask for similar representation, and the same facilities will of course be available to Canada and South Africa. The presence at the Cabinet table of Dominion representatives who have no power to take decisions and can only report to their Governments evidently raises some serious problems but none, I trust, which cannot be got over with good will. It must not, however, be supposed that in any circumstances the presence of Dominion representatives for certain purposes could in any way affect the collective responsibility of his Majesty's Servants in Great [5952] Britain to Crown and Parliament.

I am sure we all sympathise with our kith and kin in Australia now that the shield of British and American sea power has, for the time being, been withdrawn from them so unexpectedly and so tragically and now that hostile bombers may soon be within range of Australian shores. We shall not put any obstacle to the return of the splendid Australian troops who volunteered for Imperial service to defend their own homeland or whatever part of the Pacific theatre may be thought most expedient. We are taking many measures in conjunction with the United States to increase the security of Australia and New Zealand and to send them reinforcements, arms and equipment by the shortest and best routes. I always hesitate to express opinions about the future, because things turn out so very oddly, but I will go so far as to say that it may be that the Japanese, whose game is what I may call "to make hell while the sun shines," are more likely to occupy themselves in securing their rich prizes in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and the Malayan Archipelago and in seizing island bases for defensive purposes for the attack which is obviously coming towards them at no great distance of time—a tremendous onslaught which will characterise the future in 1942 and 1943. (An HON. MEMBER: "1944 and 1945?") No, I do not think we can stretch our views beyond those dates, but, again, we must see how we go. I think they are much more likely to be arranging themselves in those dis- [5953] tricts which they have taken or are likely to take than to undertake a serious mass invasion of Australia. That would seem to be a very ambitious overseas operation for Japan to undertake in the precarious and limited interval before the British and American navies regain—as they must certainly regain, through the new building that is advancing, and for other reasons—the unquestionable command of the Pacific Ocean. However, everything in human power that we can do to help Australia, or persuade America to do, we will do; and meanwhile I trust that reproaches and recriminations of all kinds will be avoided, and that if any are made, we in Britain will not take part in them.

Let me, in conclusion, return to the terrific changes which have occurred in our affairs during the last few months and particularly in the last few weeks. We have to consider the prospects of the war in 1942 and also in 1943, and, as

I said just now, it is not useful to look further ahead than that. The moment that the United States was set upon and attacked by Japan, Germany, and Italy—that is to say, within a few days of December 7, 1941—I was sure it was my duty to cross the Atlantic and establish the closest possible relationship with the President and Government of the United States, and also to develop the closest contacts, personal and professional, between the British Chiefs of Staff and their trans-Atlantic deputies, and with the American Chiefs of Staff who were there to meet them.

[5954] Having crossed the Atlantic, it was plainly my duty to visit the great Dominion of Canada. The House will have read with admiration and deep interest the speech made by the Prime Minister of Canada yesterday on Canada's great and growing contribution to the common cause in men, in money, and in materials. A notable part of that contribution is the financial offer which the Canadian Government have made to this country. The sum involved is one billion Canadian dollars, about £225,000,000. I know the House will wish me to convey to the Government of Canada our lively appreciation of their timely and most generous offer. It is unequalled in its scale in the whole history of the British Empire, and it is a convincing proof of the determination of Canada to make her maximum contribution towards the successful prosecution of the war.

During those three weeks which I spent in Mr. Roosevelt's home and family, I established with him relations not only of comradeship, but, I think I may say, of friendship. We can say anything to each other, however painful. When we parted he wrung my hand, saying, "We will fight this through to the bitter end, whatever the cost may be." Behind him rises the gigantic and hitherto unmobilised gigantic power of the people of the United States, carrying with them in their life and death struggle the entire, or almost the entire, Western hemisphere.

At Washington, we and our combined staffs surveyed the entire [5955] scene of the war, and we reached a number of important practical decisions. Some of them affect future operations and cannot, of course, be mentioned, but others have been made public by declaration or by events. The vanguard of an American Army has already arrived in the United Kingdom. Very considerable forces are following as opportunity may serve. These forces will take their station in the British Isles and face with us whatever is coming our way. They impart a freedom of movement to all forces in the British Isles greater than we could otherwise have possessed. Numerous United States fighter and bomber squadrons will also take part in the defence of Britain and in the ever-increasing bombing offensive against Germany. The United States Navy is linked in the most intimate union with the Admiralty, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. We shall plan our Naval moves together as if we were literally one people.

In the next place, we formed this league of 26 United Nations in which the principal partners at the present time are Great Britain and the British Empire, the United States, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia, and the Republic of China, together with the stout-hearted Dutch, and the representatives of the rest of the 26 powers. This Union is based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It aims at the destruction of Hitlerism in all its forms and manifestations in every corner of the globe. We will march forward together until every vestige [5956] of this villainy has been extirpated from the life of the world.

Thirdly, as I have explained at some length, we addressed ourselves to the war against Japan and to the measures to be taken to defend Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and India against Japanese attack or invasion.

Fourthly, we have established a vast common pool of weapons and munitions, of raw materials and of shipping, the outline of which has been set forth in a series of memoranda which I have initialled with the President. I had a talk with him last night on the telephone, as a result of which an announcement has been made in the early hours of this morning in the United States, and I have a White Paper for [the] House which will be available, I think, in a very short time. Many people have been staggered by the figures of prospective American output of war weapons which the President announced to Congress, and the Germans have affected to regard them with incredulity. I can only say that Lord Beaverbrook and I were made acquainted beforehand with all the bases upon which these colossal programmes were founded, and that I myself heard

President Roosevelt confide their specific tasks to the chiefs of American industry and I heard these men accept their prodigious tasks and declare that they would and could fulfill them. Most important of all is the multiplication of our joint tonnage [5957] at sea. The American programmes were already vast. They have been increased in the proportion of 100 to nearly 160. If they are completed, as completed I believe they will be, we shall be able to move across the ocean spaces in 1943 two, three or even four times as large armies as the considerable forces we are able to handle at sea at the present time.

I expect—and I have made no secret of it—that we shall both of us receive severe ill-usage at the hands of the Japanese in 1942, but I believe we shall presently regain the naval command of the Pacific and begin to establish an effective superiority in the air, and then later on, with the great basic areas in Australasia, in India, and in the Dutch East Indies, we shall be able to set about our task in good style in 1943. It is no doubt true that the defeat of Japan will not necessarily entail the defeat of Hitler, whereas the defeat of Hitler would enable the whole forces of the united nations to be concentrated upon the defeat of Japan. But there is no question of regarding the war in the Pacific as a secondary operation. The only limitation applied to its vigorous prosecution will be the shipping available at any given time.

It is most important that we should not overlook the enormous contribution of China to this struggle for world freedom and democracy. If there is any lesson I have brought back from the United States that I could express in one word, it would be "China." That is in all their minds. When we feel the [5958] sharp military qualities of the Japanese soldiery in contact with our own troops, although of course very few have as yet been engaged, we must remember that China, ill-armed or half-armed, has, for four and a half years, single handed, under its glorious leader Chiang Kai-Shek, withstood the main fury of Japan. We shall pursue the struggle hand in hand with China, and do everything in our power to give them arms and supplies, which is all they need to vanquish the invaders of their native soil and play a magnificent part in the general forward movement of the United Nations.

Although I feel the broadening swell of victory and liberation bearing us and all the tortured peoples onwards safely to the final goal, I must confess to feeling the weight of the war upon me even more than in the tremendous summer days of 1940. There are so many fronts which are open, so many vulnerable points to defend, so many inevitable misfortunes, so many shrill voices raised to take advantage, now that we can breathe more freely, of all the turns and twists of war. Therefore, I feel entitled to come to the House of Commons, whose servant I am, and ask them not to press me to act against my conscience and better judgment and make scapegoats in order to improve my own position, not to press me to do the things which may be clamoured for at the moment but which will not help in our war effort, but, on the contrary, to give me their encouragement and to give me their aid. I have never ventured to predict the future. I stand by my original programme, blood, [5959] toll, tears and sweat, which is all I have ever offered, to which I added, five months later, "many shortcomings, mistakes and disappointments." But it is because I see the light gleaming behind the clouds and broadening on our path, that I make so bold now as to demand a declaration of confidence of the House of Commons as an additional weapon in the armoury of the united nations.

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 3, 1946.)

[5960]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[5961] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have here a letter from Admiral Turner dated December 26, 1945, addressed to the counsel. He asked to have some corrections and changes made in his testimony, in line with our practice.

(The letter referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

GENERAL BOARD

Washington

MMK

26 December 1945.

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL,
*Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR GENERAL MITCHELL:

Subject: Amplification and Correction of Testimony of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, U. S. Navy, on December 21, 1945.

Reference: (a) Volume 30 of Report of Proceedings of the Joint Committee.

Enclosures: (A) Copies of Documents relating to reenforcement of Midway and Wake Islands.

- (1) CNO Secret Despatch 171450 of October 17, 1941.
- (2) CincPac Confidential Ltr. L24/VZ/(95) Serial 01825 of November 10, 1941.
- (3) CNO Secret Despatch 270038 of November 26, 1941.
- (4) CNO Secret Despatch 270040 of November 26, 1941.
- (5) CincPac Secret Despatch 280627 of November 28, 1941.
- [5962] (6) CNO Secret Despatch 282054 of November 28, 1941.
- (7) CincPac Secret Despatch 280447 of November, 1941.
- (8) CincPac Secret Despatch 040237 of December, 1941.
- (B) Copies of photographs of OpNav Fleet Location Boards of 1 to 7 December 1941, with explanation diagram.

1. There are two series of questions in reference (a) to which I believe I unintentionally did not give clear and explicit answers; I, therefore, believe that my answers should be clarified. These are:

(a) The questions from page 5444 to page 5450, relating to the employment of two carriers for the reenforcement of Midway and Wake Islands. Enclosure (A) constitutes a series of papers relating to these operations.

(b) Included in the foregoing are certain questions, from page 5444 to page 5446, concerning information shown on the Chief of Naval Operations' daily chart of ship locations. Enclosure (B) consists of photostats of the photographs of the daily set-up of the chart from December 1 to December 7, 1941.

2. You will note, from Enclosures (A) (1) and (A) (6), that the task for the reenforcement of Midway and Wake, with forces attached to the Pacific Fleet had in October been placed entirely in the hands of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific [5963] Fleet, for execution at his discretion. The Commander in Chief's plan and directive, Enclosure (A) (2), was not sent to the Chief of Naval Operations. Therefore, the exact status of the reenforcement plan was not known in the Department until the receipt of Enclosure (A) (5), replied to by Enclosure (A) (6). The chief point in the clarification of my testimony is that the orders for the movement of reenforcements to Midway and Wake were issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and not by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. From Enclosure (B) it will be noted that exact locations of the ships of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Area are not shown on the daily location charts, but only the main concentration itself. My recollection is that, though the Ship Movements Division had an accurate list of the ships of the concentration, it was not informed as to details of the deployment. I trust this information will serve to clarify my testimony.

4. In addition, it is requested that the following corrections be made to other parts of my testimony shown in reference (a) :

(a) Page 5321, line 21, insert the word "not" after the word "would".

(b) Page 5342, line 6, change the words "such material" to the words "decryption means and personnel".

(c) Page 5344, lines 11 and 12, delete the words "and three members from the Army".

(d) Page 5350, line 25, change the word "agree" to the [5964] word "disagree".

(e) Page 5367, line 8, delete the word "boat".

(f) Page 5373, lines 5 and 6, delete the words "my report", and insert in their place the words "me mistaken".

(g) Page 5380, line 18, replace the word "proper" with the word "preliminary".

(h) Page 5381, lines 7 and 8, change the last sentence in the paragraph to read, "the only war warning sent was that on the twenty-seventh".

Line 10, change the comma after the word "overhaul" to a period.

Change the sentence after this period to read as follows: "Reconnaissance planes can be operated over a long period of time under more severe conditions than he had there in Pearl Harbor or Kaneohe", replace the word "sheltered" with the phrase "or in partly sheltered waters".

(i) Page 5383, lines 6, 7, and 8, delete all after the word "Kimmel", and replace the deleted words with the following: "because when Admiral Richardson was there, the Naval Air Stations at Johnston Island and at Midway had not been activated". Line 9, replace the word "radii" with the words "air stations".

(j) Page 5386, line 2, replace the words "the Axis" with the word "Japan".

[5965] (k) Page 5400, line 14, insert the words "Admiral Turner" at the beginning of the line to show that this was an answer by the witness.

(l) Page 5412, line 10, after the word "situation", insert the words "so far as possible".

(m) Page 5415, line 5, after the word "not", insert the word "written".

(n) Page 5416, line 7, change the word "have" to "had".

(o) Page 5423, line 6, change the word "it" to read "we".

(p) Page 5442, line 4, change the word "other" to read "his".

(q) Page 5444, line 15, change the word "have" to the word "had".

(r) Page 5447, line 19, change the answer to read, "Correct. Planes were to go to Midway and Wake".

(s) Page 5448, line 22, after the word "on" insert the words "the enemy force attacking".

(t) Page 5449, in line 12, change the word "cruiser" to the word "cruisers"; line 17, change to read "the carriers could then be free to act on the offensive".

(u) Page 5452, in line 11, change to read "down in the Gilbert Islands, which was certainly to be expected"; line 21, change the word "the" to "by", the word "patrol" to "patrols", and delete the word "areas".

Respectfully,

/S/ R. K. Turner,
R. K. TURNER,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

[5966] Mr. MITCHELL. Now all the enclosures he refers to there were read into the evidence yesterday, so I need not describe those.

Now paragraph 3 was written in relation to the questions I asked Admiral Stark as to whether he did not here in Washington know day by day what ships were actually in Pearl Harbor, and the enclosure (B) that he refers to are the ship location maps, or copies of them, taken from the Navy Department which were in use here today, and we will have them available if anybody wants to look at them, or the witness wants to refer to them.

Now I have two other documents that counsel for Admiral Stark would like to put in the record now, with the idea that the subject of it may be subject to further examination.

I will read the letter of May 1 for the information of the committee. You have copies of it before you. I will ask that it be just spread upon the record instead of being labeled with an exhibit number.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. "Office of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A.

S-A16-3/A7-3(3)/ND14

(0410)

Secret

1 MAY 1941

From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District

To: Chief of Naval Operations

[5967] Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor

Reference: (a) Correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on this subject dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941.

Inclosures:

(A) Copies of two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941.

(B) Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCD-42).

That is part of Exhibit 44 in the record.

(C) Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

1. In connection with reference (a) there are enclosed herewith for your information copies of the principal directives issued in cooperation with the local Army authorities in accordance with which operation plans have been prepared, put into effect, and are in process of test and improvement, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.

2. Inclosure (A), two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941, initiated study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the defense which were mentioned in reference (a), and also included study of additional problems which were raised by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Inclosure (B), Annex No. VII of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, is a new joint agreement with the local [5968] Army authorities which pertains to joint security measures. Section II in particular relates to joint air operations.

I will interpolate by saying that that is also in Exhibit No. 44.

4. Inclosure (C), Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, serves as the basis of joint air operation orders which have been issued, placed in effect, and are in process of test, with a view to improvement in their effectiveness.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification *other than* secret.

6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/s/ C. C. BLOCH.

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The other document which I will read into the record is dated June 20, 1941.

Op-30B2-BP
(SC)A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 059230

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington, Jun 20 1941

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

[5969] To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet

Subject: Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base.

Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.

2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK

HEADQUARTERS
14TH NAVAL DISTRICT
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

JOINT

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT 1939

28 MARCH 1941

ANNEX NO. VII SECTION VI * JOINT AGREEMENTS

JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE

[5970]

I. GENERAL

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment [5971] strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the [5972] tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS

3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to friendly and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units of one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication.

a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
Hawaiian Air Force	Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
18th Bombardment Wing	Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
14th Pursuit Wing	Ewa Landing Field
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade	Waialupe Radio Station

b. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
*Headquarters Hawaiian Department	Waialupe Radio Station
Headquarters, HSCA Brigade	Senior Officer Present Afloat
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade	Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
Hq. Hawaiian Air Force	Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
	Marine Air Group, Ewa

*Net Control Station.

[5973] 18th Bombardment Wing

14th Pursuit Wing

c. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows:

ARMY	NAVY
Hq. Haw. Dept. (G-3 Office)	14th Naval District
CP, H. S. C. A. B.	14th Naval District
CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft. Kam)	14th Naval District

d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during combat and joint exercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will be as agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the Commander, Base Defense Air Force.

4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the movements of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication:

a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop.

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b. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations :

ARMY	NAVY
CP, PH Gpmt. Ft. Kamehameah	Waialupe
[5974] CP, Hon. Gpmt, Ft. Ruger	Destroyer Patrol
Additional Stations that may be deter-	Mine Sweepers
mined to be necessary	

c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 c. above.

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Anti-aircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service [5975] Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

IV. JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES

* 8. *Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.*

During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an [5976] emergency.

9. *Balloon barrages.*

Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. *Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.*

When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning anti-aircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. *Aircraft Warning Service.*

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installations, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF

12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition and bombs will exchange informa- [5977] tion concerning the types, quantities, and locations of these munitions which are suitable for use by the other service. Studies will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer of ammunition from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions will be made without specific authority granted by the commander concerned for each transfer.

VI. SMOKE SCREENS

13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor—Hickam Field area from air attacks.

VII. HARBOR CONTROL POST

14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District).

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.
(Signed) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding,
Hawaiian Department.

Inclosure A

Annex No. VII HCF-39; 14 ND—JCD—13.

[5978] Aircraft Departure, Approach, and Recognition Procedure

Oahu Area

To Be Published Later

Inclosure B

Annex No. VII. HCF-39; 14 ND—JCD—13

Harbor Control Post, Honolulu and Pearl Harbors, Oahu, T. H.

To be published later. Pending publication of this inclosure, the Harbor Control Post will be established, as far as practicable in accordance with the recommendations contained in the report (dated 17 March 1941) of the Joint committee (Chairman, Commander H. B. Knowles, USN) convened to study and report upon the establishment of a Harbor Control Post and Measures for Communication, Coordination, and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor Defenses.)

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stark, do you have anything you want to present to the committee before the committee resumes questioning you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I have one or two things [5979] which the committee asked for yesterday.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Admiral STARK. I would also like to comment on the so-called Narrative Statement of the Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations, which the committee had before it and mentioned yesterday.

I am sure the committee appreciates full well that this only represents the idea of some representative or representatives of the Navy Department as to what the evidence in the previous proceedings will show.

I have not had an opportunity to study this statement—it is some 700 page—but I do want to point out to the committee what, to my mind, is a very important error. There may be others.

On page 699 of volume 2 and also on page 699 of the loose pages distributed yesterday, you will find the paragraph beginning:

Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27 November 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communication sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of November 27 was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previously to Admiral Kimmel.

In this paragraph, the statement goes on to quote what purports to be my war warning message, and at the top of [5980] page 700 it omits a part of the concluding sentence. The last two sentences of the quoted material read:

A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Appropriate measures against sabotage.

This should read:

A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo Inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

As the message stands in this so-called narrative statement, it is so inaccurate as to be misleading. I am very anxious to have this error corrected if the document is to be referred to by the committee.

Now, the committee asked me yesterday to search my correspondence to see if I found anything additional in the way of air comment to Admiral Kimmel, and I would like to read this as my answer.

I have searched my personal correspondence with Admiral Kimmel and also the official documents I have secured from the Navy Department for any mention, subsequent to August 1941, of anything which would indicate my continuing concern over the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

I find no such letters in this later period. I would like to point out, however, that on May 1, 1941, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District—Admiral Bloch at Pearl Harbor—sent me an official letter on the subject of air defense of [5981] Pearl Harbor. That letter referred to the correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on the subject of the air defense of Pearl Harbor dated January 24, 1941, and February 7, 1941, to both of which letters

I have referred in my statement and with which I am sure the committee is familiar. Enclosed with the commandant's letter were three documents. The first does not appear pertinent here. The second was annex VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan entitled, "Joint Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base." Among its provisions were those for joint air operations and joint antiaircraft measures, including an aircraft warning service. The third enclosure was a joint estimate by the commander, Hawaiian Air Force, and commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, commonly known before this committee as the Martin-Bellinger agreement.

This estimate included a summary of the situation which reads as follows:

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

[5982] (d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

The estimate also included, under possible enemy action, the following two paragraphs:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

A copy of the letter of May 1, 1941, had been sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, by the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

[5983] After reviewing these documents I was impressed with the soundness of the arrangements arrived at between commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District with respect to joint security measures at Pearl Harbor. In fact, on June 20, 1941, I caused copies of the joint agreement to be sent to the commandants of all naval districts and to the commanders in chief of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets, and in my forwarding letter I stated:

Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.

I had shown considerable concern, as far back as the fall of 1940, for the security of the fleet and the base at Pearl Harbor against air attack, and I had caused the people in Hawaii to make an exhaustive investigation, which Admirals Bloch and Richardson followed by a report to me at the beginning of 1941. I then caused the Secretary of the Navy to write to the Secretary of War, pointing out the danger

of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, to which the Secretary of War replied, recognizing the danger and setting forth the steps which the Army had taken and proposed to take to meet this danger. I further mentioned from time to time during the first half of 1941 the matter of an air attack, and when Admiral Kimmel was here in May and early June I discussed fully with him the joint measures which were being taken, and he left with me a memorandum dated June 4, 1941, on this [5984] subject.

As I said, I was so impressed with the agreement made at Pearl Harbor that I sent it out to all concerned, stressing the importance of the subject matter.

In view of the fact that the matter of the air defense of Pearl Harbor had been surveyed and machinery put in action to implement the defense, and in view of the fact that the authorities at Pearl Harbor had arrived at a satisfactory joint arrangement for the air defense of Pearl Harbor, with which I was thoroughly familiar, I felt it no longer necessary to emphasize this matter in my letters.

I assumed that having made this agreement and having agreed with me that the danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was present, the commander in chief, Pacific fleet, would continue his efforts to prepare himself to meet the possible air attack.

I feel sure my assumption was well founded, for he wrote on October 14, 1941, in the revision of his confidential fleet letter on the subject of security of fleet at base and in operating areas, as follows:

The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) Is left out as being nonrelevant.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by: (1) a surprise attack on ships in [5985] Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, (3) a combination of these two.

This letter also provided, under the head "Defense against air attack," the following:

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(6) The Commandant 14th Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (NBDO). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns implaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over Naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing 2 for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and Navy.

A copy of this confidential fleet letter was distributed to the Chief of Naval Operations.

I had no reason to believe, from any communications which came to me from the Pacific Fleet, that the concern shown by the responsible officers there over a possible air attack on [5986] Pearl Harbor had diminished in any respect during 1941. I am certain that my concern had not.

Now, the other paper, sir, I have is the table——

Mr. MITCHELL. Just a minute. Do you want to add to that statement a reference to the letter of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to you in which, among other things, he made this statement:

With respect to sending aircraft equipment farther to the west to the outlying islands I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense of Pearl Harbor, with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far very little has been done to improve this situation.

Have you found any other references than those you mentioned?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. It is perfectly satisfactory to me to include what you have just read.

Mr. MITCHELL. I remembered this one.

Admiral STARK. We searched primarily my letters to him.

Mr. MITCHELL. Not his to you?

Admiral STARK. Not his to me, over that period.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see.

Admiral STARK. We have this official document of his of October.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

[5987] Admiral STARK. If you would like, I will go through his letters to me and bring the subject up tomorrow.

Mr. MITCHELL. I wanted to be sure we had everything.

Admiral STARK. I will search and if I find anything I will bring it up.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you had another statement?

Admiral STARK. The other statement is the table which I was asked to prepare yesterday on the distribution of our fleet.

I think I have covered everything. It won't take but a minute to read it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, before going into that I would like to say that we already have in the record the distribution of the fleet. You got that in the first exhibit in the Navy folder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to have this clear, concise statement at this point in the record, because questions have been asked General Stark directly on this point.

Admiral STARK. Aye, aye, sir.

In each case, I will first read the total number of ships in the Navy: Battleships, 15: Total in the Atlantic, 6. That does not include the *North Carolina* and *Washington*, both of which were on trials. Total in the Asiatic, none. Total in the Pacific, nine. Total in Pearl Harbor—that is, on December 7—eight. Total sunk or put out of commission at Pearl Harbor, eight.

[5988] Then, under the next heading is, "Total Pacific Fleet, vessels undamaged: Battleships in Pearl Harbor, none." In the task forces, 8 and 12, which, you will recall, included the *Enterprise* and the *Lexington* which we discussed yesterday.

None of those was hurt.

Fleet vessels elsewhere in the Pacific not hurt, was one, and which was the *Colorado*, under overhaul.

In the next heading, I put carriers. We had a total of seven. Four were in the Atlantic. That excludes the *Hornet*, which was on trial, and it includes the first of the so-called escort carriers, the converted *Long Island*. In the Asiatic Fleet, no carriers. In the Pacific Fleet, three. Total in Pearl Harbor, none. Total put out of commission or sunk at Pearl Harbor, none. And then the next, the latter column, shows that two of these carriers, the *Lexington* and the *Enterprise*, were absent in connection with distribution of planes at Wake and Midway, and the one other I just put down "Elsewhere."

I would like to point out that the data I am giving here is from Exhibit 86. I haven't gone behind that in any way.

Heavy cruisers: The Navy had a grand total of 18—5 in the Atlantic; 1 in the Asiatic; 12 in the Pacific; 2 were in Pearl Harbor. None were put out of action. None were damaged in Pearl Harbor. Six of them were accompanying the two task forces previously referred to. And elsewhere in the Pacific [5989] outside of Pearl Harbor were four, undamaged.

Of light cruisers, we had 19. Eight were in the Atlantic. That excludes the light cruisers *Juneau*, *Atlantic*, *San Diego*, and *San Juan* which had not yet joined the fleet but were in the process of completion and shakedown. One in the Asiatic, and that excludes the *Boise*, which was escorting in Asiatic waters but attached to the Pacific Fleet. Ten in the Pacific Fleet. That included the *Boise*. In Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, six. Total sunk or put out of action, three. In Pearl Harbor, undamaged—which were undamaged—three. And vessels elsewhere in the Pacific, four. The location of those four is shown in detail in the Navy folder, item 5. My recollection is that two were in the Southeast Pacific and two were on escort work, but the exhibit will show that if the committee wants to follow it up.

Destroyers, 159: 92 in the Atlantic; 13 in the Asiatic; 54 in the Pacific, which includes four destroyers assigned to the fourteenth Naval District, and does not include the destroyers which were assigned to the west coast naval districts. There were 30 in Pearl Harbor, of which three were sunk or put out of commission, leaving undamaged in Pearl Harbor, 27. And there were 14 destroyers which were accompanying the two task forces previously mentioned, and there were ten on other missions in the Pacific.

[5990] Of submarines, we had 111. There were 158 in the Atlantic, 29 in the Asiatic Fleet; 24 in the Pacific Fleet; and of which the status of two of them was not clear. I took that from the former exhibit and didn't follow it up as to why it is not clear. Total in Pearl Harbor on December 7, five; none of which were damaged. And elsewhere in the Pacific were 19 submarines. So that left 98 vessels of the Pacific Fleet undamaged. And of the 51 which were in Pearl Harbor, 14 were sunk and variously damaged from light to heavy damage.

Now, if that table is what the committee wanted, I will let it stand as is. If there is anything further that is wanted I will be glad to get it.

Mr. MITCHELL. I suggest that the table be placed in the transcript in the tabulated form right at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The table referred to follows:)

[5991]

*Dispositions of Atlantic, Asiatic, and Pacific Fleets on
Dec. 7, 1941*

Types	Grand total	Total in Atlantic Fleet	Total in Asiatic Fleet	Total in Pacific Fleet	Total in Pearl Harbor	Total sunk or put out of commission at Pearl Harbor	Total Pacific Fleet vessels undamaged		
							In Pearl Harbor	In task Forces No. 8 ¹ and No. 12 ²	Fleet vessels elsewhere in Pacific ³
Battleships.....	15	4 6	0	9	8	8	0	0	1
Carriers.....	7	5 4	0	3	0	0	0	2	1
Heavy cruisers.....	18	5	1	12	2	0	2	6	4
Light cruisers.....	19	7 8	1	9 10	6	3	3	0	4
Destroyers.....	159	92	13	10 11 54	30	3	27	14	10
Submarines.....	111	58	29	12 24	5	0	5	0	12 19
Total.....	329	173	44	112	51	14	37	22	39
							98		

¹ Task Force No. 8 included *Enterprise*.² Task Force No. 12 included *Lexington*.³ Locations of these ships shown in detail in Navy folder, item 5.⁴ Excludes *North Carolina* and *Washington*, both on trials.⁵ Excludes *Hornet* on trials.⁶ Includes *Long Island*, escort carrier.⁷ Excludes *Juneau*, *Atlanta*, *San Diego* and *San Juan* carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but not completed or commissioned.⁸ Excludes *Boise* escorting in Asiatic waters but attached Pacific Fleet. (See (9).)⁹ Includes *Boise* which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters.¹⁰ Includes 4 destroyers assigned Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl Harbor).¹¹ Does not include destroyers assigned other west coast naval districts.¹² Status of 2 submarines not clear.

Source: Exhibit 86 and transcript, pp. 5880-5883.

[5992] Mr. MITCHELL. I call attention to the fact that you have two prior sources of information. One is the one that Congressman Murphy has called attention to, put in by Admiral Inglis, giving the statistics at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941, and later we have Exhibit 86, which tabulated the fleets in both oceans.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I might mention that the committee will note that this includes only major categories of vessels. I haven't got down net tenders and that type of ship. It is just combatant ships of major categories.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete the material you desired to submit to the committee at this time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Before proceeding with the examination of Admiral Stark, I feel it necessary to call to the attention of the committee the fact that quite some time ago I made a request of counsel that he secure from the State Department and make available to the committee a memoranda prepared by Mr. Lawrence Salisbury to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, [5993] which was delivered, according to the information which I had, some 3 months prior to the resignation of Mr. Salisbury from the Far Eastern Section of the State Department.

I had already placed in evidence some material of Dr. Hornbeck and my advices were that this communication from Mr. Salisbury to the Secretary of State contains material very material to this inquiry.

Counsel has submitted to me this morning his correspondence with the State Department in respect to my request and includes a copy of a letter dated December 19, 1945, from Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, in which he concludes that the Department is unable to comply with my request and gives as the reason that Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 establishing the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack provides that the committee shall "make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941." Mr. Acheson continues in his letter:

The President's Order of October 23, 1945 addressed to this and other departments instructs the Secretary of State to make available to the Joint Committee, for such use as the committee may determine any information in his [5994] possession "material to the investigation." In pursuance of this order, this Department has made available to the Committee Counsel all information in its possession which is material to the investigation.

The memorandum requested by Congressman Keefe relates exclusively to exchanges of American and Japanese nationals after the war began. In these circumstances the Department does not understand how this memorandum could possibly be considered material to the Committee's investigation within the meaning of the President's Order of October 23, 1945. The Department is therefore unable to comply with the request of Congressman Keefe.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if I interpret this letter correctly it is to the effect that the State Department is determining in advance whether or not material requested by a member of this committee is in its judgment material to this inquiry, having before it the full text of the statement which I requested. I have not seen that text, and yet I am foreclosed from a determination of materiality as a member of this committee by the determination of the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, who concludes that in his opinion it is not material and therefore is not to be made available to the committee.

It seems to me that this presents to the committee a very definite question as to the responsibility of this investigat- [5995] ing committee. I may say that I have very definite and certain information that this communication which I have asked for is material and while it may contain some matters which are not material, it does contain matters which are definitely material and are necessary in order that I may pursue the introduction at a subsequent date of certain memoranda prepared for the War and Navy departments by Dr. Hornbeck.

Now, I want to ask this question: When a request is made by a member of this committee to the State Department or any other department of Government, am I, as a member of this committee, to be

bound by the determination of an executive department of Government that in their opinion the material which I requested is not material to this inquiry and therefore I am not permitted to see it?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a question propounded to the Chair?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it has not been the Chair's understanding that an individual member of the committee could determine the materiality of any evidence requested of a department, but that the committee as a whole had jurisdiction and authority to determine that matter, and if the committee as a whole determined that any record was material its determination governed instead of that of the executive officer who might assume to pass upon the question.

[5996] Mr. KEEFE. May I ask then, Mr. Chairman, that the State Department be directed to bring this communication to the committee in order that the committee, itself, in executive session, may determine whether or not it is material.

How can the committee, or any member of the committee, determine that question in the absence of seeing the communication itself? That is the point I am getting at.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter we might well discuss in executive session without taking the time of the hearing, but inasmuch as it has been brought up, before any action is taken, the Chair would like to ask counsel if he has additional information about that, in regard to Mr. Acheson's letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. I have never seen the document, so I do not know whether it is material or not. Heretofore when any question has been raised, I haven't found that the State Department has objected to somebody looking at certain material. They haven't yet closed the door on me. I don't see any reason why I shouldn't agree with Mr. Keefe that the committee ought to have an opportunity to examine it for the whole committee to decide whether it is material.

The CHAIRMAN. From the beginning it was the committee's understanding—it was certainly mine—that the committee would determine the materiality of evidence and not the Secretary of State or any officer of any department, and if it [5997] is agreeable to the committee, the committee will request counsel to get that document and submit it to the committee for its determination as to whether it is material.

[5998] Mr. KEEFE. My point, Mr. Chairman, is that if it appears upon an inspection of the document in connection with other matters which they have submitted that it is immaterial and not material to this controversy, certainly I would not want, nor would I expect, to pursue the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks the point made by the Congressman is well taken and the committee will take such action.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas will now examine.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, throughout the course of these hearings it becomes more clear as we move along that Japan knew everything that we were doing in this country previous to Pearl Harbor and apparently we knew little or nothing about what Japan was doing.

Let me ask you just briefly about our naval and military intelligence service in Japan at that time. How many people did we have employed in Japan in December 1941 who were actively engaged in obtaining military and naval intelligence for this country?

Admiral STARK. I do not know, Senator Lucas, of any, and information of that kind could come far better from Intelligence. I am not familiar with the details. My recollection is we had none. I may be wrong. I hesitate to testify [5999] as to the details of who we had and where.

Senator LUCAS. Well, upon yesterday you testified before the committee that in your opinion Japan had a complete spy system in this country through which they were obtaining and forwarding intelligence to their home country about every movement that took place in our naval and military circles here in America.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. My thought in asking you this question was whether or not in view of the fact that you have been a naval officer all of these years that you could suggest to this committee as to what Congress might do in the future to remedy what seemed to be a very, very serious situation in Hawaii and other command posts when the Japs struck us in December 1941.

Admiral STARK. Well, only a considered answer, I think, should be given to that question and I would not like to make an offhand answer to it.

Senator LUCAS. All right. I appreciate it may be somewhat a surprise question to you, but it does seem to me to have very considerable importance in connection with this hearing as I move along and listen to the testimony, that Japan knew every move that we were making in connection with the movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and had all [6000] this information and apparently we were getting nothing from Japan. While I appreciate that under our form of government it is almost impossible to keep anything a secret, yet, on the other hand, looking to the defense of this country in the future, it does occur to me that perhaps Congress might be able to do some things to remedy certain conditions that existed at that time and I thought perhaps you might have given it some thought.

Admiral STARK. Well, I quite agree with you that it would be well to look into the subject and the question of legislation to correct it. I am hazy on just what we had proposed but I do recall that there was some legislation proposed, I think, which did not get through, about our ability to arrest people on suspicion and that sort of thing, but it has been studied and in the light of present experience, in my opinion, and I take it in yours, I am agreeing with you, should again be reviewed with a view to our not getting into such a position again if it is possible to avoid it.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, how many naval attachés did you have in Tokyo at the time, do you remember that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not. Of course, there was one naval attaché and some assistants and usually we had language students over there, but I haven't got the details.

Senator LUCAS. Well, from whom did you get this information [6001] upon which you based your reports for certain evalua-

tion and certain information that you had to send your commands in the field?

Admiral STARK. We got it from what we got from the State Department, the War Department, sometimes the Treasury Department, intercepts from our people in the field, which was rather world-wide.

For example, in Hawaii we had the district intelligence officer and the fleet intelligence officer and a radio communication man studying those subjects. We had them spread in different places in China and, in fact, a rather broad coverage. We also, of course, in connection with the movements of the fleet had the stations which were constantly, through radio, studying through direction finder and through the system of calls to assist us in location, but we used to say, and I may possibly have expressed to you in some of the hearings, that as regards Japan, even in peacetime, we felt our information more or less stopped at the 3-mile limit.

For example, they built stockades around their navy yards, they pulled down the curtains, I have been told, in trains if they passed a section where people might look out to see what was being done.

You will recall when I was asked how many battleships Japan had we could only estimate. We could get their hearings, [6002] For example, we could get from the amounts of money they had appropriated and working on every scrap of information that we could get, backed by previous experience, we would make an estimate, but over here, as you will recall, a Japanese frequently sat in committee hearings and knew everything about what we were proposing.

I remember when I was asking for the large increases shortly after I became Chief of Naval Operations, seeing a Japanese naval attaché among those listening to the hearings and in which we put all our cards on the table.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the reason that I asked these preliminary questions is followed by this one: According to the report received from the supreme commander of the Allied forces in the Pacific, and which has been made a part of the record, that part of the Japanese Fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was sent by the Imperial Headquarters of the Naval Staff on December 7, 1941, to a place which I cannot pronounce, which is spelled H-i-t-o-k-a-p-p-u.

Now, I was wondering whether or not you as Chief of Naval Operations were familiar with that Japanese harbor previous to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. We knew of the harbor; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Were any of our Intelligence men or any of the Navy men working in there at any time, or did they ever [6008] get in there to make an inspection and see what that bay was like?

Admiral STARK. Not that I know of. It might be that you will get something on that if you repeat the question to our far-eastern man who is due here.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at least as far as you are concerned you do not recall that in the information you received any direct report about this particular bay in the months of, say, September, October, November, and December of 1941?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. I think it might be helpful with regard to what has been termed the "lost carriers" and which were not lost so far as we knew at that time, but whose appearance later

showed that our estimates as to where they were were incorrect, you will recall there has been introduced into the testimony that on December 24 Admiral Wilkinson sent a dispatch to the two commanders in chief in the Pacific regarding their size-up of where the Japanese fleet was.

You will notice that sometimes there were conflicts, but that we felt the estimates made by Admiral Hart, who had a very large force working on it and was very much closer to Japan, were probably the best we had.

Now, I would also like to point out that, of course, Admiral Kimmel was informed of that, it went to Kimmel and to [6004] Hart and there was a complete interchange.

Senator LUCAS. You meant November 24. You said December 24.

Admiral STARK. Well, if you say so that is all right. On November 24. I will read that dispatch if you would like to have it read. It is short.

The CHAIRMAN. You said "December," Admiral.

Admiral STARK. Oh. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. We are asking to have it corrected.

Admiral STARK. There was a conflict. We thought that Hart's estimates appeared to us to be the better, but Kimmel had estimates, Kimmel had his estimates, Hart had Kimmel's estimates, we had both their estimates and all three of us were working on that. Now, on the 26th—

Senator LUCAS. Just before you get to the 26th. With respect to those estimates, they were not the same. Hart had one set of figures showing where the carriers were and Kimmel had another set of figures which were different.

Admiral STARK. I am coming to that.

Senator LUCAS. All right, sir.

Admiral STARK. On the 26th we received two dispatches, one from Kimmel, who thought that possibly there might be some carriers in the eastern Marshalls, and one from Hart putting them in home waters. [6005] You will recall that we endeavored to get a coverage on the eastern Marshalls but due to weather were not able to do so. Hart put them in home waters.

On the 28th and again on the 1st we had from the Asiatic no change, which still put, in his opinion, the carriers in the home waters from what he had been able to gather or not gather. On the 1st of December Intelligence made an estimate, our own Office of Naval Intelligence, to me and from the information as they sized it up from Hart and from Kimmel they put them in home waters. So we thought we knew where the carriers were. You never can be certain in the absence of anything definite in the way of call signs and cutting them in.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you accepted the information that Admiral Hart gave you with respect to this task force or this supposed lost fleet and concluded that the fleet was not lost but it was in home waters some place?

Admiral STARK. That was the best we had to go on. Yes, sir; we accepted them.

Senator LUCAS. Well, do you know whether Admiral Kimmel accepted that same viewpoint and in view of that he gave you a report that the fleet was lost?

Admiral STARK. The only difference that I recall in Admiral Kimmel's information was that there might be two carriers in the eastern Marshalls and, of course, as time went on [6006] and there was no further change, or in the absence of information, why, one might wonder, but the best at the time we had from those who were making the estimates was that the carriers were in home waters.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that is what you are telling the committee at this time, that upon the information that you evaluated at the time and sent to the commanders in the field it was your opinion that there was no lost fleet but that the ships of the Japanese Navy were all accounted for through the Hart report?

Admiral STARK. We did not send it out. That estimate was just given to me by Intelligence. Hart and Kimmel both had their own estimates and whether Admiral Kimmel after receiving Admiral Hart's latest information agreed with him or not, whether his Intelligence officer did, I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you will agree that that was an extremely important message that came from Admiral Hart at that particular time with respect to the location of the Japanese fleet, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; but I will say, and the people in the field, I believe, would bear it out, that it was the best information we had. You never could count on it a hundred percent of accuracy. Every naval officer knows that ships can maintain radio silence.

[6007] Senator LUCAS. I appreciate that. Well, now, after this task force went into this bay the name of which I cannot pronounce, they were ordered, according to the report that is in the record here, to stay there until November the 22, 1941, and take on supplies and then upon that date they were to sail for the Hawaiian waters.

Now, as I understand it, there was no one in the Hawaiian area connected with the fleet, there was no one in the Asiatic area that was connected with the fleet that ever heard a single thing about this task force being at this bay or having the slightest knowledge of when it went there or when it sailed.

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct. I would suggest, Senator Lucas, that you repeat that question to McCollum and Kramer as to whether or not Admiral Hart in making that evaluation,—that would be home waters, and whether he had them there or not I am not certain.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I thought, Admiral Stark, in view of the crisis that we were fast approaching with Japan that you as Chief of Naval Operations would have probably known about any movements of ships in the Japanese waters at that time; that was the reason I was asking you the question.

Admiral STARK. Well, the data they gave me was home waters. I have the dispatches here, if you would like to hear [6008] just what they sent in.

Senator LUCAS. All right, please read those dispatches.

Admiral STARK. This dispatch is of November 26, from the commandant, Fourteenth District, Fourteenth Naval District, which is Hawaii, to OPNAV and for information of the commander in chief

of the Pacific and the commander in chief of the Asiatic and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District. It reads:

For past month commander Second Fleet has been organizing a task force which comprises following units:

Second Fleet, Third Fleet including first and second base forces and First Defense Division, combined airforce, Desron Three, Airron Seven, Subron Five and possible units of BatDiv Three from First Fleet.

In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indochina force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama Bako and Takao.

Third base force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive communications with Second Fleet Commander.

Combined air force has assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved on to Hainan.

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako.

[6009] Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and Submarine Division or Squadron.

CruDiv Seven and Desron Three appear as an advance unit and may be enroute South China.

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airron Twenty Four at least one Carrier Division unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

From Com. 16, that is Asiatic, to the CINCPAC and to OPNAV and to COM 14 and to CINCAF, which was Admiral Hart.

Morning comment—

Mr. MITCHELL. The date of that?

Admiral STARK. This is the 26th.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of November?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Morning comment Comfourteen two one ten of twenty-sixth—

The message I just read bears "2613"—it refers to the [6010] one I just read, which was Admiral Bloch's dispatch.

"Morning comment Comfourteen," to the despatch I have just read from Hawaii. [Reading:]

Morning comment Comfourteen two one ten of twenty sixth X Traffic analysis past few days indicate Cinc second directing units of first second third fleets and subforce in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections X For purposes of clarity units expected to operate in south China area will be referred to as first section and units expected to operate in mandates will be referred to as second section X Estimated units in first section are Crudiv seven X Airron six defense division one X Desron three and subron six XX Second section—

which is the one he put in the Marshalls—

Crudiv five X Cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru X Desrons two and four X Subron five X Desdiv twentythree X First base force of third fleet X Third base force at Palao X Fifth base force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv six and Batdiv three may be included in first and second sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX Balance third fleet units in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including Desron five will take station in Formosa Straits or further south X There are slight indications [6011] today that Desron three Crudiv seven and Subron six are in Takao area X Combined airforce units from Empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon Takao and other bases on Taiwan and China coast X Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X Our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area X Our lists indicate Cinc combined in Nagato X Cinc first in Hyuga and Cinc second in

Atago in Kure area X Cinc third in Ashigara in Sasebo area X Cinc fifth in Chichijima area X Comdr subforce in Kashima in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South China fleet appears to have been strengthened by units from central or north China probably torpedo boats XX Southern expeditionary fleet apparently being reinforced by one base force unit XX Directives to the above task forces if such are directed to individual units and not to complete groups X Special calls usually precede formation of task force used in area operations X Cinc second X Third and Cinc southern expeditionary fleet appear to have major roles X Traffic from Navminister and Cngs to Cincs of fleet appear normal X Evaluation is considered reliable.

That shows differences in opinion as to at least the carriers in the Marshalls.

[6012] Senator LUCAS. In view of subsequent events, Admiral Kimmel's report was more accurate than Admiral Hart's?

Admiral STARK. I beg pardon, Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. In view of subsequent events, Admiral Kimmel's report was more reliable than Admiral Hart's with respect to where the Japanese carriers were?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that either one of them was reliable. I do not know yet whether there were any carriers in the eastern Marshalls, and I have been unable to ascertain.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is a certainty, however, there was a task force that was lost, and Kimmel in his message was talking about the loss of part of a fleet that he could not find; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes; and Admiral Hart thought they were in home waters.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. And the very carriers that Admiral Hart talked about being in home waters turned out to be in the task force that struck Pearl Harbor; that is correct, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes. I think the information is they were not in the eastern Marshalls.

Senator LUCAS. I do not know where they were. At least they were lost and were finally discovered where they were on December 6, 1941?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

[6013] Senator LUCAS. Assuming you had taken the other position, Admiral Stark, that there was a lost fleet out in the Pacific, would that give you any greater concern with respect to the Hawaiian area?

Admiral STARK. Well, it might have. I do not know. That would be hindsight.

Senator LUCAS. What was the Navy's principal business in the Pacific Ocean? What was our chief problem out there in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. To protect the United States interests.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; to protect the United States with what? With what would we protect them?

Admiral STARK. With the fleet.

Senator LUCAS. After all, the fleet was the chief interest of the United States, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That should have been the chief interest of every naval officer in the Navy, both here in Washington and in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was.

Senator LUCAS. Now, no one knew where the Japs were going to attack, but whether it was the Philippines or Wake or any other American possessions, the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was the watch-

dog for American safety and security, [6014] not only for our possessions but for the continental United States as well; is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, it seems to me, in view of the fact that the fleet was in the Hawaiian area, the sole purpose being the defense of our country and our possessions, that there should not have been anything left undone on the part of any naval officer either in Washington or in the Pacific area to protect that fleet, because without it we were in pretty bad shape, were we not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, any of these places that you mentioned, any of the places that were mentioned there in those messages, like the Kra Peninsula, Borneo, Philippines, and other spots, if they had been struck by the Japs there would not have been any danger to our fleet, would there?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. You are speaking of the southern—

Senator LUCAS. I am speaking now of the message that you sent to the commander of the Pacific Fleet and the commander of the Asiatic Fleet wherein you mentioned certain points that you thought, from the information you had, Japan might strike.

Admiral STARK. Well, if Japan struck the Philippines, that part of our fleet out there was certainly in danger.

[6015] Senator LUCAS. That part of our fleet was in danger, but the principal part was based at Hawaii, and insofar as the principal part of the fleet was concerned it was not in danger with respect to any of those places that were mentioned in the message; isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, so far as the places mentioned in the message. I would like to point out, Senator Lucas, with regard to the places mentioned in the message, that they referred to an attack by an amphibious force.

Senator LUCAS. Well, what would an amphibious force be, Admiral Stark?

Admiral STARK. Well, an amphibious force—for example, there were somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 transports in that force.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral STARK. It was a force of ships with men for landing and with equipment for landing, and with boats for landing them, such, for example, as our own amphibious forces when they strike.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral STARK. We mention in that dispatch, or I think it may have been read into the dispatch and perhaps understood, that the dispatch referred only to that. I would like to go through that dispatch once again, if I may.

[6016] We state that—

negotiations * * * looking towards a stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

That is an aggressive move.

Now, we state that—

the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition—

and the amphibious expedition, not any strike that might come but this amphibious expedition, to be either against the Philippines or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Then we go on with—

execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform district and army authorities.

Now, we knew there was an amphibious force and we knew its possible objectives. We had stated in a previous dispatch that an attack might be coming in any direction. This dispatch speaks of a surprise aggressive movement.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. The fact that it is sent to any man for action means that we are thinking of him with reference to the material contained in this dispatch. If it were simply informatory and of interest to him we would have on there, as has been pointed out, "for information." I think the distinction between "for information" and "for action" should be cleared up.

[6017] Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Admiral STARK. We would not have sent this to Admiral Kimmel for action unless we had been thinking of him and the possibility of an attack in his direction, and for that reason he was put down "for action." I do not know whether I made that point clear before, as to the difference between "for action" and "for information."

Senator LUCAS. I appreciate the distinction and it was very fairly put to us by General Marshall on that score. However, it does seem to me that whenever, even in a command action of that type, where you mentioned these various places as the theater and Hawaii was not mentioned, it just occurred to me it was calculated to take just a little away, perhaps, from Hawaii. Maybe I am wrong.

Admiral STARK. Again, I invite your attention to the point that we were putting down the points of a possible attack of an amphibious expedition. We had no thought of an amphibious expedition striking at Hawaii. We were not thinking of an assault on Hawaii and a landing on Hawaii as a result of an amphibious expedition.

Senator LUCAS. Assuming that they did strike as was suggested, which they did later on—

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; the forecast was correct.

Senator LUCAS. The point I am trying to make is that none [6018] of that information that was sent was as vital as the protection of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. That was the main thing, was it not?

Admiral STARK. And for that purpose we gave a directive to take a defensive deployment; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, do you believe, as Chief of Naval Operations, that in November and December 1941, you exercised that high degree of care and caution which the nearing Japanese crisis compelled you to do in sending to Admiral Kimmel all the information, and the timely information, upon which he could base a wise decision?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I had thought so.

Senator LUCAS. And you still believe it?

Admiral STARK. I still think so; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You know he had many difficult decisions to make out there?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And, of course, you had many difficult decisions to make here.

Admiral STARK. I not only had many to make here with regard to the Pacific, but we were operating and were practically at war on the high seas in the Atlantic with the Department alerted for material coming in, dodging submarines, and troop convoys, and so forth, day and night. We had attacked [6019] for example, between September and the 1st of December, as I recall, three destroyers that were attacked, one sunk. We also had the *Salinas* attacked but it managed to get in; it was torpedoed. We had attacks going back as far as June. That was in addition to all the rest of the build-up, and so forth. We were extremely occupied with many heavy problems.

Senator LUCAS. I appreciate that. I want to ask you one other question along that same line. Do you feel that on the morning of December 6, 1941, when you received the last part of the 14-part message—

Mr. MITCHELL. December 7.

Senator LUCAS. I mean December 7, 1941, when you received the last part of the 14-part message, that you acted with that high degree of care that you should have under those circumstances in sending or failing to send, rather, a message to Admiral Kimmel at that time?

Admiral STARK. I thought so, because if you take out one or two words in the Japanese 14-part message, just took the meat of it, it is almost a paraphrase of what we had sent. I read that in my statement, and if you would like I will read it again.

Senator LUCAS. You took the position at that time, as I recall, when you first talked to General Marshall, that you had already sent sufficient information to Admiral Kimmel, [6020] and if you sent him more it might confuse him.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I thought there was a possibility of sending too much. That was with reference to the 1 o'clock message which, as I have stated, was the thing which stood out so clearly, because naturally, in the face of hindsight and in thinking that situation over, and in searching my conscience for what I might have done that I did not, I stated both to the Naval Committee and to the Roberts Commission, in looking over the whole field, I had, in the light of hindsight, regretted that I had not paralleled the Army message rather than just let the Army message go for me as well as for the Army. But I did not diagnose it to mean an attack at that time, and, as I stated a day or two ago, no one else pointed that out to me. Marshall said he did not understand the significance; nevertheless, it did alert him to the point that he thought something ought to go out. He read into it a possibility which I had not up until the time he called me.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, you had much communication with Admiral Kimmel, both from the standpoint of letter writing and the standpoint of messages. Let me ask you if you ever talked to him over the telephone?

Admiral STARK. I never had talked to Admiral Kimmel over the telephone.

[6021] Senator LUCAS. And it did not occur to you on the Sunday morning there that this message was important enough that you should call him on the telephone and give him the contents of the last part of the message?

Admiral STARK. It did not. I brought that out before the Roberts Commission as one of the things, and that is one thing I have thought so much about since, and that was the use of the telephone. I frankly did not think of it. I never heard it mentioned by anyone else until I volunteered the fact that I did not think of it.

Senator LUCAS. It is true that had you immediately picked up the telephone at that time, or even sent a message at 10:30 or 10:40, that morning, to Admiral Kimmel, giving him the complete digest of the fourteenth part of the 14-part message, it would have placed Kimmel on a complete war alert, would it not?

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Why do you say that?

Admiral STARK. Because I do not. I did not know what his reaction would have been to the fourteenth part of that message, which was merely confirmatory of what we had sent. After the 1 o'clock message, if I had told him that the message had come in from the Japs as confirming what we had already told him, with the simple statement that they were directed to deliver that to the State Department, to Mr. [6022] Hull, at 1 o'clock, I do not know what his reaction would have been. That is all it stated. As to whether he might have read a significance in it which nobody here read into it, I do not know. He might have.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you go back to the message of November 27 and state to the committee now, if Admiral Kimmel was not on the alert on December 6 as the result of the message you sent him of November 27, then whatever you might have given him subsequently on December 7 would not have made much difference?

Admiral STARK. For example, I sent him that information. If I had made the evaluation which we now make in the light of hindsight, and told him that, that would be one thing, but if I simply sent him the information, whether or not he would have read into it what we did not read into it here, I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you sent him some four or five messages, as I recall, between November 24 and December 6. Do you feel that you sent him all of the vital and material information that was necessary, upon which he could properly alert the naval command of the Pacific at that time?

Admiral STARK. I do; yes, sir. I feel that the message about the burning of the codes was just about as strong in its implications as anything could be. Now, as you know— [6023] and I haven't mentioned it before—I have been criticized by the Department, for example, for not having sent out Mr. Hull's 10-point note.

Senator LUCAS. I was going to ask you that in the next question.

Admiral STARK. I was hoping it would come up. I did not want to volunteer it.

Senator LUCAS. I have it here. I want to ask you whether you are familiar with the 10-point note that was prepared by Mr. Hull and given to the Japs.

Admiral STARK. With the ground work; yes. Just when I saw it, I do not know, but if you read my message of the 27th carefully, as to what it says, with the knowledge that I did not know of the 10-point note at that time, and if I knew of it subsequently and had sent it to Admiral Kimmel, I do not know what he would have thought, but it could be said, "Here is a note from Stark that negotiations have

ceased; here is one from Mr. Hull which offers to carry on negotiations, or may be considered an ultimatum," there has been much argument about that, but, in any case, it could not have strengthened the unequivocal statement which I made. It might have confused him or it might have weakened the statement. If he was confused he could, of course, have sent me the dispatch, "You state the negotiations are over; here is an offer to [6024] continue." Unless I told him Mr. Hull's own opinion was that the whole thing was over, it could have confused him. That opinion was expressed in my dispatch of the 27th. My own feeling, even in the light of hindsight and careful study of the message, is that to have sent it would have either weakened my dispatch of the 27th or would have been confusing to the man at the other end of the line.

Senator LUCAS. In your opinion the 10-point message of Mr. Hull, had it been sent to Admiral Kimmel verbatim, would have confused the issue rather than have clarified the issue?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; or weakened it.

Senator LUCAS. Now, your message of November 24 merely states—

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

Then, on November 27, as I get the distinction in the two messages, you said:

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased.

Now, that is the message that went on to Kimmel, is it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and to Hart.

Senator LUCAS. And Admiral Hart. That was a command message?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And it was a message that anyone who could read the English language ought to be able to understand, [6025] was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. When diplomatic negotiations between two countries have ceased—and that is all that Admiral Kimmel knew at that time—it means that imminent and serious danger between these two countries is near at hand; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. It is, coupled with the statement that this was a war warning.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. Now, there has also been some complaint about your failure, as I understand it, not to send to Admiral Kimmel the message that you received on November 27, 1941, in which Japan informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon powers would break out sooner than anyone dreamed. Do you think that would help Admiral Kimmel any, to have sent that out to him?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I think that dispatch was pretty well distilled and covered by our own which said that Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. I think it was also distilled, so to speak, in the Army dispatch which said war might happen any minute.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, if I understand you correctly, it is your contention that the messages of the 24th and the 27th, especially the last one, which commands, that every commander at every post should have thoroughly [6026] understood the important significance of it and acted accordingly?

Admiral STARK. We felt so; yes, sir; and we studied that situation, as to sending anything more out, and decided that the message stood and we qualified it in no way whatever. We supported it in the "codes burning" message.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. And with respect, Admiral Stark, to the "codes burning" message, do you know of any time in history where nations have burned codes that war was not imminent and did not take place?

Admiral STARK. I do not know of any. There might be some, but I do not know of any.

Senator LUCAS. There may be, but it is the exception rather than the rule, is it not, that that takes place?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We thought it pointed right toward war. We thought it was just perfectly confirmatory of what we had sent.

Senator LUCAS. And there was no question but what Admiral Kimmel knew about the burning of the Japanese codes in Hawaii at that time?

Admiral STARK. No. We got our information of the burning of codes in Hawaii from Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I say. There is no question but what he knew about it?

[6027] Admiral STARK. There was no question in our minds; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. It was through his command that you received the information that they were burning codes, am I correct about that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The dispatch came from Com. 14, which was Admiral Bloch, to us, and we assumed that Admiral Kimmel was familiar with it.

Senator LUCAS. Was that on December 5?

Admiral STARK. December 6.

Senator LUCAS. December 6?

Admiral STARK. Yes. The dispatch reads, "local consul has destroyed all but one system, although presumably not included your 18005 of the 3rd."

Senator LUCAS. Then you sent a message to Admiral Kimmel following that, to destroy certain papers, did you not?

Admiral STARK. We sent a message out on the 6th, authorizing him to authorize at his discretion his outlying islands to destroy their codes, retaining such as were necessary for talking with him up until the last minute, is the way the dispatch finished up.

Senator LUCAS. Now let me ask you this question, Admiral Stark. When these messages went to Admiral Kimmel between November 24 and December 6, and especially the messages of [6028] the 24th and 26th, and "code burning" messages—

Admiral STARK. You mean the 27th, don't you, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. The 27th; yes, sir. To whom in the fleet would that information be distributed? What officers in the fleet should have received that information besides Admiral Kimmel? I am especially referring to your war messages.

[6029] Admiral STARK. Well, the distribution in the fleet would be by Admiral Kimmel. We addressed it to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet. The distribution within his command would be at his direction.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, that would be under his jurisdiction, as to whom he delivered the contents of that message?

Admiral STARK. Entirely; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you wouldn't have anything to do with that on this end of the line?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know now who Kimmel talked with about the message that was sent on November 27?

Admiral STARK. I couldn't be sure; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. If you had been in command of the fleet at that time and had received a war warning message, what officers in the Fleet would you have talked to?

Admiral STARK. My feeling is that I would have brought in my key officers.

Senator LUCAS. Who would they have been?

Admiral STARK. COMFOURTEEN would be one of them, my battleship commanders, submarine commanders. In general the people in command of task forces and my air force commander. And we would have gone over the situation. And, of course, [6030] out there we would have assumed also that he would have taken it up, and he probably did, he can tell you, with General Short.

Senator LUCAS. Now, if there was any question about the proper interpretation of any of these messages, if Admiral Kimmel was confused in any way as to what they meant, there was nothing in Navy regulations which would not have permitted him to have gotten you on the telephone or obtained from you by message just exactly what you did mean, was there?

Admiral STARK. Nothing whatever in Navy regulations, and my knowledge of Kimmel, and his of me, from that I would have expected that if he didn't understand what I sent him he would have asked me.

Senator LUCAS. There is nothing that prevented Kimmel from conferring with you at any time upon any situation?

Admiral STARK. Nothing whatsoever.

Senator LUCAS. And did you receive any replies from Admiral Kimmel to any of these messages between the 24th and the 6th of December which would give you any indication whatsoever that Admiral Kimmel didn't thoroughly understand what these messages meant?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, I did not.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, I want to talk just a moment with you about the anti-torpedo baffles that were [6031] discussed between yourself and Admiral Kimmel, as I recall, along in the spring of 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I have before me an exhibit that is not in evidence here, a statement made by Admiral Kimmel, in which he refers to an official letter which you wrote and which is a part of Exhibit 49 in the Naval Court of Inquiry, in which is stated the following:

Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height of [6032] dropping is 60 feet or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

Now, at one time you considered seriously placing these anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor to protect the battleships?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you, as I understand it, made an exhaustive search with the British as well as our own naval experts and engineers, scientific men, with respect to what could or could not be done in shallow water?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. And this letter that you wrote is the consequence of that, am I right?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the Navy Board of Inquiry called this bomb a secret weapon in the nature of a robot bomb which was unknown to the best professional opinion in America at this time. Do you agree with that statement?

Admiral STARK. A robot bomb?

Senator LUCAS. This torpedo bomb was in the nature of a secret weapon, they said, along the lines of a robot bomb, which was unknown to the best professional opinion in America and Britain at that time.

I ask if you agree with that? Do you agree that it was [6033] unknown to the best American and British opinion at that time, that a bomb of that kind could not operate in water as shallow as it was in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not agree with that. There is a later letter of ours that states that no capital ship was safe in any water which she could float in, where there was sufficient run for the torpedo to arm itself.

However, the letter was further qualified by stating depths which were desirable. I have got the letter here.

Senator LUCAS. I wish you would produce that letter and read it into the record, as I have been under the impression that there was an opinion among British and American experts that you couldn't use a bomb of that kind in that shallow water.

Admiral STARK. That was true at the time it was written. There is a later letter of 13 June from the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator LUCAS. 1941?

Admiral STARK. 1941. To the Commandant, 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Naval Districts. The subject is:

Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Then there is a reference to the letter of 17 February, [6034] which I believe may be the one you just mentioned:

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major Fleet bases.

In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

That was in the letter you just referred to. 2:

Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300 feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

I would like to read the rest of that. If the letter [6035] stopped right there, there wouldn't have been any doubt, but it does show that possibility.

Paragraph 3:

While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depths of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13 to 15 fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in 11 or 12 fathoms.

In other words, we pointed out the danger that any ship was subject to if she were afloat, had enough water to float in and enough room to fire the torpedo, if they could get the approach, and enough length of run for arming, and we then go on to say, and I would like to repeat that "it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water," from this type of attack, and then we go on to say that we feel the attacks are more likely where the depth of water is greater.

Senator LUCAS. That letter was written in June, 1941?

[6036] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and a copy of that letter was sent to the commander in chief, Pacific; commander in chief, Atlantic; commander in chief, Asiatic; and commander in chief of some of the naval net depots, Bureau of Ordnance, and OP-12.

Senator LUCAS. In view of that discovery in June of 1941 that these torpedo bombs could operate in shallow water, was there anything done by the Navy Department toward the construction of torpedo nets to go into Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. We had directed the Bureau of Ordnance, I have forgotten the date, but it is here, to go ahead and design and develop antitorpedo nets for harbor work. The letter of February 11, which I would like to read, shows the action we took as far back as that, because of this possible contingency.

Senator LUCAS. Is it a long letter?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; one page.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Admiral STARK (reading):

1. Reference (a) requested information concerning all promising experimental and development work on nets and booms done by the U. S. Navy since March 1940.

2. As far as this Office is aware, no such work has been done other than the making of minor modifications to the Admiralty designs. It is considered that experimental and development work should be undertaken. If necessary, [6037] additional personnel for this purpose should be secured.

3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes. The present Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes and with cutters, and its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a torpedo not armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against torpedoes which would explode on contact with a metal net.

4. Effort should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms and their appurtenances without reducing their efficiency in order that they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested that plans be made to test sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well as indicator nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate British experiments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this office be kept informed of development work and all tests and experiments conducted with nets and booms.

That was our initial letter on directing the Bureau of Ordnance to go ahead with that work.

Senator LUCAS. The date is February 1941?

Admiral STARK. February 11, 1941; yes, sir.

[6038] Senator LUCAS. When did you first get any nets?

Admiral STARK. We didn't get any nets until 1942.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know why?

Admiral STARK. I have forgotten the date but we did not have them up to the time of Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know why the delay?

Admiral STARK. The Bureau of Ordnance just didn't produce on it.

Senator LUCAS. Was any follow-up made on that letter of February 11 with respect to the Bureau of Ordnance insisting that the nets be produced?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; there were several.

Senator LUCAS. A lot of ships could have been saved at Pearl Harbor if the nets had been out; isn't that right?

Admiral STARK. If an effective baffle had been there it undoubtedly would have minimized the effect. Of course, the bombs also did considerable damage.

Senator LUCAS. I understand the torpedo planes did the real damage to the battleships, according to previous testimony; more than altitude bombs.

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know how long it took us to perfect this type of bomb that we could use in shallow water?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not have that information. The [6039] Bureau of Ordnance could furnish it.

Senator LUCAS. And you don't have the information as to how long it took the Japanese to perfect that type of bomb?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I remember the original specification. I was Chief of Bureau of Ordnance. Our first specification was 100 knots and 100 feet. We were continually trying to raise the speed and increase the altitude from which they could be fired.

Senator LUCAS. Undoubtedly Japan had Pearl Harbor in mind when she first started experimenting with this type of bomb; do you agree?

Admiral STARK. Unquestionably she had us in mind, just as we had any possible enemy in mind. We were all after a high-dive and shallow-water run.

Senator LUCAS. Very few harbors are as shallow as Pearl Harbor, however?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was a shallow-water harbor. So is Colon. So is Guantanamo. So are many others. Too shallow in many cases for comfort.

Senator LUCAS. I want to change the course of the questioning just a little and ask you this, Admiral.

Did you have any definite or direct advance information that Japan was going to strike us?

[6040] Admiral STARK. No; I did not.

Senator LUCAS. You have told the committee the various sources from which you obtained information in the Far East and upon which you made your evaluations and estimates and which were sent to the respective naval commands.

Have you given to the committee every source of information that you had, including magic and information from Intelligence officers, and what not, upon which you based these estimates and upon which your Intelligence officers made the proper evaluations?

Admiral STARK. I think so, yes, sir. I can't think of anything more at the moment which I may have omitted.

Senator LUCAS. And the Army exchanged its information with you as to what they received in the Hawaiian area, through the Eastern Asiatic section of the world?

Admiral STARK. Complete and daily exchange and very close liaison and continuous between General Marshall and myself.

Senator LUCAS. You also had the advantage of seeing all the diplomatic messages that came in through the codes, at least?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; such as were considered as important were given to me; and I had confidence in the people, as to their selections.

Senator LUCAS. You were in frequent communication with [6041] the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and the President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, at that time?

Admiral STARK. Very frequent, yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, as a result of your close association and your intimate knowledge with all the cabinet officers, with all the people in the Executive Branch of the Government at that time, do you know of a single man in the Army or Navy, State Department or other branches of the Executive Government, who had any direct, clear-cut information that Japan was going to attack this nation?

Admiral STARK. I do not.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of any individual in the Executive Branch of the Government, including the Navy, Army and State Department, that had any information as to the precise point and hour that Japan was going to attack this country?

Admiral STARK. I do not.

Senator LUCAS. So far as you know all these rumors and speculations, newspaper articles that have been written in the past, that men high in the Navy, Military, and official life of Washington knew the precise time and place the Japanese would attack was utterly without foundation in fact?

Admiral STARK. That is my opinion.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations [6042] you appeared, in April 1940, before the Naval Affairs Committee of the United States Senate as a witness in behalf of HR-8026. Do you recall that?

Admiral STARK. I recall the number. I don't recall the subject matter of the bill.

Senator LUCAS. You recall the time you appeared before the Naval Affairs Committee, of which I was a member, at that time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. As a member of that committee I remembered a statement you made, a statement which I have never forgotten, and I had occasion over the week-end to review these hearings in order that I might find your direct quotation. You made the following statement after a colloquy with the Senator from Maryland, Mr. Tydings, the late Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Barbour, and the Senator from Illinois, here it is—it is on page 92. You stated, in answer to a question of Senator Tydings:

If we can get peace on earth and good will to men we are all for it. The Naval officers are not in favor of war. If there is any officer in existence who wants a war I would like to find him. Our recommendations are solely with the view of the peaceful interests of this country in mind. If anything happens we have got to bear the brunt of [6043] it. Our job is taking care of you people.

Do you remember making that statement?

Admiral STARK. I recall it now, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that?

Senator LUCAS. That is under date of April 1940, when Admiral Stark appeared before the Committee on Naval Affairs. Admiral Stark, that was your position in April 1940?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Was that your position in November and December of 1941?

Admiral STARK. That has always been my position.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of a single high ranking officer in the Army or Navy in November or December of 1941 who wanted to plunge this country into war with any nation?

Admiral STARK. With any nation?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, Japan or any other nation.

Admiral STARK. I certainly didn't want to with Japan. I would like to say with regard to Hitler that I spent many hours speculating myself as to what was the best course for this nation to pursue. Every thinking man of responsibility did. I had seen Hitler's game of one at a time. I felt that without our help England might fail. That along with that picture came the possibility of a break-up of the British Empire and its control by Germany and a Europe controlled [6044] by Germany.

That was also paralleled by the possibility of a war in Asia. And the combination might have worked a squeeze play on us which would have been a terrible thing for this country. We might have armed to the teeth and steered a course that would have kept us out, but it may just have postponed the day. That was something over which I thought a great deal.

However, I did have this background, that Congress, through lend-lease, and the knowledge of what we were doing, had, in my opinion, taken the position and the country was committed to seeing that Hitler should not win, and on that basis I felt we might wait too late, and I therefore, recommended that if we were going to get in, and if we were going to have a war psychology which would produce what it was necessary to produce, and if we did not wait until it was too late, that, in my opinion, the time had come for us to get in it, based on what I considered the country's policy.

[6045] Senator LUCAS. Well, that was your feeling towards Hitler at that particular time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And that, of course, was not followed out by the President of the United States. War was not declared upon Germany until Germany declared war upon us.

Admiral STARK. That is true.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this question: In your connections with the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the President of the United States did you reach the conclusion that any one of these men, or any group of men, wanted to take this country into war with Japan for the sole purpose of just going to war.

Admiral STARK. No, I did not. To the best of my knowledge and belief all were in sympathy from the military standpoint to avoid that war if we could do it without walking back on our principles.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, the high ranking Navy, War, State, and other officials of the executive branch of the Government were seeking through an honorable way to obtain peace with Japan but at the same time preparing ourselves for war in the event Japan and other dictator nations attacked this Nation or any of our possessions?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6046] Senator LUCAS. Do you agree with me that if we had followed any other course it would have been necessary for us to yield to this new order of might, which would have meant that we would have had to give up the freedom of the seas, we would have been submitting to mass subjection and the world trade would have been run by the edicts or decrees of the dictators of this world?

Admiral STARK. I think that might very well have happened and I think Mr. Hull's testimony and his writings and what he was after shows that it was not just theory with him but working on what Japan had done and was doing where she controlled, that any extension by her would have been very restrictive to our own interests.

Senator LUCAS. You are familiar with the testimony of Mr. Hull, are you not?

Admiral STARK. With most of it I think, yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you agree in principle with what he said before this committee?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you agree with me that had we yielded to Japan at that time we would have been yielding to might and we would have deserted every belief and every liberty and every tradition and every concept on which this Nation is founded?

[6047] Admiral STARK. I think so, yes, sir. My feeling with regard to a Pacific war and in which my letters state this fact, I think,

many times was that we would not forsake China and back out from the stand we had taken and that Japan, on the other hand, also would not back out and that regardless of all else there was a stumbling block which could not be overcome.

Senator LUCAS. That is what you continually say in your letters to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You go over that several times, as I recall it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You talk about irreconcilable conflicts here that exist between Japan and this country.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That some day they would probably meet and have to be decided through war. I think that was your position.

Admiral STARK. That is true, yes, sir. Other things Japan might have promised she would do, but personally I had no faith in her promises and there is good factual data to base that on.

Senator LUCAS. One other question: From your intimate [6048] knowledge of the naval, military and diplomatic conditions as they existed in the United States in the summer and fall of 1941 was there any one man or group of men who maneuvered the Japanese crisis so as to deliberately invite the Pearl Harbor attack?

Admiral STARK. Not to my knowledge, or I had never thought such.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you were in on the conversations, practically all of the conversations with respect to Pearl Harbor previous to December 6, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. As Chief of Naval Operations that was one of your duties, to know and understand what was going on?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, and I may say that on the contrary we were trying to maintain peace in the Pacific.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of any man or group of men high in the Executive branch of the Government that trapped the Japs or lied to the Japanese to get them to attack us in Pearl Harbor in order to make it easier to get Congressional action to declare war against Japan?

Admiral STARK. I did not get the first part of that question.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of any man or group of men high in the Executive branch of the government, including the [6049] naval, military and diplomatic group, who trapped the Japanese or who lied to the Japanese in order to get them to attack Pearl Harbor so as to make it easier for Congress to give a declaration of war?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not.

Senator LUCAS. You had frequent conversations, you have told me, with the President of the United States from time to time. You also had frequent conversations with Col. Frank Knox, who was then Secretary of the Navy. I take it that he was familiar with all of these messages that were sent to Admiral Kimmel between November the 24th and December the 6th?

Admiral STARK. He was. I had no secrets from the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, from your intimate knowledge of the diplomatic and military activities and your conversations with the

President and the Secretary of the Navy, did the President of the United States have every reason to believe that the naval command in Hawaii was properly alerted for any emergency when the Japs struck us on December the 7th, 1941?

Admiral STARK. He knew of the despatch that we had sent there, he knew how I felt about it and I felt that he agreed with me.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did he have every reason to believe [6050] from all that had been done by yourself and Marshall at that time with respect to alerting the commands that the Hawaii command at the time was properly alerted? That was your belief, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I think he felt that they were properly alerted. I may say, and I have hesitated to quote the President unless I am dead certain, but I specifically recall his statement to me that he was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor and he stated that to me as late as last summer and I told him that I had just previously a day or two before that testified to that effect myself before the Navy Court of Inquiry. It was some comfort to me to have him reiterate it.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I guess everybody was surprised except the Japs, were they not?

Admiral STARK. The Japs were the real cause for the attack on Pearl Harbor, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I want to refer to your statement briefly on page 7, where you again talk about the President of the United States, in which you stated in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on February the 10th, 1941:

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary [6051] and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the President just has his own ideas about men.

Can you elaborate a little on that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Explain that to the committee. This was in 1941, a short while before the crisis, some 8 months, and will you explain that to the committee just briefly?

Admiral STARK. I always found men the most difficult thing to get in working on naval appropriations. I had found it difficult many times on the Hill, I found it difficult in the budget, I found it difficult with the President. I think many Congressmen and Senators will recall some of the arguments we had about it.

So far as Congress was concerned I had attributed it to the fact that while you might cut ships, ships wore out and were scratched and scrapped. Once you increased the size of the regular military establishment it looked like a permanent increase in expense to the Government. I was cut in a request for men during this period by Congress, although later on practically anything that I asked for went over.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in that same—

Admiral STARK. May I go just a little further, sir?

[6052] Senator LUCAS. Certainly.

Admiral STARK. Now, as regards the President: The President knew the Navy, he loved it, he studied it and he spent a great deal of time aboard ship and he had reports that the ships were overcrowded. We had letters coming in, anonymous at times, which were sent to the White House, about the terrible living conditions on board ship and I was asking to increase the number of men on board ship.

He had taken trips and Ross McIntire could probably tell you, but I dare say one Board that he had had some cause for apprehension from certain medical officers with regard to—I don't mean that Ross was one of them but I know that he is familiar with the subject. He had that report. He also knew that every additional man that we put aboard ship, a considerable increase in weight was involved. I have forgotten what it was but the Bureau of Ships objected that for every additional man we put on at that time we would have to take some weight off. I do not mean just the weight of the man but it might have been two or three tons that went with him. There were a good many things of that sort which the President considered.

Now, as regards overcrowding: Admiral Kimmel had made a very careful study with a board and it had been shown on one ship how the men could be placed without undue over- [6053] crowding. I stood back of Admiral Kimmel on that. The President had to be convinced of these matters, it was only right that he should and when I struggled, I made sure, and I think I stated it here, that I had my own way.

Now, another question. I have a letter, I do not know whether it is on file or not, I mean I do not know whether it has been submitted, it may have been one of those irrelevant letters, but it is not hindsight because it was as of that time, that I first asked the President for 500,000 men. He threw back his head and laughed and there were a lot of people in the room and he said, "Betty usually begins working early, he starts in working a year ahead of time and he follows it up" and I usually did. But I did struggle for additional men during the time I was Chief of Naval Operations. I struggled back and forth; we always had to struggle for that, and we probably will again.

Senator LUCAS. These ships that the President was talking about of course, were laid down a good many years ago, were they not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. There were a number of things that required increases in complement. We had greatly increased the anti-aircraft defenses on the ships. Early in 1940 we had a very careful study made, Admiral King made it, it is known as the King Board, as to how to increase our anti- [6054] aircraft defenses. In addition to that, heretofore we would put enough men on board a ship to man all the guns, everything manned when we went into a battery. We foresaw that in a war, in what we might call an air war that it would be a very pertinent thing to consider that you might have to keep men at the guns 24 hours a day because you could not be sure when an air attack might develop. We could not just go to general quarters and have look-outs in the tops for an engagement which might come in an hour or two hours. They had to be there day and night, particularly moonlight nights, for operations against submarines and possibilities of an air attack. There were many things that made more men necessary.

In addition to that, I personally wanted to fill the complement up to a hundred percent complement and I wanted to run it 15 percent over complement so that I would have a pool to draw on in the manning of ships and I found a number of ships that we had coming in that they continued to cut into the personnel that ships already had and more or less disrupting them.

Senator LUCAS. And right along that line or train of thought, the letter from Admiral Kimmel of November 15, 1941, points out that the fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill the complements. It can utilize an additional 10,000 men.

[6055] My question is that as a result of what happened at Pearl Harbor would 9,000 or 10,000 more men on battleships and destroyers there have had any appreciable effect upon what happened?

Admiral STARK. I think none.

Senator LUCAS. We would just have lost more men if we had 9,000 or 10,000 more men there, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. If that had been so we might have lost considerably more on some ships.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in this same letter, you stated in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on July 24 as follows:

We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been.

Now, here is the point that I want to direct your attention to. This is July 1941 and you state:

If we could only have gone full speed 2 years ago—

I presume now you mean at that time, that if you could have had 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines 2 years ago?

Admiral STARK. Well, I mean if we could have gotten all that we wanted at that time. I have forgotten just what the [6056] figures were.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Well, why was it, Admiral Stark, back in 1939, in, say, July 1939, you were not able to get all that you wanted? What was the reason?

Admiral STARK. Because we could not get it by the budget. May I have the page number that you are reading from on that?

Senator LUCAS. Page 8.

Admiral STARK. Oh, yes. I may state that when I finally got what I referred to as the green light I went directly to Senator Byrnes. He will recall the incident, I think, very well. He called me the most persistent, stubborn man on personnel he had ever known, but he finally gave me what I had asked for. There were one or two other rather amusing incidents in that conversation that it is not necessary to go into here but we did get what we asked for.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you got what you asked for but the point I am making is that you lay particular stress upon the fact, as I read the letter, that if you could have had what you were entitled to 2 years before that you could really have been somewhere with the Navy and that would have been in 1939, in the early part of 1939.

Admiral STARK. If we could have gotten authorization and money for full complements plus 15 percent it would have made our problems very much simpler and very much easier. We [6057] solved it as best we could with what we got and the results speak pretty well for themselves.

Senator LUCAS. I agree with you on that. Public opinion had something to do with what you got and what you did not get back in 1939. isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Things were not as grave. When I went before the Naval Committee there are some things that stand out very clearly and we were struggling on this situation with regard to men, pointing out that the fleet was only 85 percent manned and what a great mistake I thought it was. I remember Congressman Ditter turning to me and saying, "Nobody has ever talked to us like that before about men." "Where do you get this stuff?"

I went back to the Department and went over some of my recommendations and some of the previous recommendations of what is now known as the Bureau of Personnel. I had them back up what I am about to say, that the Navy's pleas had been constant for men. The Navy was cut down to a so-called 85 percent complement some years previous when economy was a very potent subject and the Navy was faced—I think Admiral Pratt was Chief of Operations at the time—with either keeping fewer ships fully manned or a greater number of ships in commission partially manned and as I recall 85 percent was put down as the lower limit of what we could keep ships going with [6058] with any degree of efficiency. So we came to accept that 85 percent and I always thought it was dangerous and the minute I got where I could raise my voice against it, this practice which we had gotten to accept, I started doing so.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it took a national emergency almost before you could get what you really wanted?

Admiral STARK. It took a national emergency to blast it out; yes sir.

Senator LUCAS. And that was due to the temper of the people of this country?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think so.

Senator LUCAS. That it took——

Admiral STARK. At that early time.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. And the people, after all, usually make more or less the military and naval policy.

Admiral STARK. In the last analysis the man on the street is the first line of defense.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. And I think it is pertinent, too, along this line of inquiry, to just refer just briefly to the Treaty of Limitation of Naval Armaments signed in Washington on February 6, 1922, and ratified by the Senate March 29, 1922, as indicating how we felt at that particular time about peace and how far we were willing to go in order to maintain peace.

[6059] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and we found out to our very great cost that disarmament by example did not pay.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask you just one or two questions about the disarmament conference and see if you——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, it is practically 12:30.

Senator LUCAS. I can finish in 5 minutes I think.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We want to have an executive session.

Senator LUCAS. It may be 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, go ahead if it won't take more than five minutes.

Senator LUCAS. I want to ask Admiral Stark if he will agree with these facts. In 1918 the United States had a total combatant tonnage of ships 1,087,000 and had building additional tonnage of 953,876 tons. Do you recall those figures?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall the figures but if you have it in front of you I assume they are correct.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you recall that in the 1922 disarmament conference which I have talked about we sank or demilitarized 767,800 tons of combatant ships?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We did the sinking.

Senator LUCAS. And for the next eight years for all practical purposes ceased to build ships of war?

Admiral STARK. We had a period there where we practical-
[6060] ly stopped.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this: Did the limitation of armaments conference signed at London April the 27, 1930, and ratified by the Senate on July 1, 1930, was there anything in that treaty which prevented construction of our antisubmarine vessels and yet permitted Germany and Japan to build all the submarines they desired? Do you recall anything about that?

Admiral STARK. I think there was not. I think in the hearings that—as you recall, I was nearly nine days straight morning and afternoon early in 1940 struggling for the increase in the Navy, for what I thought was a modest increase of 25 percent that was cut in half by Congress. I pointed out we had not lived up to that very—I mean we had not built up to the 5-5-3 ratio.

Senator LUCAS. We had not built up to it?

Admiral STARK. We had not built up to it. We were disarming by example and it did not pay. I do not want to let that stay in, talking about Congress cutting it in half. They stated that; I accepted that because it was not just a straight cut in half. It was a question whether we could get through with 25 percent and we might lose the whole thing, but the figure of about 13 percent, as I recall, was all we could consider at that time and I accepted that as something sure [6061] and was told that I could come back up later. I did and got a very heavy increase, so it is not fair just to say Congress cut me. It did not hurt and they did give it to me when I came back afterwards.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in 1940 when you testified before this committee Japan had as much ship tonnage, practically as much as the United States?

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct. We did not know exactly how much they had but they claimed that they were practically on a 5-5 ratio with us, some of their public speakers did.

Senator LUCAS. That was not true, of course.

Admiral STARK. No, but it was not 5-3.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Mr. Chairman, in order to further demonstrate the point I am trying to make here as to how public opinion dominates the affairs of this country I want to read a statement made by the Honorable David Walsh, Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, who about this same time, in April 1940, placed this very illuminating statement in the record (reading):

From 1922 to 1925 the United States laid down no ships. In 1925 it laid down 1 submarine. In 1926 it laid down 1 cruiser and 5 river gunboats. In 1927 it laid down 1 cruiser and 2 submarines. In 1928, 6 cruisers. In 1929 [6062] none. In 1930, 3 cruisers and 1 submarine. In 1931, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers and 2 submarines. In 1932, 3 destroyers. In 1933, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers and 4 submarines. In 1934, 2 aircraft carriers, 1 cruiser (a), 1 cruiser (b), 21 destroy-

ers and 2 patrol gunboats. In 1935, 1 cruiser (a), 7 cruisers (b), 14 destroyers and 5 submarines. In 1936 the United States laid down—

and that is true, that we lived up to this treaty closely while Japan did not, as I understand it?

ADMIRAL STARK. We leaned over backwards the other way. We did not build up.

Senator LUCAS. In 1936 the United States laid down one aircraft carrier, one cruiser (b), six destroyers and seven submarines. In 1937 we laid down one battleship—and I call attention to that because that is the first battleship we laid down since at least 1922 or before, I guess.

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. There were no battleships laid down between 1922 and 1937 during the 15 years.

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. And the date the last was laid down is not stated here.

In 1937, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers and 6 submarines.

In 1938, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers, 4 submarines, 2 [6063] destroyer tenders, 1 seaplane tender, 3 tugs, 2 oilers.

In 1939, 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 12 destroyers, 7 submarines, 3 sub chasers, 2 minesweepers, 1 submarine tender, 1 seaplane tender, 1 oiler.

And that is all that I have.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock and the chair asks the public to retire as rapidly as possible. We want to have an executive session.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[6064]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:45 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Chair wishes to announce that after the executive session the committee has decided that following the testimony of Admiral Stark it will recess the hearing until the 15th of January in order that the new counsel collaborating with Mr. Mitchell and his staff may become familiar with the testimony adduced up to now and get into the case so he may go forward with it following the retirement of Mr. Mitchell.

Also the committee decided, upon the urgent request and in accordance with the wishes of counsel for Admiral Kimmel and General Short, when the committee reconvenes on the 15th of January Admiral Kimmel will be the first witness, to be followed by General Short when Admiral Kimmel has concluded.

You may go ahead now.

Mr. Murphy, I believe you are the next.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Admiral STARK. May I make just a short statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. My attention has been called to the fact that this morning I stated that it was last summer that the President expressed to me his surprise over the Pearl Harbor attack. It was a year ago

last summer, during the [6065] proceedings of the Naval Court of Inquiry which were held a year ago last summer.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an obvious error, because President Roosevelt was not alive last summer.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I would like to direct your attention to the message that was sent to Hawaii on the 7th of December 1941.

Do you have a copy of it?

Admiral STARK. The 7th of December?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, the message of General Marshall.

Admiral STARK. I think I have it in the statement.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, the earliest moment you have any recollection of being aware of the 1 p. m. message was somewhere between 10:30 and 11 o'clock that morning. Is that right?

Admiral STARK. I think that is right, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And, as I understand it, General Marshall's testimony was that he was aware of the 1 o'clock message sometime subsequent to that on that same morning.

Admiral STARK. I believe it was sometime later.

Mr. MURPHY. And then General Marshall sent a message to Hawaii, and I would like to read that message and discuss it [6066] with you a bit.

The message reads:

The Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum;

Now, setting aside for the moment the 1 p. m. part of it, you had already told Hawaii, had you not, that negotiations had terminated with the Japanese, and as on the 27th you sent that message setting that particular date, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the message continues, "also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately."

You had, during the previous days of December, told Admiral Kimmel exactly that, had you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And continuing, "Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly."

And then finally, "Inform Naval authorities of this communication."

Now outside of the 1 p. m. part of that message, was there anything in the message itself that you had not previously conveyed to Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. In my opinion there was not.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you at any time looked into the matter of the condition of the ships and planes at Hawaii on the [6067] morning of December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. I have not.

Mr. MURPHY. Prior to the attack.

Admiral STARK. I had not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there is testimony that has been adduced, and will be adduced before the committee, as to the condition of readiness of the ships. Assuming that you had sent the message the very moment you had gotten it, somewhere between 10:30 and 11 o'clock, and

assuming that the attack occurred about 2:30—that is when it was, was it not, about 2:30 Washington time?

Admiral STARK. About 1:57, I think, somewhere in there.

Mr. MURPHY. About 1:57 Washington time?

Admiral STARK. Shortly before 2.¹

Mr. MURPHY. Then what change in ships by way of sorties could have occurred between 10:30 and 10:40 and 1:57 to 2:00 o'clock?

Admiral STARK. Well, if I had sent a message, assuming I got the 1 p. m. message about 10:40, I have since asked the question, and recently, from communications—if I had given them a dispatch which they had coded and sent and decoded on the other end and delivered, what their estimate of the time was, and they gave me an hour and 7 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY. That would make it 11:47.

[6068] Admiral STARK. Assuming I had acted instantaneously on the message.

Mr. MURPHY. Instantaneously, yes. Without any conference at all, if you had instantaneously acted, they would get it there at 11:47?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Does that take into consideration the decoding at Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then at 11:47, from then until 1:57, what change could be made in the position of ships at that time? That would be approximately 2 hours, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Approximately 2 hours. That is more or less of a technical question. For example, I do not know which way the ships were headed. If they were placed in docks so they were heading out it would be one thing; if they had to be turned around it would be another. I think only Admiral Kimmel could give you real testimony on that.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, if the battleships themselves were berthed, 8 of them, in Pearl Harbor it would take some considerable time, would it not, to get them out of the harbor?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The last time we sortied out of there we had to be turned around by tugs, but during the [6069] preceding months in which the fleet had been there they undoubtedly had become used to being handled in there. Just what their time would have been I do not know. They would first have to have been notified to get under way, and assuming that they would have to raise steam for propulsion purposes, and if tugs were required they would have to have been brought alongside and they would then have had to be sortied, and they would, of course, have had to have destroyers ahead of them, and probably planes searching for submarines, which they would do if they thought the attack might be there, and just what the total time would have been I would rather Admiral Kimmel gave you that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, to make a rough approximation, it would be a matter of hours, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Well, you can force when you have to. Normally, as I recall, we gave a ship with one or two boilers about 2 hours' notice to get under way.

¹ Corrected to 1:25 p. m. Washington time. See page 2346, *infra*.

Mr. MURPHY. That 2 hours, Admiral, would be dependent upon the fact that as soon as Admiral Kimmel received the message from Washington he would have immediately and instantaneously had the reaction that there was to be something happening at 1 o'clock?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In order to consume the time between then [6070] and the attack, would he not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I did not quite finish my answer.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, you may finish.

Admiral STARK. If he had forced them and the emergency were understood, they could have cut that time in half, or perhaps less than that. They would have taken a chance on raising steam without regard to the normal precautions of raising it slowly so as not to affect the boilers adversely.

Mr. MURPHY. That would be also assuming that his mental processes were different than they were on the message of the 27th, which said it was a war warning?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. That is assuming he forced them. He can give you, I think, better testimony on that than I can, because of his familiarity with the picture.

Mr. MURPHY. There has been some testimony already in the record, and some to be covered, as to the condition of the readiness of the planes.

As I understand it, so far as the Army and Navy planes were concerned, in a great measure they required as much as 4 hours before they could go in the air. This 2 hours difference would not have gotten them in the air then, would it, if it required 4 hours from the time your message arrived at Hawaii to the time of the attack?

[6071] Admiral STARK. If it required 4 hours you could not have gotten them off in that time.

Mr. MURPHY. I think there will be considerable testimony along that line.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So far as the planes are concerned, if they could not get off in the air the next best thing would be to push them somewhere for protection, would it not?

Admiral STARK. To spread them.

Mr. MURPHY. To spread them?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Instead of having them bunched together the best thing would be spread them and maybe get them into bunkers?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. They did have some bunkers, there, did they not?

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, there have been some questions asked about the so-called bomb plot message. You know about that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That message actually was sent from Tokyo in September, was it not?

Admiral STARK. That is right, yes, sir.

[6072] Mr. MURPHY. It was not translated in Washington until October 10, is that true?

Admiral STARK. I think so; sometime later.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there anything unusual about our diplomatic relations in September, and was not the date of the forwarding of that message in Tokyo prior to the submission of the Japanese note of September—or do you know that?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not. I am not quite sure of your question, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, my question is this: The change in Cabinet did not occur until October 16, and on October 16 they did send a message to the Pacific.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, this so-called bomb plot message was already translated on October 10.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And had been forwarded from the Japanese in the month of September. Would not there be less likelihood of that particular message being clipped or called to your particular attention then because of the state of the relations between America and Japan at the time?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that that would have entered into the minds of the people who were going over that message. I would rather be inclined to think that the message [6073] would have stood on its merits, that they would have looked at it as a message without regard to the Japanese Cabinet change.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you do not know anybody that saw any particular significance in that, do you?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. MURPHY. It was never called to your attention, that you know of?

Admiral STARK. It was never called to my attention, so far as I recollect.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, this 1 o'clock message referred to 1 o'clock on Sunday, and there has been some considerable discussion about the fact that the Japanese were going to see the Secretary of State on Sunday. There was a discussion that morning about that, was there not, about the fact they were doing it on Sunday, or calling on the Secretary of State on Sunday?

Admiral STARK. When we got it we were a little puzzled as to just why they were making it at 1 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. And on Sunday?

Admiral STARK. And on Sunday, yes, sir. We had covered the possibility of an attack on Sunday, if it came, in a previous message.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if there was any discussion [6074] then about the fact that we also delivered our message on Sunday. When President Roosevelt came back from Argentina he asked to see the Japanese on Sunday, too, did he not? It was Sunday afternoon at 4 o'clock when he saw the Ambassador, was it not?

Admiral STARK. I believe it was. I am hazy on it. I recollect there was another instance when the message was to be delivered at a certain time. I think that occurs occasionally.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, President Roosevelt did send a wire to Secretary Hull and asked Secretary Hull to arrange to come to the White House on Sunday morning, and he asked the Japanese to see him at the White House that afternoon, did he not?

Admiral STARK. I recall that, yes, sir.

[6075] Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, one of the reasons that prompted you in delaying or in not wanting to send the 1 o'clock message to Hawaii was that you had already sent so much you thought maybe you might be confusing Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you seen Admiral Kimmel's statement given to this committee?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. MURPHY. I suggest that you have your counsel get a copy.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. In fairness to the witness I think he should have it. We may want to ask him some questions on it at some time.

Admiral STARK. Counsel, I think, has been furnished a copy.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think that the tenor of your papers that were sent to Admiral Kimmel throughout the year of 1941 were such as to take away the effect or the meaning of your war warning message?

Admiral STARK. I do not.

Mr. MURPHY. I understood you to say that you had never heard of a war warning message in the precise words that were used having been sent before to anyone in the Pacific.

[6076] Admiral STARK. That is true. I never heard of such a message before.

Mr. MURPHY. You had never, prior to 1941, December 1941, sent anything to Admiral Kimmel about codes being burned?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. When you sent your message to Admiral Kimmel in October, Admiral Kimmel wrote you a letter saying that he had sent submarines in certain directions and that he had made certain movements as a result of receiving your October message; you recall that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I do.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it Admiral Kimmel takes the position that since he told you about what he had done subsequent to October and since you had not criticized the arrangement he had made then, that he was justified in continuing the position which he had assumed in October right on down after receiving your war warning message. Do you think he was justified in that position?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not. The message that was sent in October, as I recall, he sent out some submarines to the outlying Islands, and informed me about it by letter, and I wrote him back "O. K.," but the situation in December was a decidedly different one.

Mr. MURPHY. You think——

[6077] Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I interpose to raise the question of propriety, as to whether or not the testimony to be given by Admiral Kimmel should be referred to. It has been furnished to us in confidence with a release date on it that it was not to be released until he takes the stand.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to say——

Mr. GEARHART. I don't think that should be pursued so as to destroy the effectiveness of Admiral Kimmel's testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I think that should be met by the committee. I have read Admiral Kimmel's testimony in the Narrative. I have it here. I am quite familiar with what his testimony was.

He has, however, given a statement to the committee and he has restricted the use of it until he takes the stand. Am I to understand

that we are not to go into Admiral Kimmel's case at all and that if there are accusations made against the witness on the stand we are not to ask him about it?

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to point out that the testimony is marked plainly not to be released until the witness takes the stand.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you see it here? Where is it? I am referring to the Navy Narrative.

Mr. GEARHART. You are not referring to the testimony that has been placed in our hands?

[6078] Mr. MURPHY. I want to meet that now.

The CHAIRMAN. If that matter is put up to the Chair, the Chair would hold that inasmuch as a confidential description has been put on the advance statement of Admiral Kimmel, that it is not to be released until he goes on the stand, members of the committee would be bound by that instruction no less than the members of the press, but that does not restrict a member of the committee from using any testimony that Admiral Kimmel may have given at the numerous hearings at which he testified.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Stark read this morning from the previous testimony that the Navy Board had referred to the message as being of the same tenor.

Do you recall reading that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I have Admiral Kimmel's testimony here and if the wish is that we not go into it, I suggest that it will be necessary to recall Admiral Stark back. At least I want to ask him some questions about what Admiral Kimmel said.

Mr. GEARHART. I am not objecting to any reference to any other testimony, except that which was handed us recently with a release date upon it.

Mr. MURPHY. If you can see that here I would like to see it.

[6079] The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Admiral STARK. I think we were furnished a copy of that statement. Counsel was furnished it on New Year's Eve. I have not read it. I didn't know that I would be questioned on it.

Mr. MURPHY. I have read a small part of it but I read what he said before.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Admiral, the message about which I was asking you at the time the gentleman from California spoke about the confidential statement of Admiral Kimmel, as I understand it it is in this exhibit here. Do you have a copy of that? Your letters and Admiral Kimmel's letters.

Admiral STARK. I have a copy of my letters to Admiral Kimmel and his to me.

Mr. MURPHY. You have read his letter to you and your letter to him, where you say "O. K."?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6080] Mr. MURPHY. At the time that you said "O. K.," would Admiral Kimmel be justified in assuming that the preparations that he had made subsequent to your October message had your approval to be the same that should be applied to the war warning message?

Admiral STARK. I think not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there has been reference in one of your letters about the routing of ships, and I believe you meant to refer to the routing of the ships through the Torres Straits; is that right?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And in your letter you suggested that you were perhaps making that as a preliminary move to meeting the situation when things got more critical; is that right?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. In your judgment, was it necessary to route the ships at the time you did through the Torres Straits, and if so for what reason?

Admiral STARK. It looked like trouble ahead. It was our job to prevent capture of our merchant ships on the high seas if we could in a sudden emergency of a declaration or war act of Japan. For that reason we took ships off the usual routes and sent them on the southern where they could be better protected and where there were ports to which they could go in [6081] case of trouble. It also took time to get vessels routed and get into a groove as to just how to handle them, because it required routing across the broad Pacific, and we thought it advisable to initiate it at that time, and we did.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, you did it as a precautionary measure and as a security measure?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. And I might add, it was a matter of considerable pride to us that the only ship we lost of American tonnage was one on which we took a deliberate chance.

Mr. MURPHY. Was that in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. It was in the Pacific. A ship we sent out for the remaining Marines in China, and we didn't know whether we would have time or not. She was captured.

Mr. MURPHY. Were there any German raiders in the Pacific prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; there were raiders off and on in the Pacific prior to December 7—German raiders.

Mr. MURPHY. In your judgment who was at fault, if anyone, for the failure to have the torpedo baffles or nets on the ships on December 7, 1941? You have already testified that Ordnance was working on it. There were three or four letters between you and Admiral Kimmel on the subject. Do you know of anyone particularly to blame for not having them on that day?

[6082] Admiral STARK. I was asked this morning if I instituted any follow-up of my original request of Bureau of Ordnance to design and build those baffles. I perhaps can best answer the question by reading into the record the follow-ups which we made and if the committee so desires I will read them. They are not very long.

Mr. MURPHY. I think it is important enough to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Read them into the record.

Admiral STARK. The original letter was in February. On April 9, Chief of Naval Operations wrote this letter to Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, inviting attention to certain references and stating that the:

* * * the Chief of Naval Operations brought forth the necessity for experimental and development work in connection with nets and booms, and especially the need for a light anti-torpedo net. The attention of the Bureau is directed to reference (b) which gives certain details of an apparently much lighter net now used by the Germans.

Signed: R. E. Ingersoll, Acting.

On September 16, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote the Bureau of Ordnance.

Subject: Experimental and Developmental Work on Nets and Booms.

with four references.

[6083] The letter reads:

It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of the problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and draftsmen be assigned exclusively to planning improvement in net and boom designs and to development and experimental work. The group, it is suggested, may be aided by using the facilities of the Net Depots at Tiburon and Newport. It is suggested that these two depots appear suitable as centers for experimental and development work.

In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the desirability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other suggestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be laid and removed in harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes.

Designs are requested to be prepared giving A/T net protection to one or more large ships moored in harbors against torpedo plane attack in which the A/T net may be placed completely around one or more large ships, similar to placing the ship or ships in a "dry dock" of A/T net. It may be assumed that the currents inside of most harbors are not as great as at the entrances, [6084] and the moorings of such nets may be of less weight and less extensive than for the present A/T nets which are designed principally for harbor entrances. As such nets may be desired for advance bases, as little weight and volume of material as possible is desirable. As little space as possible should be taken up by the nets in order not to take up too much anchorage space.

Designs of A-T nets which might be attached to booms on ships or floating off of ships at anchor are requested to be prepared in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships. In a design of this type it may be possible to do away with mooring the nets. A net which deflects rather than stops the torpedo may possibly be designed.

Reference (c) is a preliminary Admiralty report on the development of a torpedo net defense for merchant ships at sea. It is requested that the Bureau of Ordnance in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships undertake a similar development work for the protection of ships under way at sea.

It is possible that in our Navy the assumption that has been reached that anchorages protected by nets are secure. Nets are defensive measures, and, in general, are without destructive means. Patrol vessels are required in conjunction with net defenses, and of the two [6085] measures of defense, the vessels, capable of offensive action, are probably the more important. It is believed that the tests with nets conducted by the British should be accepted as conclusive. While one test of torpedo firing against an A/T net has been conducted by the Bureau, the torpedo was not equipped with cutters. No other tests have as yet been held. It may be well to repeat and to extend the British tests. It may be worth while to know the exact damage which will be done to an anti-torpedo net from a torpedo fired in the net.

Until the present in great measure reliance in this mode of defense has been placed on British designs, experiments and tests. It is considered that now we should be in a position to take more progressive action. In this letter it is realized that the requests made are not concrete and definite, but serve only to indicate several of the problems toward the solution of which action may be directed.

[6086] On 3 October 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations wrote again to the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance on the same subject, with references and a copy of reference A, which were proceedings of meeting of local joint planning committee, northern California sector, Pacific coastal frontier, of September 17. The letter reads:

Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval Operations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up, towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested, does not appear to solve this question; a reduction in the number of moorings, at present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required.

That is the correspondence up to December 7 that Operations had with the Bureau of Ordnance on that subject of getting nets.

[6087] Mr. MURPHY. What I was referring to previously was the Hewitt report contained in the appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence which was given to me. On page 43 there is a reference made to a letter of February 15, 1941, from you to Admiral Kimmel and again to a letter of February 17, 1941, from you to Admiral Kimmel and again to a letter by Admiral Bloch of March 20, 1941, and again a letter of June 1941 from you to Admiral Kimmel, to which you referred this morning.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in the Hewitt report I find the following:

Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor—and that even after the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor. He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason.

In the light of the fact that Bureau of Ordnance were working on it and none had been furnished to Hawaii was Admiral Kimmel justified in that statement?

[6088] Admiral STARK. I think the statement is not justified in view of the letter which I read this morning.

Mr. MURPHY. The letter in June 1941?

Admiral STARK. Of June 13 of 1941, in which appears the paragraph in part:

Hence it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack—that is torpedo attack—if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

Now, you will recall that I follow that with other paragraphs which while not changing that paragraph may have minimized it to the extent that it would not occur.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Those letters are all in the record and you read them this morning.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did Admiral Kimmel have the facilities at Pearl Harbor for manufacturing or preparing torpedo nets?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. If he had gotten them wouldn't he have to get them through the CNO or would he go direct to Ordnance?

Admiral STARK. Well, he probably would have written us about them. He could have written the Bureau of Ordnance but [6089] I think he would have come to us, undoubtedly, on it.

Mr. MURPHY. What is your judgment subsequent to June of 1941? Should he or should he not have initiated a move to get them before December and if he did initiate it, in your judgment would they have been available?

Admiral STARK. Well, we had initiated it and we did not have them, but we were pressing the Bureau of Ordnance. You will note that I also mentioned the Bureau of Ships. I remember personally suggesting to the Bureau of Ships the possibility of developing something like our targets to be placed alongside of ships in Pearl Harbor. Just

what they had arrived at at that time I do not know, but they had not produced.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, why was the President opposed to the use of draftees on ships by the Navy?

Admiral STARK. I may state with regard to that that I also was initially opposed to them.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you explain why?

Admiral STARK. It was a matter of sentiment, a matter of pride. We had always been a volunteer service and we think a service where men come into it because they want to, if you can get them, is a good thing and initially I was also opposed to it. The time came when wages were high ashore, when a man on a merchant ship could get several times what a man on [6090] board a Navy ship could get, when it was not so easy for us to get volunteers. It then became necessary for us to resort to the draft.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, in studying the message of November 27 and in studying the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and General Short in previous hearings I am wondering if the people in Washington and the people at Hawaii were not influenced more by the war plans that had been drawn up in the mind of messages and in the kind of defense that was instituted, than they were by what actually occurred between the end of November and the beginning of December and I refer particularly first—I am now referring to page 23 of the appendix to the Narrative Statement. Do you have a copy of that available, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, there is one here. I haven't read the narrative.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you have read what I am going to speak about but it is more easy for me to refer to it here.

I would like to direct your attention first to the United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five. It first sets forth the introduction, mobilization, and the assumptions, and then the assumption that would include war with Japan, under section 1211 would be A-2. Do you see that?

Admiral STARK. "A", yes, sir.

[6091] Mr. MURPHY. A-2.

Admiral STARK. A-2?

Mr. MURPHY. A-2 would be war with Japan. A-1 would be war without Japan.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, if you go over to the next page, page 24, under section 1332 there is a statement, "It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows", and I read first section "a":

- a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
- b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
- c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

Now, then, I do not see anything in there about Hawaii. Do you?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. He mentions there the principal offensive effort and we approved this plan, so I will accept responsibility for it also.

[6092] Mr. MURPHY. That is right, but these places——

Admiral STARK. In another part of this plan I think he specifically mentions possibilities of air raid even before war is declared or anything done.

Mr. MURPHY. I am just taking this step by step. At least, these places that are referred to in 1-a are the places that were referred to substantially in your telegram, weren't they?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you speak of defensive efforts. Then you come over to section 1333:

To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

- a. Capture of Guam.
- b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
- c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
- d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light [6093] naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
- e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.
- f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

Now, I do not think Hawaii is included in any of those either, is it?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Certainly, they would not refer to our main naval base as an outlying position, would they? That would be one of the smaller islands, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Smaller islands are referred to in that particular section I believe, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the places that you refer to there in 1333 are the places that you refer to in your telegram, are they not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and I think they were also referred to in our own war plan.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will come to that but I am trying to get what was the background for the telegram and why Hawaii was not included.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in section 1334 you speak of the initial [6094] Japanese deployment. It says:

The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

Then you speak of A, B, C, D, and E and then when you come to F:

Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area.

There is nothing about an attack on Hawaii via the air, is there?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I come over to the tasks assigned by the Navy basic plan and the mission and in section 2101 you come down to "H", "Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area."

That might include Hawaii but that was offensive action, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then I come over to section 2202 and I find, "tasks formulated to accomplish the assigned missions" and I go on through "A." I come to "B":

Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

That would definitely be Hawaii, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6095] Mr. MURPHY. And then on down to "K":

Continue training operations as practicable.

That would be for Admiral Kimmel, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. That always holds in war as well as peace.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, regardless of what plans there were by anyone, the first law of nature is self-preservation, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And the fleet belonged to Admiral Kimmel and those at Hawaii, and General Short, and self-preservation, regardless of when it was, dictated that they should protect that fleet in order to save themselves and be able to operate, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then I come to "M":

Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

That would be definitely the obligation of those at Hawaii and at the base, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, and, of course, they had covered that in other plans.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, Admiral, at any rate I have studied these different plans and I come to the air raid but it seems to me that the air raid itself, or the possibilities of an [6096] air raid—in fact, in the plan at Hawaii a submarine attack was listed as probable, an air attack was listed only as possible, and I was wondering if the thought in the Navy, particularly, perhaps, when these plans were prepared and manufactured was not to work that air attack in Hawaii down the line a little from what was expected in the event that war started?

Admiral STARK. Well, I had not thought of that, particularly in view of the special letters which were written on the subject and the follow-up of special plans made to guard against air raid, such as the Bellinger agreement, Bellinger-Martin agreement and the letters exchanged between Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson and the drills which were being implemented and the fact that when we got these very excellent plans of Admiral Kimmel we had distributed them throughout the service.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, it is your feeling that these supplemental plans that pertained particularly to Hawaii and the danger of an air attack and the letter of the Secretary of War and the correspondence you had kept that to the forefront regardless of where the attack on Hawaii might be in these several other plans?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, and the final letter which I read this morning dated in October, which was gotten out on [6097] that subject.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I have this last question, Admiral. In all of the messages that were sent to Hawaii and in all of the considerations

in Washington about the possible move to the southward, the reason why you were fortifying the Philippines was so that the Japanese would fear an attack on their flank specifically and, therefore, would hesitate going into the South China Sea, that is right, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir. Whether we could deter them or not—I believe I stated that we hoped that they might have some weight toward prevention, if not then in execution, but that flank position, unless the Japanese had made up their minds that we would not come in, was a serious threat to their communications to their main offensive to the south.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, isn't it also true that if the Japanese were going to go to the South Seas that the fleet, once it was in the Pacific, was always a danger to their flank and, therefore, had to be taken into consideration every time you thought of what the Japs might do, because they would have to get the fleet off their flank to be safe, wouldn't they?

Admiral STARK. Ultimately they would have to lick the fleet or be licked by the fleet.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

[6098] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster being absent, Congressman Gearhart is at bat.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark, what is the tour of duty of a Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. The normal tour, provided an officer has that much time in his active service left, is 4 years. That is true of the bureau chiefs also.

Mr. GEARHART. That was not the thought I had in mind. I meant the tour of duty on a 24-hour period.

Admiral STARK. You mean how long is he supposed to—I do not know just what you mean. You mean how many hours a day?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not think there is anything. It depends on the individual and particularly on the work.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, Admiral, I think under Navy regulations he would be on duty constantly during the time that he is serving in that office.

Admiral STARK. Always available; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. He must never be beyond reach; isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes. It always must be known where he is. He might be in the West Indies but he would still be within reach by radio or he might be with the fleet on an exercise [6099] but his whereabouts is always known and there is always a means of communication with him.

Mr. GEARHART. That is also true of the Chief of Staff of the Army; is it not?

Admiral STARK. I suppose so.

Mr. GEARHART. In fact, that is the rule applying to all high-ranking commanding officers; is that not true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I would say it would be true, certainly, of the commander in chief of the fleet.

Mr. GEARHART. Then a commanding officer, a Chief of Naval Operations, should not at any time put himself beyond communication by his subordinates; is that correct?

Admiral STARK. That would be correct, except some special circumstance might arise, which would be thoroughly understood, but I have never heard of such special circumstance.

Mr. GEARHART. And that is also true of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Admiral STARK. Well, I suppose it is, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. When you left the office on Saturday night didn't you leave word there as to where you were going to be and where you could be reached on December 6, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes; when I went out I always left word. I do not recall of any time when I did not, and occasionally I had it checked just to see if I were absent whether the [6100] follow-up would be effective. I do not recall being out that night but I also do not recall whether I was out or not; so there it is.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, isn't there a record kept in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations as to where he is every minute that he is away from the office?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When you leave—

Admiral STARK. When you say "every minute," yes; if I were going out at night my aide would usually leave word with the duty officer where I could be found, assuming that my intentions to go out were before I left the office. If after I got home I suddenly decided to go out somewhere, I would leave word with the house and usually call up the duty officer in addition.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, have you searched the records in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations to ascertain where you were on Saturday night, the 6th day of December 1941?

Admiral STARK. We have found nothing as to where I was and it follows my assumption that my thought was that I was at home. There is nothing I have been able to find out which locates where I was that evening.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that the Chief of Staff cannot remember where he was on that night is it possible [6101] that you and he could have been together?

Admiral STARK. I think we had no such conspiracy at that time, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you shut it out as being an utter impossibility that you and he could have been in each other's company that night?

Admiral STARK. I do not shut it out as an utter impossibility that we could have been in each other's company, but I think we were not.

Mr. GEARHART. You do not remember that.

Admiral STARK. No; but I feel that perhaps we both would have remembered it if that had occurred.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you not remembering where you were certainly you cannot remember that you were not with General Marshall on that night, can you?

Admiral STARK. Well, I think that may be a reasonable assumption.

Mr. GEARHART. You were together a great deal all the time, were you not?

Admiral STARK. We were together either talking by telephone or interoffice visits a great deal during office hours. We were not to-

gether a great deal in the evening. Once in a while we would have just a little family supper party but neither one—I was not going out much at that time. I could [6102] not. If I got home in time for dinner at half past seven I was rather lucky and my brief case always went with me.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you, as General Marshall did, have orderlies at your quarters at all times?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I might add that the servants in the house were given my address and there was one always on duty.

Mr. GEARHART. You have been informed that an effort was made to locate you on Saturday night, have you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I have heard that an effort was made to locate me.

Mr. GEARHART. And you also have learned that a courier called at your quarters and you were not there?

Admiral STARK. No; I have not heard that.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have any telephone call that evening from Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. Not that I recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you testified in your written statement, page 51, that the Navy was in the war in the Atlantic on the 7th day of November 1941. You remember that testimony?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. If we were at war on the 7th day of November of 1941 in the Atlantic when did that war begin?

Admiral STARK. I would like to say as to that statement [6103] that we were at war that it should be interpreted as in effect. We were not belligerents, we did not have the right of belligerents, but when we had orders to shoot any German or Italian on the high seas to the westward of the twenty-sixth meridian and when they in turn were attacking us and we were endeavoring to sink their attacking vessels and they were endeavoring and had wounded our vessels at that time, we were in effect engaging them and to that extent we were at war, and so far as the high seas were concerned when we actually entered the war there wasn't much change in that particular case.

On the other hand, there was at one time a request come to me to apprehend a certain vessel, a German vessel which was, we found, approaching Germany with rubber and we refused to do it because of the fact that we did not have belligerent rights.

On the other hand, again as regards being in war, we were in the position of having command of Canadian vessels or they might have of ours, or we might under certain circumstances under the shooting order command British vessels, Britain being at war with Germany, or a British officer might have command of ours, so in effect I made the statement we were at war. There were certain belligerent rights technically and the thing had not been openly declared, but in the ways which the President had defined and of which he had informed the [6104] country in his speech in September, there was practically war on the sea for any Axis power that came within that limit.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you described the conditions as existing on the 7th day of November 1941 as indicating a condition of war. Now I am asking you when did the condition come into being?

Admiral STARK. I think perhaps I might read a brief which I had made up thinking it might be of use to the committee—primarily I

wanted it for myself to get the sequence—of the hemispheric defense orders and whether or not I have enough copies here to give the committee at this time I do not know.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there an order commanding commanders of American ships in the Atlantic to fire upon German submarines or surface ships under any conditions?

Admiral STARK. There was.

Mr. GEARHART. Who issued that order?

Admiral STARK. I did, by direction of the President.

Mr. GEARHART. And when was it issued?

Admiral STARK (reading) :

On October 8, 1941 by despatch 082335 the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the above outlined plan executed at 1400 G. C. T.

that is Greenwich Civil Time—

11 October 1941. The plan remained in effect until December 11, 1941 at which time the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch 111550 ordered the above outlined plan cancelled and [6105] replaced by WPL 46, Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5.

I think it might be helpful if I would read this correspondence which lays down the sequence and is a brief.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it, Admiral.

Mr. GEARHART. I will be glad to have you do that, Admiral, with permission of the Chair.

Admiral STARK. It is six pages long.

Mr. GEARHART. Go ahead.

Admiral STARK. But it gives the picture and consolidation of a good many pages.

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

[6106]

DIGEST OF HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PLANS

Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan #2 (WPL—49), promulgated April 21, 1941, issued by the Chief of Naval Operations at the direction of the President, was based on the general concept:

"Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as actuated by a possibly unfriendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere."

The General Task assigned the Navy was:

" * * * warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending danger, and defend United States flag shipping against attack."

The specific tasks assigned the Naval Operating Forces were:

"(a) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers (other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory), and broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour intervals, or oftener if necessary.

"(b) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than of those Powers which have sovereignty [6107] over Western Hemisphere Territory) if suspected of acting as supply vessels for, or otherwise assisting the operations of, the naval vessels or aircraft of such belligerents. Report the movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations.

"(c) Prevent interference with United States flag shipping by belligerents.

"(d) Avoid intervening in or interfering with the armed engagements of belligerents."

The above plan became effective in the Atlantic on April 24, 1941, the dispatch placing it into effect stated "The execution of this plan shall give the appearance of routine exercises where the departure of units from port are being made." (Chief of Naval Operations Dispatch 211520 of April 1941 to Holders of WPL—49.)

2294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Hemisphere Defense Plan #4 (WPL-51), issued by the Chief of Naval Operations on July 11, 1941, at the direction of the President, was based on the following general concepts:—

"(a) Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as actuated by a possibly unfriendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere.

[6108] "(b) The President of the United States, in a message to Congress on July 7, 1941, made the following pronouncement:

"The occupation of Iceland by Germany would constitute a serious threat in three dimensions:

"The threat against Greenland and the Northern portion of the North American Continent, including the Islands which lie off it.

"The threat against all shipping in the Atlantic.

"The threat against the steady flow of munitions to Britain—which is a matter of broad policy approved by the Congress.

"It is therefore imperative that the approaches between the Americas and those strategic outposts, the safety of which this country regards as essential to its national security, and which it must therefore defend, shall remain open and free from all hostile activity or threat thereof.

"As Commander in Chief I have consequently issued orders to the Navy that all necessary steps be taken to insure the safety of communications in the approaches between Iceland and the United States, as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts.

[6109] "This Government will issue the adequate defense of Iceland with full recognition of the independence of Iceland as a sovereign state."

The General Tasks assigned the Navy were within the Western Hemisphere and were as follows:

"(a) Insure the safety of communications with United States strategic outposts;

"(b) Insure the adequate defense of Iceland;

"(c) Defend United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack or threat of attack; and

"(d) Warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending danger."

When the order to execute this plan was issued, Change #1 had been incorporated. The Tasks assigned to the Atlantic Fleet were:

"(a) Protect United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack, by escorting, covering, and patrolling, as required by circumstances, and by destroying hostile forces which threaten such shipping.

"(b) Escort convoys of United States and Iceland flag shipping, including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland.

[6110] "(c) Provide protection and sea transportation for the initial movements and continued support of United States overseas garrisons.

"(d) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers (other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory and other than belligerent vessels and aircraft involved in encounters in executing a, b, and c); and broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour intervals, or oftener if necessary. Amplify such broadcasts by encrypted despatch to the Chief of Naval Operations.

"(e) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than those powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory), if suspected of acting as supply ships for, or otherwise assisting the operations of, the naval vessels or aircraft of such belligerents. Report the movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations.

"The Atlantic Fleet will be organized into Task Forces of the approximate strength indicated:

Ocean Escort—6 BB, 5 CA, 27 DD, 23 ODD, 48 VPB.

Striking Force—3 CV, 4 CL (10,000 tons), 13 DD, 12 VPB.

[6111] Southern Patrol—4 CL (7500 tons), 8 DD (1850 tons),

Force—4 CGC (327 tons), 12 VPB."

The plan stated that Canada had made available Shelburne and Halifax as operating bases for United States Naval vessels and patrol planes, and Sydney for United States Naval vessels in case of necessity.

The Chief of Naval Operations would exchange information on movements of British and Canadian convoys and Naval forces and United States Naval forces

and United States and Iceland flag shipping with the British and Canadian authorities.

On July 25, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 251600 ordered the above outlined plan executed at 1200 (GCT) July 26th, except that only United States and Iceland flag shipping was to be escorted, i. e., the words in Task (b), "including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland," were not to be executed until necessary arrangements had been made.

Change #2 to WPL-51, issued on August 13, 1941, transferred the task of providing sea transportation for the initial movement and continued support of the Army and Navy forces overseas, other than those which are to be transported by the Operating Forces, to the Naval Transportation Service. It also contained detailed instructions for the [6112] operation of convoys and escorts in the North Atlantic which were to become effective when the escort of convoys including ships of nationality other than those of United States and Iceland was ordered.

On 25 August, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet by dispatch 252000 that WPL-51 was to be interpreted as requiring Atlantic Fleet forces to destroy surface raiders which attacked shipping along the sea lanes between North America and Iceland or which approached these lanes sufficiently close to threaten such shipping.

Change #3, issued on September 3, 1941, stated:

"Hostile forces will be deemed to threaten United States or Iceland flag shipping if they enter the general area of the sea lanes which lie between North America and Iceland or enter the Neutrality Zone in the Atlantic Ocean described in the Declaration of Panama of October 8, 1939."

This change revised the detailed instructions for the operation of convoys and escorts, which were to become effective when the inclusion in United States escorted convoys of other than United States and Icelandic ships was ordered.

Change #3 established a Southeast Pacific Sub-area consisting of that part of the Pacific Ocean outside of [6113] territorial waters south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and north of Latitude 57° South and between the West Coast of South America, and Longitude 100° West.

On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 282121 ordered Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to establish a Southeast Pacific Force of two 7500-ton light cruisers. This force, cooperating with the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, was to destroy surface raiders which attacked or threatened to attack United States flag shipping. The approach of surface raiders within the Pacific Sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area was to be interpreted as a threat to United States flag shipping.

On 13 September, Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 131816 ordered deletion of the Task—"Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, etc."

Change #4, issued on September 3, 1941, enlarged the Western Atlantic Area (which had been the area west of longitude 26° West, as far west as the continental land areas to the area west of the following line:

"Beginning from the North along longitude 10° West as far south as latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line to the position lat. 53° North long. 26° West, thence South along long. 26° West."

On 13 September the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch [6114] 131645 ordered that commencing on September 16, 0001 (GCT), the Atlantic Fleet was to execute the words, "including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland."

This order also placed into effect the detailed instructions for the operations of convoys and escorts. Under these instructions the United States assumed responsibility for transatlantic trade convoys on the North Atlantic route when west of the line from the North Pole along the Meridian 10° West to Lat. 65° North thence to the point Lat. 53° North Long. 26° West and thence along the Meridian of 26° West.

On 13 September 1941 Chief of Naval Operations informed Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, by dispatch 131855 that the President had modified previous instructions regarding convoy and escort, and that the United States Naval vessels could escort convoys in which there were no United States or Iceland flag vessels and that United States flag vessels could be escorted by Canadian ships.

Western Hemisphere Defense Plan #5 (WPL-52), issued September 26, 1941, superseded Western Hemisphere Defense Plan #4. It was to be placed into effect by the Chief of Naval Operations after Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, had submitted a readiness report.

It stated that approximately 60 Royal Navy and Royal [6115] Canadian Navy destroyers and corvettes would be engaged in escorting convoy in the Western Atlantic Area under the strategic direction of the United States. It quoted extracts from the President's speech of September 11, such as:

"Upon our Naval and air patrol—now operating in large numbers over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean fell the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas—now. That means * * * our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships—not only American merchant ships, but ships of any flag—engaged in commerce in our defensive waters."

* * * *

"From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril. The orders which I have given as Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy—at once."

It is stated in the Concept of the Plan:

"It must be recognized that, under the concept of this plan, the United States is not at war in the legal sense, and therefore does not have any of the special belligerent rights accorded under United States law to States which are formally at war."

[6116] *"The operations which will be conducted under this plan are conceived to form a preparatory phase for the operations of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46)."*

The Tasks assigned the Atlantic Fleet were:

"(a) Protection against hostile attack United States and foreign flag shipping other than German and Italian shipping by escorting, covering, and patrolling as circumstances may require, and by destroying German and Italian Naval, Land, and Air Forces encountered.

"(b) Insure the safety of sea communications with United States and strategic outposts.

"(c) Support the defense of United States Territory and Bases, Iceland, and Greenland.

"(d) Trail merchant vessels suspected of supplying or otherwise assisting operations of German and Italian naval vessels or aircraft. Report the movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations."

On October 8, 1941, by dispatch 082335, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the above outlined plan executed at 1400 (GCT) October 11, 1941. This plan remained in effect until December 11, 1941, at which time the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 111550 ordered the above outlined plan cancelled and replaced by WPL-46 (Navy Basic War Plan, [6117] Rainbow No. 5).

Mr. GEARHART. Now is this the order that you made pursuant to the direction of the President under which the Navy began to wage war in the Atlantic?

Admiral STARK. It is the order under which we operated and under which we told the Germans, and Italians in the later stages, that if they came to the westward of the 26 Meridian, as I recall, that their intent would be regarded as hostile and they would be dealt with accordingly, and regarding which the President had previously informed the country.

Mr. GEARHART. Then pursuant to this order shells were exchanged by American surface warships carrying American flags and German submarines?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; we attacked German submarines under this order.

Mr. GEARHART. How many instances can you recount at this moment?

Admiral STARK. I do not know just how many instances there were we attacked submarines with depth charges, in cases, for example, like when we were sending troops into Iceland, and which I mentioned. There are three rather outstanding cases in this connection.

There was the *Greer*, which was attacked, as I recall [6118] in September. There was the *Reuben James*, which was attacked and sunk, I believe, in November. There was the *Salinas*, a tanker, which was attacked and damaged and got into port about that time. There was some one other of our destroyers.

Mr. GEARHART. Was the *Reuben James* one of them?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. The *Reuben James*, was that one of them?

Admiral STARK. The *Reuben James* was one. I have a paper here on those four cases. The other one was the *Kearney* on October 17, which was attacked by an enemy submarine, position 57.04 North and 23 West, 300 miles southwest of Iceland. One torpedo struck the boiler room. Seven men killed, four missing and ten wounded.

The *Salinas*, a naval tanker, was torpedoed without warning during the night of October 29-30, 1941, in waters southwest of Iceland. Ship was sufficiently damaged to require 6 weeks or more in drydock, but a Navy press release stated there was no loss of life and no serious injury to personnel.

The *Reuben James* was sunk west of Iceland while on convoy duty during the night of October 30-31.

The *Greer* was not damaged.

We had a ship, the *Robin Moore*, torpedoed and sunk off Brazil in June. There was a ship called the *Steel Seafarer* [6119] I think, that was attacked. I have forgotten whether it was sunk, but that was another case, and there was still another to which I believe the President referred in his September speech, called the *Sessa*. I have forgotten just what she was.

Mr. GEARHART. Were any American transports carrying the American flag transporting the troops of any of the nations that later became our allies, after the declaration of war?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall such at the time. We were escorting British ships at one period, carrying British troops. One of the *Queens* was sent over to this side of the Atlantic and routed south and down around the southern tip of Africa. She was sent here as a matter of safety, that being a safer route. Whether or not we let the British have any of our ships at that time, or allocated them to carry troops to the Middle East I am not certain. I do not recall any at the moment.

Mr. GEARHART. We did later?

Admiral STARK. We did later; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now we occupied Iceland prior to December 7, 1941, did we not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And our American Navy took to Iceland not [6120] only Marines but soldiers?

Admiral STARK. Army; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Soldiers of the Army?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. And we established seaplanes up there also.

Mr. GEARHART. We also occupied Greenland, did we not?

Admiral STARK. We developed certain air stations, as I recall, in Greenland, to help get aircraft across the Atlantic. I do not remember of any occupational forces other than those in connection with air bases.

Mr. GEARHART. And we also dispossessed some Germans who established some air stations in Greenland, did we not?

Admiral STARK. I think what you refer to may be some Germans up there in connection with weather reports.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but they were German Army people, were they not?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall whether they were German Army or not. They were Germans.

Mr. GEARHART. Anyway, we ousted them from Greenland?

Admiral STARK. Either ousted them or they got out themselves at that time. I do not know what the situation was.

Mr. GEARHART. They were ousted prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now let us take a look at the Pacific. Did [6121] you have any orders comparable to the one that you have given me a copy of applying to the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. We did in the Southeast Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you a copy of that order here?

Admiral STARK. No; I have not. I can get it.

Mr. GEARHART. Would you be so kind as to get it and have it inserted in the record at this point, if you come to it in time?¹

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now what was the substance and effect of that order?

Admiral STARK. In the Southeast Pacific?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall any incident in connection with that.

Mr. GEARHART. What was the order?

Admiral STARK. That commanders of the Army and Navy continue similar, as I recall, to that as I recited in October, that if any German or Italian raider came within the boundary line which we set there, and which we published, they were to be engaged.

Mr. GEARHART. Did that only apply to the Germans and Italians?

Admiral STARK. They were the only ones at that time.

[6122] Mr. GEARHART. What was the date of that order?

Admiral STARK. It is covered in this digest which you have there, on page 5, and reads:

On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 282121 ordered Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to establish a southeast Pacific force of two 7500-ton light cruisers. This force, cooperating with the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, was to destroy surface raiders which attacked or threatened to attack United States flag shipping. The approach of surface raiders within the Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area was to be interpreted as a threat to United States flag shipping.

The effect, therefore, of that was to engage any German or Italian raider which might appear in that area.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, was any order promulgated by you which had direct application to Japan prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

¹ Included in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2666 et seq.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, did you regard the freezing of the assets of Japan on July 26, 1941, as an overt act?

Admiral STARK. I did not.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you regard the imposition upon Japan [6123] of economic sanctions on the same date as an overt act of the United States?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. If you read, and you have undoubtedly read, with regard to that, there were certain stipulations there whereby it was made possible for the unfreezing of assets as necessary to carry on certain trade, if we so desired to do so. It was not a loophole, but it was left open for certain essentials, that it could be done.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I think you testified, and certain other high ranking naval officers have testified, that an expedition was being prepared in Hawaii at the time of the attack, an expedition which would have been instructed to fly over Truk for reconnaissance purposes. If that flight had occurred, would that have constituted an overt act under international law?

Admiral STARK. I think not. The original decree, as I recall, regarding the mandates made it possible, or we should have been able to go into them at will practically at any time. They were a trust rather than Japanese territory. Whether that had been abrogated subsequently, I do not know, but I do recall very clearly when I wanted to send some submarines through the mandates—not while I was Chief of Naval Operations, however.

Mr. GEARHART. But regardless of the conditions under [6124] which Japan received the mandated islands, it was understood, was it not, by everybody that the Japanese were not allowing any persons to come within those areas?

Admiral STARK. She had taken that stand, and in my opinion it was not a legal stand for her to take.

Mr. GEARHART. But legal or illegal, we were avoiding going in there and creating an incident by reason of our presence there, is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir. We had abided by her decision not to let us go, a decision which, on our part, I thought was wrong at the time. That went back some years. Once it had been made, we stayed out.

Mr. GEARHART. When you considered sending an air reconnaissance expedition over Turk, did you consider the question of whether or not that would constitute an overt act against the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. Those ships, airships—I am referring to aircraft—had they made that reconnaissance flight would have gone very high. They might have been seen or might not, so the argument probably falls out. They would then have taken the pictures. The Japanese had been doing the same thing. We know of flights over our territory. It was taking a chance, but we thought the chance worthwhile. Whether it would be regarded as an overt act on our part, I do not know. I primarily [6125] wanted the information and I was prepared to take the chance.

Mr. GEARHART. If Japanese planes flew over Pearl Harbor, would you regard that as a sort of reconnaissance, the same as was to be conducted by the United States?

Admiral STARK. At that time, if I had seen them I would have shot them down, if I had been on the spot and in command.

Mr. GEARHART. Had there been any reports to you of Japanese ships flying over Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you read the story in the Saturday Evening Post of October 9, 1942, a story written by the then flying naval lieutenant, Clarence Dickinson, did you not?

Admiral STARK. No; I think not.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you read that story?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. GEARHART. The story which is entitled "I Fly for Vengeance"?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. He recites in that story, that he flew under war orders to keep his mission secret at all costs, to sink all Japanese ships he encountered on the surface of the sea or in the air. How would you classify such an order as that? Would that be considered an overt act against the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. At what time was that?

[6126] Mr. GEARHART. That order was issued November 22, 1941, 3 weeks before Pearl Harbor was attacked.

Admiral STARK. I never heard of it. I would like to see the order.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it was printed in the Saturday Evening Post of October 1942. The first 6 inches of type in that story "I Fly for Vengeance" has never, to my knowledge, been denied.

Admiral STARK. I never heard of it before. I did not read the article. I say, I would not believe it regardless of whether it was printed, unless I saw the authenticated original order.

Senator LUCAS. Congressman, will you yield?

Mr. GEARHART. I will yield.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman tell me who gave the order, according to the article?

Mr. GEARHART. I think it was given by Admiral Halsey. That was what I was going to inquire. I thought you might have information about it at this time.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. There was widespread publicity given to it. It was printed ever since.

Admiral STARK. I missed it somehow. I missed it or it may have been I just dismissed it as something crazy.

[6127] The CHAIRMAN. What was your last word?

Admiral STARK. I say it may have been I just dismissed it as something crazy, because I never had any knowledge of any such order.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, since that time the then flying Lt. Clarence Dickinson has been twice promoted. He is known today as Commander Clarence Dickinson.

Admiral STARK. Well, I would be very much interested in seeing the order.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you have testified that the President told you about a year and a half ago or 2 years ago, that he was surprised when the Japanese attacked Hawaii. That is correct, is it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And in your statement, on page 57, you testify:

The letter points out that neither the President nor the Secretary of State will be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack.

That is your testimony, emphasizing and repeating that which you have said in a letter of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral STARK. To Admiral Kimmel, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That quotation being:

The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. This situation, coupled with a statement of the Japanese Government [6128] and movements their naval and military forces indicate, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.

Then, going on further down:

I held this (the letter) up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk that I sent the message to you a day or so ago showing the gravity of the situation. Will confirm that in today's meeting by the President. Neither will be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing that could happen to us.

Do you sense any inconsistency in your statement if I told you that the President was surprised when the Japanese attacked Hawaii? Isn't that what you said in your letter to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not know that I do. I can give you practically the exact words which the President mentioned to me a year ago last summer. I was in the White House, and he said, in effect: "Betty, you were surprised at that attack and so was I." And my reply was: "Yes, sir, I was, and I just testified to that fact." Now, the previous surprise I think was more general in nature. I am not trying to make out a case for the President—I want that understood.

[6129] Mr. GEARHART. We just want the facts. I am not trying to prove anything.

Admiral STARK. That neither Mr. Hull nor the President would be surprised at a surprise attack anywhere. In my opinion, the President was not expecting that attack on Hawaii anymore than I was. I had gone over the situation with him very carefully on the chart, and the movement of vessels. He was expecting it to the southward and so was I. We did not know whether it would hit the Philippines or not. But I think there is no particular inconsistency there.

Mr. GEARHART. Since you referred to a meeting with the President, I direct your attention to a meeting of the war council, of which you are a member according to the report of the Army Board, a meeting which occurred at the White House on the 25th of November 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6130] Mr. GEARHART. I will quote from Secretary Stimson's diary as follows:

Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House, where we were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do.

Do you remember that meeting and do you remember those remarks by the President of the United States?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. With respect to whether or not he was surprised, do you think there is any inconsistency between what he said then and what you have just recited to us?

Admiral STARK. I think not. You can look at this thing in two or three different ways. And again I would repeat that I was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor. And I want to make sure that anything I state is not intended to weaken that, because I was surprised. When one had been talking about the possibility of an attack for a year or more, when you had been pressing for means to counter such an attack should it come, when you had laid out a plan to counter [6131] it, and stated that war might well be initiated, and the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us there was an attack on Hawaii, and you had gone over it forwards and backwards, to that extent you were not surprised, it was not as though it were something that suddenly came on you.

But regardless of the fact that we had been over it, we countered and we talked about the possibility, and we had done what we could, and we had made it our strongest outpost, when it came at that particular time, and in view of the fact that we had no leads to indicate it was coming at that time at Hawaii, and we did have leads only of an amphibious force pointing to the southward, and we had no indication that the Japanese carriers, the last thing I had in that line was information in the Pacific of the whole Japanese Fleet laid out as of 1 December showing the carriers in home waters—I was surprised.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you say that you were surprised?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That the Japanese should attack Hawaii on the 7th day of December 1941?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You were taken by surprise as well as the President was taken by surprise?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. All these things I had talked [6132] over with the President.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces, the President of the United States, a student of naval affairs, a frequent visitor on board ships, and you, the Chief of Naval Operations, were taken by surprise by the news that came that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii, does that mitigate or does that aggravate the fact that the Commander of the Pacific Fleet was taken by surprise?

Admiral STARK. The possibility of that attack existed. We knew of the possibility though we weren't expecting it. I had specifically written, by letter, that I thought we should be on guard. We had sent a dispatch of a war warning and we had directed the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific to take a defensive deployment. That direction was because of the possibility of an attack. We didn't expect it, but we felt we had to be on guard against it.

I was surprised at the attack, and I also was greatly surprised that more steps had not been taken to endeavor to guard against it and counter it, if possible.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if you condemn Admiral Kimmel for being taken by surprise over there, do you not in the same breath condemn yourself?

[6133] Admiral STARK. I am not condemning Admiral Kimmel for anything. And in my statement and in what I said I would do I have left that up to others. I have stated the situation as I saw it. I acted in accordance with my best judgment and I assume he did, too.

What I intended to convey apparently did not get over. Whether the fault was mine for not having expressed it properly or whether the fault lay elsewhere if I did express it properly is something which is not for me to say.

Mr. GEARHART. Now—

Admiral STARK. I felt I had, we all felt, that we had given warning and a directive which would have fully alerted the forces out there, and, as I say, what we thought we had done did not materialize, to the best of my knowledge and belief, at least as far as we thought it had. What Admiral Kimmel did do he can testify to.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, the fact that you admit that you were surprised when Hawaii was hit, and you inform us that the President told you that he was surprised when Pearl Harbor was attacked, does that not account for the fact that you left out of all these warnings that you sent to the Islands any mention of Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. The only specific objectives we gave were objectives of an amphibious force. It is all we had. [6134] The war warning was broad. The amphibious objectives we gave. And in an earlier dispatch we put "in any direction."

Mr. GEARHART. But all of the war warnings that you sent, all that General Marshall sent, all, after calling attention to the imminence of war, all narrowed down to the message later on by pointing out that you expected the attack to occur in the Far East.

Does that not spring from the fact that the President, yourself, and General Marshall, and all of the officers that stood around you close and advised with you, were of the opinion that Pearl Harbor was impregnable and that it would not be attacked?

Admiral STARK. No, I never thought Pearl Harbor was impregnable and that it would not be attacked. I did not think it would be attacked at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, going back again to that meeting with the President on the 25th day of November of 1941, that was held at the White House, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The three Secretaries were there, the two Chiefs of Staff were there, and the President brought up the subject of Japan and pointed out that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning, a sneak attack, and that we might expect an attack as soon as next [6135] Monday, referring to the Monday following the 25th day of November 1941.

Do you know whether the President had any reason for believing that an attack might occur on the 1st of December or 2d of December?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I don't know just why he made that statement, except that it was a guess that it might come within the next few days. I never went—I don't know that anybody questioned it. We had the 29th as a deadline.

Mr. GEARHART. That was what I was going to ask you next. Did anybody bring up in the discussion the Japanese intercept that the 29th was a deadline?

Admiral STARK. I don't remember that that was specifically discussed at that time. We all had it—wait a minute. I think we had it prior to the meeting of the 25th. It was about the 22d, I think, that we got it.

Mr. GEARHART. First they fixed the 25th as the deadline and then a later message came through before the 25th extending it to the 29th. Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. It could have been before you.

Admiral STARK. I think it came in about the 22d. If so, we all had seen it.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, you discussed it, did you not?

[6136] Admiral STARK. It was translated on the 22d.

Mr. GEARHART. And it had been served upon you by Captain Kramer and it had been served upon the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff by Colonel Bratton; is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You all had knowledge of that 29th deadline?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It had also been delivered to the White House.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Mr. Hull bring up any discussion of his associations with Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu?

Admiral STARK. The situation was undoubtedly discussed. I have forgotten the exact trend of it. It is a long time ago.

The one thing that I remember is that we went over the situation but as to details I don't recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Mr. Hull—

Admiral STARK. I kept no diary.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Mr. Hull say anything about the kind of message he was going to give the Japanese in reply to the one they served on him on the 20th?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall, at that time. We were still thinking, at least under the impression, that he [6137] was still considering the *modus vivendi*.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Did he read you his *modus vivendi*?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that he did at that time. However, we had a copy of it in the Navy Department.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you and General Marshall disturbed by what Secretary Hall had to say about his impending answer?

Admiral STARK. About his impending answer—you mean to the Japanese?

Mr. GEARHART. The one he was about to turn over to the Japanese.

[6138] Admiral STARK. Of the 20th. Well, we were playing for time. I do not recall that what was said in the White House on the 25th was responsible for our message of the 27th. As I have stated, I have been unable to separate and clarify just what happened on the dates around the 25th, which was when the Chiang Kai-shek note was delivered, and the 26th, and the 27th, except as to what happened during that over-all period.

Mr. GEARHART. Refreshing your memory, weren't you very much disturbed, and wasn't General Marshall very much disturbed, by what Secretary Hull told you that he planned to do?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall at that time that he told us. We did not know of the note of the 26th until after it was sent.

Mr. GEARHART. Didn't he tell you at that time that he was thinking about not answering at all, that he was thinking about ignoring the whole thing, letting it go on?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall that he did. You are referring to the—

Mr. GEARHART. Meeting of the 25th.

Admiral STARK. To the 25th. I have stated that whether he spoke to me about that note on the 25th or the 26th or the 27th, I am not sure. I know that we got it, that he called me with regard to it. It may have been the 25th, it may have been the 26th. I don't recall its having come up at the White House meeting. It may have. I do not recall the details.

[6139] Mr. GEARHART. This is very, very important, and I want you to try to remember.

Admiral STARK. I have spent hours trying to recall what went on, on the 25th, 26th, and 27th, as to time. I have discussed it with others. We came to an impasse as to any agreement every time we do it, and every time we start it we waste a couple of hours and get nowhere. I cannot recall the details of just when I got that information. I wish I could, but I just can't do it.

Mr. GEARHART. To refresh your memory, reading from the Army report—I am not picking this out of the air—didn't Mr. Hull say in that meeting and during the course of the discussion that he was about ready "to kick the whole thing over and tell them (the Japanese) that he had no other proposition at all"?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that he did.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, what caused you and General Marshall to immediately meet again together and to prepare and send to the President immediately after that meeting of the 25th of November 1941, your memorandum recommending to the President that he should do everything in his power to gain time?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that it was immediately after that meeting of the 25th that we did that.

Mr. GEARHART. The instrument is dated the 27th, isn't it?

[6140] Admiral STARK. It is dated the 27th, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It contains General Marshall's signature, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. It contains his signature which, his best judgment is, if I recall his testimony correctly, he put on, on the 28th.

Mr. GEARHART. Either the 28th or the 26th, because he wasn't in Washington on the 27th, the date that the instrument bears; that is correct, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So if you and General Marshall worked out that instrument which bears the date of the 27th, you had to do it on the 26th, didn't you?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Because General Marshall was not here on the 27th.

Admiral STARK. We didn't have to start it on the 26th.

When I first asked Turner about it, because it was drawn up by the War Plans of both sections, he was under the impression—I don't know whether he has testified on it or not—but my impression is, in asking him, he thought it started about the 24th. We are not clear just when we started that memorandum.

Mr. GEARHART. You are not in the habit of sending memoranda to the White House without the signatures of the people [6141] who are responsible?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, it must have been prepared and signed on the 26th for delivery on the 27th; is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. No, that is not necessarily correct. I might have signed it on the 27th. You have Marshall's testimony. I have no reason to doubt it. You have his testimony that his best judgment is that he signed it on the 28th when he came back.

Mr. GEARHART. Is there any reason he should have signed it on the 28th rather than the 26th?

Admiral STARK. According to Secretary Stimson's diary, as I recall, he made some minor changes in it on the 27th. It was not up in smooth form at that time. I say his diary. I believe Gerow testified to that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 4:30. I presume you cannot finish soon?

Mr. GEARHART. No, I will need 15 or 20 minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Friday, January 4, 1946.)

[6142]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, JANUARY 4, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION,
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 818), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[6143] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Congressman Gearhart had not finished examining Admiral Stark.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Admiral STARK. May I say just a word before the examination starts, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The committee will come to order.

Admiral STARK. It had reference to Senator Lucas' examination yesterday, and I think perhaps it might be better to wait until he gets here. I didn't realize he wasn't present.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Go ahead, Congressman.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark, yesterday I asked you a few very brief questions about the flying orders under which then flying lieutenant Clarence Dickinson flew from Pearl Harbor to Wake, or Midway, whichever it was, on November 22, 1941.

At that time you replied you did not know about the orders that he flew upon or anything about the incident.

Have you in the meantime discussed the subject with anybody connected with the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I have not pursued it at all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I have referred to this [6144] incident time and time again during the course of these hearings. On the second or third day of these hearings I made the request that copies of those orders be supplied me and though 6 weeks have gone by they haven't been supplied to date.¹

May I inquire as to whether or not any effort has been made to locate those orders, and if so, whether or not they are not available?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, I beg your pardon, but I was

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5476.

looking at some papers and I didn't hear just what the orders were.

Mr. GEARHART. During the course of these hearings and at different times in my cross-examination of various witnesses I have referred to the flying orders under which then Flying Naval Lieutenant Clarence Dickinson flew from Pearl Harbor to Midway or Wake, whichever it was, I have forgotten, on November 22, 1941, 3 weeks before Pearl Harbor, and on the second or third day of these hearings when I first referred to this incident I requested the orders, a copy of the orders under which now Commander Dickinson flew. I have not been supplied them. I was wondering why they have not been made available.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you let us report at 2 o'clock about that?

[6145] Mr. GEARHART. I will be glad to do so.

Mr. MITCHELL. He was in Halsey's command, was he not?

Mr. GEARHART. I think so.

Mr. MITCHELL. My dim recollection is that I felt we didn't have any written orders and that when Halsey was on the stand we would be able to find out what orders he gave to his own people. He is lined up as a witness. I haven't asked him myself whether he has any orders, written orders, or if he knows what the oral orders were, but I will check during the noon hour and try to satisfy your interest there.

Mr. GEARHART. Commander Dickinson in his article which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of October 2 or October 9, 1942, I am not precise as to the date, somebody has helped themselves to my copy of the article, which is being replaced—

Mr. MITCHELL. In that article does he say whether he had written or oral orders?

Mr. GEARHART. He doesn't say whether they were written or oral, but he definitely says what those orders were. He said he was flying under absolute war orders, period, under instructions to sink any Japanese ships that he encountered upon the sea and to shoot down any flying craft that he met in the air, and to keep his mission secret at all costs.

Now, if there were any such orders issued in the Pacific [6146] prior to Pearl Harbor that is a fact, it is a fact of which the country should be informed. I do hope that those orders are furnished me if they are in writing, or if not in writing, a statement in respect to what the situation was.

I ask about it now because under the ruling of the committee yesterday we are going to proceed to the examination of Admiral Kimmel and General Short upon the conclusion of the testimony of the distinguished witness who now occupies the stand. I will want to examine those witnesses in respect to those orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Might the Chair ask Admiral Stark if those were orders, if there were any such orders, and if they were given by Admiral Halsey, would they appear as a matter of record in the Department here?

Admiral STARK. I think not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral Halsey is to be a witness, I believe, isn't he?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And, of course, if there are no written orders in the Department, or in his files, he would be the best witness as to whether he gave any such oral orders.

Admiral STARK. I would think so; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. We may get hold of Admiral Halsey, and if it was oral, get his statement preliminary to his going on [6147] the stand and we can furnish it to the Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I imagine, in view of the very alluring picture of the admiral in the paper this morning, you may have difficulty in locating him today. [Laughter.]

Mr. GEARHART. That reminds me, are we going to get a chance to see that saddle? [Laughter.]

There is one other matter. This was not a request of mine, Mr. Chairman, but the request was made by another member of the committee, that we be furnished with the copy of the Roberts Report as it was originally submitted to the White House, together with such changes, alterations, additions, subtractions, that were made.

I want to point out again, in view of the fact that we are going to have Admiral Kimmel and General Short before us shortly, that we ought to have that report before the committee at the earliest possible moment. The request for that report and interlineations, changes, additions, and subtractions was made the earliest day of this hearing, and the request has been repeated by different members of this committee. Now we are right up against the gun. We are going to examine the witnesses concerning whom those changes and that report are going to be material.

I am constrained to inquire as to whether or not we are going to have the original Roberts Report with such [6148] information as would be important to this committee in respect to changes that were made in it.

Mr. MITCHELL. The answer is that we have been searching in all of the departments ever since then to try to find the original report, and have failed utterly, in the War, Navy, State, and every other Department, to find any such document. Two days ago I wrote to Justice Roberts and told him we had failed and that the committee wanted it and asked him if he could kindly give us any sort of relief as to where to find it and who had it. That is the best we have been able to do.

Mr. GEARHART. Thank you very much. Up to date the information is we have not been able to locate the original report?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exactly; not because we haven't put an effort on it, either.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed. Is that all of the preliminary matter?

Mr. GEARHART. That is all for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, in your statement, Admiral Stark, you referred to a Presidential direction to prepare the Navy within 30 days for the capture and occupation of the Azores Islands?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

[6149] Mr. GEARHART. Will you tell me something more about the details of that direction you received from the President?

Admiral STARK. The basis for that directive was, I believe, our apprehension that possibly Germany might go down into Spain and

Portugal. We often discussed what the effect of it might be, and particularly if Gibraltar should be taken at the same time. The Azores in nonfriendly hands, or in Axis hands, would have been a very great threat to our communications on the sea, and the preparation to take the Azores, if necessary, was predicated on that possibility, namely, that Germany might go into Spain and into Portugal.

We had hoped ultimately, and ultimately we did get permission to go into the Azores and operate from there, and it was extremely advantageous, particularly with regard to patrolling the seas with long-range aircraft against submarines.

The President gave me that order and told me to be ready in 30 days.

Now, just why he gave it to me at that time and just why the 30 days, I don't recall. He gave me the direct order and right away I went to preparing the plans for it. It was a good thing, in any case, to have the plans ready.

For example, we likewise laid plans to take Martinique, if necessary, on the assumption that that island might join [6150] the Vichy Government under circumstances which would be detrimental to our communications in the Caribbean.

Mr. GEARHART. You mentioned the Azores preparation in your letter to Admiral Kimmel of 24 May 1941 and stated that the President gave you that positive direction 2 days before. That would make the date upon which you received your instructions from the President the 22d day of May 1941; is that approximately correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It was because of action which the President was directing from day to day against the Germans—the consequent exchange of fire with German submarines which resulted—that caused you to state that we were at war in the Atlantic before Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, if you reached a conclusion sometime that we were at war in the Atlantic prior to Pearl Harbor, there must have been a time when that became fixed in your mind. I asked you the question yesterday but I think we became diverted and you didn't reply as to when you considered that the war in the Atlantic with Germany commenced.

Admiral STARK. Well, it commenced about the time of the shooting order, along after the President talked, I would say, in September—that is, his talk to the Nation. And the [6151] actual shooting orders we gave in October.

I would invite attention, however, to the fact that when I say we were at war, we were at war in effect so far as attacking German craft, subsurface or surface, which crossed a line which we had defined, and which slid down the east coast of Iceland to the twenty-sixth meridian and south on the twenty-sixth meridian, and later there was a line drawn to the westward of the west coast of South America.

Technically, or from an international standpoint, we were not at war inasmuch as we did not have the right of belligerents because war had not been declared, but actually, so far as the forces operating under Admiral King in certain areas, it was war against any German craft that came inside that area. They were attacking us and we were attacking them.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, actually there was no difference between the situation which existed and which would have existed if a formal declaration of war had been declared by Congress?

Admiral STARK. Not as regards that particular phase. I might however, read two dispatches, they are short, which I think will exemplify the differences which I have mentioned.

On 1 December 1941 I received a dispatch from our special naval observer in London, Vice Admiral Ghormley, which reads as follows:

[6152] The Admiralty believes that the French merchant vessel, *Pierrel D. Mas*, of long cruising radius, has sailed for Europe or North Africa via Cape Horn about 25-27 November with cargo rubber for trans-shipment to Germany. One of German ships at Kobe believed preparing to sail for Europe carrying rubber and nationals about 1 December. Report has been received that Germans are planning to send ships to Europe monthly. The Admiralty asks if Navy Department will cooperate as in the *Odenwald* case and intercept these vessels off Cape San Roque. If so information will be available as at Bad Washn.

That is, the British Admiralty detachment in Washington.

I replied to that dispatch the following day, 2 December, and the dispatch reads:

U. S. not being at war does not enjoy full belligerent rights and Navy Department cannot be committed to interception referenced vessels in specific locations. Your 010922. *Odenwald* made mistake of flying American flag and crew abandoned ship thus becoming subject to boarding and salvage. Such American men of war as may be in the vicinity can operate only under directives contained in WPL-52 and current operation orders of Commander-in-Chief Atlantic based thereon.

Mr. GEARHART. Despite the assertion there that we did not enjoy full belligerent rights because we were not legally at war, what belligerent right were we not exercising?

[6153] Admiral STARK. That is one, the belligerent right of what is known as visit and search.

Mr. GEARHART. Weren't we exercising that whenever the occasion arose?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The reason why we were not exercising it was simply because the Germans were using submarines and it was not practical to go aboard submarines, isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. Well, any vessel—a raider, we likewise would have attacked. We laid out an area in which we told them to keep out and if they came into that we would attack them, that is, an Axis man-of-war.

Mr. GEARHART. Then by declaration we were already exercising the right of search and would have exercised it if the occasion arose because we told them that we would, is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. We told them we would attack. In this particular case of a merchant ship, we refused to intercept her. The *Odenwald* case—I do not know whether you recall it, it was in the press at the time—was loaded with a very valuable cargo for Germany. She was flying a flag, the American flag, and one of our cruisers in the South Atlantic became suspicious of her and when the cruiser approached her the crew abandoned the vessel and as I recall—I am not sure—prior [6154] to that had dumped a good deal of the cargo. We took that vessel into Puerto Rico, as I recall, and the subsequent action with regard to that vessel I think was predicated on international law. I have forgotten for the moment just what happened to it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, on that one occasion that you point out we did exercise the right of search, didn't we?

Admiral STARK. But the vessel had been abandoned and she was flying—she was operating under—false colors. We did go aboard and put a crew aboard and take her and bring her into port.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. She was abandoned because they expected shells from the American contingent, didn't they?

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, of course, as a reasonable individual you would expect that, you would accept that inference, wouldn't you?

Admiral STARK. Well, I don't know. I think if I had been skipper of that vessel I might have hung on until an American visit and search party had come aboard, but she had made the mistake of flying false colors and that put her open to capture, and she was captured after the crew had abandoned the vessel.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Well, now, there is no use quibbling. [6155] We were prepared to do anything that was necessary to end Hitlerism, is that not correct? That was the orders to the American Navy.

Admiral STARK. No, sir. The orders to the American Navy in certain areas was to insure the safety of communications and the delivery of the hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of material which were being sent to Britain under the terms of the lend-lease. Congress having made the United States Treasury practically available to manufacture war material and to deliver it, the President took steps to insure the delivery of that material so far as we could by escorting, guarding, and covering our ships across to the United Kingdom.

Mr. GEARHART. In insuring the delivery of American goods to England we were merely indirectly insuring the destruction of Hitlerism, were we not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. And that was our objective.

Admiral STARK. That was the objective of the lend-lease law, as I understand it.

Mr. GEARHART. And there was no limit upon your belligerent rights insofar as serving that objective, was there?

Admiral STARK. Our areas were limited. I gave them to you yesterday. They show what they were. For example, we were not sending anything into the Mediterranean to fight [6516] Italy allied with Germany, nor were we going outside of what I believe the President defined as our waters. It was not all-out. It was limited, but it was effective, and it was war, to my mind, inside those limits.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, but not considering what you were not doing but considering what you were doing, the things that the American Navy was doing was war, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. As I said yesterday, when you are shooting at the other fellow and he is shooting at you, it to all intents and purposes is war, even though of a restricted nature. We were not, for example, flying planes over Germany.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, to quote from President Roosevelt's inspiring speech of October 27, 1941, he says very bluntly here, in effect, that

the objective of the United States military operation upon the high seas was to destroy Hitlerism, does he not, when he uses these words:

The forward march of Hitlerism can be stopped—and it will be stopped and very simply and very bluntly—we are pledged to put our own oar into the destruction of Hitlerism.

That indicates very clearly what was in the mind of the President on the 27th day of October 1941, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. I think there is no doubt about it and [6157] I think there was no doubt about it before that. His speech in early September was likewise very clear.

Mr. GEARHART. In another part of his speech he says:

Many American-owned merchant ships have been sunk on the high seas. One American destroyer was attacked on September 4th. Another destroyer was attacked and hit on October 17th. Eleven brave and loyal American men of our Navy were killed by the Nazis.

That shows they were making war on us, too, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, it does. I am simply trying—

Mr. GEARHART. I know, you are trying to point out the legalistic differences.

Admiral STARK. Just the legal points. We had not gone all-out. We were not basing planes in England to fly against Germany, all those things that came into effect the minute war was legally declared. Legally we were, in our opinion, at war on the high seas so far as guaranteeing the safe transit of our vessels towards Iceland and continental Europe—or the United Kingdom would be better than continental Europe there.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, the activities of the American Navy that we have just referred to constitute, do they not, legally overt acts against the Axis.

Admiral STARK. I should say we were both making overt [6158] acts against each other. I was asked with regard to that by—I have forgotten which congressional committee, I was appearing before a number of them regularly—and I stated and it will undoubtedly be in the record somewhere, that in my opinion it did not make much difference what we did; that Hitler had every reason, if he wanted to exercise it so far as international law was concerned, to go to war with us at any time but that he would choose his own time and it would be a cold-blooded decision with him as to when that time would be most effective.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, an overt act against Germany in 1941 constituted an overt act against Japan in law, did it not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; not in my opinion. We were not at war with Japan. Japan was not at war with anybody except the Chinese. We were endeavoring—that is, the President and Mr. Hull were, in my opinion, and I was close to them—not to precipitate a war in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but didn't it ever enter into your discussions as a member of the war council consisting of the President, the three Secretaries and the two Chiefs of Staff, didn't it ever enter into your discussions as to whether or not an overt act of a military nature against Germany might constitute or also constituted an overt act against the Japan- [6159] ese?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it. I had never thought of it until you just asked the question.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, let me direct your attention to page 84 in Peace and War. I will read you a paragraph:

On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a far reaching treaty of alliance. In that treaty it was provided that Japan recognized and respected the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe; that Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater Asia; and that the three countries would assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Now, it would appear from that, would it not, that Japan became obligated to attack the United States under its agreement with Germany and Italy of September 27, 1940, upon the United States attacking Germany?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that is correct, although I believe that the State Department might testify to the fact that Japan in the last analysis would make her own decision as to carrying out that provision and she would or would not, [6160] according to whether or not it would be useful to her.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you agree with this conclusion which is drawn by the writer of this book, evidently with the approval of the Secretary of State of that day:

The last of these provisions obviously was aimed directly at the United States.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that may be correct, sir. I think that they had us in mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Then it was the belief of the State Department, and possibly of the War Council, that Germany, Italy, and Japan had in mind belligerent action on the part of the United States at the time they entered into that agreement?

Admiral STARK. I think so, at least a possibility of it. I might add that for a long period our diplomatic effort was to pry Japan loose from that Axis set-up or Tri-Partite agreement.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you were familiar with the intercepts, in one of which the Japanese in Washington, or rather, in Tokyo informed Berlin of their steadfast adherence to the Tri-Partite agreements?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So far as anything that has ever been acquired along the line through any of the intercepts or through any of the discussions with the Japanese Ambassadors, no progress was made towards separating the Japanese from their Axis [6161] obligations.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; we didn't get to first base on that.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And the intercepts told you, all of the time that we were negotiating with them, that the Japanese were adhering strictly to their Axis obligations?

Admiral STARK. I believed there was one intercept showing Germany's dissatisfaction with the fact that Japan was not doing more, at least one.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I won't take the time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands the Congressman is through.

Mr. GEARHART. I will announce to the Chairman when I am through.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you said you would not take time.

Mr. GEARHART. I would not take time to look up that intercept because it is already in evidence.

Now, getting back to the meeting of the war council of November 25, 1941. Now, according to the Army report there are three different kinds of informal organizations which have been referred to colloquially as the war council.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I was originally a little confused as to just which one they referred to. I believe at one time Mr. Hull referred to his meetings with the Secretary [6162] of War and Secretary of State as a war council—or Secretary Stimson referred to it—but I do understand when you refer to it you mean the meetings of the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff with the President.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there was a meeting in the morning of the smaller war council, the three Secretaries, in which Mr. Hull explained to them what he was trying to do with the Japanese. According to the Army report he explained definitely the 3 months' truce agreement which has been referred to as the *modus vivendi*.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And at that meeting Mr. Hull expressed doubt as to whether or not he would present it. To quote Secretary Stimson:

Hull showed me the proposal for a 3-months truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow, which is on the 25th that this is.

It adequately safeguarded all our interests I thought and secured it but I did not think that there was any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic.

Quoting further:

[6163] We are an hour and a half with Hull and then I went back to the Department and I got hold of Marshall.

Now, that indicates quite clearly and it is the conclusion of the writers of the Army report that the Secretary of War was very much concerned over the developing situation and very much worried as to what the result was to be.

Now, in the afternoon or, rather, at high noon there was a meeting of the full War Council, so-called, at the White House. You were there, were you not?

Admiral STARK. I was; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You met at 12 and those present were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stimson, and yourself?

Admiral STARK. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, did Secretary Stimson bring up the subject of the kind of an answer that Secretary Hull was contemplating delivering to Mr. Nomura the next day?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall. I do not remember just what occurred at that meeting. We unquestionably got together to go over the situation and I assume that it was discussed from all angles, but just what those discussions were I have been unable to recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you remember whether or not Mr. Hull said anything about being in doubt as to whether he would serve the 3-months

truce statement or whether or not he [6164] would serve another one on them or whether or not he would just do nothing at all?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember. I think perhaps the best bit of evidence we have as to what Mr. Hull was thinking of at that time is contained in, I think, a memorandum of the 27th when he mentioned, as I recall in effect, that on about the 25th, as early as the 25th he was considering abandoning the *modus vivendi* and on the 26th he did abandon it.

You recall the paper to which I refer, in which he was discussing the matter with one of the foreign diplomats. I have that paper, it is short, and I think that gives his viewpoint very clearly.

Mr. GEARHART. I am more interested in your memory of that proceeding than I am in any other witness who is not on the stand. I am talking to you about that.

Admiral STARK. Yes. I do not recall it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, weren't you very, very much disturbed by the progress of that conference and wasn't General Marshall very much disturbed by the progress of that conference in the things that were said and the things that were being planned by Mr. Hull?

Admiral STARK. We were disturbed because we thought things were heading up so fast towards a show-down, if you [6165] will, and we wanted more time and it began to look as though we were not going to get it.

I am sure with regard to the *modus vivendi*—I do not know whether this thought has crossed your mind or not. If you read the *modus vivendi* in itself it is nothing like so drastic as the so-called 10-point note which he handed to the Japs on the 26th, but it is my understanding that the 10 points mentioned in the note on the 26th were the points which were going to be taken up, perhaps one at a time, under the *modus vivendi* and that the *modus vivendi* would provide a period of some weeks or 3 months to discuss these particular points and that then the *modus vivendi* was thrown overboard and the points with which you are all familiar were handed to the Japanese.

Mr. GEARHART. It has been stated that the *modus vivendi* was abandoned because Chiang Kai-shek vigorously objected to it. Was any mention made of Chiang Kai-shek's attitude towards the *modus vivendi* in that meeting of the 25th?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that it was. I have an extremely clear recollection of Mr. Hull telling me how he felt about the *modus vivendi* separate from that meeting of the 25th.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you hear Mr. Stimson say at that meeting anything about whether he approved the 3 months' truce, [6166] the *modus vivendi*, or not?

Admiral STARK. I have tried to reconstruct that meeting and what was said.

Mr. GEARHART. I am trying to help you reconstruct it now. That is why I am taking the time to talk around the question, hoping that I will bring to life something in your memory which you have for the moment passed by.

Admiral STARK. No; I do not recall. I remember the tense atmosphere and the discussions in general of the period, that is the thing which I am trying to reconstruct, and every time we have tried to reconstruct it for about 3 hours we just cannot do it. That is around

the 25th, 26th, and 27th. But as to what actually transpired at that meeting and what Mr. Hull may have said and Mr. Stimson may have said, I have been unable to recall.

Mr. GEARHART. But you do remember that the Japanese dead-line intercept, which said that after the dead line had passed things were going to automatically begin to happen, that was discussed; you remember that, don't you?

Admiral STARK. I remember the message, I remember the dispatch very clearly and whether at that particular time it was read or discussed I could not say. It very well may have been, probably was, but I do not recall the discussions at that meeting.

[6167] Mr. GEARHART. You heard the President say in the course of that meeting, in substance or in effect, that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as, perhaps next Monday?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I recall that. I believe that—I am not sure; I think I put that down in one of my letters. What I wrote, and in which my statement abounds, is factual, written at the time, but I do not recall the conversation at that time. Of course, it covered the seriousness of the situation. That was what the meeting was called for.

[6168] Mr. GEARHART. Do you remember that the President said that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and that the question was what should be done about it?

Admiral STARK. I assume he did. We at one time before had already mentioned that ourselves. Now the one thing that I do remember—and I do not know that it is necessary to read again—is my postscript to my letter of the 25th in which you will recall that I held up the letter for a day because of that meeting. I will read it again if you like. It is on the record. That is what I do remember.

Mr. GEARHART. How long is it, Admiral Stark?

Admiral STARK. It is short.

Mr. GEARHART. Read it in again. It will make it easier to follow:

Admiral STARK. (Reading:)

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but [6169] I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as most likely.

Then I went on to state I did not know what we would do, and the rest of the paragraph was meant to be prepared for anything.

Mr. GEARHART. This being surprised or not being surprised reminds me of "on again, off again, Finnegan." Why is this assertion made one moment that the President was surprised, and the assertion made the next moment that he was not surprised?

Admiral STARK. I might say in regard to surprise, I was endeavoring last night, in regard to surprise and war warning, to get down to some simple statement which might show my feeling about it. For example, one takes a step or steps, at times, to avoid being hurt,

even though he does not really expect to be hurt or he may regard it only as a possibility.

Now with the war warning our feeling was, except for taking the offensive, that the officers to whom that message was addressed would practically assume we were at war, so far as taking measures against surprise was concerned. I believe had we not been attacked at that time—and I am [6170] assuming this and you can verify it because I may be wrong—but had we not been attacked at that time but had Japan declared war against us, we would have started reconnaissance and those other measures in the outlying stations to guard against surprise.

I assumed when we stated the imminence of war that those measures would be put into effect.

For example, I doubt if anybody in Washington, or perhaps anybody in the Hawaiian area, in Oahu, Pearl Harbor, would have expected an attack in late 1944 or 1945 when we were knocking at the gates of Japan, nevertheless, I dare say they were taking continuous 24-hour effective measures against being caught aback by any Japanese raid.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, to come back to the meeting of the 25th, the War Council—

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you have an impression now that you left that meeting disturbed by what Secretary Hull said he contemplated handing to the Japanese the next day?

Admiral STARK. I was disturbed before the meeting. As to what he was going to hand the Japanese the next day, I have no recollection of it. You can question Admiral Schuirmann on that who was daily at the State Department, and to the best of my knowledge and belief the Department [6171] had no forewarning of the note of the 26th, nor did we know that it was not sent at that time, but it was sent later.

Mr. GEARHART. You do not mean to have me infer from that answer that Secretary Hull assumed the great responsibility personally of handing the 10-point note to the Japanese without informing the President and the War Council of his contemplated action?

Admiral STARK. I think he would not have done it without informing the President. He did do it, to the best of my knowledge and belief, without informing either the Army or the Navy.

Mr. GEARHART. Did not he inform you and General Marshall, and did not you and Marshall protest against the handing of the 10-point note to the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. Not to my knowledge or remembrance. The memorandum to the President by Mr. Hull, of which I have a photostatic copy, of November 26 states, if I may read it—

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, if it is not long.

Admiral STARK (reading):

With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese Government—this is dated the 26th, the day after the meeting—1. A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad basic peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations now going on and to be [6172] carried on, if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject.

2. The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a *modus vivendi* intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations.

In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the *modus vivendi*, without in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and benefit of this step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the *modus vivendi* proposal.

That is signed "Cordell Hull."

That was sent on the 26th to the President, and as I read it, asking the President's permission to take the course which he did take, and evidently one might infer from that, [6173] although again I have no clear recollection of the November 25 meeting, that he had not made such a request or possibly proposed it on the 25th.

I think there was boiling in Mr. Hull's mind the message from Chiang Kai-shek and it jelled on the 26th.

Mr. GEARHART. Anyway, you and General Marshall left that meeting feeling it was incumbent upon you to make a last-minute appeal in writing to the President to do everything you could to gain time?

Admiral STARK. Whether the memorandum to the President started then or before I do not know. I would recall our message of the 24th showing my apprehension, and to which General Marshall agreed. In endeavoring to fix the date that that started, about the only one whom I have heard state anything about it, who fixes it rather clearly in his own mind and who was one of the draftees of it, was Admiral Turner, who believed it started about the 24th.

Mr. GEARHART. Now this meeting adjourned about 1 o'clock, did it not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You returned to your office then, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. At 1:54 you put in a call for General Marshall, did you not?

[6174] Admiral STARK. Well, if the record shows that, I probably did; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It does. To refresh your memory, wasn't it for the purpose of getting together with General Marshall immediately to prepare a written memorandum pleading with the President to do whatever he could do to gain time for the Army and Navy?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall, Mr. Gearhart. General Marshall and I were together on that proposition. Just when we started it I cannot say.

Mr. GEARHART. Then at 4:30 in the afternoon General Marshall called you on the phone, according to the record of White House calls. Now was not that call to further discuss the hastily prepared memorandum to the President?

Admiral STARK. That is going on 5 years ago, and when you ask me what we said over the telephone at a certain hour in the afternoon, I just cannot answer it.

Mr. GEARHART. Then I notice in the same report on the afternoon of November 25 at 5 p. m. you again called General Marshall. I will ask you, to refresh your memory, wasn't it for him to come over and put his signature on the document, or for you to send it to him where he could put his signature on it?

Admiral STARK. On the afternoon of the 25th?

[6175] Mr. GEARHART. On the afternoon of the 25th.

Admiral STARK. The document shows the date of the 27th.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but you also heard the testimony of General Marshall that he was not in Washington on the 27th.

Admiral STARK. I knew that, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Therefore he could not sign it on the date it bears, he had to sign it ahead of time.

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily. He thinks he signed it on the 28th. It might have been dated the 27th. It was dated the 27th for his signature and mine, and he being absent he could not sign it until he got back. You recall the Gerow memorandum in which he states—

The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum
this is Gerow to General Marshall—

you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum that were made.

Now if the changes were made at that time it would not appear probable to me that Marshall would have signed it on the 25th, particularly as the memorandum bears the date of the 27th, and particularly also in view of this memorandum.

Mr. GEARHART. Then I note in the same White House record that on 10:30 a. m. you called General Marshall on the 26th. It is possible that he signed it on the 26th after the changes were made, is that not correct? Does not the telephone call pertain to that?

Admiral STARK. I do not know what that telephone call pertains to. Someone has suggested to me that I had something important that morning and wanted to delay the joint board meeting a little bit, and that that call was for that purpose. Personally I do not recall.

Mr. GEARHART. The same White House record discloses that you called General Marshall at 1:25 p. m. on the 26th. Could it be possible you called with reference to that memorandum to the President, that you had determined with him to send to the Chief Executive?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; it could have been possible.

Mr. GEARHART. It could have been signed on the 26th? It was within the range of possibilities?

Admiral STARK. It was; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that the diary of Secretary Stimson shows that at the meeting of the 27th, when General Marshall was out of the city, the memorandum was [6177] considered by the War Council, that would seem that it was signed before, instead of after the 27th, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily. I think the best testimony we have on that is from General Marshall himself.

Mr. GEARHART. I have here the testimony of Mr. Stimson which says:

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined and the question of need for further time was discussed.

Now, that is from the diary of Secretary Stimson, and his diary ought to be better evidence, ought it not, than the memory 5 years old of the Chief of Staff.

Do you not think so?

Admiral STARK. Yes; but I see nothing in there to show that General Marshall might have signed it on the 26th. That is a discussion of the draft of the memorandum, is it not?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; presented to the War Council, and discussed by the War Council. Would it be presented to the War Council and discussed by them if it were not assented to by the Chief of Staff already?

Admiral STARK. May I see what you are reading from?

Mr. GEARHART. I am reading from the United States newsprint of the Army report, reading from page 51, half way down the second column.

Admiral STARK. That is this publication (indicating)?

[6178] **Mr. GEARHART.** Page 51, the right-hand column.

Admiral STARK. About half way down the right-hand column?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. About one-third of the way down it says, "Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November, 1941." I have skipped down about three paragraphs.

Admiral STARK. Yes. As I read it, it says: "I then called up the President and talked with him about it."

That was not a War Council meeting, it was a conversation over the telephone if I have the right paragraph.

Mr. GEARHART. It is the next paragraph:

He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General Marshall, which became radio #472. Also, as he says, "a draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined and the question of need for further time was discussed."

Admiral STARK. As I read that, the "he" refers not to the President but to Mr. Stimson.

Mr. GEARHART. You then called up the President and talked with him about it?

Admiral STARK. It says:

"I then called up the President [6179] and talked with him about it."

He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General Marshall.

I think it refers to Secretary Stimson, as I read it.

Mr. GEARHART. Perhaps you are right. Do you remember the occasion?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, you remember whether it was the President who took it up with you people or whether it was taken up by Mr. Stimson.

Admiral STARK. It was Mr. Stimson, if I remember.

Mr. GEARHART. Where was the meeting held?

Admiral STARK. I think in Secretary Stimson's Office. It was in Mr. Stimson's office, I recollect.

Going back to your record about my calls with General Marshall, there is a note here on my copy which we obtained that General Marshall was not in, so apparently we did not discuss anything. The message of 12:50 also has an "NM" on it, on the mimeographed sheet, from which I suppose you read.

Mr. GEARHART. What does that mean?

Admiral STARK. It means "No message". I did not get [6180] hold of him.

Mr. GEARHART. Is that why you kept on trying?

Admiral STARK. Well, I tried to get him at that time and he was not there. He was there in the morning. Now, as regards the late afternoon message to which you referred, I do not see anything after that, after 12:50, which did not get through to Marshall.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, this is repetition, but when did you first hear of the 10-point message?

Admiral STARK. I may have heard of it on the 28th. It is not clear in my mind. I do not remember when I first heard of the 10-point message. Undoubtedly not later than the 28th. Possibly Mr. Stimson mentioned it. It is possible when he said Mr. Hull had thrown over the modus vivendi and was going to send a note, that I had the substance of it. I knew approximately what the substance of that note was, because, as I understand, those were the points that were going to be taken up during the period which the modus vivendi was designed to cover.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, to refresh your memory, I notice on this same record of White House calls that Secretary Hull called you and got through, it is marked with an "O.K." at 1:15 p. m. on the 26th day of November, 1941. Does that remind you of the fact that Secretary Hull told you what he [6181] had done previously that morning at 9 o'clock in reference to the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. My remembrance, and my only remembrance, is Mr. Hull's feeling about the note, and sometime during that period I learned that he was throwing over the modus vivendi, and the flat statement that it was now up to the Army and Navy, which, to my mind, pointed clearly to the fact that he had no hope of reaching a satisfactory settlement in the Pacific through further negotiations. That we crystallized in our dispatch of the 27th.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, the making of a decision to abandon the modus vivendi and to serve upon the Japanese the 10-point document, that so many people call an ultimatum, was an important event in the minds of all the members of the War Council, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Well, when I learned of it I considered it very important, particularly, as we were playing for time.

Mr. GEARHART. It was so important that I am astonished that Admiral Stark should call you on the 'phone just after he had completed the delivery, to talk with you and not say anything about it.

Admiral STARK. You mean Mr. Hull?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Hull; yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. As I say, he may have told me at that [6182] time about it being up to the Army and Navy. Just when I got that, whether it was the 26th or 27th, or I may have inferred it from his

conversation on the 25th, I could not say, but I would again invite attention to the fact that it was on the 26th that he asked the President's permission to proceed on that line. What time the President got that and what time the President O.K.'d I do not know. I doubt that Mr. Hull would have told me he was going to do it prior to getting the President's permission. I think he delivered the note in the late afternoon, somewhere around 1800, as I recall, to the Japs. That can be ascertained from the records.

Mr. GEARHART. Are you sure as to that?

Admiral STARK. Not sure. I say it can be obtained from the records. I have that recollection. It is probably based on some appointment, or something, of Secretary Hull with the Japs.

Mr. GEARHART. But you have no memory of the Secretary mentioning anything to you in his telephone call at 1:25 p. m. concerning what kind of a message he was going to deliver to or had delivered to the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. I did not get the first part of that, Mr. Gearhart. I was looking for something to back up my statement about the late afternoon, and with your permission I would like to state that from the Washington Post of the 27th [6183] Washington Post, November 27, page 4, it states, "Then came Hull to see the President. Hull left the White House and returned to the State Department to confer with Hornbeck, Maxwell Hamilton and Ballantine, his Far East experts." That is the Washington Post, November 27, page 4.

These officials were still with Hull when Kurusu and Nomura arrived at 5 p. m. The note was handed to Kurusu and Nomura at this conference which lasted until 6:45 p. m.

Now, that is from the Washington Post, and I assume the State Department can verify it if such is desired.

[6184] Mr. GEARHART. What was the hour?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. What was the hour mentioned?

Admiral STARK. It states the note was handed to Kurusu and Nomura at this conference which lasted until 6:45 p. m. It also states the two Japanese diplomats arrived at 5 p. m.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the record shows that at 2:35 p. m. you called Secretary Hull; refreshing your memory, did he say anything about what kind of a document he was planning to deliver to the Japanese later on in the day?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When did you first hear Secretary Hull quoted as saying that he had decided to kick the whole thing over and tell them that he had no other proposals at all?

Admiral STARK. That is what I have been trying to reconstruct. The Gerow memorandum shows that we had that in the conference on the morning of the 27th through Mr. Stimson. That is the one definite thing in writing which seems to set that date.

Mr. GEARHART. When did you hear for the first time that Secretary Hull had made the statement, as he put it:

I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of Stimson and Knox and the Army and Navy?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I say, I heard it not later [6185] than the 27th and on the 27th. Now, whether Mr. Hull told me that

as his feeling earlier, I don't know, but he couldn't have made the definite statement, I would say—and, of course, Mr. Hull is available—prior to getting permission from the President, which was in his memorandum of the 26th.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you, Admiral Stark, in the light of all these facts and figures and telephone calls that I have called your attention to, is it not a fact that as a consequence of the meetings of the war council of November 25 and of November 26 that you and Marshall were very, very much disturbed because of the anticipated and announced action of Secretary Hull and that you and he rushed to—and did—prepare a memorandum pleading with the President to do something which would make it possible to offset what Mr. Hull was contemplating and to gain time for the military forces of the United States to prepare for the inevitable conflict?

Admiral STARK. Well, the entire picture became serious around the 23d and the 24th, as reflected in my dispatch of the 24th. Whether that memorandum was started on the 25th or the 26th or the 24th I am not sure. But, of course, we were disturbed. That is factual. We were playing for time. That is factual. And the memorandum bears the date of the 27th.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

[6186] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Admiral STARK. May I now—I see Senator Lucas is here—bring up the point which I started to bring up this morning and noting his absence did not bring up, with reference to yesterday?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may proceed with that.

Admiral STARK. Yesterday Senator Lucas in examining me asked if the damage done to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not largely due to torpedoes, that it was his opinion that it was, and in that I agreed. I was particularly thinking of my old command, which I put in commission as executive officer, and later commanded, the *West Virginia*, whose damage was very extensive from torpedoes, and I think his statement may still stand as correct that the great portion of the damage was caused by torpedoes, although the Department can give factual information on that.

However, not being too sure of my answer I checked up and I want to offer the following, which is taken from item 15 of the Navy Folder which is before the committee, and without reading the entire thing I simply want to show the following in the record, which does show great damage probably done by bombs.

You have this item 15 among your exhibits.

[6187] The *Arizona* was attacked by both torpedoes and bombs.

The *California* was attacked by torpedoes and bombs.

The *West Virginia* was attacked—when I say attacked I mean hit—by torpedoes and bombs.

The *Oklahoma* was hit only by torpedoes.

The *Nevada* was hit by torpedoes and bombs.

The *Maryland* was hit by bombs only.

The *Pennsylvania* was hit by bombs only.

The *Tennessee* was hit by bombs only.

The *Helena* was hit by torpedoes only.

The *Honolulu* was damaged by bombs only.

The *Raleigh*, damaged by both torpedoes and bombs.

The *Shaw*, by bomb only.

The *Cassin* and *Downes*, by bomb only.

That refers to the major combatant ships and there is further data with regard to what damage was suffered. I just touched on the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement on that, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, you have now given the opinion to Senator Lucas, from the record there, on the [6188] ships. Did the Secretary of the Navy go out to Hawaii after the attack?

Admiral STARK. Very shortly after; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did he bring back a report?

Admiral STARK. He did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you examine that report with him?

Admiral STARK. The only report that I saw was the one which was made public; and, of course, he told us, in a long conference, a great deal of what happened, particularly items of interest, and of the wonderful behavior of our men, and of their wonderful spirit, et cetera, as he saw them in the hospital wards.

I was asked, and I didn't understand the question, in the previous investigation by the Navy, when I said I saw the report, I believe reference was made to a special report which he made to the President that I did not see.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand you never saw the report that went to the President?

Admiral STARK. So far as I know I never saw that report. I don't recall it. I saw the report which was made public; and, of course, from conversations with him I got the picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it true that the report that was made public was a different report than the one given to the President?

[6189] Admiral STARK. I understood so since, but I have not seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that the Secretary of the Navy did not disclose to you the facts that he disclosed to the President, you being the highest Navy man under him?

Admiral STARK. I don't account for it.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't account for it?

Admiral STARK. I don't. I don't recall any knowledge of it at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well—

Admiral STARK. That he had made a special written report to the President, if he did, and I am assuming from your question that he did.

Senator FERGUSON. And you indicated that you knew he had?

Admiral STARK. Well, I indicated to this extent, that when I was asked the question last summer, or a year ago last summer, I should say, if I had seen the report which Colonel Knox made, I replied "Yes," and I gathered later that the report—the report I referred to was that which was published, that is what I understood the question was asked on, and I gained the understanding since that there was another report.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, yesterday you made an answer to Mr. Gearhart that I want to ask you about. You said:

[6190] I have spent hours trying to recall what went on, on the 25th, 6th and 7th, as to time. I have discussed it with others. We come to an impasse as to any agreement every time we do it, and every time we start it we waste a couple of hours and get nowhere. I cannot recall the details of just when I got that information. I wish I could, but I just can't do it.

Do I understand from that answer that what you are conveying to the committee is that you have sat down with various other officials and tried to arrive at an agreement as to what happened during this period, is that what I understand?

Admiral STARK. As to when it happened. My memory is clear as to certain things which did happen and not clear as to others. But when I try, for example, to fix in my own mind whether Mr. Hull told me about the Chiang Kai-shek memorandum on the 25th or 26th, I can't do it. I have talked the matter over at length on different occasions with Admiral Schuirmann, who was in constant touch with the State Department, and as to what he knew.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not what I am getting at. Do I understand that some of your answers here are because you have agreed with somebody that that is what happened and if you can't agree then you don't give your best answer?

Admiral STARK. No. I have given my best answer. That [6191] is not the inference to be drawn at all.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I wanted to straighten out on this answer.

Admiral STARK. No; that inference is not what I intended to convey. It is my effort to fix down to a date and a time as to just when I learned, for example, of Mr. Hull's sending the 10-point note, of his conversation about Chiang Kai-Shek, and the material of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Now——

Admiral STARK. But——

Senator FERGUSON. I will have to change the subject, because I was talking about another thing, but you bring up another thing which I will ask you about now, copy of the message transmitted to Secretary Stimson by Mr. T. V. Soong, under cover of a letter dated November 25.

Will you look at that and see whether that is the Chiang Kai-shek message that you are talking about?

Admiral STARK. That is the message, or it certainly conveys the material which Mr. Hull talked to me about, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I understand that a copy of this memorandum to the Secretary of State was sent to the Secretary of War. Do you know whether or not a copy was sent to the Secretary of the Navy, and did it reach you in that manner?

Admiral STARK. It is my recollection, and again you can [6192] get factual data, that this message was not only sent to Mr. Hull but to a number of other officials in our Government.

Senator FERGUSON. That is just it. Isn't it true that the Chinese Government not only went to the Secretary of State but they went to other agencies and Mr. Hull was upset about it?

Admiral STARK. Very much upset. I believe this was also made known to people in Congress at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. So the substance of that letter not only came to you through Mr. Hull but it came from other sources, did it not?

Admiral STARK. I knew of the substance of it because I can recall Colonel Knox talking about people talking about this on the Hill.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did you have a conversation—I realize how long it has been, I realize that there is much water gone over the dam, as we say, but I want to try and get the substance of some of these conversations because what this committee has to do is to try to get the best information they can so that we will get all the facts, and I hope that you will bear with me on some of these questions.

Admiral STARK. I will do my best to give you all I know and any information that I have that should be of assistance.

Senator FERGUSON. I start out with the assumption, and [6193] I take it it is true, that you favor this hearing and you are willing to cooperate.

Admiral STARK. I am delighted that this hearing came before Congress where all parties would have the opportunity to tell you all they know about it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am assuming that.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on this information that came from the Chinese Government in relation to this *modus vivendi*, it wasn't only given to the Secretary of State, but it was given to other agencies and even came up on the Hill, as we call the Congress; that is true; isn't it?

Admiral STARK. That is my understanding, and confirmed, without any question, by Mr. Hull's statement to me that they were crying appeasement on the Hill, another thing which greatly perturbed him.

Senator FERGUSON. Now—do you want to take a moment to look at that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. There is one paragraph here in Mr. Hull's statement which reads—

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that the statement of November 29th?

Admiral STARK. No, of November 25:¹

Subject: Opposition of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to *modus vivendi*.

[6194] Participants: Secretary Hull and the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih.

And part of that reads:

I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madam Chiang Kai-Shek almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indo-China and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indo-China and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-Shek said was an imminent danger—

and so forth.

I remember very clearly how upset Mr. Hull was, of his telling me that even the Hill was crying appeasement, that the Chinese themselves should have supported him, because he was doing this in their behalf, and that apparently they didn't understand it.

Also in a previous dispatch, which I read, he pointed out that the British, he thought, were only half-way supporting it.

¹ Included in Exhibit No. 18.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it your understanding, or was it not your understanding, that to have entered into or to have sent the *modus vivendi*, or agreed on the *modus vivendi*, that [6195] thereby America would have been sacrificing her principles?

Admiral STARK. No. That is not my opinion. My understanding of the *modus vivendi* was that it was to insure a period of three months to talk things over and that the material which was in the 10-point note were the items which they were going to talk over and resolve.

Senator FERGUSON. But the *modus vivendi* would have given an extension of three months for negotiations and would have not, except for that period, let's say, sacrificed the American principles?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I had no idea that Mr. Hull for one second considered sacrificing any principles or walking backward.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the highest Naval authority in the United States?

Admiral STARK. I was.

Senator FERGUSON. You were under the Secretary of the Navy but you were the highest authority?

Admiral STARK. By virtue of my office at that time I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you were vitally interested in our diplomatic negotiations, because, as I understand it, you have to have your diplomatic negotiations tied in with your military authorities, because you have got to be able to [6196] back up what you do; isn't that the principle?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you were vitally interested in this *modus vivendi* and the diplomatic negotiations; is that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us why the *modus vivendi* was not sent. You were one of the top officials representing the United States Navy, and, if I might add, before you answer that, this would be a Naval war in the Pacific, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Largely, yes. I always looked on it as largely a naval war.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you would be very vitally interested in this question as to whether or not we had a 3 months period or whether or not we didn't take that period. Will you tell us why the *modus vivendi* was not sent?

Admiral STARK. May I add there that so was Marshall, because—

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, yes.

Admiral STARK. Because the defense of the Philippines, which was an Army problem, was one of the primary reasons for that extension.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't mean to say that the Military, [6197] the Army, was not vitally interested also, but it would have been, to a greater extent, a naval war?

Admiral STARK. Yes; but holding the Philippines was something I took up in the first meeting I ever had in the White House. There had always been a general feeling that we couldn't hold the Philippines, that we would have to abandon them. I was hoping that we would have time to take steps to make them secure. My desire for time was so that the Army could complete a project it had to greatly strengthen the Philippines, and in turn the fleet could support them in the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, coming back to my previous question, why did we not use the *modus vivendi*?

Admiral STARK. Well, I can give you my opinion as to that.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have the substance of what was said first and then your opinion.

Admiral STARK. I gained the impression from Mr. Hull that the Chiang Kai-shek note so disturbed him that—along with other things which have been read—that he seriously questioned, when he first informed me, the desirability of his going ahead with the *modus vivendi*. Subsequently he did not go ahead with it. Now—

[6198] Senator FERGUSON. What were the other things?

Admiral STARK. The other items were those which have been mentioned, but, as I recall, the British and the Dutch appeared not too strongly with him; they were crying appeasement on the Hill, as he stated to me, with regard to the course that he was taking.

Senator FERGUSON. I believe that is the message that you referred to today and it reads something like this:

They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought of what we should pay them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered that none of their Governments had given them instructions relative to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I remarked that each of their Governments were more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and to take the lead in defending the entire area.¹

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. And then there was his memorandum dated November 29,² in which he refers to a conference: Participants, the Secretary of State, Hull, and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax. That was the one I was thinking about.

[6199] Senator FERGUSON. All right. Will you give me the substance of that?

Admiral STARK (reading):

The British Ambassador called at his request and I soon discovered that he had no special business except to check on the aftermath of the conversations between the President and myself and the Japanese with special reference to the question of the proposed *modus vivendi*. This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the mechanics for the carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for example, has sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different Cabinet officers and high officials in the Government other than the State Department, and sometimes even ignoring the President, intruding into a delicate and serious situation with no real idea of what the facts are.

There are about four or five pages to this. I do not know whether you want me to go ahead with the rest of it as a refresher or not.

Senator FERGUSON. It is in, is it not?

[6200] Mr. MITCHELL. It is in Exhibit 18.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; it is in the record.

Admiral STARK. It is in the record, yes, sir. I might just add the next sentence. [Reading:]

I added that Chiang Kai-shek has his brother-in-law, located here in Washington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press and others, appar-

¹ Page 3 of Memorandum of Conversation, dated November 24, 1941, included in Exhibit No. 18.

² Included in Exhibit No. 18.

ently with no particular purpose in mind; that we have correspondents from London who interview different officials here, which is entirely their privilege to do, except that at times we all move too fast without fully understanding each other's views, et cetera, et cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in the case of the recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I remarked that it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai-shek's loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying and virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that [6201] all of the friendly countries were now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter into with China.

And then it goes on. I think I have read enough to show how Mr. Hull felt about it and which I got the impression from him in talking with him personally.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, all right. Did you feel the same way about it?

Admiral STARK. I felt the same way about the impropriety of flooding all of Washington in the manner in which Mr. Hull stated. I thought they should have gone about it to him with all of their troubles and not gone to the highways and byways.

Senator FERGUSON. But after we are all through, it is apparent that Mr. Hull—or is it apparent—that Mr. Hull followed just what the Chinese wanted?

Admiral STARK. He did. He broke off so far as the modus vivendi is concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[6202] Admiral STARK. And he gives extensive reasons there for it. Perhaps he may have agreed with some of Chiang Kai-shek's thoughts that even a leak that we were—and I think it is in that letter—a leak to the effect that the United States was going to let Japan have oil or other materials or ease up on the freezing might be such a blow to their morale as to make it impossible for them to continue. But we had all those things. He talked it over, I assume, with his chief and he came to that conclusion. We were thinking that from the military standpoint to gain time.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Admiral, isn't this true, that when you take what Mr. Hull said about Chiang Kai-shek, it indicated that he was not going to follow that route rather than that he was going to follow what he wanted; it was a criticism of it.

Admiral STARK. It was a criticism of Mr. Hull by the Chinese you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. No; a criticism of the Chinese stand, was it not?

Admiral STARK. By Mr. Hull?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not know if he criticized so much although he may have and did in some respects the Chinese understanding. That, I would say, could have been resolved and [6203] set straight between Mr. Hull and the Ambassador, but when it was broadcast, or the impression was gained or at least talked about and

Mr. Hull gained the impression, that even here at the Capitol that he, Mr. Hull, was being guilty of appeasement and that may also have influenced him in the action which he took.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait. Do I understand, then, that the opinion that Mr. Hull was appeasing Japan may have had something to do with him throwing out the *modus vivendi* and putting in the note of the 26th?

Admiral STARK. Whether or not that criticism which was being leveled at him in official Washington had anything to do with his final decision, only Mr. Hull could answer. I do know that it greatly annoyed him.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, how do you account for this note on the 24th where he fully recognized what he is saying:

I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

He fully recognized our position in the world when he said that, did he not?

[6204] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; he recognized that and I think that probably from the other governments it is not unusual. It is a rather human weakness to have that sort of an opinion. Every fellow is thinking of himself first and perhaps sometimes from thinking overmuch of himself loses sight of the broader picture. That is what I gather that he means.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that exactly what happened, just what Mr. Hull prophesied would happen, that we would have to defend the whole area and we would have to have the war for the whole area, isn't that what happened?

Admiral STARK. We would have the major role.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. The Chinese had their role and, of course, the British also had their role and there were plans being laid.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that takes me to this: What was our role, what was our plan in case there was an attack upon the British possessions in that area? I am talking right from this memorandum of the 24th here:

In case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

which would include the British.

Now, what was our plan, what was our role if an attack [6205] was made upon the British possessions in the Far East?

Admiral STARK. I do not know what it would have been. It would have been up to Congress in the last analysis, had the President decided that it was time to make a recommendation to Congress. What recommendation he would have made, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever try to find out what would be your stand? You had to prepare for such an emergency, did you not?

Admiral STARK. We were preparing for it.

Senator FERGUSON. And you could not wait until Congress acted to get at least prepared for such a situation?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, did you ever try to find out what our stand would be in that case?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did you try to find it out from?

Admiral STARK. I had asked the President.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he tell you?

Admiral STARK. He could not answer the question and I believe that he was sincere in stating that he did not know. You will recall, and I have stated factually—this is not hindsight—in answer to questions of this sort which Admiral Richardson asked me and that I had asked for the answers to [6206] those questions and could not get them, and I quote—I believe I stated—that I thought that “there was nobody on God’s green earth who could answer them.”

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you went to the President and you asked the specific question as to what we would do in that case if an attack was made on the British possessions, in which case I understand that he told you he did not know.

Admiral STARK. He did not answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what did he say or what did he do?

Admiral STARK. Just that he did not know; at least he said that he could not answer it. At one time I believe he said to me, “Don’t ask me these questions,” because I feel that he could not answer them—I felt that he could not answer them. Now, as to what he would done, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, Admiral, how could you prepare for that situation? If you could not get an answer and, as you say, you knew the President could not answer it, how could you prepare for that?

Admiral STARK. I could work on the assumption that the worst might happen and that is what I did. For example—

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you—

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness complete his answer.

[6207] Senator FERGUSON. I will let him answer.

Admiral STARK. May I just give you an example? You will recall that on my own initiative, so far as getting the British over here in early 1941, we started hearings here with the British. When I asked them to come over initially I did not ask the President’s permission or Colonel Knox. It was more or less—there was some dynamite in the fact that it might be known that we were holding conversations with the British as to what we would do and how we would work with them in case of war.

I was asked the question one day on the Hill before one of the Senate committees, as to whether or not we were holding conversations with the British with regards to participation with them in the war and my answer was that I would like to put two or three questions up to the committee. And the first one was, “Is there not some possibility of the United States being drawn into this war, remote though it may be and regardless of our endeavor to keep out?” They agreed that such a possibility did exist in the world situation at that time.

I then asked, “Suppose that possibility develops, is there any question on which side we would fight? If course there was no question. It would be opposed to the Axis.

I then answered the question and stated, “The answer is in the affirmative” in answering you, but wouldn’t I be utter- [6208] ly

derelict in my duties if I did not prepare for the contingency so that if and when war did eventuate that there would be ample working plans, so far as possible, to dovetail and coordinate our effort?

The questioning of me on that subject stopped and I never was asked about it during the course of months, during the course of those next couple of months work with the British.

Now, as regards the Far East, we did hold conversations out there in the A-D-B, none of which was approved, and final action, we put it up to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Phillips, the British Commander-in-Chief, to make their own plans as to how to work together if we both got in it. The directions were always against any political commitment. I have Hart's here, his despatch covering the recommendations with regard to that pulling together and I have our answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that at any time you discussed with the President the question as to not what we would do, but preparing for the eventuality that if they did attack the British that you would be prepared for this country to come in?

Admiral STARK. I stated, and he knew with regard to the particular conversations I have just mentioned, I informed him in January, after the committee was here, that I was going ahead with those conversations.

[6209] Senator FERGUSON. And what did he say about that?

Admiral STARK. I told him that I would prefer to be panned for not being ready than for being reproved when the time came and I was not ready, and he let it go at that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what did he say? What was the substance of what he said?

Admiral STARK. Well, he did not pan me and after looking——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean after the 7th he did not pan you?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. You mean after the 7th of December or when?

Admiral STARK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time?

Admiral STARK. After I informed him of the conversations going on. Later on all those conversations, that is, the boil-down and the plans were shown to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then, that on the 7th day of December 1941, you as the head of the Navy had no plan to go into effect if the British were attacked and we were not attacked?

Admiral STARK. If the British were attacked and we were not attacked we had no plans to bring into being.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I understand——

Admiral STARK. I say that we did not get any.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. Then I understand that the Winant note, the message sending the information that they were going to the Kra Peninsula on the 6th and that they would be there in some 14 hours, and another note, the paraphrase of a secret message—this is on page 5507 of this record—received at the War Department at 4:29 December 6th, that is, 4:29 p. m. in the afternoon of December 6th [reading]:

Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due west, were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchant ships; these were seen at 106°8' E., 8° N.; this was the first report.

The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers were seen following the same course at 106°20' E., 7°35' N.

Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force.

Now, I understand, Admiral, that those two messages, then, would not cause us to be alerted in and of themselves because we had no plan if they attacked the British and it was certainly not an attack on any of our possessions?

[6211] Admiral STARK. If they had attacked the British and not us I would have taken no action except to continue to be alert against an attack by them, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that that could account for the fact that you were not alerted, your office was not alerted Saturday afternoon, Saturday night, Sunday morning up till the time of the attack?

Admiral STARK. I do not understand just what you mean by "not alerted." Our office was operating 24 hours a day.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Admiral, having those two messages and no plan for us to take any part, were you alerted for war that afternoon and that morning, Sunday morning the 7th?

Admiral STARK. You mean where, in Washington or in the field?

Senator FERGUSON. No, Washington, right in your office.

Admiral STARK. Yes, we were. We were alerted. We were on duty at all times.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then that by being alerted you mean this, that at 10:30 on the day that war was to start that you would get down to your office at 10:30 if you were fully alerted and expecting a war to start?

Admiral STARK. If I had expected the war to start at [6212] that time I would have come down. I did not know the war was going to start that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know it was going to start as far as the British was concerned on the 7th?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What about these two messages?

Admiral STARK. Well, this message from Hart to the British—

Senator FERGUSON. And the Winant message.

Admiral STARK. And the Winant message, which is practically the same as the one from Hart, gave the movement of that and we were trying to diagnose where they would hit.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, they were going to cross the Gulf of Siam, were they not?

Admiral STARK. They were heading south, which is in that area.

Senator FERGUSON. And that fleet and that convoy would not attack America's possessions?

Admiral STARK. No, but there might have been another attack on American possessions concurrently.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you anticipate such?

Admiral STARK. Did I what, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you anticipate such another attack on American possessions?

[6213] Admiral STARK. We had mentioned that we could not preclude an attack elsewhere and we had specifically included the Philippines, which was on the flank, as a possibility in that connection

and we had sent previous messages to the effect that they might strike anywhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you figure that when they would strike the British, which would be some time on Sunday—14 hours, in fact, from some time on Saturday noon—did you figure that they would attack American possessions?

Admiral STARK. We figured at that time, in view of the fact that they had destroyed their codes with us and with the Dutch that there certainly was a possibility, even a strong probability—even a probability of their attacking all three of us. That was after the destruction of codes. It certainly was an indication and a rather clear indication of their enemies. They might simply have broken off diplomatic relations with us, we couldn't tell, but the presumption which we instilled into the dispatch was war.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say a strong probability was that they were going to attack us as well as the British?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how do you account, Admiral, for the fact that you could not be reached Saturday night—

Admiral STARK. I would not want to—

[6214] Senator FERGUSON. Wait until I finish my question.

Admiral STARK. Pardon me.

Senator FERGUSON. And that you did not get to your office and no one reached you until 10:30 that Sunday morning?

Admiral STARK. I would like to say as regards reaching me Saturday night, that I am still of the opinion that I was home. I am not sure, from the testimony which has been given on that, that I was called that night. There is room for doubt in the testimony that I have read of each of the parties concerned with calling me, that they might have been under the impression that the other had called and I have never been sure that I was called and I will continue to be in doubt unless this committee pins it down, the fact that I was definitely called by someone. It is not plain to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least your own testimony is to the effect that you did not get down to your office until 10:30 that morning or around that time, isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. My testimony is to the effect that it would be my recollection, after this lapse of time, that I was in general down there about half-past ten on Sunday morning. Others stated that I was there earlier. That was just a guess on my usual procedure that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Admiral, this was of such importance that the President of the United States took from the [6215] Supreme Court on leave Justice Roberts, named him as the head of a committee to investigate how this thing happened at Pearl Harbor. Isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you, the head of the Navy, knowing that the President a few days afterwards thought it was of such importance that he named a Supreme Court Justice to do the job, did you make an investigation into your own office, into this office that you had control of here in Washington, as to what was known in Washington and how this thing could have happened?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not. I knew pretty well what had happened and what was coming in and I was then very much engaged in fighting the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you were, but you were also interested in knowing whether or not your office was efficiently equipped and manned in order that it could fight the war in the future, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. That is true; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to leave that and I want to go to this report of the Secretary of the Navy. This is a report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President. The first sentence of it is:

The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on [6216] December the 7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy.

Now, the Army and the Navy would be all-inclusive, would it not, the way he has used it there, and I think a later sentence which I will read to you indicates that the Army and the Navy were completely surprised as far as the attack on Oahu is concerned.

Admiral STARK. That is what it says.

Senator FERGUSON. That is just what it says?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that your understanding?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would not want to make a statement as sweeping as that, particularly with regard to the Army. I know that Marshall was surprised, I know that I was surprised and I believe my principal advisers have testified on the subject.

[6217] Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to go to the next sentence:

Its initial success, which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack by both branches of the service. This statement was made to me by both General Short and Admiral Kimmel and both agreed that it was entirely true. Neither Army nor Navy Command on Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely because of the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of the preparedness of the American naval strength in Hawaiian waters. While the likelihood of an attack without warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, that is, in the Far East.

Were you of the same opinion?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I thought the attack would take place in the Far East, from the evidence we had.

Senator FERGUSON. You were then of the same opinion?

Admiral STARK. I was of that opinion as regards the most likely place of attack, but I did not preclude an attack elsewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. You were very close, Admiral, to the admiral in charge of plans, were you not—Admiral Turner?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6218] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that his opinion was that there was a 50-50 chance for an attack on Pearl Harbor at that time?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that 50-50 chance to which he has testified.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the State Department, Mr. Hornbeck, said that if he was a gambling man and was placing odds on the 27th day of November 1941, that it would be 5-to-1 that there would be no attack before the 15th of December?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that he had written such a memorandum?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there disagreement between the Navy and the State Department on that question of whether or not there would be an attack or no attack as far as America was concerned?

Admiral STARK. Well, Mr. Hull stated that he would not be surprised at a surprise attack. I dealt more with him than with Hornbeck. Admiral Schuirmann dealt primarily with Dr. Hornbeck.

Senator FERGUSON. Now reading from this report again:

Neither Short nor Kimmel at the time of the attack had any [6219] knowledge of the plain intimation of some surprise move made clear in Washington through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at 1:00 o'clock on Sunday.

Did you ever discuss that matter with Secretary Knox?

Admiral STARK. Only in the case of hindsight. No one intimated to me that that 1 o'clock message meant an attack on Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Does not he indicate it in here?

Admiral STARK. He indicates it there but after the event. I can indicate it after the event.

Senator FERGUSON. But it says here "made clear in Washington." It says "Neither Short nor Kimmel at the time of the attack had any knowledge of the plain intimation of some surprise move made clear in Washington through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura."

Admiral STARK. It is clear now. To my mind it was not clear then. Colonel Knox never intimated that to me prior to the attack, to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he goes on, and I will read this sentence—

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Are you reading from Knox's report?

[6220] Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I am reading from Knox's report.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that the one he made public; or the one he made to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. It is Secretary Knox's report to the President. That is indicated at the top.

Senator LUCAS. Is this in evidence?

Senator FERGUSON. No. Might I inquire from counsel as to where this paper was obtained from, whether from the Secretary of the Navy's office or the White House?

Mr. MITCHELL. It came from the Navy Department.

Admiral STARK. I never have seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reason I want to ask you some questions on the facts contained in it.

Senator LUCAS. May I inquire how long we have had this document?

Mr. MITCHELL. I was just going to ask that.

Senator FERGUSON. I have had it a day.

Senator LUCAS. It is not mimeographed and distributed to the members?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the only copy we have.

Senator FERGUSON. So that all will get it, I will ask the admiral to read it into the record. I think it is worth reading, because I want to ask some questions on it. It covers your question about the torpedoes, and that is the [6221-6222] reason I started out on it.

Would you read it into the record?

Admiral STARK. Starting at the beginning?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK (reading):

Report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President

The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its initial success, which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack, by both branches of the service. This statement was made by me to both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and both agreed that it was entirely true.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is not right, is it? It should be "to me," should it not?

Admiral STARK. It says "by me." I think it probably means "by me."

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is right. If you read the rest of it.

Admiral STARK (continuing):

Neither Army or Navy Commandants in Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely, because of the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of the preponderance of the American naval strength in Hawaiian waters. While the likelihood of an attack without [6223] warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, that is, in the Far East. Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday.

A general warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made.

Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared careful estimates covering their idea of the most likely and most imminent danger. General Short repeated to me several times that he felt the most imminent danger to the Army was the danger of sabotage, because of the known presence of large numbers of alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on this assumption, he took every possible measure to protect against this danger. This included, unfortunately, bunching [6224] the planes on the various fields on the Island, close together, so that they might be carefully guarded against possible subversive action by Japanese agents. This condition, known as "Sabotage Alert" had been assumed because sabotage was considered as the most imminent danger to be guarded against. This bunching of planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more effective. There was, to a lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of planes on Navy stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was not given the same prominence in Naval minds, both arms of the service lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial attack by the enemy. There were no Army planes in the air at the time of the attack and no planes were warmed up in readiness to take the air.

The Navy regarded the principal danger from a Japanese stroke without warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary provisions to cope with such an attack. As a matter of fact, a submarine attack did

accompany the air attack and at least two Japanese submarines were sunk and a third one ran ashore and was captured. No losses were incurred by the Fleet from submarine attack. One small two-man submarine penetrated into the harbor, having followed a vessel through the net, but because it broached in the shallow water it was immediately discovered by the [6225] *Curtis* and was attacked and destroyed through the efforts of that vessel and those of the destroyer *Monaghan*. This submarine fired her torpedoes which hit a shoal to the west of Ford Island.

The Navy took no specific measures of protection against an air attack, save only that the ships in the harbor were so dispersed as to provide a field of fire covering every approach from the air. The Navy morning patrol was sent out at dawn to the southward, where the Commander-in-Chief had reason to suspect an attack might come. This patrol consisted of ten patrol bombers who made no contacts with enemy craft. At least 90% of Officers and enlisted personnel were aboard ship when the attack came. The condition of readiness aboard ship was described as "Condition Three", which meant that about one-half of the broadside and anti-aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft guns were supplied with ammunition and were in readiness.

The first intimation of enemy action came to the Navy shortly after seven a. m., when a Destroyer in the harbor entrance radioed that she had contacted a submarine and had (they believed) successfully depth-charged it. Thus an attempted attack by submarine preceded the air attack by approximately a half-hour. Quite a number of similar incidents, involving reports of submarine contact, had [6226] occurred in the recent past and too great credit was not given the Destroyer Commander's report. Subsequent investigation proved the report to be correct. Admiral Bloch received the report and weighed in his mind the possibility that it might be the start of action, but in view of submarine contacts in the past dismissed the thought.

The Army carried out no dawn patrol on Sunday, December 7th, the only air patrol being that sent to the southward by the Navy.

The Radar equipment installed on shipboard, is practically useless when the ships are in Pearl Harbor because of the surrounding mountains. Reliance therefore of both branches of the service is chiefly upon three Army detector stations on the Island of Oahu. Until 7 December, it had been customary to operate three Radars for a large portion of the day. However, on 6 December, permission was requested and obtained from the Control Officer, to, on 7 December, operate only from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m. Accordingly, on 7 December, the stations were manned from before dawn until seven a. m. when they were closed officially. However, by pure chance one Army non-com officer remained at his post to practice on such planes as might take the air, and probably with no thought of enemy approach. At least a half-hour before the attack was made this Officer's Radar indicator [6227] showed a concentration of planes to the northward, about 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air Craft Warning Information Center, which was the place from which it should have been reported to Headquarters. The officer there, a Second Lieutenant, took it upon his shoulders to pass it up, explaining that he had been told the *Enterprise* was at sea, and that the planes he had located were probably from that carrier.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I interrupt you, Admiral, just one moment? Our information has been, has it not, and yours was the same, that he thought there were B-17's coming in? Is this the first time you ever heard he thought they were planes from the *Enterprise*?

Admiral STARK. I think he said that, and also waited for a flight from the coast coming in at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In the previous hearing it was said there were three different sources that the planes might come from.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask the Admiral, had you any information as to where they thought the planes were coming from, other than what is in this message?

Admiral STARK. Since that event I knew of the flight from the coast to Oahu, which came in, I believe, during [6228] the attack, and I have some recollection, although it is a little hazy, about hearing also that he thought there might have been planes from a carrier.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield to a question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In General Short's testimony he refers to an affidavit on that that covers three possible places where the planes might have been coming from.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. (Reading):

No report of this discovery of an enemy air force approaching from the north reached either the Army or the Navy Commander. If this information had been properly handled, it would have given both Army and Navy sufficient warning to have been in a state of readiness, which at least would have prevented the major part of the damage done, and might easily have converted this successful air attack into a Japanese disaster.

[6229] The Officer at the Radar station, I was advised, showed this air force on his instrument as they came in and plotted their approach. I have seen the radar plot, which also included a plot of the enemy air forces returning to the carriers from which they had come to make the attack. This latter information did not reach the Navy until Tuesday, two days after the attack occurred, although many and varied reports as to various locations of radio bearings on the Japanese carriers did come to the Navy Commander-in-Chief.

The activities of Japanese fifth columnists immediately following the attack, took the form of spreading on the air by radio dozens of confusing and contradictory rumors concerning the direction in which the attacking planes had departed, as well as the presence in every direction of enemy ships. The Navy regarded the reports of concentration of enemy ships to the southward as most dependable and scouted at once in that direction. It is now believed that another unit of the Japanese force, using the call letters of their carriers, took station to the southward of Oahu and transmitted. Radio Direction Finder bearings on these transmittals aided in the false assumption that the enemy was to the southward. A force from the westward moved over from there in an attempt to intercept a Japanese force supposedly moving westward from a position south of Oahu. Subsequent information, based upon [6230] a chart recovered from a Japanese plane which was shot down, indicated that the Japanese forces actually retired to the northward. In any event, they were not contacted by either of the task forces, one of which was too far to the westward to have established contact on 7 December.

The Army anti-aircraft batteries were not manned when the attack was made and the mobile units were not in position. All Army personnel were in their quarters and the guns were not manned or in position for firing, save only those in fixed positions. Early anti-aircraft fire consisted almost exclusively of fire from 50-caliber machine guns.

The enemy attacked simultaneously on three Army fields, one Navy field, and at Pearl Harbor. This attack was substantially unopposed except by very light and ineffective machine gun fire at the fields and stations. Generally speaking, the bombing attacks initially were directed at the air fields and the torpedo attacks at the ships in the harbor. The first return fire from the guns of the fleet began, it is estimated, about four minutes after the first torpedo was fired, and this fire grew rapidly in intensity.

Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the assault. As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. The torpedo planes, flying low, appeared first over the hills surrounding the harbor, and in probably [6231] not more than sixty seconds were in a position to discharge their torpedoes. The second wave over the harbor was resisted with far greater fire power and a number of enemy planes were shot down. The third attack over the harbor was met by so intensive a barrage from the ships that it was driven off without getting the attack home, no effective hits being made in the harbor by this last assault.

The Army succeeded in getting ten fighter planes in the air before the enemy made the third and final sweep, and in the combat that ensued they estimate eleven enemy craft were shot down by plane or anti-aircraft fire. The Navy claims twelve more were destroyed by gunfire from the ships, making a total enemy loss of twenty-three. To these twenty-three, eighteen more may be added with reasonable assurances, these eighteen being Japanese planes which found themselves without sufficient fuel to return to their carriers and who plunged into the sea. Conversation between the planes and the Japanese fleet, in plain language, received in Oahu, is the basis for this assumption. If true, it makes a total of forty-one planes lost by the Japanese.

The estimate of the number of planes attacking varies. This variance lies between a minimum of three carriers, carrying about fifty planes each, and a maximum of six carriers. This would indicate an attacking force somewhere between [6232] one hundred fifty and three hundred planes.

From the crashed Japanese planes considerable information was obtained concerning their general character. Papers discovered on a Japanese plane which crashed indicate a striking force of six carriers, three heavy cruisers, and numerous auxiliary craft including destroyers and other vessels. It is interesting to note that the Japanese fighter planes were Model 0-1, equipped with radial engines and built in early 1941. None of the planes shot down and so far examined, was fitted with any armored protection for the pilot nor were any self-sealing gasoline tanks found in any plane. American radio and other American-built equipment was recovered from the wreckage. One plane was armed with a Lewis gun of the 1920 vintage. Some observers believed that the planes carried an unusual number of rounds of ammunition and the use of explosive and incendiary 20-millimeter ammunition was a material factor in damaging planes and other objectives on the ground. The torpedo bombers were of an old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about 1906, equipped with large vanes on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive customary of torpedoes dropped by planes. It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent weapons. With this in mind, it was found that the armor-piercing bombs employed were 15-inch A. P. projectiles, fitted with tail [6233] vanes.

In actual combat when American planes were able to take the air, American fliers appear to have proved themselves considerably superior. One Army pilot alone is credited with shooting down four Japanese planes. All of the pilots who got in the air returned to the ground confident of their ability to handle Japanese air forces successfully in the future.

At neither Army or Navy air fields were planes dispersed. At Kaneohe some VP planes were, however, moored in the water. They, too, were destroyed by machine gun fire, using incendiary bullets. Consequently, most of them were put out of action by the enemy in the initial sweep. Hangars on all of the fields were heavily bombed and many of them completely wrecked. At Hickam Field a very large barracks building was burned with heavy loss of life. The heaviest casualties in the Navy were incurred aboard ships subjected to torpedo attack. The bulk of the damage done to the fleet was done by torpedoes and not by bombs, some ships being hit by four or more torpedoes. With the sole exception of the *Arizona*, bombs proved ineffectual in causing serious damage.

Many of the officers and men of the crews when their ships were set afire were compelled to take to the water. A very considerable number were trapped below decks aboard the [6234] *Oklahoma* and the *Utah*, both of which capsized. By cutting through the bottom of these two vessels, while the attack was in progress, twenty-six additional men were rescued alive. Throughout the action, small boats from other ships and from the harbor swarmed over the harbor engaged in the rescue of men who were driven overboard from their ships. The rescue of men from drowning and the recovery and swift treatment of the wounded was carried on throughout the engagement by both service people and civilians with the greatest gallantry. Temporary hospital quarters were provided in half a dozen different places and the wounded were cared for promptly. Because of the huge number of unidentified dead, many being burned beyond recognition and a large number having been picked up in the harbor unrecognizable after several days in the water, several hundred were buried in a common grave on Government land adjoining the Navy Yard. While I was still there bodies were being recovered from the water, but all were in a condition which prevented identification. Dispositions made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Bloch) were adequate and were efficiently carried out.

Of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbor when the attack was made on 7 December, three escaped serious damage and can be put to sea in a matter of a few days. These are the *Maryland*, *Pennsylvania*, and the *Tennessee*. The *Nevada* can be raised in a month, and will then require a complete overhaul. The *California* can be raised in two and one-half months, and then must be given temporary repairs in order to send her to the Pacific Coast for a year's overhaul. The *West Virginia* can be raised in three months, and will require a year and a half to two years for overhaul. The *Oklahoma*, which was overturned, it is estimated can be raised in four months. Whether she will be worth overhaul cannot be determined now. The *Arizona* is a total wreck, her forward magazine having exploded after she had been damaged by both torpedoes and bombs. The *Colorado* was on the Pacific coast for overhaul.

There were six cruisers in the harbor at the time of the attack. The *Detroit* put to sea at once and is uninjured. The *New Orleans* and the *San Francisco* are now ready to go to sea. The *Honolulu* will be ready on December 20. The *Helena* was badly damaged and may require a new engine. She will be ready to go to the Pacific Coast for overhaul December 31. The *Raleigh* was flooded throughout her machinery spaces and seriously injured in other respects. It is estimated she will be ready for the trip to the Pacific Coast for overhaul on January 15.

[6236] There were ten destroyers in the harbor at the time of the attack. Seven of these put to sea at once and were uninjured. The *Cassin* and the *Downes* were in the same drydock with the *Pennsylvania*. Bombs designed for the *Pennsylvania* hit the two destroyers and totally wrecked both of them. Although both destroyers were badly burned, prompt fire fighting work saved the *Pennsylvania* from any danger. The destroyer *Shaw* was in the floating drydock at the time of the attack. All of this ship forward of No. 1 stack was seriously damaged or blown off. The afterpart of the ship is still intact and can be salvaged, and a new section can be built to replace that part of the ship now destroyed.

The mine layer *Oglala* was lying moored outside the *Helena*, and received the impact of the torpedo attack designed for the cruiser. She is a total loss. The airplane tender *Curtis*, which was bombed and injured by fire started when a torpedo plane plunged into her crane, will be ready for service on December 17th. The *Vestal*, one of the ships on the train, which was damaged, will be ready to go to the Pacific coast on December 17th for overhaul. The old battleship *Utah*, which had been converted into a training ship for anti-aircraft instruction, is a total loss.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General [6237] Short to alibi the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted they did not expect it, and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if it came. Both Kimmel and Short evidently regarded an air attack as extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs would have to travel to make the attack, and the consequent exposure of such a task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet. Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was attempted it would be made in the Far East.

Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island, is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well-disposed anti-aircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns.

There was evident in both Army and Navy only a very slight feeling of apprehension of any attack at all, and [6238] neither Army nor Navy were in a position of readiness because of this feeling.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there was available to the enemy in Oahu probably the most efficient fifth column to be found anywhere in the American possessions, due to the presence of very large numbers of alien Japanese. The intelligence work done by this fifth column before the attack, provided the Japanese Navy with exact knowledge of all necessary details to plan the attack. This included exact charts showing customary position of ships when in Pearl

Harbor, exact location of all defenses, gun power and numerous other details. Papers captured from the Japanese submarine that ran ashore indicated that the exact position of nearly every ship in the harbor was known and charted, and all the necessary data to facilitate a submarine attack was in Japanese possession. It is an interesting fact that the *Utah* at the time of the attack occupied a berth normally used by an aircraft carrier, and she was sunk and is a total loss. The work of the fifth column artists in Hawaii has only been approached in this war by the success of a similar group in Norway.

The fighting spirit of the crews aboard ship and ashore was superb. Gun crews remained at their station with their guns in action until they slid into the waters from the *Oklahoma's* deck or were driven overboard by fires on other [6239] ships. Men ashore manned every available small boat and carried on rescue work saving the lives of the men who were driven overboard while the heaviest fighting was going on. Some of the crew of the *Utah*, swept from the deck of the ship as she capsized, were rescued by destroyers leaving the harbor to engage in an attack on the enemy forces. Although clad only in their underclothes, they insisted on joining the crews of the destroyers which rescued them and went to sea.

The evacuation of the wounded and the rescue of men from drowning was carried on with such superb courage and efficiency as to excite universal admiration, and additional hospital accommodations were quickly provided so that the wounded could be cared for as rapidly as they were brought ashore.

The removal of the convalescent wounded to the mainland promptly is imperative. I recommended that the *Solace* should be loaded with these convalescent wounded at once and brought to the coast with or without escort.

The reported attempted landing on the west coast of Oahu, near Lualualei was an effort on the part of the Japanese fifth columnists to direct the efforts of the U. S. task forces at sea and to lure these forces into a submarine trap. Fortunately, this fact was realized before certain light forces under Rear Admiral Draemel reached the vicinity [6241] of the reported landings. His ships were turned away just prior to the launching of a number of torpedoes by waiting submarines, which torpedoes were sighted by the vessels in Admiral Draemel's force.

[6242] The same quality of courage and resourcefulness was displayed by the Naval forces ashore as by the men aboard ship. This was likewise true of hundreds of civilian employees in the yard, who participated in the fire fighting and rescue work from the beginning of the attack.

It is of significance to note that throughout the entire engagement on 7 December, no enemy airplane dropped any bombs on the oil storage tanks in which huge quantities of oil are stored. This was one of many indications that appear to foreshadow a renewal of the Japanese attack, probably with landing forces, in the near future. Every effort to strengthen our air defenses, particularly in pursuit planes and anti-aircraft artillery is clearly indicated. This anticipation of a renewal of the attack is shared by both Army and Navy Officers in Hawaii. As a matter of fact, in the ranks of the men in both services it is hoped for. Both are grimly determined to avenge the treachery which cost the lives of so many of their comrades. Instead of dampening their spirits, the Japanese attack has awakened in them a stern spirit of revenge that would be an important factor in the successful resistance of any new enemy approach.

SALVAGE OPERATIONS

The salvage operation involved in raising the sunken battleships is one of the most important pieces of defense [6242] work now under way. Its magnitude warrants that it should receive maximum attention and all facilities in manpower and material that will further its expeditious progress, including top priorities for material and high speed transportation facilities to and from the mainland and Hawaii.

The Navy is fortunate that Lieutenant Commander Lemuel Curtis, who is an officer in the Naval Reserve, and who is one of the most expert salvage men in the United States was in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. He is in full charge of the salvage operations under Commander J. M. Steele, USN, the representative of the Base Force Command. With personnel already available and with certain additions to be immediately provided, adequate organization to carry on this work with maximum speed has been assembled.

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I am proposing to send to Pearl Harbor a large force of partially trained men from San Diego to assist in the salvage operations, and to be trained to form part of the crews of the new salvage ships due to be completed next autumn. The most rapid delivery to the job of matériel and men to expedite this salvage work is essential, and I am proposing to arrange for the purchase or charter of the *S. S. Lurline* of the Matson line, or of some other suitable high speed vessel to be utilized primarily for this purpose. Such a ship would also be available for returning to the United States the families of officers and men who should be evacuated [6243] because of the dangers inherent in the Hawaiian situation. In addition, any available cargo space in this vessel not needed for the transfer of matériel for the salvage operations can be used to assist in the transportation of food to Hawaii.

Lieutenant Commander Curtis is the authority for the estimates of time required for the salvage operations on the *Nevada*, *California*, *West Virginia*, and *Oklahoma*.

REPAIRS TO DAMAGED VESSELS

The possibility of advancing the repairs on salvaged vessels was discussed with the Commandant and with the manager of the Yard at Pearl Harbor. A suggestion that help might be rendered direct to the Navy Yard by Continental Repair Yards did not meet with their approval for reasons that were compelling, but the desirability of dispersing part of the Naval work on this Station resulted in the suggestion that the Navy take over, by purchase or lease, three small ship repair plants located in Honolulu and that these be operated under a management contract, with personnel to be furnished by private ship repair yards on the west coast. These three plants are the Honolulu Iron Works, the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company and the Tuna Packers, Inc. Only so much of these plants as are useful in ship repairs would be taken over, and the Navy Yard would assign work to [6244] them on destroyers, small vessels and yard craft, thus relieving congestion and scattering the risk in case of further possible attack. I am studying this proposal with the various interested parties. With these added facilities, the Navy Yard can adequately handle the work load presently to be imposed upon it.

INSTRUCTIONS TO WEST COAST NAVAL DISTRICTS

Upon arrival in San Diego, I was met by the Commandants of the 11th Naval District and Navy Yard, Mare Island, and gave them the necessary information and instructions to post them on the Pearl Harbor attack to permit them to safeguard their commands so far as possible. This included all available information about the two men submarines which might provide a serious menace to the west coast. The Commandant of the Navy Yard, Mare Island, undertook to pass on all of this information to the Commandant of the 12th and 13th Naval Districts who could not attend this meeting.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, may I invite particular attention to the following points in my report and draw certain conclusions therefrom:

(1) Neither the Army or the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air attack on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely.

[6245] (2) The Army and Naval Commands had received a general war warning on November 27th, but a special war warning sent out by the War Department at midnight December 7th to the Army was not received until some hours after the attack on that date.

(3) Army preparations were primarily based on fear of sabotage while the Navy's were based on fear of submarine attack. Therefore, no adequate measures were taken by either service to guard against a surprise air attack.

(4) Radar equipment manned by the Army and usually operated for a longer period, was only operated from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m., on December 7th. This change was authorized by the Control Officer. Accurate information of the approach of a concentration of planes 130 miles to the northward relayed to the Aircraft Warning information center by an unofficial observer was not relayed beyond that office. Nor was other information from Army Radar showing the

retirement of enemy aircraft to their bases received as such by the Navy until two days after the attack.

(5) The first surprise attack, simultaneously on five principal objectives, caught them all completely unprepared. It was about four minutes before the first anti-aircraft fire by the Navy began, and as the Army aircraft batteries were not manned nor their mobile units in position it was [6246] some time before their anti-aircraft fire became effective.

(6) Most of the damage to Army fields and Navy stations occurred during the first attack, which concentrated on planes, airfields and capital ships.

(7) As anti-aircraft fire increased the second and third attacks resulted in successively less damage.

(8) The final results of the three attacks left the Army air fields and the Naval stations very badly damaged and resulted in the practical immobilization of the majority of the Navy's battle fleet in the Pacific for months to come, the loss of 75 percent of the Army's air forces on the Islands, and the loss of an even larger percentage of the Navy's air force on Oahu.

(9) Once action was joined the courage, determination and resourcefulness of the armed services and of the civilian employees left nothing to be desired. Individually and collectively the bravery of the defense was superb. In single unit combat the American pursuit planes proved themselves superior to the Japanese and the American personnel in the air demonstrated distinct superiority over the Japanese.

(10) While the bulk of the damage done to Naval ships was the result of aerial torpedoes, the only battleship that was completely destroyed was hit by bombs and not by torpedoes. Hangers of the type used on all four stations are [6247] a serious menace and should be abandoned for use for storage purposes in possible attack areas.

(11) The loss of life and the number of wounded in this attack is a shocking result of unpreparedness. The handling of the dead and wounded has been prompt and efficient. The wounded should be evacuated to the mainland as soon as possible.

(12) The families of combatant forces should be evacuated to the mainland as soon as possible. Orders to this end are already in preparation.

(13) Salvage facilities and personnel are excellent and, as presently to be augmented, will be ample to meet the Station's needs and will place the damaged vessels in repair berths in the shortest possible time.

(14) Repair facilities are adequate to promptly carry out such repairs as are to be made on this Naval Station. Auxiliary repair facilities are under consideration to relieve the yard from small craft and to lessen the concentration of vessels at one harbor.

(15) In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, the usefulness and availability of this Naval station must be restudied. Its air defenses must be strengthened immediately by the despatch of as many fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns as can be assigned to it. Special [6248] defenses against aerial torpedoes, such as balloon barrages and deep floats to be moored alongside important combatant units must be developed. Pending these studies and the addition of satisfactory safeguards, no large concentration of Naval vessels can be permitted at Pearl Harbor.

(16) This attack has emphasized the completeness of the Naval and military information in the hands of the Japanese, the meticulous detail of their plans of attack, and their courage, ability and resourcefulness in executing and pressing home their operations. It should serve as a mighty incentive to our defense forces to spare no effort to achieve a final victory.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At this time, we will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[6249]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Are you ready to resume, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Admiral STARK. May I bring up just one thing, sir, before the testimony resumes?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yesterday on page 6067, lines 13 and 15, in answer to a question from Congressman Murphy, I stated that the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor was 1:57, shortly before 2 o'clock. I believe the official testimony shows the attack began at 7:55 a. m. Pearl Harbor time, Honolulu time, or 1:25 p. m. Washington time.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr Chairman, the record would then have to be corrected by anyone reading it because that would cut down the time between 11:47 and the time of the actual attack.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I interject a request at this time?

Senator FERGUSON. I will yield.

Mr. KEEFE. We have been provided with an instrument or document or book, whatever it may be, entitled "Appendix [6250] to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations," and in the back of that, or, the final pages of it, appears several pages entitled "Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts," referring to the Navy Court.

Now, I have been interested for a long time in trying to get the top secret report of the Navy Court of Inquiry. I have had the Army top secret report of the Army Board. Am I to understand that this addendum, which is labeled "Top Secret," which appears in the book identified, is that the so-called top secret report of the Navy Court of Inquiry?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is all of it?

Mr. MITCHELL. As we understand it.

Mr. KEEFE. It is continually referred to in portions of this report and what I want to be certain of is that this that appears following the heading "Addendum to court's finding of facts" is the entire top secret report of the Navy Board of Inquiry.

Mr. MITCHELL. Everything in this book labeled "Top Secret" is the additional material. Not only what you referred to but there are other documents in it that are labeled "Top Secret" and they are the withheld part of the original report.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not referring, of course, to—it [6251] starts out with the Hewitt report, this book does, and then it has after the Hewitt Report, as I recall, there follows certain findings and conclusions signed by H. K. Hewitt, ending on page 180.

Then appears the Navy's third endorsement on the Naval Court of Inquiry, and then appears the second endorsement.

Now, this second endorsement and the third endorsement are labeled Top Secret also.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think it would be more accurate for me to call your attention to the label on the front page, which I think really describes it. You are right in your statement that the section you refer to is the addendum to the court's finding of facts, but in addition to that in this book it says:

Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations. See Narrative statement of evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations.

Mr. KEEFE. That says "Report by Admiral H. K. Hewitt."

Mr. MITCHELL. The page I am referring to is the first page just after the cover. That describes what it is. There is some material that wasn't in the original Navy Board report. It says:

Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations.

[6252] Mr. KEEFE. What I would like to get clear in my mind is this: Is there one document that I may refer to, that is official and I can put my hands on, which is the Navy Top Secret Report of the Navy Court, disassociated from Admiral Hewitt's findings and disassociated from the endorsement of the Secretary of the Navy and the report of Admiral Gatch, and so on?

That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think my confusion, or our confusion about it, rests on the fact that the naval order of inquiry technically didn't end when the original naval board made its report. The inquiry went on and that included some supplemental inquiries that were made.

I am informed by the Navy here that the part that you referred to, "Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts," the only addition that we know of on the original board report, is that.

Mr. KEEFE. I think counsel will readily grasp the significance of the inquiry which I am attempting to make.

Mr. MITCHELL. I certainly do. I realize the propriety of it entirely, sir, and I am trying to give you the exact information.

Mr. KEEFE. Then so I may understand, when the original Navy report of the court of inquiry was released, it [6253] was understood that there was some top secret material which was not included in that report and labeled "Top Secret," which was kept out, and that that top secret material is that which is now found in the last pages of this report under the heading of "Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts"?

Mr. MITCHELL. The Navy says that is so, and that is my understanding.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is all of it, there are no other findings or no other statements of a top secret character that were withheld out of the testimony or evidence at the time the Navy Report was first released except that which is contained in this so-called addendum?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, let's be accurate about that. I never speak of the transcript of the evidence as a report, although in a broad sense it may be, but the report and the opinions and findings of a board, just like a court, after they have heard the evidence.

If you are going to treat the narrative statement and call that part of the report—in a broad sense it is—why, then I will have to check against that and see.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, as lawyers, I think we agree on that, Mr. Counsel. But may I also ask, I have seen the testimony and have gone through it, taken by the Navy court, and there was a lot of that testimony that was expurgated [6254] and transferred over into a top secret file. Is that top secret file of testimony as well as this top secret finding of facts, is that available?

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you got it, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. They tell me it is in my file. I will have to check it. I will do so right away.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think Senator Ferguson has the only copy of it, of the testimony, the additional testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. That is the expurgated testimony that was taken out of the regular and put into a top secret?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is it. This is the part taken out of the findings, this is what we strictly call the report, it is in this book.

Now, we have a set of testimony that didn't appear in the published report—that we have one copy of, and I think Senator Ferguson had use of that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have it down. I sent my secretary after it.

Mr. KEEFE. I will be glad to come over and have you read it to me, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the other Senators might have a caucus and have it read to them. It seems strange that only one member of the committee can obtain these top secret documents.

[6255] Mr. MITCHELL. My own personal recollection is nothing, because this is a thing that I personally have not had to do with. I am relying on other people.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that, but every now and then we run into a document that has been in the possession of some member of the committee or his counsel which we know nothing of. It seems to me, in fairness to the whole committee, that we ought to know something about these secret documents that are withheld and not known about except by someone who gets it first.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is about the way it works because sometimes the requests for the stuff come in and the pressure has been so strong to give it that we don't have time to study it ourselves and hand it around and we have been sniped at a good deal for delay, and we don't make for any more delay than we can help, and then we don't have it, we don't have an opportunity to mimeograph it, or anything of that kind.

Maybe we have been at fault in that. But we have some difficulties.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman—

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me. One question. Has this report been released to the press?

[6256] Mr. MITCHELL. This document you have in your hands has not been offered in evidence. We have been holding it here for several days to put in.

Mr. KEEFE. Is it confidential, has it been released to the press?

The CHAIRMAN. Copies of the first two volumes, known as the Narrative Statement, were given to the press a week or 10 days ago, when distributed to the members of the committee. Recently this addendum, the third volume, has come in, and I don't think that has been given to the press—it has been given to them but they are holding it.

Mr. MITCHELL. They are holding it until I offer it.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, I don't want to get into the situation we had here when there was some criticism over the fact that some Army top secret report was passed around to certain people and not others.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose I offer it now and release it to the press and to you.

Mr. KEEFE. I think it ought to be.

Mr. MITCHELL. I offer it now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the three volumes?

Mr. MITCHELL. This is an appendix to the Narrative Statement.

The CHAIRMAN: The other two volumes that were given [6257] to the committee as the original Narrative Statement were never made a part of the evidence and never filed as exhibits, they were just distributed to the committee.

Now, if this third agenda, addendum, or appendix, whatever it is, is to be filed as an exhibit, it seems to the Chair that the other two volumes ought to be filed.

Mr. KEEFE. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman, on that. This exhibit is in a quite different category than the other two. The other two are a narrative of conclusions and expurgations and everything else. This is supposed to be a complete and accurate statement of existing files and papers. I have no objection to this, but if you are going to offer that narrative in evidence why, I think, that would be another thing.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought this was in addition to the Narrative Statement.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. The Narrative Statement is just the Navy story that they worked up. These, as the Congressman said, are documents themselves, and not the Navy's opinion about them.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no connection then between this and the other volumes?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. That is why we didn't offer the others. This one we expected to offer and I offer it now as [6258] exhibit 107.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 107.")

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may be clear about the fact that I happened to have this particular testimony, I obtained it a few days ago to read for the examination of Admiral Stark. I have had no requests for its return. It has been here. All these matters that I have had have been on a special request either by letter or otherwise that I might see them.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not correct?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct. No special favors have been given you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not complaining about any special favors but it strikes me that when a request is made by a member of the committee that instead of it being simply a personal request it ought to be for the benefit of the whole committee if there is any benefit to accrue to the committee from that request, and that the committee might have the information available to them and not have to go somewhere in order to get it because there is only one copy.

Go ahead, Admiral, and Senator.

[6259] Mr. MITCHELL. I only want to say that a great deal of this material requested by individuals turns out to be of no particular value and so I don't make a practice of mimeographing and distributing the answers to all this stuff—any more than I did to the log of the *Boise*.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair appreciates that fully.

Mr. MITCHELL. So we have to use some judgment about it. Whenever we thought a thing was of interest generally we have had it memographed but sometimes we doubt whether anybody else will be interested. That is how it happened.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. My remarks are not intended to be in any criticism of anybody, especially counsel, but it has occurred two or three times and something has been produced here that some of the members didn't have, although others did.

Go ahead, Admiral, and Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, where did you first get the idea that there was a secret weapon used by the way of torpedoes at Pearl Harbor in the initial attack, when did that first come to your attention?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall any particular secret weapon. There was nothing revolutionary, I believe, in anything they used.

Senator FERGUSON. In the discussion here a few days ago, [6260] as part of your testimony, when you were talking about these torpedo baffles, and as to whether or not we had already equipment to meet such an attack, the words secret weapon were used. They had a torpedo that we knew nothing about and that they were able to launch in 20 or 30 feet of water instead of, as at Taranto, where they had launched it in 60 to 80 feet.

Admiral STARK. That was covered in the letter where they stated no ship could now be considered safe in any depth, that is, any major caliber depth, where there was sufficient room for the run of the torpedo to arm. It was just a progressive step, which I explained in our own experiments we were continually trying to increase the speed of a plane in dropping a torpedo, and also increasing the altitude from which it should be dropped. And the Japs, as shown, had progressed very far in that. And the letter which you read this morning where they spoke about putting some apparatus on the stern of the torpedo, we had already been experimenting with ours, we referred to it as the tail of the torpedo. But I think there was nothing revolutionary except the development had gone further.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, the Navy Department never had any complaint because Admiral Kimmel didn't put in these torpedo nets, because they had neither furnished [6261] them to him nor had they furnished the equipment with which he could make them?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. He stated, in the first place, that he thought they were not necessary from the information he had, and which later information showed them desirable, but he had no nets which were easy to handle, or baffles. These we were endeavoring to develop and they had not been developed up to December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear that there had been a so-called secret weapon as far as the torpedoes were concerned?

Admiral STARK. Have you this [indicating document]?

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't, but I have read it, I think.

Admiral STARK. In the Navy Court of Inquiry on this subject—I quote:

The especially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use fall in the category of the so-called secret weapon of which the robot bomb and the magnetic mines are examples. Such weapons always give to the originator an

initial advantage which continues until the defenses against them have been perfected.

In other words, it was a development which we were all working on.
[6262] Senator FERGUSON. I had in mind yesterday at page 6032, where Senator Lucas said:

Well, the Navy Board of Inquiry called this bomb a secret weapon in the nature of a robot bomb which was unknown to the best professional opinion in America at this time. Do you agree with that statement?

And you answered:

A robot bomb?

Admiral STARK. Well, the answer is, of which the robot bomb and the magnetic mines are examples. I never heard it called a robot bomb.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. You would take, from what Secretary Knox said, instead of it being a new, secret weapon, it was probably a forgotten weapon, when he said:

The torpedo bombs were old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about 1906 equipped with a large vane on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive customary of a torpedo dropped by plane.

Admiral STARK. Well, the Whitehead torpedo, I may say, is an English type of torpedo with a reciprocating action. We abandoned it some years ago and went into turbine torpedoes. The old Whitehead was a good torpedo and they had developed this tail arrangement to assist in having it make a shallow dive. We were experimenting with the same thing. The wings [6263] or vanes which you put on the tail detach when it hits water.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. When you quoted the Admiral you said that he said a robot bomb.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't mean to infer that—

Mr. MURPHY. It was a question, and on the next page he didn't agree that it was a secret weapon.

Senator FERGUSON. And he explained that now, that he didn't agree that it was a robot bomb.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I have given you a broad picture from my memory. The Bureau of Ordnance could give you, if you wanted it, real technical data on that. They could give it. But we ourselves were working with detachable vanes to assist us in having the torpedo make a proper entry into the water so as to facilitate its not going so deep.

Senator FERGUSON. That the next sentence was, by the Secretary:

It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent weapon.

Admiral STARK. Well, that is in line with what I have said. It was along the line of our development.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going back to one of the summaries, where he speaks about a general warning on the 27th and a [6264] special warning at midnight on Saturday, did you ever hear of that before?

Admiral STARK. Not until you read it this morning. I don't know what is referred to there.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any idea what they might be referring to?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. That is new to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall when Secretary Knox came back?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet him?

Admiral STARK. Well, I saw him as soon as he came back, I reported to him, of course, as soon as he returned.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked to go to the conference between the Secretary and the President?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account, if this paper which you read this morning, Secretary Knox's report to the President, was on file in the Navy Department that you, the operating head responsible under the statutes, the rules and regulations, never knew about it?

Admiral STARK. Perhaps one reason is there is very little in that report that he didn't tell a considerable number of us in his office. All that with regard to behavior [6265] of personnel, with reference to ships, we discussed it, the salvage matters, and in general I am so familiar with what is in there to almost think that I have seen it, but I think I have not, as set up there, just as it is, I did not see it, to the best of my recollection.

But he discussed practically every detail of it with us.

[6266] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any special representatives going out to Hawaii in the summer of 1941 to get information? Did you know a man by the name of Curtis B. Munson?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it. When you say to get information, will you elaborate on that a little bit, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, here is a man named Munson mentioned, a representative from Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Isn't he an Army officer, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know that. "Believed to be a Presidential agent, carrying a letter from OPNAV."

Admiral STARK. OPNAV.

Senator FERGUSON. That is you.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "To open everything to him."

Do you know a man by the name of Curtis B. Munson? I show you this last page and see whether or not it will refresh your memory [handing document to witness]. Could I just have it back?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I do not recall that. If he was told by OPNAV, of which I was head, that everything should be opened to him I probably O. K.'d the letter but I do not recall just what it was. We had a good many people traveling around one place and another.

[6267] Senator FERGUSON. Now, if he went out there as a special representative of the Navy or was believed to be a Presidential agent and you approved his, "Open everything to him," and this was during this critical period, did you get a report back from him?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall the incident, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, let me try to refresh your memory.

Pertinent extracts from above report:

About that time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from QPNAV to "open everything to him" sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast.

Admiral STARK. Is that Colonel Knox talking?

Senator FERGUSON. No, this is Captain——

Admiral STARK. Zacharias?

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Zacharias talking; Ellis M. Zacharias.

Admiral STARK. He was in Intelligence at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Zacharias is talking.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6268] Senator FERGUSON. Now, getting back to reading this statement:

After outlining to him my firm convictions that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor on a week end and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated: "You now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately one way or the other." This envoy arrived in Washington about the 2nd of December 1941.

Now, had that ever been called to your attention by this special envoy?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not connect that up at all, the December 2. That may, however, have formed the background for a dispatch which you will recall has been placed in evidence here, which was sent out there to the effect that if Japan attacked it might come by a surprise raid on either a Sunday morning or a holiday. We sent that out there.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Admiral STARK. It was earlier in the year and I have forgotten just what the date was.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is in Exhibit 37.

Mr. MURPHY. The first dispatch in the Navy basic exhibit, I think is what you are looking for.

[6269] Admiral STARK. That goes back to April. It was some months previous to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Very well.

Admiral STARK. I will read it if you would like to have it. It is short.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I would like to have you read it.

Admiral STARK. This is from OPNAV. [Reading:]

Action: Com all Nav districts

NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned. They should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know what was the cause of that dispatch? Was it this special representative of the President coming back and telling you about this Intelligence?

Admiral STARK. Could you give me the date of that to see whether there is any hook-up on dates?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I cannot give you the date because the letter that has it in it, the memo is dated about [6270] the 17th of March 1942.

Admiral STARK. 1942?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the 17th of March 1942. You may want to read this whole letter, which may refresh your memory. I thought you would only know about part of it.

Admiral STARK. That was after we were in the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but his happened before you were in the war. To make this a little clearer, this was on file in the Navy Department and at the top of this statement I read is this:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 10, 1942.—I have read the personal and confidential report of Captain E. M. Zacharias, U. S. N., as a memorandum for Admiral Draemel, dated March 17, 1942, and desire to state that the remarks relating to me and the outline given to me as indicated therein is exact and correct in detail. In addition he suggested that the attack would conform to their historical procedure, that of hitting before the war was declared.

Admiral STARK. Well, our dispatch is of April 1941. This memorandum for Admiral Draemel is dated March 17, 1942. [Reading:]

In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the following memo is submitted:

[6271] My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because of what I consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such a situation, I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break through preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would believe it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter other than assuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our Fleet, which is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude that it makes no difference who does a job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly.

Any criticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster such as that of 7 December.

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them, of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battle-ships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusions and advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an at- [6272] tack. From time to time, in contact with the Staff, I would voice possibilities and only two months before the attack, amazed at unrealistic attitudes, I said, "When are we going to stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack." About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Onav to "open everything to him," sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a week-end and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "You now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other." This envoy arrived in Washington about 2 December 1941.

On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorrin Thurston, Head of the Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I related the impending possibilities as above and he said, "Here I am a G-2 Officer and I haven't even been advised what to send out over the radio in case of an attack." I advised him precisely to say, "We are having a sporadic [6273] air attack, everyone should keep calm and remain indoors. Do not go on the streets as it will prevent the military from getting to their stations. There is nothing to worry about." On 28 No-

vember I sailed with Task Force 8 for Wake Island. Upon receipt of CincPac's dispatch on 7 December, "The Islands are being attacked, this is no drill," I turned on my radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At least someone believed it. This was probably made certain by the press announcement about 3 December that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third envoy.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever known that before?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of it at all. [Reading:]

Seeing this, Mrs. Thurston reminded her husband and they were alerted.

On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu—one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmel as a positive indication of intention to attack—I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation. All was garbled conversation but the intensity of the acknowledgments (typically Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a single word which would justify me in requesting ComTaskFor [6274] 8 to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper warnings would be coming from Washington.

I have made it a point when afloat to give my advice to Intelligence activities both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in." I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally, two years ago Commander Dyer advised me that Cincus was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I recommended Lt. Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job in an office where there should have been twenty officers instead of two. Early in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to crack up. But I hesitated, wondering why should I have to advise Cincus on the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition.

One of the contributing factors to 7 December was [6275] the reluctance of Admiral Kimmel to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant to carry out directives or someone else would be obtained to do the job. The possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to the Department when former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition. A typical indication was one incident which I observed closely. When I arrived in Honolulu in November, 1940 to take command of the *Salt Lake City*, I was asked to assist in a survey of the District Intelligence Officer which was initiated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations had been blocked and that the office was of little value.

This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th as quickly as possible.

The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we enjoyed in the 11th and indicating the complete lack here, he approved all steps to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning and training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline faults in the District, the report [6276] or digest was brought to the attention of Admiral Bloch. This survey was made by an officer who was working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the District. At the sight of this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch gave vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities suffered for quite a time.

Mr. MITCHELL. How much more of that is there? These are Zacharias' personal papers. He is the man who claimed also that he settled and brought peace to Japan. I am wondering how much more there is.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't any desire to have him read it. I thought it would refresh his memory, that is all. Does that refresh your memory?

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to know whether this was written before the event or after the event.

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, yes, this is a story of one of those men with great foresight.

Mr. MURPHY. We have him listed as a witness, haven't we?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Some request was made, I don't know from what member, for Zacharias' papers and we hunted around and there was none in the Navy, but I understand that these are papers that he had in his possession that the Navy asked him to produce and then we turned them over to the member of the committee that had asked for them.

[6277] Mr. MURPHY. Before the hearings commenced there was a reference to the fact that he had made a speech in Annapolis, and it was after that that he was listed as a witness.

Mr. MITCHELL. He is on the list here.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, I will just ask you if that refreshes your memory, I mean after you read it all.

Admiral STARK. No, it does not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I ask you this, inasmuch as it has been read: Who is this man referring to here when he says, "You have two envoys in Washington and when the third arrived on the 2d or 3d of December," who is he talking about and to whom? He speaks about two envoys here and he says that a third has arrived. Who is he talking to?

Senator FERGUSON. He is talking about Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was he talking to? He says "you."

Senator FERGUSON. He was talking to Munson.

Admiral STARK. This memorandum is marked "Personal and confidential memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he is evidently reciting a past event there.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He exhibited a good deal of foresight because he starts out predicting what was going to happen and then in March he says it happened. Now, I don't know who he is [6279] talking to when he is making that prediction.

Admiral STARK. And signed by Zacharias.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Admiral, do you recall whether or not it was that report from Munson that caused you to send the April notes or order?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, I do not. The Munson report was, did you say, dated in March?

Senator FERGUSON. I don't know. I have never seen the Munson report and I don't know as he has ever made a report. Do you know whether he made a report?

Admiral STARK. This is in 1942. I do not recall the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. No, it was before the attack that Munson was out there.

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. It is clear.

Admiral STARK. It is not clear. I remember our sending out the dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why that dispatch was sent?

Admiral STARK. No. To my mind it was one of those things which was brought up in Intelligence as a good thing to send. I was informed of it and I agreed that it was a good thing to send.

[6279] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, going to the Intelligence branch here, that was a very important branch, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Very, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was under you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when Admiral Kirk went in?

Admiral STARK. I have got it here somewhere. Kirk came in, as I recall, early in—well, I won't have to rely on my memory.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it in May or June, or was it in April?

Admiral STARK. 1 March.

Senator FERGUSON. 1st of March?

Admiral STARK. 1 March 1941; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know what was the occasion for changing Intelligence officers on the 1st of March 1941?

Admiral STARK. Rear Admiral Walter Anderson had been head of Intelligence, was anxious to go to sea, was due for sea, and went to sea in July 1941 and Captain Jules James was acting as an interim head of Intelligence until Kirk came in in 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then that this Intelligence branch was treated in this way, that if a man went in there no matter how good he was, if his time came [6280] around for him to go to sea, he was taken out of the Intelligence branch and sent to sea, and a new man put in?

Admiral STARK. Generally speaking, that is true in the Navy. An officer in wartime, or if the occasion demanded, I think, at any time, might sacrifice his career, and I have brought up the point that there may come a time when we would just have to keep people in their billets, but the law requires an officer to have so much sea duty before he can be promoted and if he reaches a certain age and has not had that sea duty in the grade he may be and is likely to be held too much ashore and not promoted.

[6281] Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, under that rule of the Navy, men were fearful of staying in Intelligence because they would not get promotion?

Admiral STARK. In Intelligence, or any other branch, it might be the Judge Advocate's Office, it might be too much staff duty, it might be too much radio duty, or any other shore duty too long.

Senator FERGUSON. But back at March 1, 1941, things were rather critical in our negotiations, were they not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, 1941 was a critical year, I would say.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why would we change the heads of the Intelligence Branch?

Admiral STARK. Well, we changed them because Anderson went to sea in command of a battleship.

Senator FERGUSON. And the Chief Assistant acting was who?

Admiral STARK. Captain Jules James.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not take that place. A new man came in, Admiral Kirk, is that true?

Admiral STARK. Well, James was there temporarily pending Kirk's arrival.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you had a break there while Anderson was at sea in which a temporary man by the name of [6282] James and then Kirk came in?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Around March 1, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us why Kirk was removed from that department on the 15th of October, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Well, Kirk also went to sea-going command.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it at his request that he left that department?

Admiral STARK. As I recall, he was very very glad to get the job.

That does not answer the question exactly. I think he did request a sea-going job, but I could not swear to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we had a very critical period in October. That was just about the time of the change of the Japanese Cabinet, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, it was.

Senator FERGUSON. And the department under your supervision changed at that particular time, the heads of the Intelligence Branch, is that correct?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us who named Admiral Wilkinson?

Admiral STARK. He was recommended to me. I knew [6283] Admiral Wilkinson, but not well. But I did know him to be a man with a reputation for outstanding intelligence. I do not mean Intelligence duties, but he was a highly intelligent man.

Now Personnel usually gives a list of those who are available. I undoubtedly discussed that with Nimitz and with Ingersoll, and probably with Intelligence, and Wilkinson could be made available and was entirely acceptable.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss it with the President?

Admiral STARK. I think not that detail; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not as to who was to go in?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall discussing that with the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss it with the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. Unquestionably, because he was greatly interested in the Intelligence Division, and always had been. He took a very strong personal interest in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you understand that it took a special mental attitude for an Intelligence officer?

Admiral STARK. Well, other things being equal, a man who had had Intelligence duty, or who had a flare for it, of course, would be preferable, but there was not any question in anybody's mind in regard to the fitness of [6284] Wilkinson. He had been secretary of the general board, one of his important duties, and I think Wilkinson—I can verify it—had been on one or two of the peace conferences or reduction of navy international conferences. He was considered a highly able man and strongly recommended to me, and was available.

I may state, when I state the Secretary of the Navy was very much interested in Intelligence, none of these moves was made without his personal O. K.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, at the time of the Atlantic Conference, you were called to go to that conference, were you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know just when the first order of shooting in the Atlantic was? It was after that, was it not?

Admiral STARK. It was after that; yes, sir. May I state, Senator Ferguson, in that connection, that lest my testimony this morning be misunderstood with regard to the shooting order, the shooting order appeared in the Western Hemispheric Defense Plans. It was in defense that the shooting order was issued, not offense. It was to defend our own communications and our own ships and our own western Atlantic waters. The tasks assigned the Atlantic Fleet, some of them, start out under [6285] (a)—“Protection against hostile attack United States and flag shipping; insure safety of sea communications; support the defense of United States territory.” In other words, it was a defensive order.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that, but I wondered whether this would refresh your memory as to its date. On September 22, you wrote a letter to Admiral Hart, addressed to “Dear Tommy”, which was your custom; is that right?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Now, considerable has happened since I last wrote you. So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The President's speech of September 21, 1941, put the matter squarely before the country. We were ready for it; in fact, our orders have been issued.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So prior to September 21, the orders were actually issued to shoot in the Atlantic?

Admiral STARK. They were ready for execution.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. We were in complete touch with the President on that. Of course, we could not have done anything of that sort except at Presidential direction. These hemispheric defense plans were submitted to him, and he went over [6286] them before they were issued. Where we state the President directs, it was his directive; no one but the President I would say could direct us to take the action indicated in those plans.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate, though, that congressional approval was not necessary for an overt act. You considered that an overt act, did you not, the shooting?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that you would call an act an overt act if you considered it in self-defense or in defense of carrying out what you might call the congressional will of getting material abroad. I would say the background for it is that if we were making in this country enormous amount of material, if the country approved that, and Congress did approve it, they would expect to see that it got to its destination and not let somebody else go and sink it at his will. So, this was a defensive measure.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you to look at your memorandum for the Secretary of State of the 8th of November, the postscript, and that may help you on what you told us this morning about your statement before a congressional meeting.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the postscript on page 3 of that letter of the 8th of October 1941.

Admiral STARK. That was to Hart or to Kimmel?

[6287] Senator FERGUSON. No; it is to the Secretary of State. It is the memorandum for the Secretary of State, 8th of October 1941.

Admiral STARK. That is included in the letter to Admiral Hart?

Senator FERGUSON. To Admiral Kimmel, dated October 27. That is the letter to Kimmel on October 27. That is not your letter.

Admiral STARK. The memorandum of the 8th of October?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. The last postscript may clear up something that you said this morning and also what I ask you about now.

Admiral STARK. Do you want me to read that postscript, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; it is very short.

Admiral STARK (reading):

I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you before, namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is good and ready, and it would be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and when he thinks it will pay, and not until then. He has every excuse in the world to declare war on us now if he were of a mind to. He had no legitimate excuse in the world except to serve his own ends to invade the countries he has. When he is ready he will strike and not before.

[6288] I had forgotten how closely I paraphrased that this morning. It was the same thought.

Senator FERGUSON. But you put that in the memorandum to the Secretary of State?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been consulted or asked for that information, as to what your opinion was on that subject?

Admiral STARK. Well, this memorandum starts out with:

This morning you asked me—

This is to Mr. Hull—

what would be the advantages and disadvantages of abolishing the combat zones around the British Isles and elsewhere. You also inquired as to the possibility of the United States naval-craft escorting all the way across the Atlantic, also as to the disadvantages and advantages that would occur should Hitler declare war on the United States.

This was in reply to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you just read the last paragraph? I think it will also clear up something that you testified on.

Admiral STARK (reading).

I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our country would not let Great Britain fall, and that ultimately, in order to prevent this, we would have to enter the war, and as noted above, I have long felt and have often stated, that the sooner we get in the [6289] better.

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate you had had that opinion for 2 years?

Admiral STARK. I do not know how long.

Senator FERGUSON. You said, "I have assumed for the past 2 years."

Admiral STARK. "I have assumed for the past 2 years that our country would not let Great Britain fall, that ultimately, in order to prevent this, we would have to enter the war, and as noted above, I have long felt." I did not say "for 2 years."

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you that feeling?

Admiral STARK. I do not know just how long. I became worried about the situation, feeling we were heading for it certainly in 1941,

and as I stated yesterday in giving a very brief, general picture it often crossed my mind that if we waited too long it might be too late, and we might have a job on our hands to do alone.

Senator FERGUSON. That was shortly after the Atlantic Conference. At the Atlantic Conference were you consulted in any way about the Far East?

Admiral STARK. You mean as to any political decisions?

Senator FERGUSON. No, not political but military.

Admiral STARK. I was not consulted with reference to the [6290] Far East. We had no agenda at the Atlantic Conference. For the most part we would have talks with Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, with regard to our positions, as to what we had, and we talked over undoubtedly the ABC conversations. We talked a good deal, as I recall, about aircraft. The British were extremely anxious to get more flying boats in particular, and any other things that we could give them in the way of small craft to help them out in their fight against the submarine. But as to any special plans, or talks or commitments with regard to getting into the Far East or elsewhere, there were none.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted by the President at that time?

Admiral STARK. We got in on very few of the conversations, if any, on the political issue. Ours was almost all matériel, operations, naval matters.

Senator FERGUSON. I was going to ask, were you consulted by the President at that time as to the steps essential for the defense of the whole or any part of the Pacific area?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. We had laid out our general plan in ABC-1, as was read into some of the testimony this morning, and that will be shown, if you want to read it, in the final agreement made out there regarding the division of fleets.

[6291] Senator FERGUSON. ABC-1 did not include the Pacific, did it?

Admiral STARK. We talked over the whole ocean; the whole world.

Senator FERGUSON. Did ABC-1 include the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. Yes; it did, as I recall very plainly; yes, sir. ABC-1 formed the background for Rainbow 5, which formed the basic plan for WPL-46, and ABC-1 was our broad investigation of the entire effort, should we become involved.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, when did you first know that we were building landing strips at Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Rabaul, Balikpapan, and Singapore?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall our building those strips prior to December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted about that prior to that date?

Admiral STARK. If you can give me some background for that, some letters or something to show for it, maybe it would refresh my memory. I do not recall it at all.

Senator FERGUSON. General Marshall's testimony with relation to furnishing bombs down there, the furnishing of equipment, some landing strips, gas, and oil.

Admiral STARK. That may have been Army landing strips, with which we would not have been particularly concerned.

[6292] Senator FERGUSON. You would not be consulted on that?

Admiral STARK. Well, we usually talked about everything, but I do not recall that. I had no particular interest in its prosecution, so far as being able to help is concerned, so probably it did not make any permanent impression on me. I dare say he mentioned it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when the President returned, when were you first advised that he gave a note to the Ambassador of Japan in relation to further movements?

Admiral STARK. That was the note of August 17?

Senator FERGUSON. August 17.

Admiral STARK. My recollection is that in one of our liaison meetings, I think the next day or very shortly thereafter, Mr. Sumner Welles read us that note.

Senator FERGUSON. The next day, you think?

Admiral STARK. Very, very shortly after.

Senator FERGUSON. And what did that message mean to you, instead of reading it again? You know it in substance.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The message was a very sharp message, and like messages of that sort, when nobody knows just what may develop from it. We had already frozen their assets. That happened in July, and this was August. They were clearing their shipping in the Atlantic. There was not much more we could do. There were some loopholes left. I [6293] say "loopholes," there were places whereby we could give them certain material in exchange for raw silk, and one thing and another. They might have been closed. Diplomatic relations could have been severed. That was about as far, I would say, as we could have gone without consultation with Congress. I do not know what we would do as the result of that note. It was a very briefly worded note.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you think they might do in relation to it?

Admiral STARK. What would I think the Japs might do?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I would not diagnose what the Japanese mind would have thought that note was to mean otherwise than a sort of stop, look, and listen. That is the purpose I suppose it was meant to serve.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it more than stop, look, and listen? Did not it indicate if they went further south we would take action?

Admiral STARK. As I recall the note, we reserve the right to take any action which was thought was necessary in defense of our interest.

Senator FERGUSON. It is at the bottom of the page.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I have it here, if you would like to have me read it. It is on page 714 of "Peace and War." [6294] The sharp part of that note I think to which you refer is this:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary towards safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American Nationals and towards assuring the safety and security of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you prepare to be able to back that up? Did you have a conversation with the President about preparation to back that up?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I was preparing just as fast as I could for any eventuality, and had been since I took office in 1939.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know as to whether or not Great Britain was to give parallel action along the same line?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I think we could assume that from what Mr. Churchill said from time to time, and the fact if they went south it was affecting their interests. I did not assume it, but you asked me if I thought it might. [6295] I was not in on the issuance of this note and knew of it only afterwards when Mr. Welles gave it to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard that Great Britain did give parallel action?

Admiral STARK. To this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I want to submit, Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, the evidence up to this point shows definitely there was no parallel action given. The Senator has constantly assumed all through the hearing that parallel action was given.

Senator FERGUSON. I was just trying to ascertain if it was given. If I may get the Hornbeck note——.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall——

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment until I get this paper.

(Short interruption.)

[6296] Senator FERGUSON. I want to read you from Mr. Hornbeck's statement. I had better read the whole paragraph so that I won't be taking out one sentence.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't it be well to identify it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Has this an exhibit number?

Mr. MITCHELL. I couldn't give it to you offhand.

Senator FERGUSON. It was handed to us the other morning with exhibit 95 and exhibit 97, but my copy doesn't seem to have a number on it. It is an instrument by Mr. Hornbeck on the November 27 memoranda.

Admiral STARK. 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. 1941.

Admiral STARK. The Marshall-Stark memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. He says:

Mr. Hornbeck had over the years frequently advanced the view that the United States and Japan were moving toward an armed collision and that, unless Japan changed her course or was deflected or brought to a standstill by an encounter with some other country, such a collision was bound some day to occur. During the "exploratory conversations" of the year 1941, Mr. Hornbeck took the position that the only "peaceful settlement" which Japan was seeking was a settlement on her own terms wherein she [6297] might have the assent of the United States to her program of conquest in the Far East.

It is this sentence:

By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that month, the British Government and the American Government served on Japan a strong warning against further extending of her courses of aggression.

It isn't my language at all. Senator Lucas can raise the question but it isn't my language. I am trying to get information from the head man, that is, the head of the United States Navy, and I read you that sentence now:

By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that month, the British Government and the American Government served on Japan a strong warning against further extending of her courses of aggression. From then on it was generally recognized that Japan might embark on acts of force against Great Britain or the United States or both. Officers of the Department of State were in constant touch with officers of Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, exchanging factual data and discussing the possibilities of the situation.

Now, it is not mine. I want to know if you ever heard [6298] anything to the effect that Great Britain and America had given these warnings.

Admiral STARK. I recall only our own warning of August 17.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no knowledge of this?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that you would remember it? That would be an outstanding matter?

Admiral STARK. I think I would if there had been any such note we sent, had it been called to my attention. However, I wouldn't guarantee it.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is no exhibit number attached to it. It may be identified in the record by stating the date and from whom to whom it was written. It was read into the record but not given a number.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It is the Hornbeck statement attached to "Problem of Far Eastern Relations," November 27, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. The top document to the Hornbeck memorandum, is it?

Senator FERGUSON. I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I suggest it be given an exhibit number because Mr. Keefe has already put in one Hornbeck memorandum and [6299] there are three or four more available to the committee, which will be separate.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the next exhibit number?

Mr. MITCHELL. 108.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be ordered filed as Exhibit 108.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 108.")

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a memorandum entitled, "Special Assistant to the Secretary, November 2, 1944," with the initials, "S. K. H." That is Hornbeck, I suppose. Attached to it is a long memorandum, which was read from, and that also has the initials "S. K. H."

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Mr. MITCHELL. November 2, 1944. The memorandum attached to it is dated February 28, 1944, and they both appear to be signed by Hornbeck. And that which was read, was from his memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. They are both attached to the memorandum of the 27th; is that not correct?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Let's clear this up first.

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't find it in the paper here.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How can a memorandum in 1944 be attached to a memorandum in 1941?

[6300] Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is; there it is.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will straighten that out. On top is a memorandum of November 2, 1944, signed with Hornbeck's initials, stating:

The memorandum at the bottom of this file, a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations, and we find that memorandum dated November 27, 1941, "Problem of Far Eastern Relations."

The CHAIRMAN. To whom is that memorandum addressed?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is not addressed to anybody, but it is signed or initialed by "S. K. H."

The CHAIRMAN. Does the paper indicate to whom it is intended to go?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. It is just some memorandum that he had written and was in the file. It is not addressed to anybody. Then it goes on to say:

For purposes of the record there is now being superimposed a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, of date February 28, 1944, in which certain pertinent facts are stated and an analysis is made of the contents and true purport of the memorandum of November 27, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. There was a memorandum written by Dr. [6301] Hornbeck in 1941 and thereafter a reference made to it by Mr. Drew Pearson, and this memorandum of 1944 is a discussion of the Drew Pearson paper and showing it wasn't justified and showing what he had in mind in 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. Every word in this thing is written by Hornbeck. When he speaks of "Mr. Hornbeck" he is talking about himself.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what makes it difficult to understand.

Mr. MITCHELL. It has been offered in evidence.

Senator LUCAS. Is this an argument between Drew Pearson and Hornbeck?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair doesn't know whether it is an argument or whether it is an agreement.

Mr. MURPHY. There is a dispute.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. The Chair might interject this observation, that the statement in the memorandum of Dr. Hornbeck that parallel recommendations were made by this Government and Great Britain to Japan, would not of itself be evidence that such was done, if such a protest or representation was made by Great Britain, of course the document itself would prove what it contained. We have already had evidence as to the request or suggestion or urgency upon the President to issue a parallel document, [6302] but he issued his own warning, if that may be the proper term for it, on August 17, which was not parallel to what had been urged upon him. Whether Great Britain at the time issued a similar one, or it might be called parallel, could be proved by the document itself, regardless of what Dr. Hornbeck may have said about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that the British papers are not subject to our examination, so I take it that it is our duty to present to the committee everything that we have, and particularly those things that come out of the State Department, that would bear upon this.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not protesting against it. It is entirely proper to present it for whatever it is worth. But the mere fact that Dr. Hornbeck said there was a parallel statement, by itself wouldn't necessarily be proof of that fact, without in any way impugning Dr. Hornbeck's credulity or credibility.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not commenting on the weight of this instrument, but it certainly is evidence.

[6303] Mr. MURPHY. It is my understanding that the record shows that instead of the British sending a parallel note that Prime Minister Churchill made a speech in the House, in London, which was in effect their answer, or their action, pursuant to the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. There is quite a bit of evidence in on this. There is the radio broadcast of Mr. Churchill, which was sent to Mr. Grew, indicating that that was the parallel action, and there is this.

The CHAIRMAN. This has been filed.

Senator FERGUSON. There is the New York Times article.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the record, so we will go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, you knew Mr. Hornbeck, didn't you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was the political adviser, was he not?

Admiral STARK. He was adviser to Mr. Hull on Far Eastern matters. I believe he was head of the Far Eastern Division.

Senator FERGUSON. You would take for granted that he knew what was going on on these notes and messages, as far as the Far East was concerned?

Admiral STARK. He should have known in detail.

[6304] Senator FERGUSON. You had conferred with him and taken his advice and you had given him your advice?

Admiral STARK. I didn't confer with Dr. Hornbeck very often, and when I did it would probably be in the presence of Mr. Hull. Occasionally Mr. Hull would send for me and I might talk to him and several State Department people, but generally I did not take up business with Mr. Hornbeck.

Senator FERGUSON. But you never found that he was mistaken as to what had been done or not done? That is, on these messages and notes?

Admiral STARK. I had no finding one way or the other on that. I saw very little of him. I saw him occasionally, but generally speaking, Admiral Schuirmann dealt with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether your Department disagreed with Mr. Hornbeck as to the possibility or probability of war with Japan?

Admiral STARK. On the assumption that he thought we were heading for it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I also thought so.

Senator FERGUSON. So you agreed with him on that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, on the basis that he thought so; I also thought so. That was agreed.

Senator FERGUSON. In this particular instrument—I [6305] think it is this—he said it was 5 to 1 that we would not be at war with Japan by the 15th of December. Were you that strong?

Admiral STARK. No, I didn't make those predictions, as a rule. Those 2 to 1, 3 to 1, or 50-50 chances, or 80 to 20. I believe Mr. Hull, at times, as the percentage went down, of his chances, I often thought he was optimistic, but he should have known better than I, and doubtless did—he was working on it all the time—but I never went into that 5 to 1 business, or this or that.

The other fellow had the initiative and he was going to set the day.

Senator FERGUSON. You heard Mr. Welles say that there was a change from a thousand to one to a million to one?

Admiral STARK. On what?

Senator FERGUSON. That we would stay out.

Admiral STARK. That we would stay out of the war or get in?

Senator FERGUSON. That we would get in; it was a million to one.

Admiral STARK. It was pretty close to getting in after December—after November 27.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the Konoye visit, had you ever been consulted about that?

[6306] Admiral STARK. I knew about it. I wasn't consulted as to the advisability of his coming or not coming.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you present in the room when the note of Secretary of War Stimson was read as a memorandum at the bottom of another letter where he said he had agreed he thought it would be a bad thing to have him come, were you there?

Admiral STARK. No; I don't recall that at all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been consulted at all as to whether or not you advised to confer with him or not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. That was on a high political level.

Senator FERGUSON. And had you ever talked that over with Mr. Knox, the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. Not that I recall. As to whether he should come or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever prepare any agenda or prepare any ship to have the meeting on?

Admiral STARK. Are you referring to the meeting where they wanted the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I thought—my testimony may be inaccurate—I was thinking of Kurusu's visit. You are talking about the meeting on the high sea?

[6307] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I was present at some of the meetings when that was discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask, you said Konoye.

Senator FERGUSON. I was wrong—

The CHAIRMAN. You mean Kurusu?

Senator FERGUSON. I mean Prince Konoye.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. In other words, I am referring to the proposal to have the Japanese—that he and the President meet somewhere and discuss means of settlement in the Pacific. I had heard that discussed; yes, sir. I don't recall that my opinion was asked, but I was in sympathy and agreement with the stand taken that if the President of the United States left the country to discuss matters of

State with the Prime Minister of Japan, some sort of agenda which offered some chances of success should be set up beforehand, and I believe, without going into any papers on the subject, that that was the stumbling block, that we could get nothing from Japan.

But I would say Mr. Hull would be a far more competent witness on that than I.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you oppose such a meeting?

Admiral STARK. No; I didn't oppose, nor did I approve it. I mean I don't recall having expressed an opinion [6308] except that I do recall when it was discussed my own personal opinion was that the President and Mr. Hull were right in not just going out to discuss something with the Prime Minister without some preliminary agreement regarding the agenda and something which might be accomplished.

[6309] Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned in one of your statements here that our fleet was being depleted at Pearl Harbor and that while in its full strength it would be a deterrent, yet in a weakened state it would not be, as far as Japan was concerned. Do you recall that?

Admiral STARK. You mean as regards the numbers in that fleet?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral STARK. Admiral Kimmel made that statement, and I was quite in agreement with it, that the strength of the fleet, just like the strength of the voice of the United States in international affairs, is almost entirely dependent on its armed force.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, it has been mentioned here, and I want to clear it up, as to what Mr. Churchill said in his speech on the 27th of January 1942 in the House of Commons, and I wanted to ask you some questions on it.

Admiral STARK. This was December——

Senator FERGUSON. January 28, 1942, in the House of Commons.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Churchill speaking:

On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United [6310] States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make final victory sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation has not been falsified by the events.

Did you hear that discussed at the Atlantic Conference?

Admiral STARK. I did not. I was not present at the conferences between the President and the Prime Minister. Naturally, they were alone much. I remember that speech of the Prime Minister.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the very thing that you were trying to find out from the President, was it not, as to what we would do if Britain alone was attacked?

Admiral STARK. That is true, and I was trying to find it out and just what agreements were made I have no idea. I was surprised when I heard that talk of Mr. Churchill.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am reading further——

Admiral STARK. Because the President could not commit us to going in, and the Prime Minister knew he could not without being backed by Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, could we have gone into a nondeclared war, such as in the Atlantic, where Congress did not sanction it?

Admiral STARK. Not unless we were attacked. In the nondeclared war in the Atlantic, again I invite attention to the [6311] fact that it was defensive measures in support of getting material across the Atlantic for which Congress had provided.

Senator FERGUSON. To make it clear, Admiral Stark, why I am asking these questions, this, in my mind, only leads to the one question, of whether or not you believed that they were going to attack Great Britain alone on the 7th, and as to what you were prepared to do, or other people in Washington, or in the Pacific, or anywhere else. That is the only purpose of trying to find out what you knew, whether you knew about this.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether it would cause you to do certain things then or not to do certain things then. [Reading on from Mr. Churchill's speech:]

It fortified our British decision to use our limited resources on the actual fighting fronts. As time went on, one had greater assurance than if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American fleet.

[6312] Now, here is a former Lord of the Admiralty in Britain speaking about our fleet being in the rear and on the flank. Did that ever occur to you prior to the 7th of December, that Japan would not attack Britain alone, or would not attack Britain and the Dutch East Indies, and allow our fleet to be in the Pacific as stated by Churchill?

Admiral STARK. I thought of every angle of that, not as a result of any conversation between the President and Mr. Churchill, but from my own military viewpoint.

May I, the subject of ADB has come up once or twice—may I read you a dispatch, which is not very long, showing the final termination of that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I would like to have any evidence you have.

The CHAIRMAN. You may read that into the record.

Admiral STARK. We received a dispatch from Admiral Hart on 7 November 1941:

Are there any instructions regarding ADB-2, which I understand is in the hands of Batavia but not yet received here?

I answered that dispatch on the 11th, his dispatch having been sent on the 7th:

Chief of Naval Operations and British Chief of Naval Staff have agreed ADB-1 and ADB-2 are dead and a complete new [6313] approach will be required. Your 050255.

The one I just read.

[In general it will consist of a joint naval operating plan drawn up by you and Commander-in-Chief British Far Eastern Fleet who is now enroute that station and who will probably be directed to visit Manila secretly to establish personal contact with you and with Army high command. This naval plan would be integrated with Dutch naval plans and Army and Air plans to be worked out by the U. S., United Kingdom, and the Netherlands East Indies Commands in the Far Eastern area. Letter now enroute to you by air-mail on this subject. Additional instructions will be sent later.]

[6314] In response to that, which I had taken up with Admiral Pound, I informed Hart as noted therein that Admiral Phillips of the Royal Navy would visit him, I received the following from Admiral Hart, which was sent December 7. This is in five parts.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, that was written before any attack was made, was it not?

Admiral STARK. That was written before the attack; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reporter, please make this notation in the record that this document will be found commencing at page 5125 of the record.

Admiral STARK. The first two short dispatches I believe should be put in the record at this time to make it complete. I think these are not exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you give us what they are?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They are short, aren't they?

Admiral STARK. The two short ones.

Mr. MITCHELL. You have just read them, haven't you?

Admiral STARK. I have read them; yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Please give those to the reporter and he will leave those in the transcript and strike out of the [6315] transcript your reading of the other documents.

Admiral STARK. I will give him both documents.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral Stark, you were familiar though, with the fact that prior to Admiral Hart sending you that message, he sent you Exhibit 40:

Learn from Singapore we have assured British Army support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Admiral STARK. For the reason that we did not have any to give him on that subject and the rumor that he had was false so far as we knew. I had nothing on it.

Senator FERGUSON. But as soon as you received this one that you have just read, referred back to the correct page, you did reply to that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, doesn't this amount to practically the same thing, Exhibit 40?

Admiral STARK. Will you read that again, please?

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Learn from Singapore we have assured British Army support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

That is from Admiral Hart to you.

[6316] The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Dated December 6 or 7.

Senator FERGUSON. 7.

Mr. MITCHELL. 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. At 6:45.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that letter show whether Admiral Hart said the fleet had already been attacked?

Mr. MITCHELL. That dispatch was sent 3 or 4 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, and that has already been read into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a little deceptive, that 6:45.

Mr. MITCHELL. We figured it out that it was about 6 hours before the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Just before the attack.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't the reply in the long message that he sent amount to practically the same thing as he was asking about?

Admiral STARK. We had been working for practically a year on this subject of endeavoring to get together out there. We had had two or three conferences which, as I recall, were rejected, certainly the first one which came in, which I think was in April 1941, because it showed commitments and we could not make any commitments and we had sent word that we could [6317] not make any.

Now, that dispatch which you read me might assume that Admiral Hart had heard that we had made commitments. We had not. Whether this had any bearing on that I do not recall, but we got from him, "Are there any instructions regarding A-B-D-2," which was the last conference they had? We were taking that up with the Admiralty. Both were rejected and, as I told him, they were dead and then definitely to go ahead and make his own plan in case we became involved in a war, but so far as I know the information that he got that we would go in was not correct. I had never heard of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you consult the President about your reply to Admiral Hart's message that is on page 5125, volume 29, of our record? That is the one you were reading.

Admiral STARK. Consulted him about this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; about the long one. Before you sent the answer did you confer with the President?

Admiral STARK. With regard to the answer that I sent?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I undoubtedly told him about it because I kept him pretty familiar with all that material.

Senator FERGUSON. And what was the reply given to you by the President, that is the substance of it? Did he agree [6318] to it?

Admiral STARK. To this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; your reply to Admiral Hart.

Admiral STARK. Well, it went out, it was O. K.'d. It went into operation and just whether I took that up with him or not I do not definitely recall, but in general I kept him informed of every movement we made of this sort. I have not the distinct remembrance of this dispatch as I have of some of the messages with regard to the Atlantic, but I undoubtedly told him about it.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would say that if you did tell him that you undoubtedly received his consent or you would not have sent it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; or received his O. K. that he was satisfied with it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean, his O. K.

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me. I would like to have the record show when the answer was sent, the hour or day.

Senator FERGUSON. It was sent 7 in the evening, after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Not after the attack?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; after the attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I wanted to know.

Admiral STARK. Our answer was sent on December 7 at [6319] 080121.

The CHAIRMAN. What would that be in the United States?

Admiral STARK. That would be in the United States about 3 o'clock in the morning of December 7. That is when the——

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. No; that could not be because you got his telegram after that.

Admiral STARK. Oh, I was looking at the wrong number up here. The date of that dispatch—I was looking at the top of the page—is 080121. That is 1 o'clock in the morning, 1:21 in the morning Greenwich, which would be 21 hours 21, which would be 9:21 on the evening of the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. In other words, it went out 9 o'clock that evening.

The CHAIRMAN. After the attack.

Admiral STARK. After the attack; yes, sir.

Regarding these conversations and when they started and regarding political commitments, I sent a dispatch to Admiral Hart on February 15, 1941, reading:

Beginning February 22 British and Dutch staff conversations will be held in Singapore.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is already in the record.

[6320] Admiral STARK. I would like to bring it up at this point if I may, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

Admiral STARK (reading):

Will be held in Singapore under conditions of the utmost secrecy. You are advised to have your representatives participate in these conversations. He will have the power to agree tentatively to a joint plan of operation of U. S.-English and Dutch forces, but he will not be empowered to make any commitments of a political nature. Agreements must have your and my approval.

I just want to accentuate that question about political commitments, with which we were very careful.

Senator FERGUSON. "Your and my approval." Who is he referring to?

Admiral STARK. Hart's and mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral——

Admiral STARK. Wait, let me check it, will you please? "Must have your and my approval." That is Admiral Hart's and mine to start with an, of course, ultimately it would come back to Congress before we could do anything except in the case of a surprise attack or something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you come to Congress on the same kind of a problem in the Atlantic? Did you come to Con- [6321] gress or did anyone come to Congress on the same kind of an arrangement in the Atlantic?

Admiral STARK. You mean with regard to making arrangements with the British in case we got into war?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; we did not come to Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out what is the difference between the Pacific, the ABC in the Pacific and that in the Atlantic.

Admiral STARK. Not so much, sir. In the Atlantic we originally got together and made plans to have them ready, and for which I was responsible, in case we were drawn in. This was a similar thing, to have a plan in case we were drawn in in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. But in the Atlantic with what you call technical war—we won't go over that again—we went in without Congress. Now, what was the difference in the ABCD in the Pacific and the ABC in the Atlantic?

Admiral STARK. We had no similar problem confronting us in the Pacific with regard to transport of materials.

Senator FERGUSON. Weren't we transporting material to Iceland and we were transporting it to the Philippines? What was the difference?

Admiral STARK. Well, the difference was that we were being attacked in the Atlantic and we had drawn up defense plans against that attack. We had had no attacks against any of our ships in the Pacific subsequent to the *Panay* incident.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is if they had gone in against Britain—you see, we are talking about that—what would have been our arrangement? Were they going to come to Congress about taking the Azores? You were told to get ready with transports and all to take the Azores. Did they come to Congress about the Azores?

Admiral STARK. There was given the order to make a military plan for the Azores. It never was made.

Senator FERGUSON. You got the ships all ready?

Admiral STARK. I got the ships ready and I brought marines around to be prepared to do it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. But it did not eventuate.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have the same problem about sending some of your marines down to Brazil?

Admiral STARK. We sent some of our people down to Brazil.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you send any marines?

Admiral STARK. I think we did. We established air stations down there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that there was to be a German attack on Brazil and that you were to get a certain amount of marines ready to go down, or that there had been an attack?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I think not, Senator Ferguson. I recall nothing about a German attack down there.

Senator FERGUSON. When were the reserve marines called out?

Admiral STARK. You mean the marines who were on the retired list or on inactive duty, when were they called?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall just when that was. The Department can furnish you that information.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I am not concerned with the Atlantic, only insofar as I am trying to get why there was a distinction between

the Atlantic and the Pacific, that is all; I am not concerned with that.

Admiral STARK. As I see it, sir, our problems were quite different up to the point of war because in the Atlantic we were confronted with the problem of getting supplies through to the British, a problem where sinkings—at one time in 1941 ships were being sunk three times as fast as they were being built and that could only go on until we crossed the curves in the opposite direction. It meant defeat of the British and defeat of the sending of material over there due to German aggression on the high seas. We had no such problem [6324] in the Pacific. I do not know whether I get your question right or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you gave me an answer, as you see it, what the distinction was.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know whether this was a fact—and we were interrupted when I was reading Mr. Churchill's speech. There was one other item that I wanted to ask you about, and this is quoting from Mr. Churchill's speech of the 27th of January 1942 in the House of Commons.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all cost to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged.

Did you know that to be a fact?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not. That is his opinion. I do not know whether he knew it to be a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of facts that would permit Mr. Churchill to make that statement?

Admiral STARK. I do not know what his background for it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the message of the 27th you use the word "deployment" and I want to ask you, Admiral, if [6325] there is any place in the Navy war plans where the word "deployment" is used or defined?

Admiral STARK. I think it may be used. I do not know that it is defined. A deployment to a naval officer with regard to his forces, with a specific objective in view, I think, has a definite meaning to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you used it in a little different way in the October 16th message.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There you say, "You will take due precaution, including such preparatory deployment." Deployment there is preparatory; and in the one on the 27th it is used "defensive"; "appropriate defensive deployment."

Now, was there any place in any of the war plans where that word was used so that these commanders in the field would know what they were to do under a war plan?

Admiral STARK. Not exactly, no definite set-up as I recall. He would use his judgment as to what this meant, or if in doubt he could ask.

Senator FERGUSON. If I asked you this question, the word "deployment," is it a word of art as far as the Navy is concerned? Do you know what I mean by that?

Admiral STARK. Is it what?

Senator FERGUSON. A word of art. Is it used by the Navy [6326] to designate a certain thing?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the definition?

Admiral STARK. Well, deployment in general means a spread. You deploy your forces, you deploy on a scouting line, you may deploy on an attacking line.

Senator FERGUSON. But there is nothing in any war plan that you know of where it was used where he could look and say, "There is what we are to do," or "That is what we are to do"?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I recall the deployment which he made in response to the dispatch of October 16 was a preliminary deployment in line with what war plans called for as one of the first moves in the outlying islands and he did that.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read to you now what you did say before the Roberts Commission, pages 1813 and 1814, to refresh your memory on that:

What we expected him, Admiral Kimmel, to do was to get more planes and personnel and so on down to Wake and Midway and, if possible, to send his task forces, some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raider, which he did. He did that. We knew it. We knew all the task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put the people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway and were expected to go on [6327] the fifth or sixth up down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port—

meaning you—

and at that time out of the three task forces there were two scheduled to meet in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port. He kept them at sea. He had taken those measures, which looked absolutely sound, it was a safe assignment and other measures had been taken of a similar nature.

Now, do you remember that testimony before Justice Roberts?

Admiral STARK. I recall it now that you read it, in general.

[6328] Senator FERGUSON. Is it true now?

Admiral STARK. I knew about his sending his submarines out and deploying them after the October message. We had one dispatch indicating one of the forces at sea. I do not recall the other. We knew of the general plan, we knew of the forces in port and at sea, and just what he had at sea at that time, or I mean in port at that time. Since then, I haven't any recollection that we knew just what he did have in port.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, you had a Navy board where the ships were kept on the board?

Admiral STARK. We had a Navy board, as I explained, but all the general local movements were not kept up to date.

Senator FERGUSON. Would a local movement be a movement from Pearl Harbor to Wake?

Admiral STARK. That would be one within his province, which he initiated.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. Would it be a local movement so it would not go on your board?

Admiral STARK. I would say so.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not your board did show what he had gotten? Did you ever consult your board to find out?

[6329] Admiral STARK. No; I did not consult the board for that particular thing. He sent us a message, or a letter, I have forgotten

which, about one of those movements to which I have testified. I think it was the one which left the 28th, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Now is it not a fair summary of your testimony that, so far as the disposition by Kimmel of the ships of the fleet was concerned, you considered his message was sent in accordance with the directive in your dispatch of November 27?

Admiral STARK. The disposition of ships he had at that time?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Are you including planes?

Senator FERGUSON. No; just the ships of the fleet.

Admiral STARK. I have stated I did not know what orders he gave to his two task forces, but that movement was in general conformance with the strengthening of the area, and if I had known of it I certainly would have taken no exception to it. It was all right at that time, so far as I was concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, do I understand then that we had this very critical situation where you were notifying them of a war warning on the 27th and you were not consulting [6330] the board to ascertain exactly what he was doing?

Admiral STARK. The board would not have shown exactly what he was doing.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have got all of those boards downstairs. The Admiral stated yesterday the board did not show the position in and out of port, of Pearl Harbor. I did not bring them up. If you want them we can bring them up.

Admiral STARK. Lieutenant Commander Richmond tells me there is a board showing the picture from the 1st to the 6th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it did show it?

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I misunderstood you.

Mr. MITCHELL. I tried to draw out whether he knew the ships were bottled up at Pearl Harbor and I asked him about these boards, and he said the board would not show in detail just the ships in the area, so I dropped it.

I have the boards downstairs, and I will bring them up in the morning.

Admiral STARK. I was going to say the simplest thing to do would be to get the boards and look at them.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have the boards here tomorrow morning.

Mr. MITCHELL. We can bring them up now, if you have time.

[6331] The CHAIRMAN. We have only got about 18 minutes more.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, am I not correct in saying that there are two phases which modify the word "deployment" in your dispatch of the 27th? The first phase is defensive, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the second phase is preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL-46?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a fair statement?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at this moment.

Now, Admiral, take the task assigned in WPL-46. That involves certain offensive action, does it not, such as raids of the Marshall Islands?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you directed a defensive deployment, but a deployment which was also preparatory to an offensive mission, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Well, a defensive deployment preparatory—in naval understanding, when you tell someone to do something preparatory, it means that you will bear in mind or get ready for, and be in readiness to execute another plan later on.

[6332] In taking a defensive deployment he would protect himself and be ready later on to carry on his other duties under the plan.

Senator FERGUSON. But this language called on him to do two things, that is, one was a defensive deployment and the other one was preparatory to an offensive deployment, isn't that right?

Admiral STARK. The other does not require action in the sense that he has got to take up a position prepared to attack the Marshalls, that is the Eastern Marshalls. He takes a defensive deployment and it will be in keeping with readiness to execute another plan later on.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the plans use the word "J-day"?

Admiral STARK. Use what?

Senator FERGUSON. The word "J-day." What was J-day?

Admiral STARK. I think that was something that Kimmel used for Japan day, for war. The order did not say that, and our plan did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you had a certain day which would be war, and then so many days plus they were to do certain things in the Marshalls, isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. That would have been left to his discretion, as to when he would have taken the raids in the Marshalls. It would be his own plan.

[6333] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a law passed in Hawaii that designated M-day?

Admiral STARK. A law passed in Hawaii?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; a territorial law that provided for the declaration of M-day.

Admiral STARK. No; I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mobilization day. You do not know about that?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Now isn't it true that you did not intend Admiral Kimmel, in taking his deployment, to ignore preparations for the defensive action expected of the Pacific Fleet under the war plan?

Admiral STARK. That would be correct; yes, sir, I would not ignore it. But I think he would also not let that subsequent movement interfere with his primary mission at the time, if he considered that to be the defense of his fleet and what he could do to protect Pearl Harbor, which he must defend to be of further use.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the situation in June 1940, between the United States and Japan as critical as it was in November of 1941?

Admiral STARK. In June 1940?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the head of Naval Operations in June of 1940?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time an all-out alert was ordered in Hawaii, was it not, that is "Be on the alert against hostile overseas raids"? Do you remember that?

Admiral STARK. That was an alert ordered by the Army. Is that the one you refer to?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one I am referring to, June 17, 1940.

Admiral STARK. My memory on that is very hazy. Apparently we had nothing—the files have been recently searched—to show anything of an unusual character to cause us to alert the fleet at that time, and we have been unable to find it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not Admiral Richardson say that he did receive a message later, that it was a genuine alert and that he was to act accordingly?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; he stated his remembrance of it was, at first, that it was a drill, and later he sent us a message, and we replied to it, stating, "War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure after consultation with Navy and State Departments. Request [6335] you continue cooperation."

But I do not recall, Senator Ferguson, that incident particularly. It left no particular point in my memory.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, there was not anything uncertain about it, was there?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. There was not anything uncertain about it? It said to be on the alert against hostile overseas raids, did it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes; but I do not recall that we were concerned particularly with it at that time in the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. I say there was not anything uncertain about it. An officer ought to understand that order, ought he not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; plainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Now can you tell us why that or similar language was not used to alert them on the 27th, when there was a danger, as you say?

Admiral STARK. That was a War Department dispatch at that time, and I cannot recall on what specific information it was founded, and certainly we were not perturbed and we were not looking for war at that time, and we have been able to find nothing to justify it.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you give that kind of an alert [6336] when you are not looking for war, and you cannot find anything to justify it, and then you get up to the 27th—let me relate some facts to refresh your memory, and that is that on the 5th of November you had a statement that the deadline was placed on the 25th, and then along came the days as they went by and they changed that to be the 29th, and it became certain and definite, and, as you have told us here, the President expected an attack on the 30th, which would be the 29th in Japan.

[6337] Admiral STARK. I said he would not be surprised, I believe, had an attack occurred, not that he expected it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am glad that you corrected that.

There is a distinction, you see, between you would not be surprised and you would expect. Now, with all these intercepted messages,

the one to Hitler indicating that they would go to war—when you had that tense situation, why were not the same or similar orders given to be on the alert against hostile overseas raids?

Admiral STARK. I would invite attention to what we did send, and which has been discussed dozens of times, in the messages of the 24th and 27th. I think you have my standpoint on that, and they were my best judgment. I have also stated that while I would have assumed that that would have alerted, and had thought and had intended to fully alert, the people in Hawaii, I was not expecting an overseas raid on Hawaii at that time, having no evidence of it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, do the words "deployment" and "alert" mean the same thing in the Navy?

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What does "alert" mean?

Admiral STARK. Well, we do not usually use the word "alert" in the Navy the way the Army uses it. We talk about being alerted. I assume that when we send a dispatch that [6338] states "This is a war warning and the enemy is expected to attack," that that in itself would alert the people. The language was such, without saying "alert," that it certainly, we thought, would have people ready to intercept and take action against an invading force should it occur.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you do not use the word "alert" in the Navy. Did not they have alert Nos. 1, 2, and 3?

Admiral STARK. We call them condition 1, 2, and 3.

Senator FERGUSON. Condition 1, 2, and 3?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Army uses the "alert"?

Admiral STARK. They use the word "alert."

Mr. MITCHELL. "Condition of readiness" is the term.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had notified Admiral Kimmel to be in condition of readiness No. 1, 2, or 3, what would that mean?

Admiral STARK. One is: General quarters, all out, with us on board ship. That refers to the condition on board ship.

Senator FERGUSON. They were in 3, were they not?

Admiral STARK. I believe he was in 3 at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you would have put him on No. 1 condition, would it have meant the same as deployment?

[6339] Admiral STARK. If I had told him to go into condition 1, he probably would have wondered why I was telling him what sort of condition to take on his individual ships. It was not my place to prescribe to him his internal arrangements. It was my place to give him a war warning and the gravity of the picture presented as I could see it, and it was his responsibility to take whatever condition on board ship, or whatever dispositions of the fleet, he thought best to meet it.

Senator FERGUSON. You answered one of Senator Lucas' questions and I want to try and get you to elaborate a little on it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About the oil question, and your attitude toward Japan. Did you not testify before the Navy court, on page 43, question 117, that after the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan in the summer of 1941 you stated that Japan would go somewhere and take it (oil), and that if you were a Jap you would?

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct. You are reading from the record, and I stand back of it. I stated it, and I stated in the State Department, as I recall, that if a complete shut-down was made on the Japanese, throttling her commercial life and her internal life and her essential normal peace life by stopping her from getting oil, that the natural thing for [6340] a Jap was to say, "Well, I will go down and take it."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you attend the White House conference on the 24th of July 1941 with President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, or Under Secretary Mr. Welles, where it was indicated to the Japanese Ambassador that the British, the Dutch and American Governments were about to impose upon Japan an oil embargo?

That is in Foreign Relations, volume 2, on page 527, to refresh your memory.

Admiral STARK. Well, I recall a good many discussions about economic sanctions. I do not recall that particular one. I remember very clearly one meeting in the White House about that period with the Japanese Ambassador, and I think it was Mr. Welles and not Mr. Hull, in which we were struggling to keep the peace in the Pacific, when Nomura stated it was necessary for them to secure themselves regarding certain products in Indochina, food, rice, and the President proposed that, so far as his position could have influenced he would endeavor to see that they got food and their minimum needs, provided they would stop their aggression.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I got this quote from the official record, and I wondered whether that would refresh your memory.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that particular meaning [6341] to which you refer.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember on that same occasion that the President did tell Japan, that is, through the Ambassador, that should she then attack to get oil by force the Dutch and British would go to war against her? That is on page 527.

Admiral STARK. That the President said, "if"—what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That on that occasion he said to the Japanese Ambassador should she attack to get oil by force the Dutch and British would go to war against her?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that particular statement.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 527.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that particularly.

Mr. MITCHELL. Senator, I have here papers that we very recently dug out of the State Department files, a letter of July 22, 1941, by Admiral Stark to Mr. Welles, about the possible effect of an embargo, and attached to it, on July 19, 1941, is Admiral Turner's analysis of the embargo problem which was sent to Mr. Welles, with the notation at the bottom "I concur in general. Is this the kind of picture you wanted? HRS."

Senator FERGUSON. That will help. I will quote from page 527 of Foreign Relations:

The President said that if Japan attempted to [6342] seize oil supplies by force in the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch would, without the shadow of a doubt, resist, the British would immediately come to their assistance, war would

then result between Japan, the British and the Dutch, and, in view of our own policy of assisting Great Britain, an exceedingly serious situation would immediately result.

Do you remember that?

I do not think you and I have the same volume.

Admiral STARK. I think we have.

Senator FERGUSON. It is at the bottom of page 527.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it. But it undoubtedly took place, being in here.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether or not shortly after that, in fact in about 48 hours, the embargo did go on?

Admiral STARK. The embargo went on, as I recall, on the 26th. This is the 24th; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, referring to page 531 of that same book, that is the conversation between Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa and Mr. Ballantine, were you informed on that day that the Japanese military attaché told Mr. Ballantine that Japan would have no alternative sooner or later but to go to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies [6343] for oil and other material?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that, but it is in line with the thought I had as to what to do.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, taking the high-ranking officials in our Government, you said that you thought sanctions such as this oil, and so forth, would bring war on ultimately. Who else agreed with you?

Admiral STARK. Well, according to Peace and War, and which I read into my statement, I think the State Department also agreed with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did General Marshall?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would rather you asked him. My recollection is there was no difference of opinion amongst us with regard to that, and this Peace and War states:

Practically all realistic authorities have been agreed that imposition of substantial economic sanctions or embargoes against any strong country, unless that imposition be backed by a show of superior force, involves serious risk of war. The President and heads of the Army and Navy and Department of State were in constant consultation through this period regarding all the aspects of the diplomatic and military situation.

[6344] The CHAIRMAN. It is now 4:30.

Senator FERGUSON. Can counsel show us what those papers are?

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not see why I should not hand the paper to the reporter and ask him to transcribe it, and you will all see it in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Let that be done.

Mr. MITCHELL. Put in the record, Mr. Reporter, at this time, and transcribe, the letter of July 22, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Mr. Welles, relating to embargoes, and attach to it the study on the embargo problem, dated July 19, 1941, prepared for the Chief of Naval Operations by Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we will all have it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

2382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(The matter referred to follows:)

In reply refer to Initials
and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 22 July 1941.

DEAR MR. WELLES: The latter part of last week the President asked my reaction to an embargo on a number of commodities to Japan. [6345] I expressed the same thought to him which I have expressed to you and to Mr. Hull regarding oil, but as to the subject in general I would be glad to have War Plans Division make a quick study. This study was finished yesterday. I sent it to the President and told his Aide I should also like to send you a copy. The President expressed himself as pleased with it and asked me to send a copy to Mr. Hull, which I have done; and to talk it over with you.

Will you send for me at your convenience?

Sincerely,

H. R. STARK.

Honorable SUMNER WELLES,
Under Secretary of State.
State Department, Washington, D. C.

Op-12-djm.

Jul 19 1941.

SECRET

From: The Director, War Plans Division.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Study of the effect of an embargo of trade between the United States and Japan.

Enclosures:

(A) Copy of the following tables:¹

(1) Exports to Japan—December 1940 through May 1941.

(2) Exports from Hawaii to Japan—December 1940 through May 1941.

[6346] (3) Exports from the Philippines to Japan—December 1940 through May 1941.

(B) Copy of the following tables:

(1) Imports from Japan—December 1940 through May 1941.

(2) Imports from Japan to Hawaii—December 1940 through May 1941.

(3) Imports from Japan to the Philippines—December 1940 through May 1941.

1. *Purpose.*—The purpose of this study is to determine the effect that would be produced by the enforcement of an absolute or partial embargo on trade between the United States and Japan. Detailed consideration has not here been given to the trade between Japan and the Philippines.

2. *United States exports to Japan in 1940.*—United States exports to Japan in 1940 were valued at \$227,000,000, a decline of \$5,000,000 from 1939, and of \$13,000,000 from 1938. During the first ten months of 1940 the value of exports advanced, due to higher commodity prices and Japan's increased demand for American products as a result of enforced curtailment of her purchases from Europe. However, sharp recessions in export trade during the last two months of 1940, occasioned in part by the application of export license control to certain products, wiped out earlier gains. In November and December, particularly sharp declines were registered in machine tools, ferro-alloys, and refined copper, while scrap-iron exports were practically negligible.

[6347] 3. *Present trends of exports.*—(a) United States exports to Japan during the first five months of 1941 were valued at \$47,000,000 as compared with \$91,500,000 for the same period of 1940. During the current year trade has declined steadily from \$11,336,000 in January to \$6,594,000 in May (see Enclosure (A)).

(b) The principal factor affecting exports to Japan during the past year has been the progressively restrictive effect of export control measures. The virtual disappearance from the trade in 1941 of iron and steel products and of metal-working machinery, which together accounted for shipments valued at \$67,000,000 in 1940, was the direct result of an embargo on shipments of these commodities to Japan. The sharp drop in Japanese purchases of raw cotton during 1940, however, was the result of other influences.

(c) (1) During 1939 Japan purchased American raw cotton valued at \$42,500,000, while in 1940 her purchases amounted to only \$29,500,000. This drop

¹ The tables referred to were not submitted to the official reporter.

was due to the large quantity of piece goods then on hand in Japan, the relatively high price of American cotton compared to that of India and of Latin America, and shipping requirements for items needed more urgently. In November 1940 American exports of raw cotton were valued at only \$157,000; they have risen steadily since then, reaching \$881,000 in May 1941.

(2) Declines in luxury items, including automobiles, [6348] are due to a decline in purchasing power in Japan and to Japanese action in placing restrictions on the importation and use of these items, rather than to United States export restrictions.

(d) Petroleum exports during 1940 increased by \$9,300,000, or 21%, over the figure for 1939. Exports for the first five months of 1941 were valued at \$27,200,000, or 50% of the total for the entire year 1940. This is contrary to the general trend of exports.

(e) Sharp reductions in available ship tonnage has contributed to the fall in exports. Due to withdrawals from trade of additional vessels, future exports to Japan will be even less, regardless of export restrictions.

4. *Imports from Japan.*—(a) Imports from Japan to the United States during 1939 were \$161,000,000 and in 1940, \$158,000,000. For the first four months of 1941, imports amounted to \$40,000,000, a decline of only \$8,200,000 from the same period in 1940; this compares with a decline in our exports of \$37,300,000. Our exports to Japan exceeded our imports from that country, during the period 1 January to 30 April, 1941, by only about \$500,000, much less than usual. One result of the system of export control is thus seen to be the arrival at a balance between exports and imports. This fact permits Japan to pay in kind for all goods sent to her from this country, and a continuation of the [6349] present trend may soon make her our creditor.

(b) The following table shows items of imports valued at more than \$1,000,000 during 1940:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Value of 1940 imports</i>
Crabmeat -----	\$3, 269, 000
Tea -----	3, 190, 000
Cotton cloth, bleached -----	2, 263, 000
Raw silk -----	105, 311, 000
Silk fabric, except pile -----	1, 661, 000
Hats, bonnets, and hoods -----	1, 143, 000
China and porcelain ware -----	2, 423, 000
Earthen and stoneware -----	1, 096, 000
Total -----	\$120, 356, 000

These eight items account for 76% of our imports and indicate where curtailment might start if it is decided to take steps to reduce Japan's markets.

5. *Effect of further restrictions on exports.*—(a) The most important fields for exercising further restrictions on exports are petroleum products and raw cotton, which accounted for 74% and 13%, respectively, of the trade in May, 1941.

(b) It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead promptly to an invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. While probable, this is not necessarily a sure immediate result. Japan doubtless knows [6350] that wells and machinery probably would be destroyed. If then engaged in war in Siberia, the necessary force for southward adventures might not be immediately available. Furthermore, Japan has oil stocks for about eighteen months war operations. Export restrictions of oil by the United States should be accompanied by similar restrictions by the British and Dutch.

(c) Restrictions on the export of raw cotton would probably be serious for Japan only if India, Peru, and Brazil should apply the same restrictions. Cotton stocks in Japan are believed to be rather low at present.

(d) It will, of course, be recognized that an embargo on exports will automatically stop imports from Japan.

[6351] (e) An embargo on exports will have an immediate severe psychological reaction in Japan against the United States. It is almost certain to intensify the determination of those now in power to continue their present course. Furthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then take military measures against the British and Dutch, she would also include military action against the Philippines, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war. Whether

or not such action will be taken immediately will doubtless depend on Japan's situation at that time with respect to Siberia.

(f) Additional export restrictions would hamper Japan's war effort, but not to a very large extent since present restrictions are accomplishing the same result, except with regard to oil, raw cotton, and wood pulp. Thus, the economic weapon against Japan has largely been lost, and the effect of complete embargo would be not very great from a practical standpoint.

6. *Effect on the United States of a loss of imports from Japan.*—(a) As previously mentioned, exports and imports are approaching a balance. If exports cease, imports will also cease, as Japan would not have the means to continue her purchases. The same effect would be produced if we stopped [6352] buying from Japan, but attempted to continue our exports.

(b) In 1940, raw silk formed 69 percent of United States imports from Japan. Silk is processed here. It is used in industry and for certain munitions, particularly powderbags. The armed services have large stocks of raw silk, and could get along without further imports, though silk substitutes are not entirely satisfactory. Doubtless industry could manage without silk, although the lack of it would cause a considerable dislocation of labor now employed in the industry. The effect of stopping the purchase of silk would also have an adverse psychological reaction on the part of Japan, though possibly not so great as would an export embargo.

(c) Stopping other imports from Japan would not cause any great hardship in the United States, although the general effect on industry would be adverse.

7. *Conclusions.*—(a) Present export restrictions, plus reductions of available ship-tonnage for use in Japanese trade have greatly curtailed both exports and imports.

(b) The effect of an embargo would hamper future Japanese war effort, though not immediately, and not decisively.

(c) An embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by Japan on Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, [6353] and possibly would involve the United States in early war in the Pacific. If war in the Pacific is to be accepted by the United States, actions leading up to it should, if practicable, be postponed until Japan is engaged in a war in Siberia. It may well be that Japan has decided against an early attack on the British and Dutch, but has decided to occupy Indo-China and to strengthen her position there, also to attack the Russians in Siberia. Should this prove to be the case, it seems probable that the United States could engage in war in the Atlantic, and that Japan would not intervene for the time being, even against the British.

8. *Recommendation.*—That trade with Japan not be embargoed at this time.

R. K. TURNER

(Written in longhand:)

I concur in general.

Is this the kind of picture you wanted

H. R. S.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Saturday, January 5, 1946.)

[6354]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jules M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[6355] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson will resume. Do you want to make a statement, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I have one or two things I would like to bring up.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, we will proceed.

Admiral STARK. Senator Ferguson yesterday, at page 6326 of the record, called my attention to my testimony before the Roberts commission concerning what I expected Admiral Kimmel to do, and concerning what I knew about his dispositions at the time of the attack. He read to me an extract from my testimony which I believe was taken from pages 1813-1814 of the Roberts commission record. I would like to refer to this again and also refer to my earlier testimony before this committee.

In my testimony before the Roberts commission there appears the following:

The CHAIRMAN. Well, for General McNarney's purpose, all he wants to know is whether you expected him (Admiral Kimmel) to carry out his part of the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, whatever it was.

ADMIRAL STARK. Well, significant as to the state of readiness to be expected at Pearl Harbor were the steps [6356] that he took for other than the Pearl Harbor defense plan. What we expected him to do was to get more planes and personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task forces—some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did. He did that. We knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway and were expected to go on the 5th or 6th day down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port, and at

that particular time out of the three task forces there were two scheduled to be in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. He kept the others at sea. And because he had taken those measures, which looked absolutely sound, it was a safe assumption that other measures had been taken of a similar nature.

In passing, Senator Ferguson, I might point out that this quotation is not transcribed exactly at pages 6326-6327 of volume 34 of the committee record. The differences are minor, but I thought you would want to know that there is a difference.

In my testimony of Wednesday, Mr. Mitchell asked me what [6357] I knew about location of ships in the Pacific Fleet. His questions and my answers appear at pages 5727-5728, and read as follows:

Mr. MITCHELL. You had a map in your room somewhere in the Navy Department that showed the precise location of ships in the Pacific Fleet day by day, did you not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did not you have a ship movement division there that kept track of where the fleet was?

Admiral STARK. Not in detail, sir. The ships were in the Hawaiian area, but their departures from Pearl Harbor, for example, to their target practice ground or other local maneuvers, and that sort of thing, to my best knowledge and belief we did not know. I know I did not know it. He was not required to report that. If he wanted to move the fleet to the west coast, for example, he would have not done it without asking our permission, but if he wanted to go 100 miles in this or that direction, or if he wanted to go out for some special maneuver or for target practice, or what not, he would not have reported that to us.

Mr. MITCHELL. You did not then have a system of keeping track of the daily location of ships or of the fact that ships were or were not in Pearl Harbor?

[6358] Admiral STARK. No, sir.

I believe the Senator is interested in clearing up what he considers an inconsistency in these two statements.

In order to clarify the matter, I wish to point out to the committee that in my testimony before the Roberts Commission, which was given on January 19, 1942, I indicated that "* * * we knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea * * *." I must have been referring, apparently, to the carrier force which Admiral Kimmel had sent out on the 28th of November and to the regular task force which we knew generally from his quarterly operating plan was due to be at sea. I could not have referred to the carrier force which Admiral Kimmel sent out on December 5, for I had no information as to its composition and movement.

Specifically, as to the task force which departed from Pearl Harbor on November 28, and which, I later learned, included the *Enterprise*, I stated, at page 5729 of the committee record, that:

* * * But the order to go at that time was his (Admiral Kimmel's) own, and as I recall, we were told, in answer to the dispatch asking him as to the advisability, and other things, about the *Enterprise*, I believe it was, which left around the 28th.

Mr. Mitchell then suggested to me that the *Lexington* left December 5. I replied, at page 5730:

Yes. I do not [6359] recall, and I recollect of no evidence of his reporting to us about the movement of the *Lexington* which left the 5th.

Mr. Mitchell then inquired:

* * * Did not you know that the movement was taking place right about the time that you were sending these warning messages out there?

I replied:

Not until his message came in in reply to the one in which we asked his advice on the relief—on the movement of certain Army troops, nor do I recall that we ever were informed about the movement of the *Lexington*.

This referred to his (Admiral Kimmel's) dispatch of November 28 stating in part—

Twelve marine fighters leave November 28 in carrier for Wake. Expect send other marine planes to Midway later. On December 1 sending 12 patrol planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. * * *

These patrol planes, of course, flew out there under their own power.

I think my statement before the Roberts Commission and my statement before this committee are correct and are essentially consistent.

Then, sir, there was another question raised by Senator Ferguson yesterday as to whether there was any difference between the circumstances surrounding our advance planning with the British in ABC-1—which covered both the Atlantic and the Pacific areas—and our advance planning in the so-called [6360] American-British-Dutch conversation concerning the far eastern area.

I am afraid my answers yesterday did not make the matter very clear.

You will note that ABC-1 covered not only our advance planning in case we were drawn into the war in the Atlantic, but also contained our advance planning in case we were drawn into a war in the Pacific. This is shown in annex II and in annex III of ABC-1, which gives considerable detail concerning the responsibility, tasks, and forces in the Atlantic and the Pacific area, including the Far East.

I considered it my duty as Chief of Naval Operations to be ready with plans for coordinating our efforts with the British if we should be drawn into the war in the Atlantic. Having in mind, however, that I was not empowered to commit the United States to any course of action, there was written into the agreement, that is, ABC-1, the following:

* * * The agreements herewith submitted are subject to confirmation by:

(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom.

(b) The Government of the United States and His [6361] Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

This agreement formed the basis for WPL-46, the Navy's basic war plan.

As to whether we obtained the approval of Congress before engaging in so-called overt acts in the Atlantic, I can only say, as I have already said, that the people of the United States, through the Congress, had established their policy of aid to Britain in the Lend-Lease Act passed on March 10, 1941. We considered that the Hemisphere defense plans, calling for the defense of the sea lanes through which any effective aid to Britain must pass, was in accordance with this policy.

There was no difference in the circumstances surrounding our conversations with the British and the Dutch in the Far East. In my dispatch of February 15, 1941, to Admiral Hart, directing him to

have a representative participate in conversations with the British and Dutch at Singapore, I stated, with respect to this representative:

* * * He will have the power to agree tentatively to a joint plan of operation of U. S., English, and Dutch forces, but he will not be empowered to make any commitments of a political nature. Agreements must have your and my approval. * * * Strategic plans adopted should be completely realistic in nature. Due to the fact that doubt exists as to whether the Congress would declare war [6362] in case of Jap aggression against any country but the United States, your representative will express my view that any strategic arrangements of the British and Dutch which depend for their efficacy upon intervention by us would not be sound. * * *

I am sure that Admiral Hart and his representative at the various conversations in the Far East were well aware of my injunction against any political commitments and my caution that all planning must be done subject to the will of Congress, and so far as I know, these restrictions were fully complied with.

There was one other point that I am not sure that I got over to the committee with regard to the difference in the Atlantic, where the hemispheric defense plan was in full operation in defending our commerce and the fact that no such order was issued in the Pacific, except on the Southeast Pacific.

The reason for that is that we were at peace with Japan. Japan had not attacked any of our shipping and it had been unnecessary to call into being any such plan. The hemispheric defense plan was not a war plan in the sense that it involved offensive movements on a broad scale anywhere the enemy might be located. It was a defensive plan for the Western Hemisphere and our shipping.

[6363] Now, there was one other item and one which Senator Ferguson asked me to check up and that is as to who Mr. Curtis Munson was and if I could get any further information on him.

On the 23d of October the State Department sent word to us that Mr. Curtis Munson was desired by the President for a mission to study Japanese-American relations on the west coast and in Hawaii. As a result of that request by the State Department on us there was a dispatch sent by OPNAV, released by Admiral Wilkinson on 24 October 1941, which reads as follows:

On confidential mission Mr. Curtis Munson for President of the United States to determine exact status of Japanese-American relations on West Coast and in Territory of Hawaii. Allow him access to all information on Japanese activities in files of District Intelligence Offices. Mr. Munson now in California.

I did not have time to get further information but I learned just before coming up here that Mr. Munson made either two or three reports, I assume to the President, copies of which reports are in the files of Naval Intelligence and can be produced if the committee desires Admiral Colclough to produce them.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I would like, Admiral, to now ask counsel to get the entire files on Munson from the White [6364] House or the Navy file.¹ You have not seen those files, I take it, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; they came in just as I was leaving; they are rather long reports and I did not even read the first word of them.

Senator FERGUSON. I meant at the time that they came in. This was October what? When did he come out there, October—

Admiral STARK. My dispatch was October 24. The request was made on us on the 23d and it was stated at that time he was on the west coast.

¹ Included in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2680 et seq.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did not see the reports when they came in in 1941?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall them. I might add that I stated this dispatch was sent by Admiral Wilkinson. I did not state to whom. It was sent to the commandants of the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth districts, which are San Diego, San Francisco, Puget Sound, and Hawaiian districts.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, do I take it then that in this ABCD arrangement that we were speaking about yesterday you felt there was an implied approval of Congress as to what was done in the Atlantic because we had passed the lend-lease bill?

Admiral STARK. I felt so in that it was being done to protect what Congress had provided for and the President also [6365] made it very plain to the country I think in his address of early September.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was no difference in the plans in fact. In the Pacific you were going to do the same thing as you had done in the Atlantic if the facts required it?

Admiral STARK. That would be conjecture and I assume that it is a proper conjecture.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. In other words, this was a tentative plan. It would go into effect under certain circumstances.

Admiral STARK. Well, now I am not sure which plan you are talking about, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. The one in the Pacific.

Admiral STARK. The broad plan was the Rainbow 5. I thought at first my answer to your question was based on the assumption that you were talking about the hemispheric defense plan. That is the one which has the so-called shooting order in it.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is why we ordered three small boats out to watch for these ships going down to the British possessions, why we sent these airplanes out on December 2d on a specific order out scouting to see this movement to the British possessions, if we did not have a tentative plan which involved a movement against England?

[6366] Admiral STARK. We did have a tentative plan, but only based on if and when we got in.

[6367] Senator FERGUSON. But if they attacked Britain and not America, why were you concerned with going over there and scouting to see whether they were going to attack Britain and not scouting to see whether or not they were going to attack our own possessions?

Admiral STARK. Our scouting would have given us information as to where they were going, and we were very anxious to get that information, and the dispatch states that that was the purpose of the dispatch—in other words, to find out what was going to happen.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you—

Admiral STARK. May I go just a little further on that, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I gather—and if I am not correct, you can inform me—that what you are getting at is the possibility, at least, that if Japan attacked the British or the Dutch we might automatically come in.

Senator FERGUSON. That is exactly what I want to know, whether that was not what was in your mind, and then, going further, that

being true, as Churchill said in his speech, that they would not allow our fleet to remain on their flank, and therefore it should have been anticipated that they would attack at Pearl Harbor. Churchill is the one that raises [6368] this question in his speech.

Admiral STARK. Well, now, as regards that being true, I can only reiterate that in my initial orders regarding those plans I stated specifically that no political commitment could be made; that the plans, when they first came out, I rejected. When I read the paragraph from which one might infer that we were going to do certain things if Japan attacked the British or the Dutch, I rejected the plan right there, and what I read this morning further verifies that.

This is all from the record, to which I tried to stick so far as I possibly could.

I also, in my replies to Joe Richardson as to what we would do if Japan attacked the British or the Dutch, I did not know, and I did not think there was anybody on God's green earth that could tell me. That was wide, and it was meant to be wide, and I did not know, and in the dispatch this morning I stated I did not know what the Congress would do.

Now to go one step further with regard to Mr. Churchill's speech, I can only reiterate what I stated yesterday in regard to that, that I do not know his background for that statement.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand you cannot make a treaty. No one can make a treaty without the approval of Congress. But you, as the head of the Navy, had a plan that in case [6369] certain things happened you would be in a position to move and to defend America.

I am not criticizing the plan.

Admiral STARK. I understand that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know whether that was in your mind, and, therefore, I ask the next question: That being true, did not the high officials in the Navy and Army anticipate an attack upon America?

Admiral STARK. We knew it to be a possibility. Later on we anticipated it, and even almost a year before it happened, in both the Atlantic and Pacific the times were fraught with that possibility, and I endeavored to be prepared for that should it eventuate. It was very much in my mind. It was my job.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, for instance, on page 12 of your memo to the committee you have struck out these words "and by the President." You were saying, "Based on the understanding arrived at in the ABC-1 the Army and Navy developed a joint basic war plan known as Rainbow 5, which was approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy," and you struck out these words "and by the President."

Now, when you drafted this instrument you believed that the President had approved that plan; is that true?

Mr. MITCHELL. May I interrupt?

[6370] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you forgotten the exhibit that is in evidence, in which the President expressly refused?

Senator FERGUSON. I have not forgotten that, but I am asking for the opinion of this gentleman.

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't forgotten that at all. I want to know, when you put that in there, whether you were of the opinion personally that that had been approved by the President?

Admiral STARK. I was. I had forgotten the later document showing that he had not specifically approved it, but stated if we got in the war, as I recall the document, to then bring it back to him and he would approve it. At least that was my assumption from the memorandum, I believe, from Pa Watson.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you—

Admiral STARK. Just a second further.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Admiral STARK. I took that out because I had no documentary proof of it. I do know the President, except officially, approved of it, although it shows he was not willing to do it officially until we got into the war. Nevertheless, I sent that plan out on April 3. This is also from the record. [6371] I think it is in my statement, and in a letter to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have you go to your letter of April 4.

Admiral STARK. Of April 4?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I told Kimmel and told Tommy—Admiral Hart—that I had read to the President my official letter of April 3 and that the President had approved it and knew I was sending it out. Therefore, I think it is safe to say that the President certainly approved of it. He approved my sending it out, although he had not officially approved it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on April 4 you said this in your letter:

I make a two-weeks' inspection trip in the West Indies and our activities in the United States south of Washington and just about as I got back the President shoved off, so I had no close liaison with him until his return this week.

This is the part I want to call your attention to.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

I spent over 3 hours with him day before yesterday and another hour yesterday. My official letter on the staff conversations had some flaws in it as the result of that conference. I may tell you and Hart and [6372] King in the strictest confidence—and I mean by that nobody but you and Hart and King—that I read to the President the official secret letter which I mailed you three yesterday and received his general assent to it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That explains the situation because that happened at the time, did it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to the next page of your letter:

I am also enclosing a memorandum which I regard as vitally secret—

Admiral STARK. Is this my letter of 4 April?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Will you read the first letter?

Senator FERGUSON. It is the third paragraph down on the second page of that letter:

I am enclosing a memorandum which I regard as vitally secret and which I trust you will burn as soon as you have read it covering the President's talk with Ghormley—

Admiral STARK. Yes; that is Vice Admiral Ghormley—

Senator FERGUSON. "And me yesterday."

Now, what was in that memorandum that was ordered to be burned?

Admiral STARK. I do not specifically recall what was [6373] in that memorandum. There is nothing in it that I would not be glad to have this committee see, if I could put my hands on it.

I went to the White House with Ghormley. I understand that Admiral Ghormley is now in Washington, should you desire to call him. I went to the White House with Admiral Ghormley in order that he might talk to the President and the President to him prior to his going over as our special naval observer in London. We talked about ABC-1, as I recall, at that time, and I particularly pointed out something that I had always stressed, and that is generally with reference to the so-called "plan dog" as our guiding principle and as a simplified WPL-46 regarding the principal enemy.

I also distinctly recall the President's warnings to Ghormley not to, by any possible chance, make any commitments or say or do anything which would lead the British to think that we were going into the war. Nevertheless, he wanted Ghormley to find out all he could with regard to the British thoughts, and he authorized me to let Ghormley sit in over there—two Army officers were sent over at the same time—on conversations with regard to plans in case we got in.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you—

Admiral STARK. Just a minute.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir. I want to get as complete [6374] an analysis of that as I can, that secret memorandum that was to be burned. That is the only instrument I find that you mentioned was to be burned or destroyed.

Admiral STARK. In all this correspondence?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. There was one other letter which I wrote, and I think with which the committee is familiar, which I asked to be destroyed as soon as read. The letter turned up in the hearings before the naval court of inquiry and has been given this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, there should be a copy of this memorandum in the Navy files, should not there? You would not send the only one over there and have it burned?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that a copy was retained. I have given you my remembrance of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Admiral Ghormley can give you his remembrance of it, and I will ask that a search be made, or if counsel will ask the Department to make the search.

Senator FERGUSON. I will now ask counsel to do that.¹

Admiral STARK. I do not have it in my personal files.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know, Admiral, where you kept these personal letters when you were active with the Navy.

Admiral STARK. They were kept in the files of the Navy [6375] Department. My secretary kept them.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the file be marked "personal" so when you would leave the letters would go with you?

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5502, for a memorandum from the Navy Department in this connection.

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Admiral STARK. I left them in the Department under lock and key.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose lock?

Admiral STARK. I say under lock and key. They are in the files which I generally kept under lock in the Chief of Naval Operations' office.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not kept by you personally?

Admiral STARK. Not at the time I first went abroad. Later on I got them.

Senator FERGUSON. Later on did you remove them from the Navy files?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I got them to study them.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt they were your personal correspondence?

Admiral STARK. They were, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume when Admiral Kimmel got a personal letter from you it did not remain in the Commander in Chief's files there so that the succeeding Commander in Chief would have access to that file, any more than your successor would have access to yours?

Admiral STARK. I do not know. You may recall when Kimmel [6376] relieved Admiral Richardson I wrote him and asked him to read the correspondence which I had had with Admiral Richardson as affording a good background, and that in the court of inquiry in the summer of 1944, when I got my letters together, I also told Admiral Kimmel I had them, and if he would be lacking anything I would be glad to furnish him anything I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I am going to go to some other items which will be rather disconnected, because I do not want to cover anything that has been covered. I want to try to clear up some matters in my own mind at least.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As the Chief of Naval Operations you were responsible for the operation of the Navy, were you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And under article 433, that is the act of 30 March 1915, it states that you shall:

under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operation of the Fleet, and with preparation and readiness of plans for use in war.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You were charged with that statutory duty?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I think some misunderstanding might naturally arise in the minds of those who might read [6377] that, to think that I was actually operating the fleet. I believe the committee, after the testimony given, would not be under that impression.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were charged—

Admiral STARK. May I go a little ahead, a little further, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to complete your answer.

Admiral STARK. There was what they call the force employment plan, which was made out usually to cover a year, made out on a yearly basis. It gave broad directives. It showed when ships were going into the navy yard for repair; it showed the areas in which they were to operate; it would show a block when fleet maneuvers were to be held; it showed target practice periods, a general broad outline which the Commanders in Chief afloat and CNO reconciled, and then issued a plan.

Now the details of operation under that plan, that is the operations within an area in which the fleet was to base, that was up to the Commanders in Chief.

Do I make myself plain, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But you were also charged, as a matter of statutory law, with the preparedness and readiness of plans to be used in war.

Admiral STARK. That is quite true, and it was one of [6378] the first things that I took up when I went to Washington, and I am responsible for the plans which were drawn up and which I insisted be realistic. We even drew up things as to what we might have and might not have. The plans drawn up here were——

Senator FERGUSON. Who was authorized——

The CHAIRMAN. Let him finish.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me.

Admiral STARK. The plans drawn up here were realistic. The allocation of forces was based on the forces that we actually had, and the plan was disseminated, I think, on May 26, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you have ordered the fleet to mobilize? Was that your responsibility?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I could. But the fleet was mobilized.

Another thing that I did almost as soon as I became Chief of Naval Operations—I would like to give the committee this background—some of you may remember my coming on the Hill for special appropriations. My experience and my knowledge of previous wars in which we had engaged was that we entered them with a large number of ships in what we might call a reserve, and when I became Chief of Naval Operations we had a large number of ships in reserve, destroyers, submarines, some cargo vessels, some tankers. It was my [6379] ambition that if we got caught there would not be a single ship left on the Navy list which would be of use to us which was not ready. I went on that basis immediately, I went to Congress, with the President's permission, to ask for special appropriations for money for getting the large number of destroyers we had into commission, and the submarines and other ships, and Congress granted the funds for that purpose. It was tough on the forces afloat in some respect, because they had to give up enough experienced men to form a nucleus around which we put recruits to get these ships going.

But in December of 1941 we were practically mobilized.

The commander in chief of the Pacific corroborates that in his own war plan when he states that he was virtually mobilized.

Senator FERGUSON. You could do that on your own responsibility, and did it, even without consulting the President?

Admiral STARK. I tried to sell the President on it. I had to go on the Hill, for special appropriations for the destroyers, for example.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember having any discussion with the President in 1941 about mobilizing the fleet for war in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. The President knew that I was working on getting everything we had ready.

[6380] Senator FERGUSON. So then you take it it was an understanding between you and the President that you were mobilizing the fleet?

Admiral STARK. Perfectly, and requesting men in that connection.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was it your duty—

Admiral STARK. May I add to that also?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. The Congress knew it, because before the committees I went asking for money, it was thoroughly explained what I wanted it for, and it was to get these ships that were tied up in the Philadelphia Navy Yard and San Diego, Puget Sound, San Francisco, and elsewhere. Congress knew why I was asking for that money. I was asking for money for all sorts of purposes, for our shore bases, and I have often stated, and I would like to state publicly here, as I told President Knox—

Senator FERGUSON. You mean Secretary Knox?

Admiral STARK. Secretary Knox. That the work done by Admiral Moreell in getting the bases ready, that Midway might not have been possible, and the great victory that turned the point we had there, had it not been for the work done on those shore bases.

I would like to say also that the dock, the big drydock, [6381] in Hawaii, which was available the day after Pearl Harbor, was finished months ahead of time, and I had to come up on the Hill to defend myself against having made contracts which were perhaps not quite according to Hoyle in order to push on the work, as some of you may recall, not only in connection with my endeavor to double the size of the fleet but also to build up the shore bases to support the fleet, and particularly in the Pacific, and not only in the Central Pacific, but in the Aleutians.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, was it your duty as Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate the effect of diplomatic representations upon the countries to whom they were addressed?

Admiral STARK. I was necessarily interested in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it your duty?

Admiral STARK. I would consider it my duty to keep in touch with that so far as I possibly could, and to keep the commanders in the field informed of my evaluation.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did I understand you the other day to say that you only read part of the magic?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Ingersoll read part?

Admiral STARK. I suppose it would depend a good deal on how busy he was. He might also have read only the messages which were clipped as of importance.

[6382] Senator FERGUSON. Did you read all that were clipped?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were away, what happened?

Admiral STARK. Well, when I was away, the duty would be carried on largely by Admiral Ingersoll, and, of course, the others who were there.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose duty was it to clip the messages that you would or would not read?

Admiral STARK. That duty was performed in Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Who in Intelligence had the responsibility of clipping, with paper clips, I take it, what you were to read?

Admiral STARK. I think the initial clipping was done by Kramer, and McCollum was our far eastern officer, and he was also very much interested in it. Whether Captain Safford also clipped, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did they clip for you these so-called ship-movement messages?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall specifically about the ship-movement messages. I kept in touch with them generally, with War Plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. He is talking about ship locations.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about these messages in volume 2, in the yellow book.

[6383] Admiral STARK. You are referring to the ships at certain points?

Senator FERGUSON. The intercepts, at certain areas.

Admiral STARK. I thought you were talking about the broad problem.

Senator FERGUSON. I was talking about something different.

Admiral STARK. Your question is what?

Senator FERGUSON. Did they clip for you these intercepted ship-movement messages or ship-location messages, as they are known as, the Japanese messages, the military installations and ship movements, and so forth, in exhibit 2?

[6384] Admiral STARK. I can only say with regard to the particular messages to which I believe you refer what I said previously, that I do not recall having seen those messages, and to the best of my knowledge and belief I did not see them, but I may have seen them. In any case, it was my over-all responsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, which was of the most importance, when Japan was going to strike or where Japan was going to strike, or was there any distinction between those two points?

Admiral STARK. I would say they were both so important as to be No. 1 priority.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to get at why the same effort was not put on the translations or deciphering as to where they were going to strike as was put on the diplomatic messages.

Admiral STARK. Senator Ferguson, that gets down into a matter of detail which I think my subordinates could give you much better than I. I can give you my own knowledge of the thing but it is very general. It is not specific and I might be in error.

Senator FERGUSON. After all, you were responsible, under the rules, for the conduct of the officials under you; were you not?

[6385] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The over-all responsibility was mine; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, without reading some of these ship messages, they have been read, I want to call your attention to some that I think have not been read.

You say it is of equal importance where they were going to strike as when they were going to strike.

The message on page 12 was read to you. I won't read that again. It has been used as indicating a plan of Pearl Harbor, indicating a desire to get a plan of Pearl Harbor exactly, each part of the water, where the ships would be.

I go to the next message which is the 29th of September.

Admiral STARK. That is on page 13; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And there the message reads:

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels.

Indicating exactly what kind of a code will be used to tell where these ships are.

Navy docks in the navy yard (the ten ten pier).

Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island.

Along side in Ford Island: (East and west sides will be differentiated by A' and B respectively.)

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

We get that on "10-10-41" indicating that the Japanese [6386] have a code method of telling Tokyo exactly our plan at Pearl Harbor. Would you say that is true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's take the next message. Who was Togo in 1941?

Admiral STARK. Tojo, as I recall, was Prime Minister and Togo was—

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't he Foreign Minister at that time?

Admiral STARK. I think he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. I thought I had them straightened out between Tojo and Togo.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a high official in the Japanese military hierarchy?

Admiral STARK. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's take the short message, the 15th of November. That is after we get the dead-line message of the 25th. It is not translated until 12-3.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.

Now, it is a "in harbor report."

* * * irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

[6387] Wouldn't that be of great significance? You have a dead line and here is a message going from a high official in Tokyo to Honolulu—to Togo. They want to get their reports irregular but they want them twice a week. Wouldn't that be very impressive at that time; wouldn't it indicate something? You have a dead line. They want to get these reports twice a week.

Admiral STARK. Well, assuming that that "ships in harbor report" is not just the normal ships in port, which they were giving in ports like San Francisco and Puget Sound and in the Canal, but that it referred to the previous two dispatches, it does not say so, but assuming that it does refer to the previous two dispatches, it would be very important.

Taken of itself, without the background of the other two, I wouldn't consider it so important.

Senator FERGUSON. Take it by itself, take this language:

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical.

Not that they want this because they are trading with America and want to know when ships are leaving, but "the relations are most critical and, therefore, we want these twice a week, in the harbor." What could any intelligence officer read in that?

Admiral STARK. It is an important dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that was called to [6388] your attention?

Admiral STARK. I do not. Again I say it might have been, but I have no recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 3d of December, when it was translated, this most critical period, this important language, you can't now recall whether that was called to your attention; you say you cannot?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's take page 14. This is from Honolulu to Tokyo. It is a message showing that they are using the one on page 12, which much stress has been put on here and many questions asked, they are using those areas and that method.

Area A—A battleship of the *Oklahoma* class entered and one tanker left port.

I want to go down to paragraph 3 and see whether we can analyze that. This is obtained on the 6th. It came in on November 18. That is why I asked you if it was not just as important to ascertain where they were going to attack as when they were going to attack.

Here we had a pilot message on the 6th indicating that a reply to ours of the 26th was going to be received. We had the message over in Berlin that they were going to break relations and anticipated war. We had all of the information. [6389] We have coming into the Navy this information.

Admiral STARK. I would like to say in regard to all that information, even if it is reiteration, bear in mind our messages of the 24th and the 27th—the war warning message, with all of its directions.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is what they say on the 18th. This is after the deadline has been set:

At ten o'clock a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course five times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

Relayed to ———.

Now, wouldn't that information indicate that they wanted to get the exact court, where there were no mines, so that if they wanted to use submarines, and later they did use submarines, or tried to use them, wouldn't this indicate to you that they wanted to know exactly where they could travel [6390] in our harbor?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; it would, and, of itself, they probably wanted that and got it everywhere they could, just as we did on enemy harbors. If you could find out where the swept channel was it was always important to know.

I don't say that in mitigation of the inference from these dispatches, but I want to point out that that particular information is something that any military naval man would want to know.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing all these other facts, he wouldn't want to know of it just to file in his file, would he?

Admiral STARK. No. It might be useful to him, and it was asked in this case, in the light of hindsight, for a specific purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that specific purpose was to use it for small submarines to come in?

Admiral STARK. I would say, in the light of the knowledge we now have, it may very well have been for that purpose. At that time we didn't know they had the small submarines.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean that our Intelligence was such that we didn't even know that Japan had these small submarines?

Admiral STARK. That is my remembrance, and I might suggest that you ask committee counsel to certify that with [6390-A] Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. I certainly want to get that information.

Admiral STARK. To see if we did have any knowledge of them or not.

Senator FERGUSON. We didn't know they had the last four battleships, our Intelligence was such that we didn't know that?

Admiral STARK. My appearance at hearings on the Hill will show how little knowledge we had of what the Japs had. You will recall a day or so ago my stating that when trains went by certain Japanese navy yards the curtains were pulled down so that people could not see out and also my statement that it was sometime felt we didn't get much inside the 3-mile limit. I have covered that in previous testimony.

[6391] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. We won't repeat if we can help it. We weren't getting this kind of information in the Japanese harbors, were we?

You say that was probably one of those things that any military agency would get but we weren't getting it because we had no idea of attacking Japan?

Admiral STARK. We undoubtedly had Japanese channels. I cannot recall that we had any swept channels at that time. But if we had been able to get anything of that sort and our people could have picked it up I have no doubt they would have.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in our Intelligence Branch, at least on the 6th, we have this message.

Let's go to the next message. We got that the day before, on the 5th. This is from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu. November 18, translated on the 5th. So, we get it Friday.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein.

Not moving vessels. But the following areas—they want to know what ships are anchored in them.

Area N—Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, Honolulu—

"Honolu" is written up in the margin.

and the areas adjacent there to. Make your investigation with great secrecy.

In other words, don't let America know that you are [6392] doing this, but we want to know what ships and we want to know what is in those adjacent areas. We translated that on the 5th.

Let's go to the next. This one comes on November 20. Getting nearer this dead line.

Strictly secret.

This we get on Thursday before.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet.

This is from Tokyo to Honolulu, from Togo, a high official.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

Now, "military reservation" would be where the anti-aircraft was, wouldn't it? And they wanted comprehensive analysis.

Admiral STARK. I would say it would mean bases anywhere. Where the fleet was located, in the neighborhood of Hawaii. I don't know just why he states "military reservation" there, but I would say they wanted any information they could get.

Senator FERGUSON. But they wanted it comprehensively.

Admiral STARK. They always wanted it comprehensively, whatever it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's go to the next. Here is another message from Tokyo. Here are three messages from Tokyo seeking information on the 5th, 4th, and 6th, immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. Here is Tokyo concentrating on [6393] getting information.

By the way, this next message is dated November 29, which is the day before the dead line, and it would be the day before the President had indicated that there might be an attack.

Now, here is what they want to know.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

Indicating that they want to keep, isn't it true, they want to keep exact information on every ship in our harbor at Pearl Harbor, not moving but in the harbor?

Admiral STARK. That is not unusual. It is my recollection that I sent Admiral Hart a similar message with regard to his scouting, to report not only what he saw but to report daily if he didn't see anything. We get that from the war games also. It is simply to insure that it was sent out properly and got through, by getting a message each day. I think that is the significance of it.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no rule that this information was not to come over your desk?

Admiral STARK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. As you understood it, this same information that went to the Secretary of the Navy went to the President?

[6394] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as the Navy was concerned?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 2 days we get these three messages. In fact, on the 3 days—on 4 days: 12/3, 12/6, 12/5, 12/4, and 12/5—these five messages would normally come across your desk, and they don't strike any responsive chord at all now that you saw them?

Admiral STARK. They would normally come across my desk if they were evaluated as of particular significance and interest. I can only repeat what I have already said, that so far as I know the significance of these messages at that time, among the great mass of information that was coming in, was not realized as we realize it now, laying them out subsequent to the event.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, isn't it true that you had officials that were culling the insignificant from the significant? And here we have had delivered to us just these. I don't know how much came in that may have been considered not significant. But these have been delivered to us and would normally go across your desk. I wonder whether you have ever made an investigation to point out whether they did go across your desk.

Admiral STARK. Well, I wouldn't make an investigation [6394-A] on something I didn't know had happened. Occasionally I would go through, if I had time, and I was pressed for time continuously, I might read through the entire file that came in to me—not the entire file that was in the Navy Department—as a check-up. And my aide, Commander Wellborn, who was a very brilliant and able young man, occasionally did that also.

Now, I can see exactly how this looks now. I can only say that to the best of my knowledge and belief, and from anything that I have, it was not so appreciated at that time. I can repeat in more detail what I said originally, but I can't add anything to it.

Senator FERGUSON. But America had placed her safety in officials whose duty it was to evaluate the evidence before them in order that America might be protected; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. That is true, and I will say further that they were good men, going through these dispatches daily.

Senator FERGUSON. But you told me yesterday that on the 15th of October you changed the Intelligence Branch, had Admiral Wilkinson, who had never had any previous experience in intelligence work; isn't that a fact?

Admiral STARK. That is a fact, but these dispatches came to him after being looked over further down, and it required no particular, I would say, no special previous [6395] experience in intelligence to handle something of this sort. Wilkinson is a brilliant man. He is known as such. Just what happened to these dispatches, and what went on where they came in, obviously they came in to Intelligence. They couldn't get out of Intelligence. And I understand you are asking other people to testify on these. I won't add anything to what I have already stated with regard to them.

Senator FERGUSON. Has there ever been any disciplinary action against anyone in the Navy, court martial or otherwise, for either failing to translate these within a reasonable time after, or not getting them to you and not calling your attention to the significance of them?

Admiral STARK. I would say that the only man who has been censured with regard to this and other matters is myself, by the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand. But there has not been anyone down the line that was similarly acted upon for neglect of duty?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. These dispatches came to light a couple of years after the event. I say they came to light. That is my understanding. I do not recall having seen them until they were produced. And while it would have been, perhaps, in view of what has happened since, a good thing at the time to have gone through everything, I was busy. We had [6396] the war in the Pacific on our hands, and in addition what was going on in the Atlantic, and elsewhere. But I was doubly busy right after the event and during my continued duty in Washington until I went abroad. I was thinking more of handling the job and getting on with the war than I was on possible post mortems at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, the action of the Secretary of the Navy as to you has been very recent, in 1945?

Admiral STARK. The action of what?

Senator FERGUSON. Of the Secretary of the Navy, which you mentioned.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And prior to that you had been decorated, prior to the criticism of the Secretary of the Navy you had been decorated by the President, had you not?

Admiral STARK. I had been, and one of the finest—well, I don't know that I might mention it—but I received a letter from Colonel Knox also when I left, of which I am very proud. Incidentally—well, I won't mention it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were decorated by the President after that?

Admiral STARK. I was, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the decoration?

Admiral STARK. I have a brief of that citation here, [6397] and I also have kept in my file, ever since coming up here I have kept it with me, the letter from the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we have those both printed as part of the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read them at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Read them. They are not very long?

Admiral STARK. They are not very long; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Read them now.

Admiral STARK. The other thing which I started to mention bore on my duty abroad, from the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. When the King went back to Norway you were delegated by the President to be his representative at that ceremony, were you not?

Admiral STARK. The President of the United States sent me on a mission to Norway and also Denmark, rather a nice diplomatic mission. It was of no great significance. I haven't mentioned any foreign decorations. I don't imagine you would want to go into that.

Senator FERGUSON. But they were given you—

Admiral STARK. The British gave me one of the highest decorations, as a result of the action by the Chiefs of Staff, that it was within their power to give. The one from Norway, by King Haakon, of whom I had seen considerable in London, [6398] was the highest decoration that they could give.

The French also gave me a high decoration in connection with the Normandy invasion.

[6399] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Admiral, go ahead and read it, please.

Admiral STARK. This letter is dated 21 March, from Colonel Knox.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What year, please?

Admiral STARK. 1942. It reads:

I have just signed the order assigning you to your new command in London. You know, of course, that you take with you from me my heartiest best wishes for success in this most responsible post, but I do not want to terminate the relationship which has existed between us for the past two years via a coldly formal letter.

I came to this present task of mine with little besides good intentions, energy, and a desire to serve my country in a very grave crisis. No one in the Navy has been of greater assistance and help to me in my efforts to be a constructive and helpful force in the Navy than you. In every possible official way, you have aided me and supported me. However, this is but a minor part of the story. In a warmly personal way, you have been my friend and counselor

throughout. I can think of scores of times when you have saved me from serious missteps and, in everything that I have attempted, designed to promote efficiency in the Navy, especially in its administration, [6400] you have been a tower of support and strength.

In all of a fairly long and busy life, I have never had a more dependable, constructive, and self-effacing associate. As Chief of Naval Operations, during two and a half of the most critical years in American naval history, you have discharged the duties of your high office with brilliance, single-minded devotion to the Navy and to the country and in a manner which will leave an indelible impression on the naval establishment for many years to come.

You take with you as you leave your post here for the one in London the affectionate regard and the most heart-felt good wishes of the entire establishment. May God go with you and bless you in all that you do. I shall hope to hear from you occasionally in an informal and personal way as well as officially.

Yours sincerely,

FRANK KNOX.

The citation from the President reads:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Gold Star in lieu of the Second Distinguished Service Medal to

ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES NAVY

for services set forth in the following:

[6401]

CITATION

"For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government of the United States in a duty of great responsibility during his tenure of office as Chief of Naval Operations from 1939 to 1942 when he was charged with the responsibility of building and administering the largest peacetime Navy in the history of this country.

"Due to his exceptional qualities of leadership and his outstanding ability, full reliance was placed upon his advice and counsel by the Secretary of the Navy, by the Congress and by the President of the United States as evidenced by the executive and legislative measures adopted for the Naval Service to effect a high state of training for war and the building of a 'two ocean Navy.'"

Mr. MURPHY. May I have the date of that?

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. The date of it is April 9, 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what was your assignment to London?

Admiral STARK. I was in command of the naval forces in Europe, originally less the Mediterranean and north Africa, which theater was added in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. And you stayed on that post how long?

Admiral STARK. I stayed on the post until the war was [6402] over.

Senator FERGUSON. So you completed that assignment until the war was over?

Admiral STARK. I completed that assignment and the items of this sort, as I stated, came from the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean the war in Europe?

Senator FERGUSON. The war in Europe I have in mind, but when did you leave?

Admiral STARK. I left after Japan had surrendered. We had also had VJ-day.

Senator FERGUSON. Thanks for the correction, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral STARK. I had received orders shortly before Japan surrendered but I actually did not leave until the 16th of August.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Mr. Chairman, I won't touch on what is

in these messages but I would ask to have printed in the record what is in this yellow book, exhibit 2, here at this place in the record from page 16 to page 29, inclusive. It is to bring to us in the printed record and at one place all of the messages that we have been handed in this book showing ship movements or harbor locations, which were the messages translated after December the 7th, but I think all of them received prior to that date.

[6403] The CHAIRMAN. They have not heretofore been printed in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. They have not been printed in our official record, as I understand it.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. They have been introduced in an exhibit but never included in the transcript, in the daily transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. I just do that to call attention to them, because I do not want to review it with the witness—

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection the pages indicated will be included in the transcript at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. To complete my sentence—because he had not seen them because they were not translated.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you included in that series the one about Manila, where they want the information about the airplanes and the number of fields.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it would be in there, I am sure.

Well, now, Admiral, to move along, did you know—

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me. You see, this Exhibit 2 is divided up into groups relating to Hawaii, Panama Canal, Philippines, and they are all separated, and what the Senator has asked to put in is the messages relating to Hawaii which [6404] were intercepted prior to December 7 and not translated until after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have, in addition, this one particular dispatch as to Manila which seems to be more elaborate and in greater detail than the others.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you point it out?

Mr. MURPHY. I will give the stenographer a memorandum as to where it is in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The excerpts from Exhibit No. 2 referred to follow:)

[6405]

B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokyo

November 24, 1941.

#234. (Part of 2)

Re your #114.*

Strictly Secret.

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

[6406] * Not available.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-16-41 (2)

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

November 24, 1941.

#234 (Part 2 of 2).

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of —, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

[6407] ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 28, 1941.

#119 Re your message #243*.

Secret outside the Department.

Intelligence of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (S)

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

November 28, 1941.

#238.

Military report:

[6408] (1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their antiaircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots—12; interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

* Available in code under study.

2406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor. ARMY 25928 JD-7212 Trans. 12-8-41 (7)

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

#241 (In 2 parts, complete).

Re your #119*.

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on:

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for [6409] the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on:

(1) Fuel is plentyfull and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns can not be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring on 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

[6410]

JD-1: 7294 26053 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu

December 2, 1941

#123

(Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

NOTE.—This message was received here on December 28.)

ARMY 27065 JD 8007 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

From: Honolulu (Kitz)

To: Tokyo

3 December 1941

#247

Ship report.

2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.

3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.

26065

JD-1: 7309 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

*JD-1: 7158.

**Available, dated 28 November.

[6411] From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
#245 (In 2 parts, complete)

(Military secret)

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters:

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

Meaning		Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units.	Preparing to sortie.....	1
A number of carriers.....	Preparing to sortie.....	2
Battle ship divisions.....	All departed between 1st and 3rd.....	3
Carriers.....	Several departed between 1st and 3rd.....	4
[6413] Battleship divisions.....	Several departed between 1st and 3rd.....	5
Carriers.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	6
Carriers.....	Several departed between 4th and 6th.....	7
Carriers.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	8

26145

2. Signals.

I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p. m.....	1
" " " 9 and 10 p. m.....	2
" " " 10 and 11 p. m.....	3
" " " 11 and 12 p. m.....	4

II.

Two lights " 12 and 1 a. m.....	5
" " " 1 and 2 a. m.....	6
[6413] Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m.....	7
" " " 3 and 4 a. m.....	8

III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:

Times	Signal
1900-2000.....	3
2000-2100.....	4
2100-2200.....	5
2200-2300.....	6
2300-2400.....	7
0000-0100.....	8

V. K. G. M. G.*** Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC. Co farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P O box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

[6414] 3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maul Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium**** at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40' N., longitude 156°19' W., visible from seaward to the south-

*Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

**A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile north of Lanikai.

***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

****At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

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east and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

Time	Signal
From 7-8-----	3 or 6
From 8-9-----	4 or 7
From 9-10-----	5 or 8

JD-1: 7370 (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo
8 December 1941
#248

Ship report.

December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movements.

28068

JD-1: 7310 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

[6415]

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokio
December 4, 1941
#249

On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft. —

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.

ARMY 26161 (Japanese) Trans. 12/12/41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Toyko.
5 December 1941
#252

(1) During Friday morning the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

[6416] 8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and — were in dock.

*Available, dated 29 November.

28029

JD-1: 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 6, 1941
#128

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123* the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

ARMY 26158 JD 7381 (Japanese) Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

* Not available.

From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

December 6, 1941

#253 Re the last part of your #123.*

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but [6417] it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa,^b there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

ARMY 25877 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

[6418] From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

December 6, 1941

#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were — and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874 JD-7179

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

[6419] Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, do you have any knowledge that some time in August they stopped sending Admiral Kimmel what was known as "magic"?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not recall having any knowledge of that or of the fact that those messages had been sent previous to that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it possible that in the Navy Department we did not appreciate or did not recognize the value of air as an offensive weapon over ships in harbor, that this might happen?

Admiral STARK. I think the Navy was very much alive to that. Air power—

Senator FERGUSON. If they were very much alive to it how do you account for it happening?

Admiral STARK. I do not just understand your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you say they were very much alive to the weapon. Now, how do you account for that happening then? How did this happen? How did we get surprised?

Admiral STARK. You mean how did what happen, the Japanese—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, how were you surprised then if we were fully cognizant of the ability of air power to destroy a fleet in a harbor?

* Not available.

^b Kana spelling.

Admiral STARK. Well, the correspondence shows how air-minded [6420] we had been with regard to a possible attack on Pearl Harbor and in laying plans to prevent it. The question as to why we did not detect it or why we were not making reconnaissance is the question which I imagine you are asking in connection with it?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral STARK. Well, in Washington, as I have stated, that is in the Navy Department, we had intended to convey the critical situation and the possibility of an air attack in the messages which we had sent and we had felt, I had felt that when I sent the message starting out with, "This is a war warning," and in view of what had gone before and the subsequent dispatches with regard to, or without regard to the subsequent dispatches but, certainly, reenforced by subsequent dispatches on the burning of the codes, that those in the field, in the Pacific, both in the Asiatic and in the Central Pacific would have been on the lookout for a surprise attack from any direction.

Senator FERGUSON. In June of 1940 you said in effect, "Look out for an air raid."

Admiral STARK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Or "Look out for a raid."

Admiral STARK. No; I did not say, "Look out for a raid."

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; you did not, but the order did.

[6421] Admiral STARK. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. The alert did.

Admiral STARK. Well, I had assumed that they would be on the lookout for it from what I stated as a possibility to be guarded against even though only a possibility.

Senator FERGUSON. This is very difficult to read but that message was:

War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measures after consultation with the Navy and State Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. Apparently he is talking about the Herron alert.

Senator FERGUSON. The Herron order.

Admiral STARK. Yes, I get that now. I thought you were talking about the raid which was made.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, yesterday you said that the Navy and State and the Army opposed the embargoes. What department of government or who was for them and how did they come to get that if three departments were against it?

Admiral STARK. With regard to your statement that I opposed them, I pointed out whenever it was brought up to me the seriousness that such an embargo would have or might have on our relations with the Japanese. When you throttle a nation's economic life she has got to do something if she thinks she [6422] can, particularly with regard to oil, which I always stressed. Now, that was a military or a naval man's estimate with regard to it.

There was a political significance also in connection with that which was not within my province, except to say what I thought as regards its implications on the military so that the implication of those could only be—the placing of such could only be by the State Department and I assume with the approval of the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, I understand that it is a fair conclusion to say that the political situation outweighed the military and they were put on?

Admiral STARK. All things were considered, must have been considered, our opinions and the political and the decision was made higher up.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever consulted as to whether or not if they were put on and it meant war that we had the military might to defend our action?

Admiral STARK. We discussed all angles of that picture and that picture was thoroughly known by the high authorities in the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What was your opinion in July, that we had the military might to back it up?

Admiral STARK. We had the military might to implement the [6423] war plan. When you say to back it up—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is a layman's expression.

Admiral STARK. We knew, as I stated, again quoting from my letter, "It would be a H— of a war, particularly to start with." I may state my sizing up of that. I think I stated it before Congress. At the first press conference—and I did not hold one except when I had to—in England, which was a very large conference and particularly many of our own correspondents to start out, occasionally, that asked me for my opinion. I stated what I felt at that time, which was what I felt earlier, that in view of the conditions then existing in 1942, the year 1942 would be a very tough year, that we would be on the defensive in the Pacific, seizing an opportunity which might give us a chance for attack, or creating one when we could.

That in 1943 we would be gathering our strength and perhaps a limited offensive, but certainly we would be gathering our strength and beginning to go after the enemy and that in 1944, which I used to state I could hardly wait to come around, we would then be realizing from the legislation and the earlier authorizations and would be able to go all out and that we would win in 1945. That statement was made back in 1942.

Now, I also told Admiral Nomura, and an officer when I was in London pulled a memorandum on me of what I had told him, [6424] which happened to be a good guess, that initially with the initiative in their hands and a readiness and a plan they probably would have a considerable initial success but that we would completely break them before we got through. It was inevitable because they could not replace their losses and we could not only replace ours but continue to gain and it was a simple matter of arithmetic.

I said "Therefore, if you attack us you insure the destruction of the Japanese Empire." I am inclined to think that he agreed with me but I could not state so. That was my feeling of the situation. I did not feel that we were then ready to go all out and finish the thing up, I knew we could not, but I felt we were strong enough to hold until we could go all out and win.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, were you one of those in the Navy that felt that we would lose the Philippines if we went to war in the fall of 1941? We have had testimony here by other men that that was true.

Admiral STARK. Well, my hope was to put up a good, stiff fight. I would not say that I would have thought that we could have held them with what we had at that time, and you will recall that I stated

almost in my first meeting in the White House, I can remember it, to the President, with Marshall, recounting the fact—and this goes back to 1939— [6425] that always in war plans, which had been going on for many years, we conceded that we would lose the Philippines and that how much easier it would be if we could hold them rather than to lose them and fight to get them back and in the hope that we could strengthen them, which we had not been able to. We did not have the material.

Senator FERGUSON. You did discuss it with the President?

Admiral STARK. I did; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That we would lose them?

Admiral STARK. He was thoroughly familiar with the picture and so was Marshall. I remember in that conversation Marshall recounting what we could do.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was not considering the possibility that we would lose the fleet we had waiting in Pearl Harbor, the Pearl Harbor fleet. Your view was without losing the fleet, so it was much worse when we lost our fleet.

Admiral STARK. It was tougher because of the vessels we lost, and I think perhaps there may be some surprise over the fact that of the 112 vessels in Pearl Harbor as I recall—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you explained that yesterday, how many were lost.

Admiral STARK. That a great number were not touched.

Senator FERGUSON. That leads me to this question. In your letter of November 25, the last page—would [6426] counsel show it to the Admiral? The postscript. I will read it because I want to ask you some questions about it:

“I held this up pending”—this is the 25th, just 4 days before the dead line, the last dead line, which they said they meant and they even said what time it would end.

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack.

Now, this is the question I want to ask you:

From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us.

What were you talking about there?

Admiral STARK. I was thinking that we might lose them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk with the President about that on that day?

Admiral STARK. We had talked with the President—I don't know about that day. Probably. We had talked over that situation many times.

[6427] Senator FERGUSON. Now, indicating a change—this is a letter which was modified because it went to him after; at least it reached him after he got the cables.

Admiral STARK. It reached him—I believe I was asked when it reached him and I believe they reached him on 3 December, some 6 days after the message of the 27th and 9 days after the message of the 24th.

Senator FERGUSON. But it says:

I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance in Thailand, Indochina, Burma Road area as the most likely.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that be misleading to him? You have got possibilities and probabilities and now we come to the words "most likely."

Admiral STARK. Well, I did not think so. I was giving him the evidence I had and which had been given in the dispatch, or which he had. I think it was in the dispatch of the 24th.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not quite clear on this:

From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us.

Suppose they took Wake, suppose they took Guam or—I mean suppose they attacked Wake? Suppose they attacked at [6428] Guam or at Pearl Harbor? That wouldn't be embarrassing to us?

Admiral STARK. Any one of them would have been embarrassing to us. The Philippines was on the flank. To lose the Philippines was costly. The probability of their loss was recognized due to their insufficient state of preparedness. Therefore, if that was correct and we did lose them we knew it was a big fight to get them back; also it left the Japanese flank secure from that attack on the continual support of their movement south.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you disagree with Churchill that the fleet at Hawaii was on the flank also?

Admiral STARK. Well, there is some 4,000 miles or 3,000 miles difference in the flank and with no places to go after you go out there to support you. We had to build a chain of bases up all the way across before we could go out there and we had to build a train which could support the fleet after they got out there. The fleet in Hawaii was not, except for submarine work, and they did wonderful work as you know, was not in position to seriously threaten Japanese communications going south until it was strong enough to go out there itself. Raids occasionally under auspicious circumstances, yes, but not continued pressure.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, wasn't the only deterrent in the Pacific as far as Japan was concerned the fleet at Hawaii?

[6429] Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that is a fair statement. The United States Fleet, but sitting as a threat on the flank; Hawaii was a long ways away.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, on the 25th of February 1941 you spoke about sending four cruisers, nine destroyers and some carriers to the Philippine Islands by the southern route and let it leak out that they were going out there. I found that in your book. Had you ever discussed that with the President?

Admiral STARK. Yes, and the President backed me up—

Senator FERGUSON. What was that?

Admiral STARK. If I may just finish.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. And the President backed me up in my recommendation not to send a detachment to the Philippines. You will recall a day or two ago my reading a memorandum to the President opposing the sending of a detachment to the Philippines and the Pres-

ident accepted that memorandum. The proposal was from the State Department.

I noted that one paper in the press took that memorandum as though I were opposed to the President's desire to send them out there——

Senator FERGUSON. You were opposing the State Department.

Admiral STARK [continuing]. And it stated so. I was giving that to the President backing me up, to back me up in [6430] my arguments against those who wanted to send them out there and the President was with me. He was not for it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, why did the State Department want to send this fleet, a part of the fleet, to the Philippines?

Admiral STARK. I think they thought that it might have a further deterrent effect on Japan. That could have been, in my opinion, their only reason for such a request.

[6431] Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything said about sending a much smaller one so in case you lost the loss would not be so heavy?

Admiral STARK. I think so. We might have sent something light out there. My reaction to all that was: Get them out there. Then you would be divided up still further if attacked at sea, or you might lose what you had, or if you started to pull them back, then there might be an argument against weakness.

Senator FERGUSON. Had not you heard from Grew that there might be war?

Admiral STARK. I quoted a part of Grew's letter in my previous testimony, in my memorandum to the President, and in it Grew agreed with me. You will recall I stated to the President——

Senator FERGUSON. On February 7.

Admiral STARK. That I was obviously quoting that part of Grew's letter which supported me.

Senator FERGUSON. On February 7. Could I ask counsel whether they know whether that is in the white papers, that memo from Grew?

It is as follows: "I have just read a telegram on the 7th of February from the American Embassy at Tokyo which the State Department has furnished. In it appears the following:

[6432] Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East, and it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factors which such risk constitutes. The risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities.

Even Grew was notifying the State Department, and were they still insisting on sending this out there even though it meant war?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was at the State Department's request. I was delighted to have it from Grew.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that help you in keeping them from going out there?

Admiral STARK. The President decided not to do it. I am inclined to think he would agree with me even though he had not seen the Grew memorandum. That, however, is conjecture.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, on April 19, 1941, you said:

I wrote about the Australian detachment. The President said, incidentally, "When I open to you that way I do not expect you to quote the President and I know there is nobody who can keep a thing secret better than you can." Just as soon as those ships come back from Australia or New Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out.

[6433] You are quoting the President as wanting to send some more out.

I just want to keep them popping up here and there and to keep the Japs guessing. This, of course, is right down the State Department's alley. I might say a lot of State Department suggestions and recommendations are no less than childish. Don't quote me, as I have practically said so in so many words in the presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they finally got it going. Of course, I recognize some merits, if exercised with some discretion, and that is where the Navy has to count on FDR for reserves. So we did have to send ships into Singapore, and we did keep them on a flank, to be in a position to go to work or to retire if something broke.

At that time did not you consider Hawaii the flank?

Admiral STARK. I considered Hawaii more of a central covering position for the United States, the Canal, and the Aleutians. You can look at it as the flank, I have no objection to it. But when I sent ships farther to the westward, much farther, I did not want them to get into what might be called a central hole like the Philippines, but felt if they were well down on the flank away from Japan, where they could retire or perhaps take care of themselves in [6434] case of emergency, that I could see some merit in it, and that is what the President approved. But as to sending them beyond and into Singapore, I always opposed it.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel has just advised me that he searched widely and has not found the February 7 message.

Mr. MITCHELL. That Grew message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. We asked the State Department for that on the day that Admiral Stark furnished us his statement and they have not reported yet.¹

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, this was popping you. You were going to have the ships around the various places, and the State Department was very active to have that done. I want to read what you said on the next page:

Now, when the question of popping up everywhere came and having in mind keeping on the flank, I said to the President, "How about going north?" He said, "Yes, you can keep any position you like and go anywhere." There was a little method in my madness as to the northern cruise. I thought for once, if I could, I would give the State Department a shock which might make them hold back. Incidentally, that northwest cruise may have many good points. It still conforms to the [6435] flank and a detachment on an occasional sortie or in an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if you ever want to make such a cruise yourself of your own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of course you can see what a striking force on the position I gave you and known to the Japs would mean to them in view of their unholy fear of bombing, and a striking detachment would have been right in position for most anything. I had a broad awkward smile when the State Department in effect said, "Please, Mr. President, don't let him do it," or words to that effect. It was a little too much for them.

What did you have in mind there?

Admiral STARK. Well, I had in mind what I produced but, as I stated, it also had some merit, and there was some merit in ships popping up here and there, provided we still maintained them in a position where we could concentrate where necessary, and not isolate them from the rest of the fleet. My recollection of that is that I suggested we might take a carrier, probably accompanied by the usual support of four fast cruisers and destroyers and send them well to the northwest-

¹ The message referred to appears in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2917 et seq.

ward or that we might send a couple of ships on in advance, or on either flank, and let them start some radio work first one place and then another one a thousand [6436] miles to the southward, all in connection with this, and that they would be in a position to withdraw, but at the same time it was in line with keeping the Japs guessing.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this a fair evaluation of this situation about the ships popping up, that the State Department wanted to use the United States Navy in a diplomatic way as a deterrent to Japan, or a threat to Japan? Is that a fair estimate?

Admiral STARK. In supporting diplomacy in a way in which they thought would be effective, and to a degree, as regards exposed positions, I interposed the strongest objections I knew how.

Senator FERGUSON. Were we doing this very thing? Were we using the United States Navy in November or early December as a weapon with our diplomacy, or had we got away from that because of your victory on that point?

Admiral STARK. The fleet was then all in Hawaiian waters, except for one or two cruisers doing escort duty, and which, of course, they have to pick up as soon as war began or beforehand, if it was deemed advisable, and it was, and also for those vessels in the Asiatic Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you last use the Navy for popping up purposes in aid to diplomacy?

Admiral STARK. The best of my recollection is that [6437] cruise to Australia was the last and the only move we made of that kind. Well, I would say it was the only one of that kind, unless you would consider the movement of the fleet under secret orders and radio silence when it went out in June, I believe it was, in 1940 for a specific purpose and was kept absent for a week.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, on June 10, 1941, did not you say, in one of those instruments for the Secretary of the Navy, or memo for the Secretary of the Navy, that it was apparent to Japan that the United States Pacific Fleet was no longer strong enough to be a threat? How do you reconcile that with some of the other testimony about our fleet?

Admiral STARK. That would be a threat in the Far East, and which I have mentioned this morning we were not strong enough, nor did we have the facilities in the Far East to keep the fleet there as a threat, as an effective threat, or strong enough to interpose against a southern movement.

Senator FERGUSON. On December 2, 1941, a message went out—

Admiral STARK. What date was that, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. December 2. It was from CinCAF to OpNav.

Admiral STARK. That is from Hart to me.

Senator FERGUSON. From Hart to Stark?

[6438] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Part of it states, "Calling *Isabel* from current Mission," and we got a memorandum yesterday on that same *Isabel*. What mission was she on? That is the ship that the President had directed to be used as one of the men-of-war?

Admiral STARK. We authorized Admiral Hart to use her in connection with reconnaissance as one of the three vessels if he so desired.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. I take it his recalling her from a mission means that he recalled her from where he had her. I do not know just what the disposition was at that time. I do know that he was deployed to some extent. He had sent some ships south. He had certain submarines out looking for whatever they could find, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the same day in the same message, the last line, I want to ask you some questions about that.

Admiral STARK. I might add, I replied to that dispatch and said, "*Isabel* may be replaced by chartered vessels at your discretion."

Senator FERGUSON. The last part states, "When it is considered called for will increase air patrols and send out [6439] more subs." Now, he had the same message at that time that Kimmel had?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was he speaking of, or do you know? He said, "When it is considered called for will increase air patrols"—that is reconnaissance?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. "And send out more subs."

Now, if you had a war warning out, I am wondering what he had in mind there and what he was asking you to do.

Admiral STARK. That meant that when in his judgment further vessels should be sent out he would do so. The record will show what he had out. The Army was scouting over there, and he was scouting over there. He had submarines out. I am not sure just where his destroyers were at that time. He had sent some ships to the southward. He had kept in Manila Bay ready for further scouting, if necessary, or for attack in case we were attacked, a certain number of submarines.

Senator FERGUSON. Don't mind me now, Admiral, for just a moment.

Mr. Chairman, I ask to put in the record this message, because it is not in the record yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Which one is that?

[6440] Senator FERGUSON. The one dated December 2, 1941, from CinCaf for action, OpNav.

[6441] It starts out:

My views are as follows: The Jap movement down the Indo-Chinese coast is already defined but it remains to be seen whether aimed against the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, or both. That the British can meet their commitment to guard as far as Cape Padaran and we should use what have left after guarding against descent on Luzon in watching for one on Borneo.

What could he be there talking about? That the British can meet their commitment to guard as far as Cape Padaran?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

And we should use what have left after guarding against descent on Luzon in watching for one on Borneo. Am recalling *Isabel* from current mission and sending toward Padaran. She is too short radius to accomplish much and since we have few fast ships her loss would be serious. Therefore have to recommend against carrying out *Isabel's* movement though it is improbable that can start any chartered craft within two days.

It is improbable, he said. That is the one that the President had ordered, I take it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Am searching for vessels for charter that are suitable but cannot yet estimate time required to [6442] obtain and equip with radio.

Army planes are reconnoitering sector northerly from Luzon and eastward from Sanbernardino. Navy planes northwesterly from Luzon, also covering Balabac Strait and joining up with Dutch to cover Mindanao-Halmahera line, effectiveness is problematical but as great effort as available forces can sustain continuously. Two cruisers, two desdibs—

what is that?

Admiral STARK. Destroyer divisions.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Two desdibs are deployed well south, remainder surface forces on local missions or repairing.

Have five submarines out now, remainder either placed in readiness for defensive missions or held here prepared for offensive tasks. When it is considered called for will increase air patrols and send out more subs.

Now that gave you a definite statement as to what Admiral Hart was doing?

Admiral STARK. That was a very comprehensive picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was not he operating on a plan with the British and Dutch even though the attack would not have been on America?

Admiral STARK. The dispatch shows that he was, to some extent, dovetailing where he was searching. It states there, I believe, that he was covering up to a certain point, and [6443] then the Dutch were covering, and in a previous dispatch you may recall I had told him where the British were searching.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, we can assume that the Japanese knew what we were doing as far as these ships were concerned on December 2, 1941?

Admiral STARK. I think we could not assume that they knew where his submarines were.

Senator FERGUSON. Outside of the subs.

Admiral STARK. Outside of the submarines I dare say they had the picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And therefore, to all intent and purposes, on the surface it would look as if the British, the Dutch, and the United States had one plan in relation to an attack on the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral STARK. Their searches were made in coordination.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now that being true, was it not also apparent to America that if the Japs were going to attack one it meant war with all?

Admiral STARK. I can only repeat what I have said before, that I did not know, and I do not know now, if Japan had attacked one or two and left us out—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). That was not my question. My question was from the Japanese viewpoint.

Admiral STARK. What is that, sir?

[6444] Senator FERGUSON. From the Japanese viewpoint of what was going on with this plan, would not it be apparent to the Japanese, in what we were going to do, apparent to the Japanese that if they attacked the British it would mean war with all three?

Admiral STARK. I think that would depend a good deal on how they had sized up the situation, and the opinions of the American people and a political estimate as to what our Congress might do, and I would say that would have been a tall order. I do not know.

[6445] Senator FERGUSON. On the 23d of September 1941 you wrote to Kimmel—

Admiral STARK. What date was that?

Senator FERGUSON. The 23d of September 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the second page of that letter you said this:

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East.

Now, that is just what we were doing on the 2d of December 1941, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. That is true, and that is what we were planning. We had to know what our possible allies would do if we were to get in.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral Stark, did it become aware to you in the meetings with the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff that Japan's stand was that, if the American-Japanese negotiations fell, the result would be war in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. If the Japanese negotiations fell, there would be war in the Pacific?

[6446] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. It was likely. We stated, I believe, in one letter it might possibly mean a breaking up of negotiations. After the destruction of codes it looked definitely like Japan would attack all three, and we took no chance even before that, but that she might.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, in December 1941 were we breaking the Jap Navy code?

Admiral STARK. December 1941?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. We were breaking some of their codes, but not all of them. We had broken, as I recall—I would be glad if you would verify this, but one of the codes that we had not broken and which had been assigned to the unit in Hawaii was the Japanese naval code. I think that was not broken at that time. What other codes were not broken, I do not know. We did not break them all.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the movement into the Kra Peninsula a rejection of the note of the 17th of August, or was it a rejection of the note of the 26th of November?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would say it was a rejection of what they knew we were opposed to. It was further military extension by Japan, something to which they knew we were opposed.

[6446-A] Senator FERGUSON. Will you refer to your letter of August 28?

Admiral STARK. 1940 or 1941?

Senator FERGUSON. 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I have it.

[6447] Senator FERGUSON. You referred in that letter, on the second page of that letters, Admiral, down, "Once again thanks for the

human side of the news," and this is what I want to call your attention to:

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific, about all I can say is that the Japs seems to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them, but just what they are going to do I don't know.

What messages were you referring to, to Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. I think——

Senator FERGUSON. You said you could only intimate to him. What were those messages?

Admiral STARK. I think the message to which I undoubtedly referred there was the message which had been sent by the State Department, as I recall, on 17 August, and to which you have made reference previously.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. This letter——

Senator FERGUSON. Refers to that message?

Admiral STARK. I think so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if the movement on the Kra was a rejection of the note of the 17th of August and also a rejection of the note of the 26th, wasn't the 14-part [6447-A] message only a confirmation of that rejection?

Admiral STARK. I thought the 14-part message first set up a confirmation of what they had said before and put it all together and finally stated what, as I testified, we had said in substance some days earlier, namely, that negotiations were broken off.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything said at the Atlantic Conference about babying them along for 3 months, or anything to that effect?

Admiral STARK. I never heard of it until it came up in recent months.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember preparing an instrument with the Chief of Staff which provided a line beyond which the Japs were not allowed to go?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell me whether you conferred with the President on that before you drew it up?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that we did. He got it, of course, after we had drawn it up.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever acted upon?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it turned down by the President?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall any action with regard to it. He had the information, I know, and I feel that he was [6448] endeavoring to and was backing Mr. Hull in his efforts to maintain peace, but as to giving us any clear indication, or any indication of what he would do if they went beyond this line, I have no recollection of his ever having given us any intimation on that.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 24th of November Senator Pepper in a speech at Boston said that a line had been marked in the Pacific, and if the Japs crossed that line, the United States Navy would shoot without a declaration of war. Had you ever heard of that before?

Admiral STARK. You mean before right now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I may have. I would not have given it any weight at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is your memorandum of the 17th—no, of the 5th—where you put down a line, but you say it has never been agreed to. Here is Senator Pepper on the 24th, the same month, saying that a line had been marked in the Pacific and that if the Japs crossed that line the United States Navy, and that is your department, would shoot without a declaration of war.

Was that a fact?

Admiral STARK. If the Senator is available may I suggest you ask him.

[6449] Senator FERGUSON. No; I am asking you. As far as you knew, was it a fact?

Admiral STARK. Not so far as I knew; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew of no such line, that if they crossed that your Navy was going to shoot?

Admiral STARK. We had no commitment or any intimation that we would shoot until we were attacked, in which case we would have done it without any orders from anybody, depending on the scale.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know how far we are going into these irresponsible statements that United States Senators previous to Pearl Harbor made. If we get into that, we will never get through.

Senator FERGUSON. I am through with the statement. I merely wanted to find out whether that was a fact, insofar as the admiral knew, and he was in charge of our Navy, and he said it was not a fact.

And I take it for granted, Admiral, that you are the man that would have known?

Admiral STARK. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You say that our fleet was on a war basis. You still say that is a fact?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was done without consultation, [6450] necessarily, with the President, merely with his assistant?

Admiral STARK. The President knew that I was going to do that; I was getting everything ready as fast as possible, had started in on that in 1939.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think that this particular question has been asked you, Admiral.

What was the cause of the sending of the message of the 24th? What was in your mind when that message was sent, what caused you to send a message?

Admiral STARK. Well, in general, of course, it was the developing seriousness of the situation. We had at that time the first dead-line message. We had the Jap note also as background, of September 20—

Mr. MITCHELL. November 20.

Admiral STARK. November 20. We were getting nowhere and the situation, the gravity of the situation was just generally increasing, and my own feeling was, after talking with Mr. Hull, where I got most of my background, that the chances of favorable conclusions, or favorable outcome of our negotiations, were growing less and less, if

they hadn't already practically disappeared. That background, unquestionably, was influenced by conversations with Mr. Hull.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time you got it you even had the change of the date, put over to the 29th, where they [6451] stressed the "repeat 29th"?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In your conference at the White House on the 25th, which was the day following, with the President, Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and General Marshall, was the matter contained in these intercepts that you have been given, about the deadline, discussed?

Admiral STARK. As I said before, Senator Ferguson, I don't recall just what we discussed at that time. I think everyone present had seen those messages, knew about them, and we may have discussed them, but certainly it was common knowledge to us at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, couldn't that have placed the date the President thought might, there was some talk about being an attack by the next Monday, because that would be the very date—

Admiral STARK. Monday would not have been the 29th, would it?

Senator FERGUSON. Monday was the 30th.

Admiral STARK. The 30th.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was our 29th.

Admiral STARK. I don't know just why he made that statement as regards Monday. It may have been a considered statement or it may have just been one of those statements [6452] which we all make at times, "Well, I wouldn't be surprised if they attacked by next Monday." I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this discussed, that Japan was a nation that would probably attack before a declaration of war?

Admiral STARK. We all knew that, that was common knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the President left for Warm Springs on the night before he anticipated that there would be an attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He went on the 29th.

Admiral STARK. Yes. I knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. And the conversation was about the attack coming on the 30th. How do you account for that, was there any conversation is what I have in mind.

Admiral STARK. His plan was to go. He did go. He knew that he could be called back if necessary. And, incidentally, Mr. Hull asked me about calling him back and I said I hated to do it but I advised that he come back before his vacation was over. He needed the rest. He had planned it. Wherever he would have been we would have been in constant touch with him by telephone, if necessary, and a trip by plane would have brought him back to Washington very quickly.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, as I get the picture [6453] from what you have told us the President was greatly interested in all these moves, all these intercepted messages, they were being delivered to him daily, or hourly, as the case might be, and it was anticipated that the deadline would be on the 30th, and notwithstanding that on the afternoon of the 29th the President went to Warm Springs?

Admiral STARK. He did.

Senar FERGUSON. Now, did you have any conversation with him about his messages, that would come through your Navy, these intercepted codes, and so forth, while he was at Warm Springs?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall having any conversation with him while at Warm Springs?

Senator FERGUSON. To whom—

Admiral STARK. While he was at Warm Springs.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom were the messages delivered while the President was at Warm Springs?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall that detail.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a little more than a detail, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Well, it is a detail; arrangements were made to get the President's mail to him by pouch, usually flown down, locked pouch, or by courier, and they may very well have been sent that way, or to his naval aide, I don't [6454] recall it. I don't recall having taken the matter up. Arrangements for his mail were generally made by his aide.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least, you don't recall any conversation about that?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There wasn't any doubt in your mind that the President knew about the deadline being set on the 29th?

Admiral STARK. None.

Senator FERGUSON. None whatever?

Admiral STARK. None whatever. When I say "none whatever," those messages were being delivered regularly to the White House and I assume that he saw them, and that is what I base my answer on.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Do you know whether you ever had any discussions about these important messages?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. As I stated, we were talking that situation over more or less continuously.

Senator FERGUSON. With all that has been gone over about these various messages, of the 27th and 26th, do you now recall anything that you want to add, that you had conversations about with anyone, as to why you sent one message on the 27th, why you sent another, of a different [6455-6456] text, on the 28th?

Admiral STARK. Nothing beyond—

Senator FERGUSON. Or, the 29th.

Mr. MITCHELL. What messages are they?

Admiral STARK. Our messages and Army messages?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. No, I think I have covered that in my testimony rather fully.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know of any conversations you had with the President or Secretary of War or Navy on that question?

Admiral STARK. Beyond what I have testified to, which is the fact they were familiar with them.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you ever discussed with the President the message which was intercepted from Tokyo to Berlin on the 30th, it is at page 204 of our exhibit 1?

Admiral STARK. Are you referring to that part of the message which stated:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

[6457] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You knew there was a tie-up between Hitler and the Japs and you had this message in your possession on the 1st. It was translated on the 1st. Did you ever discuss that with the President?

Admiral STARK. I may have. The message was undoubtedly sent to him. I had anticipated the effect of that message by having previously stated in a dispatch that it might come within the next few days, that dispatch being of the 27th, and Marshall having stated it might come any time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this called to your attention, that we intercepted parts 1 and 3 of that very vital and important message, but we don't have part 2 here—and I want to read you the first line of part 3:

If when you tell them this——

Which would be referring to what was in part 2.

If when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July.

Was there anything said about this missing part of this important message?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not anyone got in touch with the Philippines, where they were intercepting [6458] the same kind of messages, to see whether or not part 2, which seemed to be vital in this language, was ever intercepted?

Mr. MITCHELL. What about page 211? They are scattered around.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a different number. I have written to—or asked counsel's office to write and try to locate why they didn't get part 2 and why we don't have it. That is why I am questioning the Admiral.

Admiral STARK. I don't recall it. We probably didn't get everything. There may be gaps here and there all through this.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is a very vital message. There are three places that they are being intercepted and decoded. One is the British. One at the Philippines. One is here. I am wondering whether this wasn't called to your attention or whether you didn't notice in reading these dispatches, whether you didn't notice it and say, "Where is part 2."

It says:

If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you——

Which indicates what was said in number 2.

Admiral STARK. I don't recall it, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall it at all?

[6459] Admiral STARK. No, I have no memory with regard to it, but it may be that you can get that from other witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least it didn't strike any chord in your mind?

Admiral STARK. It doesn't now, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And doesn't even now?

Admiral STARK. It does not now. I don't recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't think that that could be a very significant message—did you ever try to get it from the British?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall the incident. I believe we were exchanging with the British almost continuously. It is my recollection that we had a British Officer right in our group in Corregidor and that we had an officer right in their group in the Singapore area.

[6460] Senator FERGUSON. Did we have them in London with them?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall that. We probably—well, I don't recall. You can get that from the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get over your desk, Admiral, admiralty messages?

Admiral STARK. Well, I got over my desk any admiralty messages which were intended for me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am talking about admiralty messages on this question of intercepts. For instance, they wired that about the Kra Peninsula.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I got that.

Senator FERGUSON. Ship movement.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Those messages would come through the same channels through which messages from our own people came, and they would be delivered to me in the same manner.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall ever getting this part 2?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall the thing at all; no, sir. The answer is no.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall part 1 and part 3?

Admiral STARK. I recall the one about the war breaking out. To the best of my remembrance, I saw that at the time. That sort of rang the bell somewhere. But some of this is [6461] pretty difficult to separate after the intervening years, as to whether you are thinking in terms of what you are reading now or what you saw then. But I do think that I saw that particular message.

Senator FERGUSON. When you take that with the previous message on the 29th from Berlin to Tokyo, where they hadn't given them any information, then when the deadline comes along we get this important information going right into Berlin, doesn't that impress you that you knew about that?

Admiral STARK. I was greatly impressed when I sent out a message stating it was a war warning and that the Japs were expected to strike in the next few days. I don't know how I could have made it stronger or more unequivocal.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, this all came after you sent the war-warning message.

Admiral STARK. This particular message did. The previous one you referred to did not. It was confirmatory of our evaluation which we had made and sent out.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall where you were when you received the word of the attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you?

Admiral STARK. I was in the office.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose office?

[6462] Admiral STARK. My own.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you with the Secretary of the Navy when he received his message?

Admiral STARK. You mean the 1300 message? I was not with him when he received that. I believe he received that very shortly after I did. It was delivered to him in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the attack message.

Admiral STARK. The attack message.

Senator FERGUSON. This is a raid, not a—what do you call it when it is not maneuvers—no drill?

Admiral STARK. This was a raid. With regard to the Secretary's moves at that time, you know that there had been some telephone calls recorded, and I had been asked what they were, and trying to get back in my memory what they were, and I recently saw someone who was going up North, and endeavoring to check back on that, and I have learned this, and with full authority.

Secretary Knox had intended this morning going to Chicago with Mr. O'Keefe, who, I believe, was manager of his paper. His plane was standing by. He stopped in at the State Department. And after that conference, according to Mrs. Knox, who was waiting for him and expecting him to go on, he changed his plan and O'Keefe went on separately. The Secretary went [6463] on down to the *Sequoia*, his naval yacht, for lunch, and she remarked they were not ready for them, and not expecting them. My guess would be that he received the dispatch while on the *Sequoia*. He came to the office later and remained in the office, getting home that night about 2 o'clock in the morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the Secretary of the Navy's office between 12 and 12:30 on Sunday?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. To refresh—

Admiral STARK. The clear thing that stands out in my memory is the discussion of the 1300 dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the 1300 dispatch is the 1 o'clock dispatch?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. My memory is extremely clear on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this refresh your memory, that the Secretary of the Navy received that as you and he came out of your office—out of his office? He made a remark about it. I am trying to get the remark, if you remember.

Admiral STARK. I do not remember discussing it with him. As to the time of delivery, the dispatches were delivered, I believe, by Kramer, who is going to be a witness here, and it is my understanding that immediately after bringing the message [6464] to my office, about 10:40, as I recall, he went directly to the State Department and delivered the message, delivered Colonel Knox a copy of that message.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now past recess time.

Senator FERGUSON. I can't finish in the next few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[6465]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Dues counsel have anything now?

Mr. MITCHELL. Not just at present.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you have anything to present before you proceed?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything you want to present at this time?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, did you know of any diplomatic relations being carried on with Japan along the same questions that we were carrying them on, by the British Empire, by London or by the Netherlands?

Admiral STARK. I gather the question is—

Senator FERGUSON. During the period that we were negotiating.

Admiral STARK. Did I know whether Great Britain or the Netherlands were carrying on?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[6466] Admiral STARK. No, sir, I did not know.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no information on that subject?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, when you were moving the vessels around in the Pacific was it called to your attention, or did you ever get any information to the effect that Japan made a protest that our fleet in effect had surrounded one of their task forces or their fleet in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard of that in 1940?

Admiral STARK. I never heard of that at any time.

Senator FERGUSON. We had no particular lanes laid out at that time?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That had never been called to your attention, that there was a protest filed?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, it never had. When I state that we had no particular lanes laid out, there were certain areas wherein the fleet exercised.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, as far as our fleet was concerned.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, as far as our local exercise in an area.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it was also true when we were exercising that we had some difficulty with parts of the Jap [6467] fleet getting in there and observing those?

Admiral STARK. We seldom had fleet maneuvers when I was in the fleet on the west coast that some time or other during the maneuvers a Japanese tanker or Japanese fishermen were not present. That goes back a number of years.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So we felt at that time they were even using that means of obtaining information?

Admiral STARK. Always regarding our fleet formations and how we were maneuvering.

Senator FERGUSON. It was no surprise then for us to learn how much in detail they had obtained the information at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the statement made in exhibit 16 by Admiral Schuirmann in relation to the note of August 17?

Admiral STARK. That it was an ultimatum?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I did not know about that or did not recall it until after the discussion of that here before the committee that there was an ultimatum and somebody discussed that. We have had a lot of fun with Admiral Schuirmann about it but I have no recollection of it otherwise.

Senator FERGUSON. In exhibit 45, Admiral, there is one [6468] sentence I would like to talk with you about in order to get your explanation of it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading).

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was assured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

Will you explain that as far as your knowledge was concerned, as to what it was?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I recall, the changes suggested by Colonel Stimson were very minor and also, as I recall, he did not want us to put the President in a position, or recommend in any way that he go back to the Japanese in any way which would walk back anything we had said. My recollection is not too clear. I do not think it amounted to a great deal. The memorandum stands about as it was. If he comes before the committee he can give it himself and I would rather he would. My remembrance is that we did not want to be put in a position of—or, rather, Colonel Stimson did not want to be, of walking back on anything we had done.

Senator FERGUSON. I had felt that there was some doubt [6469] that he might appear and that is the reason that you, being a top, high-ranking officer of the Navy and being a party to this instrument, in effect drawing it up, that you would be able to explain that as far as the Navy was concerned.

Admiral STARK. Well, I think that is what it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no better or different recollection than that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it considered that that was part of the diplomatic-political angle that you were not to be concerned with that you were strictly to keep to the military?

Admiral STARK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that explained to you in any way?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; we had the right to say anything we wanted to. I think the message speaks for itself. Primarily, and as I recall this message of the 27th so stated, either that or the one of the 5th or both—we were primarily concerned with getting time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand this the same as I understood that Admiral Turner understood, the memo of the 27th was brought about by the British, that they wanted it drafted and that they were after that information? It was to be given to the President so that he could pass upon a question that they wanted in relation to sending out some reconnaissance [6470] planes?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall the British prompting having anything to do with this memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you recall in one of the diplomatic notes there is evidence that we were to send out three scouting planes?

Admiral STARK. Yes. I do not know about the diplomatic notes. I remember having directed Admiral Hart to do that and stating that the British were—I remember what you are talking about now.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. And that the British were scouting a certain area and this dovetailed with it. That may have been in response to either a request of theirs or of their stating where they were looking and asking what we were doing and, as a matter of fact, I think I am correct in stating that Admiral Hart was already doing that before we told him.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Admiral Turner gave us the information that one of our planes in scouting had gone over Formosa and there was a protest. Did you ever see that protest?—

Admiral STARK. I remember his stating it. I had forgotten the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no knowledge of that?

[6471] Admiral STARK. I had forgotten it. I have knowledge of it now.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you did have knowledge?

Admiral STARK. I say I had forgotten it. I have knowledge of it now from the statement which has been made.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what was done about the protest? Had you any conversation with the President about it?

Admiral STARK. Not that I recall. I think not. I do not know what was done about the protest, whether it was let go or what not. They were flying over us in spots regularly and we knew it and they knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not one of the things that made the wording "Avoid the first overt act" to be put in the note? I assume that that was after the note was given.

Admiral STARK. That is with respect to the Army note?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I am not sure. I do not recall of the President having directly told us not to put it in the dispatch, certainly we did not put it in, not to commit the first overt act. That, however, I knew to be general policy.

Senator FERGUSON. It was the general policy?

Admiral STARK. General policy; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with Admiral Kimmel's retirement?

[6472] Admiral STARK. Well, I knew that he had retired; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And will you tell us what you know about it? Were you consulted or conferred with?

Admiral STARK. I was directed.

Senator FERGUSON. Who directed you?

Admiral STARK. It came to me from Colonel Knox regarding the relief of Kimmel; regarding his detachment.

Senator FERGUSON. Yesterday, when you read the memo of Secretary Knox to the President you did not find anything there critical about his removal.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did Colonel Knox first talk with you about the removal of or detachment of Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Shortly after he came back and after coming from the White House he directed that Kimmel be relieved. There is a dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy to the commander in chief, Pacific, 162105; that would be 16 December.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK (reading):

You will very shortly receive dispatch orders detaching you as CINC Pacific and Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet and ordering you report Com. 14 for temporary duty.

[6473] Inform Pye.

That is Admiral Pye.

He will be your temporary relief.

That is from the Secretary of the Navy and it bears my initials and also those of Admiral Nimitz, who was Chief of Personnel at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had no conversation with him as to the cause, merely that you were approving or initialing the order doing it?

Admiral STARK. I received my orders regarding Kimmel. I was not consulted beforehand.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say he had any conversation with the President about his removal or his detachment?

Admiral STARK. A commander in chief would not be removed without the President's permission.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, of course, there is a distinction between permission and a directive.

Admiral STARK. I say without his permission or without his O. K.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether it was on his direction?

Admiral STARK. Well, I know that the Secretary told me to send that dispatch and that the Secretary had been in touch with the President. I never asked the Secretary whether the President directed it initially or whether he did or whether [6474] it was Colonel Knox's recommendation to the President and the President so ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. But you took it then that it was on at least the President's order?

Admiral STARK. In effect; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And how many days would you say that was after Colonel Knox returned from the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. I think it might be best to get the fact on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I do not have the information.

Admiral STARK. It was shortly after, I would say that.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it hours or days or a week?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would say shortly. By "shortly" I mean perhaps in a day or two.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he retired to the coast?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have any conversation with him or anyone else about his resignation or retirement?

Admiral STARK. I wrote him, as I recall, with regard to his retirement and I have not seen a copy of that letter. Whether it was official or whether Admiral Kimmel may have a copy of it, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what did you say? What was the substance of the letter you wrote him about his retirement? [6475] Now, when you said "official" did you mean whether you were acting as an official or personal?

Admiral STARK. Whether I wrote him an official note from Chief of Operation to Admiral Kimmel or whether it was one of my "Dear Kimmel" letters?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it would amount to the same thing about his retirement?

Admiral STARK. It would be notifying him; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you write him?

Admiral STARK. My recollection—and I want to make it plain that this is recollection—is that I discussed the matter from one angle or another, suggested that I was not trying unduly or even to influence him, pointed out that Short had requested retirement and that he might want to parallel that or he might not and asked him to advise me. I wish I could find that correspondence and whether Admiral Kimmel has a copy of it or not I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write that after conference with anyone?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; with the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it on his request that you do it in that way, which was at least a polite suggestion, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Well, he was familiar with it. Whether [6476] it was my suggestion or his, I am not certain.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever call anyone at the Mare Navy Yard in relation to it?

Admiral STARK. At where?

Senator FERGUSON. At Mare Island.

Admiral STARK. I think I did talk to Kimmel or to the officer out there at the time with reference to getting some word to him. Kimmel afterwards came to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember what was said in that conversation about asking him to retire?

Admiral STARK. No. I only remember the general subject of retirement and that it was taken up.

Senator FERGUSON. And he did retire on your suggestion then?

Admiral STARK. He retired—

Senator FERGUSON. That is, your suggestion from the Secretary.

Admiral STARK (continuing). On his own volition. We did not force him at all as I remember it. I never knew of a man to put up a manlier, straighter, finer front than did Admiral Kimmel in this entire picture at that time. His whole bearing was exemplary and what I would have expected of him.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I understand that the information or opinion that you had was if he had not retired he [6477] would have been removed?

Admiral STARK. If he had not retired I do not know just what action might have been taken.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had you a conversation with the Secretary about that?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that, when I got it. We did not have to.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that he would do it on the suggestion?

Admiral STARK. He did it. He did do it, I think, after sizing up all the considerations and, as he said, he had only the best interests of the Navy and of the country at heart, I believe almost in those words and what happened to him he was not so concerned with at that time, the war was on, and I believe his own size-up of the situation was that the best thing for him to do at that time was to retire. Now, if I am mistaken in that he can correct it and I would abide by anything that he stated with regard to it.

Senator FERGUSON. And did the Secretary of the Navy say that he had had a conversation with the President or not about his retirement? Was that a matter that only the President could pass on?

Admiral STARK. I imagine that had been discussed with the President because the future of those two officers at that time [6478] was on a high level.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you assumed that that was true when you were talking to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. I think Colonel Knox undoubtedly told the President just what we were doing because I had kept Colonel Knox fully informed.

Senator FERGUSON. And how long was that after your letter to him that he retired?

Admiral STARK. That he actually retired?

Senator FERGUSON. That he actually retired?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not remember the date of his retirement, sir. Counsel can also get that from the Navy Department if it is desired.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, one or two questions on the wind message. Did you ever see the message that came from Batavia in relation to the wind message, that had a little different angle to it than ours. Instead of diplomatic relations being broken off it used the word "war."

Admiral STARK. My recollection is very hazy on that entire subject. I heard it discussed so much since then, before the Navy Court of Inquiry and what has been testified to, I know exactly to what you are referring; whether my remembrance is in the light of what I have heard since or before I am not sure. I do not recollect it except as it has come to us later [6479] but I may have known it at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it would be very significant, would it not, that they expected if relations were broken off, it meant war?

Admiral STARK. It was very likely to mean war.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your opinion whether you would have had that message or not?

Admiral STARK. If we broke off relations?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I thought we were heading for it pretty well anyway.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, the message that they sent of 14 parts was more than an ultimatum, was it not? There was no chance to comply with that at all and never was intended.

Admiral STARK. That broke off negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. In other words, you described that the other day as an ultimatum. It was more than that, was it not?

Admiral STARK. I described it as an ultimatum?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall, but it was to break off all negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. It was more than an ultimatum because [6480] we could not ever comply with it if we wanted to. They intended war.

Admiral STARK. The message stands for itself, I think, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, did you hear before the President sent this message to the Emperor that he was going to send one? Were you consulted about that?

Admiral STARK. I believe I knew about that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before the evening of the 6th were you informed about that message?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember just when. I knew that there was talk about the President sending the message as one last hope for continuing the peace in the Pacific. I could not say just when I knew about it. I may have known about it shortly after it was conceived, to which I believe Secretary—I do not know whether Secretary Hull has testified as to that date or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any opinions or was any opinion sought by the President from you on that?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that it was. It was one of those things that might do some good, could do no harm. The issue was pretty well drawn at that time. It was what might be called a last hope. I recall the President's message with regard to the European war before it broke out, and it is [6481] one of those things which I believe we have always done.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in relation to that, as I am informed and I will ask you, Did you hear that broadcast on the radio on Saturday evening, that the message had been sent?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be a very important matter, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Important that I heard it over the radio?

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; that you did hear it. You say you do not remember hearing it.

Admiral STARK. Well, I do not know that it would have been particularly important if I knew it was going that I happened to hear it over the radio.

[6482] Senator FERGUSON. Now you had said in the message of the 27th that diplomatic negotiations had ceased. Now I want to get your opinion on how that would be construed in the field, hearing it on the radio and knowing from press reports that on the 2d or 3d of December the President had made another request from the Japanese, and that was in relation to going into Indochina, or Thailand, I do not have that message here at the present time.

Admiral STARK. I do not know to just what message you refer about the 2d or the 3d.

Senator FERGUSON. There was a message sent on December 2d. In the white book we have quite a number of conversations. In fact we have on page 777 of Foreign Relations one where Mr. Ballantine had an appointment with Mr. Terasaki, and one on December 1 stating "The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that he noted that the President was returning to Washington in advance of his schedule and inquired what the reason for this was," and so forth.

Another note on December 2 handed by the first secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on December 2, 1941.

Another memorandum of a conversation on December 2, 1941. Another memorandum on December 5 between the Japanese [6483] Ambassador and the Department of State, stating, "The German Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department."

Admiral STARK. I remember those, or at least I have seen them within the last few months. I thought you were referring to a message which had been sent out from Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. These are messages delivered by Washington, or memoranda of conversations.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now that being true, and Admiral Kimmel not knowing that the message of the 26th had gone, and we were waiting for the reply on that message, and you saying it had practically ceased, and all this information going out from the articles in the newspapers, and the President personally negotiating with the Emperor on the night of the 6th, would not that cause a belief that your former message about "they had ceased" was not exactly true?

Admiral STARK. I think the Commander in Chief knew that I would not make such a flat statement and of such gravity without full consideration, and he would believe that if I said it, and said it to him officially, it was so. I believe that that again backed up by the burning of the codes, and even the burning of the codes in Honolulu, would have outweighed anything else in his mind, or if he were in [6484] doubt he could have asked me, and I feel he would have thought that I would have changed my message if there had been any reason to change it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did not your message, when you sent him a copy of the Army message, weaken it?

Admiral STARK. I did not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not think so?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Reading it now, what would you say?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not think so. I think my message stands for itself.

Senator FERGUSON. When was Singapore alerted, to your knowledge?

Admiral STARK. Singapore?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. By the British?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, the British in Singapore.

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any knowledge on that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that on the 6th, and right before the 7th, troop ships were sailing out of our west coast at San Francisco?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I probably did know that. I recall [6485] we were sending troops out, and I recall the action taken the next day when we were wondering if submarines might not be in that area.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the Roberts report before it was filed?

Admiral STARK. I do not think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you requested to make any changes in it?

Admiral STARK. I beg pardon, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I say were you requested to make some changes in it? Do you have some information that you want to get?

Admiral STARK. This was information on my statement about sailings. I think I have covered that.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot recollect seeing the Roberts report before it was filed?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not consulted on it?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. What I saw about the Roberts report was the printed report.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing but the printed report, after it was printed?

Admiral STARK. That is all I recall; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have not, I take it, then [6486] seen the original Roberts report since?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I have not. This is the document which I saw [indicating], Docket 159, Seventy-seventh Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the printed report. I want to ask you now if you can recall going to the Secretary of the Navy's office at noon prior to the 1300 message that we talked about this morning, the one on attack, and talking with the Secretary for some 30 minutes?

Admiral STARK. No; I have no recollection of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Trying to refresh your memory, and only for that purpose, when you and the Secretary were walking out of the office the message was handed to the Secretary advising him about the attack. Does that refresh your memory?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall anything being discussed with the Secretary of the Navy on the morning of the 7th?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask you when you first talked with the President on Sunday, the 7th of December 1941?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember when I first talked to him. It is my impression that I did talk to him after I had talked to Pearl Harbor, but I do not remember the times of [6487] those calls.

Senator FERGUSON. Now to again refresh your memory, and only that, from the evidence that has appeared in one of the previous hearings—

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Of Captain McCullom coming to your office and giving you a message and you indicated that you were going to talk to the White House and lifted up the phone and he left?

Admiral STARK. That was after the attack?

Senator FERGUSON. No; before the attack. Do you recall any conversation with the President prior to the attack?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any with him that day after the attack?

Admiral STARK. I think I did. It would have been the most natural thing in the world and in accordance with my regular procedure of giving him anything of importance, any news of importance which I had, and I had been in touch with the commander of Pearl Harbor as regards what had happened out there. I either would have told him personally or made sure that he would have gotten it through Colonel Knox or his aide. Usually I picked up the phone and without hesitation gave the President everything I had of interest.

[6488] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what his remark was to you about the attack when you did discuss it with him, not saying when the time was?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not. I do not remember what his expression was at that time when it occurred.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall whether or not you ever notified CINCPAC and CINCAF of the orders to the Atlantic Fleet to start shooting German subs?

Admiral STARK. I think I covered that in my statement, about telling them about the order.

Senator FERGUSON. There was no official order?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be in that letter that I read to you this morning, or that you read to me?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall having informed them officially. I believe I sent them copies of the order and told them in a personal letter.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, is there anything that you want to add on this record or that you want to take from the record as far as any of my questions or any other questions are concerned?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I think of nothing at this time. I will read the record over very carefully. I have not had an opportunity to do it. If there is anything I will write [6489] a letter to the committee. I was trying to think during the noon hour if there was anything—thinking of your questions—anything that I could add that would be helpful. I could think of nothing that I could subtract and I cannot think of anything that has not been pretty well covered, as far as I am concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Then what you want to tell us is that at least you have had a fair hearing, and a complete hearing, that you have had an opportunity to give all your versions and views before this committee?

Admiral STARK. Absolutely; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether the questions were asked or not, you have had that opportunity?

¹ See Hearings, Part 6, p. 2668 et seq., for a letter from Adm. Stark and list of Naval commands receiving Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5.

Admiral STARK. That is correct. If I thought there was anything of any importance, or if I do think of anything which I have left out, I would not hesitate to send it up.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the purpose of my questions to you.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I understand.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I yield.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It seems at the time the Senator from Michigan [6490] placed in the record a series of messages between certain dates and at certain pages to Pearl Harbor he left out one particular message in exhibit No. 2. I find that the message in regard to the Philippines is not there, but since there has been so much testimony about the bomb plot at Hawaii and some questions particularly by Mr. Gesell that the other messages were mostly ship movements, there has been some testimony by General Marshall to the effect that there were other messages that were not ship-movement messages.

I would like to place in the record at this time reference to the entries in exhibit No. 2 at page 34 which pertains to maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone; at page 36, which speaks of a transfer of an air depot at Panama Canal, about the petroleum supply tanks being camouflaged, about the amount of food supplies there, about the shifting around of the use of the ammunition loading pier.

I would like also to place in the record the entry at page 122, again thinking about taking the maps of the Panama Canal out by plane so they would not be picked up.

Again, I would like to place in the record the message at page 125, and particularly this quotation:

Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval preparations by enforcing various [6491] exercises to meet any eventuality.

And again I quote:

Evidently the preparations are intended for defense against Japan.

And again:

Lately the departure of craft from the bay has become infrequent but since the war, those craft which do go out seldom return, even through it be Saturday or Sunday.

I would like also to place in the record the entry at page 123 outlining the preparations which the Russians made in the month of June at Vladivostok.

I would also ask to have placed in the record the entry at page 38 about the inspection for the location of airplane bases and the construction of airports at Panama Canal.

Also the entry at page 39, dated October 18, 1941, where the statement is made, "In order to find out the plans of the Canal Command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th." And again, "going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and 8 barracks to accommodate 200 men each."

As well as the entry at page 40 in regard to gun emplacements. The entry at page 51—and I would like to call particular attention to that entry, wherein the following language is used—it was sent on the 22d of November 1941 and not translated until December 25, 1941, but the language is used: [6492]

The United States Government is going on the assumption that the attack on the Canal will be made from both air and sea.

I would like also to put in the entry at page 52, which speaks of the anti-air defenses on Lock No. 1, which is now being used, are being improved. It states:

Of course, there are anti-air defenses at Lock No. 3. The naval defense area, patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene on the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands.

[6493] Present Army strength is 47,000; naval, 10,000; Air Force, 5,000. In addition, it is estimated that there is approximately twice this general total, made up of the families and laborers,

and so on.

I would like also to call your attention to the entries at pages 58, 70, 71, 79, 81, 82, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, and 96 none of which are ship-movement reports but in effect specific inquiries about the Aleutians and Alaska, about the Panama Canal Zone, about the Philippines, as well as the west coast of the United States.

And I would like to call the particular attention of the committee to the master plan for espionage at page 117.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All of those pages are in exhibit 2?

Mr. MURPHY. All in exhibit 2.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, it will be so ordered.

Do you have something, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I understand the committee asked me for the time of transmission by radio to Honolulu of certain of our dispatches, and I have it here. I will give it to counsel. It just gives the time groups.

There is the message of the 24th, with which you are all familiar, in which the time of transmission was 24—2355, and it runs down through from that message of the 27th and those with regard to the codes. I do not know who asked for it, [6494] but counsel informs me that someone did.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for a moment and ask if you obtained the Munson reports yet, or were they delivered to you?

Admiral STARK. I think they have not yet come up. Counsel was going to ask for them.

Senator FERGUSON. At least they have not come to your attention?

Admiral STARK. I will follow it up personally, to make sure that they come through.

Mr. MITCHELL. While we are on it, I will ask the reporter to write into the daily transcript this memorandum that has just been furnished by the admiral, giving the times. These were received by the naval radio station at Honolulu and are expressed in Greenwich civil time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

[6405]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington 25, D. C., 5 Jan 1946.

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-20-4-blp
Serial 0003003P20
(SC) A17-24(1)
Top Secret

Memorandum for Captain John F. Walsh, USN.

Subj: Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack.

Ref: (a) Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark, dtd 3 Jan 46.

1. The following information is submitted in accordance with reference (a). The times given represent time received by Naval Radio Station, Honolulu, T. H., and are expressed in Greenwich Civil Time:

Originator	Date/time group	Month and year	Time of transmission to radio Honolulu
OPNav.....	242005	November 1941.....	242355
OPNav.....	272337	November 1941.....	280106
OPNav.....	290110	November 1941.....	290238
OPNav.....	031850	December 1941.....	031956
OPNav.....	031855	December 1941.....	031952
OPNav.....	270038	November 1941.....	270709
OPNav.....	270040	November 1941.....	270558

[6496]

/S/ Joseph R. Redman,
JOSEPH R. REDMAN,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Chief of Naval Communications.

[6497] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, just one short letter. You may recall that in my testimony, when the question came up of dawn at Honolulu, I stated I thought it was at least an hour before the 7:55 time which was reported as the time of the attack, and that I could get something definite on that from the Naval Observatory. I made a request of the Superintendent of the Naval Observatory, and I have his report, which, if you would like to have it, I will read. It will clear up that matter.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Admiral STARK (reading):

On December 7, 1941, sunrise at Pearl Harbor occurred at 0627—

that is 6:27—

time of 157° 5 meridian (Zone +10^h 30^m). National twilight began 52 minutes before sunrise, at 0635; and civil twilight 24 minutes before sunrise, at 0603. Civil twilight is conventionally taken to begin in the morning when the sun is still 6° below the horizon, and is intended to cover the somewhat indefinite period during which the natural illumination usually is sufficient for ordinary outdoor operations to be carried on.

That was at 3 minutes after 6:00.

Nautical twilight begins when the sun is 12° below the horizon, a time intermediate [6498] between complete darkness and civil twilight. Actually, the illumination varies greatly according to weather conditions at the time.

The moon was a few days past full (full moon occurred on Dec. 3). The moon rose at 2005—

that is 8:05 p. m.—

on the evening of December 6 and set at 0925 on the morning of December 7 (Zone 10^h 30^m time) at Pearl Harbor.

The times of sunrise, and of moonset, are for the instant when the upper limb appears on the horizon.

That is, you get the round sun, and the upper limb is the tangent to the horizon.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. That is all, yes, sir. I think the important thing in that message is, in addition to the moonlight, that at 6:03, the time of civil twilight, is a period when natural illumination usually is sufficient for ordinary outdoor operations to be carried on.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I would like to call the attention of the committee to the fact that in the narrative there is a statement by the commander of one of the destroyers going into Pearl Harbor that visibility was good between 5 and 6 that morning.

[6499] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the admiral one question on that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the mountains make any difference in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I think very little. Of course you would not get the direct sun rays just as the sun comes above the water, but I think that time is all right, and particularly because of the fact that the moonlight out there is frequently brilliant.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire, Admiral.

[6500] Mr. KEEFE. I assume at this time, Mr. Chairman, that everybody connected with this examination has exhausted every possible question that could be asked of Admiral Stark, and I hesitate to take much of Admiral Stark's time, but I think there are a few things that I think this record ought to show.

Admiral, when were you relieved of your duties as Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. I was relieved in March 1942.

Mr. KEEFE. And was the letter which you read into the record this morning from Secretary Knox dated at that time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were then assigned as commander of the European Fleet?

Admiral STARK. The United States naval forces in Europe; yes, sir.

Later on, the fleet was known over there as a fleet, and I was given additional orders.

I have a short and rather pithy transcript here that I had made up some days ago in case this question should be asked me.

Mr. KEEFE. I haven't any objection, but I would like to shorten this up as much as I can and ask some very simple questions that can be answered rather easily and without going into too much length.

[6501] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. This is rather short.

Mr. KEEFE. What does it have reference to?

Admiral STARK. My duties in Europe.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral STARK. Upon my detachment as Chief of Naval Operations, I was designated commander, United States naval forces in Eu-

rope with headquarters in London. In 1943, as preparations for the invasion progressed, I was given additional duty by the commander in chief, United States Fleet, as commander, Twelfth Fleet. Also in 1943, I was given additional duty by the Secretary of the Navy as United States Naval Advisor to the European Advisory Commission, an organization in London of representatives of the Big Three Powers, which was charged with making recommendations concerning problems arising out of the war in Europe. In November 1944, I reached the statutory retirement age, but continued in my command. In April 1945, the United States naval forces in the Mediterranean-North African area were added to my command. On 16 August 1945, I was relieved by Admiral Hewitt.

During the preinvasion, invasion, and postinvasion phases of the liberation of France, Belgium, and Holland, and the conquest of Europe, COMNAVEU was at all times the representative of the Navy Department in Europe and in direct control of all matters relating to convoys and shipping, anti- [6502] submarine warfare in general, the logistic support of all naval forces in Europe (less Mediterranean) and the screening agency through which all logistic requirements for the United States Army, British Navy, and the navies of governments in exile funneled. COMNAVEU-COM-12 was in administrative control of the submarine and surface forces of the United States Navy which operated with the British Fleet in European waters (less Mediterranean), of the air squadrons which operated with coastal command, RAF, and of the naval forces and shore establishments which were placed under the control of General Eisenhower and the allied naval commander in chief for the invasion of France. As the senior United States naval officer in Europe, COMNAVEU and commander Twelfth Fleet received copies of all orders regarding the operational control of naval forces under the afore-mentioned commands and was in constant touch with their dispositions and requirements. His assistance in bringing about any needed adjustments was constantly sought by submarine, air force, surface force commanders, and commander Task Force 122. Vice Admiral Kirk, United States Navy, was in command of this task force. He was the operational commander of the United States naval task forces engaged in the invasion of Normandy. COMNAVEU was the senior naval adviser to the United States Ambassador to Great Britain, Ambassador to governments in exile, and, in effect, to the commanding general, European theater of operations, General [6503] Eisenhower, and subsequently the supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. Both port organizations and shipping were at all times under the control of COMNAVEU and commander Twelfth Fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I assume that the carrying out of the responsibilities incident to that position required the exercise of some superior judgment, did it not?

Admiral STARK. With all due modesty, I may say I thought it did.

Mr. KEEFE. When you were relieved of your command, did you receive any word from General Eisenhower, the supreme allied commander?

Admiral STARK. I received a dispatch from him, which I greatly prize, and prior to that, and after the Normandy invasion, the Army awarded me the Distinguished—Army Distinguished Service Medal.

Mr. KEEFE. What date was that award made, and will you produce the message from General Eisenhower?

Admiral STARK. The message from General Eisenhower reads—

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of it?

Admiral STARK. It is an Army message. In the 17th of August.

Mr. KEEFE. 1945?

Admiral STARK. 1945; yes, sir.

[6504] Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral STARK. I read his message:

I have no words to express my appreciation for the great help you have given the Forces under my command over the past three years. Your assistance has been vital and the spirit in which it was rendered has been the acme of generous cooperation.

Good bye and good luck.

(Signed) EISENHOWER

Mr. KEEFE. When was the citation from the Army by which you received the Distinguished Service Medal?

Admiral STARK. It was initiated and bears the date of July 15, 1944.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, have you that citation?

Admiral STARK. I have it.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you read it into the record, please?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I will eliminate the first part which refers to previous decorations and Army requirements. It starts with:

Recommendation for Award of Distinguished Service Medal. * * *

For Distinguished Service Medal: Admiral Stark, while serving in support of the Army of the United States, distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious service [6505] to the Government in a duty of great responsibility.

Admiral Stark, as Commander of the United States Naval Forces in Europe, was charged with the planning and preparation of the United States naval aspects of the launching of the campaign for the liberation of Europe. These plans were coordinated with the United States Army and the Armies of the Allies, as well as the Navies of the other participating countries. From an Army standpoint, the attack on Europe would have been impossible without the complete support of the U. S. Navy.

More than 4,000 naval ships and craft and over 100,000 naval officers and men were used in the V-Day assault. The fact that these ships and men were available is directly attributable to the efforts of Admiral Stark. The successful planning for the needs and employment of these ships and for the officers and men was accomplished through the untiring efforts of Admiral Stark and the close cooperation which he maintained with the appropriate Army commanders and their staffs. Every desire of the Army commanders for naval craft, personnel and matériel was met in a most efficient manner.

The planning for this assault was complete to the smallest detail on the part of the United States Naval [6506] Forces and served to make the combined Naval and Ground Forces of the United States an integrated unit.

The efficient planning of Admiral Stark enabled the United States Navy to assemble and maintain—in spite of unfavorable weather—a list of a substantially greater assault force than was first anticipated by the Army commanders. The results so far accomplished in this assault on the Fortress of Europe would have been impossible without the complete and wholehearted support on the part of the Navy.

The service for this award as recommended has been completed, as the original assault has been successfully concluded.

And the proposed citation reads:

Admiral Harold Raynsford Stark, Commander, United States Naval Forces in Europe, for exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. Admiral Stark was responsible for the planning, preparation and coordination of the United States naval aspects of the launching of the campaign for the liberation of Europe. Through keen foresight and excep-

tional administrative ability, Admiral Stark was able to plan for and meet the necessary personnel and matériel requirements for this enormous operation. Only through his untiring [6507] efforts was the accomplishment of this successful invasion completed. The services rendered by Admiral Stark reflect great credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of the United States. Entered Naval Service from Pennsylvania.

(Signed) DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
General, U. S. Army,
Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

May I add, of course that would have been impossible for any commander to attain without a wonderful lot of personnel under him.

I might mention, for example, that an initial goal of readiness of the 4,000-odd craft; that is, of a large portion of them, was put at 85 percent readiness, which was higher than any other power had put it. We kept raising that, and in the last visit I made, particularly to the workmen, with their torches and whatnot, at all of the large number of stations we had, my constant plea was for 100 percent, and they all said they would give it. They were working day and night. They practically attained it. The over-all result for all stations being 99 percent plus. And what was accomplished was entirely due to the subordinate commands, which were the finest in the world.

[6508] Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Stark, to get this matter chronologically in one piece, as a result of your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were cited by the President and awarded, as I understood your testimony, a gold star; is that right?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. At the termination of your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were given the letter from the Secretary of the Navy which you have read into the record this morning?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. You then embarked upon service as commander of the naval forces in the European area and as a result of that service rendered during the war you were decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross from the Navy—from the Army?

Admiral STARK. Distinguished Service Medal from the Army.

Mr. KEEFE. Distinguished Service Medal, I should say, from the Army, together with a citation from General Eisenhower and also a personal letter from General Eisenhower, which you have read into the record, when you left that service?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. That was a dispatch.

Mr. KEEFE. In addition you were decorated by at least three foreign governments?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6509] Mr. KEEFE. Now during this period of time between December 7, 1941, and the time of your relief from duty as commander of the United States naval forces in the European area, did you know of any action taken by Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King with respect to your conduct as Chief of Naval Operations prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you first learn that Admiral King had recommended to the Secretary of the Navy that you be relegated to a position not requiring the exercise of superior judgment and to a position, and I quote, "in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors"?

Admiral STARK. I learned that after I returned home and when I was on what has become to be known as terminal leave. In other words, my service had terminated. I am still waiting orders for retirement. I first saw that, as I recall, in the press.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you officially notified by a finding by the Secretary of the Navy that you should be retired under circumstances so that you could never again serve in the Navy in a position that might require the exercise of superior judgment?

Admiral STARK. Not until it was published. I had no previous knowledge of it.

[6510] Mr. KEEFE. So upon your return from your service in Europe, after receiving citations from the President of the United States, from the Navy Department, from the War Department, and from at least three foreign governments, you learned for the first time, in the press, that you had been retired under these circumstances which I have just related?

Admiral STARK. That I was to be retired.

Mr. KEEFE. Were to be retired?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you been retired?

Admiral STARK. Not yet, sir. I was placed on 4 months' leave, as is customary. That 4 months was up on December 24, but in view of these hearings I have not yet been retired. My service was over really when I returned home.

Mr. KEEFE. Is it accurate for me to say, as a layman, that during all your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were the opposite number of General Marshall?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. You as Chief of Naval Operations and he as the Chief of General Staff were opposite numbers?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. He having responsibility on the Army side and you on the Navy side?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6511] Mr. KEEFE. And from your testimony that you have given before this committee I conclude that you feel that as Chief of Naval Operations you did everything which you considered possible and proper for you to do to alert the Navy prior to December 7?

Admiral STARK. I thought so.

Mr. KEEFE. At Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I thought so; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you say that principally because, as you have reiterated time and again, you sent the message of November 24 and the war warning message of November 27?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; plus the code dispatches.

Mr. KEEFE. Plus the code-burning dispatch that followed on the 3d of December?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and plus the background of many months before.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, plus the background of information relating to the general situation which you knew was in the possession of Admiral Kimmel, our commander on the Navy side at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. What I had sent and the efforts that we had made in preparation.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me ask you this; it is one of the things that bothers me as a layman: When you sent this order, or [6512] this message of November 27, you stated in it, in substance, that Admiral Kimmel was to take certain deployment measures?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You stated that it was a war-warning message?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, specifically what were the deployment measures that you expected Admiral Kimmel to take?

Admiral STARK. A deployment means a spread. A defensive deployment means a spread for defense. And I would take it, and I believe it would be generally accepted, to intercept and guard against surprise. My first thought would have been a conference of Admiral Kimmel with his key people and with the Army.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, will you permit me to interrupt at that point: Admiral Kimmel was in command on the Navy side?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. General Short was in command on the Army side?

Admiral STARK. True.

Mr. KEEFE. You would expect, would you not, that there would be close liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and I have no reason to believe that there was not.

Mr. KEEFE. General Short received his directions from [6513] General Marshall?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Kimmel received his from you as Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The evidence in this case shows that you sent your message on the 27th, Marshall likewise sent a message to Short on that day, and asked General Short to report. You recall that, do you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ask or expect Admiral Kimmel to report to you as to measures taken?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not.

Mr. KEEFE. Why not?

Admiral STARK. That was not Navy custom. It was not my practice to ask the people in the field—I gave them a broad directive, expected them to carry out the details. You may recall that Admiral Kimmel asked me not to send him any categorical instructions, in one of his letters, but to give him only broad general objectives. Prefacing that request with the fact that I could not know or be too well informed of the conditions confronting him on the spot. It was not my practice, it never has been, to tell the "how to do," but rather the "what to do."

[6514] Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, Admiral, am I to understand from that statement that having sent your message of November 27 you had performed your full and complete duty as Chief of Naval Operations, and having given him this war warning and ordered him to take a defensive deployment, you had no further responsibility in the matter to see that the order which you had given was carried out?

Admiral STARK. I felt that way about it, that it was then up to him.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am not asking how you felt, Admiral. I am asking you whether or not there was, in connection with your responsibilities of Chief of Naval Operations, a responsibility on your part to see that the order which you had given was carried out?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not feel that there was a responsibility on my part to see that the order was carried out. I gave the order and assumed that it would be carried out. I had the right to make that assumption.

Mr. KEEFE. Is there a written order or booklet defining the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations that covers that situation?

Admiral STARK. Not that particular point. I think it is Navy, general Navy custom, for a senior to give a subordinate an order and leave it to the subordinate to carry it out.

[6515] Mr. KEEFE. In that respect apparently there was a difference between the Navy and the Army because, as I recall General Marshall's testimony, he felt that it was his responsibility to see to it that his orders were carried out.

Admiral STARK. Well——

Senator LUCAS. The Congressman is wrong about that.

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't say that.

[6516] Admiral STARK. Well, I do not know just what their practice is. Our practice——

Mr. KEEFE. So far as the Navy is concerned you have stated them to be as just indicated?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, Kimmel was supreme commander out there in the Pacific area and when you gave him an order it was assumed by you that that order would be carried out?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you did not feel that you were under any responsibility to pursue the matter to see that it was carried out, is that right?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, you expected Kimmel and Short to get together and compare notes to determine what they should do; did you not?

Admiral STARK. I did; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It is to be assumed that they did get together out there after receiving these messages, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Because I believe on the next day, on November 28, you sent what purported to be a copy of the Army message to Admiral Kimmel; did you not?

Admiral STARK. I sent it to him for information; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand, for information.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, supposing these men got together and Short says, "Here is a message from Kimmel, read this over," and Kimmel says, "Here is one we got from Stark," and Short says, "Here is one I just got from G-2, from Miles and I have answered and here is what I have answered to Marshall, that I am alerted against sabotage, liai-

son with the Navy"; you were in constant contact with General Marshall here, were you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You said you were in the closest contact with him—

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE (continuing). Day after day during that period of time.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I was; we always were.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, if the Army had paid any attention to Short's reply stating that he was alerted against sabotage only they perhaps would have discussed that with you, would they not?

Admiral STARK. Well, I do not know that they would. That was something between them and their field commander. I [6518] may say that the first I learned of the Short dispatch was at the Roberts Commission. I did not know of it before that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral Stark, it certainly must have been of concern to the Navy to know what measures were put into force by the Army because the Army was there to defend the fleet, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and the Army had—

Mr. KEEFE. Your fleet would have been in bad shape without the protection that should have been afforded by the Army; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; but the outstanding things in the Army message to me was that war might come at any moment and directed Short to make a reconnaissance and I had directed Kimmel to make a defensive deployment. The two hooked up together. Short had the stations on Hawaii, the radar stations as one element for reconnaissance, he had a few planes, not many, but that is where he would have been helped out in his direction for reconnaissance by Kimmel, who had under the Martin-Bellinger agreement assumed responsibility for the so-called offshore reconnaissance with planes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you as Chief of Naval Operations at any time between the 27th of November and the 7th of December did not know of your own knowledge that Kimmel was in fact alerted, did you?

[6519] Admiral STARK. No; I did not.

Mr. KEEFE. You simply assumed that he would follow your command?

Admiral STARK. I thought that that message was so outstanding, I had worked for hours over it and particularly the war warning, which was all out, that I thought it would convey what I intended it should convey. I thought it was very plain and it flew all the danger signals.

Mr. KEEFE. The difficulty that I find in my thinking, Admiral Stark, and I want you to help me if you can, I have heard you say repeatedly you did not expect an attack at Pearl Harbor; you were surprised, the President was surprised, General Marshall was surprised, you were all surprised, you did not expect an attack at Pearl Harbor and yet you expected Kimmel with less information than you had of the situation, even conceding this order which was given on the war warning, you expected him to be prepared against an attack which none of you thought would take place. Now, it is difficult for me to reconcile those two positions.

Admiral STARK. Well, I reconcile it this way, that I had sent to Kimmel for action a war warning signal containing a directive

and containing what information we had, but the signal was sent to him for action and he was directed to take a deployment and it started out with, "this is a war warning."

[6520] A surprise attack on Hawaii was known to be a possibility. I did not expect it, I was surprised that it took place at that time, but we all recognized it to be a possibility and we had worked and pressed for months with regard to drilling for it, if you will recall, training once a week for this thing, we had pressed for weapons to repel it, we had pressed for planes to be there, we had talked about it by letter and by official letter, we had pointed out that war might be preceded by it and here was war at our door and with all that background and with the statement, "This is a war warning" and to take a defensive deployment, we thought that that would put them on a war footing out there so far as any surprise was concerned. It did not but we had expected it would.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral, I appreciate your statement exactly but I still am in a fog to a certain extent and am unable to understand your position and see if I can make myself clear.

You say you were surprised that an attack took place, you say you did not expect an attack to take place at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. At that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Yet you say it was possible for an attack to take place and you had spent your time getting ready to repel that attack but in your warning to Kimmel you called his at- [6521] tention to the place where you thought the attack would take place, which was way off thousands of miles away, down in the China Sea, Samoa, and Kra Peninsula, and so on.

Admiral STARK. That is true, but the attack which we envisaged down there, we stated that the makeup, and so forth, of this amphibious expedition, not a raiding force or a carrier force but an amphibious expedition, and the points of that amphibious expedition might be so and so.

There was no question, there had not been in my mind at any time of an amphibious expedition against the Hawaiian Islands. Now, the points mentioned there were in line with what had gone before and that was the information that we had, but one of the things that means a lot, I think, to the average naval officer when he gets a message—that part of the message was information. We could have sent that simply out as a separate dispatch had we so willed, just to him for information, it could have been left out, but when we sent the dispatch to him for action it was with the idea that there was a war warning and that the attack might come in any direction.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, let me understand this. Now, the thing that I cannot understand is this and I hope you will try and make it clear to a layman: Evidently you had a war plan, Rainbow No. 5, which I hold in my hand, this big document. I understood you to say this morning that that was the [6522] outgrowth in its final form of your ABCD.

Admiral STARK. ABC-1 was the Basic War Plan for both the Army and Navy, Rainbow 5, and that, if it is the WPL-46, is the Navy plan.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you kindly tell me where in this plan, which I assume was in the possession and within the knowledge of both General

Short and Admiral Kimmel, where is the specific program set out that covers this so-called deployment business preparatory to actual war?

Admiral STARK. You mean as to where any phrase in connection with deployment is used?

Mr. KEEFE. Where can I look in this plan to see what the commander, Kimmel, was to do when you told him to execute a defensive deployment? If there is anything in this war plan, I would like to have you point it out.

Admiral STARK. There is one place where deployment is mentioned. I do not think there is any place in the plan where it would tell him what to do in connection with a defensive deployment. That would be of his initiative to make a defensive deployment which he thought was proper.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in the name of conscience then how am I as a member of this committee to determine whether Admiral Kimmel carried out the order that you gave to him if nobody knows what the order means and what the deployment is to be? [6523] Supposing he took one ship and took it out to sea, that would be a deployment, would it not?

Admiral STARK. That would be a partial deployment; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is there anything in the Navy record or in the files or in the war plans that I can point to which says when an order is given to a commander to take a defensive deployment he is to do A, B, C, D, E?

Admiral STARK. I think you will not find that anywhere. From long naval experience a defensive deployment means a spread in defense. That would be my definition of it.

Mr. KEEFE. Would that mean then that he should take his fleet out of Pearl Harbor and spread it out on the ocean, or what does it mean?

Admiral STARK. Well, it would mean, in my opinion, scouting with his planes, it would mean the disposition of other forces such as submarines or light forces or perhaps aircraft in accordance with his best judgment for defense. It was a defensive deployment. Now, he did have, as we now know, certain forces on the sea. He may have considered them as part of a defensive deployment. He can testify as to that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, he had the *Enterprise* out, did he not, with planes in the air?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6524] Mr. KEEFE. Scouting around. Admiral Newton had the *Lexington* out with a task force, also with planes in the air; and the balance of the fleet, except a destroyer that went out that morning, I guess, was in Pearl Harbor. Now, would you consider the fact that the *Enterprise* was engaged in the specific task of taking planes to Wake and the *Lexington* was engaged in the specific task of taking planes to Midway, as I recall—those would not be defensive deployments, would they, in accordance with your order?

Admiral STARK. If he had been sweeping ahead of him, and, as I recall, he did sweep ahead of him and if he were flying any planes and I dare say they were and scouting around the horizon it might very well be considered part of a defensive deployment.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all right. Now, then, assume that he did that. That, then, is at least a partial compliance with your order then, is it not?

Admiral STARK. It very well might be according to what they were doing and what we told them.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, we lost a lot of ships in Pearl Harbor and a lot of men. Do you conceive that your order and directive to make a defensive deployment involved the ships that were in the harbor and, if so, how?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I have stated, I left that up [6525] to him. It was impossible—not impossible but generally we did not know the ships that were in or what their condition was or just what was out there, but the planes were one of the means which could have been used and how many destroyers he might have had at that time to accompany his battleships if he wanted to put them out, and it is an open question whether or not it would have been best to have them out or have them where they were, provided they were ready, in other respects, to meet this attack.

I would hesitate to state without full knowledge and without being on the spot at the time just what I would have done there at that time. My feeling—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, with full knowledge as to what he did do—

Admiral STARK. My feeling is that I certainly would have had my planes out, I would have had my radar going, and I would have been using my submarines and perhaps—

Mr. KEEFE. Now, just a moment before you go further, if you will pardon the interruption. You say you certainly would have used your radar. You mean ships' radar?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I mean—and I am glad you picked that up—the Army radar.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, then, let us talk about Kimmel and then we will get to Short after a while. Let us stick [6526] right with Kimmel. Certainly his radar would not be any good with the ships located in Pearl Harbor and with these mountains on all sides, would it?

Admiral STARK. Very little, if any.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral, what I am trying to get at, and I wish we would stick right with that point, I want you to tell this committee, if you can, what did Admiral Kimmel fail to do with respect to this order which you gave for him to take a defensive deployment; specifically state what he failed to do.

Admiral STARK. Well, if I may say so, I would rather the committee judge of his failure. My feeling is that if I would have had this job and what we thought when we gave the order, that one of the first things that he would have done would have been to scout continuously with what aircraft he had in the direction which he would have worked out as being the most likely point from which an attack might come.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, did he have these aircraft out?

Admiral STARK. I believe he did not.

Mr. KEEFE. And thus you say he defaulted, because he did not have proper reconnaissance by aircraft; that is number one, is that right?

Admiral STARK. I say what I would have done and he did [6527] and it is hindsight. It is hindsight and it is not hindsight. You have asked me to state specifically what I think I would have done and that is what I think I would have done and I assumed

that is what was done. We were assuming that they were scouting with everything they had in the air.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Stark, if I may be so bold as to interrupt. I am just a layman and I think most of the members of the committee are laymen. You gave this Admiral, as Chief of Naval Operations, an order to do a certain thing, to take a defensive deployment. Now, you must have had in your mind as Chief of Naval Operations that that placed the responsibility upon Admiral Kimmel to do some specific thing. Now, your answer to us is that that was in the discretion of Admiral Kimmel, that he could do what he thought was the proper thing to do. I am asking you what did you contemplate you intended him to do when you issued that order to him, that is what I would like to know?

Admiral STARK. Well, the answer to that is, starting out again, if I may, first conference with the Army. We had told Kimmel to take a defensive deployment, we had said that war might come in a few days, we had stated the war warning. Short was told war might come at any minute. He was told to make reconnaissance.

Now, confining myself to what I intended and what I [6528] thought Admiral Kimmel would do, I thought that they undoubtedly were considering if an attack did come where it would come from and, of course, I would assume that it would be air and submarine, either or both.

A defense against such an attack, either air or submarine or both, is scouting with planes. Therefore, I would have assumed that he would have scouted with his planes to the best of his ability with what he had. I would have assumed that he would have used his submarines to assist him in that scouting and I would have assumed he would have weighed the rest of the force he had, what he had at sea, what he had in port, as to whether he had the best balance possible also to assist in that scouting. He had fast task forces at sea, which are well adapted to that sort of work, carriers whose planes can cover a wide area, accompanied by defensive units such as we usually have in a fast carrier task force, namely, cruisers and destroyers. Those are the basic things I would have assumed.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, am I to assume or is the committee to assume that in the event that Admiral Kimmel states here on the stand that he considered as the Commander out there that it was the proper thing to do to have this fleet deployed in Pearl Harbor as he had it, that he having exercised that judgment was clearly within his rights and that no [6529] criticism can attach to him because he exercised that judgment under the circumstances? Are we to understand that?

Admiral STARK. He was within his rights to exercise his judgment and when you have heard his judgment I assume then you will be in position to weigh what I have said and his judgment.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I realize the delicacy of these questions, Admiral Stark, because Admiral Kimmel is your friend and he has been all through.

Admiral STARK. One of the closest and finest I ever had and one of the finest I ever knew.

Mr. KEEFE. Almost as close as a brother to you and because of that I shall not press it any further at this time except that I want

to call your attention to the fact that in this war plan Rainbow No. 5 on page 17 of this photostat that I have it says:

Upon the receipt of the following OpNav dispatch the naval establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war:

Execute Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5.

(b) The date of the above dispatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated.

Admiral STARK. Not until after the attack.

Mr. KEEFE. Then was such a dispatch sent?

[6530] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; at once.

Mr. KEEFE. Then that put in operation the entire Rainbow No. 5 plan?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Upon the sending of that dispatch?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It put it in effect against Japan.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, exactly. Now, then, so prior to the sending of that dispatch, "Execute Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5" these other dispatches did not have reference to anything contained in this War Plan Rainbow No. 5?

Admiral STARK. I believe the dispatch of the 27th directing the defensive deployment stated preparatory to carrying out the tasks herein, being to him for action, further showing, in my opinion, that we were expecting an attack and that this would come in effect.

[6531] Mr. KEEFE. All right; now, Admiral, but there is no similar document on the part of the Navy showing what a Navy commander situated as Kimmel was, was to do before the receipt of this "execute" message?

Admiral STARK. Admiral Kimmel's own plan drew up certain things which he contemplated doing, or might consider necessary to do before actual hostilities in his own Pacific plan, which was predicated largely and necessarily on WPL-46.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now I want to ask you a few questions about this 1940 alert.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were Chief of Naval Operations at that time?

Admiral STARK. I was.

Mr. KEEFE. And General Marshall, through Adams, sends a message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, stating:

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly.

[6532] Acknowledge.

Signed, "Adams."

Now, you were in close liaison with General Marshall at that time, were you not?

Admiral STARK. I was; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not he ever discuss with you, as Chief of Naval Operations, the background and the facts which prompted him to send this alert order on the 17th of June, 1940?

Admiral STARK. I have stated that I do not recall that clearly, and I can only assume that the reason I do not recall it clearly is that I was not impressed, so far as the Navy was concerned, with any particular gravity at that time. That is the reason that I did not initially send Admiral Richardson anything in regard to it, and I must have looked on it, I assume I looked on it largely, as an Army affair.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, that is not what I asked you, Admiral Stark, and that is not a direct answer to my question. My question is whether or not you discussed this alert with General Marshall. Now, if you didn't discuss it, or if you do not remember it, that is one thing.

Admiral STARK. That is what I meant to convey. I do not recall that alert.

[6533] Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you had some communications with Admiral Richardson in reference to it, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes; there were dispatches exchanged, but the one thing I did recall when I came up here, and which I checked upon later, was that Admiral Richardson had written me and requested, if anything like that occurred again, he would like to be informed beforehand.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you give Richardson any orders for the deployment of the fleet?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. We told him, in response to his question with regard to it, to continue cooperation with the Army. They were already working with the Army on it out there, without any directive from me.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that during this alert Admiral Richardson took the fleet out of Pearl Harbor and went to a secret rendezvous, giving the impression that he was sailing to the Panama Canal, in order to try to stir up the saboteurs of the Canal?

Admiral STARK. I remember that.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you give that order?

Admiral STARK. I remember that very clearly. I think the fact that it happened at this time was a coincidence. I remember very distinctly telling Joe to take the fleet out and to provide for a leak. When it was brought up to me, I said [6534] "Yes," and I also recall extending his time 2 days, which I also verified, the time was extended 2 days. We told him to maintain radio silence, to start as theoretically heading southeastward, in case any Japanese ship should see him. It was an exercise at sea, but the primary purpose was that the Canal authorities thought, if war came, that the fleet was going into the Atlantic, and that some of their agents would commit considerable sabotage down there. They were anxious to apprehend these people, and we thought we might precipitate action on their part. So after the Army had provided to catch these people if they did start anything, and to break this thing up, we then agreed and we sent the fleet to sea. But that it happened at the same time as this alert is, in my opinion, just a coincidence.

I have a dispatch here—

Mr. KEEFE. I think it is already in evidence.

Admiral STARK. I think I have covered the thing.

Mr. KEEFE. I offered it in evidence, I think, heretofore.

Admiral STARK. That I do recollect quite clearly, but the other I do not.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral Stark, when General Marshall ordered that alert on the 17th of June 1940, he clearly must have felt that there was some possible breach in the relations with Japan that prompted him to put Hawaii on the [6535] alert?

Admiral STARK. He has so testified, I believe.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; he testified, but the reasons for it did not come in until after he left. I sought to get those, and we have them in the record now, the reasons which prompted that alert.

Now, you cannot recall any of the conversations that took place between you and General Marshall which prompted Marshall to order an all-out alert in 1940?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I cannot.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now I would like to ask a question which bothered me, with respect to this Rainbow No. 5, which places the island of Guam in what is called category F.

Admiral STARK. I have the category here.

Mr. KEEFE. Now will you state for the record what category F means?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; we have that, I am sure. This is out of Joint Action, Army and Navy, and refers to degrees of preparation, and they are put in categories of defense A, B, C, D, E, and F.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, take Guam to start with. That is in F. Now give us what category F means.

Admiral STARK. Category F: "Positions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject [6536] to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this category the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy."

[6537] Mr. KEEFE. Then, so far as Guam was concerned, at the time this basic war plan was devised it was the considered opinion of both the Army and Navy that it could not be defended and it therefore was placed in category F that required those on the island, through demolition or otherwise, to destroy anything of value to the enemy and to permit it to be taken?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And to surrender?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is right, is it not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in what category was Wake placed under this war plan?

Admiral STARK. I will have to look that up under the war plans, sir. I think it is misplaced here.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I would like to get it also for Midway and Samoa.

Admiral STARK. I think it is a safe assumption that Wake may not be specifically mentioned, but it is included in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, and on that assumption the category of defense would be D. I will check the war plans carefully, and if that assumption is inaccurate, I will notify the committee.

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier was in category D.

[6538] Mr. KEEFE. Then, I will ask to have placed in the record, Mr. Chairman, this document that has been presented to us, to which we may make reference to the record, as to these war plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to find out where it comes from. I have been trying to locate it.

Admiral STARK. The reference I think is given at the top. It is from Joint Action of the Army and Navy.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, in the book, Exhibit 44, we have as item 6, Joint Coastal Defense Plan. Is that what it is?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; it is a book which has been approved by both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that covers joint action. I think it is FTP-145.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean it is not in any of the war plans we have had here at all?

Admiral STARK. No. Here it is. I think the assistant counsel has it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it in effect prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; it has been in effect for a number of years, with several changes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Chapter V out of that book, is it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. This is taken right out of the book.

[6539] Mr. MITCHELL. This is the printed publication of the Public Printing Office, prepared by the Joint Board, and revised by the Joint Board, 1935.

Admiral STARK. If I said FTP-145 I should have said 155.

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not find anything like that on the title page.

Admiral STARK. It is FTP-155.

Mr. MITCHELL. What does FTP stand for?

Admiral STARK. Fleet training publication.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you also give me the information as to Midway?

The CHAIRMAN. Let us settle the question whether this is to be printed at this point in the record, to which I assume there is no objection.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. It can be transcribed in the daily transcript, but I wanted it identified. It says, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, Chapter V, Coastal Frontier Defense," but it does not say what volume it comes from.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been identified.

Admiral STARK. It states, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." That might very well be clear enough.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a Public Printing Office publication of 1935.

[6540] The CHAIRMAN. All right. It will be printed at this point in the transcript.

(The document referred to follows:)

[6541] *Confidential*

JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

CHAPTER V—COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE

SECTION III—CATEGORIES OF DEFENSE AND REQUIREMENTS AND MEANS TO BE PROVIDED

30. *Degree of preparation.*—The degree of preparation in coastal frontier defense and the frontier defense measures to be taken, including the strength of

the forces to be provided, depend upon the enemy and the character of the enemy operations to which coastal frontiers may be subjected in the early stages of a war. For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken under specific situations, categories of defense are established as listed below. Decisions as to the "category of defense" required for each coastal frontier are included in all joint basic war plans except those for wars of a minor nature. These decisions constitute a directive to the Army and Navy commanders of the joint organization for coastal frontier defense as to the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken. They likewise constitute a directive to the [6542] War and Navy Departments as to the allocation of the means required for this defense. Defensive sea areas will be proclaimed in time of actual or impending war as necessitated by the nature of the war and the probable enemy.

31. Categories of defense.

a. Category A.—Coastal frontiers that probably will be free from attack, but for which a nominal defense must be provided for political reasons. Under this category, only a sufficient part of the gunfire elements of harbor defense will be manned in the strength required to create a show of preparedness. The strength required will be that considered necessary to repel small naval raids. A nominal offshore patrol will be maintained.

b. Category B.—Coastal frontiers that may be subject to minor attacks. Under this category, the harbor defenses will be provided with one manning relief, and a part of the obstacles will be prepared but not put in place. Certain defensive sea areas may be established and a limited offshore patrol may be instituted, with a limited control of shipping entering and leaving harbors.

c. Category C.—Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor attack. Under this category, the coastal defense area should be provided, in general, with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet the following enemy naval operations: those incident to con- [6543] trolling the sea; those against shipping; and minor attacks against land areas. The harbor defenses should be fully manned and air support arranged. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided, if practicable. If sufficient forces are available, outposts will be established outside of harbor defenses along the sensitive areas of the shore line. The inner mine barrages will, in general, be established; a full inshore patrol and complete control of shipping will, as a rule, be instituted; and certain outer mine barrages and defensive sea areas may be established, and a limited offshore patrol instituted.

d. Category D.—Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category, the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C, will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely [6544] to become theaters of operations. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force.

e. Category E.—Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to major attack. Under this category, in addition to the measures required for Category D, there will be required generally the concentration of the troops necessary to defend the area against a serious attack in force, together with additional naval forces to provide intensive inshore and offshore patrols. Defensive sea areas will be established. Air defense will be provided as in Category D. All or a part of the GHQ air force may be ordered to the threatened area to operate either under direct control of Army GHQ or under that of the Army commander of the theater of operations or frontier.

f. Category F.—Possessions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation, but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this category, the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy.

g. General.

(1) Where Categories D and E are applicable [6545] initially, local defense plans should provide for the initial employment of such forces of the

Army and the Navy as may be required in addition to those forces which are ordinarily available for the initial defense of the coastal frontier in question, and which can be diverted from the mobilization and concentration of the Army forces, from the United States Fleet, and from other naval forces, during the period of mobilization and concentration, without materially interfering with or seriously delaying the operations to be undertaken in the principal theater of operations.

(2) Under all categories of defense, the Army coastal frontier or Army sector commander is responsible for the antiaircraft defense within the corps area and naval district extending inland from the frontier or sector, such antiaircraft defense to include an aircraft warning service. Cases involving the antiaircraft defense of Army GHQ airdromes and those where one corps area borders on two coastal frontiers, will be specifically covered in appropriate Army strategical plans.

[6546] Mr. KEEFE. Can you now state, Admiral, the category in which Midway was placed?

Admiral STARK. That would be in the same category as the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

Mr. KEEFE. And what about Samoa?

Admiral STARK. Samoa would be also in D.

Mr. KEEFE. The same category?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, at the time of the attack on Guam and the capture of Guam by the Japs were improvements on the harbor being made at that time or had they been completed?

Admiral STARK. They had not been completed. Of course, I recall very clearly the legislation with regard to that. I do not know just what their status was at this moment. I had obtained from Congress the appropriation, I believe it was \$6,000,000, for certain improvements to the harbor. You recall the first year I lost it by six votes, and the following year it went through almost unanimously, only one vote being opposed to it. Just how far we had gotten along with that I do not recall at the moment.

Mr. KEEFE. With those improvements completed, Guam would still be in Category F, would it not?

Admiral STARK. In the same category, category D. The improvements were not such as improved the defense of Guam [6547] but very little.

Mr. KEEFE. Even with the improvements that were requested and contemplated the Island of Guam, in the opinion of the Joint Army and Navy Board, could not be successfully defended due to the power that Japan had in the mandated islands surrounding it, is that right?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. May I state for the record when I said category D a minute ago that should be F, which Congressman Keefe mentioned.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, just a couple of other questions to make the record clear, Admiral Stark: You have referred repeatedly to the experience which you have had over the period of time that you were Chief of Naval Operations in coming to the Congress for appropriations.

And I would like to make this record crystal clear as to that procedure, which I am sure you are familiar with and which I know many members on this committee are quite familiar with. When the Navy or the Army prepares its annual request for appropriations,

they must first be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget, is that not true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the presentation of requests for appropriations is always first made to the Bureau of the Budget? [6548]

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And the Budget tells you how much money you can spend?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So far as they are concerned?

Admiral STARK. Yes. That is our guide from then on.

Mr. KEEFE. And that action of the Bureau of the Budget is then translated into the President's budget which he submits to the Congress?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Whether it be his annual budget or supplementary budget?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It is our guide. When we are through with the Budget and they tell us how much we can have; my own naval experience is we stick within that.

Mr. KEEFE. That same thing holds true for any supplementary estimates. The same procedure is indulged in, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We cannot come up here for supplemental estimates without first getting the permission of the Budget.

Mr. KEEFE. So, when you made the statement about coming up to the Hill for money, asking for appropriations on the Hill, [6549] you had to proceed first and get authority from the Bureau of the Budget and the Bureau of the Budget transmitted your request to the Congress in the form of a budget estimate?

Admiral STARK. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. By the President; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. There were times, of course, when I went directly to the President without going through the budget for money, and he would grant it to me.

Mr. KEEFE. And then submit a supplementary estimate to the Congress?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Then, we would inform the Budget.

Mr. KEEFE. Now then, you appeared before the House Subcommittee on Naval Appropriations, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I have, at a great many hearings.

Mr. KEEFE. And also before the Senate Committee?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When you appeared before either the Senate or the House Subcommittees on Appropriations asking for funds, were you not under a direction and injunction from the President not to justify any item that was not contained in the Presidential budget?

Admiral STARK. Well, I knew that I could not do it. Nobody ever had to give me an injunction. I just did not have [6550] to do it, and I did not do it. The Commander in Chief having set for us a limit, we stayed within it.

Mr. KEEFE. So everytime you came to a committee of the Congress you came up to justify and defend the Budget estimate submitted to the Congress by the President?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. And that has been the universal practice, has it not, during all the period that you were Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. Once or twice in response to questions, we went outside, when the question was asked us, initiated by someone on the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if a member of the committee, or the committee itself, saw fit to ask you questions as to whether or not you did request additional funds from the Bureau of the Budget you would answer those questions?

Admiral STARK. If the committee asked me, I would.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Otherwise not?

Admiral STARK. Otherwise, I would not initiate it.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact, there has been placed in the record here a statement of the appropriation request made by the Navy and Army to the Bureau of the Budget, the action taken thereon by the Bureau of the Budget, and the action taken thereon by the Congress. You have seen that [6551] calculation, have you not?

Admiral STARK. I have seen it; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Now, in both cases, in the case of the Army and Navy, over the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, those figures show that the Congress exceeded the Presidential Budget estimate, do they not, in the matter of appropriations?

Admiral STARK. Which years did you say?

Mr. KEEFE. The total years from 1933, I believe, or 1932. I think those figures start from 1932 and go to 1941, inclusive, excluding the contract authorizations provided for by the Congress and referring to just cash appropriations. Leave out, if you please, the contract authorizations.

Admiral STARK. Well, assuming that the arithmetic here is correct—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, those are my figures, and I think they are correct.

Admiral STARK. They show appropriations requested by the Navy Department \$9,434,271,533. Budget estimates submitted to the Congress, \$7,428,240,190. Amounts made available by the Congress, appropriations, \$7,256,896,276, along with a contract authority for \$1,029,038,112. The total of appropriations plus contract authority from Congress was \$8,285,934,388 as opposed to I believe to what you want to check it on, a [6552] budget of seven-billion-odd dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman, don't those figures speak for themselves, and is it necessary to make Admiral Stark add them up again?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I think they speak for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, assuming they are correct.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And nobody has challenged it.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking these questions because of the fact that Admiral Stark himself sort of indicated the difficulty that he had experienced in getting appropriations in order to increase the personnel of the Navy. You made reference to that in your testimony, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That may have been a different item from the ones in these categories of figures. They were more or less sporadic efforts, on your part, as I understand it, to get more men.

Admiral STARK. Well, they were continuous. We finally got authority to ask for what we needed.

Mr. KEEFE. One other question, Admiral Stark, and perhaps you can clear this up. It is minor in character. When Admiral Wilkinson was on the stand, there was placed in [6553] evidence a written or printed statement showing his responsibility as Chief of Naval Intelligence. A dispute arose between Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval War Plans, as to whose responsibility it was for certain things. Admiral Wilkinson contended that the written orders or printed orders specifying the duties of the Chief of Naval Intelligence had been changed, the Schedule of Organization, I believe it was called, had been changed by you in verbal instructions to Admiral Kirk, his predecessor, so that when he, Wilkinson, came into the office and tried to ascertain what his duties were he went over this schedule of orders, and so on, that were issued by you as Chief of Naval Operations but was told by Kirk that there were certain things in there that he did not have to do, that were transferred over to Turner, Chief of War Plans, and Turner specifically denied that any other change had taken place, so far as he was concerned, and stated that that schedule of organization was the law, so far as he was concerned, today, and that there never had been any change made, and thus Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner clashed very definitely on that issue.

Now, I want to ask you the simple question whether or not, when a written order was issued by you as Chief of Naval Operations specifying the duties and responsibilities of an office—whether those orders were subject to be changed by verbal communications to the incumbent?

[6554] Admiral STARK. Where one or two people were concerned and there was a mistake in understanding, they would naturally go, as provided in the publication, to Admiral Ingersoll, which they did, as I understand, in this instance. And what was referred to, I believe, was that it was War Plans' duty to make up the war plan, including the estimate of the situation. It had to be funneled through one source. It couldn't be sent out from two. Ingersoll spoke to me about it. I was in complete agreement with him. I never felt that there was any real difficulty there. In the first place, these people were working together every day. Intelligence had to give the material, all it had, to War Plans, on which they could base their estimate. I think they continued to do it and continued to evaluate it for that purpose. I know that they did and were continually working together. But the final estimate, which went into the war plan, on that sort of thing, rested with War Plans. And, so far as I know, as a result of that, there was never any gap or hiatus that was created anywhere, or any conflict or any trouble about it. I was surprised when the situation developed the way it did up here.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, I still don't have an answer to my question. Was that written order ever changed verbally in any respect? Admiral Wilkinson claimed it was. Admiral Turner claimed it was.

You are the one who is supposed to [6555] have changed it verbally to Admiral Kirk. All I want to know is, did you change the order verbally or didn't you?

Admiral STARK. Well, I know that when it came to me with Ingersoll's recommendation, and with regard to the getting out of the probable intentions for incorporation into the war plan, that I stated that that was War Plans' duty, but that the material in connection with it would continue to be supplied, as it had been in the past, by Intelligence. I don't—

Mr. KEEFE. Do you mean by that the evaluation of the material was to be the duty of Intelligence who would in turn transmit that to War Plans?

Admiral STARK. They continued to give it, with their evaluation, but the final over-all set-up in the war plan was Turner's.

For example, in the Fortnightly Summaries we got out there were evaluations there being made right along by Intelligence.

I would like to read, in that connection, if I might, three paragraphs in this same publication.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't care for that myself, Admiral. All I want is an answer to a very simple question. If it can't be answered, all right. We have gone all over that with Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner, and they were in complete [6556] disagreement as to the proposition, and Admiral Wilkinson had gone to the trouble to send over and get some statement from Admiral Kirk over in the Mediterranean, as I recall. It was a question as to their respective responsibilities, one claiming that he was complying strictly with the order as written, the other claiming that that order had been changed verbally by you to Admiral Kirk, predecessor to Admiral Wilkinson.

Admiral STARK. I remember some of their testimony, and I thought they were nothing like as far apart as might appear. There was one part of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony in particular with regard to the meat of it, and one part of Admiral Turner's testimony, as I studied it, that were very much in line. I never felt there was any real difficulty between them.

Mr. KEEFE. I guess you weren't here in the room then to see the clashes that passed when that incident occurred or you wouldn't think so.

Admiral STARK. I wasn't here.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought they were very much disturbed at each other.

Admiral STARK. I would like to read these three paragraphs, if I may.

Mr. KEEFE. Can't you answer my question, did you or did you not change that order through verbal instructions to [6557] Admiral Kirk?

Admiral STARK. I decided, when it came to me, that the estimate of the situation in War Plans would be made by War Plans, and War Plans would be responsible for it.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that in accordance with the written order?

Admiral STARK. That is where they seem to have a good deal of trouble. In my opinion it is not—

Senator LUCAS. It is not clear.

Admiral STARK. It is not clear and it is not worth while. The written order states:

Secure all classes of pertinent information, especially that affecting disposition and probable intentions.

Wilkinson continued to get all classes of information and he continued to give it to Turner, who, where the main war plan was concerned, finally evaluated it and put it in.

The paragraphs that I mentioned are overriding considerations and I would like to read them to you. This was not given on the sheets that were given you. I would like to have you have them.

Matters which are of paramount interest to any one division shall be handled by that division.

Responsibility for necessary liaison with other interested divisions shall rest with the director of [6558] the division having paramount interest, who shall keep other divisions informed of action taken.

The director of each division is responsible, in matters assigned to its cognizance, for necessary liaison and coordination of effort within the Navy Department.

Now, the staff was an integrated staff. It is almost impossible to write up a set of regulations where things dovetail in as closely as they do in an organization such as we have, so as to lay down just what each person will do specifically.

Those paragraphs were meant to cover and get the people together on them, and my feeling is that Turner and Wilkinson always did work together closely and without any trouble on this.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman, where these three paragraphs are from?

Admiral STARK. They are from the same pamphlet.

Mr. KEEFE. It is the Operational Order?

Admiral STARK. The Operational Order. It is sort of an over-all picture to show that you just can't get down and say, "Well, you stop there, and you stop there," when people are working together and seeing each other all the time.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I want to express my thanks [6559] to Admiral Stark for his great patience, he having been here a long time, and I am not going to ask him any further questions.

Admiral STARK. There is one thing that occurred to me this afternoon in Mr. Keefe's questioning. Whether it would be helpful or not, I don't know. I would just like to take a minute or so to glance at the so-called tasks assigned in WPL-46 or in Kimmel's orders.

(Short pause.)

Admiral STARK. This is reading—

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Admiral STARK. From Admiral Kimmel's war plan, which in turn was based on WPL-46.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is not labeled that way officially. Identify it for the record.

Admiral STARK. It is U. S. Pacific Fleet Publication W. P. Pac. 46, promulgated July 25, 1941.

Mr. Keefe was asking about just prior to plans coming in, and I remembered that Admiral Kimmel had covered that, and thought possibly this might be of assistance, and, regarding which, of course, he will have a more intimate knowledge than I have, but I had remembered that he had done that.

Chapter II, page 25, under the heading, "Tasks Formulated to Accomplish the Assigned Missions." It is an outline of [6560] tasks.

It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption A2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption A1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

- a. PHASE I—Initial tasks, Japan not in the war.
- b. PHASE IIA—Initial tasks, Japan in the war.
- c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
- c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.
- d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific force, if ordered.
- e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day.

f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day.

[6561] g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155 degrees East.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, at this point:

You are referring to the plan of Admiral Kimmel now, which relates to M-day, are you not?

Admiral STARK. This is phase I, which he designates as "Initial tasks, Japan not in the war."

Mr. KEEFE. But he refers to M-day? You just referred to it.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier, on M-day.

I read this:

Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day.

Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups [6562] as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155 degrees East.

h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

And you might recall that he had already done that. He called it a defensive submarine patrol.

i. Observe, with submarines outside the 3-mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.

j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.

And you will note that he was strengthening those, some of those places, by sending planes.

k. Continue training operations as practicable.

l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

That is in his phase known as "Japan not in the war." He has covered there some of the things that have been talked about, and it

occurred to me, when you were asking me questions, that it might be of interest to you to know about that. [6563] I assume that he will be able to testify on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel for Admiral Stark wish to ask any questions?

Mr. OBEAR. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel wish to ask further questions?

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one or two questions.

Senator Lucas, you may go ahead if you have some questions.

Senator LUCAS. No; wou go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stark, Admiral Richardson testified that when he was relieved of command of the Pacific Fleet, he submitted to the Navy Department a list of men whom he recommended from whom the successor be chosen, and he testified that on that list was the name of Admiral Kimmel; is that your recollection?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. There was universal regard for the right caliber of Admiral Kimmel. I think he would have been on anybody's list. He was on mine also.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the appointment of Admiral Kimmel made by you or the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. That appointment always goes to the President for the final selection or at least the O. K. [6564] I remember, when the President mentioned Kimmel, he said, "He has been a White House aide," he remembered him very well.

The CHAIRMAN. A good deal has been said about this word "deployment." It is not a new word in military and naval matters, is it?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been used ever since Hannibal, hasn't it?

Admiral STARK. I think so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Doesn't every Naval Academy graduate, when he goes out, know what it means?

Admiral STARK. He certainly learns what it means before long from war games.

The CHAIRMAN. It is used in the arrangement of ground forces, in military matters, as well as upon the high seas, in regard to ships, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, it is used; it was used in our war plans. It was incorporated in Kimmel's war plan. I didn't read it this afternoon. That was another thing I thought of. But it is there.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it is the arrangement of troops or ships in order to accomplish a definite purpose, whether it is defense or offense?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6565] The CHAIRMAN. And the word "deployment" as I have read in the history of battles in all our wars, it has ben used in the sense that General So-and-So deployed his forces by putting so many over yonder on the right and so many over on the left, so many in the rear, depending upon the character of battle it was to be, and whether he was to defend his ground or whether he was to make an attack upon the enemy.

Admiral STARK. That is true, and it occurs particularly in our tactical instructions where we deploy for battle.

The CHAIRMAN. Any naval officer of the rank of admiral or vice admiral or rear admiral would know, whether he was instructed to deploy his forces, what that meant, wouldn't he?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; in my opinion he would.

The CHAIRMAN. He might be, of course, expected to use his own judgment as to how he deployed them, but the particular arrangement under which he was to carry out the instructions was within his discretion, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you were asked if it was your duty to see to it that the orders were carried out. When you gave an order to a naval officer in any part of the world, you had the right, under his responsibility, to expect that he would carry it out?

Admiral STARK. That is right.

[6566] The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't see that they were carried out, yourself, unless you went out there and did it?

Admiral STARK. Or unless I directed him to report whether or not he had done it.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if he reported that and hadn't done what you ordered him to do, you could reiterate your orders, but if you saw they were actually executed personally, you would have to be on the ground; would you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The details were his.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Navy Department, and you, had confidence in all our officers in all theaters of war, so far as the Navy was concerned, that they knew what orders would mean and how to carry them out?

Admiral STARK. I did; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In regard to the situation in the Atlantic that has been talked about, there was nothing secretive about that at the time; was there?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. About the orders to shoot in defending the shipment of our materials which Congress had authorized, there wasn't any secret about that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. It was wide open.

The CHAIRMAN. The President made speeches; my recollection is that he reported to Congress on it.

[6566-A] Admiral STARK. I don't remember about that, but his speech in September was wide open on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyhow, at the time it was going on, the American people knew it, and the President issued public statements and made speeches about it, so that there was nothing secret at all in regard to it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all.

Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, have you ever had a conversation with Admiral Kimmel since December 7, 1941, about what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. No; I have not talked to him about it at all in detail.

[6567] Senator LUCAS. When you left the service as Chief of Naval Operations you went directly to London?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And there became the Admiral of the American Fleet?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was operating then with the English?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The operational commanders, of course, were those in immediate command, like Kirk for the Normandy invasion; the forces we had at Scapaflow had their own admiral; we had a man in command of Air Forces.

Senator LUCAS. What was your exact title there?

Admiral STARK. Commander, United States Naval Forces, Europe.

Later on I was given the additional title of commander of the Twelfth Fleet, of which these other forces would be made a task force under the commander of the Twelfth Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. How long did you remain in that position?

Admiral STARK. I reported there, it was the last day of April in 1942, and I was detached on the 16th of August 1945—something over 3 years.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I take it that in that important position which you held it required that you exercise superior judgment, did it not, from time to time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I think so. I think the Army [6568] citation on that—apparently the Army thought so.

Senator LUCAS. For exercising that superior judgment during those long years you were awarded several citations by different governments and our own?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You said in the early part of your examination that you failed to send Admiral Kimmel any of the ultra or magic codes because it might compromise the source, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Senator Lucas, will you repeat that?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have the wrong man.

Senator LUCAS. I will withdraw the question.

Admiral STARK. I didn't testify to that.

Senator LUCAS. Anyhow, you realized and appreciated the secrecy of magic as it was being intercepted by our Government?

Admiral STARK. It was a very powerful weapon, or might be one; yes, sir.

[6569] Senator LUCAS. And you had a certain group of officers in the Navy here in Washington that knew about the secret code?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you whether or not Admiral Kimmel knew about the secret code at the time?

Admiral STARK. Of our breaking the codes in Washington?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Senator Lucas, I have asked myself that question. I took it for granted, not that he had them but that he knew that we were breaking them, because I have found out since that messages showing these were being sent out there, and some of the messages that we sent showed where these dispatches were coming from. So, I am under the impression that he did know, but I have never asked

him personally whether he knew. At least, I don't recall it. I would rather that he would clinch that with you.

Senator LUCAS. One other question that intrigues me a little. They have some bearing upon my own judgment and may not be of particular importance here. It is in respect to the Battle of Midway. Who was in command, who was the commander of the Pacific Fleet at that time?

Admiral STARK. That was about 6 months after Pearl Harbor, something like that, and Nimitz was in command.

Senator LUCAS. You were not Chief of Naval Operations?

[6570] Admiral STARK. No. King had relieved me by that time, and Nimitz was commander in chief of the Pacific.

Senator LUCAS. I was just wondering what kind of an order King gave to Nimitz with respect to the Battle of Midway, if he gave him any order at all.

Admiral STARK. I don't know. I know that King published a paper when he was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet calling attention to the fact that people should not give specific detail to subordinates, but what I said earlier, tell them what to do, not how to do it.

Senator LUCAS. The only reason I asked the question was to try to determine what kind of an order King may have given to Nimitz at that time, to make a comparison with the order you gave to Kimmel and to see whether or not Nimitz carried through the responsibilities and whether the orders were similar and just what responsibility was given to that command at that particular time.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you have any notion about that at all?

Admiral STARK. No, I have nothing, but I do know that in the Normandy invasion, the plans were worked out entirely in Europe and copies simply sent back to the Department. Our relations with the Department at that time were simply in the plea for the material, men, ships, equipment, et cetera, that [6571] we needed to implement orders which we had drawn up.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you drew up the orders?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; the operational people. Kirk, for example, drew up the orders for the actual ships and which came down the line for higher authority.

Senator LUCAS. And the subordinates in the Normandy invasion assumed the responsibility, after they got the command, for either success or failure?

Admiral STARK. The subordinates down the line drew their cue, so to speak, from over-all orders higher up, and they in turn issued their own orders.

Senator LUCAS. Now, one other question with respect to the breaking of the Japanese code. Who, in your immediate naval family, knew that we were breaking the Japanese code at that time?

Admiral STARK. The President knew it. Colonel Knox knew it. Ingersoll, of course, knew it. The radio people, certain ones, knew it. Intelligence and certain people there knew it. War Plans people, I don't know just how many of them, such as Turner, as the head of War Plans, knew it.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interject? When you say, "radio" you mean naval radio?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I am speaking about our communications division. Perhaps that would have been a better term to use. But it was kept rather close. For example, in the morning sessions which we had we were very careful about talking about anything of that sort; or in the big conferences, which we held on Thursday, with all the chiefs of bureaus, matériel bureaus, and so forth, that sort of thing was never mentioned.

Senator LUCAS. Did you give any specific and direct orders to your subordinates that knew about magic with respect to keeping it a secret?

Admiral STARK. I think at that time we had to sign up a paper. I am not sure. I know we have since. For example, Lieutenant Commander Richmond, assisting me here, he has pretty near signed his death warrant, and if he were to give anything out about it, he would be doing that, but it is all out now.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. Practically everything that has ever been known about breaking the codes is known now to the world.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Primarily, through this Pearl Harbor hearing.

Admiral STARK. Before that happened, anybody who was let in on that had to sign a paper never to disclose it, practically so long as he lived, or ever to talk about it. And, as a [6573] matter of fact, people coming to Europe, we did it there, too. Not only people coming to Europe, we did it there, too. Not only people coming to Europe, but if anybody came in my office and I started to talk to them about things, regardless of their rank, I would not discuss such things with them because I didn't know whether they knew the codes were being broken or not, and I didn't dare bring up subjects which might be unknown to them, because of that.

Senator LUCAS. Did it ever come to your attention at any time while you were Chief of Naval Operations that there was a leak in any part of your Department with respect to giving away this secret to someone?

Admiral STARK. Not in my Department. There was an incident that occurred, I am not very clear on it, where a reporter, or someone connected with the press in the Pacific, mentioned the breaking of codes, while the war was still on. The Navy Department could give you the details. I recall only the one incident.

Senator LUCAS. Well, there was nothing that ever came to your attention, as I understand it, that would imply that anyone under your immediate control was letting the secret out?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, there have been a lot of questions asked you, Admiral Stark, about the so-called purported agreements [6574] that were made between this country and the Dutch and the British.

Admiral STARK. I did not get the first part of that.

Senator LUCAS. I say, a great many questions have been asked you by members of the committee with respect to the so-called agreements that were made between America, the British, and the Dutch.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And some assumptions have been made here from time to time in this committee that there might have been some agreements of some kind. But, if I understand you correctly, insofar as

you know, while you discussed, you and your officers in the Navy discussed, from time to time matters with the British and the Dutch about what should be done in the event that you all got into war, at no time was there any formal agreement drawn up or any commitments made that were approved by the President of the United States?

Admiral STARK. And on which would be predicated a forecast that if Britain or the NEI were attacked we would come in?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I know of no such agreement.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you include the Canadian agreement?

Senator LUCAS. No; I do not include that.

Mr. MITCHELL. The Canadian agreement was a defensive agree-
[6575] ment for defending our own territory. I imagine the President could do that without a declaration of war.

Mr. KEEFE. I ask so that there would not be any question.

Senator LUCAS. I do not include the Canadian agreement. The Dutch didn't have anything to do with the Canadian agreement.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; these ABD are the American, Dutch, British.

[6576] Senator LUCAS. It was a necessary procedure for the Navy to make all plans that it could possibly conceive of for the defensive purposes of this Nation of ours at that time?

Admiral STARK. That is the way I felt about it and that is what I thought.

Senator LUCAS. And you did more or less what the country was doing at that time in view of the passage of lend-lease and other measures to aid England and the Dutch; you were working out or at least you were talking about plans that might come into being in the event that we were drawn in?

Admiral STARK. That is true, and in that connection there is a distinction between the so-called hemispheric defense plans and WPL-46.

Senator LUCAS. I want to direct your attention to exhibit 33, which is the estimates of the military intelligence, and read a paragraph or two from that exhibit with respect to economic sanctions and whether or not you agree or disagree.

Admiral STARK. What page, sir?

Senator LUCAS. It is on page—well, it is the July 25th memorandum that was prepared by General Miles for the Chief of Staff, entitled "Sanctions Against Japan," Exhibit 33. I do this because there has been so much insinuation or, rather, so many questions asked of you about economic sanctions, and I want to read paragraph 9, on page 2, of that letter.

[6577] Effective economic sanctions against Japan imposed by us, today, would not, in the opinion of this Division, force Japan to take any steps in the way of aggressive action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favorable opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration of war on us by Japan. Such action on our part need not and should not distract our attention from the main theater of operations. On the contrary, by adopting such a policy we will be able to conserve for Britain and for ourselves supplies which from the viewpoint of our national defense, are being worse than wasted when we place them in Japanese hands.

And then on the bottom of that:

Recommendation: That this paper be referred to the Joint Board with a view to initiating plans whose execution will place a complete export and import embargo on our trade with Japan.

Then the latter was stricken out and there is a penciled notation which says:

This memo was written prior to receipt of information regarding embargo decision.

In other words, it appears here at that time that the G-2 of the Army was in full accord with the economic-sanction program that was then being discussed by the State Department [6578] and I was wondering whether or not you agreed at that particular time with Miles with respect to economic sanctions?

Admiral STARK. Well, in the last analysis under the conditions obtaining in the Government of Japan I felt that the military would control. Nevertheless, I did think that certainly the impositions of economic embargoes, economic sanctions might possibly precipitate hostilities, if not make the time closer when they would occur inasmuch as they might trottle Japanese life. Now, against that had to be balanced an opinion that ultimately we would go to war with them anyway and if we did not impose these they might take it as a sign of weakness, it also might hasten it and it also might have them better equipped if war did come about.

Senator LUCAS. Well, there were two schools of thought on that question at that particular time.

Admiral STARK. Well, there was a balance there and the economic sanctions, as I recall, were imposed after Japan had made her move into Indochina and it may have been just another way of saying, "Keep this up and here is our reply to your going on the rampage."

Senator LUCAS. Well, I would like to call the committee's attention to this same exhibit. From time to time Miles expresses the same opinion as I just read, without reading them. I will turn to the one of December the 5, 1941, [6579] in his memorandum to the chief of staff, the latter part of it, in which he says:

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner.

In other words, I merely call attention to the fact that even up to the very last the intelligence chief of the Army was asking and recommending to the Chief of Staff economic sanctions against Japan.

Now, I have placed these matters before you in the record for the purpose of more or less answering some of the questions, at least some of the insinuations that have been placed here in the record that economic sanctions was the thing that more or less drove Japan into this war.

I want to state this for the record while I am discussing economic sanctions: You will recall, Admiral Stark, that there were a great number of people from 1936 to 1941 that were asking that we do apply the embargo on oil and scrap iron and other things, do you not?

Admiral STARK. Among the general public; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And, on the other hand, there was another group of people, big business and small business, that were insisting that we sell to Japan oil and scrap iron and these [6580] other things.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I remember them very well because I expressed myself strongly against the imposition on oil unless we were prepared to fight.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, here are the figures that I want to offer into the record for whatever they are worth:

In 1936 this country sold to Japan—I don't say this country, but the business interests of this country sold to Japan 27,781,999 barrels of crude petroleum, natural gasoline, gasoline, and other petroleum motor fuel in bulk, and so forth, besides millions of pounds of greases and paraffin wax, and so forth.

In 1937 the business interests of this country sold 28,377,381 barrels of the same commodities.

In 1938, 31,354,050 barrels.

In 1939, 28,012,000 barrels.

In 1940, 22,796,748 barrels, and this does not include, and I will not read it, the millions of pounds of lubricating greases and petroleum coke and petroleum jelly and other things that were used in connection with getting ready for war.

In 1941 it fell off to 6,986,517 barrels.

In other words, you have one group of people in this country that was doing everything that they knew how to sell this [6581] oil to Japan knowing that they were aggressors at that time and doing what they were doing. On the other hand, you have another group that are attempting to apply economic sanctions for the purpose of stopping the aggression, and right along that line, if I may, I will read this into the record.

Right at that particular time American business firms made shipments of scrap iron to Japan:

In 1936, 1,057,000 tons.

In 1937, 1,900,000 tons.

In 1938, 1,380,000 tons.

In 1939, 2,000,000 tons.

In 1940, 960,000 tons.

So we did pretty well as far as supplying the Japs in those years with oil and scrap iron and I am not so sure but that if we had applied economic sanctions sooner it would have been better for us. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark, I hate to detain you at this late hour but this is my last chance, I suppose, to tender interrogatories to you.

Yesterday when I was examining you I referred to the story which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of October of 1942, an article which was written by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson, United States Navy, and which was entitled, [6582] "I Fly for Vengeance." At that time my questions were from memory. Today I have had the Congressional Library send me a photostat of that article and with your indulgence I will read the first two paragraphs:

You would damn well remember Pearl Harbor if you had seen the great naval base ablaze as we of Scouting Squadron 6 saw it from the air, skimming in ahead of our homeward-bound carrier. The shock was especially heavy for us because this was our first knowledge that the Japs had attacked on that morning of December seventh. We came upon it stone cold, each of us looking forward to a long leave that was due him.

It wasn't that we pilots didn't sense the tension that gripped the Pacific. You could feel it everywhere, all the time. Certainly the mission from which we were returning had the flavor of impending action. We had been delivering a batch of twelve Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron 211 to Wake Island, where they were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from

Pearl Harbor on November twenty-eighth under absolute war orders. Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., the commander of the Aircraft Battle Force, had given instructions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot down anything we saw in [6583] the sky and bomb anything we saw on the sea. In that way, there could be no leak to the Japs.

Now assuming that the then Lieutenant and now Commander Clarence E. Dickinson correctly records in this paragraph the nature of the orders under which he flew, absolute war orders as he calls them, orders which directed him to sink without a trace any Japanese ships that he encountered, to shoot down any Japanese planes he encountered in the air, would you say that those orders did not constitute an overt act against the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. When you previously questioned me on this I did not have the detail which you give there. I do not know the route they took and I would rather not express an opinion unless I knew more about it. For example, I stated that if I had been on the Island of Oahu and Japanese planes came over I would shoot them down. Kimmel stated and informed me that he had given orders to bomb any submarine which came in that area. I thought it was a perfectly proper order.

Now, if I had been going close by a Japanese mandate and a scouting plane had appeared within reach of my guns I do not know that I would have shot it down unless I had felt that there was pretty good reason to believe that it was going to attack. It is a rather difficult thing to answer but if Bill Halsey felt that it was necessary from where he was going to give those orders I would not differ with him until I knew more about why he issued them.

[6584] Mr. GEARHART. Well, there isn't so much left out of this paragraph that I have read to you. You know from it that the mission was from Hawaii to Wake and from Wake back to Hawaii, do you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Well, regarding the overt act, anything that he did in self-defense he was authorized to do. The Navy Regulations covered that.

I had invited Kimmel's attention to that when he asked me about shooting orders in the Pacific. I think I put it in my statement. Anyway, it is available to the committee in my correspondence. He told me what he was doing. I agreed with him on every point, as to what he was doing.

But if out on the high seas, out of sight of everything, to take the other extreme, that force had run into a Japanese merchant ship on the horizon and a plane saw her and deliberately bombed her and sank her, I will say it would be an overt act.

If a Japanese submarine had popped up close aboard, I would say it would be self-protection to have sunk that submarine and not an overt act. Between the two is a line of judgment which must be left up to the man in the field.

Mr. GEARHART. But under this order that was issued it would have been the duty of Commander Dickinson and his copilots to have sunk a merchant ship, if it had encountered it on the sea, because they were under absolute orders to keep [6585] their mission secret at all costs. That is an absolute war order, is it?

Admiral STARK. I would say so if it were issued, but I would like to have Halsey's version of that before I would be prepared to accept it.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. But assuming the facts as they are stated here by Clarence E. Dickinson, who has been twice promoted and never recommended for this article or criticized for writing it in all the years since it was published, if these facts are accepted as true, that he, as he said, was "flying on absolute war orders with instructions to keep my mission secret at all cost," "under orders to sink any Japanese ship I encountered on the surface of the seas and to shoot down any Japanese airplanes that I encountered in the air," that is war, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Well, from the illustration that I have given you of what might be regarded perhaps as an innocent merchant ship on the horizon, not bothering anybody, perhaps even headed home for Japan, why, I just have difficulty in understanding that Halsey would have expected them to sink such a ship.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, Admiral, how could he keep his mission a secret if he allowed a merchant ship to observe him in the air, allow it to radio the information that he had gone [6586] by? If he did not sink such a ship, he would certainly not have lived up to the letter of the war orders that had been given to him, would he?

Admiral STARK. He would not have lived up to the orders that he states were given him.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral STARK. He might, however, change the course of his flight so that the merchant ship could not see him. If he had spotted the merchant ship from the air, perhaps 100 miles away, in that case he would not have had to change his course.

Mr. GEARHART. Does the fact that Admiral Halsey gave that order to Commander Dickinson when he had before him your message, "This is a war warning," have any influence on your answer to these questions?

Admiral STARK. No; I have not been thinking of it in that connection, except for the tenseness of the period. I think in all those cases a matter of judgment comes in. If there were no question of being seen, and coming back to the merchant ship example, where a plane might be well up in the air and where a merchant ship might not see the plane because the plane could see her a long ways off, for the plane to go out of his way to sink that merchant ship, I just rather doubt that Halsey intended that to be done.

[6587] Mr. GEARHART. That is all right. Let us doubt it, but assuming that Vice Admiral Halsey ordered Lieutenant Dickinson to keep his mission secret at all cost, what would you say then?

Admiral STARK. Then it comes to whether it would have been a secret or not. With all the assumptions that you put in there, and on the merchant ship example which I have given it might be regarded as an overt act.

Mr. GEARHART. Then it follows as a logical conclusion, assuming all that Lieutenant Dickinson says is true, that we were at war in the Pacific on the 28th day of November 1941?

Admiral STARK. No; I would not say so.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then, point out why.

Admiral STARK. Because we were not.

Mr. GEARHART. When we are directing our fleet commanders to sink without a trace we are not at war?

Admiral STARK. Well, you are drawing up a premise here which I do not think holds.

Mr. GEARHART. I am asking you to assume what Lieutenant Dickinson said. Assume that that is true; I am asking you as a naval expert, based upon that assumption, that carries with it the acceptance of the idea that Clarence Dickinson was under orders to sink without a trace any ship that he [6588] encountered upon the sea, I want to know whether or not, on that assumption, you will say we were not at war on the 28th day of November 1941 in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. And you are assuming that he sees the ship and he is sure that ship would have information of him, and that that information of one single plane which he might never see, would disclose—

Mr. GEARHART. You are asking me to pass on the question of whether or not—

Admiral STARK. I am asking you; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You are asking me to pass on the question of whether or not a certain situation constitutes keeping his mission a secret at all costs. Now, you can pass on that same situation. Is he keeping his mission a secret at all costs if he flies by a merchant ship that he might encounter on the sea?

Admiral STARK. What do you consider keeping his mission a secret? If his main body is here [indicating] and off here on the horizon, maybe 100 miles away, is a merchant ship and which the plane can see probably from such a distance and the merchant ship cannot see him, I would say that is not giving the secret away.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, he is under orders to sink that ship, isn't he? [6589]

Admiral STARK. May I finish, sir?

You said that his orders are such as to have him go out of his way to sink that ship, and I say in that case it might be regarded as an overt act. Somebody might ultimately have to pass judgment on it. But in my opinion, also, under those conditions, the merchant ship would not discover what Admiral Halsey's mission was.

Mr. GEARHART. That hasn't got anything to do with the question I am propounding to you. If he is under orders to keep his mission secret is he not under orders to sink every ship that he encounters carrying the Japanese flag?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. In the first place, the Jap might not see the plane, and, in the second place, if he did see it what can he gather from it?

Mr. GEARHART. How would Lieutenant Dickinson or any American officer know whether the Jap saw him, or if he saw him plainly on the sea? Would not he, as a reasonable man, have to assume that the ship saw him?

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily; no, sir. But in any case, suppose he did see him, would the short picture of one plane indicate what Halsey's mission was 100 miles away?

Mr. GEARHART. He was flying with the squadron.

Admiral STARK. Well, you are further amplifying it now. Was he deployed on the scouting line?

[6590] Mr. GEARHART. That does not make any difference, Admiral.

It does not make any difference at all. The question is: We are officially issuing orders to keep a mission secret at all costs, to sink all ships encountered.

Admiral STARK. Which might—

Mr. GEARHART (interposing). No, no; there is not any "which might" there. There is no question as to whether the Japs saw or not.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I think the witness ought to be treated with some courtesy here.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you think I am discourteous, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. I have no objection. That is all right.

Mr. GEARHART. You do not need the protection of the gentleman from Illinois?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. GEARHART. You have got a pretty good reputation as a fighting man, yourself, haven't you?

Admiral STARK. In some ways.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us not get into an argument on that either.

Mr. GEARHART. I am asking you to assume that the orders issued to Clarence Dickinson were as he says they were. Now, can a man fly on the Pacific under those orders and next be flying under absolute war orders, as he says he was, himself?

[6951] Admiral STARK. Congressman Gearhart, I understand that the orders were premised on the fact that the objective was that Halsey's mission should not become known to the Japs.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Admiral STARK. Well, I submit that one plane—you say there was a squadron, but if they were out searching they would not be bunched, I do not believe. It might be that they were looking for an enemy, and if an enemy came close by, if he had discovered a Japanese force at that time heading eastward, that would have been one thing, but if they were deployed on the scouting line and the ship, way outside of Halsey's force, were to see a Japanese merchant ship—we have gotten into that phase of it, that that would disclose Halsey's intentions, but I do not believe it would, and assuming that, if he were out there for the purpose of protecting the secrecy of Halsey's position, he would not have been required, under the orders, I would say, to sink the ship.

[6592] Mr. GEARHART. We were to shoot down anything we saw in the sky?

Admiral STARK. Anything.

Mr. GEARHART. And bomb anything we saw on the sea. Is there anything equivocal about that?

Admiral STARK. Isn't that, "shoot down anything we saw or bomb anything we saw on the sea which might disclose our mission or threaten it"?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; that is the purport of it.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that Admiral Halsey is going to be here as a witness, wouldn't it be advisable to let him in on this?

Mr. GEARHART. I want a definite answer. I think you can answer the question definitely. Can those orders be issued and not be war orders?

Admiral STARK. Under certain circumstances, yes, sir. If I had been in Halsey's shoes—and he didn't need anybody else's shoes—and he had started on this mission, say a couple of hundred miles, or a hundred miles, from Oahu, and he had met this Japanese task force headed eastward, Bill would have hit it, and so would I, and I believe

anybody else would. Under that circumstance he was justified in it. How far he would have gone, and of which I drew an extreme one way and an extreme the other way, I don't know. Just [6593] whether his orders to shoot down what he saw were further qualified by some reasoning as to position and threat, I don't know.

In other words, I am telling you frankly where I would have shot. You might stretch it. Say they were 400 miles away. I still think I would have let him have it. Supposing he were 800 miles north of Oahu and were headed south. I certainly would have let him have it then. But if I saw a single merchant ship—

Mr. GEARHART. You are not talking about the order. You are talking about what you would have done. You say you expected Admiral Kimmel to do certain things under your very loosely drawn order. Here is a positive order. You are finding ways of avoiding observing it by pointing out fanciful situations which fly in the face of the order to sink everything encountered on the sea and shoot down everything encountered in the air.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. I yield, and that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. What you are being asked, Admiral, is, if that article in the Saturday Evening Post is true, and the orders were given, it constituted an overt act which justified an attack on Pearl Harbor. That is what you are being asked.

Mr. GEARHART. I am trying to find the facts. I have no [6594] one to defend, no one to prosecute, and no cause to serve save the truth. Let's have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, as part of the record of Admiral Stark, he has brought in and given to counsel these maps showing the location of the ships—

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Turner—but he was also asked about it, whether or not they show the ships, and they are here, from the 1st to the 6th, inclusive, and I would like to have them in evidence as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; they will be marked. What is the next number?

Mr. HANNAFORD. 109.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 109.")

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, have you any further statement that you would like to make in addition to what you have already stated?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I can't think of anything that I know that I haven't told you or of anything that I can suggest that hasn't been covered.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks you for your very manifest effort to give it all the information within your [6595] knowledge. You have been patient and courteous and you have demeaned yourself before this committee as befits your rank and your record as an admiral of the United States Navy, and we appreciate it.

Admiral STARK. Thank you, sir. I also appreciate the opportunity to come before you all. I was hoping that it would happen, both for Admiral Kimmel and myself, and I am delighted to have the oppor-

tunity; and I also want to thank the committee for its courtesy in every instance.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; good, luck, Admiral.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman—

Admiral STARK. I take it you will not want we again?

The CHAIRMAN. No, not so far as the committee knows.

Senator LUCAS. We might want you here when Admiral Halsey is here to answer that last question.

Admiral STARK. I think Bill can take care of himself.

Senator LUCAS. It is very important.

(The witness was excused temporarily.)¹

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, we have a great number of documents here that have already been distributed to the committee, and instead of holding the committee, I would like the committee's permission to have Mr. Hannaford dictate certain statements to the stenographer referring to those exhibits and place them in the record. They are not things that you would want to rule against or anything of that kind. [6596] They are before the committee members but they are to be put in as formal exhibits, and I thought, with your permission, Mr. Hannaford could dictate that into the daily transcript and you would have the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they will go in as part of the daily transcript.

I would like to say to the committee that I possibly might want to have a brief executive session Tuesday in regard to a matter Mr. Richardson might want to bring up.

Mr. HANNAFORD. First, I have two letters from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief United States Fleet, dated November 17, 1940, and February 10, 1941. The committee will recall that exhibit 9 contains the correspondence between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Stark. There are two letters in this exhibit from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark, to which the two letters to which I have just referred are replies. I would, therefore, like to have these two letters of December 17, 1940, and February 10, 1941, inserted in exhibit 9 at the appropriate places.

In Admiral Stark's prepared statement he quoted excerpts of certain letters he had written to Admiral Hart. In order that the records of the committee may be complete, Admiral Stark has requested that the file containing the complete copies of the letters be introduced in evidence as an exhibit. [6597] I therefore offer these letters from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart as exhibit 110.

(The letters referred to were marked as "Exhibit No. 110.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. Admiral Stark has asked that the following documents be inserted in the daily transcript of the hearing. They are the following:

First is his letter of June 11, 1941, to the holders of WPL-46.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

[6598]

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
WASHINGTON, June 11, 1941.

Op-12B-5-McC (SC) A16/EM Serial 063712

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Distribution List (attached).

Subject: Order of priority in the preparation of war plans.

¹ Adm. Stark's subsequent testimony appears in Hearings, Part 11.

2478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Reference:

- (a) CNO Secret Letter Op-12B-5-McC, (SC) A16/EN, Serial 03112 of January 8, 1941.
- (b) Paragraph 3302, WPL-8.
1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.
2. In accordance with the provisions of reference (b), the highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to the plans required by WPL-46. It is directed that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay.
3. WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL-44, and subordinate plans, are placed in an inactive status. WPL-1 is also placed in an inactive status.
4. The subject matter of subordinate plans prepared in accordance with the directives of WPL-42 and WPL-44 may be used where applicable in the subordinate plans required by WPL-46.
- [6599] 5. A copy of this letter will be placed in the front of each volume of WPLs-1, 13, 14, 42, and 44, in your custody.
6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

(S) H. R. STARK.

Second, his memorandum of January 9, 1941, to the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, relating to the installations of aircraft-detection equipment.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

[6600] Op-12A-4-dro 1/9/41 (SC) H1-16 Ser. 04312
Secret

JANUARY 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
Subject: Installation of Aircraft Detection Equipment.

1. The Navy Department considers that improvement of the antiaircraft defenses, and particularly of the aircraft detection components of those defenses, in the Hawaiian Islands is urgently necessary for the protection of the fleet units there present. It is believed that in the spring and summer of 1941 enemy air operations are much more likely to take place in the Hawaiian area and in Alaska than in Puerto Rico, Panama, and the Continental United States.
2. For the foregoing reason the intended priority of permanent installation of the fixed antiaircraft detection equipment being procured by the Navy is as follows: Midway, Johnston, Guam, Palmyra, Samoa, Wake, Guantauamo. It is requested that consideration be given to revising schedules of delivery so as to provide Army installations in the Hawaiian Islands and at Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and Sitka before completing installations at Panama and before proceeding with installations in Puerto Rico and the continental United [6601] States.
3. Confirmation is also requested of the understanding reached on 8 January 1941, in a conference between the Director of Naval Communications, the Chief Signal Office, and representatives of the War Plans Divisions of both services, that the Navy Department will be given priority in deliveries of seven sets of mobile equipment and at least eight of the eighteen sets of antiaircraft equipment for the use of Marine Defense Battalions.
4. It was learned in the conference on 8 January that delays are anticipated in obtaining steel for use in completing this equipment. It is recommended that the highest priority be given to production of this equipment and supplying the material needed. The Navy Department will be glad to cooperate in obtaining the necessary priorities.

R. E. INGERSOLL, *Acting*.

Copy to: Op-12, Op-20, Op-23, Op-30.

[6602] Mr. HANNAFORD. Third, a memorandum of July 25, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, with reference to WPPac-46, and Admiral Stark's reply thereto, dated September 9, 1941.

(The documents referred to are as follows:)

[6603] Op-12B-2-djm (SC) A16/EF12 Serial 008912 D-33956.

Secret

SEP 9 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.

Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July, 1941.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.
2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A16/WPPac-46(16)

[6604] Serial 064W

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (WPPac-46).

Reference: (a) WPL-46.

Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.

1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for approval.

2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might have a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this Plan has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. The Plan required by paragraph 3215 a.2 of reference (a) will be submitted when completed.

4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and will be submitted as they are developed.

5. This O-1 Plan is the best that this command has been able to evolve for carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of prospective op- [6605] erations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that risk of serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft must be incurred. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handicapped for any such operations, because of the limited forces made available to him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-submarine vessels, and the lack of transports and a properly trained and equipped marine force.

6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually existing and the forces actually available.

(s) H. E. KIMMEL.

Secret

[6606] Mr. HANNAFORD. Yesterday, we offered as Exhibit 107 the unpublished portions of the various Navy Pearl Harbor reports. The findings, conclusions and action by the Secretary of the Navy were not bound in the volume with the other reports. In order that the record may be perfectly clear I suggest that the findings, conclusions and action by the Secretary of the Navy, which is a separate document, be marked as exhibit 107-A.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 107-A.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. Exhibit 8 contains various reports from General MacArthur's headquarters relating to the Japanese plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor. We have received a subsequent report from General MacArthur's headquarters dated December 13, 1945, with reference to this subject. I request that this document be received in evidence as Exhibit 8-D.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit 8-D.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. From time to time, the witnesses who have appeared before this committee have submitted memoranda to counsel suggesting corrections in the transcript of their testimony. I have before me a memorandum from Mr. Grew dated December 18, 1945, which is in reply to a memorandum from Mr. Mitchell dated December 1, 1945; a memorandum from Lt. [6607] Col. Harmon Duncombe, dated December 21, 1945, prepared on behalf of General Marshall; a memorandum dated December 21, 1945, from Admiral Wilkinson, and three memoranda from General Miles, dated December 12, 1945; and a memorandum from General Gerow dated December 26, 1945; all suggesting changes in the transcript of their testimony.

I request that these memorandum be spread upon the daily transcript.

(The memoranda referred to follow:)

[6608]

[Copy]

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,

December 1, 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Grew.

Regarding changes you desire to make in the transcript of your testimony, it will not be possible to allow any changes in the existing transcript in matters of substance—only errors of spelling. Consequently, in order to record your desire to have changes made in your testimony, you should write us a memorandum referring to the pages of the transcript where you want the corrections to be made, and in that memorandum state the words you want stricken out and the words you want substituted. There will be no changes in the existing transcript, but your memorandum requesting those changes will be put in evidence and form a part of the transcript.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

WDM/CBN

[6609]

2840 WOODLAND DRIVE,
Washington, D. C., December 18, 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

With reference to your memorandum of December 1, 1945, I enclose two papers:

1. List of errors of spelling in the transcript of my testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

2. Corrections in the transcript of my testimony. I do not wish to change my testimony in any respect. Here and there the stenographer appears to have heard my words incorrectly and these corrections are intended merely to give an accurate record of what I actually said before the Committee.

[S] Joseph C. Grew.
JOSEPH C. GREW.¹

CORRECTIONS IN SPELLING IN THE TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. GREW
BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

November 26, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1502; line 12: "Kasa" should be altered to "Kase".

Page 1503; line 19: "Gogi" should be altered to "Gogai".

¹ Mr. Grew's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 2, pp. 560-603, 615-773.

[6610] *November 26, 1945 (Afternoon Session)*

Page 1554; line 16: "Chaing" should be altered to "Chiang".
 Page 1555; line 9: (same correction)
 Page 1556; line 19: (same correction)

November 27, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1648; line 18: "Toyda" should be altered to "Toyoda".

November 27, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1680; line 24: "Chaing" should be altered to "Chiang".
 Page 1681; line 20: (same correction)
 Page 1751; line 17: (same correction)

November 28, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1839; line 5: "KGI" should be altered to "KGEI".

November 28, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1902; line 23: "Shanghi" should be altered to "Shanghai".
 Page 1926; line 8: "Eugene F. Dooman" should be altered to "Eugene H. Dooman".
 Page 1929; line 17: "omniescent" should be altered to "omniscient".
 Page 1946; line 19: "Hiramuna" should be altered to "Hiranuma".
 Page 1947; line 3: (same correction)

[6611] CORRECTIONS IN THE TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY. EACH LINE IS GIVEN COMPLETELY AS IT SHOULD PROPERLY READ.

November 26, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1474:

Line 14: Mr. GREW. Joseph Clark Grew.

Page 1497:

Line 6: army went into Manchuria and that inevitably brought the
 Line 7: military into a position of control.

Page 1498:

Line 11: of Admiral Yonai, who was a naval officer.
 Line 13: in Japan for many years.

Page 1501:

Line 6: telephoned to Mr. Dooman, the Counselor of the Embassy, to stand by.

Page 1502:

Line 7: Togo, the Foreign Minister—and the Minister finally said, "I will present your

November 26, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1523:

Line 13: Mr. GREW. A military and a naval attache and

Page 1528:

Line 6: Mr. GREW. I said that is correct, sir.

[6612] Page 1533:

Line 17: garden, and just chatting about things, and I said:

Page 1538:

Line 8: Mr. GREW. No, sir; it did not.

Page 1539:

Line 15: called their co-prosperity sphere, first economic control, to
 Line 17: by the Japanese military was in the way of implementing that

Page 1542:

Line 19: the more difficult their economic position became. They however had

Page 1546:

Line 22: his salt if, in case he felt he couldn't conscientiously carry out that
 Line 23: policy, he should remain in office. There can be no question about that.

Page 1557:

Line 10: Mr. GREW. Yes, perfectly.

Page 1562:

Line 20: that they were ostensibly fighting for. I do not say what

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Page 1569:

Line 11: Very probably, but I have had no evidence to be able to
[6613] Page 1580:

Line 9: before the Konoye Cabinet fell, Admiral Toyoda, the Foreign Minister,
Line 10: asked me to call and said the Ambassador "was fatigued" and he
Line 14: he could not mention his name to me, but he just wanted me to
Line 15: know he was going to have to send somebody over for the reason he
Line 16: had stated and he hoped I would cooperate in getting plans ready as
quickly as

Line 17: possible. Before he could act the Konoye Cabinet fell and
Line 18: the Tojo Cabinet came in, and in my first interview with the
Line 19: Foreign Minister, he brought up this point at once. He
Line 23: Nomura's reports of the conversations in Washington were always

Page 1581:

Line 14: an American wife, and I had negotiated with him, and I had seen
him

Line 15: in a personal way often. I always regarded him as
[6614] Line 16: pro-American in his outlook and sentiments, and the

Page 1582:

Line 10: him over here—to support and cooperate with Admiral Nomura.
Line 22: conversations did not come to a satisfactory conclusion that

November 27, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1625:

Line 5: absence in 1939 and when I saw the President he said, When

Page 1639:

Line 22: 1. Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941, published
in 1943.

Line 25: 2. Foreign Relations of the United States; Japan, 1931–1941.

Page 1640:

Line 3: 3. My book entitled "Ten Years in Japan".

Line 20: been misinterpreted by foreign governments, and points of

Page 1649:

Line 4: that record of a conversation with the Foreign Minister.

November 27, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1668:

Line 12: as comment in my diary. I considered that September was one of

Page 1669:

Line 10: Mr. GREW. No, sir, that is a telegram from our then Legation

Line 15: Mr. GREW. Mr. Steele was a prominent correspondent in the

Page 1674:

Line 16: It would be short-sighted, however, to deny their existence or

Page 1677:

Line 8: used. Once that conviction is shaken it is possible that

Page 1680:

Line 12: East and from time to time my recommendations as to what

Line 13: policy should be followed in Washington.

Page 1682:

Line 8: into East Asia. They were potentially

Page 1684:

Line 24: "Only insuperable obstacles will prevent the Japanese

Page 1692:

Line 2: Mr. GREW. Yes, as I remember it, we might

Line 3: have. Let me see how that was stated.

Page 1740:

Line 17: Mr. GREW. Senator, I did not go into those stra-

Page 1753:

Line 20: with the responsibility for some of the worst acts of banditry

Page 1757:

Line 18: 29, Senator. I think I had better stick to the record here.

November 28, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1802:

Line 8: the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and

Page 1837:

Line 5: Mr. GREW. That would be 14 hours earlier. I understand

Page 1841:

Line 15: Mr. GREW. Fourteen hours earlier. That, in Washington.

November 28, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1880:

Line 12: ing from Japan in August 1942 submitted a [6617] report to Mr. Hull.

Page 1901:

Line 20: prime minister Hiranuma was also attacked. His throat was cut and

Page 1904:

Line 11: and it is all on the record—I had better read you exactly what

Page 1908:

Line 13: Mr. KEEFE. When did the Konoye Cabinet fall?

Line 14: Mr. GREW. October 16, 1941.

Page 1909:

Line 6: this meeting with the President took place the Konoye Cabinet

Page 1917:

Line 7: a purely technical point; it is a point as to what is meant

Line 17: in it so much as whether further negotiations continued after

November 29, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1994:

Line 18: might have been the Counselor of the Embassy; it might have

[6618]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 21 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

It is requested that the following corrections be made in the transcript of the testimony of General Marshall.¹

Page	Line	Correction
2766	4	Change "McNary" to "McNair".
2767	4	Omit "Of".
2767	18	Change "priority" to "priorities".
2767	25	Change "point" to "part".
2769	9	Change "the" to "their".
2769	10	Change "representation" to "presentation".
2787	11	Change "Hart" to "Stark".
2790	6	Change "Squadron" to "Squadrons".
2790	18	Change "times" to "time".
2822	6	Change "brough" to "brought".
2825	14	Change "known" to "not".
2830	15	Change "each" to "each".
2834	21	Change "approved" to "approve".
2836	7	Change "operations" to "operation".
2850	4	Change "outweight" to "outweigh".
2868	11	Omit "for", change "operation" to "operational".
3874	9	Omit "Mr. Mitchell."
[6619] 2874	12	Change "General Marshall" to "Mr. Mitchell".
2874	13	Change "Mr. Mitchell" to "General Marshall".
2874	14	Omit "General Marshall".
2885	20	Change "Aid de Memoirs" to "Aide Memoire".
2891	12	Change "far" to "for".
2895	8	After "Japanese", insert "Expedition".
2896	10	Change "on" to "in".
2898	18	Change "on" to "at"; capitalize "Joint Board".
2901	5	Change "sources" to "resources".
2914		Change page No. from "2194" to "2914".
2914	16	Change "from 7 to 9" to "before dinner time"
2918	4	Change "from" to "for".
2925	11	Change "is" to "was".
2928	11	Change "officers" to "opposite".
2929	13	Change "Dean" to "Deane".
2930	4	Remove comma after "authentic".
2933	17	Change "officer" to "opposite".
2933	21	Change "officer" to "opposite".
2938	7	Change "transportation" to "transmission".

¹ Gen. Marshall's testimony appears in *Hearings*, Part 3, pp. 1049-1358, 1377-1541.

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	Page	Line	Correction
[6619]	2939	5	Change "Bundy" to "Bratton".
	2953-A	15	Change "materiel" to "material".
[6620]	2953-A	21	Change "they" to "the".
	2956	25	Change "B-1's" to "B-17's".
	2960	18	Change "Haway" to "Hawaii".
	2973	2	Change "Ferguson" to "Lucas".
	2979	2	Change "to" to "the".
	2989	2	Change "Clark" to "Clarke".
	2994	24	Change "it a matter of record" to "another effort".
	2995	2	Change "telephone" to "telephoned".
	2996	4	After "Mr. Bell", insert "but not".
	2997	12	Change "Vissell" to "Bissell".
	2997	15	Do.
	2997	19	Do.
	2997	22	Do.
	2997	24	Do.
	2998	7	Do.
	2998	13	Do.
	2998	17	Do.
	3003	20	Do.
	3004	2	Do.
	3004	6	Do.
	3009	6	Change "quadron" to "squadron".
	3016	8	Change "measure" to "message".
	3037	14	Change "arrived" to "were away".
[6621]	3056	25	Change "to him" to "to me".
	3061	14	Change "Phillipping" to "Philippine".
	3063	3	Change "Backking" to "backing".
	3109	8	After "fact" insert "as far as I recall". (See p. 3515, line 9.)
	3111	24	Change "ready" to "already".
	3112	24	Change "some" to "someone".
	3113	4	Change "knew the" to "was the only".
	3116	18	Change "there" to "then"; "any" to "it a".
	3132	25	Change "chief of" to "General".
	3145	6	Change "at 7:00 o'clock" to "on the 7th".
	3147	18	Change "suversive" to "subversive".
	3156	14	Change "ythis" to "this".
	3164	10	Change "his" to "my".
	3171	17	Change "hear" to "head".
	3172	3	Change "advise" to "advice".
	3178	21	Change "8:30" to "6:30"; "American" to "A. M.".
	3182	9	Change "presented" to "prevented".
	3189	4	Change "applie" to "implied".
	3194	5	Change "from" to "near".
	3195	20	Change "on" to "all"; "and" to "on".
	3195	25	Change "Hawaii" to "Panama"; "we" to "I".
[6622]	3235	13	Change "attack" to "attacked".
	3253	6	Change "Marshall" to "Marshal".
	3256	4	After "Washington" insert "to".
	3260	23	After "that" insert "we".
	3270	11	Change "concerning" to "concerned".
	3276	11	Change "was" to "war".
	3315	25	Change "though" to "thought".
	3316	5	Change "emphazied" to "emphasized".
	3321	4	Change "scope" to "slash".
	3327	15	Change "sent" to "send".
	3344	10	Change "night" to "morning".
	3352	13	Change "C. S. O." to "C. N. O."; "S. O. S." to "C. O. S."
	3352	19	Change "C. S. O." to "C. N. O."; "S. O. S." to "C. O. S."
	3353	6	Change "seee" to "see".
	3359	8	Change "kept on with our" to "felt no fear for".
	3364	15	Change "Winane" to "Winant".
	3364	22	Change "7th" to "6th".
	3371	12	Change "possible" to "possibly".
	3405	17	Change "exchange" to "change".
	3419	11	Change "chance" to "change".
	3427	2	Change "indicate" to "indicative".
	3451	22	Change "somewhere" to "interrupted with something".
[6623]	3453	23	Change "terne" to "tern".
	3455	16	Change "know" to "knowing".
	3472	18	After "message" insert "indicate".
	3472	20	Change "thatm" to "that".
	3473	13	Change "too" to "to".
	3480	4	Change "o" to "do".
	3480	16	Change "Denny" to "Deane".
	3501	6	Change "gto" to "to".
	3506	23	Change "deligated" to "delegated".
	3543	25	After "1941" insert "called".
	3548	11	Change "point" to "joint".
	3555	7	Change "proceedures" to "procedures".
	3558	22	Change "MacArthur" to "Herron".
	3565	14	Before "prompted" insert "that".
	3621		Should be page "3622".
	3622		Should be page "3621".

Page	Line	Correction
3627	2	Change "exhause" to "exhaust".
3640	2	Change "distributed" to "disapproved".
3652	3	Change "discussion" to "discuss".
3652-B	4	Change "Decxmber" to "December".
3662	6	After "Yes, Sir" start a new paragraph and insert "Mr. Keefe", capitalize "And".
3680	17	Change "thought" to "though".
3685	18-20	Omit lines "18 to 20".
[6624] 3724	2	Change "siwht" to "with".
3729	7	Change "makking" to "making".
3734	8	Change "presumaly" to "presumably".
3747	6	Change "Simenko" to "Semanko".
3747	7	Change "Spearman" to "Speaman".
3754	12	Change "contract" to "contact".
3766	7	Change "Corp" to "Corps".
3971	14	Change "Dean" to "Deane".
3972	25	Change "is" to "was".
3983	18	Change "Short" to "Strong".
3984	20	After "to" insert "get".
4032	23	Change "Genera" to "General".
4040	10	Change "nto" to "to".
4057	7	Change "hour into" to "out to".
4060	23	Change "Normany" to "Normandy".
4071	7	Change "vinal" to "final".
4073	3	Change "port and" to "important".
4075	5	Change "Dean" to "Deane".
4080	24	Change "be" to "me".

(S) HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

[6625]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 21 December 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: In the record of my testimony in the current hearings before the Joint Committee I note a few stenographic errors, due doubtless to my over-rapid replies, which I believe should be corrected in the interest of clarity and accuracy.

Record of December 18

Page 4754:

- Line 20. Change "a 55" to "the 5th".
- Line 21. Strike out "the translation is inadequate".
- Line 22. Change "which" to "each".

Page 4759:

- Line 21. Strike out "not".

Page 4766:

- Line 17. Change "Marshalls" to "Carolines".

Page 4773:

- Line 12. Change "for" to "by".
- Line 15. Strike out "and again".

Page 4791:

- Line 8. Change "Kirk" to "King".

Page 4800:

- Line 1. Change "fleets" to "planes".

Page 4806:

- Line 5. Change "fleet" to "field".

Page 4897:

- Line 23. Change "not" to "now".

Page 4900:

- Line 24. Change "communications" to "intentions".

[6626]

Record of December 19

Page 4947:

- Line 21. Change "but not" to "or".

Page 4963:

- Line 1. Change "certain" to "the Anglo-Saxon".

Page 4964:

- Line 11. Change "it" to "they" and "out of the" to "on".

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Page 4986:

Line 14. Change "days" to "years".

Page 4996:

Line 9. Strike out "Admiral Wilkinson".

Page 5018:

Line 4. Change "20th" to "25th".

Page 5019:

Line 3. Change "November" to "September".

Page 5033:

Line 11. Strike out "and".

Line 12. Change "Ingersoll" to "Stark".

Page 5057:

Line 3. Change "and it was an" to "in the".

Also, for clarity, though an emendation and not a stenographic correction, there should be added to Page 5063, line 7, the following: "The fortnightly *summary* of that date, but not the *memorandum* of December 1 discussing the Japanese movements into the South China Sea".

Very truly,

(S) T. S. WILKINSON,¹
T. S. WILKINSON,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Mr. W. D. MITCHELL,
Counsel to the Joint Committee.

[6627]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D 761, THE PENTAGON,
Washington, D. C., 12 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Gesell.

I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of my testimony on 4 December:

Page	Line	Correction
2425	13	Insert period after the word "message".
2425	14	Delete words "so that".
2425	15	Insert comma after word "message".
2425	22	Change "this" to "that".
2425	23	Change "up" to "my attention to".
2428	21	Insert words "those two" after "except".
2450	4	Change first "that" to "with".
2454	7	Change first "it" to "there".
2481	24	Change "place" to "status".
2485	15	Change "have" to "had".
2485	20	Change "it" to "they".
2486	23	Insert comma after word "read".
2486	24	Change "over" to "addressed".
2487	16	Insert comma and the word "as" after "record".
2488	5	Change "written" to "read".
2495	20	Change "intercepting" to "decoding".
[6628] 2507	15	Insert comma and the word "then" after "one".
2507	16	Delete comma after "code".
2516	6	Insert comma after "checked"; insert "if" after "and".
2516	7	Change "if" to "then".
2524	4-5	Change comma after "Japan" to period and delete remainder of sentence.
2527	14	Insert "that" after the comma.
2527	15	Change commas around phrase "and I think I can say always" to parentheses.
2527	16	Insert comma after "messages".
2536	16	Change "Atlantic" to "Pacific".
2543	18	Change "concentration" to "control".
2548	8	Change "would have" to "when it".
2554	6	Change "from" to "to"; change "at" to "after".
2574	15	Change period to colon; change "The" to "that the".
2574	16	Change "indicated" to "indicate".
2574	17	Change "was" to "be".
2575	6	Line should read ". . . ABC (not D) agreement . . ."
2582	12	Insert "not" after "of".

(S) SHERMAN MILES,
Maj. Gen., USA.

¹ Admiral Wilkinson's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1723-1782, 1794-1911.

[6629]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D761, THE PENTAGON,
WASHINGTON, D. C., 12 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. GESELL:

I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of my testimony on 30 November:

Page	Line	Correction
2133.....	13	Change "the same" to "some".
2133.....	17	Change "in" to "with".
2133.....	20	Change "hemispheric" to "hemisphere".
2133.....	24	Change "hemispheric" to "hemisphere".
2134.....	3-4	Change the lines to read "Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, with eight subsections".
2135.....	3	Delete the "g" from "bulletings".
2136.....	3	Delete the word "controls".
2136.....	12	Insert a comma after the second "gauge".
2136.....	18	Change the line to read "for maps of all sorts, and we were coordinating—we were the".
2137.....	23	Change "for" to "in".
2137.....	24	Change "for" to "with".
2137.....	25	Change line to read "Army—I mean the next to the last war. I served other times".
[6630] 2146.....	14	Insert comma after "Staff"; delete "and".
2146.....	15	Change line to read "of the War Plans Division, and the Secretary of War, were, from then".
2153.....	19	Change "by that" to "on".
2157.....	12	Change "a" to "the".
2157.....	13	Change "twice" to "once".
2157.....	22-23	Change lines to read "the Dutch, the Siamese, the British, the Chinese or the Russians".
2161.....	3	Change "message" to "messages".
2161.....	5	Change line to read "was only one of many. There were more, actually, that indicated an attack".
2161.....	6	Change "and" to "or".
2162.....	17	Insert "a" after "being".
2163.....	13-14	Change lines to read "Many times I have drawn up a maneuver or war game situation on the assumption of a Japanese attack fol-".
2164.....	15-16	Change lines to read "General Niles: Many times I have drawn up a maneuver or war game situation under the assumption of an all out".
2165.....	19	Delete the word "all".
2165.....	23	Change "in" to "or"; change "situations" to "situation".
2169.....	11	Change "wild" to "wide"; delete "in".
2173.....	9	Insert quotation marks after "efficiency".
2173.....	10	Delete quotation marks after "it".
2173.....	13	Insert the word "successfully" after "she".
2176.....	6	Insert the word "that" after "learn".
2182.....	5	Change line to read "the Commanding General himself had put an alert in his".
2205.....	23	Change "Deputy" to "Chief of".
2205.....	24	Delete word "General".
2208.....	17-18	Consolidate lines and change to read "ference by direction. In other words, I was the one who was raising".
2209.....	3	Delete comma after "to".
2209.....	5	Delete words "limiting it only".
2209.....	6	Delete word "to"; change "against" to "about".
2210.....	15	Change "General" to "Colonel".
2214.....	19	Substitute "Japanese" for "American".

MR. GESELL'S QUESTION

2238.....	4	Change "Staff" to "a division".
2238.....	11	Insert "there was also the" after "end".
2245.....	8	Change line to read "day that I have counted 56 of those that were deciphered * * *".
2246.....	19	Change second "the" to "that it is".
2246.....	20	Delete comma following "probable".
2251.....	16	Change "and would be a" to "since they were".
[6632] 2251.....	17	Change line to read "meaningless messages to the person sending them."
2254.....	3-4	Change lines to read "could add, however, of course, that we knew the Japanese were following".
2254.....	10	Change "there" to "it".
2258.....	10	Change "running" to "writing".

2488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

General Miles has also requested the following corrections in the reporter's transcript of his testimony on 3 December:

Page	Line	Correction
2314.....	24	Change line to read "General Miles: The possibility or the probability of".
2314.....	25	Delete the word "it".
2315.....	22	Delete the words "Now" and "have".
2315.....	23	Change line to read "You ask me whether I thought it was a".
2315.....	24	Change comma to period after "surprise"; capitalize "w" in "we".
2315.....	25	Change line to read "in war with us, might attack Hawaii, and we took action".
2316.....	2	Change "This" to "The".
2316.....	3	Change "billeted" to "established".
2316.....	4	Change line to read "We also followed, I think, the second principle. We".
[6633] 2316.....	6	Change "he" to "they".
2316.....	10	Change "very" to "great".
2316.....	11	Change "he" to "they".
2318.....	22	Change "Yes" to "No".
2319.....	6	Delete words "a mine".
2320.....	13	Change "control" to "controlled".
2323.....	7	Change "sent" to "seem".
2323.....	9	Insert word "by" after "believe".
2324.....	8	Delete words "or might not".
2332.....	14	Change "waters" to "province".
2337.....	18	Change "close" to "closer".
2338.....	15	Change "officially" to "generally".
2367.....	10	Insert word "was" after "question".
2367.....	11	Change "their" to "our".
2367.....	14	Change line to read "the risking of this secret by using the two codes. We were".
2371.....	22	Change "Brunert" to "Grunert".
2373.....	15	Delete words "knew, and".
2374.....	24	Change "of the" to "and train".
2374.....	25	Change "people" to "the agents"; change "why" to "what".
2383.....	18	Insert word "we" after "which".
2384.....	21	Change "he is" to "his".
2384.....	22	Delete word "good".
[6634] 2384.....	23	Change "You" to "I".
2389.....	17	Delete words "one of".
2389.....	18	Change line to read "sole function".
2390.....	20	Delete period and add "in our army".
2391.....	6	Add "—a" after "that".
2394.....	20	Inset "and" after "department".
2399.....	4	Change line to read "Marshall's warning message of November 27. Concerning my message of".
2399.....	5	Delete words "did" and "and".
2405.....	25	Delete "Admiral Turner".
2408.....	6	Change "authority" to "authorities".
2409.....	7	Change line to read "those codes. But the Japanese could not jump our headquarters".
2409.....	24	Change "take" to "attack".
2419.....	13	Change comma to period after "citizens"; capitalize "b" in "but".

(S) SHERMAN MILES,
Maj. Gen., USA.

[6635]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D761, THE PENTAGON,
Washington, D. C., 12, 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Gesell.

I request that the following corrections be made in the transcript of the testimony which I gave on November 29:

Page	Line	Correction
2065.....	16	Strike the word "the".
2066.....	16	Strike the word "general".
2067.....	9	Strike the word "with".
2067.....	10	Change "commanders" to "commands".
2074.....	23	Change "not" to "now".
2083.....	6	Change "nor was G-2" to "nor was Naval Communications".
2084.....	11	Change "Hugh" to "Jules".
2108.....	9	Change "of" to "or".
2111.....	17	Strike the word "few".
2111.....	24	Strike the word "it".
2115.....	10	Strike the word "preceding".
2115.....	11	Change "April" to "August".
2115.....	14	Change "battle for the Leyte Gulf" to "battle for Leyte Gulf".
2116.....	13	Change the line to read "gagged by the Chief of Staff or was it in any way suggested that I".
[6636] 2125.....	7	Insert "and" after "economic".
2127.....	23	Change the line to read "War Department, the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of War that we".
2100.....	14	Change "right" to "light".

(S) SHERMAN MILES,¹
Maj. Gen., USA.

[6637]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D761, THE PENTAGON,
Washington, D. C., 26 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Gesell.

I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of my testimony on 5 December:

Page	Line	Correction
2603.....	10	Delete comma.
2603.....	22	Delete "of"; substitute comma.
2641.....	4	Change "means" to "mission".
2641.....	5	Change "means" to "missions".
2645.....	19	Change "means of" to "missions, the".
2668.....	8	Insert "that" after "conclusion".
2668.....	22	Change "earning" to "warning".
2668.....	22	Change "that" to "as".
2669.....	12	Change "article" to "obstacle".
2672.....	2	Change "aircraft" to "aircraft".
2672.....	5	Change "autmenting" to "augmenting".
2688.....	4	Change "there" to "these".
2691.....	13	Change "drafting" to "drafting".
2708.....	25	Insert "not" after "is" and before "necessarily".
2709.....	10	Change "sent" to "send".
[6638] 2711.....	6	Change "Galey" to "Galley".
2714.....	24	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
2714.....	25	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
2715.....	9	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
2715.....	12	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
2725.....	6	Strike "from".
2728.....	25	Strike line (duplicated top of next page).
2743.....	2	Insert "I saw" between the words "time" and "the".
2743.....	4	Delete "was".

¹ Gen. Miles' testimony appears in Hearings, Part 3, pp. 1360-1375, 1541-1583.

2490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The following corrections should be made in the transcript of my testimony on 14 December:

Page	Line	
4248.....	3	Change "preciipitate" to "precipitate".
4254.....	24	Change "Memoirs" to "Memoire".
4262.....	24	Insert "do not" before "believe".
4271.....	19	Change "Commanding" to "Command and".
4307.....	11	Change "Bad Nomen" to "Bad Nauheim".

(S) L. T. GEROW,¹
Lieut. General.

[6639] Mr. HANNAFORD. At pages 4164 and 5038-40 of the transcript Congressman Gearhart requested information concerning any all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from December 1 to December 6, 1941. We have received two memoranda from the War Department, dated December 27, 1945, and January 2, 1946, in reply to Congressman Gearhart's request. I request that these memoranda, together with the attachments, be spread upon the daily transcript at this point.

(The memoranda referred to follow:)

[6640-6641]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
ROOM 4D757, THE PENTAGON,
2 January 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

With reference to Congressman Gearhart's request for information concerning any all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from 1 to 6 December 1941, there is inclosed a further report from the Commanding General in Hawaii.

(S) Harmon Duncombe,
HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

1 Incl.

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Incoming Clear Message

1 JANUARY 1946.

From: CG USAF MIDPAC Ft Shafter TH.

To: War Department.

Nr: MP 18038.

To the Chief of Staff USA Washn DC Attn Assistant Chief [6642] of Staff Operations Div info CINCAFPAC Admin CINCAFPAC Adv MP 18038 MPGCT Richardson.

See following references:

A WCL 30471 DTG 200138Z Dec

B AFMIDPAC radio MP 17177 DTG 220554Z Dec

An intensive and thorough search of all records of this Hqs and Air Corps Hqs on Oahu fail to disclose info requested in reference A).—End.

Note: MP 17177 is MC-IN-62666 (22 Dec 45) OPD

Action: OPD

Info: L & L D

MC-IN-60590 (2 Jan 46)

DTG 010720Z rmw

Unclassified

COPY

¹ Gen. Gerow's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 3, pp. 983-1048; Part 4, pp. 1592-1640 and 1643-1673.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
ROOM 4D757, THE PENTAGON,
27 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

At pages 4164 and 5038-40 of the transcript, Congressman Gearhart requested complete information concerning any [6643] all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from 1 to 6 December 1941. A thorough search has disclosed no information in the War Department files concerning such an alert. Inclosed herewith are (1) a 19 December 1945 cable on the subject from the War Department to the Commanding General in Hawaii and (2) a preliminary reply dated 22 December 1945.

(S) Harmon Duncombe,
HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

Incls. (2).

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Outgoing Clear Message

Operations Division WDGS.
Current Group WAROPDIV 74676.

19 DECEMBER 1945.

COMGENAFMIDPAC Ft. Shafter T H
INFORMATION:
CINCAFPAC Admin Manila P I
Number: WCL 30471
From WARSEC

Joint Congressional Committee has requested information [6644] whether orders were issued placing Hickam, Wheeler or any other Army airfield in Hawaiian Department on alert during first week December 1941 and also whether any such alerts were cancelled on or about 6 December. Request immediate thorough investigation of available records and other sources of information relating to any such alerts. If alerts were placed in effect or cancelled, send by cable the text of all such orders and specify by whose authority they were issued. Give details as to nature of alerts and any other pertinent information.—
End.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION: L & L D
MC-OUT-30471 (Dec 45) DTG 200136Z 1s

COPY

Unclassified

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Incoming Clear Message

Urgent

From: CG, Fort Shafter, Honolulu, TH.
To: War Department
Nr: M 17177

22 DECEMBER 1945.

[6645] To the Chief of Staff United States Army Washington 25 DC Attention Assistant Chief of Staff Operations Division info Commander in Chief Army

2492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Forces Pacific Admin Commander in Chief Army Fores Pacific Adv. M 17177.
Signed Richardson.

See urad WCL 30471 DTG 200138 z December 1945.

Records searched to date have not disclosed information requested in subject radio. All possible sources and records are being canvassed and any pertinent information found will be forwarded immediately.—End.

ACTION: OPD

INFO: L&LD

MC-IN-6268 (22 Dec 45) DTG: 220554Z blw

COPY

Unclassified

[6646] Mr. HANNAFORD. At page 5904 of the transcript Senator George requested the number and type of ships attached to the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets on December 7, 1941. This request was repeated by Congressman Gearhart. The information requested appears on page 6 of Exhibit 86, copies of which have been furnished to committee members.

In addition Congressman Gearhart asked for the specific location on December 7, 1941, of the ships in the Pacific Fleet. This information is contained in Exhibit 6, which is the Navy folder of maps, charts, and statements. Item 1 of that exhibit shows the disposition of the Pacific Fleet in graphic form, and item 5 shows the same information in written form. Item 8 shows the disposition of the ships in Pearl Harbor in graphic form, and item 9 shows the disposition of the ships in Pearl Harbor in written form.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., an adjournment was taken until Tuesday, January 15, 1946, at 10 a. m.)

Part 6—January 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946—follows.

×



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 6

JANUARY 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, AND 21, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)

▲ CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
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PART 6

JANUARY 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, AND 21, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

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HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina	

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE

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Sworn statement presented to committee.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
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[6647] ¹

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m. in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson and Brewster, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[6648] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel, I believe, desire to have some documents put into the record before we begin the testimony.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I am requested by counsel for General Short to have the name of Lt. Col. Randolph Karr added to the list of his counsel, as shown by the record, volume 1, page 11.²

His address is 2601 Munitions Buildings, and his telephone is REpublic 6700, extension 78109.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to read into the record some correspondence between Miss Tully and Mr. Mitchell, and some correspondence between Justice Roberts and Mr. Mitchell with reference to the whereabouts of the original Roberts report, which was requested by Senator Ferguson at page 3180 of the transcript, and was again referred to by Mr. Mitchell at page 6148 of the transcript.

By reading it into the record, it will avoid making an exhibit of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead, Mr. Masten.

Mr. MASTEN. The first is a letter dated December 21, 1945, addressed to Miss Tully from Mr. Mitchell.

DEAR MISS TULLY:

[6649] The Committee has requested, and I therefore wish you would obtain for us, a photostatic copy of the original signed report of the Roberts Commission as filed with President Roosevelt, together with any drafts of the report which may be available in the files of President Roosevelt.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. MITCHELL

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

² Hearings, Part 1, p. 4.

Miss Tully's answer, dated December 27, 1945, is as follows:

DEAR MR. MITCHELL:

I have your note of December 21st, requesting a copy or draft of the report of the Roberts Commission. I am sorry, indeed, that I cannot find this report, or any reference to it, in the files of the late President Roosevelt.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) GRACE G. TULLY.

Under date of January 2, 1946, Mr. Mitchell wrote the following letter to Justice Owen J. Roberts:

DEAR JUSTICE ROBERTS:

The Committee is attempting to locate the original report submitted by the Commission, of which you were Chairman, which investigated the Pearl Harbor matter. We have been advised that the report is not in the files [6649-A] of the White House or the files of the late President Roosevelt.

I would appreciate a note from you, at your convenience, advising just what procedure was followed in submitting the report and to whom it was submitted.

The Committee is particularly anxious, apparently, to determine whether any portions of the report were stricken or amended following your submission of the report, presumably to the President.

I am sorry to bother you again.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

Justice Roberts' reply, under date of January 4, 1946, is as follows:

[6650] HON. WILLIAM D. MITCHELL,
*Counsel, Joint Committee on Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I have your letter of January 2. I am glad of the opportunity to answer it. The report of the Commission of which I was Chairman was signed by the Commission in duplicate originals. When it was ready for presentation to the President on the afternoon of Friday, January 23, 1942, I telephoned the White House and inquired whether the President desired the report transmitted to him by messenger, delivered to him by the Commission in a body, or delivered to him by me as its Chairman. The President's secretary later telephoned that the President desired I should present the report as Chairman of the Commission to him in person, and would see me for that purpose at eleven o'clock on Saturday [6651] morning, January 24, 1942.

At the time named I called at the White House and handed the President, at his desk in his study on the second floor, the two duplicate original copies of the report. He read the entire report in my presence, asking questions and making comments concerning the facts disclosed. The interview lasted over two hours.

At the conclusion of his perusal, the President inquired whether any of the facts stated in the report, if given publicity, might embarrass our military or naval operations or give the enemy information which ought not to be disclosed. I replied that the Commission had submitted the fact findings (but not the report) to the Secretaries of War and Navy and had been advised by each of them that there could be no objection to the publication of the facts as the Commission had stated them in its report.

The President then said he saw no reason why the report should not be given to the press in full. I replied that it would be a satisfaction to the Commission if this were done. He thereupon rang for his secretary, Mr. McIntyre, and when the latter arrived said to him that the report should be released to the press in its entirety, for publication on the following day, Sunday, January 25, 1942. Mr. McIntyre said he would have mimeographed copies for the press prepared at once. I am not certain whether he handed [6652] both duplicate originals to Mr. McIntyre, but I believe that he did. I have never since seen the originals. I subsequently read the report in mimeograph, as given out by the White House. The mimeographed sheets looked as if a number of stenographers had worked simultaneously on different portions of the report. I also read the report as printed in the New York Times, and as printed as a public document pursuant to Congressional direction. I can assure you the report thus published was full and complete, as submitted by the Commission, without deletion or alteration.

One copy of the report was retained by each member of the Commission. I have my copy, which I believe to be a carbon copy of the original handed to the President.

Yours sincerely,

(S) OWEN J. ROBERTS.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with that, is it clear as to whether there were any changes at the time the original statement was submitted to the Army and Navy concerning the facts, as to whether there were eliminations [6653] at that time incident to the war situation then?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, we have no information with reference to this report, except as contained in this letter. We have endeavored to find the original report, but we cannot. It would be possible, I think, to ascertain very likely from Mr. Justice Roberts whether there was any change in the findings after they were presented to the military authorities.

Senator BREWSTER. That was the point. I was not clear from the letter whether that would be clarified or not. I think whatever is the most practical and convenient should be done.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will endeavor to get some information on that, because this letter does not cover that.¹

Senator BREWSTER. It might well have been proper to eliminate certain findings of fact at that time, due to the war situation, but that would not be material now, I presume. Whether that is the case, I do not know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, there has come to our attention some correspondence relating to the idea that Mr. Wendell Willkie would take a trip to Australia and other points in the Southwest Pacific. We have gathered together letters from the Under Secretary of State, a memorandum for the President in connection therewith, and a letter issued by the President to Mr. Willkie, and some postscripts thereto.

[6653-A] This correspondence is, I think, complete so far as our files are concerned, with reference to the Willkie correspondence, and I would like permission to offer it in evidence as Exhibit 111.

Copies have already been distributed to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The correspondence referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 111.")

[6654] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Mr. Chairman, in connection with the examination of Admiral Kimmel, his statement, which has been circulated and which he proposes to read here today, makes reference to a large number of documents and other evidence, much of which has already been offered in evidence as exhibits in this proceeding, but there are a large number of those documents referred to by Admiral Kimmel in his statement which are not in evidence yet as exhibits, and Admiral Kimmel and his counsel have prepared a compilation reciting in detail the dispatches and other material which are referred to in the footnotes to the statement which he proposes to read.

With possibly a very few exceptions, these documents that are set forth in this compilation are not yet in evidence, but there may be in a very few instances a duplication of exhibits that are already in evidence.

Inasmuch as this compilation would be of very great convenience to the committee in the examination of Admiral Kimmel's statement, we

¹ See Justice Roberts' testimony in Hearings, Part 7, pp. 8261-8303.

would like to present it and have it marked as an exhibit in order that the source authority which is contained in that compilation may be exhibitively before the committee for examination, subject, of course, to the understanding that if it should be hereafter found that there were any typographical or other reportorial errors in the compilation they can be corrected, as, of course, we [6655] have not had time to go over this entire compilation and compare word for word the copies here with the original.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the same document which has been distributed to the members of the committee?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right; it has been distributed to all members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be filed as Exhibit 112.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 112.")

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to the committee Admiral Kimmel, who has a statement that he desires to present to the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire what are the facts regarding the release of the previous confidential testimony of Admiral Kimmel. As I have had various inquiries with regard to that I want to know what the committee's records are in the matter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have this to say in answer to the inquiry that when the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel was collated we had it mimeographed. After consultation with my staff, I directed that it be given to the members of the committee, with a notation that we did not propose to release it until after Admiral Kimmel had made his statement on the stand.

The next I heard of it were the press notices, that indicated [6656] that the press had had access to one of those copies. Since none were issued by our office, it must have been that one of the copies that went to the members of the committee went to the press, concerning which the committee is as familiar as I am.

That is all the information I have.

Senator BREWSTER. Then there was exactly the treatment accorded the previous confidential testimony of Admiral Kimmel so far as the committee officially was concerned as was accorded to Admiral Stark and General Marshall, so far as your knowledge goes?

Mr. RICHARDSON. My associate advises me, as I understood the fact to be, that, we at no time, had a compilation of Admiral Stark's prior testimony. With reference to General Short, there was a compilation of his prior testimony and that, as I understood it, was released by the committee to the press direct, and it was because of that release that I thought it well not to release the Kimmel testimony until after Admiral Kimmel testified.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recalls that when General Short's prior testimony was distributed among the members of the committee, and also I think copies given to the press, it was stated here in the committee that so far as previous records were concerned, as I recall it, it might be released. That was not done, so far as I recall, in regard to Admiral [6657] Kimmel. The fact that it was done illustrates what probably was an error and an unfairness on the part of the committee in releasing General Short's testimony because it discounted in advance what he would say to this committee.

It seems to me that regardless of what happened in these prior instances, that prior testimony of witnesses ought not to be made available for publication until the witness goes on the stand.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be the rule hereafter so far as the Chair can control it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not quite clear. It looks to me as if there might be some confusion. I was wondering whether Senator Brewster was referring to the copies of the statement that Admiral Kimmel expects to make here today.

Senator BREWSTER. No; not at all. It was his prior evidence.

I am very glad to hear the statement of the Chairman in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Frankly, I was away last week and I haven't seen the newspaper reports about this prior testimony nor the editorials, which I understand were somewhat critical of the committee on account of it, but the committee is out to observe the rule that until a witness goes on the stand neither [6658] his statement to the committee now or previous testimony should be released for publication, because it inevitably discounts the testimony in advance. It is unfair to the committee and to the witness, too.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might make one further suggestion. If it should be determined by the committee, or a member of the committee, that such testimony should be released, and the committee should determine that it is to be released, if the committee's decision could be routed through me, I can then furnish to the members of the press copies of that testimony.

Now, our difficulty, one of them, has been to have quite a group of newspapermen descend on us and ask for copies of Kimmel's testimony because someone got a copy of his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. That illustrates the difficulty.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you be sworn.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)¹

The CHAIRMAN. You may be seated.

The Chair understands that you have a written statement which you desire to read to the committee.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, sir.

[6659] Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to announce before Admiral Kimmel begins his testimony that new counsel succeeding Mr. Mitchell and his assistant, Mr. Gesell, are here. Mr. Seth W. Richardson and associate counsel, Mr. Samuel H. Kaufman, of New York.

Now, you may proceed, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

This is the first opportunity I have had to speak to the representatives of the American people. I propose to give an account of my stewardship as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. My statement has four main parts.

¹Footnotes and subtitles throughout Admiral Kimmel's statement are his own.

In part I, I shall describe the Pacific Fleet in 1941, its base at Pearl Harbor, its assigned tasks under the war plans, its program of preparation for war, and the measures I took to provide for its readiness at sea and its security in port.

In part II, I shall set forth the information I had prior to the attack and my conclusions and actions based upon it.

In part III, I shall describe how the Pacific Fleet was deprived of a fighting chance to avert the disaster of December 7, 1941, because the Navy Department withheld information which indicated the probability of an attack at Pearl Harbor at the time it came.

[6660] In part IV, I shall outline previous investigations into the Pearl Harbor catastrophe.

Part I. The condition and activities of the Pacific Fleet in the year 1941.

I took command of the Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941. I had served for more than 40 years in the Navy. I entered the Naval Academy in 1900 and graduated in the class of 1904. I went around the world with the fleet in 1908 as a junior officer. During World War I I served on Admiral Rodman's staff. He was in command of the United States battleships operating with the British Grand Fleet. I commanded a destroyer division in the Asiatic Fleet, and did additional duty in the Philippines and China from 1923 to 1925.

After a tour of duty at the Naval War College and in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, I commanded a destroyer squadron in the Battle Fleet from 1928 to 1930.

I was Director of Ship Movements in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations from 1930 to 1933.

I commanded the battleship *New York* in 1933 and 1934, and during the next year served as chief of staff to Admiral Craven, commander, battleships of the fleet.

I was budget officer of the Navy Department from 1935 to 1938. As a rear admiral, I commanded a heavy cruiser division of the Scouting Force of the fleet in 1938.

[6661] I was type commander of the cruisers in the Battle Force in 1939. I held this position until I was appointed Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The facts as to my acquaintance with President Roosevelt are briefly stated. Six months after my appointment as Commander in Chief, and in June of 1941, I came to Washington on official business and called on the President. This was the first time that I had had any conversation or communication with him since 1918.

My appointment as Commander in Chief came as a complete surprise to me. My reactions at the time are stated in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 12, 1941:

When I got the news of my prospective assignment, I was perfectly stunned. I hadn't had any intimation that Richardson's relief was even being considered; and even had I known that his relief was being considered, I did not in my wildest dreams really think that I would get the job. Nevertheless, I am prepared to do everything I can when I take over on about the first of February.

When I assumed command, the decision to base the fleet in the Hawaiian area was an historical fact. The target and base facilities required to train the fleet for war were in the process of being moved from the west coast to Hawaii. The fleet had been practically

without gunnery practice for nearly a year due to the previous uncertainty as to the location of its base. Any further uncertainty would have delayed the availability of the mobile facilities to maintain, repair, and train the fleet. The resulting loss of time in starting intensive training would have been disastrous.

This was my view when I took command. My appointment was in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence on my part in a decision already made months before to keep the fleet in Hawaiian waters.

The fleet was not ready for war in 1940.¹ I set out to make it ready. This required an intensive training program. In carrying out this program, we were handicapped by the detachment, from time to time, of officers and men in large numbers to meet the demands of the expanding procurement and training agencies on shore, and the supply of trained personnel to man new ships.

My concern about this is reflected in my correspondence in 1941. On February 7, in an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, I stated:²

[6663] We are forced to operate our ships as they are and the number of men required to man them has been determined by the considered judgment of the best officers we have available. In view of the large numbers of men required for newly commissioned ships, both now and in the future, and in view of the fact that only at sea can men-of-warships be adequately trained, every seagoing ship should be filled to capacity now. In this connection it cannot be too strongly emphasized that stabilization of personnel, both officers and enlisted, will contribute more to the efficiency of the Fleet than any other single factor.

On February 16, 1941, I wrote to Admiral Nimitz, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now the Bureau of Personnel, that:³—

I realize in some degree the necessity for the services of competent personnel under the Bureau of Ordnance. I am, however, faced with a very real situation here in the Fleet. During the past year the detachment of so many competent officers has reduced the number of experienced officers remaining in ships of the Fleet to such a point that I consider it dangerous to make further considerable reductions in our best officer personnel at this time. The Fleet is [6664] just now recovering from the heavy officer personnel shake-up which it has experienced.

While I appreciate to some extent the deficiencies of the Bureau of Ordnance and the urgent necessity to remedy them, I must sound a note of warning that we cannot spare any considerable number of qualified officers from the Fleet without assuming an enormous risk. The condition of the Fleet now and in the near future may well be of much greater importance to the nation than the production of a two-ocean Navy by 1946.

While on this subject of personnel, I would like to add that the continued detachment of qualified officers and enlisted men renders it next to impossible for the ships to reach the high state of efficiency demanded by a campaign. This Fleet must be kept ready to fight, and that is impossible unless we stabilize the personnel to a much greater degree than has been done in the past. * * *

On March 3, 1941, Admiral Nimitz, in reply to my letter wrote:⁴

* * * Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance [6665] problems through the administration of the Lend-Lease bill is the task of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormous—almost astronomical—quantities of ordnance supplies for the British Navy and any Allies which may survive to fight

(See footnote 1, p. 2497, supra.)

¹ Record testimony Admiral Richardson, p. 777.

² CINC file, P16-3/(0217).

³ Personal letter to Admiral Nimitz, Feb. 16, 1941.

⁴ See file letters Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel.

the dictators. I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance plants that are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch the manufacture of various items of ordnance * * *

Admiral Nimitz pointed out that these conditions made it necessary to detach trained officer personnel from the fleet.

In addition, the aviation expansion program required that trained aviation personnel from the fleet be sent to the mainland to train others. For example, we were required to send from the fleet to the mainland 12 trained patrol plane crews each month. In the same letter Admiral Nimitz stated:

The situation regarding aviators is not unlike that of Ordnance P. G.'s. In order to build up our aviation we must of necessity have the services of qualified aviators to get all our air training stations going. We know the new aviation officers lack a great deal in being ready to serve the Fleet when they first report, and we also know you will do your best to provide the additional training and [6666] experience needed.

The naval expansion program required the fleet to supply large numbers of trained officer and enlisted personnel to man the new ships. The building and procurement program for all classes of naval vessels and material also required naval personnel from the fleet for inspection and supervisory duties.

[6667] The detachment of trained officer and enlisted personnel continued until December 7, 1941. The corresponding need for training new personnel continued. Because of this situation, the manpower needs of the fleet were never satisfied. In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 15, 1941 I wrote:

This Fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize an additional 10,000.

More than 50 percent of the officers of the fleet were newly commissioned reserve officers. With constantly changing personnel, both officers and enlisted men, and the induction of new personnel, there were times when 70 percent of the men on board individual ships had never heard a gun fired. Training and target practice were imperatively needed for every ship's crew and every plane's crew. The men and officers who were detailed to the engine room, to the guns, to the radio, to the ship control, to the lookouts, to the electrical installations, to the fire control for the guns, to the signals, to the commissary, and numerous other billets, had to be trained before they were competent. Unless they were trained, the most modern equipment was useless. Break-down or insufficiency in any category might well be very costly in time of war.

There were other factors that made the training activities of vital importance. In addition to individual ship training I had to provide for coordinated training of ships, divisions, and squadrons as part of the fleet as a whole. New weapons and new techniques were an every-day product of the war in Europe. New methods had to be devised, tested, and perfected to meet new threats. For instance, the antiaircraft defense of large formations had to be improved to meet possible Japanese air tactics in the event of war. Our previous training, chiefly dictated by safety considerations, had been largely confined to individual ship practices in defense against individual attacks. It was now necessary to develop means and methods of countering mass attacks by coordinated fire, in maximum volume, [6668]

from as many ships as could bring their guns to bear with reasonable prospect of hitting the target and allowing for acceptable hazards to other ships.

Again, the advent of radar with all of its implications, particularly the necessity for wide extension of existing communication channels required to take full advantage of its latent possibilities, posed an entirely new problem for which no solution was to be found in past experience. We had to visualize and set up new situations in order even to indicate a solution. It was only through wide experience, covering a period of months and crowding in as much work as possible, that the new apparatus could be utilized to its fullest potential. [6669] We were handicapped by the few ships equipped with this device, making it all the more important that advantage be taken of every opportunity that could be stolen from the few days or weeks that might remain to us prior to actual hostilities.

Radar, also, gave promise of completely revolutionizing the art of night warfare. This possibility was especially important as it was known that the Japanese attached great importance to night action. Measures, such as steaming and maneuvering in complete darkness in large and complex formations, with abridged accent on safety, had to be perfected. Most of this program was, for us, experimental, because large-scale and complicated maneuvering at night was new to our Navy.

In addition to all this, we needed all the time we could get to try out and perfect the operations we had set up for the opening phases of the war, if it came, against Japan. These operations, too, were largely new and untried, and handicapped by lack of facilities and personnel, particularly in the case of amphibious landings. These exercises gave birth to the Fast Carrier Task Force, later found so effective in the prosecution of the war.

Our training activities were not just routine training or peacetime training. They were intensified training activities [6670] indispensable to the creation of fighting efficiency in the fleet.

At the same time the ships needed substantial repair and maintenance work. We had before us, and I believe I accomplished, the task of preparing practically every ship to a high degree of material readiness. The engines and motive equipment were overhauled and retuned. The ship's crew engaged in many tasks of installation, repair, and alteration to the limit of their ability while in port. This included the installation of splinter protection, degaussing, the installation of listening gear, and in general, the application to the fleet so far as the supplies were available, of the lessons of war in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. On April 4, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations advised me by dispatch "to strip ship in accordance with orders."⁵ This operation alone consumed considerable time for every ship in port.

On May 26, 1941, the Navy Department promulgated its Basic War Plan. This plan set forth the Navy's tasks under the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan which had been drawn up after staff conversations with the British in February and March of 1941.

In February and March of 1941 Great Britain and the United States had staff conversations. The report of these conversations un-

⁵ Dispatch, Op.Nav to CinCPac, April 4, 1941, 041700.

der date of March 27, 1941, bore the short title [6671] "ABC-1."⁶ On the basis of these, the Army and Navy prepared the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan. This joint plan was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the Secretary of War on June 2, 1941. It bore the short title "Rainbow No. 5."⁷ On the basis of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan the Navy Department promulgated the Navy Basic War Plan on May 26, 1941. This plan bore the short title "W PL-46."⁸ The Pacific Fleet was directed to prepare its own war plan supporting the Basic Navy War Plan. This was done. The War Plan of the Pacific Fleet was distributed on July 25, 1941⁹ and thereafter, on September 9, 1941, approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.¹⁰ This plan bore the short title, "WPPac-46."

The Joint Army-Navy War Plan primarily emphasized the defeat of Germany. Admiral R. K. Turner, war plans officer for the Chief of Naval Operations in 1941, in his testimony before Admiral Hart described these objectives of the War Plan in these words:¹¹

The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the principal Associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period this matter was discussed and it was [6672] determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe. We felt that it was incumbent on our side to defeat Germany, to launch our principal efforts against Germany first, and to conduct a limited offensive in the Central Pacific, and a strictly defensive effort in the Asiatic.

In accordance with this statement of principles, the Basic War Plan of the Army and Navy, Rainbow No. 5, provided in section 4, paragraph 13 (a):

Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

Again, section 4, paragraph 13 (d) of the plan provided:

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not [6673] intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malasia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

The following tasks were assigned the United States Pacific Fleet in section one, paragraph 3212 of the Navy Basic War Plan, W. P. L. 46:

a. TASK

Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of

⁶ Exhibit 49.

⁷ Official letter CNO to CinCPac, April 3, 1941, serial 088612.

⁸ Official letter CND, May 26, 1941, Serial 060512.

⁹ Official letter CinCPac, July 25, 1941, Serial 063W.

¹⁰ Official letter CNO to CinCPac, September 9, 1941, Serial 088912.

¹¹ Hart testimony, Admiral R. K. Turner, pp. 251, 252, question 10.

positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

b. TASK

Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced Fleet Base in Truk;

c. TASK

Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or [6674] destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

d. TASK

Support British Naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° east;

e. TASK

Defend Samoa in Category "D";

f. TASK

Defend Guam in Category "F";

g. TASK

Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);

h. TASK

Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;

i. TASK

Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces;

[6675] j. TASK

Establish Fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;

k. TASK

Route shipping of Associated Powers within the Fleet control zones.

These tasks were to be carried out in "the Pacific area." The Pacific area included the ocean areas from the coast of North America and north of the Equator to a line extending to the westward of the Marianas up to latitude 30 north, where the area was extended to include the reaches of the ocean all the way to the Asiatic Continent and from about 700 miles off the coast of South America south of the Equator, to a short distance from the Australian coast.

I changed the wording to make it a little more accurate, that is all.

It was this vast expanse which I had to consider the prospective theater of operations for my forces. It was in this area that the Pacific Fleet was to divert enemy strength by the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, destroy Axis sea communications, and protect the territory of the associated powers. To build the fleet into a fighting machine capable of meeting these assigned tasks, and to solve the manifold problems of supply and logistics required considerable planning. [6676]

It became apparent soon after I took command that the existing organization of the United States Fleet was not a proper one to meet the tasks which would be required in a Pacific war. Early in 1941, therefore, the vessels of the Pacific Fleet were reorganized into three task forces, including one fast carrier task force, one amphibious task force and one battleship task force. In their operations at sea, these task forces were operated under wartime conditions. Fueling at sea, a requirement for long-range operations, was stressed.

The operating schedule was so arranged that there was always at least one of these task forces, and usually two, at sea. Frequently during fleet maneuvers the entire fleet was at sea. Periods in port were of course necessary for all ships. At no time during 1941 were all of the ships of the fleet in Pearl Harbor.

It was recognized that the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet in every category of fighting ship.¹² No one in authority expected that the Pacific Fleet could meet the Japanese head on.

Admiral King's official report, Our Navy at War, transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy on March 27, 1944, completely dispelled previous public misconceptions about the strength of the Pacific Fleet prior to Pearl Harbor. Admiral [6677] King stated:

Had we not suffered these losses (at Pearl Harbor), however, our fleet could not have proceeded to Manila as many people supposed and there relieved our hard pressed forces. Such an undertaking at that time, with the means at hand to carry it out and support it, would have been disastrous.

Japan, at the outbreak of hostilities, had nine aircraft carriers in commission and operating. We had three carriers in the Pacific and those did not have their full quota of planes.¹³ Although the battle-ships of the fleet were all approximately the same age as the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy, our ships were particularly deficient in short-range antiaircraft weapons.

The fuel problem affected every decision. At this time both the reserve stocks in the Hawaiian area and the facilities for getting fuel from storage tanks into combatant ships were not adequate. The Pacific Fleet had only 11 tankers. Of these, only four had the speed and mixed-cargo characteristics suitable for fueling other ships at sea. It required from 24 to 36 hours to refuel a task force in Pearl Harbor. Shortly after I organized the fleet in three major task forces, I attempted to keep two of the three forces at sea and only one in Pearl Harbor. I quickly found that fuel deliveries were [6678] falling behind consumption. The reserves were being depleted at a time when it was imperative to increase them. It was this fact, and this alone, which made it necessary to have two task forces simultaneously in Pearl Harbor at certain periods. It was not advisable, unless an attack on Pearl Harbor was known to be imminent, to keep the fleet at sea and fuel it by sending detachments into Pearl Harbor at night even if there had been adequate fuel reserves in port. Operations at sea would have been then restricted to a small area. The increase in submarine risk would have been unjustified.

A destroyer at full power exhausts its fuel in 30 to 40 hours, at medium speed in 4 to 6 days. War experience has proven the necessity of fueling destroyers every third day, and heavy ships about every fifth day to keep a fighting reserve on board. To have kept the entire fleet at sea for long periods would have required not 11 tankers but approximately 75, with at least one-third of them equipped for under-way delivery. I did not have adequate reserves. There were no facilities for delivering stored reserves to the ships at a rate which would permit fueling more than about one-fourth of the fleet in any one 24-hour day or one-eighth of it in any one period of darkness. To keep the fleet at sea and exhaust our resources; only to find that such expenditures were unnecessary, or, still worse, to have the entire fleet short of fuel [6679] when action was joined, were contingencies too grave to be accepted on indefinite information or conjecture.

¹² See Joint Memorandum, Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, November 5, 1941, exhibit 16.

¹³ See exhibit 86, also Record, p. 4840, also personal letter Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, August 22, 1941.

We had one newly commissioned Navy troop transport in the Pacific and a handful of partially trained marines at San Diego. These, with the marines stationed at Pearl Harbor and the outlying islands, constituted our landing force.

On May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote me that he had "an over-all limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores." In connection with this proposed expedition in May and June of 1941, practically all the trained and equipped marines on the west coast, several small transports, and some other small craft were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic.¹⁴ They were never returned.

In April and May of 1941, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 battleships, 4 cruisers, and 18 destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic.¹⁵ In a letter to me on April 19, 1941, Admiral Stark advised me of this proposed transfer. He described the fleet units to be detached as "the first echelon of the Battle of the Atlantic." He added: "I am telling you; not arguing with you." This transfer took away approximately one-fourth of the fighting ships of the Pacific Fleet and resulted in a striking reduction in its power. The details of the transfer must have [6680] been quickly known in Japan.

When I was in Washington in June 1941, it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detachment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer was not made.

The tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet under the War Plans indicate that it was not based in the Hawaiian area for the sole purpose of defending Pearl Harbor. The War Plans required fleet action far from the Hawaiian Islands. They did not contemplate that the resources of the fleet were to be devoted exclusively or even primarily for the defense of Hawaii.

A naval base exists primarily for the support of the fleet. The Naval Court of Inquiry, in paragraph VIII of its findings, states:

A naval base exists solely for the support of the Fleet. The fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the Base, or for that of the vessels within its limits * * *. To superimpose upon these essentials the further requirement that the seagoing personnel shall have the additional respon- [6681] sibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent Naval Base, is to challenge a fundamental concept of naval warfare.

This principle has long been recognized by both the Army and the Navy. In the "Joint Action Army and Navy, 1935" the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was vested in the Army. That specifically provided:

Strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. The Fleet must have no anxiety in regard to the security of its base.

When I took command of the fleet, the exchange of letters between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy¹⁶ indicated that

¹⁴ Dispatch, OPNAV to CinCPac, May 24, 1941, 242180.

¹⁵ See dispatch, OPNAV to CinCPAC, May 18, 1941, 182019; CinCPac to OPNAV, May 15, 1941, 180625.

¹⁶ Exhibit 10.

the provisions of the agreement would be carried out and that existing deficiencies in the defense of Pearl Harbor would be corrected. However, it was never my disposition to assume that high echelon agreements or correspondence were panaceas. At all times in 1941 I was concerned with the security of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor. I did everything within my power to strengthen and improve the base defense.

Pearl Harbor was the only refueling, replacement, and repair point for ships operating in the Hawaiian area. Lahaina Roads off the Hawaiian Island of Maui could not be used as an operating base. About a month before I took command, Admiral Richardson issued orders that no ship was to be anchored [6682] at Lahaina because it was not safe against submarine attack. I agreed with and continued those orders in effect.

Pearl Harbor had but one entrance. Because of the topography of the island and the narrowness of the channel, the capital ships were obliged to move in and out in single file. We had frequent training in this maneuver even at night under war conditions without lights. To complete a sortie of the fleet required at least 3 hours. The danger that the channel would be blocked was always present.

The defense of such a base before the outbreak of hostilities is quite different from its defense in war.

During hostilities, when the fleet is not required to wait until the potential enemy commits the first overt act, our own offensive operations protect the base.

Pearl Harbor was included within an area defined as the Hawaiian coastal frontier in annex 1, page 9, Joint Army and Navy War Plan, Rainbow 5.¹⁷ The defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, which included Oahu and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu, was entrusted by this plan to the commanders of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, who were designated as follows:¹⁸

Army—The Commanding General Hawaii Department

Navy—The Commandant, 14th Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier [6683] tier. This officer also commands the assigned Naval local defense force and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

The local naval-base defense forces under the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District were negligible. On October 17, 1941, the commandant wrote requesting the Navy Department to send a number of small fast craft, equipped with listening gear and depth charges, and two squadrons of patrol planes. He said:¹⁹

The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, is the USS *Sacramento* which has no batteries, to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run.

I forwarded the commandant's letter with the following endorsement:²⁰

There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the United

¹⁷ Exhibit 44, item 3, p. 3.

¹⁸ Exhibit 44, item 3, p. 3.

¹⁹ Official letter Com 14 to CNO, October 17, 1941, ND 14 (01084). See exhibit 46, Naval Court of Inquiry.

²⁰ COMINCH 1st endorsement to Com 14 letter A16-1/ND 14. See exhibit 46, Naval Court of Inquiry.

States Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its base by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its [6664] security at sea is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can possibly be made available. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs.

The commanders of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, General Short, and Admiral Bloch, had no means to conduct distant air reconnaissance from the island of Oahu. The War Department had allocated on paper 180 flying fortresses to the Hawaiian Department. General Short had only 12 of these planes in Hawaii prior to the attack of which but 6 were in flying condition.

The Navy Department had allocated on paper one-hundred-odd patrol planes to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. He never received a single patrol plane.

As a consequence, the base defense against air attack was predicated on borrowing Fleet patrol planes for distant searches. Under the war plans these fleet patrol planes were ear-marked for operations with the fleet thousands of miles from Hawaii when war broke out. Their primary mission was always connected with fleet operations. They were frequently based on the outlying islands—Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. [6685] They had to train with the fleet and search areas in which the fleet operated. Under these circumstances, they were available for distant search from Oahu, only when and if the fleet did not need them for its own operations, actual or impending. They were not at any time sufficient in number to conduct distant searches from Pearl Harbor as a regular routine.

The local defense plan against air attack, submitted to the War and Navy Departments, clearly provided that effective distant air reconnaissance from Oahu could not be made as a routine matter. It was only to be instituted when there was information from other sources that a carrier strike against the islands was probable within narrow time limits.²¹ This was a makeshift plan, but none better was possible with the means at hand.

The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District wrote letters to the Chief of Naval Operations on December 30, 1940,²² May 7, 1941,²³ and October 17, 1941* pointing out that he had no planes and that he needed planes. Each of his letters was strongly and favorably endorsed by the Commander in Chief of the Fleet. On November 25, 1941, 2 weeks before the attack, the Chief of Naval Operations informed the Commandant:²⁴

The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become available [6686] in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops.

Under my standing orders I placed the guns of the fleet at the disposal of the local anti-aircraft defense. My Security Order 2 CL 41²⁵

²¹ Exhibit 44, item 8, p. 4.

²² Letter from Com 14 to CNO, December 30, 1940, ND 14 (629), exhibit 28, Naval Court of Inquiry.

²³ Letter from Com. 14 to CNO, May 7, 1941, exhibit 41, Naval Court of Inquiry (ND 14).

²⁴ See footnote 20.

²⁵ CNO to CinCPAC and Com 14, November 25, 1941, serial 0185412.

²⁶ Exhibit 44, item 12.

prescribed a plan for berthing ships in sectors to develop in each sector the maximum antiaircraft fire. I designated the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District Naval Base Defense Officer because he was permanently stationed in Pearl Harbor and would always be familiar with local conditions. I delegated to him the duty of advising the Senior Officer Present Afloat (exclusive of the Commander in Chief), what condition of readiness to maintain in the ships in port. This was a flexible system designed to use the fleet's resources in port in the base defense.

In addition, I issued standing orders for all ships that ammunition for all antiaircraft guns, 5", 3", 1.1 and 50 caliber, be kept available in the ready ammunition boxes at the guns at all times, day and night. These orders also required that there be on board at all times a sufficient number of trained personnel to man completely all the guns of the antiaircraft battery. All double bottom and lower deck compartments of the ships in harbor were to be kept closed except when work required they be temporarily opened. No higher state of material readiness could long be continued without serious [6687] reduction in the morale and physical condition of men and the accomplishment of necessary work on the ships.

At the time of the attack, the orders in effect required that one-fourth to one-half of the antiaircraft guns, depending upon the type of ships, be manned at all times in port. At the time of the attack the guns were so manned. Admiral Inglis has testified that on the morning of the attack all the antiaircraft batteries on all the ships were manned and firing within 4 to 7 minutes.²⁶ The men of the fleet on December 7, 1941, made the transition from peace to war with speed and courage.

[6638] I might add that immediately after that attack I was informed that in the first flight of torpedo planes, the ships shot down three out of the first flight, and I have never seen that contradicted.

In his letter to the Secretary of War on January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy listed an air torpedo plane attack as one of the possible forms of hostile action against Pearl Harbor. Subsequently, the Chief of Naval Operations forwarded to the Fleet and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, detailed technical advice which practically eliminated from consideration an air torpedo plane attack as a serious danger to ships moored in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor.

The depth of water in Pearl Harbor is 30 feet or less, except in the channels where it was generally 40 feet. The Chief of Naval Operations on February 15, 1941, wrote to me on the subject of anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks on Pearl Harbor stating:²⁷

Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T (antitorpedo) baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attack. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles * * *

[6689] * * * A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is

²⁶ Record, p. 124.

²⁷ Official letter, CNO to ClnCPac, February 15, 1941, Serial 09330, exhibit 49, Naval Court of Inquiry.

250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. The desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed but this may be altered.

In the same letter he underlined the fact that the depths of water in which torpedoes were launched in the successful attacks at Taranto were between 14 and 15 fathoms; that is, 84 to 90 feet of water. A letter of similar tenor was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandants of various naval districts, including the 14th Naval District.²⁸

On June 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter on the same subject to the commandants of the various naval districts, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District a copy of which was sent to me.²⁹ After reading this letter, my staff and I, as well as the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, believed that the danger of a successful airplane torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was negligible.

[6690] The Naval Court of Inquiry concluded that the torpedoes launched by the Japanese in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor constituted, in effect, a secret weapon in the category of the robot bomb, which was unknown to the best professional opinion in Great Britain and the United States at the time.³⁰ The Secretary, in his endorsement to that report, stated that the Navy Department had information from British sources that aircraft torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water in the year 1940. Such information was never supplied to me.

In any event, the Navy Department apparently decided that torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor were not required and exhibited no concern at their absence.

In his letter to me of February 15, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations stated, in effect, that existing torpedo nets were so cumbersome that their installation in Pearl Harbor would interfere with the movement of ships and the ability of the Fleet to get away on short notice. He stated:

There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protective harbors and which can be readily removed.

[6691] The fleet did not have facilities in Hawaii to manufacture anti-torpedo nets or baffles. If the light efficient net described by the Chief of Naval Operations was ever developed by the Navy Department in 1941, we never heard of it or received it. Admiral King, in his endorsement to the record of the Naval Court tersely stated:

The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department.

My relations with General Short, which were once the subject of considerable confusion in the public mind, have now been clarified by exhaustive investigations. The committee has all the evidence on this subject. I need not labor it. It has been established that our official and social relations were friendly, that we frequently conferred on official matters of common interest and invariably did so when either

²⁸ CNO to several commandants, February 17, 1941, Serial 010230, exhibit 54, Naval Court of Inquiry.

²⁹ CNO to several commandants, June 13, 1941, Serial 055730, exhibit 55, Naval Court of Inquiry.

³⁰ Naval Court of Inquiry, finding XV.

of us received messages which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on our several plans in preparing for war. As the Naval Court of Inquiry summarized the matter:³¹

Each was mindful of his own responsibility and of the responsibilities vested in the other. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes.

[6692] General Short and I were not "opposite numbers" in the sense that our total concerns and duties were coextensive. The responsibilities of the fleet under war plans were far flung and offensive. Those of the Hawaiian Department were local and defensive. Because I was interested in the security of the fleet and the Hawaiian Islands I gave General Short all the assistance I could, even in connection with local defensive measures which were exclusively under the Army's control. The Aircraft Warning Service is a case in point. I took Army personnel to sea with the fleet so that they could be trained as radar operators. I assigned to the Army a naval officer who had experience in Britain with radar to give any advice and assistance he could in connection with the aircraft warning net in Hawaii. General Short informed me his radar was operating and could give a 100-mile coverage. In joint Army-Navy drills it did perform satisfactorily. In the period before December 7 I was informed that the Army's radar was manned. It was so manned. It was only the day before the attack that some subordinate Army officer gave the permission to shut down at 7 a. m. on Sunday. Even despite this, one of the stations was operating after 7 a. m. on the morning of December 7, and obtained information both about the incoming and outgoing planes. This information was not passed on to the Navy.

[6693] My relations with my staff, Task Force Commanders and senior flag officers were excellent. This is another subject dealt with exhaustively in the testimony of previous investigations now before the committee. My staff was composed of superior officers whose records in the war have demonstrated their abilities. I was accessible to them. We had full and frank discussions about the various decisions which it was my responsibility to make. The so-called "war warning" dispatch I also discussed with the senior task force commanders, Admiral Pye, commander of Task Force 1; Admiral Halsey, commander of Task Force 2; Admiral Brown, commander of Task Force 3; Admiral Calhoun, commander, base force; and Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

I did not personally show that dispatch to or discuss it with Admiral Newton or Admiral Bellinger. The orders sending Admiral Newton to Midway were issued by me to Admiral Brown, who was in command of Task Force 3,³² and under whom Admiral Newton served. Admirals Newton and Brown conferred before the former set out to Midway.³³ Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions. As for Admiral Bellinger, he served directly under Admirals Bloch and [6694] Brown, who were familiar with all important developments. I was fully aware of the conditions in Admiral

³¹ Naval Court of Inquiry, finding IV.

³² Secret dispatch, CinCPac to COMTASKFOR 3, COM 14, December 4, 1941, 040237.

³³ Hart investigation, testimony Admiral Newton, p. 320, question 45.

Bellinger's patrol plane force, knew and had approved his schedule of operations. Had I seen any need for him to change his course of action, I would have issued orders to him to that effect directly.

A description of the measures I took for the security of fleet units at sea remains to be given. The Naval Court of Inquiry has described them as follows: ³⁴

The task forces operating at sea were screened defensively by aircraft and destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night, ammunition was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Watertight integrity was maintained, horizon and surface battle lookouts were kept posted, the ships steamed darkened at night, and the use of the radio was restricted to a minimum.

The court concluded:

It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security of his fleet while at sea were adequate and effective.

In summary, the Pacific Fleet in 1941 established and maintained the highest degree of security measures at sea and in port consistent with our assigned mission of intensive [6695] preparation for war. We had our difficulties with shifting personnel and an exposed and inadequately defended base. We had much to do in preparing a fleet then unready for war. We were proud of having a hard job to do. Admiral Hewitt, in his report to the Secretary, made this finding which has never been made public.³⁵

Throughout his incumbency as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for War * * *.

We maintained as a regular procedure a high state of daily alertness which, with a very short time, could be intensified to deal with a particular hazard when and if it developed. We needed one thing which our own resources could not make available to us. That vital need was the information available in Washington from the intercepted dispatches which told when and where Japan would probably strike. I did not get this information.

PART II—INFORMATION RECEIVED AND ACTION TAKEN

In this part of my statement, I shall describe the information available to me prior to the attack and the actions which I took upon the basis of that information. [6696] I shall deal with the following topics:

First, the information furnished to me by the Navy Department, prior to October 16, 1941;

Second, the dispatches sent to me by the Navy Department from October 16, 1941, to and including November 27, 1941;

Third, the meaning of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, and related information;

Fourth, my decisions and actions from November 27 to the time of the attack.

1. *Information and dispatches, January–October 1941.*—In February 1941, when I became commander in chief, I was somewhat familiar with the tense situation in the Pacific. During the year 1941 I received dispatches and letters from the Chief of Naval Operations

³⁴ Naval Court of Inquiry, finding X.

³⁵ Hewitt report, conclusion 25, p. 779.

which might be broadly described as "war warnings." On January 21, 1941, he sent a dispatch to the commander in chief¹ which stated:

The international situation continues to deteriorate. It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my memorandum to the Secretary. If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to plan RAINBOW THREE with following modifications Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute all tasks except affirm [6697] expect early reenforcement from Pacific and much stronger British Isles detachment. Pacific Fleet waiting attitude or execute assigned tasks in Area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan. Asiatic Fleet cannot expect early reenforcement alert status or carry out tasks according to circumstances.

On February 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch from the United States naval attaché in London which stated:²

I have been officially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offensive on a large scale presumed against Indo-China Malay Peninsula or the Dutch East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approximately February 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming more intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the British even in ordinarily pro-English press also two large Japanese merchant vessels sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state that all Jap shipping being called home to be taken over by the government. Request your knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating Thai Indo China scene meeting abroad Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases on the west coast of Siam [6698] that are usable by light craft for cutting Singapore communications via the Malacca Straits.

On July 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch which stated:³

The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. However, CNO holds the opinion that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of Naval, Army and Air bases in Indo-China * * *.

The dispatch predicted that Japan's major military effort would be against Russian maritime provinces. It also stated that all Japanese vessels in United States Atlantic ports had been ordered to be west of the Panama Canal by the 1st of August.

On July 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me another dispatch.⁴ This reported that the Japanese Government had issued orders that certain Japanese vessels in the North Atlantic and Caribbean areas pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific. Under these orders all Nipponese [6699] merchant vessels would be clear of the Caribbean and North Atlantic areas by July 22. It related information from unusually reliable Chinese sources that within two weeks Japan would abrogate the neutrality treaty with Russia and attack. The dispatch concluded as follows:

That present strength and deployment of Nip Army in Manchuria is defensive and the present distribution of the Japanese Fleet appears normal, and *that is capable of movement either north or south*. That a definite move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 20-August 1 is indicated by the foregoing. [Italics supplied.]

¹ Dispatch CNO to CInCUS, January 21, 1941, 212155.

² Dispatch ALUSNA, London to Opnav, February 3, 1941, 081400, passed to CInCUS as OPNAV 032300.

³ Exhibit 37, p. 4.

⁴ Exhibit 37, p. 5.

On July 25, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch in which the Chief of Staff joined.⁵ This advised that on July 25 the United States would employ economic sanctions against Japan. It stated in part:

* * * The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff do not anticipate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. This dispatch is [6700] to be kept secret except from immediate Army and Navy subordinates. * * *

In addition to these dispatches the Chief of Naval Operations' letters to me show recurrent tension in the international situation during 1941. His letters use such expressions as:

What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess. (Memorandum of May 14, 1941.)

An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941, "Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual." (July 31, 1941.)

* * * Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate. (August 21, 1941.)

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender. (August 28, 1941.)

P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying *that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse.* (September 23, 1941.)

None of these letters or dispatches warned of an attack in the Hawaiian area, or indicated that an attack there was imminent or probable. None of these letters or dispatches [6701] directed an alert in the Hawaiian area against an overseas attack.

On the contrary, on February 1, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me on the subject of "Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor."⁶

He stated that Mr. Grew had telegraphed the State Department on January 27, 1941:

The Peruvian minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless, he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff.

The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations added:

The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, *no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.* [Italic supplied.]

[6702] This estimate as to the improbability of a move against Pearl Harbor was never withdrawn.

Consider my situation as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet at the time I received, by letter and dispatch, these ominous predictions of Japanese aggression in the Far East.

⁵ Exhibit 37, p. 14.

⁶ Exhibit 15.

I was carrying out an intensive training program to prepare the fleet for war. I was under specific injunction to continue that program. In an official letter to me on April 31, 1941 (Serial 038612), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote:

In the meantime I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war.

[6703] On November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch stating that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that, in his opinion, an aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam was a possibility.⁷ Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he did not intend that the Pacific Fleet should discontinue its training program upon receipt of this dispatch, 2 weeks before the attack.⁸

I was not expected to discontinue training for all-out security measures, concentrated on the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, every time an alarming dispatch was received from Washington predicting Japanese aggression in the Far East. Indeed, had I done so, the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the fleet could not have been prepared for war.

During the time these dispatches were sent, the Navy Department knew just what my program in Hawaii was. My fleet-operating schedules were filed with the Navy Department,⁹ [6704] where the location and movement of substantially every ship in the fleet was known at all times. No dispatch or letter contained any order or suggestion for departure from my operating schedules. On May 24, 1941, the Navy Department sent me the following dispatch.¹⁰

The Department in the interest of morale will consider visits of small detachments or individual ships to the Pacific Coast. *It is not desired that detachments of such size make these visits as to indicate the breaking up or reducing the Hawaiian concentration.* Your recommendations are requested. [Italics supplied.]

When the War and Navy Departments wishes to put the forces in Hawaii on alert against attack, they could and did use appropriate language to that end. The dispatch of June 17, 1940, from the War Department to the Hawaiian garrison demonstrated this. That dispatch stated:¹¹

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff [6705] be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

In reply to Admiral Richardson's dispatch reporting the actions taken by the fleet forces to cooperate with the Army in maintaining the "alert", the Navy Department directed him to continue such cooperation.¹²

⁷ Exhibit 37, p. 32.

⁸ Naval Court of Inquiry. Testimony of Admiral Stark, questions Nos. 142, 404, and 405.

⁹ CinCPac file No. A4-3/FF12/(18), Serial 01254, August 18, 1941, received OpNav September 3, 1941.

¹⁰ Dispatch OpNav to CinCPac, 24 May 1941, 242150.

¹¹ Exhibit 52, p. 1.

¹² Record, vol. 17, pp. 2779-2781.

It is one thing to warn commanders at a particular base of the probable outbreak of war in theaters thousands of miles away, knowing and expecting that they will continue their assigned tasks and missions after the receipt of such warning, and that the very nature of the warning emphasizes to them the necessity for continuing such tasks and missions.

It is quite another thing to warn commanders at a particular base of an attack to be expected in their own locality.

In 1941, we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premonitions, of generalized warnings and forebodings that Japan might embark on aggressive action in the Far East at any one of the variously predicted dates. After receipt of such warnings, we were expected to continue with renewed intensity and zeal our own training program and preparations for war rather than to go on an all-out local alert against attack.

[6706] In the year 1941, the international situation was grave and, at times, tense. However, preparing the fleet for war through an intensive training program had to go on. There was a vital element of timing involved in determining when the fleet should curtail training for all-out war measures. Maximum security measures, consistent with the maintenance of the training program, were already in effect in the fleet. When would Japanese-American relations reach the point that all training should cease and all-out war dispositions should be made? This was what we needed to know in the Pacific in the year 1941.

Throughout 1941, the Navy Department had several courses open. It could furnish me directly with the best evidence of Japanese intentions and plans—the intercepted Japanese military and diplomatic messages. This would have given me an opportunity to judge for myself the gravity and intensity of the crisis as December 7, 1941, approached, and the probability of a Japanese attack on Hawaii. The Navy Department failed to do this. The Navy Department did not permit me to evaluate for myself the intercepted Japanese military and diplomatic messages.

Another course of action then remained. That was to issue an order which would have directed dispositions of the fleet to guard against an attack in Hawaii. The message [6707] of June 17, 1940, "be on the alert against hostile overseas raid," was such an order. It would have had the same effect in December of 1941 as it had in June of 1940. Such an order was not given.

Further, the War and Navy Departments could have ordered the local commanders of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Admiral Bloch and General Short, to execute the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. This was not done.

The Navy Department could have given the order to mobilize under the War Plan. This order would have had a definite meaning. It would have placed the fleet on an all-out war basis. The order to mobilize did not authorize acts of war.¹³ The dispatch of January 21, 1941, indicated that mobilization would be ordered when war was imminent.¹⁴ The order to mobilize was not given.

¹³ Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, ch. II, sec. 2, sections 0221, 0222, 0223.

¹⁴ Dispatch CNO to CinCUS, January 21, 1941, 212155, "If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to Rainbow Three with following modifications. * * *

In the dispatches I received on and after October 16, 1941, I was not given available information as to the actual status of Japanese-American negotiations and as to Japanese military plans; nor was I given orders for alert against an attack on Hawaii. These dispatches had the same tenor as the warnings which had previously been sent in February, June, and July 1941 predicting probable Japanese action [6708] thousands of miles from the Hawaiian area.

2. *Dispatches from October 16, 1941, to and including November 27, 1941*—On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the commanders in chief, Atlantic, Asiatic, and Pacific Fleets, the following dispatch:¹⁵

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U. S.

In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The term "preparatory deployments" used in this dispatch is non-technical. It has no especial significance other than [6709] its natural meaning. After receiving this dispatch, I made certain preparatory deployments. I ordered submarines to assume a war patrol off both Wake and Midway.¹⁶ I reinforced Johnston and Wake, with additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island. I ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands. He did so and reported his action to me.¹⁷

I placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in west coast ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a west coast navy yard. I dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island,¹⁸ and placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating areas.

On October 22, I reported by letter all these dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations.

[6710] I might say I summarized all these movements in a letter and the reports had previously been made in movement reports.

By letter dated November 7, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations specifically approved these dispositions. He wrote:

OK on the dispositions which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet.

The naval court of inquiry found:

He (Admiral Kimmel) did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his Staff, all experienced officers of long service and sought by every means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the information at hand.

¹⁵ Exhibit 37, p. 18.

¹⁶ Dispatch, CinCPac to ComSubSecFor 170354 and 170426, October 17, 1941.

¹⁷ Dispatch, CinCPac to Com14, 170319, October 17, 1941, and dispatch Com14 to CinCPac 170356.

¹⁸ Dispatch, CinCPac to Compatwing 2, 170429, October 17, 1941.

In the dispatch of October 16, 1941, I was advised that there was a possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great Britain. But this advice was given a definite meaning by the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to me on October 17, in which he said:

Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you *merely stated the* [6711] *"possibility"*; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. (Italic supplied.)

This letter made it clear to me that when Admiral Stark stated certain Japanese action to be "possible," he meant that it was not probable.

In his letter of October 17, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations enclosed a "Memorandum for the CNO" from Captain R. E. Schuirmann, who was in charge of the Navy's liaison with the State Department. Admiral Stark stated in his letter that this memorandum by Captain Schuirmann "sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down."

The dispatch of October 16 and the Schuirmann memorandum were not consistent. The dispatch of October 16 began: "The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave crisis." The memorandum began: "I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese policy of thought or action."

The memorandum stated:

Present reports are that the new Cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen.

The memorandum was to the effect that the Japanese military would determine Japan's policy regardless of the [6712] Cabinet in power.

On November 24, I received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which was addressed to me, the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and the commandants of the Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts. This dispatch read as follows:¹⁹

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their Naval and Military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform Senior Army Officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

Under date of November 25, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me a letter which reached me on December 3. This letter contained a postscript added after a "meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today." The dates of the conference and the postscript are not known to me. In the postscript he wrote:

[6713] * * * *From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indochina, Burma Road area as the most likely.*

¹⁹ Exhibit 37, p. 82.

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it more likely to be "anything". (Italic supplied.)

On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me and to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the following dispatch:²⁰

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. [6714] Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

On the same day I received two other dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations, which affected my current estimate of the situation, as well as my subsequent dispositions.

The first of these dispatches was as follows:²¹

Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.

The second of these dispatches was as follows:²²

In order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use OpNav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway [1615] and a similar number at Wake provide you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations. Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable. (Italics supplied.)

3. *Analysis of the so-called "war warning" dispatch of November 27, 1941, and related information.*—The so-called "war warning" dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. It did not repeal or modify the advice previously given me by [6716] the Navy Department that no move against Pearl Harbor was imminent or planned by Japan. The phrase "war warning" cannot be made a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dispatch contained.

²⁰ Exhibit 37, p. 36.

²¹ Dispatch CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270040.

²² Dispatch CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270038.

The dispatch warned of war—where?
In the Far East. The dispatch stated:

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Thus the Philippines, Thai, and the Kra Peninsula were stated to be expected objectives of Japan. When it came to "possible" objectives, Borneo was the only one specified. Hawaii was not mentioned. As the Naval Court of Inquiry points out, "No reference was made to the possibility of an aggressive movement in any direction as had been done in the dispatch of 24 November." This indicated to us in the fleet that since the earlier dispatch, the Navy Department had obtained later information, on the basis of which it could specify both probable and possible Japanese objectives.

Moreover, the two other dispatches which I received on November 27, in addition to the so-called "war warning" [6717] dispatch were affirmative evidence that the War and Navy Departments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable.

One of these dispatches proposed ^{22a} that I send 25 Army pursuit planes by aircraft carrier to each of the islands of Wake and Midway. The other dispatch ^{22b} proposed the reenforcement of Marine defense battalions on Midway and Wake with Army troops.

About the same time General Short received a dispatch ²³ from the War Department which stated that the Army proposed to take over the defense of these islands from the marines.

Thus, the dispatches sent from the War and Navy Departments were in disagreement on the very fundamentals of the project.

The proposed exchange of Army troops for marines on the outlying island bases was not feasible. General Short and I had extensive conferences on the subject. I learned that the Army had no guns, either surface or antiaircraft to equip any troops which might relieve or reenforce the marines. Thus, if the marines were withdrawn, their equipment and arms would have to be left for the Army. I did not have sufficient [6718] additional supplies to reequip and rearm the marines removed. The marines stationed on the island were trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards which could be immediately obtained by Army troops relieving them. The Army had nothing in its organization comparable to a Marine defense battalion, so that the Army garrison would have required a new table of organization. The proposed relief of the marine garrisons by Army troops would necessarily disrupt the defense of the islands during the period that one garrison was preparing to depart and the other was being installed.

Furthermore, at Wake, the more westerly of the two islands, there were no harbor facilities or anchorage. Material and personnel had to be landed from ships under way in an open seaway. Ships had been delayed in unloading at Wake for as long as 28 days due to bad weather. It was not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. Extensive unloading of men and material from ships at Wake, in the face of any enemy operation, would be impossible.

^{22a} See footnote 22.

^{22b} See footnote 21.

²³ Message No. 489, November 29, 1941, War Department to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

I believe that responsible authorities in Washington would not plan or propose a project for shifting garrisons under such circumstances, if they considered that enemy action against these outlying bases was imminent.

I promptly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that the marines should not be withdrawn from the outlying [6719] islands until the Army had received arms and equipment for its defense battalions and had adequately trained them.²⁴

The replacement of Marine planes on the islands of Wake and Midway with Army pursuit planes, as proposed by Washington, was also impracticable. At conferences with the Army on this matter, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment stated that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than fifteen miles from land, nor could they land on a carrier. Consequently, once they were landed on one of the outlying islands they would be frozen there. Their fifteen-mile limit of operation radically restricted their usefulness in the island's defense. I so advised the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch and letter.^{24 25}

[6720] The Army pursuit planes which it was proposed to send to outlying islands from Oahu on November 27 constituted approximately 50 percent of the Army's pursuit strength on Oahu. The very fact that the War and Navy Departments proposed their transfer from Hawaii indicated to me that responsible authorities in Washington did not consider an air raid on Pearl Harbor either imminent or probable.

In brief, on November 27, the Navy Department suggested that I send from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor the carriers of the fleet which constituted the fleet's main striking defense against an air attack.

On November 27, the War and Navy Departments suggested that we send from the island of Oahu, 50 percent of the Army's resources in pursuit planes.

[6721] These proposals came to us on the very same day of the so-called "war warning."

In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that the "war warning" was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.

From November 27 to the time of the attack, all the information which I had from the Navy Department or from any other source, confirmed, and was consistent, with the Japanese movement in south-east Asia described in the dispatch of November 27.

On November 30, the Navy Department sent me for information a dispatch addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.²⁶

²⁴ Dispatch CInCPac to OpNav, November 28, 1941, 280627; Official letter CInCPac to CNO, December 2, 1941, Serial 0114W; personal letter to Admiral Stark, December 2, 1941.

²⁵ In the "Narrative Statement of Evidence (sic) at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations" prepared by the Navy Department for the Senate Naval Affairs Committee and distributed to this committee, the following statement is made (pp. 326 and 327): "It appears from the evidence that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had a conference about the subject of the dispatches concerning the Army's willingness to garrison Midway and Wake Islands, and that the project fell through because these two area Commanders could not agree as to whom should command the Army troops. Each insisted he should be supreme." This statement is not accurate. The decisions not to send the Army pursuit planes and not to relieve the marines with Army troops were made for the reasons I have outlined and which are stated in my dispatch, and official and personal letters.

²⁶ Exhibit 78, p. 2.

This stated there were indications that Japan was about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition. The Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was directed to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.

On December 1, the Navy Department sent me for information another dispatch which it addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet,²⁷ describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malay into Thailand. Thailand would then call Britain an aggressor, and call upon Japan for aid. This would facilitate the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally, and give Japan [6722] air bases in the Kra Peninsula, and a position to carry out any further operations along Malaya.

From the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, from the China coast, and other sources, we had reports of the development of a Japanese amphibious expedition headed south. Movements of troops, tanks, amphibian boats, landing craft, transports, and naval vessels had been sighted moving to the Kra Peninsula.²⁸

On December 6, 1941, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet reported various large Japanese forces apparently making for Koh-tron,²⁹ These consisted of one 25-ship convoy with an escort of 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers, and another 10-ship convoy with 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers. The scouting force of the Asiatic Fleet had sighted 30 ships and one large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay in Indochina. Incidentally, Kohtron is in Indochina.

In short, all indications of the movements of Japanese military and naval forces which came to my attention confirmed the information in the dispatch of 27 November—that the Japanese were on the move against Thailand or the Kra Peninsula in southeast Asia.

The fortnightly "Summary of Current National Situations" issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations under date of December 1, 1941, stated on page 1 "Strong indications [6723] point to any early Japanese advance against Thailand."³⁰

The same publication, on page 9, under the heading "The Japanese Naval Situation," stated definitely "Major capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the carriers."

On December 3, 1941, I received intelligence that Japanese consular and diplomatic posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London had been ordered to destroy most of their codes.³¹ This dispatch stated "most of their codes and ciphers"—not all—a point which was noted by me and my staff at the time. This information appeared to fit in with the information we had received about a Japanese movement in southeast Asia. Japan would naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her communication system in the event that her action in southeast Asia caused Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over her diplomatic residences.

²⁷ Dispatch OPNAV to ClnCAF, info ClnCPac, 1 Dec., 011400. See also Hewitt testimony, Captain Layton, pp. 216, 217.

²⁸ Dispatch OpNav to ClnCAF, info ClnCPac, November 28, 1941, 281683. See also Hewitt testimony, Captain Layton, p. 201.

²⁹ Dispatch ClnCAF to OpNav, info ClnCPac, December 6, 1941, 061255.

³⁰ Exhibit 80.

³¹ Exhibit 37, p. 40.

[6724] In addition to actual observation, there was another way of obtaining some indications of Japanese Fleet movements. This was the system of so-called traffic analysis. It rested on an attempted identification of call signs of various enemy ships and of subdivision commanders in the enemy fleet. The call sign is a group of letters and numbers used by a ship to identify itself much as a radio station announces itself as "Station WABC." The location of the ships from whence the call signs emanate is made by direction finders. In 1941 we had direction finders at Manila, Guam, and Pearl Harbor. We made a daily traffic analysis. I went over the material with care.

Under the best of circumstances the accuracy of estimates of enemy fleet movements based upon traffic analysis is open to serious doubts. To illustrate: On December 8, 1941, the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to me for information. This dispatch was based upon traffic analysis made by the Communication Intelligence Unit in Manila. It stated:²²

The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveries since December first and are conservative:

* * * Radio bearings indicate that Akagi is moving south from Empire and is now in Nansei Islands area.

This dispatch therefore placed the Japanese carrier *Akagi* [6725] early on December 8 in Empire waters proceeding south from Japan. As a matter of fact, we now know—and you have the evidence before you (record, p. 450)—that the carrier *Akagi* was in the striking force that attacked Pearl Harbor and could not possibly be moving south from Japan on December 8.

I was familiar with the vagaries of traffic analysis, which this dispatch illustrates. May I point out how these mistaken estimates arise?

Let us assume a radio call sign "KAGA" is heard, and that direction finders locate in the China Sea the ship from which this call sign issues. The crucial question still remains: What ship is using the call sign "KAGA"? Is it a battleship, a cruiser, a destroyer, a carrier, or some auxiliary? The actual intelligence transmitted by the ship having the call sign "KAGA" affords the best clue to her identity. The analyst, however, does not have that intelligence unless he knows the text of the message which the ship is sending. Until then his estimate of the identity of the ship from her call sign alone rests on assumptions which are open to question, and may be in error.

When the call signs of the flagship and individual ships in a fleet are changed, there is a considerable period during which the location of these fleet units, through traffic analysis, is practically impossible.

[6726] The Japanese Navy changed its call signs on May 1, 1941. It took about a month thereafter before sufficient signs had been identified to make the location and identification of ships and subdivisions of the fleet sufficiently accurate to merit any real consideration.

Again on November 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese Navy were changed. About the end of November we had reached a point where the number of identified calls made the data as reliable as such data can be. Then on December 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese Navy were again changed. This second change within 1 month was entirely consistent with preparation for the anticipated movement to southeast Asia by Japan.

²² Dispatch Com16 to OpNav, info ClnCPac, December 8, 1941, 080333.

From December 1 to December 7, 1941, as a consequence of the change in call signs, the data which we obtained from traffic analysis was fragmentary. Out of 20,000 calls involved in the change, only 200 service calls had been partially identified.³³ After December 1, practically all Japanese naval traffic was in a code which we were unable to read.

During the days from December 1 to December 7, 1941, there was a heavy volume of unidentified radio traffic of the Japanese Fleet. The Japanese carrier calls were not identified, nor were the calls of the major part of the Japanese Fleet. [6727] The failure to identify carrier traffic did not indicate that the carriers were en route to Pearl Harbor. There was a similar failure to identify the calls on other major units of the Japanese Fleet, which did not come to Pearl Harbor. The failure to identify the carrier calls did not indicate that the carriers were not a part of the fleets which were known to be moving to southeast Asia.

Nor did the failure to identify carrier calls mean that the carriers were preserving radio silence. It was entirely possible that the carriers were originating traffic and that their traffic was included within the great volume of unidentified traffic. Even on the assumption that the Japanese carriers were not originating radio traffic, it would not follow that the carriers were engaged on a secret mission. When ships are within the immediate location of shore stations, they do not ordinarily transmit over long distances, because their traffic is handled through shore stations. Consequently, even radio silence may merely mean that the ships are at anchor in some port in home waters.

The failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and after December 1st when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During the 6 months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of 8 to 14 days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about the location of [6728] the Japanese battleships. During the 6 months preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese First Fleet, and eight periods of 10 to 20 days each, in which the location of the greater numbers of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet was uncertain.

[6729] As to the Japanese carriers, during the 6 months preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of 134 days—in 12 separate periods—each ranging from 9 to 22 days, when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain.³⁴

In brief, in the week immediately prior to Pearl Harbor, I had no evidence that the Japanese carriers were en route to Oahu. Radio traffic analysis did not locate their positions. But this was not a new or unusual condition. It was inherent in the changes of call signs. It had existed on 12 other occasions over a 6-months' period.

The dispatch of November 27 stated that Japanese-American negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had ceased. The Navy Department did not let this statement stand without modification. On November 29, 2 days later, the Navy De-

³³ Hewitt testimony, Captain Layton, p. 224.

³⁴ See memorandum for the Roberts Commission from Lt. Comdr. E. T. Layton, Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, dated January 5, 1942.

partment sent me a dispatch,³⁵ which quoted the War Department's message to General Short of November 27. It stated:

Negotiations with Japan *appear* to be terminated with only the barest possibility of resumption. [*Italic supplied.*]

[6730] This dispatch came to me near the end of "the next few days" set forth in the dispatch of November 27 as the period within which the Japanese action would come. Further, there was a public resumption of Japanese-American negotiations after November 27. The public press and radio news broadcasts contained accounts that negotiations were continuing after November 27 and after November 29. In the absence of more authoritative information, I took account of this public information as to diplomatic developments. This suggested a lessening of the emergency which prompted the so-called "war warning" dispatch.

The Navy Department did not inform me of the contents of the American note to Japan on November 26, or that the prevalent opinion in the Navy Department was that the proposals contained in that note were so drastic as to make Japanese acceptance of them impossible.³⁶ In a letter of November 14, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a copy of a memorandum for the President signed by himself and General Marshall. This memorandum advised against direct United States intervention in China and recommended specifically that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

I was not informed that the Japanese were continuing the negotiations after November 26 only as a device to cover up their plans. The Navy Department knew this to be the fact.³⁷ I was not informed that, upon receipt of the American note of November 26th, the Japanese considered that negotiations had not merely ceased but that relations with this country were ruptured. The Navy Department knew this to be the fact.³⁸

The statement in the Navy Department's dispatch to me to the effect that negotiations had ceased on November 27 was a pale reflection of actual events; so partial a statement as to be misleading. The parties had not merely stopped talking. They were at swords' points. So far as Japan was concerned, the talking which went on after November 26 was play-acting. It was a Japanese stratagem to conceal a blow which Japan was preparing to deliver. That stratagem did not fool the Navy Department. The Navy Department knew the scheme. The Pacific Fleet was exposed to this Japanese stratagem because the Navy Department did not pass on its knowledge of the Japanese trick.

In the November 29 dispatch after quoting the Army message, the Chief of Naval Operations added the following direction:

WPL-52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will [6732] not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in South East Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

WPL-52 was the Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5. Under this plan the Atlantic Fleet had shooting orders. It was

³⁵ Exhibit 37, p. 38.

³⁶ See Finding XVI, Naval Court of Inquiry.

³⁷ See exhibit 1, pp. 191, 195, 199.

³⁸ See exhibit 1, pp. 204, 180.

charged with the task of destroying German and Italian naval, land, and air forces encountered in the area of the western Atlantic. The southeast Pacific sub area covered the area from the coast of South America to a distance of 700 miles westward. Here the southeast Pacific naval force had similar shooting orders and a similar task. In the dispatch of November 29, the Chief of Naval Operations informed me that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific. This was to impress upon me the fact that I did not have shooting orders and that I was not to shoot until Japan had committed an overt act. Although this dispatch was sent me for information I was as much bound by these orders as though I had been an action addressee.

Incidentally, when I received that dispatch, I considered that a modification of the orders I have received in the war-warning dispatch, and that I was to be governed by the [6733] provisions of this dispatch. I can see no other interpretation, and I thought that the Navy Department had been brought into accord with the orders that had been issued by the War Department, and I thought that was what they were doing when they sent that dispatch.

This same note of caution is in the dispatch of October 16, 1941:

You will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan.

Again in the War Department dispatch, quoted to me by the Chief of Naval Operations in his message of November 29:

The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. * * * Measures should be carried out so as not repeat not alarm civil population or disclose intent.

The Pacific Fleet was based in an area containing over 130,000 Japanese, any one of whom could watch its movements. You can appreciate the psychological handicaps orders of this kind placed upon us. In effect, I was told:

Do take precautions.
Do not alarm civilians.
Do take a preparatory deployment.
Do not disclose intent.
Do take a defensive deployment.
[6734] Do not commit the first overt act.

One last feature of the so-called "war-warning" dispatch remains to be noted. This is the directive with which it closed:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Under WPL-46 the first task of the Pacific Fleet was to support the forces of the Associated Powers (Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States) in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay barrier.

The Navy Department emphasized this instruction by repeating it on November 29. The dispatch of that date directed:

Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

Thus in two separate dispatches I was ordered by the Navy Department to have the Pacific Fleet ready to move against the Marshalls upon the expected outbreak of war in the Far East.

This was a determinative factor in the most difficult and vital decisions I had to make thereafter. There was not a hint in these two dispatches of any danger in the Hawaiian area.

The CHAIRMAN. The recess having arrived, the committee [6735] will stand in recess until 2 p. m.

(Whereupon, at 12: 30 p. m., the committee recessed to 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[6736]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

(The hearing was resumed at 2 p. m.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Admiral.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL (Resumed)

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed, I have a request that I would like to submit to the committee and counsel.

We have been provided with the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and General Short given at previous hearings before the Army Board and the Navy Board.

Admiral Stark has testified as a witness before this committee. I have not yet had an opportunity to examine the testimony given by Admiral Stark before the other examining bodies, and I believe that, in the interests of a proper determination as to the weight to be given to certain testimony by Admiral Stark before this committee, the committee should have the benefit of the same prior analysis of testimony that has been furnished in the case of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

I wonder if that testimony is available?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will ask counsel to answer that question. I think none of the members of the committee [6737] have been as yet furnished with the previous testimony of Admiral Stark.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We have one copy of that testimony, but it has never been duplicated as yet, in the same way that we have duplicated the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. It can be duplicated and furnished to the committee if the committee so desires.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, as one member of the committee I do desire it, and I think it is quite advisable that we have that testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection the committee will ask counsel to provide that duplicate.

Mr. KEEFE. May I also suggest at this time, in view of the fact that I understand Admiral Bloch will also be a witness before this committee, that we also have the benefit of the prior testimony given by Admiral Bloch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The some thing that is true of Admiral Stark is also true of Admiral Bloch. That can be furnished to the committee if the committee desires it.

Mr. KEEFE. I think the committee ought to have it prior to the time that Admiral Bloch takes the stand as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the desire of the committee on that?

[6738] Senator BREWSTER. I would think it would certainly be appropriate and would probably expedite the consideration if that can be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection counsel will furnish the committee with the previous testimony of Admiral Bloch.

Senator BREWSTER. I think the same consideration, as far as I know, applies to the previous testimony of General Marshall.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Beg pardon?

Senator BREWSTER. The previous testimony of General Marshall is in the same status.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to make the same motion in regard to that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, just where does the committee want to fix or draw the line on that? Is there to be a manifold duplication of the testimony of all of the earlier hearings? You suggested General Marshall, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Stark. Are there any others?

If we could have the committee's ideas as to just what they wanted, then we could do this job only once.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I anticipate there are some other witnesses coming on, such as Safford, Cramer, Bratton, and various other witnesses, and it certainly would [6739] be very beneficial for the committee members to have that testimony of these important witnesses before they take the stand.

I anticipate the committee should, at the end at least, put into the record the previous testimony of all of the witnesses before all the boards.

The CHAIRMAN. That involves quite an order. If you mean by putting in the testimony having it printed as part of these hearings, or making it in the form of exhibits available to the committee—

Senator FERGUSON. I had in mind an exhibit, so it can be released to the public, showing what the previous reports were based upon. That would include the Roberts report. That is so the public may know what the reports are.

The CHAIRMAN. The immediate matter is the duplication of Admiral Bloch's, Admiral Stark's, and General Marshall's testimony, and without objection, the counsel will be asked to do that.

As these other witnesses come along we can probably discuss that later. Personally, I have no objection to any of it being made available. It would involve quite a lot of printing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It will take weeks to get all of that record duplicated, if it is to be duplicated.

[6740] Mr. KEEFE. May I ask counsel as to whether or not he has received from the State Department the Hornbeck statement which I requested?

The CHAIRMAN. I might say, Congressman, that Secretary Acheson called me yesterday and said he would like to bring that statement over and let you go over it and see exactly what it is, and then we can determine whether his estimate of its pertinency or our own would govern. He said he would be glad to do that.

It has not been received yet officially, but he wanted to show it to you. so you could see it yourself.

Mr. KEEFE. That is perfectly all right. Of course, all I wanted to do was to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no purpose to withhold it. It seems that this statement, from what I gather, only made an indirect reference to Dr. Hornbeck. You can determine for yourself when you see it.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; we will proceed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, just one word. We have, of course, copies of the testimony previously given by Safford and Kramer, and all of the witnesses just discussed, and that testimony is available to any member of the committee who wants to examine it.

[6741] It might be worthy of consideration to see whether the examination of that testimony could be so spelled between the members of the committee that it would not be necessary to go to the trouble of having mimeographs made of all of that testimony, because we are already rushing the mimeograph facilities almost to the limit.

That constitutes a pretty big order.

Mr. KEEFE. May I say, Mr. Chairman, I have specifically limited my request, because I have had the opportunity to read carefully the testimony of General Marshall, Captain Kramer and Captain Safford, and also Colonel Bratton. I have read that testimony and the memorandum received, and as far as I am concerned personally I do not need the copies, but I have not been able to see the testimony of Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. It is entirely possible that all the members of the committee would want to take the time to read in detail all of the testimony of these former witnesses, and if it could be arranged that those who are interested in reading it in order to make a comparison, wish to do so, and it can be made available to them, it would save a considerable item of printing, and the work of the mimeographing machines if that is done.

Senator FERGUSON. I was not inquiring for my own use.

[6742] The CHAIRMAN. No doubt some of the members of the committee will not have the time to read all of the previous testimony in order to make a comparison with this testimony.

Those who are interested in it, I am sure it can be made available to them.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is an excellent idea. You will recall that some rather, it seemed to me, unkind comments came from our former counsel occasionally of how this procedure was interrupted by members of the committee getting single documents. I gather that this counsel will not be troubled with that. It is also true if any member of the committee wants to read this information it is much easier to have 10 copies than 1.

That is what happened with Admiral Kimmel's evidence in this previous case. I do not suggest that as the reason why it should be duplicated at all.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there will be no difficulty in making a satisfactory arrangement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, as I understand it, we are to furnish you with the former testimony of General Marshall, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Stark?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.¹

¹The complete records of all prior investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack have been admitted to this committee's official record as Exhibits Nos. 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, and 149. (See Index of Exhibits; see also Index of Witnesses.)

All right, Admiral, you may proceed.

[6743] You were at the top of page 58, I believe.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

4. *Action taken and decisions made after November 27, 1941.*—The War Plan of the Pacific Fleet (W. P. Pac-46) prescribed a definite plan of operations to enable the fleet to carry out its basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the Malay barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls.

The CHAIRMAN. "The Marshalls" refers to the islands and not to the general?

Admiral KIMMEL. How is that?

The CHAIRMAN. The word "Marshall" there refers to the islands and not to the general?

Admiral KIMMEL. This refers to the Marshall Islands to the east of the Carolina Islands in the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Admiral KIMMEL. This plan was called the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan.³⁹ Under the plan, Task Force 2, under the command of Admiral Halsey, was to depart from Pearl Harbor one one J-day; i. e., one day after hostilities with Japan began. This task force, consisting of the carrier *Enterprise* with battleships and destroyers, was to proceed toward Taongi Atoll in the northern Marshalls. [6744] Task Force 1 under the command of Admiral W. S. Pye, was to depart Pearl Harbor above five J-day, so as to rendezvous with Admiral Halsey's task force at a designated point on eleven J-day. From six J-day to nine J-day, Admiral Halsey's task force was to reconnoiter by air the atolls of the Marshall Islands for the purpose of determining the best objectives for a raid. About 10 J-day, Task Force 3, under the command of Admiral Wilson Brown, was to join Task Force 2 under Admiral Halsey, and thereafter operate as a part of that force. After the rendezvous of the task force on 11 J-day, the commander in chief of the fleet would direct Admiral Halsey to commence the attacks on the selected islands of the Marshalls group. Admiral Halsey's battleships would then be transferred to Task Force 1, which would operate as a covering force for Halsey's raiding force. On about 13 J-day, Task Force 2 would attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces.

Thus our plans called for a strike at the Marshalls very shortly after J-day—when hostilities commenced. We were conscious of the great value of speed in setting this expedition in motion. Its prime purpose was to divert Japanese strength from the Malay Barrier. If it were delayed, its entire purpose and value would be frustrated.

Under this plan of operations, the patrol planes of [6745] the Pacific Fleet had an essential role. The plan provides:⁴⁰

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

³⁹ W. P. Pac-46, annex II.

⁴⁰ W. P. Pac-46, annex II, p. 7, subpar. (d) (1), (2), (8), (4), (5).

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint *Commander Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume normal operations as required by paragraph 3242 b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

[6746] The mere recitation of these tasks demonstrates the vital air reconnaissance required of the patrol plane force. Without it, the task forces might be exposed to surprise attack if they entered the dangerous Marshall area. It was an indispensable feature of the entire operation.

Beginning November 30, 1941, I made a daily memorandum entitled "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 24 hours." The last form of this memorandum I reviewed and approved on the morning of December 6, 1941. In it I attempted to keep the basic plan of the raid on the Marshall Islands up to date and in conformity with the existing dispositions of fleet units. The last issue of this memorandum, dated December 6, 1941, is as follows:

1. Send dispatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

2. Send dispatch to task force commanders:

(a) WPL 46 effective (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below). (The submarine and patrol plane plans will become effective without special reference to them.)

(b) Commence sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Napo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and reconnaissance plan effective, [6747] modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost dispatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

(d) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Taskfor 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

(e) Lexington land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in Company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to join Lexington group. Return DMS to Pearl.

3. (a) Do not modify the movements of Regulus at Midway (departing 9th), nor ships bound to Christmas and Canton.

(b) Direct that William Ward Burrows continue to Wake but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that Lexington group send two destroyers to join Burrows prior to her arrival at Wake.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

[6748] (d) Provide two destroyers to escort *Saratoga* from longitude 150° west to Pearl Harbor.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from Manila, nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward California or Samoa until further developments occur.

The provisions of the memorandum were coordinated with the basic plan for the Marshall raid. The "VP plans" which were to "become effective without special reference" were the plans for the operation of the patrol-plane force. Paragraphs 2 (c), (d), and (e) had reference to the existing disposition of fleet units on December 5 and 6. Admiral Halsey at that time was returning from an expedition to Wake Island with a task force specially constituted for that purpose

and called Task Force 8. I planned to have him return to Pearl Harbor to refuel before joining Task Force 3 on the expedition to the Marshalls. The carrier *Lexington* on December 6 was en route to Midway. She was in a task force specially constituted for that purpose and called Task Force 12. In the event of hostilities I planned to have the *Lexington* carry out the Midway expedition and proceed to Wake, there to be joined by the commander of Task Force 3 of which the *Lexington* was a regular component. Admiral Wilson Brown, the commander of Task Force 3, on December 5 was engaged in operations in [6749] the vicinity of Johnston Island. I planned to have him leave that area and join the *Lexington* group, thereby bringing together all elements of Task Force 3. Task Force 3 would then be joined by Admiral Halsey's Task Force 2. When these task forces joined, they would proceed with the reconnaissance features of the raiding plan as a preliminary to the actual raids on the Marshall Islands.

This initial expedition was to continue operating as long as we could supply it with fuel. We estimated that it would require continuous operation of maximum patrol plane strength from 4 to 6 weeks. Additional expeditions were to be undertaken as rapidly as events and forces permitted.

I shall now describe the nature and extent of distant reconnaissance from the Hawaiian area on and after November 27, 1941.

By dispatch on November 27, the Navy Department had urged me to send Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake by aircraft carrier. I replied by dispatch that on November 28 I was sending a carrier to Wake with Marine fighter planes, and that I expected thereafter to send other Marine planes to Midway.

I considered the Navy Department's suggestion that planes be sent to Wake and Midway to be sound. It was [6750] desirable that the defenses of these outlying islands should be as strong as possible. The planes which went to Wake were, of course, not enough to save that island. Together with its other defenses, they could make the capture of that island sufficiently costly to justify sending them there. The actual results in the defense of Wake after December 7 demonstrated that fact.

The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midway did more than reinforce the air defenses of the islands. It permitted a broad area to be scouted for signs of enemy movement along the path of the advance of these task forces to the islands and their return to Oahu. In addition, they were in an excellent position to intercept any enemy force which might be on the move.

On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier *Enterprise*, 3 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles with his planes for any sign of hostile shipping.⁴¹

On December 5, 1941, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in command of Task Force 12, consisting of the carrier *Lexington*, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Newton, like Halsey, conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance.⁴²

⁴¹ Hart testimony—Admiral Halsey, p. 299, q. 44.

⁴² Hart testimony—Admiral Newton, p. 318, q. 30.

On December 5, Admiral Wilson Brown left Pearl Harbor en route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises.

Thus by December 5 there were at sea three task forces of the fleet, each deployed in a different area. The *Lexington* and the *Enterprise* were each conducting air searches. It was a more intensive search in the areas covered than could have been made by patrol planes based on Oahu. Further, as they approached the outlying islands, these searches were conducted at a much greater distance from Oahu than any patrol plane based on Oahu could travel.

In addition to the operations of these task forces, other distant reconnaissance was conducted by the fleet after November 27.

Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, I ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake on December 2 and 3, they searched to a distance of 525 miles. These orders were executed.⁴³

[6752] I also ordered another squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor to replace the squadron which went from Midway to Wake.⁴³ This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded to Johnston Island. On the way to Johnston, it searched the ocean areas. It then proceeded from Johnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5, and 6.⁴⁴ On December 7, five of these Midway-based patrol planes were searching the sector 120° to 170° from Midway, to a distance of 450 miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the *Lexington* at a point 400 miles from Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready striking force.⁴⁵

When the *Enterprise* completed its delivery of planes to Wake, I withdrew a squadron of patrol planes from Wake. This squadron then proceeded to Midway, searching the ocean areas en route. It then moved from Midway to Pearl Harbor, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en route.

In the week before December 7, these reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor, covered a total distance of nearly 5,000 miles. As they proceeded, each squadron would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path. They brought under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of ocean area.

In addition to these reconnaissance sweeps, submarines of the fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously.

At Oahu before the attack, there were 49 patrol planes which were in flying condition. Eight other planes were out of commission and undergoing repair. In addition, on December 5, a squadron of patrol

⁴³ Dispatch CinCPac to COMPATWING 2, 28 November 1941, 280450.

⁴⁴ Mailgram COMTASKFOR 9 to COMPATRONS 21 and 22, November 20, 1941, 292103.

⁴⁵ Naval Court of Inquiry testimony, Admiral Bellinger, p. 684, questions 106, 107.

planes returned to Pearl Harbor after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake. This squadron consisted of obsolete PBV-3 planes, approaching 18 months' service and overdue for overhaul. It was not available for distant searches.

The 49 flyable patrol planes on Oahu were part of the planes which had arrived during the preceding 4 weeks—18 on October 28, 24 on November 23, and 12 on November 28. These planes were of the PBV-5 [6754] type. They were experiencing the shake-down difficulties of new planes. There was considerable difficulty due to the cracking of new engine sections, which required replacement. A program for the installation of leakproof tanks and armor on these planes was underway.⁴⁶ The leakproof tanks and armor were necessary to make these planes ready for war. That work had to be carried out in Hawaii. Under war plans the planes were to operate from advance bases, Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra Islands. There, they would operate from aircraft tenders. There were no facilities at those advanced bases to complete important material installations. The planes had to be in the highest condition of fighting efficiency before they left Oahu.

There was a total absence of spare parts for these planes.

There were no spare crews.

To insure an island base against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes, it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360° arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. Of course, the same planes and the same crews cannot make that 16-hour flight every day. For searches of this character [6755] over a protracted period, a pool of 250 planes would be required. These are fundamental principles. You will find them in the testimony of expert aviation officers before the naval court; and in the very comprehensive letter Fleet Admiral Nimitz wrote to the commander in chief, United States Fleet, on January 7, 1942, on the subject Airplane Situation in Hawaiian Area.

It is clear that I did not have a sufficient number of planes to conduct each day a 360° distant search from the island of Oahu. That fact is beyond controversy.

A search of all sectors of approach to an island base is the only type of search that deserves the name. The selection of one sector around an island for concentration of distant search affords no real protection. After a while it may furnish some insurance that the enemy, having knowledge of the search plan, will choose some other sector within which to make his approach. The search concentrated on the so-called "dangerous sector" then ceases to offer much prospect of detecting the enemy. Admiral Nimitz put the matter clearly in his official letter on the subject. He said: ⁴⁷

It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded. The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.

Tactical discussions now of what was the most dangerous sector around Oahu before December 7 do not reach the heart of the problem which I faced.

⁴⁶ Hewitt testimony, Admiral Bellinger, pp. 485, 497. Naval Court of Inquiry testimony, Captain Ramsey, p. 590, q. 72.

⁴⁷ Letter CinCPac to CinCUS, January 7, 1942, serial 059.

The Secretary of the Navy in his endorsement to the record of the Naval Court of Inquiry has stated:

There were sufficient fleet patrol planes and crews, in fact, available in Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128° to a distance of about 700 miles.

This statement assumes a 25-mile visibility for each patrol plane engaged in the search. It further assumes that I could have used all the patrol plane force for this type of search alone without keeping any planes in reserve for emergency searches or to cover movements of ships in and out of the harbor and in the operating area.

If I instituted a distant search of any 128° sector around Oahu on and after November 27, within the foreseeable future, I would have deprived the Pacific Fleet [6757] of any efficient patrol plane force for its prescribed war missions.

In the secret investigation before Admiral Hewitt, from which I was excluded, Vice Admiral Bellinger, who commanded my patrol plane force, testified: ⁴⁸

Q. Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible partial reconnaissance over an indefinite period of time, could you have covered 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis and for how long?

A. It could have been done until the failure of planes and lack of spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that it would have made it impossible. *Perhaps it could have been carried on for two weeks*, perhaps, but this estimate is, of course, very vague and it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight. (Italic supplied.)

This testimony reflected the conditions in the patrol plane squadrons as I knew them on November 27 and thereafter.

Captain Ramsey, the executive officer of the patrol wing, testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry as follows: ⁴⁹

[6758] * * * As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view of our almost total lack of spare parts for the PBV-5 planes, I believe that three weeks of intensive daily searches would have been approximately a 75 percent reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approximately a six-weeks period, but at the end of that time they would have all required a protracted rest period.

[6759] The patrol planes in Oahu were not uselessly employed prior to the attack. They were not standing idle. There was a definite program for their operation which was consistent with creating and preserving their material readiness for war. In the week preceding the attack, there was a daily scout by patrol planes on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, of a sector to the north and north-west of Oahu to a distance of 400 miles, after which the planes required maintenance and upkeep.⁵⁰ This was not distant reconnaissance, as such, although the distance covered was greater than that searched at the time of the 1940 alert. In addition, there was the daily dawn patrol out 300 miles to cover the areas where the fleet operated.

I had been ordered, not once but twice, to be prepared to carry out the raids on the Marshalls under WPL-46, which meant the extended use of the fleet patrol planes from advanced bases in war operations.

⁴⁸ Hewitt testimony—Admiral Bellinger, p. 505.

⁴⁹ Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony Captain Ramsey, p. 583, q. 44.

⁵⁰ Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony Captain Ramsey, p. 595, question 101.

I had to decide what was the best use of the patrol planes as a matter of policy for the foreseeable future, and with their war task in front of me.

Had I directed their use for intensive distance searches from Oahu, I faced the peril of having these planes grounded when the fleet needed them and when the war plan was executed.

[6760] I had no way of knowing that the war was to start on the 7th of December. I could not decide the matter on the basis of 5 days or 10 days of distant searches.

I did not have the intercepted Japanese dispatches pointing to Pearl Harbor as a probable point of attack.

I knew that any search I could make, straining the planes to the breaking point, was in its nature partial and ineffective.

I took account of my resources. They were slender.

I took account of my probable future needs and of my orders from the Navy Department.

I decided that I could not risk having no patrol plane force worthy of the name for the fleet's expected movement into the Marshalls.

I considered the nature and extent of the distant reconnaissance I was effectuating with my task forces at sea and the patrol plane sweeps to and from the outlying islands.

I considered the necessity of permitting the essential replacement and material upkeep program for the new patrol planes in Oahu to be continued to get them into war condition.

I considered the need for patrols of the fleet operating areas against the submarine menace and these I carried out.

I considered the need for some reserve of patrol planes for emergency distant searches.

[6761] I considered the need for patrol planes in covering fleet movements in and out of the harbor—which might have to be quickly and unexpectedly executed.

I considered the endurance of my patrol-plane manpower—and the absence of any spare crews.

I decided that I could not fritter away my patrol-plane resources by pushing them to the limit in daily distant searches of one sector around Oahu—which within the predictable future would have to be discontinued when the patrol planes and crews gave out.

The three admirals who composed the Naval Court of Inquiry scrutinized my decision after extensive testimony. Each of the admirals could view the matter from the point of view of the commander in the field. They summarized the problem:

The task assigned the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent—how imminent he did not know. The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information.

If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet [6762] for war would be reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet operations.

The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced seriously after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews to stand up under the demands of daily long-range reconnaissance.

The court concluded (finding XIII):

The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and con-

sultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved.

I shall now discuss the dispositions of the capital ships of the Pacific Fleet on and after November 27. On November 28 Admiral Halsey left for Wake with a carrier task force and on December 5 Admiral Newton left for Midway with another carrier task force. These missions were in pursuance of an explicit suggestion from the Navy Department. When Admiral Halsey left for Wake on November 28 the three battleships of his task force accompanied him out of Pearl Harbor so as to avoid creating the impression that there was anything unusual about the movement of his task force. However, immediately on clearing the channel Admiral Halsey diverted his battleships and instructed them to carry out exercises in the Hawaiian area. He then [6763] headed west with the remainder of his task force.

It would have been unwise for Admiral Halsey to have taken along the battleships. The maximum speed of the battleships was 17 knots. The fleet units which he took to Wake could make 30 knots. To take his battleships with him would have meant the loss of 13 knots of potential speed. He was bound for dangerous waters where curtailed speed might spell disaster. He needed all the mobility his force could attain. Three battleships did not furnish sufficient supporting strength to warrant the risks of reduction in speed and mobility which their presence in the expedition to Wake would entail. Moreover, it was necessary to complete the Wake operation as quickly as possible so that the ships engaged might be ready for further eventualities.

Almost every disposition which I made in the Pacific with the forces available to me had its cost. In sending the two carriers to Wake and Midway, I took from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor, for the time being, the fleet's air strength. We had no carrier left in the Hawaiian area. The *Saratoga*, the third carrier of the Pacific Fleet, had been undergoing repair and overhaul on the west coast. The advisability of using her to transfer a squadron of Marine fighter planes from San Diego to Hawaii was suggested by the Chief of Naval Operations on November 28.⁵¹

[6764] The absence of the carriers from the Hawaiian area temporarily limited the mobility of the battleships which were left behind.

While the carriers were absent on the assigned missions to Midway and Wake, the battleships force was kept in Pearl Harbor. To send them to sea without air cover for any prolonged period would have been a dangerous course. The only effective defense at sea from air attack, whether it be a bombing attack or a torpedo-plane attack, is an effective air cover. Surface ships, such as destroyers and cruisers, are much less effective against an air attack. That is so today. It was the more so prior to 7 December because of the existing inadequacies of antiaircraft guns.

The carriers furnished air coverage for the battleships at sea. The few planes that battleships and cruisers carry for use by catapult are not fighters. Their function is only scouting and reconnaissance. They are ineffective as a defense against enemy air attack. The battleships at sea without carriers had no protection from air bombing attack. In Pearl Harbor they had the protection of such antiaircraft

⁵¹ Dispatch CNO to CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 282054.

defenses as the Army had. At sea, in deep waters, there were no physical barriers to the effectiveness of torpedo-plane attack. In Pearl Harbor, where the depth of water was less than 40 feet, a torpedo-plane attack was considered a negligible danger. The [6765] battleships of the fleet at sea, without carriers, sighted by a force of such character as to have a chance of a successful air attack on the Hawaiian Islands appeared to be more subject to damage than in port.

Vice Admiral Pye, commander of the Battle Force, and I discussed these considerations in a conference after the receipt of the so-called war-warning dispatch.

At the time of our discussion—at that time and later—we did not have before us the intercepted Japanese messages indicating that the ships in port in Pearl Harbor were marked for attack. We had no information that an air attack upon Pearl Harbor was imminent or probable. The fact that the Navy Department proposed at this time that our carriers be sent to the outlying islands indicated to us that the Navy Department felt that no attack on Pearl Harbor could be expected in the immediate future.

All the dispositions of my task forces at sea, as well as the presence of the battleships in port, were known to the Navy Department. Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Roberts Commission as follows:⁵²

What we expected him (Admiral Kimmel) to do was to get more planes and personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task forces—some [6766] task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did. He did that. *We knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put the people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway, and were expected to go on the fifth or sixth day down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port, and at that particular time out of the three task forces, there were two scheduled to be in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port. He kept the others at sea. He had taken those measures which looked absolutely sound. It was a safe assumption that other measures had been taken of a similar nature.* (Italics supplied.)

Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, 1941, I issued orders to the fleet to exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas and to depth bomb all contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas.⁵³ My dispatch of November 28 to the fleet containing this order was forwarded to the Navy Department on that day. On December 2, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations directing his personal attention to this order. The Navy Department, in the 10 days prior to the attack, did not approve or disapprove my action.

For some time there had been reports of submarines in the [6767] operating areas around Hawaii. During the first week of February 1941, a submerged submarine contact was reported about 8 miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division of destroyers trailed this contact for approximately 48 hours, after which the contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a Japanese submarine. I was not fully convinced, but made a complete report to Naval Operations, stating the action taken and adding that I would be delighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact

⁵² Roberts Commission testimony, pp. 1813 and 1819.

⁵³ Dispatch CinCPac to Pacific Fleet, info OpNav, November 28, 1941, 280355.

in the operating area around Hawaii.⁵⁴ I was directed by dispatch not to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the 3-mile limit.

A similar contact at approximately the same position was made about the middle of March. Again the destroyers were confident that they had trailed a Japanese submarine. Again the evidence was not conclusive because the submarine had not actually been sighted.

On September 12, 1941, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations and asked him "What to do about the submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity." I stated, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts but not to bomb [6768] unless they are in the defensive areas. Should we now bomb contacts without waiting to be attacked?"

On September 23 the Chief of Naval Operations replied to my question in a personal letter. He stated:

The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step.

No conclusive evidence was obtained until December 7, 1941.

The files of the Comander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, contain records of at least three suspicious contacts during the 5 weeks preceding Pearl Harbor.

On November 3, 1941, a patrol plane observed an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41. The patrol plane searched a 15-mile area. A sound search was made by the U. S. S. *Borden*, and an investigation was made by the U. S. S. *Dale*, all of them producing negative results.⁵⁵ On November 28, 1941 the U. S. S. *Helena* reported that a radar operator without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against submarines was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area.⁵⁶ [6769] A search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During the night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S. *Gamble* reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine.⁵⁷ On the morning of the attack, the U. S. S. *Ward* reported to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District that it had attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon a submarine operating in the defensive sea area. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District directed a verification of this report with a view to determining whether the contact with the submarine was a sound contact or whether the submarine had actually been seen by the *Ward*. He also directed that the ready-duty destroyer assist the *Ward* in the defensive sea area. Apparently, some short time after reporting the submarine contact, the *Ward* also reported that it had intercepted a sampan which it was escorting into Honolulu. This message appeared to increase the necessity for a verification of the earlier report of the submarine contact.

Between 7:30 and 7:40 I received information from the Staff Duty Officer of the *Ward's* report, the dispatch of the ready-duty

⁵⁴ Official letter CinCPac to CNO, February 11, 1941, serial 0243.

⁵⁵ Hewitt report, pp. 148-149.

⁵⁶ Dispatch U. S. S. *Helena* to GR 1.5—info CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 280835.

⁵⁷ Hewitt report, p. 149.

destroyer to assist the *Ward*, and the efforts then under way to obtain a verification of the *Ward's report*. [6770] I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action in view of the number of such contacts which had not been verified in the past.

PART III.—INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM THE FLEET AND ITS
SIGNIFICANCE

When I took command of the Pacific Fleet I realized that information about our relations with Japan and the plans of that government was of supreme importance to me. I knew in general, from my experience in the Navy, of the sources from which the Navy Department might derive such intelligence, including the so-called "magic" source. The Pacific Fleet was dependent upon the Navy Department in Washington for information derived from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages.

Shortly after I took command, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, upon his arrival in Hawaii from Washington, informed me of some confusion in the Navy Department as to whether the responsibility of furnishing the Commander in Chief, Pacific, with secret information rested with Naval Operations or Naval Intelligence. I immediately added a postscript to a letter which I was writing to the Chief of Naval Operations, bringing this situation to his attention. I wrote Admiral Stark on [6771] February 18, 1941:

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI—that is Naval Intelligence—considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander in Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding.

He replied in a letter of March 22:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and the responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CinCUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibilities in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

On May 26, 1941 I wrote an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject of "Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet." In a separate paragraph entitled [6772] "Information", again I described my need for information of all important developments affecting our foreign relations.

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tend to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify. [6673] adapt, or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

I brought this official letter to Washington with me in June of 1941, handed it to the Chief of Naval Operations personally, discussed it with him, and received his assurance that I would be informed of all important developments as they occurred and by the quickest secure means available.

In the month of July 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations [6774] sent me at least seven dispatches which quoted intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Washington, Tokyo to Berlin, Berlin to Tokyo, Tokyo to Vichy, Canton to Tokyo. These dispatches identified by number the Japanese messages they quoted and gave their verbatim text.¹

I was never informed of any decision to the effect that intelligence from intercepted Japanese messages was not to be sent to me. In fact, dispatches sent to me by the Navy Department in the week before the attack contained intelligence from intercepted messages. On December 1, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations,² sent to me for information, quoted a report of November 29 from the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok to Tokyo which described a Japanese plan to entice the British to invade Thai, thereby permitting Japan to enter that country in the role of its defender. On December 3, a dispatch to me from the Chief of Naval Operations set forth an order from Japan to diplomatic agents and expressly referred to this order as "Circular 2444 from Tokyo."³ Another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations on December 3 referred to certain "categorical and urgent instructions which were sent [6775] yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts."⁴

The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conduct calculated to give me the impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese messages was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a failure to send me important information of this character was not merely a withholding of intelligence. It partook of the nature of an affirmative misrepresentation. I had asked for all vital information. I had been assured that I would have it. I appeared to be receiving it. My current estimate of the situation was formed

¹ Exhibit 37, pp. 6 to 12.

² Dispatch OpNav to CinCAF info CinCPac, 1 December 1941, 011400.

³ Exhibit 37, p. 41.

⁴ Exhibit 37, p. 40.

on this basis. Yet, in fact, the most vital information from the intercepted Japanese messages was not sent to me. This failure not only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me.

I was not supplied with any information of the intercepted messages showing that the Japanese Government had divided Pearl Harbor into five subareas and was seeking minute information as to the berthing of ships of the fleet in those areas.

On September 24, 1941, the Japanese Government instructed its consul general in Honolulu as to the type of report it desired from him concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. These instructions divided Pearl Harbor into five subareas. Each area was given an alphabetical symbol. Area A was the term prescribed to describe the waters between Ford Island and the ar [6776] senal. Area B was the term prescribed to describe the waters south and west of Ford Island. Area C was the term prescribed to describe East Loch; area D, Middle Loch; Area E, West Loch and communicating water routes. The dispatch stated: ⁵

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)

This dispatch was decoded and translated on October 9, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

On September 29, 1941, Kita, the Japanese consul general in Honolulu, replied to his government's dispatch of September 24. He described an elaborate and detailed system of symbols to be used thereafter in designating the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor. The letters "KS" would describe the repair dock in the navy yard. The letters "KT" would describe the navydock in the navy yard. The letters "FV" would describe the moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island. The letters "FG" would describe vessels alongside Ford Island, the east and west sides to be designated by A and B, respectively. This dispatch of the consul general was decoded and translated on October 10, 1941.⁶ This information was never supplied to me.

[6777] In the critical period before the attack, the Japanese Government sent further significant instructions to Honolulu. On November 15, Togo sent the following dispatch: ⁷

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular but at the rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy in Washington on December 3, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

On November 18, 1941, Togo sent the following dispatch to Honolulu: ⁸

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein; area N, Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay (Honolulu), and the Areas Adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

⁵ Exhibit 2, p. 12.

⁶ Exhibit 2, p. 13.

⁷ Exhibit 2, p. 13.

⁸ Exhibit 2, p. 15.

This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 5, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

On November 18, 1941 the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu reported to Tokyo in accordance with the system prescribed in the dispatch from Tokyo on September 24. He reported that in Area A there was a battleship of the *Oklahoma* [6778] class; that in Area C there were three heavy cruisers at anchor, as well as the carrier *Enterprise* or some other vessel; that two heavy cruisers of the *Chicago* class were tied up at docks "KS." The symbol "KS" it will be recalled was established by the Consul General in his September dispatch to Tokyo to designate the repair dock in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. The Consul General described in great detail the course taken by destroyers entering the harbor, their speed and their distances apart. He reported that they changed course five times, each time roughly 30°, from the entrance of the harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C at which they were moored. This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on December 6, 1941.⁹ This information was never supplied to me.

On November 20, Togo in Tokyo dispatched instructions to Honolulu to investigate comprehensively Fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation. This dispatch was decoded and translated on 4th of December.¹⁰ This information was never supplied to me.

Again on November 29, Tokyo sent the following dispatch to Honolulu:

[6779] We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 5, 1941.¹¹

This information was never supplied to me.

In the volume of intercepted Japanese dispatches eliciting and securing information about American military installations and naval movements, the dispatches concerning Pearl Harbor, on and after September 24, 1941, stand out, apart from the others (exhibit 2). No other harbor or base in American territory, or possessions was divided into subareas by Japan. In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harbor, followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed, there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual character and outside the realm of reasonable suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to [6780] ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately

⁹ Exhibit 2, p. 14.

¹⁰ Exhibit 2, p. 15.

¹¹ Exhibit 2, p. 15.

preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed by Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor. The information sought and obtained, with such painstaking detail, had no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost completely when the ships left their reported berthings in Pearl Harbor.

No one had a more direct and immediate interest in the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor than its commander in chief. No one had a greater right than I to know that Japan had carved up Pearl Harbor into subareas and was seeking and receiving reports as to the precise berthings in that harbor of the ships of the fleet. I had been sent Mr. Grew's report earlier in the year with positive advice from the Navy Department that no credence was to be placed in the rumored Japanese plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor. I was told then, that no Japanese move against Pearl Harbor appeared "imminent [6781] or planned for in the foreseeable future." Certainly I was entitled to know when information in the Navy Department completely altered the information and advice previously given to me. Surely, I was entitled to know of the intercepted dispatches between Tokyo and Honolulu on and after September 24, 1941, which indicated that a Japanese move against Pearl Harbor was planned in Tokyo.

Knowledge of these intercepted Japanese dispatches would have radically changed the estimate of the situation made by me and my staff. It would have suggested a reorientation of our planned operations at the outset of hostilities. The war plans of the Navy Department, and of the Pacific Fleet, as well as our directives and information from Washington prior to the attack indicated that the Pacific Fleet could be most effectively employed against Japan through diversionary raids on the Marshalls, when the Japanese struck at the Malay Barrier. Knowledge of a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor afforded an opportunity to ambush the Japanese striking force as it ventured to Hawaii. It would have suggested the wisdom of concentrating our resources to that end, rather than conserving them for the Marshall expedition.

The intercepted dispatches about the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor also clarified the significance of other intercepted Japanese dispatches, decoded and translated by the Navy [6782] Department prior to the attack. I refer particularly to the intercepted dispatches which established a deadline date for agreement between Japan and the United States. When this date passed without agreement, these dispatches revealed that a Japanese plan automatically took effect.

The deadline date was first established in a dispatch No. 736 from Tokyo to Washington on November 5, 1941. In this dispatch the Japanese Government instructed its Ambassador in Washington as follows:¹²

[6783] Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement, be completed by the 25th of

¹² Exhibit 1, p. 100.

this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself alone.

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy on the date of its origin, November 5, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline was reiterated in a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 11, 1941. This dispatch stated:¹³

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message No. 736 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite deadline and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day?)) according to the schedule. The government [6784] must have a clear picture of things to come in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short * * *

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy Department on November 12, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline was again emphasized in a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 15, 1941. This dispatch stated:¹⁴

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy Department on the date of its origin, November 15, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline was again reiterated on November 16 with great emphasis upon its importance. A dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of that date was as follows:¹⁵

For your Honor's own information:

[6785] 1. I have read your #1090 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. * * * In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline from the solution of these negotiations in my #736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

This dispatch was decoded and translated on November 17, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deal line was finally extended on November 22 for a period of 4 days. On that date a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington instructed Nomura and Kurusu:¹⁶

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our

¹³ Exhibit 1, p. 116.

¹⁴ Exhibit 1, p. 130.

¹⁵ Exhibit 1, p. 138.

¹⁶ Exhibit 1, p. 165.

fixed policy and do [6786] your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short, if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

This dispatch was decoded and translated on the date of its origin, November 22, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

Again on November 24, 1941, Tokyo specifically instructed its Ambassadors in Washington that the November 29 deal line was set in Tokyo time.¹⁷ This dispatch was decoded and translated [6787] on November 24, the date of its origin. This information was never supplied to me.

In at least six separate dispatches, on November 5, 11, 15, 16, 22, and 24, Japan specifically established and extended the dead line of November 25, later advanced to November 29. The dispatches made it plain that after the dead line date of Japanese plan was automatically going into operation. The plan was of such importance that as the dead line approached, the Government of Japan declared: "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days."¹⁸

When the dead line date of November 29 was reached with no agreement between the United States and Japan, there was no further extension. The intercepted dispatches indicated that the crisis deepened in its intensity after that day passed. On the 1st of December, Tokyo advised its ambassadors in Washington:¹⁹

The date set in my messages #812 has come and gone and the situation continues to be increasingly critical.

This message was translated by the Navy on the 1st of December. This information was never supplied to me.

An intercepted Japanese dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of November 28, 1941, made it clear that the American proposal [6788] of November 26 was completely unsatisfactory to Japan and that an actual rupture of negotiations would occur upon the receipt of the Japanese reply. A dispatch on November 28, decoded and translated on the same day, stated:²⁰

Well, you two ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the view of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. * * *

After receipt by Tokyo of the American note of November 26, the intercepted Japanese dispatches show that Japan attached great importance to the continuance of negotiations to conceal from the United States whatever plan automatically took effect on November 29. Thus,

¹⁷ Exhibit 1, p. 178.

¹⁸ Exhibit 1, p. 137.

¹⁹ Exhibit 1, p. 208.

²⁰ Exhibit 1, p. 195.

the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 28, cautions the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington: ²¹

* * * I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that [6789] you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific * * *

This information was never supplied to me.

Again the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of December 1, 1941, advising the Japanese Ambassador that the dead line date had come and gone and the situation continues to be critical, contains this further information: ²²

* * * to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

This information was never supplied to me.

Again in the trans-Pacific telephone conversation intercepted on November 27, and translated by the Navy Department on November 28, Yamamoto in Tokyo explicitly instructed Kurusu: "Regarding negotiations, don't break them off."²³

In another trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, intercepted and translated by the Navy [6790] on November 30, Kurusu noted the change in the Japanese attitude with respect to the duration of the American-Japanese negotiations. Before the deadline date Kurusu and Nomura had been urged by Tokyo to press for a conclusion of negotiations. Now they were instructed to stretch them out. Kurusu asked, "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?" Yamamoto replied, "Yes." Kurusu then stated: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."²⁴

The information from these telephone conversations was never supplied to me.

Again on November 29, an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Tokyo contains cautious representations to be addressed to the United States. The following instructions accompanied them: ²⁵

* * * In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations. * * *

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy on November 30, and never sent to me.

[6791] The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show that on and after November 29, a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect; that the plan was of such importance that it involved the fate of the empire; and that Japan urgently wanted the United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan.

²¹ Exhibit 1, p. 195.

²² Exhibit 1, p. 208.

²³ Exhibit 1, p. 190.

²⁴ Exhibit 1, p. 207.

²⁵ Exhibit 1, p. 199.

What was this plan? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch out negotiations as a pretext to hide the operation of this plan? Any-one reading the Japanese intercepted messages would face this question.

Certainly the concealed Japanese plans which automatically went into effect on November 29 would hardly be the Japanese movement in Indo-China. " * * * No effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because physical observations of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy."²⁶ The troop movements to southern Indo-China were the subject of formal diplomatic exchanges between the two governments of Japan and the United States.

On December 2, 1941, Mr. Welles handed to Mr. Nomura and [6792] Mr. Kurusu a communication which the President of the United States wished to make to them. This communication was as follows:²⁷

I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indo-China. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indo-China. . . The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. . . . Please be good enough to request the Japanese ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indo-China. . .

[6793] Thus, it was apparent to the Japanese Government from this formal representation of the United States that our Government was aware of the movement in Indochina. The United States expressed its concern about potential Japanese action against the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand. There was, therefore, very little reason for Japan to keep up a pretext of negotiations for the purpose of disguising these objectives.

Consequently, as time went on after November 29, and as Japan insisted to her envoys upon the continuance of negotiations as a pretext to divert the suspicion of the United States, it must have been apparent to a careful student of the intercepted dispatches that Japan on a dead-line date of November 29 had put into effect an operation, which was to consume a substantial time interval before its results were apparent to this Government, and which appeared susceptible of effective concealment in its initial phases.

The messages as to the berthings of ships in Pearl Harbor would then have given the reader of these intercepted dispatches an insight as to one of the probable directions of the plan which went into effect automatically on November 29, and which Japan was so anxious to conceal. All these dispatches taken together would have pointed to Pearl Harbor as a probable objective of this plan. Yet, because [6794] I was not furnished with these intercepted dispatches, nor

²⁶ Record, testimony Admiral Inglis, p. 458.

²⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan : 1931-41, vol. 2, p. 779.

given in summary form any indication of the dead-line date, the automatic execution of a plan by Japan on that date, and the continuance of negotiations thereafter as a pretext to hide that plan, I was deprived of the opportunity to make this deduction, which the dispatches as a whole would warrant, if not compel.

After November 27, there was a rising intensity in the crisis in Japanese-United States relations apparent in the intercepted dispatches. I was told on November 27 that negotiations had ceased and 2 days later that they appeared to be terminated with the barest possibilities of their resumption. Then I was left to read public accounts of further conversations between the State Department and the Japanese emissaries in Washington which indicated that negotiations had been resumed.

[6795] The Navy Department knew immediately of the reactions of Nomura and Kurusu to the American note of November 26—"Our failure and humiliation are complete."²⁸

The Navy Department knew immediately of the reactions of the Japanese Government to the American note of November 26. Japan termed it—²⁹

a humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.

The Navy Department knew that Nomura and Kurusu suggested to Japan on November 26 one way of saving the situation—a wire by the President to the Emperor.³⁰

The Navy Department knew that the Japanese Government advised Nomura and Kurusu on November 28 that the suggested wire from the President to the Emperor offered no hope: "What you suggest is entirely unsuitable."³¹

[6796] The Navy Department knew that on November 30, Japan gave Germany a detailed version of the negotiations with the United States. Japan stated that "a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause," and characterized certain features of the American proposal of November 26 as "insulting"—"clearly a trick." Japan concluded that the United States had decided to regard her as an enemy.³²

The Navy Department knew that Japan had instructed her ambassadors in Berlin on November 30 to inform Hitler: ³³

The conversation begun between Tokyo and Washington last April * * * now stand ruptured—broken. Say very secretly to them (Hitler and Ribbentrop) that there is extreme danger that way may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

All this vital information came from intercepted dispatches, decoded and translated in Washington, either on the day they were sent or a day or two later. None of this information was supplied to me.

²⁸ Exhibit 1, p. 180.

²⁹ Exhibit 1, p. 195.

³⁰ Exhibit 1, p. 180.

³¹ Exhibit 1, p. 195.

³² Exhibit 1, p. 205, 206.

³³ Exhibit 1, p. 204.

[6797] On November 19, 1941, the Japanese Government set up a system for informing its representatives throughout the world of the time when Japan was to sever diplomatic relations³⁴ or go to war³⁵ with the United States, Great Britain, or Russia. This decision was to be made known through a false weather broadcast from Japan. The words "east wind rain" in the broadcast meant that Japan had decided to sever relations or go to war with the United States. The words "west wind clear" would denote such action against England. The words "north wind cloudy" would denote such action against Russia.

The interception of the false weather broadcast was considered by the Navy Department to be of supreme importance. Every facility of the Navy was invoked to learn as speedily as possible when the false weather broadcast from Japan was heard and which of the significant code words were used. Extraordinary measures were established in the Navy Department to transmit the words used in this broadcast to key officers in Washington as soon as they were known.³⁶

[6798] The Naval Court of Inquiry heard substantial evidence from various witnesses on the question of whether or not Japan gave the signal prescribed by the winds code. The Naval Court of Inquiry found the facts on this matter to be as follows:³⁷

On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, [6799] although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department.

[6800] From various intercepted Japanese messages it was apparent that the high point in the crisis in Japanese-American affairs would be reached when the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 was received. As the Naval Court of Inquiry put it:³⁸

The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of the War and Navy Departments because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be severed or that war would be declared.

On the afternoon of December 6, 1941, there was intercepted, decoded, and translated in the Navy Department, a dispatch from Japan to her Ambassadors in Washington, known as the "pilot message."

This stated:³⁹

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

³⁴ Exhibit 1, pp. 154, 155.

³⁵ Dispatch Alusna Batavia to OpNav, December 5, 1941, 031030; Naval Court of Inquiry, exhibit 64, item 3; record, testimony General Miles, p. 4100.

³⁶ Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony Commander Kramer, p. 956, question 32.

³⁷ Addendum to Naval Court of Inquiry Finding of Fact, p. 4 (not published).

³⁸ Naval Court of Inquiry, finding XVI.

³⁹ Exhibit 1, p. 238.

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

[6801] 3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

The first 13 parts of the Japanese reply were intercepted and received by the Navy Department at about 3 p. m., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made ready for distribution by 9 p. m., Washington time, on that date. These 13 parts contained strong language. The following expressions are fairly typical of the tenor of those 13 parts:⁴⁰

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war (Part 9) . . . it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure (Part 9) . . . It is a fact of history that the countries (of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have) been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice [6802] (themselves) to the prosperity of the two nations. (Part 10).

Mr. Hull described the whole document on December 7:⁴¹

In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government of this planet was capable of uttering them.

The 13 parts and the pilot message instructing the Japanese envoys that a specific hour was later to be fixed for its delivery could mean only one thing; that war with the United States was imminent. An hour had been fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimate and for the probable outbreak of hostilities. The hour fixed would be communicated to the Japanese emissaries in Washington in a separate message to be expected shortly. Not a word of these supremely critical developments of Saturday, December 6, was sent to me. This vital information which was available at 9 p. m., Washington time, was distributed to the most important officers of the Government in Washington by midnight, Washington time. The President of the United States had it. The Secretary of the Navy had it. The Chief of Military Intelligence had it. The Director of [6803] Naval Intelligence had it. Apparently, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State were apprised of these momentous events on that same evening. Nine p. m. in Washington was 3:30 in the afternoon in Hawaii. At midnight in Washington it was early evening, 6:30 p. m., in Hawaii.

The dispatch fixing the hour for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to the United States as 1 p. m., Washington time,⁴² was intercepted and decoded by the Navy Department by 7 on the morning of December 7—7 a. m., Washington time, 1:30 a. m., Hawaiian time—nearly six and a half hours before the attack.⁴³ The translation of this short message from the Japanese was a 2-minute job.⁴⁴ Not

⁴⁰ Exhibit 1, pp. 239–244.

⁴¹ Foreign Relations of United States, Japan: 1931–41, vol. 2, p. 787.

⁴² Exhibit 1, p. 248.

⁴³ Hewitt report, p. 86.

⁴⁴ Hewitt testimony, Captain Kramer, p. 595.

later than 10:30 a. m. the Chief of Naval Operations was informed of it. This information was not supplied to me prior to the attack.

I cannot tell what the evidence at this investigation will ultimately show as to the precise hours on the morning of December 7, when various responsible officers of the Navy Department knew that 1 p. m., Washington time, was the hour fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to this Government. This much I know. There was ample time, at least an interval of approximately 2½ hours, [6804] in which a message could have been dispatched to me.

Regardless of what arguments there may be as to the evaluation of the dispatches that had been sent to me, I surely was entitled to know of the hour fixed by Japan for the probable outbreak of war against the United States. I cannot understand now—I have never understood—I may never understand—why I was deprived of the information available in the Navy Department in Washington on Saturday night and Sunday morning.

On November 28, 1941, the Navy Department could have informed me of the following vital facts:

(1) Japan had set November 29 as an immovable dead-line date for agreement with the United States.

(2) The United States gave to Japan certain proposals for a solution of Japanese-American relations on November 26. I might remark parenthetically that an authoritative statement from my Government as to the general nature of these proposals would have been most enlightening.

(3) Japan considered the United States proposals of November 26 as unacceptable and planned to rupture negotiations with the United States when he reply to them was delivered to this Government.

(4) Japan was keeping up a pretext of negotiations after November 26 to conceal a definite plan which went into effect on November, 29.

[6805] This was the type of information which I had stated in May I needed so urgently in making the difficult decisions with which I was confronted.

The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine: Would the receipt of this information have made a difference in the events of December 7? No man can now state as a fact that he would have taken a certain course of action 4 years ago had he known facts which were then unknown to him. All he can give is his present conviction on the subject, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible, and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors which then influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner.

Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor" messages on November 28, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected the Navy Department's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Midway. I would have ordered the third carrier, the Saratoga, back from the west coast. I would have gone to sea with the fleet and endeavored to keep it in an intercepting position at sea. This would have permitted the disposal of the striking power of the fleet to meet an attack in the Hawaiian area. The requirement of keeping the fleet fueled, however, would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor from time to time. [6806] time of detachments of various units of the main body of the fleet.

On December 4, ample time remained for the Navy Department to forward to me the information which I have outlined, and in addition

the following significant facts, which the Navy Department learned between November 27 and that date:

(1) Japan had informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon powers would break out sooner than anyone dreams;

(2) Japan had broadcast her winds code signal using the words "east wind rain", meaning war or a rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States.

Assuming that for the first time on December 5 I had all the important information then available in the Navy Department, it is my present conviction that I would have gone to sea with the fleet, including the carrier Lexington and arranged a rendezvous at sea with Halsey's carrier force, and been in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack.

On December 6, 15 hours before the attack, ample time still remained for the Navy Department to give me all the significant facts which I have outlined and which were not available to me in Hawaii. In addition, the Navy Department could then have advised me that 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the American proposals had been received, that the tone and temper of this message indicated [6807] a break in diplomatic relations or war with the United States, and that the Japanese reply was to be formally presented to this Government at a special hour soon to be fixed. Had I received this information on the afternoon of December 6 it is my present conviction that I would have ordered all fleet units in Pearl Harbor to sea, arranged a rendezvous with Halsey's task force returning from Wake, and been ready to intercept the Japanese force by the time fixed for the outbreak of war.

Even on the morning of December 7, 4 or 5 hours before the attack, had the Navy Department for the first time seen fit to send me all this significant information, and the additional fact that 1 p. m., Washington time, had been fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to the United States, my light forces could have moved out of Pearl Harbor, all ships in the harbor would have been at general quarters, and all resources of the fleet in instant readiness to repel an attack.

It is my conviction that action by the Navy Department at any one of these significant dates in furnishing me the information from the intercepted messages would have altered the events of December 7, 1941.

The Pacific Fleet deserved a fighting chance. It was entitled to receive from the Navy Department the best [6808] information available. Such information had been urgently requested. I had been assured that it would be furnished me. We faced our problems in the Pacific confident that such assurance would be faithfully carried out.

[6809]

PART IV—PREVIOUS PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS

Voluminous data and documents have accumulated during the course of previous Pearl Harbor investigations. The procedure adopted at certain of these investigations must be considered in placing a value on the results and conclusions which were reached.

At the proceedings of the Roberts Commission, I was told that I was not on trial.¹ I was not permitted to be present at the testimony

¹ Roberts Commission testimony, p. 581.

of other witnesses or to examine or cross-examine them. I was not permitted to know what evidence had been presented.

The Roberts Commission held sessions in Washington prior to going to Hawaii. At these sessions the highest-ranking officers of the War and Navy Departments were heard. Their testimony was not recorded. A precis was made of testimony given by responsible officers of the Navy Department.² There is also a memorandum prepared by Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, dated December 19, 1941, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, which gives a contemporaneous account of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony.³ These documents contain statements that prior to the attack I was [6810] given all the information available to the Navy Department.⁴ It appears that the so-called magic or intercepted messages were freely discussed before the Commission. Consequently, it is likely that the Commission received the impression that the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were either forwarded to me by Washington or available to me in Pearl Harbor. The Director of War Plans, Admiral Turner, testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry to the effect that he may have given the Roberts Commission the impression that I was familiar with these intercepted dispatches because that was his information at the time.⁵

I do not intend to suggest that any of these responsible officers deliberately misled the Roberts Commission as to my receipt of the "magic messages." It was tragic, however, that the Commission did not ask me about this matter. No question was addressed to me on the subject of my knowledge of the intercepted Japanese dispatches. I had no opportunity to correct any misinformation which the Roberts Commission may have received as to my receipt of this information. I had no way of knowing what evidence had been given the Commission other than my own testimony. It was more than 2 years after the Commission concluded its proceedings before I [6811] was permitted to know what evidence had been presented to the Commission.

In June of 1944, the Congress, by statute, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to make investigations. The Naval Court of Inquiry was appointed for this purpose. The three admirals who sat on the court were selected by the Secretary of the Navy. The court proceedings lasted several months. I was present at all hearings, was represented by counsel, introduced evidence, examined, and cross-examined witnesses. This proceeding was the only one of the secret investigations of Pearl Harbor in which these basic American rights were accorded to me.

The Naval Court of Inquiry found unanimously that there was no ground for criticism of my decisions or actions. The findings of the naval court were not made public, however, until August 28, 1945. When they appeared in the press, I learned for the first time that the Naval Court of Inquiry had found that I was not guilty of any dereliction of duty or errors of judgment.

On February 6, 1945, I wrote to the Secretary of the Navy requesting permission to read the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations

¹ Record, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, p. 5021.

² Record, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, pp. 4891-4900.

³ Record, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, pp. 4893-4895, 5022.

⁴ Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony of Admiral Turner, vol. 4, p. 1018, question 158.

of the Naval Court. On February 13, 1945, the Secretary of the Navy denied my request.

In May of 1945, long after the Naval Court of Inquiry [6812] had filed its report, the Secretary of the Navy detailed Admiral Hewitt to conduct a further secret investigation into Pearl Harbor. I learned from the public press that this investigation had begun. On May 8, 1945, I wrote to the Secretary requesting permission to be present at the hearings before Admiral Hewitt, to introduce evidence, to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The Secretary of the Navy denied my request in a letter of May 14, 1945.

On May 24, 1945, I wrote again to the Secretary requesting that he reconsider his decision to exclude me from the Hewitt investigation. The Secretary of the Navy never replied. The Hewitt investigation went ahead in secret.

On the basis of this secret investigation, the Secretary, in effect set aside the verdict of the Naval Court of Inquiry.

With these facts the American people will know how to evaluate the various investigations into Pearl Harbor. If this investigation succeeds in preserving for the future the pertinent facts about Pearl Harbor, I shall be content. History, with the perspective of the long tomorrow, will enter the final directive in my case. I am confident of that verdict.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 4 o'clock, and the Chair was advised in advance that if Admiral Kimmel did not finish [6813] reading his statement until 4, he would rather not proceed now to examine.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the hearing was recessed until tomorrow morning, Wednesday, January 16, 1945, at 10 a. m.)

[6814]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson and Brewster and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[6815] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chairman is detained a few moments and we will go ahead. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, in relation to the letter written by Mr. Justice Roberts read yesterday, I would like to call attention for the record to the minutes of the meeting of the Roberts Committee on January 21, 1942. It is just one page and if I might put it into the record I would like to do so.

January 21, 1942.

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m. at room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were in attendance.

The Commission went into an Executive Session which continued until 1:10 o'clock p. m., when the Commission took a recess until 2:45 p. m.

At that time the Commission reconvened and resumed the Executive Session until 6:30 o'clock p. m., when there was an adjournment until Thursday, January 22, 1942, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.

[6816] At 3:00 o'clock p. m., the Secretary of the Navy, having been—

This is the part I had in mind calling to the attention of the committee and for the record:

At 3:00 o'clock p. m. the Secretary of the Navy, having been shown certain proposed findings of fact, stated that he suggested no changes for safeguarding the national interest, in any of the statements, except one in Finding No. 20. This was then differently phrased.

At 4:30 o'clock p. m. Brigadier General Gerow, designated by the Chief of Staff, after examining the same findings for the same purpose, stated to the Recorder that he found no changes to suggest, and the Recorder so informed the Commission.

Signed Owen J. Roberts, Chairman.

Signed Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder.

Signed Albert J. Schneider, Clerk.

Now, if we examine the Roberts report, that was printed as Document No. 159 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, second session, I find only 19 paragraphs. The nineteenth finding is on page 16 and carries over on page 17. There is no No. 20 finding. Whereas in the minutes of the Commission it says "except one in finding No. 20. This was then differently phrased."

I think we should have that as part of the record, indicating that the finding No. 20 does now not appear in the record, as indicated by document No. 159 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, second session. [6817]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is all. It is to clear up that matter of yesterday.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, might I, in that connection, ask whether it is contemplated that that will be taken up further with Justice Roberts to find out what the report was on that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was a suggestion yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that it was possible that the reading of the Roberts' letter might dispense with the necessity of calling Justice Roberts as a witness.

My attention was called later to the idea that he might still be asked to appear as a witness. I would like to inquire now whether any member of the committee would like to have me arrange to have Mr. Justice Roberts present himself for examination in connection with the point brought up by Senator Ferguson, or any other point in connection with the report in which the committee is interested.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have Justice Roberts called as a witness, particularly with regard to the minutes that I read this morning indicating that there [6818] were 20 findings and there are only 19 appearing in the official document. Also if he had a conversation, which is indicated in the letter, for several hours with the President on this particular case and on his findings, and so forth, we may obtain information there that would help to explain some of the things now before the committee.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson has submitted his request. Are there any other requests?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say on the record that I cannot see why we should call Justice Roberts, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, when we are not calling any members of the Army Board, we are not calling any members of the Navy Board.

Of course, it may be that the gentleman wants to talk to him because he talked to President Roosevelt.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask Senator Ferguson this question: I haven't examined the report to which the Senator refers. Do I understand that each one of those paragraphs presents a separate finding within itself?

Senator FERGUSON. That is true. They relate to each other but they are the findings.

[6819] Senator LUCAS. I was wondering whether the report might not include the entire findings even though there are only 19 paragraphs in it.

Senator FERGUSON. But I can't tell that from the report itself and from the minutes. That is the reason I think it is material that we find out. Particularly is this true because we haven't been able up to now to locate the original of a report from a commission named by the President.

Senator LUCAS. The only point I was attempting to make was whether or not the report itself sets out definitely one finding after another.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. There are a number of findings in there?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that it is altogether desirable that Justice Roberts should appear, as I think there is something that would be not clear to any further student of this situation in the letter of Justice Roberts that we had read yesterday. He said:

I replied that the Commission had submitted the fact findings (but not the report) to the Secretaries of War and Navy and had been advised by each of them that there could [6820] be no objection to the publication of the facts as the Commission had stated them in its report.

I assume the Justice there referred to the final draft after the changes had been made, but that was, of course, the object of the committee in its original inquiry, as to whether there were changes made subsequent to the first determinations of the Commission, and I am sure Justice Roberts would be helpful in clarifying that situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, so that the record will be complete, I would like to say that in the testimony of the Roberts Commission itself there was a statement made that all of the testimony would be submitted to both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy in order to have them pass on it, to see whether or not there was anything there that would affect national security, that would affect national interest, or would affect national defense, and as to whether or not that in being made public would affect them.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that was proper. The clear implication of the Roberts letter is that no changes were made as a result of that inquiry and it would appear from the record Senator Ferguson has read clearly there were certain changes which may well have been in the public interest at that time but might affect the record as far as subsequent developments were concerned.

[6821] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request that former Associate Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court be requested to appear as a witness in this hearing.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection but I prophesy now that he won't add anything to this Pearl Harbor inquiry outside of taking a little more time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

(No response.)

The Chair hears none and the counsel will please arrange for the appearance of Justice Roberts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I should like to offer at this time a number of exhibits for the record that came to my attention in connection with an examination of the record and of Admiral Kimmel's statement in his prior testimony. I do not regard them as particularly important and they are not new but in order that the historical documents in the case may be complete and since some questions may be asked concerning some of these exhibits, I have had copies prepared and laid before the members of the committee and I should like permission now to have the various documents marked as exhibits and offered in evidence at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You will please proceed and call the attention of the committee to the documents and give the number of the exhibit. They will be admitted as exhibits for the record.

[6822] **Mr. MASTEN.** As the next exhibit, which I believe is 113, we would like to offer the document entitled "Pacific Fleet Employment Schedules, Fall and Winter, 1941." This includes a letter dated August 13, 1941, signed by Admiral Kimmel, the employment schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.

In addition, we are having duplicated the employment schedule for Task Force 9, which will be offered as soon as it has been duplicated.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This will be received as Exhibit 113.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 114, we would like to offer photostatic copy of WPAC-46, which is Admiral Kimmel's implementation of Rainbow 5.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that before members of the committee?

Mr. MASTEN. We did not have the 10 copies necessary for each member of the committee, but we have distributed as many as we had, and we will obtain the other copies, but did not get them this morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That will be accepted as Exhibit 114.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 114.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 115, we would like to offer a collection of three documents. The first is entitled "Communi- [6823] cation Intelligence Summaries Concerning Location of Japanese Fleet Units, 1 November 1941 to 6 December 1941."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is 115?

Mr. MASTEN. One hundred and fifteen; yes. The second part of Exhibit 115 is entitled "Intelligence Reports by Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, 27 October 1941 to 2 December 1941."

The third part of Exhibit 115 is entitled, "Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum of 1 December 1941—Location of Japanese Fleet Units."

We would like to offer all of those as Exhibit 115.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be so received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 115.")

Mr. MASTEN. As exhibit 116 we would like to offer a compilation of all of the correspondence which we have found dealing with the subject of antitorpedo nets. Certain of this correspondence has already been offered as part of the record included in the present exhibit, but this brings together in one compilation all of the correspondence in that connection. We offer that as Exhibit 116.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let us see a little more clearly just what that is. Hold up the document.

Mr. MASTEN. This is a compilation of letters the first of which is dated February 11, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

[6824] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is 116?

Mr. MASTEN. 116.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 116.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 117, we would like to offer a collection of correspondence, the first of which is a letter dated 16 January 1941, from the Commander Patrol Wing 2 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This correspondence is offered to complete the record on the subject of the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. There are a number of other documents in this connection that are already in exhibits, but they do not include the correspondence which we now offer as Exhibit 117.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 117.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 117.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 118, we would like to offer the daily memoranda dated 30 November 1941 and December 5, 1941, prepared by Admiral Kimmel and entitled "Steps To Be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War Within the Next 24 Hours." It is our understanding that no memoranda were prepared on the days of December 1, 2, 3, and 4, that these two are the only ones that exist. We offer them as Exhibit 118.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 118.

[6825] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 118.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 119, we offer the document entitled, "Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station 7 December 1941." This includes the communications between the Destroyer *Ward* and the radio station in connection with the dropping of depth charges on the submarine on the morning of 7 December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 119.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 119.")

Mr. MASTEN. As the last exhibit this morning, which will be No. 120, we offer two reports, the first of which is a memorandum for Admiral Kimmel signed by Admiral Bellinger and dated December 19, 1941, and the second of which is a memorandum dated 2 January 1942, also signed by Admiral Bellinger, to which is attached a report of the Army-Navy Board dated 31 October 1941, referred to in the memorandum of 1 January.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 120.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 120.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete the exhibits?

Mr. MASTEN. That completes all of those that are ready this morning. There will be a few others.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to inquire as to this document that appears to be before all members.

[6826] Mr. MASTEN. That is the Pacific War Plan 46 which was offered as Exhibit 114.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what you referred to as the photostat?

Mr. MASTEN. That is right. That is all we have this morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further at this time before the examination of the witness begins?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything further you desire to present to the committee before the examination of counsel begins?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I have nothing further.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed with the examination of the witness.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral Kimmel, you have spent 40 years in the Navy, according to your testimony yesterday?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How much time and what have been your assignments in the Pacific area during those 40 years, generally?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will have to think a minute. I was in the Pacific area first in 1908 on a cruise around the world, when we went around South America up the west coast to Hawaii, Australia, Manila, Japan, China, and the rest of the way around the world.

In 1913 I was in the Pacific. I served on the staff of Admiral Thomas B. Howard and later Cameron Winslow, who were successively commanders in chief of the Pacific Fleet. I was a fleet gunnery officer at that time.

In 1923 to 1925 I was in the Asiatic Fleet.

In 1921 I was in the Pacific Fleet. Oh, I suppose all the time I was in command of a battleship or command of a squadron of destroyers I was in the Pacific except for brief visits to the Atlantic. As a matter of fact, the last duty I did in the Atlantic was about 1911, except for a period during the first war, First World War, when I was with Admiral Rodman in the American detachment of battleships with the British Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you join the Pacific Fleet prior to your appointment as commander in chief of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I joined the Pacific Fleet in the summer of 1938. I took command of the Seventh Heavy Cruiser Division with the *San Francisco* as flagship. I cruised in the Pacific and when we came to the Atlantic for the war game I made a trip around South America with three cruisers on a good will tour and I visited all the principal ports of South [6828] America. After that I shifted my flag to the *Honolulu*, which was the flagship of the cruisers for the Battle Force, that is, the light cruisers, and from that time until I became commander in chief—this was in 1939—I was in command of the cruisers of the Battle Force and I cruised with the fleet. When the fleet went to Hawaii in 1940 I went out there with the fleet and except for about 2 weeks when I came back to the coast I stayed out there until I was relieved as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your specific command at the time you were promoted was what?

Admiral KIMMEL. My specific command at the time I was promoted was three divisions of light cruisers. They included two divi-

sions of the *Boise* class, which were probably some of the most effective units we had in the fleet. I trained them and I think I contributed somewhat to their efficiency.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you retire from the Navy, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I retired from the Navy on the 1st of March, 1942.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you relate the circumstances leading up to and in connection with your retirement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have some documents here which I have [6829] prepared on that subject, which gives a factual account. I will review it briefly rather than read it. If I make any mistakes you can readily correct it from this record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it might be well, in view of the nature of the testimony, if this compilation might be offered as an exhibit since copies are now being distributed to members of the committee. I have not seen this compilation myself up to now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the number of the exhibit?

Mr. RICHARDSON. 121.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 121.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Admiral.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 121.")

Admiral KIMMEL. After I was relieved I was ordered back to the west coast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when were you relieved?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was relieved on the 17th day of December 1941. I stayed in Hawaii for several weeks and after I had completed my testimony before the Roberts Commission I was ordered to the west coast and I went to San Francisco.

I waited in San Francisco for whatever disposition they wished to make. The Roberts Commission report was published and about 2 or 3 days—a few days after the Roberts [6830] Commission report was published Admiral Greenslade, Rear Admiral Greenslade then Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District, got in touch with me, told me he had an official communication from the Navy Department for me. He informed me that Admiral Randall Jacobs, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, had telephoned him an official message to be delivered to me that the Acting Secretary of the Navy had informed him that General Short had submitted a request for retirement. That was the message.

Up to that time I had not considered submitting any request for retirement; it never entered my head. I thought the matter over and decided if that was the way the Navy Department wanted to arrange this affair that I would not stand in their way. I wrote a request for retirement and I submitted it.

A few days later Admiral Greenslade told me that he had a telephone message from Admiral Stark in which Stark assured him that this information which had been supplied to me was not intended to influence me in submitting a request for retirement, that I was free to do as I thought best. Of course I was free to do as I thought best.

In reply to that I submitted a letter to the Navy Department under date of January 28, 1942, in which I stated:

Reference (A) was submitted after I had been officially informed by the Navy Department that General Short [6831] had requested retirement.

I was officially informed today by the Navy Department that my notification of General Short's request was not intended to influence my decision to submit a similar request.

I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service.

That went along. I had various communications from Admiral Stark in the meanwhile which are included here. The the storm of criticism arose because I was running out on them and on February 22 I wrote this letter to Admiral Stark.

[6832] DEAR BETTY: I started writing this letter a few minutes after Pye gave me your letter of 21 February. I thank you for the letter and for the information contained therein. I also thank you for your other letters which I have not answered.

I understand from your letter that I will not be retired for the present, that I will be in a leave status until some further action is taken.

I submitted my request for retirement because I was notified that Short had done so and took that notification as a suggestion for me to do likewise. I submitted this request solely to permit the department to take whatever action they deemed best for the interests of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment.

When I was notified that the notification in regard to Short was not meant to put pressure on me, I submitted my second letter on the subject.

When the fact that Short and I had submitted requests for retirement was published to the country, I was astounded that the department would put Short and me in such light before the public.

On February 19, I received notification by the [6833] Secretary that I would be placed on the retired list on March 1, 1942. Paragraph 2 of this letter states, "This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action."

I do not understand this paragraph unless it is to be published to the country as a promise that I will be disciplined at some future time.

I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences of my acts. I do not wish to embarrass the government in the conduct of the war. I do feel, however, that my crucifixion before the public has about reached the limit. I am in daily receipt of letters from irresponsible people over the country taking me to task and even threatening to kill me. I am not particularly concerned except as it shows the effect on the public of articles published about me.

I feel that the publication of paragraph two of the Secretary's letter of February 16 will further inflame the public and do me a great injustice.

I have kept my mouth shut and propose to continue to do so as long as it is humanly possible.

I regret the losses at Pearl Harbor just as keenly, or perhaps more keenly than any other American citizen. [6834] I wish that I had been smarter than I was and able to foresee what happened on December 7. I devoted all my energies to the job and made the dispositions which appeared to me to be called for. I cannot now reproach myself for any lack of effort.

I will not comment on the Report of the Commission, but you probably know what I think of it. I will say in passing that I was not made an interested party or a defendant.

All this I have been willing to accept for the good of the country out of my loyalty to the Nation, and to await the judgment of history when all the factors can be published.

But I do think that in all justice the department should do nothing further to inflame the public against me. I am entitled to some consideration even though you may consider I erred grievously.

You must appreciate that the beating I have taken leaves very little that can be added to my burden.

I appreciate your efforts on my behalf and will always value your friendship, which is a precious thing to me.

My kindest regards always.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL

To: Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.
(Written in San Francisco, California.)

[6835] That letter went forward on the 22d of February.

Admiral Stark apparently did not even know that the papers retiring me had left the Navy Department. In any event, I was retired and the Secretary promised the public to give me a general court martial.

I subsequently learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Acting Secretary of the Navy who had directed him to inform me of General Short's retirement was Mr. Knox.

In my request for retirement, the original request, I stated that I stood ready to perform any duty that the Navy Department would assign to me. In order to keep the record straight, on 21 April 1942 I submitted an official letter to the Bureau of Navigation in which I stated:

Supplementing the statement in my request for retirement dated 28 January 1942, I wish to again state that I stand ready to perform any duty to which the Navy Department may assign me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You received no assignment?

Admiral KIMMEL. I received no assignment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When Admiral Stark testified, Admiral Kimmel, he stated that there never at any time was anything between you and him except the closest personal friendship. Do you agree with that statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I agree in that statement. I [6836] had known Admiral Stark since Naval Academy days. I had served with him on several occasions; I had the highest regard for him; I trusted him, and I felt he was one of my best friends. I had that feeling, but I cannot forget the fact that—well, events that have occurred since then.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you say that your relations during your term of duty at Hawaii were friendly and cooperative with the various naval officers connected with Admiral Stark in the Office of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are not conscious at this time that that office, or anyone in it, had any personal dislike or hostility to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had not that idea at any time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And is that also true with respect to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I felt the Secretary of the Navy was a very loyal friend of mine, Mr. Knox. I had known the Secretary only slightly. I met him when he came to Hawaii in September, I think it was, of 1940. He was sent by Admiral Richardson—I will put it this way: Admiral Richardson arranged for a schedule for him to visit various types of ships with various flag officers, and Secretary Knox spent about 3 days with me in my flag [6837] ship while we were at sea, and that was when I came to know him, and about the only time I knew him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You know of no reason, admiral, why there should have been the slightest difficulty in a complete liaison between the Office of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy in Washington, and your command in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had not any question in my mind. None.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, admiral, it would be fair to say, would it not, that your experience in the Pacific had given you a very intensified superior knowledge of naval conditions in the Pacific area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I had served there a good while.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Subject to your ability to understand those conditions, you have had plenty of opportunity to find out what that work was?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had plenty of opportunity; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And those contacts of yours in the Pacific gave you an extensive and detailed contact with Japan, and its representatives?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I did not have detailed contact with the representatives of Japan. I had some contacts with them. I had never lived in Japan. I visited in Japan [6838] on occasions, two or three times, but I had no opportunity to obtain any profound knowledge of the Japanese people by contacts with them.

The knowledge I had came principally from reading, and I did that extensively.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The only important power in the Pacific of direct interest to the United States was Japan, was it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in all of your war plans from the time you first went to the Pacific and up to the 7th of December, Orange in those plans meant Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And all of those plans were directed at the exigency of possible war with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in connection with those plans there was constantly in the minds of you and the other officers in charge of our Navy in the Pacific what would be done or could be done, and how it should be done in the event hostilities with Japan should ever eventuate?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will put it this way:

The only war plan that was called for in the Pacific, and the only one of which I had any knowledge, was the [6839] Orange war plan, and all of our thoughts, so far as the Pacific war was concerned, were directed against Japan, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it had come to be a fixed feeling among the naval officers familiar with Pacific missions that sooner or later it was extremely likely there would be a war with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think that is a fair statement that a good body of opinion in the Navy felt that a war with Japan was coming sooner or later. There was, however, a considerable number of officers in the Navy who felt that Japan and the United States would have no real reason to fight, and principally because if Japan did ever start anything, they would be wiped off the map.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As a matter of fact, Admiral, there was quite a divergence of opinion in the Navy as to how long it would take to accomplish that result, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. In a body of that kind there is always a considerable number of different opinions, but in my thoughts about Japan, and my studies at the War College, and other places, everything I knew and read about, confirmed what President Theodore

Roosevelt is purported to have said back in about 1905 or 1906, and [6840] that was that forces necessary to lick Japan in the Pacific would take a fleet equal to the then British Fleet, plus an army equal to the then German Army, and that anybody who embarked on a Pacific war with any other idea was in for a great awakening.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In 1941, all of this situation with respect to the probability of war with Japan immensely increased, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And may it be fairly said that it was the opinion of the high naval command in the Pacific that the peaceful situation between Japan and the United States was constantly deteriorating day by day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that it seemed quite probable, from a military standpoint, that war would result?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[6841] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in 1941 there was a shooting war in the Atlantic?

Admiral KIMMEL. Beginning in the summer, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was known to the high command in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was the subject of certain conversations and correspondence between you and the Office of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You understood that it was the settled military policy that the war in the Atlantic was to have precedence over the situation in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is one way of putting it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there was during 1941 a transfer to operations in the Atlantic, and operations relating to the Atlantic, of the overwhelming majority of all of our munitions of war and ships and other equipment in aid of the Atlantic situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and that was something I tried to put a few brakes on, and I felt that a strong Pacific Fleet was a real deterrent to Japan and, as I think you will find in my correspondence—this is no afterthought—I stated then that a weaker one might be an invitation.

[6842] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, at its top strength the Pacific Fleet during 1940 and 1941 was never strong enough to meet in battle the main Japanese Fleet, was it, on equal terms?

Admiral KIMMEL. If you could have gotten the two fleets out and lined them up and eliminated all questions of logistics and just gotten them into battle with the fleet prior to the time they made the transfer to the Atlantic—well, it would have been a nice mix-up, and it would not have been all one-sided by any means.

But when you speak of a fleet in the Pacific sufficient to defeat Japan, we are speaking of something entirely different from what you have spoken of. We are speaking of a fleet which can go to Japanese waters and force them out and defeat them in their own home waters, and none of our plans ever stopped short of that, and we never at any time until this war started had the Navy to implement that plan.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And until we had this policy of ours in the Atlantic you never contemplated that the war against Japan in the Pacific would be given secondary consideration?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. By the Government?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. We were forced into that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now early in 1941 this fleet in the Pacific was materially weakened by the withdrawal of a [6843] battleship and several cruisers, several destroyers, and other naval vessels?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, not the withdrawal of "a" battleship, but it was a withdrawal of a division of three battleships which, incidentally, were probably the strongest ships we had in the fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were removed from the Pacific area to the Atlantic area?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were removed, 3 battleships, 1 carrier, 18 destroyers, and 4 of the most modern and most effective light cruisers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who recommended that withdrawal?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know. I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion that you knew of pro and con on whether that withdrawal should be made at the time it was made?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not with me. I think you will recall I had a letter setting forth this plan in which Admiral Stark says, "I am telling you, not arguing with you."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, following that, Admiral, there was another proposed attempt to further weaken the Pacific Fleet by an additional assignment of additional fighting ships to the Atlantic area, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[6844] Mr. RICHARDSON. Just what part did you plan in connection with that event?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was in the Navy Department, having come here for an official conference, in June of 1941, and Mr. Knox, I think, came back from a cabinet meeting and stated that they had decided to transfer another division of battleships, another carrier, four cruisers, and a number of destroyers to the Atlantic from the Pacific. I heard that, and I was very much concerned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because I felt that we should make every effort to keep Japan out of the war. I felt that the way to keep Japan out of the war was to have a fleet out there which would deter them from doing anything. I felt in case we did get into a war with Japan and if we had been further reduced by another increment equal to the first, leaving us one-half as strong as we had been in 1940, that we would be in a bad way.

Subsequently, when I had an interview with Mr. Roosevelt, I told him just that. As I recall his conversation, he said, "Well they told me from the Navy Department that that would be all right." "Well," I said, "whoever told you was crazy. It just is ridiculous," and eventually that transfer was not made.

[6845] Mr. RICHARDSON. As an experienced naval officer, Admiral, what is and what was during 1941 the importance of the Pacific Fleet in the Pacific to the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the importance of the Pacific Fleet was to keep Japan out of the war, and failing that, to be in a position to stop their advance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any other defense of importance in the entire Pacific Ocean to our western coast than this Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. May I have that question again?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you read it, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there were many important elements out there: The bases on the Pacific coast, the productive capacity of the Pacific coast, the bases at Hawaii. The fleet was a very important part, and perhaps the most important part, of the defense of the coast at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It was the only major naval power we had in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. It was all the naval power we had in the Pacific except the detachment in the Asiatic known as the Asiatic Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And how extensive a detachment was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they had a squadron of destroyers, [6846] a number of submarines, about two light cruisers, and we had—the Navy Department had, I mean, deliberately kept that fleet down there for two reasons. One was that unless they could put a sufficient fleet in the Asiatic to meet the Japanese Fleet it was not good policy to sacrifice ships out there, and the other was we had no means of maintaining a fleet in the Asiatic.

In the weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of war we transferred most of our submarines from the Pacific to the Asiatic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the base of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. What was the basis of it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The base. What was its base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Manila, I should say. They had other bases out there, but Manila was the principal one.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With the exception of the Manila base the only major base we had in the Pacific was at Pearl Harbor, was it not, away from the mainland?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I would say Pearl Harbor was the only base we had in the Pacific. Manila was by no means a major base at that time. All it afforded was ample anchorage space.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The main base was Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[6847] Mr. RICHARDSON. And had been such for years, had it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Pearl Harbor is located on the island of Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the island of Oahu is a small island?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the base is very largely surrounded by mountains?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The base itself is a shallow harbor, is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Difficult of entrance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is not a difficult navigational problem, but there is only one entrance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is narrow, long, and somewhat winding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is fairly straight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is no place in the base where major ships can be hidden or camouflaged?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the base is of such a nature and location that anyone with a pair of spy glasses who wants to climb any one of 100 mountains can see the entire base and [6848] everything in it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there is no possible way of avoiding it except by keeping human beings away from the mountains with spy glasses?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I might add, with cameras also.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How close is it possible for the casual observer to get to the Pearl Harbor base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, it is my recollection maybe 100 yards, 200 yards, something of that kind.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now our two main military establishments in Hawaii are Hickam Field and Shafter, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Hickam Field and what other?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Shafter. Isn't it Shafter where the general of the Army has his headquarters?

Admiral KIMMEL. Shafter?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They are the two military establishments on Oahu, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Schofield Barracks.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Schofield, I mean; not Shafter.

Admiral KIMMEL. Shafter is another. Then they have a [6849] number of small forts scattered around.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What are two or three of the largest?

Admiral KIMMEL. Schofield Barracks is the largest. Shafter is the next. I suggest you get the details from General Short. I may be a little mixed up in names.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, in location, Admiral, they are all fairly close to Pearl Harbor, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I do not remember the exact dimensions of Oahu, but I think it is something like 40 by 25 miles, something like that. Isn't that about right?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, they are close enough, are they not, Admiral, so that it is perfectly practicable for one air attack to attack all of those establishments at Pearl Harbor on the same operation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Provided you have enough planes, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, if we are to have any defense in the Pacific worthy of the name the thing of the most supreme importance in the Pacific is the Pacific Fleet, is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Do you mean now?

Mr. RICHARDSON. At any time in the last half-dozen years.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in order to have a Pacific Fleet functioning there must be a base for that fleet?

[6850] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but the experiences of this war have pretty well demonstrated that the fleet can take its own base

with them, and that is something that our Navy had been working on for many years, and I think it is in pretty good shape at the present time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But that was not the situation in the summer of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And with conditions as they were in the summer of 1941 would you not agree with me that the protection of the Pacific Fleet was of the highest importance to the interest of the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now what is the significance, Admiral—

Admiral KIMMEL. I just want to interject one little thought. You cannot spend all your time protecting yourself. If you do you do not get anywhere.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I was just going to come to that. What is the significance of a base for a fleet such as you had in Hawaii in 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I cannot give any better definition than I have already given. It is in the statement taken from the joint action of the Army and Navy in a plan known long before it was enunciated, and the basic point of that is that [6851] a permanent naval base must have within itself the means for its own defense and for the defense of all the naval units which are based thereon, and that the fleet must have no anxiety as to the security of its base. That was laid down many, many years before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now it is essential, is it not, Admiral, in the operation of such a fleet as you had there in the summer of 1941, that that fleet make use of the Pearl Harbor base at regular intervals?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was no alternative.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What use would the fleet be absolutely required to make of the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the first place, the thing that tied the fleet to the base more than any other one factor was the question of fuel. We had the fuel at Pearl Harbor. During the time I was there, as I stated in this statement, I tried to operate more ships at sea and found I could not do it because I was depleting the fuel supply at a time when it was imperative that we bring this fuel supply up. Every move I made I had to get back to that base to get some fuel.

The facilities for fueling in Pearl Harbor were such that you could not fuel more than about one-eighth of the [6852] fleet in any 12-hour period. And the tankers we had were entirely inadequate to support that whole fleet at sea for indefinite periods.

I had gone to great lengths in order to get the tankers equipped for fueling ships at sea, and we were running our tankers betwixt the mainland and Hawaii and having them away long enough to have these exercises at sea in fueling and to keep up the fuel supply there. It was a nice balance that we had to maintain.

The policy that I did follow out there—and it was forced on me more than anything else—and when the time came we did have the place full of fuel, and I have been informed that, I think in the first 6 months after the war started, they used up more than half of that

stored fuel before they could get their supply coming out to keep it replenished and to keep the fleet replenished.

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, Admiral, the fuel supply in Pearl Harbor is kept in a lot of metal tanks?

Admiral KIMMEL. Was kept in metal tanks.

Mr. RICHARDSON. On the edge of the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Perfectly visible?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Perfectly subject to air attack?

[6853] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But fortunately not touched by the attack of December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If that supply of fuel in the Pearl Harbor base had been destroyed by that attack, could you have continued to maintain your Fleet at the Pearl Harbor base in the future?

Admiral KIMMEL. With the facilities I had at that time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What would you have had to have done?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have had to withdraw to the Coast where I could get fuel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were familiar, were you not, Admiral, with the dispute between Washington and Admiral Richardson with respect to where the Fleet should be stationed?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In that controversy did the question of the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor ever become the subject of discussion?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never took part in any of those discussions. I think you better get that answer from Admiral Richardson. However, I think from all my knowledge of it that [6854] his prime idea was to put the Fleet in a place where it could train more expeditiously. All of this that you speak of was well-known to Admiral Richardson, the Navy Department, and everybody concerned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, on the question of fuel alone, there always hung over the safety of the Pearl Harbor base the protection of that fuel supply?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now from the very start of your connection with the Pacific Fleet as its commander in chief, you knew, did you not, Admiral, what that base in Hawaii and what your fleet should have in connection with the base by way of equipment in order to properly defend the base and defend the Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think if you will read my letters written during that period you can arrive at that conclusion.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that constantly from the time you took charge of that fleet you bombarded Washington for more planes, more anti-aircraft guns, more ammunition and more men?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you think that those additional items were necessary in order to properly protect the fleet and defend the base?

[6855] Admiral KIMMEL. I adopted the scheme of providing as far as I could for all eventualities. I wanted Hawaii to be secure not only for the protection of the fleet while it was in there, but for the protection of the base, for the facilities, the fuel supply at all times, and I wanted the fleet free to move and accomplish something.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What would you have had to have had that you did not have to accomplish those results? Let me put it affirmatively.

You needed more patrol planes, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a combination—

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not saying, Admiral, what you had or the devices that you used to make what you had go as far as possible, I am simply stating now, as a naval expert, when you took charge of the Pacific Fleet what did you need to be sent to you as commander in chief of the fleet in order to protect the fleet and protect the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I should say the protection of the base was an Army responsibility.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I understand that.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was not what I needed. I did not command the Army in Hawaii, I had no command over them whatsoever. It was what the Army needed for the defense of Hawaii.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In order to make my question clear, I [6856] am entirely familiar, Admiral, with your suggestion that it is a military axiom that the fleet is not supposed to protect its own base.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the duty of the Army. But there never was a time at Hawaii, was there, Admiral, when the protection of the base was not part of the duty of the fleet, under your cooperative arrangement that you made with the Army in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, if you are talking about what steps I took after I came there in command, we had a condition to face and not any theory.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the condition?

Admiral KIMMEL. The condition was that the Army had a handful of planes, the Army was short of a great many things. Subsequent to the effort that we made in the early days of my command out there they got a few planes. They got some fighters, they got some B-17 bombers. At one time the Army was built up to 27 B-17's—I think that figure is correct—and we had promises of more. Then the War Department ordered the bombers transferred to the Philippines and all of those B-17's disappeared to the westward, along with some others, except 12, and in the process of outfitting them at Hickam Field they stripped 6 of those 12 planes to such an extent [6857] that they were not in commission.

That was the way we found ourselves on December 7th.

Now the Army had allocated—and I speak from memory—about 180 B-17's. The Navy had allocated 160 patrol planes to Oahu, and with that 160 patrol planes plus the 180 bombers—and we had hopes always, you see—this condition would have been quite different.

The allocations were all right, but what we had was all wrong.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In order to properly defend the base and the fleet in connection with the base, it was necessary, was it not, to have Navy patrol planes to carry on that type of reconnaissance which would disclose an approaching enemy force in the ocean?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. And furthermore, to have available a striking force of bombers and torpedoes, and what not, who would go out and destroy the approaching force. It does not profit you much to discover the enemy if you cannot hit him with anything.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you had neither the planes with which to discover nor the planes with which to hit him after you discovered him?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you so advised Washington?

[6858] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the fact is, Admiral, is it not, that as a matter of naval policy you were directed to carry on and maintain a defensive position in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the only departure that was contemplated in WPL-46 was a raiding move toward the mandated islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. The most important part of any defensive attitude is the offensive action you take to carry it out. We speak of defensive in the sense of strategic defensive, not a tactical defensive.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, with the size of fleet that you had in Hawaii during the summer of 1941 you were not in a position to inaugurate a grand offensive?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Against the Japanese Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. A main offensive involved going into the Japanese waters. What we had there would permit us to make raids on the Marshalls. This was a Navy Department plan, and I was carrying out the plan. We hoped to divert the strength of the Japanese away from the Malay Barrier, to ease the pressure on the British and Dutch, and to do as much damage as we could to the enemy.

[6859-6959] Incidentally, we had Wake Island and we planned, in the days before Pearl Harbor, that we could use Wake Island as more or less of a bait to catch detachments of the Japanese Fleet down there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, if you had any naval disaster in the Hawaiian area, was there any place you could look for immediate aid?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we could look for immediate aid by planes from the coast, that they would send out.

Incidentally, I have been informed, although not in detail, that in the days immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor a great many planes of good type did appear there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the only relief they could give to you would come from the mainland?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And from the mainland bases?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that, as a matter of fact, Admiral, it can be fairly stated, can it not, that your main defense for yourself in the Pacific lay in your own hands and that of the Army at Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; we were out there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now you not only found when you went there, Admiral, a shortage of planes which could make [6960] recon-

naissance and planes which could attack upon a reconnaissance, but you also found the base deficient in antiaircraft defenses, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. And in fighter planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Leaving the fighter planes, there was also a shortage of antiaircraft guns, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And part of your requests to Washington asked for an assignment of more of those guns?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[6961] Mr. RICHARDSON. Were they an essential part of the defense of the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I think so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Those guns would be ordinarily under the control of the Army, would they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but we wanted additional antiaircraft guns for our outlying island bases. We requested that on many occasions.

Incidentally, on the 29th of November of 1941, I received a dispatch from the Navy Department in which the—well, here is the dispatch:

Arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be best that can be done under the circumstances, but suggest advisability of transferring very many of 221.

That is a Marine fighting squadron.

—from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga. War Department will instruct Commanding General, Hawaiian Department to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of marines. War Department will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses, but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon.

Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37-millimeter AA guns and receive ammunition in February. You desire these guns for Midway and Wake. Request Airmail report on present defenses of all outlying bases and these increases planned in immediate future.

When I got that dispatch, I sent another dispatch—I don't see it here—to the Navy Department, in which I urged that inasmuch as they were going to supply us with sixteen 37-mm. AA guns for the marines in December, that they give us at least 3,000 rounds of ammunition to teach the people at least how to use them when they got the ammunition in February.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, was this condition that I have been talking about with respect to the need of planes and antiaircraft guns and the other equipment which you felt was essential to the protection of the base—the fleet's interest in the base—ever furnished you in sufficient quantities to meet the need?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not completely, no. And when you say "furnished me," you mean furnished the Army in Hawaii?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. Admiral, I plead guilty to the fact of not being able all the while to separate in my mind the Army and the Navy in Hawaii, but that is due to the fact, and I am going to ask you, whether you didn't enter into a cooperative defense arrangement in late 1941 in which you were both for one and one for both?

[6963] Admiral KIMMEL. I entered into that early in February of 1941. I issued a letter which is entitled "2 CL-41." The date of the first letter was early in February, and about 2 or 3 weeks later we replied to that. I wanted to get something out right away and that is the reason we hurried with the first one.

Two or three weeks later we revised it, and issued another one in the latter part of February, and by that time we felt that we had covered the point with the equipment and the forces we had in pretty good shape.

That letter stood until the 14th of October of 1941, when we issued another letter.

Incidentally, I might tell you a little bit about my activities in regard to getting an agreement betwixt the air forces out there. Immediately I got this responsibility, or knew I was going to have it, I started to work on the Army, and when General Short arrived I went out to call on General Short before he had taken over his command. I went out in civilian clothes. I realized the importance of cooperation betwixt the services.

I found General Short a very likable gentleman, and subsequently a very able Army officer. I broached the subject of some kind of an agreement whereby the efforts of the Army air and the Navy air could be coordinated on [6964] the island of Oahu and in the Hawaiian area.

I found General Short very much of the same mind, and we set in motion the studies which eventually resulted in the agreement to use what we had jointly.

That agreement was sent on to Washington. Eventually, we got out the estimate of the situation, which Admiral Bellinger and General Martin had a great deal to do with drawing up, and the coordination betwixt the two services was of a higher degree there than any other area that I had ever known prior to that time.

I issued an order that every Navy squadron of planes on wheels was to land on each of the Army fields, and to be serviced there and to get ammunition and bombs so they would know how to do it, and General Short did the same thing for the Army.

Now, those were the steps that we took in trying to utilize to the best advantage the facilities and the forces that we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Those steps were made necessary, Admiral, by your shortage in equipment?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, in any event it would have been very desirable, especially as regard air. I am talking now of the air of the Army and the air of the Navy, which was temporarily based on shore at any one time.

[6965] Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, as a matter of fact, Admiral, for the Navy you did assume a protection to the base which, under better conditions you wouldn't have had to assume?

Admiral KIMMEL. I tried to insure that we would have all of our forces actively take part in the defense of the Islands.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had become quite familiar with Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know what you mean.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew that 40 percent of the people in Hawaii were of Japanese ancestry?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I knew that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew that there was in Hawaii a very numerous and highly developed Japanese espionage system?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I had an idea that that might be so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The conditions were ideal for the building of such a system, were they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, and in the summer of 1941 there was numerous consular agents there. The commandant of the district, who handled all of those matters for the fleet and for the Navy—

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was Admiral Bloch?

[6966] Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Bloch. Recommended they put them all in the jug. That is in effect what he recommended. The Army thought that wasn't a good idea, and they recommended against it.

This bounced back and forward and I believe that—I have since found out, or since been informed that the Secretary of War was the man who finally decided that no action should be taken against these people.¹ What his reasons were, I don't know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in dealing with such a group, did you find any difficulties in your way by reason of the law in connection with wire tapping, or the tapping of cables and other means by which message could be transmitted from Hawaii to Tokyo?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I did find some difficulties; yes. I, of course, took an interest in all of these matters. I was more concerned with the information they obtained than the means they took to obtain it. And, as I have said, that phase of the Pacific Fleet's operations, whatever responsibility the Navy had in Hawaii, was directly under Admiral Bloch.

I have every reason to believe that Admiral Bloch did everything within his power.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, with that large group of Japanese [6967] agents free in Hawaii, you knew, did you not, Admiral, that they knew everything with respect to the disposition of the base, its defense, and the movement of ships in and out of the base; that you knew?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I wouldn't go so far as that. I would say that they could know the movements of the ships in and out of the base, but I hoped then that we were able to keep a good many things from them. When all of the disclosures were made about what they knew at Pearl Harbor, I found we hadn't been quite so successful as we thought we had been.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no reason, was there, why an intelligent group of spies, such as these, couldn't keep an active watch on what was happening on every airfield in Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I imagine they did pretty well, because they could go up in the hills and look down.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if the planes on the various air fields were bunched together, it would be very easy for them to find it out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I don't know about that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All they would have to do is use their eyes; wouldn't that be so?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say so.

[6968] Mr. RICHARDSON. You had always discovered in your talks and conferences concerning the Japanese that they were an ardent, competent, intelligent people in connection with such a subject as espionage?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And they were not afraid?

¹ See Exhibit No. 128, introduced on p. 2768, *infra*.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were most industrious.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They never were afraid?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were industrious. I don't go with all the rest of that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They never were afraid of hard work?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, would you be surprised now to find that the Japanese spies were unable to find out the number of available planes that the Army and the Navy had in Hawaii during 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think they knew that; they must have known it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew, of course, that whatever they knew, they were free to send to Tokyo?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they were much freer than I knew they were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Every method of transmission between Hawaii and Tokyo was open to them, was it not?

[6969] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; but you must remember that I had something else to do besides running around finding out what the Japanese knew. I had competent officers there to do everything within their power. I believe they did do everything within their power.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I understand that. When I say "you" Admiral, it is a rather editorial "you."

Admiral KIMMEL. All right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I mean that you knew, as the commanding officer, the extent and possibility of Japanese espionage in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it was your duty as a commanding officer, to fear the worst with respect to the amount of things they could find out?

Admiral KIMMEL. We feared the worst, all right. We feared it all the time.

In connection with this, you mentioned something about the bunching of planes. This is something about which my part has never been presented to anybody so far as I know.

I ran across this letter, which I knew I had issued on September 23, 1941, and this is a letter which deals with the security of aircraft in the Hawaiian area from [6970] air attack at fields or stations. I don't know whether it is necessary to read the whole letter, but in it I direct the commandant of the district to take steps to insure at all times the maximum dispersion of aircraft at the various fields, and naval stations there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because it was the sensible thing to do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I ask again why was it sensible? What were you trying to effectuate by objecting to the bunching of planes on airfields?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was reading at all times, the results of the war in Europe. We were trying to put into effect in Hawaii every single thing that would help us in the defense of Hawaii in the event of an air attack or in the event of any other kind of an attack.

I tried to overlook nothing, and this was just one of the steps.

Now, this was a thing that could be done and should be done and I presumed was done to the limit of the facilities that we had there at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if the planes were all bunched up close, wing tip to wing tip, it would take a considerable amount of time to get them in a position where they [6971] could take off and go into the air?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; I don't think it would take much more time. They could be bunched wing tip to wing tip and you could run one out at a time and get them out quickly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you think, was the primary danger by way of attack to the Pearl Harbor base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Pearl Harbor base, the principal danger from attack to the Pearl Harbor base was from the air, of course.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You pointed that out, did you not, over again in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; but there is another form of attack in the Hawaiian area, and that was a submarine attack on the base as divorced from the whole area. The primary form of attack was probably by air, if any attack came.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, in view of the Admiral's suggestion as to this letter, since we have been furnished with copies, it might be well to have it made an exhibit, and circulated with the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why not just read it into the record?

[6972] Mr. MURPHY. It would be better to spread it in the record so it will be tied up with the testimony at this point.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no objection.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed to read it, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP

CinCPAC File No. A16-3/AD/(95) Serial 01504

Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., September 23, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Security of Aircraft, Hawaiian Area, from Air Attacks at Fields or Stations.

1. The Commander-in-Chief desires that provision be made for maximum security of fleet aircraft in the Hawaiian area from air attack while on the ground or water.

2. As amply demonstrated by current war experience, both dispersal and protection where dispersed are fundamental requirements. Movement of aircraft units to various available fields or locations and individual dispersal at these locations are primarily operational responsibilities. [6973] bilities. Provisions for this individual dispersal and for passive protection, however, are under the cognizance of the District.

3. Because of the large size of patrol planes and the need for solid surfaces for these planes when on shore, less can be done for their individual dispersal and protection than for landplanes. It must be handled primarily by maximum intervals between planes on parking platforms and maximum provision of well separated moorings of all patrol plane operating points.

4. Much can and must be done, however, for individual landplane dispersal and protection. Ideally, there should be separate "stalls" at each landplane field

or runway where, during emergency conditions, all planes that may need to operate from a given field can be placed while on the ground. It should be possible to taxi planes readily to and from these points without undue delay in operating speed. These points should, further, be arranged in other than straight lines so as not to provide consecutive targets for attacking planes. Revetments for averting and localizing damage should be provided around each stall.

For both patrol planes (when on shore) and landplanes, suitable concealment camouflage should be developed and provided. The net type is suggested.

[6974] 6. The Commander-in-Chief understands that action along the above lines is already being taken by the Army in this area. He also understands that studies are in progress for dispersal construction at Ewa Field. (That is a marine field.) He considers that dispersal construction should be undertaken at all fields under naval control in the Hawaiian Area and on the outlying islands. These on the Island of Oahu are of primary importance and should have first priority. It is recognized that what can be accomplished on Ford Island will, because of space restrictions, be far from ideal, but the best possible solution should be sought.

7. Because of the close relationship of dispersal construction requirements with active operations, it is important that all phases of dispersal be simultaneously considered and coordinated. Accordingly, Commander Aircraft Battle Force and Commander Patrol Wing Two are directed to consult with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District as to plans and requirements. The objective is the earliest possible provision of both the necessary construction and suitable operating doctrine.

H. E. KIMMEL.

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Compatwing TWO.

Senator LUCAS. May I inquire, Mr. Counsel, what is the date of that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Senator LUCAS. What is the date of that again, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. September 23, 1941.

And I might add that the Navy at Kanoeha Bay had dispersed their patrol planes to the maximum extent possible. Over there they had anchored out quite a number of patrol planes. They had done the same thing at other naval fields out there.

On the day of the attack every single one of the patrol planes that was anchored out was destroyed because they were sunk at the moorings, and the ones that were more or less bunched on the ramps, most of them were saved because they could get to them and put out the fires.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, the United States lost about 3,000 men in that attack, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Something on that order.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you tell me where the great bulk of losses came? Was it on board ship, or was it in connection with trying to get the planes off? [6976]

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the major part of the losses were on ship-board. That is something you can verify very readily.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, throughout 1941 and up to the early fall, pretty near every communication you had with the Chief of Naval Operations referred to the possibility of air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

No; that isn't right. It didn't refer to the possibility of air attack. Nearly every communication I had from the Navy Department did not refer to the possibility of air attack. It referred in greater or

less degree to the supply of material which we thought we needed out there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, in every one of your letters where the subject of an attack on Hawaii was discussed, the possibility of an air attack was presented by you as one of the hazards of the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was always that possibility. I wanted that base to be secure over an indefinite period and to meet any eventuality that war might bring forward.

I wanted it to be able to defend itself even though the Pacific Fleet were wiped out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And so far as ships in Pearl Harbor [6977] were concerned, the danger that they would suffer from a submarine attack would be less than they might suffer from an air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. We thought that the danger from submarine attack in Pearl Harbor was nil—nothing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. We had at the entrance of the Harbor an anti-torpedo net. We didn't have an antisubmarine net. We knew of no submarines which could enter the harbor entirely submerged and this two-man submarine that did enter the harbor submerged was an entirely new type and something of which we had no knowledge.

Incidentally, I think the two-man submarine never paid for itself. The only one that ever got in to that harbor they sank very promptly, and its two torpedoes were discharged harmlessly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then your discussion of a submarine attack had reference to damages to the fleet in the open sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, in the operating areas around—in the sea around Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With reference to the hazard to the base that lay in a possible air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. That appeared to be the only means [6978] that they could take to get in to do any damage to the fleet at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, with respect to an air attack, you had to have a suitable fleet of reconnaissance planes that could carry on a distant reconnaissance in an attempt to locate an attacking enemy force before their planes could leave their carriers for attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. And to have a striking force to go out and sink the carriers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The second thing that you had to have, passing from the question of patrol planes for distant reconnaissance, was a suitable fleet of fighters that could do some fighting after you found the enemy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, the fighters—the pursuit planes, which we call them in the Navy—fighters are defensive. They are to knock down the planes after the attack is launched. And the only real defense against an airplane attack from carriers, is to discover the carriers and to sink the carriers before they can launch the planes. And those are bombing planes, long-range bombing planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that once the planes leave a carrier in quantity for an attack it is a very difficult matter to prevent some of those planes from reaching their objective?

[6979] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And however good your defense may have been against the attack on December 7, you, as a Naval man, would be surprised if some of the attacking planes had not come through and reached their targets?

Admiral KIMMEL. Those were the lessons that we had learned from the war in Europe at that time. We had learned those lessons from our own maneuvers.

We had staged many attacks on Pearl Harbor ourselves as a matter of training, and those same principles and facts have been demonstrated many, many times during the 4 years that have elapsed since that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in addition to the subject of planes, patrol and fighters, it was essential to a proper defense of an attack on the base that you have, that there be available a proper number of anti-aircraft guns?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, as an immediate defense.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have such in Hawaii at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. We didn't have such on our ships. The anti-aircraft batteries of all our ships, and particularly the battleships, were woefully inadequate. It was something that a great many of us had known for many years, and that somehow or other we hadn't been able to remedy. [6980] And the thing we were particularly deficient in was the short-range anti-aircraft guns. That deficiency we were in the process of remedying at the time the attack came on Pearl Harbor.

Today battleships, I don't know the number, but they have hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. On the battleships that we had out there we had 12 or 15, maybe 20 altogether of all types. Fifty calibers. And no real short-range anti-aircraft guns.

I mean, so few as to be almost negligible.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The land-based anti-aircraft guns were under the control of the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever make an inspection of the anti-aircraft batteries of the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know how many they had?

Admiral KIMMEL. In general, it has been reported to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Had you made the subject of their guns or their number a matter for definite examination by members of your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; the number of anti-aircraft guns had been reported. I don't know what you mean by definite [6981] examination by members of my staff.

You mean to go out and look at them?

[6982] Mr. RICHARDSON. That is what I meant.

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, no.

Now, this question of numbers of guns was treated in correspondence and you will recall that that subject was taken up by Admiral Bloch, and in December of 1940 he prepared a letter. Richardson had had a conference with the commanding general, General Herron, out there, and this letter was prepared by Bloch and forwarded by Richardson, and apparently that started the correspondence betwixt the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, and when I saw that correspond-

ence I had high hopes that we were going to get what everybody seemed to admit was required in Hawaii.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you knew you had not gotten them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I knew we had not gotten them and in the quantities—they got some but they had not gotten them in the quantities that they thought were necessary.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any knowledge, or did you direct any member of your staff to get specific knowledge as to the status of readiness of the Army's anti-aircraft batteries immediately prior to the attack on December 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a matter which was covered in my fleet security order, and all of that work was delegated to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was the naval base defense officer; he was also the commander of the [6983] Hawaiian coastal frontier, and, as I indicated yesterday, with General Short was charged with the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier by the Navy Department and as a naval base defense officer to coordinate whatever fleet effort could be available with that of the Army, and I read from specification "G" of 2 CL-41, dated October the 14th, 1941:

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer. As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

[6984] (4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed."

Admiral Bloch, I might say, was the commander in chief of the United States Fleet just prior to Admiral Richardson. Admiral Richardson relieved him as commander in chief of the United States Fleet. I relieved Richardson, as you recall.

Admiral Bloch was an accomplished officer, an officer in whom I had the highest confidence and still have and I had turned over this matter to him, not to a member of my immediate staff, and he did, I believe, a great many things. You will get him here, you will have him testify.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, did you understand, Admiral, that it was Bloch's duty under your direction to see to it that the Army anti-aircraft batteries were in a state of readiness to defend that base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, insofar as the Navy had any responsibility for it, yes, but now I think maybe it would be well for me to go into that a little bit in regard to General Short's alert.

In the late afternoon of November 27, 1941, Captain Earle, Admiral Bloch's Chief of Staff, brought to me a copy [6985] of the message which General Marshall had sent to General Short. General Short had sent a copy to the Naval Base Defense Officer, Admiral

Bloch. I read General Marshall's message. I noted the language that Short's measures were not to alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. I also noted the order directing General Short to report the measures taken by him to General Marshall. The officer who brought me the message informed me, "The Army has gone on an alert." The next morning my Chief of Staff confirmed this report with information about Army troop movements.

I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We considered, as we did frequently before and did later, the probabilities and possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was discussion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that 50 Army pursuit planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage among other things, although I do not now recall General Short specifically mentioning the details of his alert.

During 1941 I went to sea with the fleet on maneuvers whenever that was possible. I also expected that if war came and the fleet left Pearl Harbor on an operation, I would be [6986] far from Pearl Harbor. Consequently, I knew there was need to have a naval officer permanently based in Pearl Harbor to coordinate the use of the naval units which might be in Pearl Harbor at that time in the base defense. If you refer to my Fleet Security Order, 2CL-41, Exhibit 44, item 12, you will find the following provisions:

(G) (6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer. As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what conditions of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

[6987] (4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, was the naval base defense officer. He was invariably in attendance at my conferences with General Short. He has testified at some length before the Naval Court as to his activities prior to the attack in carrying out the duties assigned to him under the provisions of my orders which I have just read. He will be a witness here. I do not wish to anticipate his testimony. However, I will give you certain highlights of his activities, as testified to before the Naval Court of Inquiry, because I was generally familiar with them prior to the attack.

In February 1941 he had urged upon General Short the necessity of emplacing his mobile antiaircraft guns in the field. He personally examined the plans for location of all Army antiaircraft weapons that were to be emplaced. His subordinates were in constant touch with Army representatives.

In October or November 1941 General Short had explained to him the difficulties General Short had emplacing certain of the Army's mobile antiaircraft guns. Sites were not on [6988] Government land. Fire-control communications were out in weather and subject to deterioration. It was difficult for personnel comprising the gun crews to be quartered and subsisted.

To help obviate this last problem for the Army, the Navy was actually making arrangements on December 7 to mess and quarter Army gun crews on Navy reservations.

I considered I had done everything I could prior to the attack to strengthen the Army antiaircraft defense of Pearl Harbor. As late as December 2, in an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, I pointed out that "the Army is not only lacking antiaircraft guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu." I had appointed a responsible naval officer to exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and to arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced. From everything I knew, he had been active and diligent in following the matter up. Of course, the Army had its difficulties, some of which I have mentioned. Neither I nor Admiral Bloch could solve them. Moreover, if I had constantly intruded into the day-to-day coordination of Admiral Bloch and General Short on this matter I might very well have undone all my security order, 2 CL-41, was designed to accomplish, the working out of a permanent Army-Navy local defense coordin- [6989] ation which would have to continue in my absence and that of the fleet.

I knew that General Short had been ordered to report the measures he took in response to his message of November 27 from General Marshall. This meant the joint participation of General Marshall and General Short in the character of the alert assumed in Hawaii. I thought that General Marshall and General Short knew better than I what specific Army measures should be adopted to perform adequately the Army mission of defending the naval base at Pearl Harbor and at the same time of complying with the restrictions involved of not alarming the civilian population nor disclosing intent.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire from what the witness is reading? Is it from a previous record or what?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy has inquired, Admiral, as to what it is you have been reading from?

Admiral KIMMEL. A memorandum which I prepared.

Mr. MURPHY. Your own memorandum?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know, Admiral, what General Short's first alert was?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean No. 1 alert, as you call it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is it.

[6990] Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know he had but one kind of an alert.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What kind of alert did you think he had?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought he had an alert where he put his people on the alert.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know at the time you talked with General Short that his No. 1 alert was simply against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know he had a No. 1 alert. I think I have found out since, however, that this No. 1, 2, and 3 alert business was put into effect on the 5th of November of 1941. Prior to that they had an alert and a nonalert status.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know from any conversation you had with General Short or any reported to you by your staff that Short had responded to the dispatch from Marshall with a notice on his part to Marshall that he had put in this first alert against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw Short's reply and was never informed of it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You never knew anything about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In your opinion, under the circumstances that there faced you would an alert against sabotage have been in accordance with what you were contemplating under the order that you have just referred to concerning a defense [6991] of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had taken the steps to put the ships of the fleet on an alert some time before—I mean to put them in shape where they could go on an alert very quickly a long time before. I had provided—I mean I had made sure that the ammunition for the guns was available, that the crews were on board and that a certain proportion of them would be manning the guns. At sea we had full security measures in effect and in port we had the security measures in effect which we felt that the situation demanded at the time and there was very little more that we could have done in port than what we did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, did you contemplate, Admiral, in connection with your assignment of duties to Admiral Bloch, that he should inform himself of the question of the readiness of the antiaircraft batteries of the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the Army's responsibility and there were two separate commands in Hawaii. There was the Army command and there was the Navy command and when the Army said they were on an alert I thought they knew their business and I had every reason to think so because General Short is a very capable officer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if it should be found to be the fact that only one battery of antiaircraft guns were in readiness [6992], that none of the other guns had ammunition, some not nearer than 75 yards and some not nearer than 500 yards from the gun placements, would, in your opinion, that have been a form of alert against an attack on the base that you thought the Army had in effect at the time of your discussion with General Short or at the time of any directions you may have given to Admiral Bloch?

Admiral KIMMEL. My best answer to that is to call your attention to the steps that I took.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, one more subject I want to bring up at this point.

In addition to the question of the use of planes to defend against an air attack and in addition to the use of antiaircraft guns to defend against an air attack there is one more method, is there not, by which you can help and get ready to defend yourself and that is radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, as I understood your statement, you suggested that there had been supplied at long last to the fleet various radar equipment?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that in connection with the use of that equipment and as an aid to the Army you took with you a number of men designated by the Army on your ships in order to [6993] familiarize them with radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it is a fact, is it not, that there was to be supplied to the Army in Hawaii a number of so-called mobile radar sets and a number of radar sets that were to have fixed land locations?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is true.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you knew prior to December 7 by a report from General Short or under his authority that the mobile radar sets were operating and were in shape to operate?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will put it this way: I could not concern myself with whether the Army had mobile radar sets or fixed radar sets. I knew they had radar which could give a coverage, I had been so informed by General Short, and whether they were mobile or fixed I do not recall whether I knew that or not. I knew something of the plans but just which ones they had in operation, my knowledge of that prior to the attack, which ones they had in operation; was sketchy. I knew they had sets in operation, that they could give us coverage and I was so informed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, there was no way within the instrument itself at that time by which you could tell through radar whether approaching planes were enemy planes or friendly planes?

[6994] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, and that was something that we had urgently requested because we realized from the time that radar first came out there that that was going to be one of the great difficulties.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in order to make a practical use—

Admiral KIMMEL. Such a device was in existence, you know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you did not have it?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not have it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So the only way you could allow for that would be to try and orient planes that would be discovered on radar with your own information as to where your own planes might be?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that if a radar set operating on Hawaii should find on the chart approaching planes, the only way of telling whether those planes were friendly planes or enemy planes would be to have available the information where the friendly planes that you knew of were?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, in order to do that you would have to have, would you not, established what is known as an information center and to that information center would come the reports from the various radar sections of what they discovered and then there would be at the radar center appropriately assigned men who from their knowledge of where our planes were could make a deduction as to whether the planes shown were or were not friendly planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they had to have that knowledge and the only way they could get that knowledge and keep up to date was to be in communication with the operating agencies. All they had to do was to get in communication and even then it would be a very difficult thing to do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, I presume so, because you never could be exactly sure where your own planes were?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, you could never be exactly sure where your own planes were and with some of the—well, I will say half-trained pilots we had out there at that time, they were fine boys and no fault of theirs, but they did not always go and do exactly what they were told to do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, if on the morning of December 7 a radar station had located an approaching group of planes, the next step would have been to have communicated that information instantly to an information center?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then at the information center there should be representatives familiar with the supposed whereabouts of any friendly planes, either Navy or Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[6996] Mr. RICHARDSON. So that would require at the information center Army representatives to do that job and Navy representatives to do that job and Navy representatives to do that job?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why not?

Admiral KIMMEL. A Navy man has no God-given faculty for telling where Navy planes are. He has to work with the naval operators to get it. An Army man properly trained could do it just about as well as a Navy man. Any individual put in there and trained and told where to get his information could have done it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it would be the duty of the representative, let us say, of the Navy at the information center to communicate where he had been educated to communicate to find out whether there were Navy planes in the sector from which these approaching planes had been seen?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I never operated an information center, I have never had anything to do with an information center such as this. That was purely and entirely an Army function. I presumed that the steps necessary to make the information center or the radar information, you might say, effective had been taken. I did not go to the information center.

Now, one other thing: There would be in a case like Hawaii [6997] not one Navy representative as you call him, one man to look out for Navy affairs, but one man perhaps to look out for the patrol planes, another man to look out for the planes at Wheeler Field, another to look out for the battleship planes, to look out for what not. Now, how many men would be required is a question of experience and whether that man who sits there and is responsible for a segment or detachment of planes is an Army man or a Navy man is immaterial so long as he gets the information and knows where to get it.

Now, suppose—I will anticipate a question a little bit. I had a letter from General Short. He asked me on 5 August 1941 in a letter to

detail an officer from my headquarters to serve as liaison officer betwixt my headquarters and his.

Senator LUCAS. Is that an exhibit, Mr. Counsel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Senator LUCAS. Is that in an exhibit?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think not. I have it here, you can have it. It has been passed to the committee, I am informed.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Admiral KIMMEL. On August 16 I replied to that letter and assigned my fleet communications officer, Commander Maurice L. E. Curts, to act as a liaison officer.

Now, Commander Curts was to assist him. My understanding [6998] and my intention at the time was that Commander Curts was to assist him in any way he could in technical matters. I never had any request from General Short at any time to detail any watch standards in the communications center, the information center, and I would not have expected him to request me as commander in chief to detail these officers. I would not have expected him to ask Admiral Bloch to detail the officers and I think you will get from Admiral Bloch whatever steps that were taken there.

Now, I did detail an additional officer to General Short at the request of the Army, I think it was General Short's request, a Lieutenant Taylor. Lieutenant Taylor had been in Britain and he had some knowledge of the operational difficulties of an information center and I turned Lieutenant Taylor over to the Army completely for the time being, to give them whatever assistance he could in advising them as to the operation of an information center.

Now, you must realize that we had had many drills in Hawaii, during which time this information center, to the best of my knowledge and belief, was operating and in shape. The commandant of the district reported to me that successful drills were conducted. He had the men who conducted drills insofar as the Navy was concerned. I never inspected the information center and I never went into the organization of [6999] the information center and I was under the conviction, you might say, from the conversations that I had had with General Short and also with General Davidson, who was in command of the fighter group and the information center, General Davidson had told me of some of the results that they had obtained and they appeared to be quite satisfactory to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your answer, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all I want to say.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[7000]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything further before resuming the examination?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There are two more compilation of the records which have been referred to by Admiral Kimmel which we would like to offer in evidence at this time as exhibits.

Mr. MASTEN. The first is a compilation of letters, of eight letters, the first of which is dated August 16, 1941, on the top of the compilation, all having to do with aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department. We believe these should be offered as exhibit 122.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Mr. MASTEN. They were distributed to the committee near the close of the morning hearing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Give us the date and description again, please.

Mr. MASTEN. The top letter is one dated August 16, 1941, from commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, regarding aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is exhibit what?

Mr. MASTEN. 122.

[7001] The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 122.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 122.")

Mr. MASTEN. The second is a group of communications, copies of which were distributed to the committee a few minutes ago, having to do with the question of the construction of a combined operating center in Hawaii. The top communication is a message from Opnav to commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, dated October 15, 1941.

We offer those as exhibit 123.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 123.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 123.")

Mr. MASTEN. That is all we have, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further at this point before resuming the examination?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything at this point before the examination is resumed?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I don't.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, are we to understand from your [7002] testimony that there was an information center in operation in connection with the Army radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. You would understand from my testimony that the radar had been operated; that orders had been given to planes in drills. I did not know the condition of the operating center, information center, and I did not inquire as to the specific condition in which it was at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do I understand that it is your recollection that you assigned anyone from the Navy to function at that information center?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was never requested to detail anybody to function at that information center. I considered it an Army responsibility. I stood ready to help them in any way I could. I did help them. The organization and the whole information center was purely an Army function.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I want to call your attention to your testimony before the Roberts Commission to see whether it, in your opinion, is a fair statement of what it had reference to. I read from page 663 of the record. This is your language:

My recollection is, and I give you this for what it is worth—I have not talked to anybody about this since the action—but my impression was that they had, I think, three permanent stations, and I think some seven or eight portable stations around the island, and their big ones were the ones, [7003] according to which I thought that we could have some dependence on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, while I think your information is incorrect as to that, the fact is that in the week of December 7 and the days prior to that, and on the morning of December 7, you were quite confident that you would get a definite warning of distant planes; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought we would get some warning of distant planes.

General McNARNEY. And as a responsible officer you did not assure yourself of that fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate commanders and when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them.

General McNARNEY. Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had the system of mutual cooperation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And in the method of mutual cooperation, it is necessary for one commander to know what the other commander is doing or what his plans are?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

That fairly represents what you desire to express with [7004] reference to your attitude toward this radar information center?

Admiral KIMMEL. The "no" business at the end there?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Let me see that.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that, 667?

Mr. RICHARDSON. 663.

Admiral KIMMEL. You will have to turn over—in the first place, I put in a correction; I find here now, on page 631-A, wherein the answer to the last question was changed from "no" to "yes." As a matter of fact, I have no recollection of every having said "no," but I corrected it.

[7005] Then on page 672 of the record——

Mr. RICHARDSON. What page is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. 675. [Reading:]

After the conclusion of the session on Saturday, I thought that a portion of my testimony was not clear and also that there might be some misapprehension as to my underlying attitude. I think I stated in the discussion which took place at the last session that I was convinced that there were at least three fixed stations, and by that I mean three stations with communications to the central plotting room, and to the central place by wire, and reasonably secure, and I thought there were more.

I find that there were six, and I underestimated.

Now, I have been informed that each one of these radar stations that was manned was the search type and that they are—what do you call them, two seventy, wasn't it? Leave that out.

I don't know what that means now, that last thing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is that all you want to read?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all I see right here now. I think that is all for the present.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Admiral, in order to sort of crystallize this, I want to go over those operations which, in your opinion were

essential to the defense of [7006] Hawaii, so that none may be omitted, and the first I desire to suggest would be the availability of a suitable number of patrol planes for distant reconnaissance.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Second, there should be enough of those patrol planes to conduct a proper patrol over a 360-degree protected area around Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There should be available the best radar facilities.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Land defenses of all character should be mobilized in radio?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The fleet should be alerted?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, it is true, is it not, Admiral, that the extent—

Admiral KIMMEL. Just one moment. You left out, I think, an essential point of this defense of Oahu, and that is the presence of sufficient long-range bombers to destroy the enemy carriers after they are discovered.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Correct. I accept your suggestion. I missed it in my notes.

[7007] Now, Admiral, the extent and detail to which these operations are to be carried is dependent upon judgment as to the extremeness of the danger?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[7008] Mr. RICHARDSON. You thought on December 7 that the danger of air attack on Hawaii was very slight?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In fact, Admiral, the danger was exceedingly great as the event proved to be?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I think that is fair.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the disaster at Hawaii was the result of an error of judgment?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, not entirely. It was not entirely the result of an error of judgment. If we had had available in Oahu at this time all of the facilities which you have outlined and we had been able to take the precautions which you have outlined, that would have been one thing.

We had to make a choice. We felt that we had to make a choice. We had to provide for what we knew was coming in all probability against what we conceived at that time to be a very small chance of an attack on Oahu.

Now, you can never be absolutely secure, there is no such thing as absolute security and with a fleet that is particularly true and this estimate that we made—that I made—was made after mature consideration of balancing probabilities and when you balance probabilities you must take into account the means which you have to meet these various possibilities.

[7009] Mr. RICHARDSON. In reaching such a judgment, Admiral, do you have to consider the possible result of a mistake?

Admiral KIMMEL. You should; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if the mistake on the one hand might result in the destruction of the fleet as against a delay in training what have you to say to that?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was not a delay in training that was involved in this. The primary thing that we had in mind all the time was to be ready for offensive action.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, let me restate my question. In reaching a judgment as to what you were to do, what weight would you give the fact that a mistake with respect to a possible air attack on Hawaii which might result in the destruction of your fleet as compared with the preparation of your fleet for future offensive action outside of Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the first place, I never believed that an air attack on Hawaii, on Pearl Harbor would result in the destruction of the fleet. I was firmly convinced at the time that torpedoes would not run in the waters of Pearl Harbor and if it had not been for the destruction accomplished by the torpedoes at that time the damage would have been comparatively negligible.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Weren't you told, Admiral, in the letter of June 13, which was the second letter in the series with [7010] respect to torpedoes launched from planes, that it cannot be determined that any preexisting depth of water is too shallow to dispose of the possibility of torpedo attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. You have not stated that exactly correctly. What it did state—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you mind reading it?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to inquire. That is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to you as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet? Is that correct, Mr. Counsel?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; that is not a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to me as commander in chief. It is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandants of the various naval districts, with a copy sent to me for information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You received it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I received it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now read it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might state, since you brought that question up—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to identify what you are fixing to read, that is what I had in mind.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; but you have reminded me of something.

[7011] **The VICE CHAIRMAN.** All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a letter that was addressed to me as commander in chief on February 13, if I remember the date correctly, and in it the Chief of Naval Operations told me as commander in chief that the minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed and that 150 feet is what they would most likely need; that is the essence of it. At the same time the Chief of Naval Operations wrote a letter to the commandants of the districts, in which he included approximately the same information.

Now, when the change came in this letter of June 13 he did not write anything to me. He wrote a letter to the commandants of the districts

and sent me a copy of the letter. I got the letter, there is no question about that. I just want to show you the difference.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Read it, please, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Paragraph 2 of this letter of June 13, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandants of the various naval districts states:

Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300 feet, and in some cases may initiate dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it [7012] cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

Paragraph 3:

While no minimum depth of water in which Naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attack force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto, were, in general, at thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched at eleven or twelve fathoms.

Now, there is no information, definite information in there anywhere that you can launch a torpedo at less than ten fathoms.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you concluded—

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, I would like to add to that just a little bit. [7013] Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was not the only man who read this letter. I had a very competent staff. Their accomplishments during this war have proved that beyond doubt. Admiral Bloch, who was more directly concerned with this, any protection that should have been afforded in the harbor because he would have been the one to install it, all of my staff, Admiral Bloch and I considered the torpedo danger negligible after receiving this letter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, in connection with the subject of information and referring to information from external sources and what I may call information from internal sources, is it correct to say that the external sources would be, first, intelligence reports to you, both local and from other sources; second, information you might get from spies or espionage of your own if you had any such; third, a formal declaration of war.

Now, what other sources of information would there be from the exterior to the commander of a fleet as to a possible coming attack than may fall within those three categories?

Admiral KIMMEL. The commander in chief and the commandant of the naval district had in Hawaii an intelligence unit and this intelligence unit was primarily concerned with information which they could obtain in the Hawaiian Islands. The [7014] only exceptions to that were what is known as the traffic analysis method of locating ships. That was a radio-direction finder hook-up which permitted them to make certain traffic analyses.

Mr. RICHARDSON. These were Hawaii originated activities?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; they were not Hawaii originated activities. They were part—Hawaii was part of a net—I am talking now about traffic analysis—which included Guam and Manila.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Oh, I see.

Admiral KIMMEL. But I think what you are driving at and what I hope to answer is that practically all information that we could hope for from spies abroad, from intercepts, from diplomatic exchanges, from naval attachés' reports and from the multitudinous means that Washington had of obtaining information had to be supplied to me by Washington. I had no way to get it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If there had been a formal declaration of war and you had been advised of that, would that have been information which would have changed your Hawaiian dispositions?

Admiral KIMMEL. If we had had a formal declaration of war my troubles would have been practically ended.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, so far as internal sources of information against an attack you would have radar? [7015]

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You would have your distance patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then you would have the military deductions that you as the chief might eventually make on the information you had?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let me run over with you the knowledge that you had in Hawaii on December 6th. You knew at that time of the fundamental importance of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; I had known that for a long time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you knew at that time of the vulnerability of the Pearl Harbor base?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know that the Pearl Harbor base was nearly as vulnerable as it proved to be, as I have just tried to explain in regard to this torpedo business.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Except for the liability of torpedo attack was there any other vulnerability of the base that you did not appreciate?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, not that I can recall at the present moment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, you knew at that time that [7016] your armament, whether considered as patrol planes or fighter planes or bombers or antiaircraft guns was insufficient to permit you to make a full, satisfactory defense of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will answer that this way: A full satisfactory defense of an island base can never be assured no matter what you have there. The element of surprise, the element of a fast moving, superior air force coming down on you—and although we would have been in much better case had we had the additional forces which you have outlined here previously, we could not have had absolute security there. And we were not entirely helpless out there. I do not want anybody to get the idea that I thought we were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, insofar as your armament availability was lessened your ability to defend also lessened, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; of course.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you had at the time a fleet sufficiently inferior in size so that it had to remain generally in a defensive position?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew that war was imminent?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that the relations were badly strained. I knew that war had been predicted time and again [7017] during the past year. Just how imminent was just what I did not know and I did not know that a deadline date had been set, I did not know that after a certain date things were going to happen automatically; I did not know but that the situation had eased somewhat in the 10 days since I had received the warning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew of the Japanese reputation for surprise attacks?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew how closely they corresponded to a declaration of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes; I had known that they had corresponded closely to a declaration of war.

I think there has been a little misconception about the Japanese attack on Port Arthur. My recollection of that Japanese attack is they had broken off diplomatic relations some 2 or 3 days, I think it was 4 days, before they made the attack on Port Arthur.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, was not one of the things, Admiral, constantly discussed by you and your staff that Japan was just the kind of a nation that might attack without warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you knew at that time of the ap- [7018] propriateness from a military standpoint of an air attack on Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I cannot say that I fully appreciated the appropriateness of an air attack on Oahu at that time. In the first place, there were very many difficulties that the Japanese had to overcome in order to be able to make that attack. I had been warned of a surprise attack. I had been told where that surprise attack was coming, at least by implication; that it was to be against Thai, the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Philippines.

[7019] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, did you understand, Admiral, that the attack on Thai or Borneo or the Philippines, or down to the China Sea was a surprise attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why yes. Why not? We did not know which place they were going. They could have attacked many places. They could have made a surprise attack in many places.

As a matter of fact, one of the most productive places for them to make a surprise attack was in the Philippines. That, I think, was mentioned by the Chief of Naval Operations to me as one of the most embarrassing things that could happen to us.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He said it would be embarrassing, but did he say it would be a surprise?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the surprise could very easily be gotten from the tenor of all of the dispatches, yes; a surprise attack in the Philippines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In view of the fact that pretty near all of the dispatches that you had from Washington, and in view of your suggestion that those dispatches misled you, because they constantly talked of the Philippines, Thai Peninsula, Indochina, Malasia, you still think that those attacks would be a surprise attack similar to

what a surprise [7020] attack would be on Oahu that had never been mentioned?

Admiral KIMMEL. They could very easily have made a surprise attack on any one of the places I mentioned. They could have made a surprise attack on the ships of the Asiatic Fleet, as far as that goes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, including your conversation with President Roosevelt on your visit to Washington, one form of attack on Hawaii that was constantly mentioned was an air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, and there was just one reason that was constantly mentioned, and that reason was because we wanted to be sure they could not make a successful air attack, and we felt reasonably certain that any other form of attack would not have been successful because we had the means to combat it, and we were emphasizing our deficiencies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Admiral, it would seem from an examination of the dispatches that after about October, say the first of October, there seems to have been no more mention of air attack in the correspondence and the dispatches that passed between you and Washington.

Have you any explanation of why, for a period of 6 months or more, there should be such constant reference to [7021] air attack and then a sudden cessation of reference to it in the trend of dispatches after about the first of October?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I presume that you have been over the correspondence, and that what you say is indicated. However, I think I read a dispatch here this morning of November 29, and in that we were talking about antiaircraft guns, 37-millimeter guns.

In my correspondence with the Navy Department, and particularly with the Chief of Naval Operations, I asked for many things. I pointed out many deficiencies.

The one that you have emphasized the most—and as a matter of fact it has been emphasized the most since Pearl Harbor—was that it had to do with antiaircraft and an air attack.

I was equally concerned about the lack of bombs in Pearl Harbor. We had no bombs. There were not any out there when I took over—a handful, perhaps. We had no replacement ammunition for the ships. We had no transportation to get that ammunition, and those bombs out there and I remember in the early months of my time there I issued orders that every ship that came out there was to bring bombs and ammunition.

Of course, that is explosive, and I had to take that [7022] responsibility.

There were numerous other things I asked for besides antiaircraft stuff. I was trying to and did emphasize a great many other things besides antiaircraft. I tried to emphasize everything that we were lacking in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I simply wanted to ascertain whether the fact that an air attack seems to have not been the subject of comment after about the first of October, was due to any change in your belief that an air attack, which had been feared for 6 months during 1941, was no longer to be feared after October?

Admiral KIMMEL. You have said I feared an air attack. I felt always that an air attack was a possibility. I felt that I would have been remiss if I had not called the attention of the Navy Department and the War Department, with all of the force at my command, to the necessity of providing against every contingency in Hawaii.

At no time did I consider that an air attack was any more than a possibility under the conditions that we had out there. What the events of a war might bring forth was quite a different thing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We might just as well explain it now. Why do you suggest that you did not think an air attack was more than a possibility? What were the reasons why it not [7023] only could not have been limited to a possibility, but that it was not a probability?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I knew the difficulties of an overseas expedition such as that. I knew the short range, the steaming range of the Japanese aircraft carriers. I very much doubted their ability to plan and execute an attack such as they made. We had had various reports on the Japanese Air Force, and I think not only I, but all the Navy Department were very much surprised at the efficiency of their air force and the manner in which they conducted that attack.

Now, the hazard that they undertook when they came there was something that I thought they would never take a chance on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You also knew by December 7—

Admiral KIMMEL. And I might add that I gathered this opinion after a great deal of thought and a great deal of consultation with the best naval minds we had, and I think those naval minds were right in Hawaii at the time I was there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew, Admiral, of the burning of the Japanese codes by December 7, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean the message of December 3?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is one of them. There was more [1024] than one with reference to the burning of codes, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was only one that I recall at the moment. There was a message of December 3 which said the Japs were burning most of their codes and ciphers in London, Hongkong, Batavia, Washington, and so forth.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What would that indicate to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. At that time it indicated to me, in conjunction with the other messages I had that Japan was taking precautionary measures preparatory to going into Thai, and because they thought that the British or the Americans, or both of them, might jump on them and seize their codes and ciphers after they went into Thailand.

Now, that was the interpretation we gave on it at that time.

[7025] Now incidentally, I would like to add another thing to that. That message came to me. It had nothing in it directing me to pass this on to General Short. That was a procedure that the Navy Department always used when they had an important message that they wanted me to give to General Short. I tried to give everything that I thought would be of interest to General Short to him anyhow.

But when the Navy Department sent me an important message which they thought should be conveyed to General Short they put that

in the message. They did not put it in this message, and that in itself lent some weight to my construction of it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you advise General Short about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not personally, no, but you will hear from him about whether he heard about it or not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you instruct any of your staff to advise General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not. I did not advise my staff to instruct General Short to do a great many things, but they did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They did what?

Admiral KIMMEL. I say I did not instruct my staff to instruct General Short to do a great many things that they did automatically. Most of his information he got from the commandant of the district.

[7026] As I have tried to tell you, this liaison with the district on matters of that kind was more direct than it was with my fleet staff. Now the district got everything that I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I was just going to ask you, do you know that Admiral Bloch got this information with reference to the burning of codes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then from your plan of operation that you had there you would expect that information to go from Bloch to Short or his staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. To exchange the information, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now you knew also on December 6 about the status which we spoke about this morning of the Jap espionage in Hawaii. You had all the knowledge you ever had up to December 7 about the presence in Hawaii of a flock of Japanese spies that were transmitting information into Tokyo as to the situation in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. We knew about that, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew also on December 6 about these reports which had frequently come to you of military movement by Japan on the Asiatic Coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh yes, yes. That was following the pattern that was laid down in the messages of the 24th and [7027] 27th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, it is also a fact, isn't it, that on December 6 it was reported to you by one of your staff, under circumstances showing his nervous interest in the fact, that for 6 days the Japanese carriers had been lost?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought I covered that pretty completely.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You did. Let me finish.

And in response to his anxiety about it you made the remark, "Do you expect me to believe that the carriers are coming around Diamond Head?"

Now do you recall the incident and will you give us your version of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking about the twinkle in my eye, I suppose.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that is part of it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall the exact words that I used to Captain Layton, but I was very much interested in the location of all Japanese ships, not only the carriers but the other types. I felt if I could locate the carriers I would be able to determine pretty closely

where the main Japanese effort was going to be. I went over these traffic analyses reports with Captain Layton every morning. Captain [7028] Layton was a very excellent officer. He was very intense, and I have no doubt that I made such remark as that to him, not in any way to decry his efforts, or to treat the matter lightly, I did not treat the matter lightly, and he would be the last one to ever say that I treated the matter lightly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you had a very different reaction to the suspected fact than he did?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I had no different reaction from what he had. If you have gotten that impression I think it is entirely erroneous.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he come to you with a twinkle in his eye when he told you that he had not heard anything of the carriers for 6 days?

Admiral KIMMEL. He came to me because I told him to come.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that is all right.

Admiral KIMMEL. He came to me every morning. The first thing I did when I reached the office in the morning was to go over everything that had come in during the night.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you get any idea from him when he came that he was not serious in this report about the loss of the 6 carriers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Serious?

[7029] Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course he was serious. There was never any question of being serious. Not about the loss of the carriers. As far as we were concerned the carriers were never lost, and when people say the carriers were lost they might as well say the whole Japanese fleet was lost.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, Admiral—

Admiral KIMMEL. Just one second, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. We had during this period a wealth of traffic. There was a great deal of traffic. The only trouble was we were unable to identify it, and we were not only unable to identify the Japanese carriers, we were unable to identify pretty nearly all the Japanese fleet. It was not that we had lost six carriers, that was not the thing. We did not even know we had lost them. We could not identify them.

[7030] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did not Layton use the word "lost" in reporting to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. As far as I remember, no. All he said he was unable to identify them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, you also had on December 6, and the morning of December 7, various information with respect to real, or fancied submarine activities at the Hawaiian base?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in that connection, without referring to those submarines which had been reported at an earlier date and referring to what we may call the Ward submarine—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many submarines were there discovered in the immediate Hawaiian-Pearl Harbor area on the morning of December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, on the morning of December 7, there must have been a half-dozen altogether. There was one which came into the harbor and which was promptly sunk by one of the airplane tenders, and destroyer—well, somebody else got into it, I forget now, but they hit him all about the same time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How far did that one get in?

Admiral KIMMEL. He got all the way in to Ford Island. [7031] He apparently did no damage at all. They got him right away.

I have never investigated this myself, because I left out there too soon to go into things like that, but my recollection is that he was supposed to have followed the *Altair* into the harbor, not the *Altair*—one of the tugs into the harbor earlier in the morning when she came in through the gate, through the antitorpedo net.

Now, mind you, this was a submarine of a type that we did not know existed, and we did not believe any submarine could get into the harbor without showing its periscope as it came in. That was the reason they got in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was it sunk?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was sunk inside.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I know, but when? Do you know the precise time? Could you tell me?

Admiral KIMMEL. Just about the time the attack started or within 5 minutes of it, when I think it was sunk.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, go ahead.

Admiral KIMMEL. Then, there was another submarine which ran aground up in Bellows Field, the north side of Oahu, and they got the skipper out of it. He was the one that the FBI finally decided had been around Pearl Harbor and had reported the location of the ships in there.

[7032] Mr. RICHARDSON. What time did he go ashore, about as compared with the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not remember.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it before the attack or during the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it was after the attack.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Army found him over there and we sent over there and got him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Describe those submarines that you refer to that were of a new type.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know too much about them because I had a great many things to do out there at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were they both these midget submarines?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were they both these midget submarines?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they were the midget submarines, the two-man submarines. The submarine is about 10 or 12 feet in diameter and about 60 or 70 feet long. It is so small that a white man could not get into it. They had to cut the thing apart in order to get a white man in [7033] to the seat where they drove it.

I think it was air-driven and it was capable of about 20 knots under water, which was something far in excess of any submarine we knew anything about. It was a ship very much like a torpedo and could have, I think, about a 100-mile cruising radius, or something of that kind.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, there were two, Admiral——

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, Draemel went out——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who is he?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is Rear Admiral Draemel. He was in command of the destroyers, of the Battle Force at the time. I forget the details, but anyhow, he got a distress call in one of the bays over there. He started in and two submarines fired at him torpedoes. They were trying to get him in there to shoot at him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was that with respect to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was that with respect to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, maybe a couple of hours afterward. I cannot recall all these things off the bat, but I should say there were conservatively a dozen or more submarines in the Hawaiian area at the time the attack took [7034] place that we discovered, and maybe more than that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did the *Ward* episode happen with respect to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. The *Ward* episode I have since learned—I think she fired depth charges at this submarine around about 6:30 or a quarter to 7, and she made some kind of a report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whom did they report to?

Admiral KIMMEL. The report went to Admiral Bloch. The report was, "Have attacked a submarine." It was not as clearly stated at that time as it was in a subsequent message about a half-hour or three-quarters of an hour later.

When Admiral Bloch received it, he was waiting for verification, because we had had various attacks, or incidents where our people had dropped depth charges on suspected submarines, after I had issued the order there on the 27th of November.

I thought his action was quite all right. He did seek verification before he did anything else.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I call the committee's attention to the fact that there is a log which is in the record as exhibit 119, giving the radio log with respect to some of this submarine activity.

[7035] Admiral KIMMEL. You must realize, in reading this log—I have never read it in detail, but I have been told approximately what is in it—that we were constantly receiving reports of suspicious objects to be investigated, of possible submarines, and this kind of thing was going on several times a week.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, should that report that came in on this so-called *Ward* submarine to Admiral Bloch have been immediately relayed to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was relayed to me. I do not know how immediately, because I got it around 7:30, between 7:30 and 7:40, something of that kind, or 7:20 to 7:30, something of that kind.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, you had also on December 6–7, information with reference to the change in the call letters of the Japanese Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, yes. On December 1 that change was made.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the previous change had been made on November 1.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And before that, those call letters had been changed about every 6 months, were they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. At irregular intervals, as I recall it. The first one in 1941 was made in May 1941. The second one in November 1941, and the third in December, December 1, 1941.

[7036] Mr. RICHARDSON. Would the fact that there had been such a short period from the change on November 1 arouse any apprehension in your mind that it had any particular significance?

Admiral KIMMEL. We thought that was a prelude to their moving down the China coast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you did think that the change in call letters had some call reference to future military operations with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in that way; yes. It was entirely consistent with the advice we had received from the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now you also knew on the morning of December 7 that you were not conducting any distant patrols other than those which attended the operations of your task forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. On that particular morning; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that has been very thoroughly covered in the previous testimony that I have given.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, there is another thing I wanted to talk to you about. It was quite generally understood, was it not, during 1941, in discussing the question of air attack upon Hawaii, that the dangerous sector, the origin of those attacks was the northern sector?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I think that that is a misconception, and it is a natural misconception which seems to be inevitable after a fact. I know that my predecessor did not consider the northern sector the most dangerous, if you take the sector that he covered during his patrol, which was to the westward, northwestward, and around to the southwestward. I know that Admiral Halsey's idea even on the day of the attack was that they would probably come from the Marshalls.

I testified before the Roberts Commission as to the north being a dangerous sector, and I gave the reasons which appealed to me at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. If I can help counsel, pages 605 and 606.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. Pages 605 and 606.

Mr. MATSON. Is that the typed number?

Mr. MURPHY. That is the little typed number, on the bottom of page 605 and the top of page 606.

Admiral KIMMEL. Are you ready for me to go ahead?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just let me clarify your recollection, Admiral Kimmel, with this testimony. I am reading from typewritten page 605 and pencil page 622. This is the Kimmel previous testimony before the Roberts Commission.

Senator BREWSTER. Could we have what Admiral Kimmel [7038] was saying at the time he was interrupted?

Admiral KIMMEL. Beg pardon, sir?

Senator BREWSTER. You made a statement as to having predicted an attack in the north and having given reasons for it. I think you were in the process of stating the reasons when you were interrupted by the gentleman on the other side.

Admiral KIMMELL. Yes; I started to give an answer but I was diverted.

Senator BREWSTER. Will the reporter read the statement to see how far you got?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Admiral KIMMELL. Then I started out to say I did not wish to make an alibi after the fact, and maybe I leaned over a little too far the other way.

In any event, I gave the reasons why an attack from the northward might be successful. I did not give it in any detail at all, in fact I scarcely touched upon the disadvantages of the northern route, and those disadvantages were well known to me at the time.

The principal disadvantage of the northern route is that it is a 3,500-mile pull from the homeland; it is through rough seas at that time of the year; the 3,500-mile pull would require refueling, and an expedition of that kind had no better than a 50-50 chance of getting through, due to weather alone.

[7039] You have heard testimony here to the effect that this task force was very lucky in being able to get through, I mean in being able to refuel and come down there, because they struck some smooth weather, which was very unusual at that time of the year.

In view of all the circumstances before and since I feel, and I felt then, that no arc, no sector could be ruled out as a possible way for them to come in. I quoted Admiral Nimitz on that, who relieved me, and he agreed in toto with the conception that I had of that. They could come in from the east without too much trouble; they could come from the Marshalls, and come in from the southeast. There was no sector that they could not come in from.

If they could come in after a 3,500-mile trip through the northern seas, the rough seas up there, there was certainly no deterrent to their coming in from any direction. We know that now better than we did before Pearl Harbor, as a matter of fact.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Admiral, just to keep the record straight, do you think that this answer should be qualified:

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you were expecting a raiding force to come from the southward, what would you do?

Admiral KIMMELL. The air raid force on this place would [7040] have a better chance, a much better chance to get in from the northward than they did from the southward, but no part should be disregarded.

Admiral KIMMELL. One reason I made that statement—and these were not considered statements anyhow, I was called before this commission and questioned at length, I had no time to prepare myself, I had been without sleep for some time, I was, to a considerable extent, strained, and all that must be taken into consideration here—but what I probably had in mind at the time about coming in from the southward was that we had been operating from the southward.

Admiral Brown was down at Johnston Island, which is to the southward, he had been operating out of there, and I had had some patrol planes operating out of there, I had had some patrol planes sweeping betwixt Johnston Island and Midway, and I had patrol planes sweeping betwixt Oahu and Midway.

I thought their chances at that particular time for being able to get in were better than from the northward, and that probably influenced me considerably in what I had to say at that time.

Now I have attempted to reconstruct in my own mind a little about where the Japanese say they went. I am not sure that one of our sweeps missed them by so very much out [7041] there. I have not plotted it on the chart.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, let me call your attention also for clarification to the further testimony of yourself on typewritten page 1547, in which the chairman says this:

Now I think that General McNarney wants a question in order to avoid reading all that the order relates and having you repeat it, and his question is to the effect: Why, Admiral, did you suggest there was a probability or possibility of a carrier to the northward?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because I thought that was the most probable direction of an attack coming against this place.

Admiral KIMMEL. Just what I have stated, sir, because we had covered a good many areas to the southward recently. And there was another thing. I had on that morning what might be termed a hunch and I did not know why, but I felt the carriers were to the northward, and I put that in a dispatch to Halsey. I did not want to make it much more than a hunch.

Subsequently we got information which seemed to indicate the carriers were to the southward, and I had nothing more than this feeling, you might say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall the subject of the northern sector being the most likely sector in which an air attack would approach in any dispatches or correspondence between [7042] you and Stark's office?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I recall nothing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you remember any suggestion coming out of the Office of Naval Operations affirmatively stating that the northern area was the dangerous area?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I remember no such communication at any time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, I want to ask you another question. Do you know a man named Captain Zacharias?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I know him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There has been a suggestion made that he had conversations with you prior to the attack on December 7 with respect to the probability of air attack on the Pearl Harbor base.

I would like to have you give us, if there were any such conversations, what they were, how they occurred, the circumstances, and generally tell the committee about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will do so. Captain Zacharias is a Japanese language student. He is a very excellent Japanese language student. I will give you a little background.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is what I want.

Admiral KIMMEL. He was an intelligence officer down in the San Diego district in October of 1940 when Admiral Richardson had a detachment of the fleet consisting of two or three [7043] battleships and some smaller craft at anchor at Long Beach, and Captain Zacharias sent a message to Admiral Richardson that there was going to be an attack by Japanese planes on the fleet in Long Beach that night, that the Japs had an airfield down in Mexico, and that they were going to get the planes over here some way or another—I believe by carrier—and they were coming up there.

Richardson had this information. He did not believe it, but he had no choice but to get his detachment under way and get out, and subsequent investigation proved there was not anything down there and there were not any Japanese planes anywhere near the coast.

Captain Zacharias had an interview with Mr. Nomura, Admiral Nomura, when he came over here, and he gave me a valuable résumé of his conversation with Admiral Nomura by letter. Eventually he, in command of a cruiser, the *Salt Lake City*, I think, came out and joined the fleet, and along in March of 1941 I was back in the War Plans Section of my headquarters when Admiral W. W. Smith, my chief of staff, brought Captain Zacharias back there to talk to me.

I had a conversation with Captain Zacharias. Most of it was taken up with my asking him questions about the Japanese Navy. I have no recollection of Captain Zacharias having said anything about an attack on Pearl Harbor, and [7044] least of all do I recollect anything about his having said that the attack was going to come at any particular time.

I might add if he had told me in March that the attack was coming on December 7, I would not have been greatly impressed. In any event, about 2 weeks prior to Captain Zacharias' conversation with me I had received from the Chief of Naval Operations a letter, which has been quoted here before this committee, to the effect that no Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was planned for or projected in the foreseeable future. I think you will recall that letter.

I would have been very much inclined to take the estimate of the Chief of Naval Operations forwarding the views of the Chief of Naval Intelligence over those of Captain Zacharias.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, don't you think, Admiral, that if he had specifically advised you of the probability of an immediate attack on Pearl Harbor that you would now recollect that conversation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should think so, sir, but I do not recollect it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now let me move on, Admiral, to ask you some questions as to the precise condition in Hawaii at the time of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might add you will have Captain Smith before you and you can get his version of the same [7045] conversation, because he was prompt throughout the conversation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now at the time of this attack on December 7 you had three task forces out: One to Johnston, one to Wake, and one to Midway; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And they were out upon missions, they were not connected with fear of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes; that is true; not fear of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now let me call your attention, Admiral, to this map. I place the pointer on Oahu. Now I place the pointer on Midway. One of these task forces was proceeding from Oahu to Midway [indicating].

Admiral KIMMEL. It was down about 400 miles, a little bit further down from where you are indicating. It is to the southward and eastward, along in there [indicating], about 400 to 500 miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is this [indicating]?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Newton task force, the *Lexington*.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not referring to any particular name, but there was a task force that went to Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did not go to Midway, it was only going about 400 miles from Midway, or put it about 700 miles from Oahu.

[7046] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that task—

Admiral KIMMEL. That put it about 700 miles from Oahu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To the west?

Admiral KIMMEL. To the west of Oahu about 700 miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But the course of that task force was to the west?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; a little north of west.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many degrees north of west?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, looking at it, I would say 20, maybe.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The other task force was going to Johnston Island?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. That is, Brown's task force.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then did you have a task force going to Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that would also be in a weswardly direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was on its return at that time. That was about some 300 miles west of Pearl Harbor at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But that task force at no time would go appreciably north of a west line from Oahu, would it?

[7047] Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Calling your attention to these red lines on this map as very inferentially illustrating the course of the Jap fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had no task force or other patrol that was operating in the area covered by those red lines?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that on the morning of December 7, your three task forces and the supporting planes which were making reconnaissance with those task forces was very largely confined to a sector which might be called the southwest sector from Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it was the westerly sector, I should say, would be more appropriate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you also on that morning had a plane patrol between 4 and 7 a. m., that was covering only local areas for training purposes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. Covering the operation areas to search out the submarines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you had on that morning also a radar operation schedule between 4 and 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Army had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. And, so far as you [7048] know, and so far as the Navy is concerned, no method of getting a radar report to the Navy from that operation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why wasn't there anybody to get a radar report from them to the Navy?

Mr. RICHARDSON. You didn't have a Navy man assigned?

Admiral KIMMEL. That makes no difference, sir, that I can see. Anybody that could talk English could tell me where the planes were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no Navy man assigned to the Information Center on Sunday morning, was there?

Admiral KIMMEL. The only Navy man that I had assigned to the Army at that particular time was Lieutenant Taylor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He was a technician?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; he was an operating man. He was not a technician.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You didn't think, did you, that he was to make reports?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought he was to be used by the Army in any way they saw fit. I turned him over to them completely, and they could give him any order they pleased.

Now, if they had the information, if the information was in fact available, anybody could have telephoned it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But nobody did?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, they didn't. I [7049] never received it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, on that Sunday morning of the attack, you had your ships so arranged in the harbor as to facilitate the use of your antiaircraft batteries on the ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a fact.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was a matter of definite policy which you had worked out to guide your ships when in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So in event of an air attack they could concentrate their fire in the most scientific way?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; instantly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you testified that your information is that your fleet guns, aircraft, antiaircraft guns were firing on this attack within 4 to 7 minutes after the attack started?

Admiral KIMMEL. My understanding and my belief is that in from 4 to 7 minutes, variously estimated, all the guns of the fleet were firing, all the antiaircraft guns of the fleet, but that those that were manned before the attack opened fire at once.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is that in your opinion as great a state of readiness as could have been provided for for those [7050] ships under those circumstances that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it was a very reasonable condition to maintain. When any gun, or group of guns, one-quarter to one-half of them, opened fire at once, and began to shoot at the first planes coming in, and when the rest of them chime in to the extent of the whole outfit within 4 to 7 minutes, I don't believe you will beat that much anywhere.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Also, it is a fact, is it not that on this Sunday morning, under the Short direction, the Army was in its first alert against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have heard that stated. I don't know it as a fact.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you have also heard it stated, have you not, Admiral, that upon the Army air fields, the planes of the Army were bunched together in order to facilitate guarding themselves against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I read that in some reports, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, passing from the exact condition in Hawaii on this morning to find out what was not available then, I bring up

again the fact that there was on that morning no distant patrol reconnaissance out of Oahu.

Admiral KIMMEL. That has been pretty well established.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there was no continuous radar [7051] beyond this operation we referred to between 4 and 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. You have the testimony on that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there was no alerting of the antiaircraft guns of the Army on that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. I learned the details when I read the report of the Army Board.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And those details that you learned indicated that they were not alerted?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think those details, as published, speak for themselves.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the only comment you care to make?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no—I don't think any comment is called for by me. I don't know whether the assertions made in the report of the Army board are correct or not. I think you should get this from General Short.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you don't know, and your Navy contingent had no knowledge, with respect to whether those guns were or were not alerted?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know now from my own knowledge what condition the Army guns were actually in on that morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was any report made to you by members of your staff with reference to that fact?

[7052] Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall any at the present time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now—

Admiral KIMMEL. But the members of my staff were not charged with that duty.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was because it was the duty of the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; that was because it was a duty that was, insofar as the Navy had anything to do with it, it was a duty of the commandant of the district to look out for that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He was under you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but he is not on my staff. Maybe I spoke in a restrictive sense of "staff."

Mr. RICHARDSON. It was of exceedingly great importance to you that those antiaircraft guns of the Army were in a condition of readiness?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had confidence in General Short. I may say I had confidence in General Marshall. I read the report—not the report—the dispatch which came to General Short, in which he was told to report to General Marshall just exactly what he had done, and I had, I remember, this dispatch, you see. I had every reason to believe that that business had been looked out for. It [7052 A] was doubly sure that if it were reviewed by the Chief of Staff, that they would get this condition of alert that he with his additional information in Washington knew or believed was required there at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, at best, that would be an assumption on your part, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh—

Mr. RICHARDSON. There certainly was no verification of it by you?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I made no assumptions, I would have spent all my time running around checking up on every detail.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was the condition of readiness of your antiaircraft guns defending Pearl Harbor, simply a matter of detail?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was in the dispatch which came to General Short an admonition not to alarm the civil population, and I presumed that he would work that out to the satisfaction of the defense of Pearl Harbor and the Chief of Staff, so it wouldn't alarm the civil population, and that they would get a reasonable set-up for it.

[7053] Mr. RICHARDSON. In other words, neither you nor any member of your staff made any attempt to verify or find out what the condition of alertness was with respect to the antiaircraft guns operated by the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. And neither did General Short make any attempt to find out the details of an alert that the Fleet had in effect at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That, I might suggest, Admiral, is one of the troubles in this proceeding.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there is such a thing as having confidence, and if you don't have confidence in the people you work with you don't get much result.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me interject this at this point, Admiral: Do you think the condition of affairs that existed in Oahu, which culminated in the attack on this Sunday morning, has any relevance to the question of a single authority directing military operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say no, and the reason I make that statement is that we had two chances to receive the vital information which was withheld from us. One chance was from the Chief of Staff of the Army supplying it to General Short. The other chance was from the Chief of Naval Operations supplying it to me. And if either one of us had had the vital information, which I have set forth, I believe, at great [7054] lengths, I think that the conditions that obtained in Hawaii on that morning would not have obtained.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The fact is, is it not, Admiral, that as you approached December 7 you very definitely gave the Navy program for action in event of the declaration of war precedence over the establishment of the defense of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had believed in those days preceding Pearl Harbor that there was a 50-50 chance or anything approaching that of an attack on Pearl Harbor, it would have changed my viewpoint entirely. I didn't believe it. And in that I was of the same opinion as that of the members of my staff, my advisers, my senior advisers.

In this connection it might be appropriate to say this. I had conversations with Admiral Pye several times during the week ending on November 7. On November 6 we spent most of the forenoon together going over the situation.

Senator LUCAS. Do you mean December 6 or November 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. December 6, the day before the attack.

And in the afternoon I spent practically all afternoon, and spoiled a couple of golf games, by keeping my operations officers, my war plans officer and my Chief of Staff to discuss the situation. I had

conversations with Admiral Wilson Brown, who was in command of the Scouting Force of the Fleet, and [7055] under whose command Admiral Bellinger operated as part of the Fleet. I had several conversations with him. He went to sea on the 5th of December and was down at Johnston Island. I had on my staff Captain Smith, W. W. Smith, commonly known as "Poko," who has since become a vice admiral. And Captain McMorris, who was my war plans officer. Captain McMorris stayed there with Admiral Nimitz as war plans officer for several months, when he went to sea, and was in action up in the Aleutians, successful action, too. And then Admiral Nimitz took him back as his Chief of Staff, where he remained as Chief of Staff until the end of the war.

Admiral Delaney, he is a vice admiral now, he was a captain, he was my operations officer, and he was one of the three that was with me most of Saturday afternoon.

There is Admiral Murphy, Rear Admiral Murphy, then the commander, who was one of the assistant war plans officers. He has been a very successful commander in this war.

There was Kitts, my gunnery officer, the man who, incidentally, advised me about the torpedoes. He is now Assistant Chief of Bureau of Ordnance here in the Navy Department and a very able one.

Those were the type of men I had advising me. Admiral Calhoun, vice admiral now, was the commander of the base force. He was there. Not to mention Admiral Bloch, whom I [7056] have talked about before.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You agreed, did you not, Admiral, that if there was real danger of an air attack on Hawaii the training program shouldn't have stood in the way for a moment?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't let the training program stand in the way of the alert that I considered necessary at that time. The fleet was on the alert. It was on the alert and any man who says the fleet wasn't on the alert, when the whole outfit were firing in the times that have been testified to here, well, I don't know what he means by alert. I took certain courses of action. I took them after mature consideration. I did the best I could. And with the same information again I am not sure but what I would do the same thing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if you had been sufficiently wise to have sensed the probability of an air attack, would you have withdrawn all of your distant reconnaissance patrols?

Admiral KIMMEL. Would I have done what?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Withdrawn all of your distant reconnaissance patrols, as you did do?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I have tried to indicate in my statement what I believe, now believe, I would have done had I considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable.

[7057] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, let's consider for just a minute the propositions suggested as to mistakes originating in Washington.

You, as I understand it here, assert that the messages that you received from the Chief of Naval Operations properly bear the interpretation that you put on them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your point, as I understand it, is that if those dispatches were intended to alert you against an attack at Pearl Harbor

they should have said something about Pearl Harbor as well as talking about Borneo and the Malay States and Thai and the China Sea and other places on the Asiatic coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. If they had convinced me in the dispatches which they sent to me of what they now say they meant by those dispatches there would never have been any Pearl Harbor such as it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your contention with reference to what I call the harbor plotting message, your contention with reference to them, is that had that information come to you it would have definitely pointed to Hawaii as a possible point of attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't gather any other conclusion from those messages, and I have taken this matter up with [7058] members of my staff, former staff, with Admiral Pye, and they wouldn't believe, when I first told them about it, that those messages were in existence. They wouldn't believe it. I couldn't believe it myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, the evidence that has been given here indicates that those intercepts with reference to those harbor plotting messages reached all of the high command here in Washington who customarily received such intercepts.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that they passed over the desks of all of those members of the High Command.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any explanation, as an Admiral in the Navy for 40 years, of how a series of messages like those could have passed through all those hands without any significance being attached to them?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have tried to get an answer to that and I have none. I do feel this, that had they given me those dispatches, my primary concern out there being the fleet, these people in Washington, it is true, had other things to do, but if they had given them to me I can say, without any reservation whatsoever, that it would have changed my ideas completely and every one of my staff that I have talked to, [7059] and I have talked to Smith, Murphy, Kitts, and Pye, all of them feel exactly the same way I do. We were there. We were on the ground.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, the thing that bothers me is just that, you were on the ground.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were in the midst of the greatest hotbed of Japanese espionage there was in the United States. Shouldn't you have had reason to suspect that such an important bit of information as the plotting of the only fleet we had in the Pacific, in Pearl Harbor, was being transmitted to Tokyo by that Intelligence without receiving information on it from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. The significance isn't so much that they were transmitting this information to Tokyo. The significance is the demand of Tokyo to get this information to Tokyo, Tokyo's anxiety to have it, Tokyo's reiteration of what they wanted, and of making the reports twice a week, making them even when there was no movement. Tokyo's demand was, to me, the significant thing. It wasn't so much that the Consul there was transmitting information. But there is no reason why they would have wanted that information unless they were going to use it on the ships while they were in the harbor. You

must remember that this [7060] information was good only for a matter of days at best because the ships got out. They had to find out over again where they were. This question of getting the ships out of Pearl Harbor, of putting them in a position where they could get out and head out, and that kind of stuff, we had worked that out months before, and when a ship came in she was berthed headed out, so that all she had to do was cast off her lines and breast herself out a little bit and out she steamed.

More time was consumed in berthing the ships for that reason.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let me direct your attention to these dispatches with reference to the so-called cut-off dates of November 25 and November 29. Those were the dates mentioned in the letters.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, there would be nothing in those letters, would there, that would indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All you would get from those letters would be some appreciation of one of the two elements of doubt, to-wit, when war would be declared?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; yes; and what we would have gotten [7061] from those messages is this, that a definite date after which things were automatically going to happen had come and passed, the automatic operation that was planned was not taking place. It took some time to get it into operation and every day it was delayed after the 29th made an attack far distant from Japan much more likely than it had been before.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me see if I follow you. Your contention is that since the 29th passed—

Admiral KIMMEL. The 25th first.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The 25th first, then the 29th passed, and no action; in view of the language of those dispatches, that they indicated a movement from Japan to some distant point that would require that expenditure of time to get there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That seems reasonable.

[7062] Mr. RICHARDSON. For that reason those cut-off dates didn't have reference to a war on the Asiatic coast. Thai, Indo-China, Malasia, or the Philippines?

Admiral KIMMEL. After the elapse of a certain time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. One thing further: You stated in your testimony with reference to the flight of B-17's that came in from San Francisco on the morning of the attack, you suggested that the fact that those planes had been sent in unarmed, not ready for fighting, indicated that the high command on the mainland couldn't have contemplated an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't remember my testimony on that line, but it is quite probable that is what I thought, whether I testified to it or not, that nobody would send unarmed planes to Hawaii if they expected an attack on Hawaii any time in the immediate future.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I only brought it up to suggest to you whether it wasn't known that the reason that the planes were not sent armed was because of the necessity of increasing their possible gasoline load so they could make the trip to Hawaii.

Admiral KIMMEL. The planes, I have been informed—I haven't seen the planes—had the guns on board. I am, in talking of arming

planes, I am talking of self-defense [7063] now, not offensive measures. They had guns on board and they were what was called "kalsomined," put up in heavy grease, and they couldn't operate.

Now, the only additional thing that would have been required would have been the ammunition necessary to serve those guns.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, these task operations to Wake and Midway were under your control, were they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had disapproved them, you wouldn't have had to send those task forces out, would you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you concluded, as you stated in your statement that the idea of the high command in directing those task forces to move to Wake and Midway was sound?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I thought so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Had you made that—

Admiral KIMMEL. Under my conception at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you made that decision knowing that you could have held them back if you wanted to?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I could have held them back; I could have reported to the Navy Department that I was going to do so, and then they had the power and the auth- [7064] ority to order me to do it, anyhow.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, if they had not gone out, isn't it reasonable to expect that the number of ships in Pearl Harbor at the time of this attack would have been multiplied?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't think so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You don't think you would have increased your ships in Pearl Harbor out of these task forces if they had not been on missions, but had been in Hawaiian waters?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is something that is in the realm of speculation at the present time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the point that I was driving at was whether or not the situation wouldn't have been worse in point of danger to the fleet if the task forces hadn't been sent than it was in sending them, even though you weakened the defense at Hawaii in sending them?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I hadn't sent these task forces to Wake and Midway, it would have been because I wanted to get the fleet out and to have air cover there for them.

They wouldn't have been in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had sent your battleships to sea on the morning of the 7th, if you had had sufficient information so that it would have been possible to maneuver [7065] them and make a sortie with your battleships, wouldn't those battleships have been in greater danger from air attack in the open sea without any planes of yours that could protect them than they were in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the morning of December 7, it was a little late to send the battleships to sea, but on the night of December 6 I could have arranged a rendezvous with Halsey and gotten out pretty much in the same vicinity with him. I could have had the patrol planes out, and such planes as we had in the fleet at that time. I could have called back Newton with the *Lexington*, and he would have been in supporting distance of the fleet by daylight the next morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long would it take to sortie the battleships out of the harbor into the open sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. Three hours, perhaps.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had had every possible warning of the 1 o'clock message which was so delayed on Sunday, the most you could have done with your battleships in that time would have been to sortie them, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but I think now, and again this is hindsight, I can't help but believe I wouldn't have sent the battleships to sea.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is just the point I was making.

[7066] Admiral KIMMEL. I would have sent all the light forces to sea. I would have gotten the destroyers and cruisers out. As a matter of fact, one of my problems all the time there, against a fast raiding force, if any should come, was the fact that my battleships would have been of very little use to me.

They couldn't go fast enough, and the only ones that were of use were the ones that could get out and do something to the enemy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the point that was running in my mind was that so far as your battleships were concerned, the 2-hour warning that you might have had on the 1 o'clock message wouldn't have assisted in your defense?

[7067] Admiral KIMMEL. It would have assisted to this extent. I would have had every gun on deck manned. We would have had not condition X-ray, as we called it, but condition ZED in the ships, which would have made it a little bit more difficult to sink them and this 2-hour warning would certainly have served to warn the Army.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 4 o'clock and we will recess until 10 o'clock in the morning. That will give you a chance to review your notes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have just a few minutes left.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., January 16, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 17, 1946.)

[7068]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7069] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this time for the record before resuming the examination?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, we have for introduction into the record a large number of documents which we think essential in order to completely cover the field, which have been prepared; copies have been, I think, distributed or are available for distribution by Mr. Hannaford, of my staff, and as he will be leaving Washington on Saturday, I would like to have about an hour of the committee's time, either today or tomorrow, to enable him to offer those documents in evidence; and if the chairman will give the matter attention and let me know sometime during the day when that may be done, he is prepared to go ahead with it at that time. It is a matter that does not have to be decided now, but sometime during the day. Most of these exhibits, if not all of them, are answers to requests that have been made by different members of the committee of us.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, do the members of the committee have any views on this point? If we will have to take an hour to do this, it seems to me we might just as well decide now when to take it.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that this is to be done in open hearing and that he will offer them while we are here [7070] in session.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I noticed the other day that a group of exhibits were offered and extended on the record by the reporter without the committee being in actual personal session. I do not know whether that would be permissible practice with these. It is purely a formal introduction into the record of these exhibits.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, that occurred late one afternoon.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We had run over the usual meeting time already and then it developed that certain exhibits were ready to be presented to the committee and the committee, as I recall, by unanimous consent agreed that counsel might submit those for the record, but personally I would think it would be better if these could be presented when the committee is in session so that we may have a description of them and know what they are.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if, for instance, just by way of suggestion, the committee could conclude to pause, for instance, at 3:30 this afternoon, Mr. Hannaford would be ready to complete the presentation of those exhibits at the close of this afternoon's hearing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to that suggestion on the part of counsel?

[7071] (No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair hears none. It will be so ordered.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further before resuming the examination?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Nothing, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you having anything you want to present before counsel resumes his examination?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will now proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, referring to your compilation on retirement matters, which is noted in the record as exhibit 121, I note in the first paragraph the statement that a message came to you that, "Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the Acting Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement."

I note then in the fourth paragraph of the letter:

Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official directing him to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement was not the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox.

[7072] What do you desire the record to show as to the significance of the reference to the Acting Secretary and the reference to the Secretary?

Admiral KIMMEL. Technically the term "Acting Secretary" as referring to Mr. Knox was perhaps correct. I was curious to know the individual who had ordered Admiral Jacobs to send this message to Admiral Greenslade for me and I inquired of him who it was and he told me Mr. Knox. I wanted to know who the individual was.

[7073] Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there not a common understanding dealing with departments of the nature of the Navy Department, that the Acting Secretary, so-called, is not usually the Secretary himself?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was the reason for your further inquiry?

Admiral KIMMEL. When I made the inquiry, I did not know who had given the order. I wanted to know. I found that Mr. Knox had given it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, referring to your statement which you read the other day, and referring to page 35, I want to ask you a question or two.

I asked you yesterday whether you had not concluded, as the commander of the Pacific Fleet, to subordinate the question of Hawaiian defense to the proposition of training.

I find in your statement this paragraph:

I was not expected to discontinue training for all-out security measures, concentrated on the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, every time an alarming dispatch was received from Washington predicting Japanese aggression in Far East. Indeed, had I done so, the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the Fleet could not have been prepared for war.

[7074] Now turning to page 36, I find this paragraph:

In 1941 we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premonitions, of generalized warnings and forebodings that Japan might embark on aggressive action in the Far East at any one of the variously predicted dates. After receipt of such warnings, we were expected to continue with renewed intensity and zeal our own training program and preparations for war, rather than to go on an all-out local alert against attack.

Now, Admiral, you are not complaining, are you, because you received from Washington, what you call a "plethora of premonitions, generalized warnings and forebodings"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was merely stating facts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the transmission to you as commander of the fleet of just such premonitions, warnings, and forebodings as were sent you were precisely what should have been sent you from Washington for your information?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was glad to have all of these warnings and forebodings, but the continued submission of these did not mean to me at any time that I was to go out on all-out security measures and abandon the training program.

What I was trying to emphasize was that in my correspondence with the Navy Department, and in particular in my letter of May 26, I set forth my principal problem, and [7075] my principal problem was to determine when to stop the training program and to go to all-out security measures, and that was what I wanted more than anything else, and in a very definite form.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And with the information that you had at your disposal in Hawaii, preceding the attack and the inferences which you drew from it, there came your decision to proceed with the training program rather than with an all-out alert for defense?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; not entirely. I took the steps which I have outlined in great detail, which I thought it was possible and advisable to take, which I thought the situation demanded.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Precisely; but the steps which you did take, and which you thought the situation demanded put you on a training basis, rather than on an all-out alert defense basis, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. The steps that I took were all that I considered the situation justified at the time, and the fleet was on the alert at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, a word, Admiral, with reference to the use of torpedoes, aerial torpedoes, by the Japanese in the attack.

You have referred to the letters of February and June [7076] as informative to you as to the probability of such an attack on your ships in Pearl Harbor with the depth of water there present.

Now, all the Japanese did to have the aerial torpedo to make the attack was to take some old Whitehead torpedoes built back in 1931, and put some fins on them, so located on the torpedo that when it struck the water the fins would bring it up to the surface and avoid the question of shallow water, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a device which the Japanese used. It was a device which all the brains of our own Navy Department, who had been seeking such a solution, had been unable to arrive at. Any solution of any problem appears simple when you get the answer, and the simpler the better it is.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The fins were made of wood, weren't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know. I think so. I never saw one of them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you feel that the use of wood fins on a torpedo in the water, with those fins so slanted as to bring the torpedo up to the surface as soon as possible was a new development in the art of warfare comparable to the use of radar?

[7077] Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; I do not go that far, but this was a device which the Japanese discovered, and which our own people had been unable to discover. I think it cannot be compared in importance with the discovery of radar.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, on October 14, 1941, you issued to your fleet what is known and referred to as Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, Revised?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did. That was not the first time that was issued. I think that has been stressed here before.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I understand that, but there was one issued on October 14?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that is included in the compilation known as Exhibit 44?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume so. I do not know what is in Exhibit 44.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me read you the second paragraph of that letter.

The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian area is predicated at present on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under present existing conditions, by attack on [7078] Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) Sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft;
- (2) To block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel;
- (3) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

[7079] Now:

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

- (1) A separate attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
- (3) A combination of these two.

Now in sending that letter to your fleet on October 14, you sent that to them as indicating to them what your understanding was as to the basis for the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and Hawaiian waters at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you will find substantially the same wording in every issue of this 2CL-41, the security order.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that continued appearance of that information in all of those confidential letters either before or after the one of October 14 was because there was present in your mind at that time that the matters mentioned in that paragraph threatened the security of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. We were covering, as I have stated several times, all the possibilities that we could foresee, and we were laying down a procedure, insofar as we could see, to meet each one of these conditions that arose. When you make plans you make plans to foresee everything possible, not only the probable things.

[7080] Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, would a copy of these confidential fleet letters to which we have been referring come to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations in due course?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; he is furnished with copies of all these letters. You will note at the end of the letter the distribution is 5CM-41, and a great many letters and indications there, and if necessary, you can find from the then existing mailing list whether this was received in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I can tell you now that there is not the slightest doubt but that he did receive it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were also transmitting these confidential fleet letters to the Army in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am quite sure they were furnished copies of this. I cannot swear to that now, but I am as certain as I can be of anything without investigating it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, calling your attention to your testimony in the Roberts hearings, on page 366, I want to read to you a short excerpt from that. Commencing with question 376.

Mr. MASTEN. That is the Navy court.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me correct that. The record that I am reading from is Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the naval court, commencing with question 376:

QUESTION. Did you at any time as Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, question the advisability of maintaining the Pacific Fleet [7081] in Pearl Harbor?

ANSWER. When I took command of the Fleet I knew of the disagreement between Admiral Richardson, my predecessor, and the authorities in Washington on the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He told me himself. I agreed with Admiral Richardson in general, but when I took command of the Fleet we had been for sometime without much gunnery, due to the fact that no adequate training target facilities were present in the Hawaiian area, and when I took command we had just about succeeded in completing the transfer of the material from the Coast. I did not make any protest, any formal protest against maintaining the Fleet at Pearl Harbor at any time. I did, in conversation with the Chief of Naval Operations in June of 1941, point out to him the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor as a Fleet base. The various elements that entered into it are well-known. I repeated substantially the same thing to the President when I had an interview with him, and the substantial point of the conversation was that so far as an air attack on Pearl Harbor was concerned, the only real answer to an air attack was not to have the Fleet in port if and when the air attack came, that it took from two to four hours to sortie, and once an air attack started the attack would be completed before we could change in any degree the disposition of the [7082] Fleet. I pointed out the chances of blocking the entrance, the single entrance that we had, and the danger from the oil storage as it was at that time, and I do not recall anything other than that at the present time, although there probably was. These were factors which were well-known to the President and Chief of Naval Operations prior to any statement by me.

I accepted the conditions at Pearl Harbor. That was one of the reasons why repeatedly in correspondence I requested to be kept informed of developments.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON (reading) :

Question. In other words, does the Court understand that you concurred with your predecessor in that the Fleet should not be kept at Pearl Harbor?

Answer. In general, yes.

Question. And you so expressed your opinion in conversations with the President and Chief of Naval Operations?

Answer. I did not definitely recommend that the Fleet be withdrawn at the time of my conversation, because I wanted to get some training in. I accepted the situation but pointed out the dangers that existed so long as the Fleet was in Pearl Harbor.

Question. Did you at any time make any recommendations as to the withdrawal of the battleships and carriers or battleships alone from Pearl Harbor?

[7083] Answer. Not that I recall.

I just wanted to ask you, Admiral, whether today you regard that as an accurate statement of the situation as thus discussed and reported?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, I want to call your attention to exhibit 37, page 1, a dispatch from OPN to "All naval districts." You are familiar with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me read it:

Personnel of your naval intelligence service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

Do you agree with the statement thus made, that Saturdays and Sundays and holidays were days of more probable attack than other days of the week by Axis Powers?

Admiral KIMMEL. I want to say first that I never saw this dispatch until after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In fact, I never saw it until I came to Washington. The dispatch is addressed to the commandant of the naval districts. It was never sent to me. I have no recollection of ever having [7084] been warned by any agency that Saturdays and Sundays were a time of particular danger for a surprise attack.

However, I was familiar with, in general, with the activities of the Axis Powers; but I didn't then consider that Saturday and Sunday were particularly a time when the Axis would choose for such a surprise attack, and I am not convinced even today that such a time was any more than a coincidence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it discussed at any time between you and the members of your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not to my recollection. I have no recollection of ever having discussed that with members of my staff, or anybody else.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me call your attention to exhibit 16, which purports to be a memorandum for the President, dated November 5, 1941, from Stark and Marshall, which memorandum came to you by letter on November 14, 1941, as shown in the record as exhibit 106. You are generally familiar with what I am talking about?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me read an excerpt from page 2:

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. [7085] In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all naval vessels. * * *

There is a notation at the bottom of the page that there was inserted after the word "all" the word "practically," so that it should read:

* * * practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only existing plans. * * *

Here there is a notation at the foot of the page "two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word 'current' substituted," so that it would read:

The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies.

You received that communication?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You agree with the statement of fact [7086] therein contained?

Admiral KIMMEL. With the statement of fact? I don't understand you, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will put it differently. Have you any comment to make upon that language as to whether you agree with it or not? Let me carry it through—

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't quite understand the question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The statement is made that the U. S. Fleet is inferior to the Japanese Fleet. Do you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The statement is made that to enable you to do so you would have to withdraw strength from the Atlantic.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That such an offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage. Do you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That the result of such withdrawal might [7087] well cause the United Kingdom to meet with disaster. Do you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a matter of opinion. I think it was perhaps accurate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that the current plans for war against Japan were to conduct a defensive war in cooperation with the British and Dutch for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was correct insofar as I knew it, so far as any facts were available to me.

[7088] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, we discussed very briefly, yesterday, Admiral, the question of the report to you by Captain Layton

of your staff, with respect to the change in Japanese call signs on November 1.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall Captain Layton stating to you in connection with the communication intelligence summary of December 1, 1941, that the change in the Japanese call signs "indicated a progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall the exact language, but I have no doubt that language was used in the summary which was submitted to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And do you recall that at the time he submitted it to you with his communication intelligence summary that you underlined the sentence I have quoted in red pencil?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't recall whether I underlined that myself, or whether Captain Layton underlined it. It was a phrase that would and should have been called to my attention, and I have no doubt it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it was a practice when particular words were called to your attention for you to underline them?

[7089] Admiral KIMMEL. A practice for me to underline them?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. If something struck my mind as being of particular importance, I might underline it. I think it is equally possible that Captain Layton himself underlined it. I don't quite get the significance or importance of whether I underlined it or whether Captain Layton underlined it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, there wouldn't be, Admiral, any particular distinction if the underlining was done when you two were conferring about it. What I am more interested in is what the significance was of underlining it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I would say that the significance of underlining it was that that was probably the most important part of that particular communication, and either I underlined it to get the significance when I was rereading it, or Captain Layton underlined it before he brought it to me, or he may have underlined it after I had completed my conversation. That I can't say now to save my life.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, we discussed yesterday also briefly what I clumsily referred to as the lost carrier fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. One of your staff was Vice Admiral [7090] McMorris?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He was a captain then?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was a captain in charge of the war plans section of my staff. He had several very able officers assisting him in that section.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you read his testimony in the Hewitt investigation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't now recall whether I have read his testimony in the Hewitt investigation or not. I have read a great deal of his testimony.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I want to call your attention to this language:

Taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand, we were extremely disturbed.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You would agree with that conclusion on his part?

Admiral KIMMEL. We were disturbed; certainly we were disturbed, not only on November 27 and succeeding days, but disturbed—I was disturbed all the time I was in command of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, but, Admiral, this discussion of Admiral McMorris had reference to the particular report to [7091] you by Layton with respect to the lost fleet around the 1st of December, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to state that unless I read his testimony. If you say he was referring to that, I presume he was.

Senator LUCAS. Will counsel tell me what he is reading from?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have tried to the best of my ability to set forth just what I knew, and just what significance I attached to these traffic analysis reports.

I have tried to indicate that so far as I was concerned there was no lost fleet. There were ships and types of ships which we were unable to identify, and we had no reason to suspect that there was a lost fleet containing the six carriers any more than we had reason to say there was a lost fleet containing, we will say, 75 percent, or 80 percent of Japanese naval forces.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If the fleet that we speak of as a lost fleet was still in home waters in Japan, or in the China Sea, it would not be as important to you as though that fleet was in the neighborhood of Hawaii, would it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I read now from page 321 of the Hewitt report, statement by Vice Admiral McMorris:

[7092] Mr. SONNETT. Well, I take it, Admiral you recall no specific discussion of the lack of information concerning carrier divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese fleet on or about December 1, 1941, and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I do not so recall, but I do recall that during this general period the information as to the locations of Japanese fleet units was far from as specific as desired. But I do not recall that lack of information. Taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand, we were extremely disturbed.

Admiral KIMMEL. Extremely disturbed?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you extremely disturbed at that time about the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I wanted to know where the Japanese carriers were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you extremely disturbed about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I won't say I was extremely disturbed. Had I been extremely disturbed in it, I would have—might have deduced that they were headed by Hawaii. Is that what you are trying to drive at? I was not disturbed to that extent, and neither was Captain McMorris, as shown by his testimony before numerous other boards.

I am unable to interpret Captain McMorris' testimony [7093] as to exactly what he meant. I am quite sure that Captain McMorris will be able to speak for himself, and I understand he is on the list of witnesses to be called here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, let me read you further from page 363.

Admiral KIMMEL. Does that answer your question?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think so. Let me read this to you further from page 363 of the Hewitt report, answers given by Vice Admiral Smith, who was also on your staff.

Admiral HEWITT. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Referring now to the whereabouts of the lost carrier fleet, as I put it:

Mr. SONNETT. Does—

I guess I will read the preceding question.

Senator BREWSTER. Give the page each time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I did. 363.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Now, I see nothing very alarming in those dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy, right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the second fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercises maintain radio silence. We had a very large force, almost [7094] half of the Pacific Fleet in May 1941 proceeded to the Atlantic, and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks, so the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea.

Do you agree with that conclusion?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not entirely. They may have been at sea. They may have been in port. The only thing we knew was that we were receiving a great deal of traffic. We knew a great deal of traffic was being exchanged, and we were unable to identify it.

Now, Admiral Smith's testimony and Admiral McMorris' testimony was given without benefit of recent examination of the daily summaries which were submitted to me, and which they themselves saw at the time, and the best answer to their impressions and their testimony here is that during all of this period prior to December 7, never once did any of them suggest to me that the carriers might be on the way to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know, Admiral, anything about at the time, a conference of destroyer commanders conducted [7095] by Admiral Bloch following the receipt of the warning message of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall whether I knew of any such conference prior to December 7. It would have been a natural thing for him to do, and when he spoke of his destroyer commanders, he spoke of those destroyers which were assigned to him for use in the defensive sea area.

It would have been a perfectly proper thing for him to do, particularly in view of my order to exercise extreme diligence in the operating areas against submarines and to bomb all suspected submarines contacted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If he, in his conference, warned his destroyer commanders following the warning message of November 27 that something might happen and they should be on the alert that in your opinion was precisely what he should have done?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, yes. I tried to warn them myself, and I tried to warn them in positive language.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall, Admiral, that he reported to you what he had told his destroyer commanders?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall that he told me anything about it. There was no reason why he should. I [7096] would assume that he had done some such thing. I had a right to assume so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever, following the receipt of the warning message of November 27, ever advise the Chief of Naval Operations that you had decided not to operate any long-distance reconnaissance, but intended to concentrate on your training program?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Chief of Naval Operations was informed in correspondence the means available for long-distance air reconnaissance in Pearl Harbor, that we were unable to maintain a reconnaissance for more than a short time, that in order to have a reconnaissance, we had to know within narrow time limits, the time of attack, and we had no means in Hawaii to make that reconnaissance over indefinite periods.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you were in effect, through the disposition of your task forces, maintaining in effect, such a reconnaissance in the west and southwest sectors of Oahu; were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we were; and we did that incidental—not incidental, it was a factor which was considered in this situation, and we took advantage of everything we could to make a reconnaissance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you did not detail a single patrol [7097] plane to make any kind of reconnaissance in the entire north and northwest sector from Oahu either on December 6 or December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, would it have been practicable for you to have detailed either destroyers or submarines for the purpose of maintaining a distant patrol in any of those sectors?

Admiral KIMMEL. The naval court of inquiry went into that question very thoroughly. To maintain an effective reconnaissance by surface vessels or by submarines—the use of surface vessels for such a purpose was, to my mind, highly inadvisable. We had no unimportant units out there which we could afford to sacrifice for that purpose. You will find in the record that we tried to get a bunch of vessels which might have been useful for such things. We were never able to get them.

The only thing we had were surface vessels which, in my mind, were far too valuable to put out on a wide arc and had they been put out there, they would have been destroyed in detail by the attacking force with never a chance. The submarines might have been used if I had had submarines available to do it with.

At the time of Pearl Harbor and immediately preceding [7098] it, I had a patrol of submarines off Wake and Midway. We had not a sufficient number of submarines to maintain more than patrol. I mean a sufficient number available for operation at that time.

In about the early days of November, or it may have been the latter part of October, it was decided, with my approval and the approval

of the Navy Department, to send a large number of submarines to the west coast ports in order to have installed a distilling apparatus. We found that the time the submarine could stay at sea was dependent upon the amount of fresh water they had available, and by putting in an improved distilling plant, they were able to increase the time by something like 50 to 75 percent.

And they were balancing then the supply of water against the supply of fuel oil and other things which enabled them to remain at sea.

For that reason a large part of the submarines which were attached to the Pacific Fleet proper were in the west coast ports at that time, and I recall specifically that Admiral Withers, who was examined before the naval court, had told me he was having great difficulty in maintaining the patrol of these four submarines off Midway and Wake and the reliefs for them.

You will also be interested to know that in the, oh, [7099] within 2 or 3 months preceding Pearl Harbor, we had sent successive detachments of submarines to the Asiatic Fleet, where we believed they could be of more use because they were closer to the Japanese homeland. Therefore we had very few submarines available at this time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many did you have?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection of the figures is that there were four, on patrol off Midway and we had either four or five in Pearl Harbor being held there, who had recently returned from Midway, and were having a rest and recreation period and getting ready to go out and relieve these fellows at Midway.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The patrol of submarines at Midway and the outlying islands was at your order?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You removed them from the Hawaiian area and sent them on to the Midway area?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You could have brought them home any time you wanted to?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; any time I considered it desirable to do so, but I did not consider it desirable to do so, and I think they were performing very useful service off Midway and Wake.

[7100] Mr. RICHARDSON. Is it your position, Admiral, here, that you were instructed by the Navy Department to continue your training programs?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made no such statement. I made the statement that the Navy Department knew throughout the year that I was continuing the training program and that when in their opinion, with all of the information they had here—I thought the least they could do was to give me a definite time, either by supplying me with all of the information, or by giving me orders.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well—

Admiral KIMMEL. I repeated and I repeat again, that what we needed was information or orders, and what I wanted to determine above everything else was when to stop the training program, and when to go on all-out security measures.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And did you ever send a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations asking that question?

Admiral KIMMEL. I gave it in language which I am unable to improve upon to this day in my letter of May 26 and I believe in terms which cannot be misunderstood by any human being.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, let's change our question.

Did you ever ask Naval Operations in Washington after November 1, 1941, whether you should continue your training [7101] program, or whether you should go on an all-out defense of Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't ask them that question; but I would like to invite your attention to a statement I made at page 35 of the paper which I read before the committee the other day.

Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he did not intend that the Pacific Fleet should discontinue its training program upon receipt of this dispatch, two weeks before the attack.

That is on November 24—was the dispatch referred to.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But, Admiral, you didn't know that before the attack, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Didn't know that Admiral Stark felt that way?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew it in every way that I could deduce it from the dispatches that I had received.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it a serious question that you had to consider and decide, whether you would continue the training program or concentrate on Hawaiian defense?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a serious decision to make to stop all training and to go to all-out security measures. I never conceded that the Pacific Fleet was placed in [7102] Hawaii to defend the base at Hawaii. I thought the Pacific Fleet was there, I still think the Pacific Fleet was there to conduct offensive operations, and by offensive operations to afford a measure of security for the fleet—for the base, I mean.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Don't you think it is unusual, Admiral, if you had such a serious decision to make in November 1941, that you didn't ask the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, in an appropriate way, for his up-to-date conclusions on this very important question?

Admiral KIMMEL. From his dispatches and from his letters to me I felt I would get nothing more than he had already given me, and in his letter of November 25, which came to me on December 3, you will see the language which was quoted there.

[7103] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well now, Admiral, referring again to the so-called war warning message of November 27, what did you do with respect to the defense of Pearl Harbor and Hawaii after November 27, in response to that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I have set that forth in the statement there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In other words, the statement you have made in your statement is your answer to that question?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You refer at one place in your statement to your desire to see the actual decoded messages which were being received in Washington.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you take the position here that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to send to commanders in the field

the precise documents by way of information that came in to the office at Washington or their compiled judgment of what those dispatches mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. I felt that the commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, which positions I occupied at the time, were entitled to every scrap of information they had in Washington, and how or in what form that information was supplied to me, or supplied to the commander in chief, I think is unimportant, [7104] it is whether or not the information was supplied.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you think, Admiral, that there should have been sent to you the specific dispatches themselves?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't care whether they were sent by dispatches, by letter, by courier, or by any other means that they wanted to send them. I felt that in order to get—I will say this today that I feel that in order to get the meaning out of dispatches, referring particularly to Pearl Harbor and to the Pacific situation, it would have been very much better to give me the text of the dispatch. That I didn't at any time in this statement intend to insist upon. What I did intend to insist upon was that I was entitled to all the information, whether in summarized form, all the essential information which had to do with the Pacific situation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you understand, Admiral—

Admiral KIMMEL. And I thought I was getting all that information.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you understand, Admiral, as to the scope of the interception of messages that was being conducted by the Intelligence stationed at Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that the Intelligence stationed at Hawaii was detailed primarily and almost exclusively on what we have termed traffic analysis, that all of their [7105] resources were devoted to that end. When they got a message, such as this light message, as I think it has been referred to, where they talked about burning the flares, and lights in the windows, and things of that kind, they undertook to decode that more as a matter of interest and exercise, with entirely inadequate facilities for decoding it. They had no facilities for decoding it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it was your understanding that at no time were they in position to intercept and decode these messages that were referred to here as magic?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Incidentally, I think, in regard to this light message, I think you will find some testimony before the Hewitt Board, Hewitt Board of Investigation, that that light message was in fact decoded and translated in an understandable form by 1 o'clock on December 6, 1941, and that that was here in the Navy Department at that time. That type message that these young fellows out in Hawaii were doing their best to break and which they were unable to break until, I understand, they got some tips from the Japanese Consulate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you consider, Admiral, to have been the significance of the so-called Mori message?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know. I never heard a thing about that. Never knew any such message existed until after [7106] the

attack was over. I recently saw in the newspapers, if you want me to tell you what I saw in the newspapers —

Mr. RICHARDSON. No; if you didn't see it before the attack I am not interested in it.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, on page 67 of your statement you advanced the idea that if you were conducting a partial patrol confined to a single sector, that would immediately become known to Japan and completely neutralize the advantage of such patrol in that sector.

Now, if I correctly interpret your position in that regard, then it would necessarily follow, would it not, Admiral, that this reconnaissance that was being conducted in the west and southwest sector would make it pretty certain that no Japanese attack would come from that sector under that reconnaissance, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that the form of reconnaissance that we conducted in the west and southwest sector from the airplane carriers and from planes operating from Midway and Johnston and from Wake, was much less liable to be known in Japan than any search conducted by planes based on Oahu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, there would be no possible way, would there, except through Japanese espionage in Hawaii, of Japan knowing about a patrol in the north section?

[7107] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Japanese espionage in Hawaii would have been able to determine about the north sector. What I am talking about is that planes taking off from carriers at sea and planes taking off from Midway and Wake and Johnston, the knowledge of that would have been much less liable to get into Japanese hands than anything which originated on Oahu and, according to the northern sector, it would have to come from Oahu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, I have just a question or two, Admiral.

Admiral, isn't it fair to state that the information contained in the war warning message of November 27 was a fair compilation of the general, specific information which had been given to you in the two or three preceding messages in late October and November? Isn't it in effect a summarized compilation of the information you had in the messages which immediately preceded it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a summarized compilation, but it was more definite and more restrictive than the previous messages were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now —

Admiral KIMMEL. It indicated not an attack in any direction but an attack in one of, I think it was, four specified directions.

[7108] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever in all of your experience as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet ever see another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which was designated a war warning in words?

Admiral KIMMEL. My answer to that—I have prepared a little memorandum here because I thought something like this might come up.

On July 3, 1941, I received the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations in which it was stated that the Japanese Fleet was so deployed that it was capable of movement either north or south, that a definitive move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 20–August 1.

On July 25 I received another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations in which the Chief of Staff joined. This told me of the economic sanctions that the United States was about to impose and continue. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff "do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities."

In the letters of the Chief of Naval Operations to me there appear the following which I detailed on page 33 of my statement and which I repeat:

What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess.

[7109] (Memorandum of May 14, 1941.)

An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941.

Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual.

(July 31, 1941.)

Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate.

(August 21, 1941.)

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

(August 28, 1941.)

I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse.

(September 23, 1941.)

My reaction, and the reaction of all of the people, insofar as they communicated their feelings to me, was that this term "this is a war warning" added little, if anything, to the message of November 27. "This is a war warning," merely, "This is to be considered a war warning" merely characterized the information which it contained and the information which [7110] it contained was the thing that we considered most. I had never heard the term used in naval parlance before "This is to be considered a war warning." I considered all the messages—not all—but a great many of the messages that I received during the years as war warnings, and the addition of these five letters which are now pointed to as a cure-all for every deficiency that might have accrued to Washington in this matter, did not have any such effect on me, nor did it have any such effect on any of my associates in Pearl Harbor.

[7111] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, your answer to my question as to whether you ever saw another message from the Chief of Naval Operations stating that the message was a war warning in those words, your answer would be "No"?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. I not only never saw that before in any correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, I never saw it in all my naval experience.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And did it occur to you, since it was such an extraordinary term, that you might inquire from the Chief of Naval Operations what he meant by using it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is just the trouble. I did not consider it an extraordinary term.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, one further question, Admiral. In your statement in a number of cases you refer to information from Washington.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you detail just what you meant by "Washington" for us? Did you mean the Chief of Naval Operations or the Secretary of the Navy or State or War or the President or who?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I was concerned in my official capacity I referred to the Navy Department. I used the term "Washington" to include by implication, if you will, the fact that the War Department, in my humble opinion, had just [7112] as much responsibility for notifying General Short of activities that might affect Hawaii in any degree as the Navy Department had in notifying me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, in fact your reference to Washington meant any of the high command at Washington who were in a position to give you information either through your Navy Department or through the War Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. I looked to the Navy Department for my information. I took all the information I could get either from the Navy Department or from the War Department and I considered every bit of this information, and in that connection I considered the information in General Short's messages from General Marshall and I noted on the 29th that the orders that were given to General Short by General Marshall in Hawaii were also given in almost exactly the same terms to the western defense command, which indicated that General Marshall must have considered the western defense command in as much danger of attack as he considered Hawaii.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, right along that line, Admiral, a question occurs to me that I have overlooked. If the message of November 27 or its equivalent went to all of our naval commands on our west coast—Puget Sound, San Pedro, and whatever others there are there, should there have been, in your opinion, any different interpretation placed upon that [7113] dispatch by those posts than you were entitled to place on it in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection of that, the addressees for that message—

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am referring to the message of the 27th. Who would that message go to, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. This message went from the Chief of Naval Operations to action of commander in chief, Asiatic, and commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. It went for information to the commander in chief, Atlantic, and to special naval observers. That did not go to all the other naval commands. Those were the ones that that message of November 27 was confined to, and Admiral Hart in the Asiatic was faced with a considerably different situation from the one I had in Hawaii and that was meant to cover both.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If counsel will permit, I think it is shown that the parallel War Department message went to these commanders to whom you have referred.

Mr. Richardson. That will be brought out.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir. That is what I was referring to a moment ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, one final question, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. The message to which I referred a few minutes ago was from the Chief of Naval Operations to commander, Pacific Northern and Pacific—to the two commandants on the west coast as I understand it here. [7114]

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would include Panama?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. Pacific northern coastal frontier and Pacific southern coastal frontier, naval coastal frontier. That is where this message went to and it was for information of CinCPac and Commander Pacific naval coastal frontier.

Now, in the text of the message it says, "Army has sent following to Commander, Western Defense Command," and this was the message which was sent to me for information.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any indication that the message went to Panama?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; information Pacific naval coastal frontier—Panama naval coastal frontier, I guess that is what that is. They have got these abbreviations which I am a little bit rusty on right now.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, a final question, Admiral. You will agree, will you not, with reference to this Pearl Harbor attack question that we have been discussing, that if the information which you had and those deductions which you as a skilled naval commander should have made warned you of the immediate danger of an attack at Pearl Harbor, that no amount of negligence at Washington should have prevented you from offering all the defense you could?

[7115] Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly, if I had had anything which indicated to me the probability of an attack on Hawaii then there would not have been any trouble about what I did out there in Hawaii. The messages which came to me, and particularly this message of November 27, were carefully gone over, not only by me but by a great many intelligent people and they got the same meaning out of it that I did. Now, when a number of people of the intelligence of members of my staff and my principal task force commanders who saw these messages and this particular message, too, and had seen everything else that I had gotten, including my correspondence with Admiral Stark, when they did not get the meaning out of it then there must have been something the matter with the message and the people who originated the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, over and above those messages and the meaning of those messages it is your contention, is it not, Admiral, that you did not have enough information available to you to warrant you in doing otherwise than you did?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the hearing began the committee adopted the procedure by which questions from the committee would alternate from the center toward each end. If it is [7116] agreeable to the committee, the Chair would like to reverse that procedure during the remainder of the examination of Admiral Kimmel and give the end man of this group a break by beginning at the end and going toward the center. Is there any objection to that?

Mr. MURPHY. I object to that, Mr. Chairman. I do not think that there should be any variance on any particular witness. Having adopted a procedure, I do not think there should be any change as to one of the most important witnesses that is before us.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, if there is objection, the Chair will not do it.

The Chair wishes to say that on account of his necessary absence yesterday and his inability to hear the testimony given by Admiral Kimmel on the examination by counsel, he asks that he may be passed until he can look over the testimony so that he will not in his questioning duplicate what has already been brought out. Therefore Congressman Cooper, of Tennessee, will be recognized.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is the plan to continue to 12:30, is it?

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter for the committee. We decided while the two Houses were not in session that we would go to 12:30. There will be no legislation today, I suppose, [7117] in the Senate. I don't know about the House. There may be some bills introduced and speeches, but it will probably be a relief to the committee to be in session while they are made.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, as the chairman is the only gentleman who has had the privilege of making a speech in the Senate since we have reconvened, I appreciate his modesty, but I think—

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator calls what I said the other day a speech, I would like to have a description of one of them that I really do make.

Senator BREWSTER. From certain questions which were raised on the Chairman's side of the Senate the other day about very important matters that one of the Senators who is usually regular wished to bring up, I would be glad if I could be present there to see just what he has in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. The only question brought up the other day was whether bills and resolutions should be introduced prior to the President's message, and I rather indicated that, if the President's message was not ready by today, that we would take the halter off and let Senators introduce bills and resolutions, but so far as I know, there is no legislative business.

Senator BREWSTER. I refer more specifically to Senator [7118] Green of Rhode Island, who indicated that he had a matter of great importance to bring up. I would like to know what it is.

The CHAIRMAN. The matter of great importance was a resolution which he proposes to introduce along with Senator Smith, of New Jersey, authorizing the appointment of a committee to look into the question of a Presidential successor. There will be no action taken on it. He just wanted to introduce it.

Senator LUCAS. I think the Senator from Maine is about ready to make a speech on the floor of the Senate. I think the chairman ought to withdraw the remark.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, whatever the committee wants to do about going on after 12 is all right.

Senator BREWSTER. Without indicating any agreement with the Senator from Illinois, because I do not think I have made many speeches and I haven't any in mind today, but I do think that we could make an exception on this particular day in view of the discussion, and I would appreciate it if you would. I felt from what the chairman said the other day on the floor about going forward today if the Presidential message was not received. I appreciate the supe-

rior knowledge in possession of the chairman as majority leader to determine it, but I would personally be glad to have the opportunity of going on the floor at 12 o'clock today to see what goes on.

[7119] The CHAIRMAN. We might as well then, under the circumstances, agree to adjourn today at 12. That is not a precedent that we will set, however.

Senator BREWSTER. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I desire to inquire briefly. Admiral Kimmel, you served in the Navy more than 40 years?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor you were one of the senior officers of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Very few were senior to you in length of service in the Navy at that time, were there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes; I think that is a fair statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And on December 7, 1941, you held one of the most important commands in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You received considerable communications from the Navy Department during the period of time that you were in command of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did.

[7120] The VICE CHAIRMAN. There has been presented to the committee a compilation including letters of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel to and from each other. The pages of this compilation are not numbered but according to my count there are 241 pages in this exhibit No. 106.

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume that may be correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Which is copies of communications from Admiral Stark to you and from you to Admiral Stark.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That would certainly show that there was a considerable volume of correspondence between you two gentlemen?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There has also been presented as exhibit 37 in this hearing a document showing basic exhibits of dispatches of the Navy Department. Those pages are numbered and show that some 46 pages are included here. An examination of that document also shows that many of those dispatches went to you as commander of the Pacific Fleet. That would also indicate, wouldn't it, that the correspondence and dispatches from the Navy Department to you and from you back to the Navy Department was quite voluminous during the period of time that you were in command of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I might add that that is only a part of [7121] the correspondence, of the total correspondence. It includes substantially all the so-called personal correspondence, which was really official, but in addition to that there was a great deal of official correspondence which has not been presented to the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that, then, it is true that there was a great volume of correspondence and dispatches passing between the Navy Department and you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Undoubtedly. Yes, sir; that is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You also kept informed from all sources available to you as to the situation existing between this country and Japan, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did, indeed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you consider war with Japan as inevitable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Beginning when?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At any time in your life have you considered war with Japan inevitable?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the few months before Pearl Harbor I thought was with Japan was highly probable. At no time did I reach the final conclusion that war was inevitable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then your answer is that you never did at any time consider war between the United States and Japan as inevitable?

[7122] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I thought it highly probable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, when did you reach the conclusion that it was highly probable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I should say by the time I became commander in chief.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was in February of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From that time on you considered that war between the United States and Japan was probable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or did you say highly probable, which?

Admiral KIMMEL. Maybe I said highly probable, yes; highly probable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ever consider that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made estimates of the situation from time to time. Had I considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent at any time my course of action would have been considerably different from what it was. I set out from the time I became commander in chief to do everything within my power to make Pearl Harbor secure against a Japanese attack. I felt it was the part of prudence, it was our most important base in the Pacific outside the continental United States, but [7123] I have testified here, I put into my statement that I did not consider an attack on Hawaii any more than a remote possibility at the time that it came and that I had to make a choice of how I was going to employ my forces.

Does that answer your question, sir?

[7124] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I would like you to be a little more specific as to whether you at any time considered or were definite in your own mind that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought it was a possibility. I at no time considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent, if that is what you mean.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You never did at any time consider that an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor was imminent?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor might be possible, but you did not at any time think it was probable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. In a campaign, and the ups and downs of a campaign my opinion on the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor might very well have changed considerably. I was looking forward in all of my efforts to any and all eventualities and under all of these eventualities to be able to hold Pearl Harbor, to hold the Hawaiian Islands.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But if I understand you correctly—and I want to try to understand you—

Admiral KIMMEL. I want you to understand me, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is my whole purpose in asking you these questions. My only purpose in serving on this committee is to try to find the truth about Pearl Harbor.

[7125] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and I hope you get it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were one of the head men there.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and I will give you everything I know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think you ought to be in a position to tell us considerable about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then I would like to know, if it is appropriate, as to whether you at any time thought Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Prior to December 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Then of course the attack that did come on December 7 came as a great surprise to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I was surprised when it came. I did not think it was coming.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then having reached the conclusion that the war was highly probable between the United States and Japan, where did you think the first attack would probably come?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I have stated that in my statement. I expected the attack, any attack that eventuated after [7126] November 27, to be confined to the Far East.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. For the purpose of assisting, I would like to have the reporter mark the passage where Admiral Kimmel spoke about taking every possible step for the security of Pearl Harbor as either the present examiner or others I am sure will want to refer to that. Perhaps the reporter can already locate it now, the statement he made a few questions back about taking every possible step for the security of Pearl Harbor.

Do you recall the answer?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I recall the answer.

Senator BREWSTER. I would just like to have it marked, that is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I hope the reporter will please note that. I did not consider it exactly responsive to the question I was then asking and that is the reason I did not pursue it further. I might ask some other questions about it.

Senator BREWSTER. It varies, as I understood it, with what previously has been said with respect to the respective responsibilities. That is why I thought it was significant and it ought, at any rate, to be noted in the record, and I shall want to ask about it. I will ask the reporter to note [7127] that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Along the line of the question I asked before the Senator from Maine intervened, I understood you to say, Admiral, that you considered that if war did come between the United States and Japan, that Japan would probably first attack in the Far East. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. As nearly as I can recollect my feelings at that time, I was not at all sure that Japan was going to attack the United States when it did. The information that I had indicated to me, and to my associates, that the war would probably—that Japan's next move would be to go into Thailand, and that it was by no means certain that they were going to attack the United States. I do not mind saying that one of the reasons why I felt Japan was not going to attack the United States was because it was national suicide for them to do so. I never at any time wavered in my belief as to that, not even immediately after Pearl Harbor; I had no doubts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "immediately after Pearl Harbor you had no doubts?" As to what?

Admiral KIMMEL. That Japan was going to be wiped off the map before the end of the thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now I did not know of the Japanese [7128] "mad dog" attitude, as I have heard some people express it, that they were of a state of mind where they were going to strike out regardless of how much they got hurt, or how much they hurt anybody else.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In other words, you thought they would have too much common sense to attack the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, at least in that respect I think you and Admiral Stark are in agreement.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe it was Admiral Stark who expressed in somewhat those words that he gave them credit for having too much common sense.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To jump on the United States.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your view of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never disassociated myself from that view, and I could not conceive—well, I never have understood why they were so lacking in—well, common sense; yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But having reached the conclusion in your mind that war with Japan was highly probable, if that did occur, why—it had to start somewhere—didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, it had become highly [7129] probable, I mean that I had reached that conclusion due to the information which I had received as to their actions. But even "highly

probable" does not mean inevitable, and I thought there would be and there should be forces in Japan which would be able to see this thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, had not there been more or less a general feeling, admiral, in the Navy for many years that it was probable there would sometime be war between Japan and the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes; there had been a good many people in the service who felt that war with Japan and the United States would come. It started back in my earliest recollection of this when Mr. Hobson back in about 1904 indicated that, and various writings in all the years since then indicated it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you one of those in the Navy that entertained the view that war between Japan and the United States was sometime probable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Was sometime probable, you say?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Probable, yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never reached the stage where I thought war with Japan was inevitable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did you think war was going to occur between Japan and the United States?

[7130] Admiral KIMMEL. I thought there was a very good chance of it, as I told you before here.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Eventually. What I wanted to know above everything else was when it was going to start.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am satisfied many people would have liked to have known that. They did not send out any message as to when it was going to start, did they?

Admiral KIMMEL. Pretty nearly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And based on that, why, the Navy Department issued you an order, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Based on that information which you say was pretty nearly a notice, the Navy Department issued you an order?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they issued me certain information and certain advice.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did not they issue you a direct order, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. The only direct order in the message which I received was this "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL-46," and I carried out that order to the best of my ability.

[7131] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have issued and received many orders during your service in the Navy, haven't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you regard the dispatch you received on November 27, 1941, as an order from the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. The part "execute an appropriate defensive deployment," certainly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I executed it in a way that I thought would best meet the situation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I had one more question I wanted to ask back along the line of inquiry I was making before going to that message that we have just referred to.

You stated here yesterday that you considered that the best minds of the Navy were at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I consider there were no better minds in our Navy, or any other navy, than at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did any of those best minds expect an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, they did not—not at the time it came.

[7132] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did they expect an attack on Pearl Harbor at any time, as far as you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not like to speak for a body of men like that, but insofar as they expressed their views to me, I think they shared my views fairly completely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were in command of all of them?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And none of them ever expressed any view to you that indicated they expected an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now you were asked some questions about—

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). At the time it came, I am talking about.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did anybody expect an attack on Pearl Harbor at any time, as far as you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not at any definite time; no. They shared with me the idea we should be prepared for eventualities out there, and the situation might change and it might develop into a time when we could expect an attack on Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But up until December 7, 1941, you and none of the other so-called best minds stationed at Pearl Harbor expected an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now you were asked some questions about conversation between you and Captain Zacharias.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was an officer under your command at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you stated that you did have a conversation with him in March of 1941, and you did not recall that he said anything to you about expecting an air attack on Pearl Harbor, is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I made such a statement as that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have any conversation with him at any other time other than March 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not that I now recall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You had no other conversation with him at all, that you remember?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I cannot recall every conversation I had with every other officer in Pearl Harbor, but so far as I know, Captain Zacharias never expressed any idea that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent at any time to me. He may have expressed such sentiments, I do not know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, Admiral, you say that when [7134] you received the message of November 24, 1941, from the chief of naval operations you considered that with the senior officers of your command.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that all of them concurred with you in the view that there was not anything in that message to cause you to anticipate any trouble at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. To anticipate an attack on Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. An air attack on Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, any other kind of attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking about the message of November 24 and not the message of November 27 now? You said the 24th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I said I expect to ask you a few questions about both, but I now have before me the message of November 24, and to refresh the memory of both of us I will just read it.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, are you going to go on? We are a little past our hour now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon. We will suspend at this point to 2 o'clock, Admiral. Thank you for calling my attention to that.

(Whereupon, at 12:03 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[7135]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Nothing, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything you want to present before the examination is resumed?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I may have left the wrong impression in regard to these torpedoes by leaving the statements about these long vanes and large rudders, that putting these long vanes and large rudders was the only thing necessary to make these torpedoes run in shallow waters.

As I told you, I had never seen the torpedoes but during the noon recess Admiral Smith informs me that he did examine the torpedoes and, incidentally, Admiral Smith is an officer who has had a great deal of experience with torpedoes and understands them very well.

He said in addition to putting long and staunch vanes on and rudders on these torpedoes it was necessary to greatly strengthen the after bodies. That in our experiments in dropping torpedoes the trouble was that the shock of impact would [7136] break the torpedoes in two and, therefore, before these old torpedoes were suitable for dropping from an airplane they had to have their after bodies very greatly strengthened, practically rebuilt.

Also, the other factor in connection with it and probably the most difficult was to get a gyro. The gyro, as you know, was the agency by which the torpedo was kept on a straight course and this gyro had to be completely rebuilt and strengthened so that when a torpedo struck the water the gyro neither upset nor carried away completely, in either event making the torpedo entirely inoperative, and in justice to our own Navy Bureau of Ordnance I think that I should make that statement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, admiral, in commenting on it what difference would the depth of water have to do with the effect on the torpedo of dropping it to which you have referred? If it broke in two it would break by reason of striking on the surface of the water, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, would it make any difference whether the water was 40 feet or 80 feet deep?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there is something in that, but to make these torpedoes effective to drop them from airplanes all these things had to be done and these old torpedoes, modernizing them to make them suitable for dropping from airplanes, was [7137] not merely a question of putting more vanes on them. That is the point that I was trying to make.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement on that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all I have, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, this morning I asked you a few questions about your conversation with Captain Zacharias. At that time I did not have before me the photostatic copies of certain documents that have been presented here to the committee with respect to Captain Zacharias, and at the conclusion of the morning session counsel handed me this copy which is the only one before the committee. It is headed, "Notes, correspondence and reports relating to Pearl Harbor and events leading up to it," and quite a number of items are listed on the front page, but I will pass on down to an item appearing about the middle of this page, which I will read to you:

March 1941: Conversation with Admiral Kimmel, CinCPac—

that was you—

and his Chief of Staff, Captain W. W. Smith, U. S. N.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Regarding Nomura, notifying of surprise attack on our fleet by Japanese in case hostilities eventuate. De- [7138] tails of this conversation are covered in a personal and confidential memo to Chief of Staff, to CinCPac, Rear Admiral Milo Draemel, U. S. N., for presentation to CinCPac (Admiral Nimitz) and dated March 17, 1942, copy attached.

Then I turn over to this copy to which he refers in that note. I will not take time to read all of it but in the fourth paragraph of this headed, "Personal and confidential memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942," I read you as follows:

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them of the exact events to take place on 7 December not only as to what would happen but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battle-ships and they got five.

Do you recall any such statement as that, or any information of that nature given you by Captain Zacharias?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is very little I can add to my previous testimony on that subject. In the past few days I heard of this memorandum and I had read that memorandum before I testified before this committee and if you want me to clarify any of my previous statements I will be pleased to do so, but I am willing to let it stand as it is.

[7139] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, in questions asked you by counsel and those which I asked you you stated that you did not remember—

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). Any conversation with Captain Zacharias along this line.

Admiral KIMMEL. I remembered a conversation with Captain Zacharias.

[7140] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But I have now tried to refresh your memory.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If it is worth anything in that respect.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. By reading you what appears in this memorandum prepared by him, which has been presented to this committee for whatever it may be worth.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I am now asking you whether he said to you what he states there, or anything like that.

Admiral KIMMEL. He did not. And furthermore, I would have paid very little attention to any man who told me in March of 1941 that an attack was going to occur on the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I might say, Admiral, that certain members of the committee requested that Captain Zacharias' name be added to the list of witnesses to appear here.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would be very glad to have you hear him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I was not one of those that made the request, but the request was made.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

[7141] The VICE CHAIRMAN. However, that was a long time before this thing even came to our attention.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to invite attention to one thing. The date of his memorandum was nearly a year after his purported conversation with me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think that is correct. I think his memorandum is dated March 17, 1942. But my purpose in asking you and inviting your attention to it was I wanted you, if you felt prepared to do so, to give a direct answer as to whether that was said to you or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thank you very much, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, Admiral, just before the noon recess I was in the act of asking you some questions about the message of November 24, 1941, that was addressed to you along with several other responsible naval officials.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you received the message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I received the message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This message states:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

That is a definite statement, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You had no doubt that that was the fact?

[7142] Admiral KIMMEL. Very doubtful.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I say, you have no doubt that I stated the fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. I believed it, if that is what you mean.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You believed that anyhow before you received this, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I should say that is true.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. And at least that stated a clear statement of fact of the Navy Department to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movement their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction—

now that states a definite fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. "In any direction," yes, that is what it says.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

A surprise aggressive movement in any direction.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a very definite statement of fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then following that:

Including [7143] attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform Senior Army Officers their areas.

That was a definite statement and request?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to invite your attention to the fact that the "surprise aggressive movement in any direction" is somewhat qualified by the statement "including an attack on Philippines or Guam."

[7144] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, Admiral, after all that is a question of construction.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is a question of your construction; it is a question of the construction of the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. But nevertheless, it is there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it is a question of construction that I or anybody else might give to it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But the words are there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. The words are there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right—

Admiral KIMMEL. "Including an attack on Philippines or Guam" is also there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. If I say I am going to take a trip to my home, including a visit to one or two other points, the fact that

I include a reference to one or two other points does not change the fact that I said I am going home, does it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I suppose not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. But in this case, "surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philip- [7145] pines or Guam," you are entitled to your own opinion, sir, and I do not want to change that, but when you say "including the Philippines or Guam," it seems to limit the ideas of the man who is sending it to the vicinity of the Far East somewhere.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, anyhow it states "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction"?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It says that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then following that, "including attack on Philippines or Guam."

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, it is your interpretation, and you gave the construction at the time you received it that those last quoted words, "including attack on Philippines or Guam," qualify or limit the previous statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. To a degree; yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I might say to you that I questioned Admiral Stark about that.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I recall I questioned Admiral Turner, who is the man who wrote the message—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[7146] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And their construction is entirely different from yours.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no doubt of that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So after all, it is a difference of opinion on that point?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They stated, as I recall, that that meant just what these words said to them.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, too.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction." Now it is your view that the following words qualify or limit them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, but I would like to call your attention again to the fact that this message of November 24 was followed 3 days later by the message of November 27.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. If you will indulge me a moment I am hoping to get to that. I am just trying to take the cold words that appear on the printed page of this message and discuss them with you. That is my only purpose of inquiring about this dispatch here.

Admiral KIMMEL. I should be pleased to do just what you want, sir, but this message stood undiluted for only 3 days. At the end of 3 days I had another message.

[7147] The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. It also states:

Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The words "tense situation" are there, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. The "tense situation" I cannot say was anything new.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The situation had been tense for some time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And according to the words of this message it was still tense?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Guam will be informed separately.

That concludes the message.

Well, now, what did that message mean to you, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. That message meant to me to do whatever I could to be prepared for anything that might make—

The VICE CHAIRMAN (interposing). If you will pardon me at that point, I do not know whether you have quite finished your statement or not, but this message does not tell you to do anything except notify the Army, doesn't it?

[7148] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was not directed to you on any point except to notify the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Purely an information message?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it referred to aggressive movement in any direction, and "tense situation" and so on?

Admiral KIMMEL. There is one thing that might be considered a directive in there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the "utmost secrecy necessary."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It might be. Yes, that is true. It might be. So, as I understood you to state in response to the previous question I asked you, that message meant to you that you were supposed to do whatever you thought was necessary to take care of the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you accepted it as a warning to that extent, that you understood you were supposed to do whatever was necessary to take care of the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, I invite your attention to [7149] the message of November 27, 1941, which was addressed to you, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, and sent to two other officers for information?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was sent directly to you and Admiral Hart?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And of course you received it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Now, in connection with this message of the 24th, in a letter to me sent by Admiral Stark on November 25, 1941, he said, in a postscript:

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk with

him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation.

That I take to mean the message of the 24th, which you have just been talking about.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the date of the letter that you are referring to now?

Admiral KIMMEL. November 25.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

Will confirm it all in today's meeting, [7150] as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything."

Certainly, when I received that it qualified to a considerable extent the dispatch which I had received before on the 24th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you receive that?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the 3d of December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The 3d of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Still even what Admiral Stark stated there indicated that the situation was still quite tense and serious, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It did not detract any from that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; that is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. But it was concerned much more with what we should do than what Japan was expected to do to us.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But it still emphasized that the situation was tense and serious?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it did not retract anything that had been said to you in the message of the 24th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he states:

I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know that I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, they did all of them, except attack Russia, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Eventually, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They did everything he mentioned there except what he says about Russia?

[7152] Admiral KIMMEL. But that limits the perspective, after all, considerably.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There isn't anything in there that said that they were not going to do anything that he indicated in the message of November 24?

Admiral KIMMEL. But I think any reasonable man would take that as a qualification.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, some men did not. You say you did.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the point I am getting at.

Then inviting your attention to the message of November 27, to the words "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning," you say you never knew of that language being used in any other message in your 40 years' experience in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why do you think responsible officials of the Navy Department sent that message to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean now, or when I received it?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At the time you received it. Why did you think the Chief of Naval Operations, the head of the United States Navy, and responsible officials working with him said those words to you?

[7153] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think I have covered that very thoroughly in the statement I made. I do not know how I can add to that any, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I have no doubt, Admiral, you have done that to your complete satisfaction, but unfortunately I am sorry it is not completely satisfactory to me, and I am hoping that I might be able to get some further information from you on it.

I would still like to know why you thought the head of the United States Navy would say those words to you if they did not mean anything.

Admiral KIMMEL. They did mean something.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. What did they mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. They meant that they were a characterization of the rest of the message which came to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you accept it as such?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you still state, as I understood it, in effect, that the inclusion of the words "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," did not mean anything, did not carry much weight with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it added very little to the message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It added very little to the message?

[7154] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you do not know this, I suppose, and that is why the head of the United States Navy would put those words into such a message? You do not think that they would amount to anything?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will put it this way: It did not mean to me, nor to my associates, what Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark they were intended to mean. I have told in great detail, I think, what those messages meant to me.

Incidentally, sir, before I brought this statement of mine down here, I asked various members of my former staff, who happen to be here

in Washington, Admiral Smith, Admiral Delaney, Admiral Murphy, Admiral Kitts, Admiral Pye, who was one of my task force commanders—those were all that happened to be available in this area—to read this statement, and to indicate to me any place that I had made an error, an overstatement or an understatement, and they agree that factually the statement of what occurred, what we thought and what we did at the time is a correct statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Does the gentleman yield for just one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Do I understand that all of these admirals [7155] have gone over the statements you have given to the committee and agreed with it before you submitted it to the committee?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. I asked them to check it. If there was anything wrong I wanted to know about it.

[7156] The VICE CHAIRMAN. In that connection, was that statement written by you?

Admiral KIMMEL. This statement is, to my mind, the same story that I attempted to tell to the Roberts Commission.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. With all deference to you, Admiral, I asked: Did you write this statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will answer your question, sir, if you will give me an opportunity. I will try to, at least.

Senator BREWSTER. I think he is entitled to that courtesy, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I presented the same thing, if not in the same words, to the Naval Court of Inquiry. This statement was prepared under my direct supervision. I had the assistance of counsel and I had the assistance and criticism of various other people in getting it up. This is my statement. I had a great deal of assistance in preparing it. I am not a literary genius and I couldn't have submitted it in the words that it is here.

But the ideas, the facts and everything that is in it are mine.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you did not write the statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I wrote various parts of it. I will say that the words, I was assisted there. The ideas are mine.

[7157] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you did not write or dictate the statement yourself?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not all of it, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, has that question been asked of other witnesses who appeared here?

The CHAIRMAN. The record will show whether it has or not.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it is regrettable, and I hesitate to comment, but I think that as to all the people who have appeared here we have recognized that the statements were composite products, and I never before heard that criticism.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The only reason I thought of asking the question was because the admiral himself stated that he conferred with all of these other officers that he named in the preparation of this statement. I think it is a perfectly logical and reasonable question for me to ask—how much of this statement then is Admiral Kimmel's statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Every bit of it is mine.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And how much of it was prepared, suggested or dictated by someone else. He said it was a composite thought and idea of all these officers he conferred with, so I am just trying to find the fact.

[7158] Admiral KIMMEL. I tried to give you the fact.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. I thank you.

Senator BREWSTER. I didn't understand his statement to be as you stated it. I don't want that implication to appear. He stated that he submitted this to a variety of officers on the staff and they indicated their concurrence. That was his statement. About his counsel, and others, that was assistance.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I hadn't thought anything about it until the gentleman from Pennsylvania asked him the question as to whether this was the result of conferences with all these other officers named by him, and he said "Yes."

Now, Admiral, getting back to the message of November 27, that I was seeking to secure some information about, I would like to ask you, with your permission, once more what you think the words "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning"—what those words mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the time I received it, and in conjunction with the rest of the dispatch, the part of that dispatch which appealed to me, "and an aggressive move by Japan is expected"—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, I dislike to interrupt, but I am asking this simple question—what these words I quoted, "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning," [7159] what they meant to you, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. It meant—I am trying to tell you, sir. I am trying to tell you what this dispatch meant to me. It meant to me that war was going to eventuate in the Far East.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all it meant to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I got out of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. [Reading:]

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was a clear statement of fact, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You knew that from what it says here?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what it says.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a clear statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you accepted that for what it says?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

* * * The number and equipment of [7160] Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

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The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was a clear statement as to what the indications appeared to be?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

That is a clear order to you, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you do that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Completely?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did. You must read the rest of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

Preparatory to—

Admiral KIMMEL (reading) :

Carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. That is the end of the sentence.

Admiral KIMMEL. I executed an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to executing the tasks assigned in [7161] WPL-46.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you complied with that order?

Admiral KIMMEL. I complied with that order and I took every precaution in the Hawaiian area that I thought the situation justified and the probabilities demanded. The fleet was on the alert. The use of the patrol planes I have given in great detail here, my reasons for taking the steps I took, and I have also given in great detail my reasons for the disposition of the fleet at the time, in the days before and at the time of the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then it states:

Inform District and Army authorities.

You did that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Now, I understood you to state, Admiral, that even if you had understood that Japan was going to attack that you would not have moved your battleships out of the harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Will you please show me that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I got the impression from what you stated in response to a question asked here.

[7162] Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall making such a statement as that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. I think I can find my note here.

I will ask you this question: Did you state you would not have taken the battleships out of the harbor even if you had expected the attack was coming?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had expected the attack was coming—and when did I find out that the attack was going to come?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I just want to ask you this question: Did you state you would not have taken the battleships out of the harbor if you had expected the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I may have made a statement that if I had received this information on the morning of December 7, when I wouldn't have had time to get them out, that I would not have taken them out. Other than that I have no recollection of making such a statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say you would have sent smaller craft out but would have kept battleships in the harbor probably for use of their antiaircraft guns. Did you say anything like that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I made that statement, and I made that statement because—I predicated that on receiving the knowledge of an attack too late to do anything else, and I [7163] predicated it on the chances of getting the battleships caught in the channel on the way out and blocking the whole channel, and the various other considerations.

That was on the basis of receiving the information so late that, by 1 o'clock, I couldn't have completed a deployment.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But if you had—

Admiral KIMMEL. I stated in other places that if I had received the information a day or two days before then I certainly would have taken the ships to sea.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. I believe you stated that you did not consider it the duty of the fleet to defend Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, wasn't it your duty to defend yourself so far as you could?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; and it was my duty to do everything I could to destroy any enemy forces. But that is quite a different thing from being tied down to have to remain in one vicinity for the defense of that particular locality.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you stated on page 27 of your statement to this committee, the statement that you have here, "The so-called war-warning dispatch," toward the [7164] bottom of the page, the next to the last sentence on page 27—do you find it there, "The so-called war-warning dispatch"?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Six lines from the bottom.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

The so-called "war warning" dispatch I also discussed with the Senior Task Force Commanders, Admiral Pye (Commander of Task Force 1), Admiral Halsey (Commander of Task Force 2), Admiral Brown (Commander of Task Force 3), Admiral Calhoun (Commander, Base Force), and Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I did not personally show that dispatch or discuss it with Admiral Newton or Admiral Bellinger.

That is correct, then, is it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is a correct statement.

[7165] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Newton was a commander of one of the task forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bellinger was the air officer of your command, was he?

Admiral KIMMEL. With headquarters at Ford Island, across the bay from where I was, and in constant telephone communication with me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was your Air Corps officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was. He was the commander of patrol planes. Patrol Wing 2.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He is the same officer who had prepared the so-called Bellinger report?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Which was an air defense of Hawaii, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; but you must remember—I would like to just correct what may be a misapprehension. Admiral Halsey, then Vice Admiral Halsey, was the senior Naval Air Force commander in the Hawaiian area, and as such the rest of them looked to him more or less for guidance and assistance. He had command of the carriers, the airplanes afloat.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, wasn't it about the day you [7166] received the war-warning message, or the following day, that you sent Halsey off to Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; and in the afternoon Halsey came over, he spent the day with me before he went to Wake and his recollection and mine, I have talked to him about this, is that he saw the war warning before he sailed, and we discussed it briefly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What I am getting at is, Admiral, why didn't you show the war-warning message or even discuss it with your air officer Bellinger, who had prepared the air defense for Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Bellinger was a subordinate of Admiral Wilson Brown in the organization and also a subordinate of Admiral Bloch. I knew what Admiral Bellinger was doing. I didn't consider it necessary and I didn't consider it necessary to discuss it with a great many other admirals that I had in Pearl Harbor with me.

The ones that I discussed it with were by no means all the admirals that we had out there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bellinger was the man who had prepared the plan for the air defense of Hawaii, wasn't he? The Bellinger report shows that.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, Admiral Bellinger did the work under the direction of Admiral Bloch. Admiral Bloch was the [7167] man who was responsible for that report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All I know, Admiral, is what I have heard here.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Admiral—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I know it has been referred here throughout the hearings as the Bellinger report for the air defense of Hawaii.

Admiral KIMMEL. That report was prepared by Admiral Bellinger, and General Martin, and they submitted it, whether it was revised or not, I don't know, but it had to be approved by the Commandant of the District, Admiral Bloch, and by the Commanding General in Hawaii before it could have gotten past them, and they were, therefore, responsible for that publication.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But Admiral Bellinger is the man who prepared the report?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume he is. He signed it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He prepared the plan for the air defense of Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, he prepared it for Admiral Bloch's approval.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he was your air officer there at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[7168] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't show him—

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't tell him because I didn't consider it necessary.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't tell him about the war-warning message or didn't show it to him?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't consult with him about it at all?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

In that connection, Admiral, I might ask you, did you show the war-warning message or discuss it with Admiral Newton?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not show it to Admiral Newton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was one of your task force commanders?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, he was not a regular task force commander. His task force was organized by Admiral Brown at my direction, and Admiral Brown issued Admiral Newton's orders.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, whether you issued the orders, or some man you told to issue the orders, did so, Admiral Newton was the commander of one of those task [7169] forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, and before he went to sea with his task force, according to his testimony, he had an interview with Admiral Brown, and I have no doubt that Admiral Brown told him everything he needed to know. I don't know whether he told him about the war-warning message or not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't have his testimony before me, but I have a recollection that he says he wasn't told.

Admiral KIMMEL. He said he was never told about a war-warning message. He also says he was in conference with Admiral Brown, who had seen it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

You never did tell him about it, never did show it to him?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not, and I did not tell a great many other admirals out there, and I didn't show it to them, this war warning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. I certainly understand you, but he was one of your task-force commanders; he was in command of one of your task forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. Excuse me, sir. All I am trying to do is to give you the facts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all I am trying to get.

[7170] Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, I will yield.

Senator LUCAS. Just for a question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I think it is important right here to ascertain whether or not Admiral Newton had the same orders that Admiral Halsey had in his task force.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you answer that question for the Senator's benefit, please, sir, and I will be interested in it too.

Senator FERGUSON. May I also, in the same question, put this, whether or not it was in writing, whether the orders were in writing.

Admiral KIMMELL. I told Admiral Brown, and the dispatch is in the file, showing exactly what I said to Admiral Brown, to send Newton with a certain detachment up to Midway to land these planes, and Brown issued his orders. Just what they were, I don't know. I haven't seen them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were there any written orders about it?

Admiral KIMMELL. My orders to Brown I have here, but I have never seen the orders Brown gave to Newton. I suppose he gave him adequate orders.

As far as Halsey is concerned, I gave him written [7171] orders, and he was in my office, as I told you, for pretty much all day of the 27th, and in the course of the conversation, and having seen these warnings he turned to me and he said, "How far do you want me to go in this business?" "Well," I said, "all I can tell you is to use your common sense."

Those were the orders that he sailed with, according to conversations I have had with him since. I had forgotten some of the details myself. And the next I knew about his orders was after he returned to Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor. And then Halsey told me he had sailed under war orders, as I testified before, I think, one of the other—the Roberts Commission, perhaps—that he had sailed under war orders.

He had armed all of his planes, and he had given orders to sink every Japanese ship he came in contact with. Those were the verbal orders, as I recall his conversation with me, and that is all I know about it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, getting back—do you want some time to look at something there?

Admiral KIMMELL. They just called my attention to something. I have here, if the committee wishes to look at it, the orders issued to Admiral Brown, directing him to send Newton to Midway, if you would like me to read them.

[7172] I have no desire to put them in.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You might just read it for us.

Admiral KIMMELL. On 4 December, 1941—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You issued it, you probably know more about it than anybody else; so you go ahead and read it.

Admiral KIMMELL. These are already included in an exhibit on page 41.

[7173] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand, but you wanted specific attention called to this, and I think you might go ahead and read it.

Admiral KIMMELL. No, I didn't.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In response to the question, Admiral, by the Senator, maybe it would be well to read it.

Admiral KIMMELL.

From: CINCPAC
 Action: COMTASKFOR 3 }
 COMFOURTEEN } MAILGRAM
 COMPATWING 2 }
 Info: COMBATFOR }
 COMBASEFOR } MAILGRAM
 COMAIRBATFOR }
 LEXINGTON }

949237

Myser 01825 of 10 Nov Marine Scoron Two Three One will base eighteen planes Midway X Lexington provide transportation X On 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form Task Force Twelve under Comcruscofor consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria Portland Desron Five less Desdiv Ten X Task Force Twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 130 degrees from Midway at 2230 GCT on 7 Dec X From that vicinity fly off marine planes to Midway X Return operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X Comtaskfor Nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying [7174] off position provide security while that area and guard marine plane flight X Communications radio condition 19.

Et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there an English translation of that available?
 Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to be funny. Is there any English translation of all that available?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I don't blame you, sir.

That means we sent the *Lexington*, three heavy cruisers, five destroyers from Honolulu to 400 miles from Midway, where he was going to fly off 18 marine planes to form part of the garrison of Midway.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What it finally means is that you ordered an admiral to take his force to within 400 miles of Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I wanted the admiral to form a task force from his forces to go to a point 400 miles from Midway.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had to use all those technical and all those other words and signs and ciphers to tell him that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then there is some question raised [7175] about whether people understand naval orders or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. You must understand that that order went not only to the people who were in that particular task force but they were to go to Admiral Bellinger's outfit who were to cover his advance up there and to cover him while he was on the way up there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, to get back to the point I was seeking some information on, admiral, Admiral Newton left with his task force without ever seeing the war warning message or having it discussed with him?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know he did. That is what he said.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what he said.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no reason to doubt it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You said in your prepared statement you didn't show it to him or discuss it with him.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. You know, in this business about Newton going up there, he only got about 700 miles from Pearl Harbor, I don't know whether you realize that or not. Midway is only 1,100 miles from Pearl Harbor and he was going about 400 miles from Pearl Harbor. That wasn't so far away to run off.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand that. The fact is—
Admiral KIMMEL. And Halsey's condition was considerably
[7176] different.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was going to Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. 2,000 miles away.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Which was much further.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But as events finally transpired Newton was much closer to the line of approach of the Japanese attacking forces than Halsey was.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct; yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In fact Newton's task force was the one closest to the line of approach of the Japanese attack force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes. I wish he had been closer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sure we all do.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; I yield.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman permit me to read something into the record right on this point?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I am reading from Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations, page 87:

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation—

[7177] Admiral KIMMEL. May I inquire what you are reading from, sir?

Senator LUCAS. I am reading from Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations.

Admiral KIMMEL. That has never been submitted in evidence and it has never been reviewed by anybody in authority.

Mr. MURPHY. It was admitted in evidence last week.

Senator LUCAS. It is exhibit 107.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is in evidence in this hearing, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

Senator LUCAS. If these facts are not correct, Admiral, why you can so state, but I am reading this statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you, sir. I didn't understand.

Senator LUCAS. It was prepared by the Navy and I thought it was information upon this point that might well be developed here.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a powerful force consisting of the *Lexington*, *Chicago*, *Portland*, and five destroyers, to deliver a squadron of planes to Midway.

[7178] He testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war, other than the ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was he ever informed of the contents of the October 16 dispatch concerning the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch advising of the possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, or the November 27th war warning. He said that except for what he read in the newspapers, he did not learn anything during the period November 26 to December 5th which indicated the increased danger of hostilities with Japan.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think, if you want to get—this is a version, this version was prepared in the Navy Department. The testimony

in regard to this, I am sure is available to the committee, and I think it would be well to examine that and not to—I have endeavored, in the testimony I have given, to tell you what I know about.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, is this information here that the Senator from Illinois just read, is it in conformity with your knowledge of the facts?

Admiral KIMMEL. In this account, I think they should have added that the testimony before Admiral Hart showed [7179] that Admiral Bellinger had a conference with Admiral Brown—with Admiral Newton—wait a minute.

That Admiral Brown had a conference with Admiral Newton before he sailed on this expedition to Midway and I did not attempt to inform all of the admirals in the fleet of this. I informed the senior task force commanders. And I was enjoined to preserve secrecy and not to alarm the people and I restricted the information to the officers that I have indicated.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But that didn't mean you couldn't tell an admiral in the United States Navy about it, did it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Neither did it mean that I was obligated to tell every admiral out there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But here was an admiral going off on a mission under your orders, in command of a task force, with some of the most valuable vessels of the United States Navy in that force, and you didn't tell him, or you don't know that anybody else ever told him?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have every reason to believe, and I believe, that Admiral Brown gave him the information which he needed to put him in proper shape.

Now, it says in here that he proceeded in the routine way. Well, the routine way, as a matter of fact was to take all precautions at sea. He also testified that he [7180] zigzagged on the way up there. He testified that he put up an airplane patrol, and that he maintained an airplane patrol constantly. I don't know myself how many more things he could have done. He also had my order, which was issued to all the fleet, in regard to exercising extreme vigilance in regard to submarines and to depth charge everyone that came in the operating area.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether Admiral Brown will be a witness? If he isn't listed, I think he should be.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel may answer that, whether Admiral Brown will be a witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We expect to call everyone of these members of Admiral Kimmel's staff, both those in charge and those that were subordinates.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, Admiral, what day was it that Admiral Newton left with his task force for Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. December 5.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. December 5. What day was it that Admiral Halsey left with his task force for Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. November 28.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor under your orders on November 28 with his task force to [7181] go to Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And——

Admiral KIMMEL. He was going into an area where a contact with the Japanese was much more probable than in this 700-mile jaunt of Newton's.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But Admiral Halsey left with his task force on November 28 under your orders, with full orders and instructions to sink every Japanese ship in sight?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have just given you the facts in the case, and they are not as you have stated it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How was it you stated it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I stated that Admiral Halsey, after seeing these warnings, turned to me and asked how far he should go, and I said, "Use your common sense," and he left with those orders.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all he had from you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all he had from me, was to use his common sense. He interpreted that as I have told you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He interpreted that as full battle orders, didn't he, and so issued it to his command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is what he did.

[7182] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And based on the war warning message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. And Admiral Newton, who left on December 5, which was some 7 or 8 days later, left without any knowledge of the war warning message, without any information about it, or without any war orders; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't think that is right, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. You will have to ask Admiral Brown, because he gave Admiral Newton his orders.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you don't know?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I have told you that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was under your command, and you don't know what orders he went under or what his instructions were?

Admiral KIMMEL. The details, no; I trusted Admiral Brown and I have no reason to regret that trust.

The CHAIRMAN. And you don't know whether Admiral Newton had war orders when he left Pearl Harbor or not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I don't; not personally.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, I would like to invite your attention, Admiral, to page 47 of your statement presented [7183] here to the committee, the second short paragraph there, just three lines, or two and a half.

Perhaps I can read it to you quicker than you can find it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Page 47?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[7184] The VICE CHAIRMAN (Reading):

In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.

That is the way you felt about it at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cited the circumstances in the preceding pages, if I remember correctly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think that is true; that is your conclusion there.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was my conclusion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Then why didn't you so advise the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. It never occurred to me to notify the Navy Department of every conclusion that I reached.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, they had sent you a message they called a war warning message and made reference to a tense, critical situation, and so forth. You did not consider it such?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did not construe what as such?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As a war warning message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, if anybody will define for me what a war warning message is I would be better able to tell you whether I construed it as such.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I have certainly understood [7185] from you—and if I am mistaken I want you to correct me—that you did not consider it as a message indicating that war was imminent or that there would be any probability of any attack on your command.

Admiral KIMMEL. The two are considerably different.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, war was getting closer, we could see that, there was no question about that, I have never tried to get away from that at any time and I took all steps in Pearl Harbor which I considered the probabilities justified and what my forces permitted.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then just to get back to the words of your own statement here:

In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you said it did not occur to you to ask the Navy Department about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, I believe you state that you did not know about General Short's reply to General Marshall's message.

[7186] Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that he would make a reply because he was ordered to.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. You did not make any reply to the message you received?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not because none was required.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was not customary in the Navy, was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It has been done.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, was it customary in the Navy to reply to messages of that type?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not unless a reply was asked for.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. I think that is what Admiral Stark testified here, that it was not the custom in the Navy, as it was in the Army, to ask for acknowledgment or—

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I wouldn't say that. When you speak of customary, whenever the situation demanded a reply. I have seen such messages where a subordinate was given instructions or informa-

tion and directed to report the measures taken, but it was not done in this case. If he had wanted a reply he would have asked for one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it never did occur to you to ask for any further information or anything further after you received that message of the 27th?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought I understood the situation.

[7187] The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had not I would have asked for further information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, testimony has been given the committee here, admiral, by the first witnesses who appeared at this hearing, Admiral Inglis for the Navy Department and Colonel Thielen, I believe his name was, for the War Department, that no searches were made by airplanes on December 6, 1941. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have covered that exhaustively in my statement, the searches that were made prior to December 7, and on December 7, and on December 7 Halsey's force did make a search in the early morning and were in process of making that search when the attack took place.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand that is the 7th, admiral. I am asking you if there were any searches made by aircraft from Pearl Harbor—

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, from Pearl Harbor?

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). On December 6, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; there were searches made of the operating area.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On December 6, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What searches were made?

[7188] Admiral KIMMEL. Of the operating area.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, just what was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. A distance of about 300 miles out and an area to the southward.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. On December 6 and December 7 too.

The VICE ADMIRAL. Well, there were not any searches made beyond the 300 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Navy had the responsibility for long-range reconnaissance, didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; they did under the agreement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And none were made on the 6th beyond the 300 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. With the important qualification that it had been stated and had been given to the Navy Department, and which the Army and all interested parties understood, that you could not maintain a search except when we knew that an attack was expected within narrow limits, narrow time limits.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not make any searches or reconnaissance unless you expected an attack within a limited time?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what we said. That is all we could do. We told them that months before and the situation [7189] had not changed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So there were never made at any time then?

Admiral KIMMEL. On occasions we made some searches, yes. On one occasion Admiral Bloch came to me and suggested we scout down to the southward.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was probably in September. I do not recall exactly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About how long a range search did you make?

Admiral KIMMEL. We sent them about three or four hundred miles and we took as a median line a line betwixt Oahu and Jaluit and our object was to try to catch on the surface some of these submarines that we suspected as operating in the area.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, these flights that you referred to, Admiral, on December 6 within a distance of 300 miles, that was part of the training program, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. That was—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was not connected with training?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was an established patrol of the [7190] operating area to discover any submarines that might be there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were looking for submarines?

Admiral KIMMEL. Primarily.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But there were not any searches made looking for any surface vessels?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had forces operating around Hawaii both to the northward and to the southward at all times and they made searches with their observation planes from the battleships and by the planes from the carriers almost constantly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There wasn't any made to the north?

Admiral KIMMEL. Some were made to the northward, yes. In the case of people who went up there we had planes operating to the northward and they reported everything they saw, not as a regular patrol you understand, but it served the same purpose.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, wasn't there something connected with the Martin-Bellinger report and the Bloch report and those related to the possibility of an air attack—

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). —on Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes—that rather emphasized the northern direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, it never emphasized the northern direction. [7191] It emphasized an attack on Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Didn't it call attention to any extent to any particular direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not to my best recollection at the present time, because I think they felt that it was dangerous to predict which sector the attack was coming in from.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I am sorry to have detained you as long as I have, admiral. I would like to ask you this, though: I understood you to state this morning that you issued notices on November 27 to sink all submarines that were sighted.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I issued no such order as that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I issued an order to depth bomb every submerged contact in the operating area. If a Japanese submarine had appeared on the surface, that would have been another story.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you issued that order on November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought it was the 28th. It may have been the 27th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was the 28th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You issued the order on the 28th?

[7192] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To sink Japanese craft of any kind that was encountered, was that it, or found?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. I had better read it to you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is CinCPac to Pacific Fleet. This is to everybody; and, incidentally, I thought it was a pretty good alert in itself [reading]:

Exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas vicinity Oahu especially during sortie and entrance X. Our submarines will conduct submerged operations in areas cast 5 and cast 7 only proceeding elsewhere on surface X. Depth bomb all submarine contacts suspected to be hostile in Oahu operating areas except areas cast 5 and cast 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you. Describe what you mean by "operating areas". Is that the three hundred mile limit?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, what do you mean by the operating limit there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Have you got that chart you had this morning?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you can tell me, can't you, what [7193] it is?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think if you have that in front of you you can see it. Just put it right in front of him.

We carved up the ocean area in all directions from Pearl Harbor, north, south, east, and west, into rectangles or squares in order to be able to designate these particular areas and those we had—you see there "Cast 5 and Cast 7"—that is C-5 and C-7. "Cast" is a naval term.

When I issued this order that said depth bomb them everywhere except in those areas which were very definitely laid down on that chart and such a chart was in the possession of each ship in the fleet, they knew exactly what I meant, the areas in which they were not to depth bomb submarines and they were to depth bomb them in all the rest of the areas in which they were discovered.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They were to depth bomb submarines in all of the areas except those that were excluded?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And we used that in order to assign a detachment of the Fleet to some particular locality to carry out certain exercises and during that time they had that area clear and we put others in other areas where they would not interfere with each other.

[7194] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you issued those orders for that on November 28?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Admiral Halsey issued orders to shoot every Japanese vessel in sight?

Admiral KIMMEL. So he told me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. And you issued orders to get into action on 24 hours' notice, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that? I don't know what you mean now about 24 hours.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You referred to something. I think it is on page 60.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, you mean my plans of exactly what orders we expected to issue, or at least what things we expected to cover in case we had war with Japan in 24 hours? Yes, I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You issued those, prepared those plans?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had those plans. I had that drawn up as a memorandum and kept it in my headquarters for quick reference in case anything should happen.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I believe you stated, didn't you, that Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions?

Admiral KIMMEL. As nearly as I could make out from his description in his testimony.

[7195] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you say on page 28, line 5:

Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions.

Admiral KIMMEL. The information I have of that is Admiral Newton's testimony before Admiral Hart.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All those things happened after you received the war warning message of the 27th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. What you have referred to here, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. These specific things that I have referred to all happened under your orders and instructions after you received the war warning message on November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you at any time after November 27 order long-range airplane reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I covered that completely and the answer is "no."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will the gentleman yield for just one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, under the order of the committee 3:30 having arrived the hearing will be suspended in order that the counsel may file some documents here that they said will take about an hour. Admiral, if you have got another word here put it in.

[7196] Admiral KIMMEL. I just wanted to add, the answer is "No" with the qualification that I have set forth completely in my statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At this point, Admiral, I think you may be excused until 10 o'clock in the morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is not suspended. It is simply diverted here for the next hour or so in order that certain official documents may be filed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, you may proceed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, in the statement filed by General Short he refers to an exhibit which consists of a statement made by him and filed with the Roberts Commission and which exhibit also has been filed with the Army board as an exhibit. The document is very, very long. There are six copies of this document, one in the possession of General Short, three in the files of the War Department, and two in our files and we were wondering whether this exhibit may be used without having duplicated the necessary copies for all of the members of the committee. We have five that can be made available to the committee and many of the documents referred to in this exhibit are already in evidence here and have been copied and copies are in the possession of all of the members of the committee.

[7197] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, Mr. Kaufman. Due to the confusion I did not catch just what the description of this is.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General Short in the statement that he has filed, which he will read when he takes the stand next week, refers to an exhibit,¹ which exhibit he tendered to the Roberts Commission in December of 1941. That exhibit was also referred to in the hearings before the Army board.

Many of the documents making up this exhibit are already in evidence and copies of them have been supplied to members of the committee. Other parts of it have not been marked in evidence.

There are in existence six copies of this exhibit, one in the possession of General Short, two in the possession of counsel, and three in the War Department, and we were wondering whether we could avoid the duplicating of this entire exhibit, most of which is already in the record in various parts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And there are five copies available for members of the committee?

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to not having this duplicated?

(No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair hears none. It is so ordered. Proceed with the next item.

[7198] Mr. HANNAFORD. Mr. Chairman, I have here a number of matters which I would like to insert in the record. They are for the most part in response to inquiries made by various members of the committee.

The first matter is in response to an inquiry of Congressman Murphy at page 1952 of the record where he asked for information regarding the establishment of Pearl Harbor as a Navy base.

The Navy has submitted a two-page memorandum here which I would suggest be made a part of the record or I can read it if the committee cares to have me read it. It goes back to 1899 and brings the history of Pearl Harbor up to date.

Do you wish to have it spread on the record, or do you wish to have it read, Mr. Chairman?

¹ Subsequently introduced as Exhibit No. 133.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is something that Mr. Murphy called for, isn't it, or inquired about?

Mr. HANNAFORD. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have some preference about this?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not hear what was said.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that when they are marked as exhibits that we will get copies of them, each member will get a copy? If it goes into the transcript, naturally, we get the copies and are able to read them.

Mr. HANNAFORD. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But if they are just put in as exhibits, [7199] then we must go to the office of counsel in order that we may read them or get them from him to read, that is the distinction.

Mr. HANNAFORD. I would suggest that this be made part of the transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not very long, is it?

Mr. HANNAFORD. It is a two-page exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you suggest that it be spread on the transcript?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I suggest that it be spread on the transcript.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be spread on the transcript at this point.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, it might be better to put it in tomorrow because I am going to go into it, but it can be spread now in order to get it in for reference.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 14 January 1946.

1083A

R#-5

Memorandum

To: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

[7200] 1. In response to the request of Congressman Murphy, noted at page 1952 of the "Report of Proceedings of the Joint Committee's Investigation," for information regarding establishment of the port and base at Pearl Harbor, the following information is submitted:

The Naval Station Hawaii was established in 1899 and in 1902, the Navy Yard Hulaawa was established in Pearl Harbor. The name was changed to Navy Yard Pearl Harbor about 1912. In 1909 construction of a dry dock and improvement of the channel was begun. To improve security Pearl Harbor was declared a "closed port" in 1912 and a defensive sea area was established in 1939. A submarine base was established in 1919 and the Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, in 1920.

Following World War I, reestimates of Naval Base requirements were made by Navy and Army-Navy planning agencies culminating in the report of the Rodman Board. The Secretary of the Navy approved this report and forwarded it to the Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives, with copies to other appropriate committee and subcommittee chairmen of the Senate and House. This report recommended "An advanced base to be developed on Oahu capable of serving the entire fleet to the maximum subject only to the natural limitations imposed by the size and character of this island. * * * This advanced base should have priority of development over the fleet bases named in paragraph 19 (San Francisco, Puget [7201] Sound, New York-Narragansett Bay region, Chesapeake Bay, and Canal Zone)." This recommendation gave the Hawaiian base first priority.

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Development of the base facilities was slow until the mid-twenties when the surface fuel storage was begun, additional dry docks were constructed, industrial facilities were expanded, and the channel was improved. During the thirties, further dredging and industrial expansion occurred, the radio station and ammunition depot were moved out of the Navy Yard, and moorings were constructed in Pearl Harbor. The Aiea Hospital was built and the underground fuel storage was begun. Incident to the latter, an independent water supply system for the Navy Yard and the adjacent activities was installed. Supply Depot facilities were also progressively developed. Several air fields were built on Oahu and one on Maui. Aviation repair capacity primarily on Ford Island was also increased. This base development proceeded in the forties at an ever-increasing tempo before and during hostilities until it became apparent that the war was nearly over.

The Naval Base facilities on Oahu and other Hawaiian Islands were before the war, and continued to be, the most important in the Pacific. Fleet concentrations for combined training occurred in the Hawaiian area in 1925, 1928, 1932, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1938, and 1940. In 1939, a large number of ships called [7202] the Hawaiian Detachment, were sent to Hawaii and remained until joined by the remainder of the fleet in 1940. These fleet visits tested the capacity of the base and indicated necessary improvements. Prior to the war, repair and supply facilities were especially deficient to maintain the fleet. During the war it was necessary to limit repairs to emergency work, largely battle damage, and to return ships to West Coast ports whenever time and the ship's condition permitted. Pearl Harbor was the port of departure and return for practically all Central Pacific and the early South Pacific Task Force Operations prior to our capture of the Marshalls. Subsequently, individual ships returned there for permanent or temporary repairs and replenishment. The supplies stored there both in the Naval Supply Depot and the Aviation Supply Depot were invaluable to support the routine and emergency requirements of our forces in more forward areas. All Central Pacific Submarine Patrols originated at Pearl Harbor until the secondary base at Midway was ready for service in late 1942, after which major overhauls continued to be accomplished at Pearl Harbor until the end of the war, minor refits being conducted in forward bases. A large part of the Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Marianas, the Iwo Jima, and the Okinawa operations were mounted in Pearl Harbor.

In addition to serving the material requirements of the [7203] fleet during the war, Pearl Harbor, with its extensive communications facilities, was the Pacific Fleet operational command center from December 1941, until early 1945, when CinCPac moved to Guam. Many of the CinCPac staff functions continued to be performed in Pearl Harbor as well as those of the various type commanders. CinCPac's operational staff has now returned to Pearl Harbor.

JOHN FORD BAECHE,
Lieut. Comdr., USNR.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item I have is a letter from Admiral Stark in response to a question submitted to him by Representative Gearhart, at page 6121 of the transcript. I might read the letter.
[Reading:]

In my testimony during the afternoon session of 3 January 1946, at page 6121 of the transcript, Representative Gearhart asked whether there were any so-called "shooting orders" applicable to the Pacific. I stated that there was such an order applicable to the Southeast Pacific, and Mr. Gearhart asked that I produce it for the record.

Accordingly, I am enclosing a photostat copy of CNO's secret despatch 282121 of 28 August 1941, which was sent to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and other [7204] addressees.

I would suggest that this letter and the attachment also be spread upon the record at this point, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The attachment referred to follows:)

NAVAL MESSAGE—NAVY DEPARTMENT

Phone extension number	Addresses	Message
From : CNO	Cincpac	Precedence
		Priority
		PPPPPPPP
		Routine
Released by : Adm. Stark	Commander Panama	
	Naval Coastal	Deferred
Date : 28 August 1941	Frontier	
Tor : Coderoom	Cinclant ; Spenavo, Lon :	
	Commander Pacific	
	Southern Coastal	
	Frontier ;	
Encoded by Obannon-Purdy	Commander Caribbean	
	Naval Coastal Frontier ;	
	Com 11	

Paraphrased by Allensworth

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory

Note : This despatch sent to SPENAVO London as OPNAV 282128 282121 CR 0840

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

[7205] Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery
Date Time GOT

Text

Certain operations prescribed for the Atlantic by WPL 51 are hereby extended to areas of the Pacific Ocean as described herein. In view of the destruction by raiders of merchant vessels in the Pacific Ocean within the Western Hemisphere neutrality zone as defined in the declaration of Panama of Oct. 3, 1939. Formal changes in WPL 51 will be issued but meanwhile action addresses will execute immediately the following instructions. Cincpac constitute the southeast Pacific force consisting of two 7500 ton light cruisers and dispatch it to Balboa. For task purposes this force will operate directly under CNO after entering the southeast Pacific sub area as defined in WPL 46, PARA 3222 except western limit is longitude 100 degrees west, within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier and within the southeast Pacific sub area the commander Panama naval coastal frontier and commander southeast Pacific force will in cooperation and acting under the strategic direction of the chief of naval operations execute the following task colon destroy surface raiders which attack or threaten United States flag shipping. Interpret an approach of surface raiders [7206] within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier or the Pacific southeast sub area as a threat to United States flag shipping. XX For the present the forces concerned will base Balboa but CNO will endeavor to make arrangements for basing on South American ports as may be required XX Action Adees and commander Southeast Pacific Force inform CNO when these instructions have been placed in effect. XX

Distribution

12 . . . Originator CNO File. Show File . . File . . .
Copies to 16. 2¢. 3¢. . 38. . 38W. . WPD, US Army. . Brit. Nav. Staff in Washington

SECRET

See Art 76 (4)

Nav Regs

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person
Return to F-105.

Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have is also a letter from Admiral Stark in response to a question propounded by Senator Ferguson with respect to whether or not the shooting orders issued in the Atlantic had been also sent to the Pacific. Admiral Stark has submitted a letter here and has attached to it the dispatch which advised the Pacific Fleet commander of the issuance of these orders to the Atlantic.

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[7207] Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of notifying the Pacific?

Mr. HANNAFORD. The dispatch is dated October 9, 1941.

I would suggest that this letter and the dispatch also be spread upon the daily transcript.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[7208]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington 25, D. C., 14 January 1946.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY,

*Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: In my testimony during the afternoon session of 5 January 1946, at page 6488 of the transcript, there appears the following colloquy with Senator Ferguson:

"Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall whether or not you ever notified CINCPAC and CINCAF of the orders to the Atlantic Fleet to start shooting German subs?"

"Admiral STARK. I think I covered that in my statement, about telling them about the order.

"Senator FERGUSON. There was no official order?"

"Admiral STARK. No, sir.

"Senator FERGUSON. It would be in that letter that I read to you this morning, or that you read to me?"

"Admiral STARK. I do not recall having informed them officially. I believe I sent them copies of the order and told them in a personal letter."

[7209] I have checked up on this matter and I find that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was a holder of Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5 (WPL-52), which contained the so-called shooting orders with respect to the Atlantic. A photostat of the distribution list of Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5 is enclosed.

When WPL-52 was placed in effect, a despatch was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to "ALL US HOLDERS OF WPL FIFTY TWO OUTSIDE OF NAVY DEPARTMENT". Therefore, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet *was* informed officially of these so-called "shooting orders" in the Atlantic. A copy of CNO's secret despatch 082335 of 9 October 1941 is enclosed.

Respectfully,

(S) H. R. STARK,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

cc: The Hon. HOMER FERGUSON,
Rear Admiral O. S. Colclough, USN.

(without enclosures)

[7210] U. S. NAVY WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PLAN NO. 5—SECRET

Distribution List

<i>Official to whom issued</i>	<i>Registered Nos.</i>
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet-----	1
Commander, Battle Force-----	2
Commander, Battleships, Battle Force-----	3
Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force-----	4
Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force-----	5
Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force-----	6
Commander, Scouting Force-----	7
Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force-----	8
Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force-----	9
Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force-----	10
Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet-----	11
Commander, Southeast Pacific Force-----	12
Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet-----	13
Commander, Battleship Division Three, Atlantic Fleet-----	14
Commander, Battleship Division Five, Atlantic Fleet-----	15

Distribution List—Continued

<i>Official to whom issued</i>	<i>Registered Nos.</i>
Commander, Cruiser Division Eight, Atlantic Fleet.....	16
Commander, Cruiser Division Seven, Atlantic Fleet.....	17
Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet.....	18
Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet.....	19
Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet.....	20
Commander, Patrol Wings, Atlantic Fleet.....	21
Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.....	22
[7211] Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet.....	23
Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet.....	24
Commander, Train Squadron Three, Atlantic Fleet.....	25
Commander, South Greenland Patrol.....	26
Officer in Charge of U. S. Naval Shore Activities in Iceland.....	27
Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.....	28
Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force.....	29
Commanding General, First Marine Division.....	30
Commanding General, First Marine Brigade (Provisional).....	31
Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in Iceland.....	32
Operations—Director, War Plans Division.....	33
—Director, Naval Intelligence Division.....	34
—Director, Naval Communications Division.....	35
—Director, Fleet Maintenance Division.....	36
—Director, Ship Movements Division.....	37, 38
—Director, Naval Districts Division.....	39
—Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, Ship Movements Division).....	40
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.....	41
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.....	42
Chief of the Bureau of Ships.....	43
Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.....	44
[7212] Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.....	45
Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.....	46
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.....	47
Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy.....	48
Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.....	49
Director, Shore Establishments Division (Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy).....	50
President, Naval War College.....	51
Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard.....	52
War Plans Division, General Staff, War Department.....	53
Commandant, First Naval District.....	54
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.....	55
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I.....	56
Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.....	57, 58
Commandant, Third Naval District.....	59
Commandant, Fourth Naval District.....	60
Commandant, Fifth Naval District.....	61
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda.....	62
Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	63
Commandant, Sixth Naval District.....	64
Commandant, Seventh Naval District.....	65
Commandant, Eighth Naval District.....	66
Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.....	67
Commandant, Tenth Naval District.....	68
[7213] Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.....	69
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad.....	70
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.....	71
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.....	72
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.....	73
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.....	74
Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.....	75, 76
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.....	77
Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.....	78
United States Military Mission in London.....	79, 80
United States Naval Attaché, Ottawa, Canada.....	81

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Distribution List—Continued

<i>Official to whom issued</i>	<i>Registered Nos.</i>
Registered Publications Section—Working Copy-----	82
Registered Publications Section—Library Copy-----	83
Registered Publications Section—Reserve Copies-----	84,
	85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96

Official to whom issued but not to be accounted for to RPS

British Joint Staff Mission in Washington-----	97, 98
The British Admiralty (To be issued through the U. S. Military Mission in London)-----	99
The Canadian Chief of Naval Staff (To be issued through the U. S. Naval Attaché, Ottawa, Canada)-----	100
The Canadian Chief of Air Staff (To be issued through the [7214] U. S. Naval Attaché, Ottawa, Canada)-----	101
The Naval Attaché to the Canadian Legation, Washington, D. C. (To be issued through the Office of Naval Intelligence)-----	102

NAVAL MESSAGE		NAVY DEPARTMENT
FROM CNO	ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
RELEASED BY	ALL U. S. HOLDERS OF	PRIORITY
Adm. H. R. Stark	WPL FIFTY TWO OUTSIDE	ROUTINE
DATE 9 OCT. 1941	OF NAVY DEPARTMENT	DEFERRED
EM		
DECODED BY		
IVANYSHYN		
PARAPHRASED BY		
ALLENSWORTH		
INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY		
082335 CR 0786		
TEXT		
ON OCTOBER 11TH AT 0200 GCT CANCEL WPL 51 AND PLACE WPL 52 IN EFFECT		
DISTRIBUTION:		
12 A ORIG		
13 A 16 A 38 A 20P A RECORD COPIES		CNO FILE G
GENERAL FILE		20 OP FILE G

[7215] Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have is at page 6438 and 6442 of the transcript, various portions of two dispatches produced by Admiral Stark which related to the dispatch of December 2 on page 39 of Exhibit 37, the so-called order of the President to establish a patrol in the Western Pacific, various portions of these dispatches were read on those pages that I have just cited and I think in the interest of clarity for the transcript we might have the two dispatches spread upon the record in full at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The dispatches referred to follow:)

[7216] 2 December 1941

From: CINCAF

Action: OPNAV

Info:

021332

URDIS 0 12356: My views are as follows: The Jap movement down the Indo-Chinese coast is already defined but it remains to be seen whether aimed against the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, or both. That the British can meet their commitment to guard as far as Cape Padaran and we should use what have left after guarding against descent on Luzon in watching for one on Borneo. Am recalling Isabel from current mission and sending toward Padaran. She is too short radius to accomplish much and since we have few fast ships her loss would be serious. Therefore have to recommend against carrying out Isabel's movement though it is improbable that can start any chartered craft within

two days. Am searching for vessels for charter that are suitable but cannot yet estimate time required to obtain and equip with radio. Army planes are reconnoitering sector northerly from Luzon and eastward from Sanbernardino. Navy planes northwesterly from Luzon, also covering Balabac Strait and joining up with Dutch to cover Mindanao-Halmahera line, effectiveness is problematical but as great effort as available forces can sustain continuously. Two cruisers, two desdibs are deployed well south, remainder surface forces on local [7217] or repairing.

Have five submarines out now, remainder either placed in readiness for defensive missions or held here prepared for offensive tasks. When it is considered called for will increase air patrols and send out more subs.

Naval message
3 December 1941
From: OPNAV
To: CINCAF
Secret
031540

message precedence: priority

Isabel may be replaced by chartered vessel at your discretion as per my 012356. Ref your 021332.

Redistribution:

38 . . . Orig

Record copy . . . 12 . . . Gen file CNO file 20 OP file

[7218] Mr. HANNAFORD. The next, Mr. Chairman, is another letter from Admiral Stark in which he asked that certain corrections be made in his testimony. I would request that the letter and the corrections be spread upon the record at this point as we have done in the past.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[7219]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ROOM 3028.
Washington 25, D. C., 11 January 1946.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the
Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: I am enclosing a list of corrections to my testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

I understand the record is to be printed, and I trust these changes will be approved and made in the transcript before printing.

There is also enclosed an errata sheet issued by Ward & Paul, correcting the time of the attack, which was erroneously stated by me in a colloquy with Representative Murphy. I assume this change will be included in any made in the transcript before printing.

Respectfully.

(S) H. R. Stark,
H. R. STARK,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

[7220] Corrections in testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N.¹

VOLUME 31

Page	Line	Correction
5687.....	4	Insert a period after "time". Begin new sentence with "I".
5696.....	22	Change "to use his eyes" to "for use as eyes".
		Change "For example" to "However".
5696.....	3	Change "extent" to "intent".
5696.....	8	Add "reconnaissance" after "distance".

¹ See Index of Witnesses for testimony of Admiral Stark.

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Corrections in testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N.—Continued

VOLUME 32

Page	Line	Correction
5722.....	14	After "recollection" add "that it was".
5723.....	22	Change "Mr. Stark" to "Mr. Mitchell".
5728.....	19	Change "what" to "which".
5731.....	12	Change "UPNAV" to "OPNAV".
5734.....	13	Delete "Yes".
5745.....	12	After "is" insert "a letter".
5745.....	14	After "Two" add "dated 10 November 1941".
5750.....	25	Change "6 o'clock" to "1 o'clock".
5790.....	14	Change "sak" to "say".
5790.....	18	Change "apetite" to "appetite".
5814.....	25	Change first "He" to "General Marshall".
5815.....	16	Insert period after "it".
5815.....	18	Insert period after "phone".
5833.....	22	Change "Admiral Keefe" to "Admiral Stark".
5839.....	17	Delete the period.
[7221] 5839.....	18	Change "With" to "with". Insert period after "population" and begin new sentence.
5845.....	15	Place period after "were tense".
5845.....	16	Before "might also" insert "To have brought it back".
5845.....	20	Change "reaction" to "recreation".
5855.....	22	Change "change" to "chance".
5856.....	19	Insert "in connection" before "with".
5868.....	17	Change "term" to "time".
5869.....	22	Change "jointed" to "joined".
5870.....	18	Change "by" to "we weren't".
5870.....	19	Change comma to period after "more" and begin new sentence.
5870.....	20	Change to read, "we were playing for time. In the fall of 1941, it".
5886.....	24	Insert "10:40" after "somewhere around".
5889.....	5	Change "craft" to "aircraft".
5894.....	7	Insert "and" after "Admiral Hart".
5896.....	10	Change "blowed" to "flowed".
5899.....	11	Change "absent" to "absence".
5907.....	20	Change "to include" to "I included".
5911.....	21	Insert "Not" before "separating".
5913.....	15	Insert "now" after "I have seen it".

[7222]

VOLUME 33

5989.....	23	Correct spelling of "accompanying".
5990.....	2	Change "158" to "58".
6008.....	8	Change "Commander-in-Chief" to "Commandant".
6009.....	25	Change "2613" to "261331".
6016.....	11	Delete "proper".
6016.....	13	Insert period after "WPL-46". Change "in foreign" to "Inform".
6022.....	12	Insert "if" before "I". Insert "had" after "I". Change period at end of line to a dash.
6035.....	22	Delete "from this type of attack".
6036.....	4	Change "Commander" to "Commanders" and delete "in Chief".
6044.....	10	Correct spelling of "Congress".
6047.....	3	Delete "in which".
6051.....	19	Insert "But" before "Once".
6052.....	11	Change "board" to "Board" and "he" to "we".
6052.....	12	Insert "overcrowding" after "to".
6052.....	14	Change "He had that report" to "The President had that report."
6052.....	15	Insert "for" before "every".
6054.....	17	Change "and" to "because"; insert "that the" after "found" and delete "a".
6054.....	18	Insert "into commission" after "coming" and delete "in that they".
6057.....	25	Delete "with".
6067.....	11, 12	Change "2:30" to read "1:25".
	13, 14	Change "1:57" to read "1:25".
	15	Change "Shortly before 2:00" to "1:25".
	17	Change "1:57 to 2:00" to "1:25".
	21	Insert a dash after "Communications".
6084.....	9	Change "18" to "A/T".
6088.....	15	Delete "it to"; change "that" to "to which", and delete "not".
6088.....	15	Insert "definite on that" after "anything".
6117.....	25	Change "Grear" to "Greer".
6118.....	23	Change "Grear" to "Greer".
6119.....	5	Change "Caesar" to "Sessa".
6121.....	19	Insert "steps" after "similar".
6129.....	4	Insert "I wrote" before "that".
6129.....	5	Insert period after "anywhere" and begin new sentence with "In my opinion".
6131.....	13	Change "southern" to "southward".
6141.....	14	Change "he" to "Secretary Stimson".

Corrections in testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N.—Continued

[7224]

VOLUME 34

Page	Line	Correction
6151-----	11	Change "right or" to "rights of".
6152-----	20	Change "men-o-war" to "men of war".
6154-----	20	Change "hunt" to "hung".
6160-----	14	Change "as" to "at least".
6169-----	16	Change "inferring" to "endeavoring."
6180-----	7	Change "did not" to "indicates I tried to".
6182-----	12	Change "ascertain" to "ascertained".
6183-----	5	Change "Maxwell, Hamilton and Ballenger" to "Maxwell Hamilton and Ballentine".
6185-----	6	Change "on" to "in".
6186-----	13	Insert "officer" after "executive" and before the comma.
6201-----	10	Change "ready" to "read".
6201-----	17	Change "about it" to "right".
6203-----	6	Delete "and"; insert comma before "that".
6204-----	3	Insert "it" after "governments".
6207-----	17	Insert quotation marks before "is there etc".
6207-----	19	Insert quotation marks after "out!".
6207-----	24	Delete "answered the question and", and insert before "The answer" the word "Assuming".
[7225] 6207-----	25	Delete quotation marks after "affirmative". Insert a comma after "affirmative", and delete "in answering you, but".
6208-----	5	Add quotation marks after "our effort".
6209-----	4	Delete "not" and the second "for".
6214-----	22	Insert "a" before "guess".
6279-----	20	Change "July" to "January".
6281-----	8	Change "short" to "shore".
6287-----	17	Change "attack" to "attached".
6290-----	3	Change "Jerry" to "Dudley".
6293-----	8	Change "briefly" to "sharply".
6322-----	12	Change "made" to "implemented".
6331-----	22	Delete comma and insert dash at end of line.
6331-----	23	Change "understand" to "understanding".
6333-----	20	Insert "if it is" after "defend".
6338-----	14	Change "The use" to "They use".

[7226]

VOLUME 35

6370-----	17	Change "Mr." to "Pa".
6376-----	6	Change "that" to "them".
6377-----	15	Change "outlay" to "outline".
6377-----	20	Insert "up" before "to the".
6379-----	7	Change "in" to "into".
6379-----	9	Change "tought" to "tough".
6379-----	18	Change "tried" to "had".
6379-----	19	Change "to, on" to "to go on".
6380-----	10	Change "That" to "The".
6382-----	15	Change "McCollough" to "McCollum" and "Cramer" to "Kramer".
6384-----	4	Change "but" to "that".
6389-----	4	Change "bearing" to "bear".
6389-----	5	Delete ", and" and insert dash after "27th".
6393-----	17	Insert "it" after "that" and "and" after "properly".
6393-----	18	Change "they" to "by".
6394-A-----	5	Change "me. Not" to "me—not" and change period at end of line to dash.
6394-A-----	6	Change "As" to "as", change "Wellborne" to "Wellborn" and "is" to "was".
6395-----	6	Change "couldn't get" to "came".
6395-----	25	Change "busy, we" to "busy. We".
[7227] 6397-----	13	Insert "the" before "King".
6421-----	23	Correct spelling of "seriousness".
6424-----	7	Delete "that".
6446-----	3	Change "He" to "We".
6448-----	24	Change "if available" to "is available".
6449-----	9-10	Change "depending on the scale" to "defending ourselves".
6463-----	6	Delete "about 200,".
6471-----	19	Insert "it" after "put".
6474-----	21	Insert "recently" after "not".
6477-----	11-12	Change "as sizing up under all" to "after sizing up all".
6477-----	14	Correct spelling of "heart".
6483-----	21	Change "I" to "he".
6502-----	12	Capitalize "Allied Naval Commander in Chief."
6502-----	20	Change "Transport" to "Task Force".
6521-----	7	Change "of this" to "indicated an".
6526-----	9	Change "were they" to "where they".
6527-----	5	Change "assume" to "assumed".
6546-----	4	Change last word of line to "as".
6547-----	18	Delete "Admiral Keefe".
6567-----	15	Change "conditional" to "additional".
6567-----	19	Change "premises" to "premise".
6592-----	8	Change "say" to "saw".

[7228] Mr. HANNAFORD. At page 4346 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson requested all Japanese intercepts in addition to those set forth in Exhibit 1, which were transmitted between August 16 and August 29, 1941, and which pertained to Japanese-American negotiations.

I would just like to note at this point that these dispatches have been sent to Senator Ferguson and they are so bulky that I do not think it is worth while making them part of the transcript, but I just want the record to show that they have been sent to him and we have another copy available for any member of the committee that wishes to see them.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to see them.

Senator FERGUSON. They are going to be made an exhibit now?

Mr. HANNAFORD. They are not an exhibit as yet, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I would certainly like to have them an exhibit.

Mr. HANNAFORD. We can make them an exhibit at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Senator requests that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I request that. It is very material to the issue.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered. What will be the number?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I request then that this document be marked [7229] "Exhibit 124," Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be so numbered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 124.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item, Mr. Chairman, is an answer to Mr. Murphy's request at page 160 of the transcript in which he asked for a comparison of the actual damage to the battleships at Pearl Harbor as compared with the statement issued by Secretary Knox on December 15.¹

A photostatic copy of this comparison has been placed before each member of the committee and I would suggest that the actual document be made part of the transcript at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

Comparison of actual damage suffered by the fleet at Pearl Harbor and that stated in the report that was released by Secretary Knox on 15 December 1941

Name	Actual damage	Reported by Knox
Arizona.....	Sunk.....	Destroyed.
California.....	do.....	Not mentioned by name.
West Virginia.....	do.....	Do.
[7230] Oklahoma.....	Capsized.....	Capsized but can be righted and repaired.
Nevada.....	Heavily damaged.....	Not mentioned by name.
Maryland.....	Damaged.....	Do.
Pennsylvania.....	do.....	Do.
Tennessee.....	do.....	Do.
Helena.....	Heavily damaged.....	Do.
Honolulu.....	Damaged.....	Do.
Raleigh.....	Heavily damaged.....	Do.
Shaw.....	do.....	Do.
Cassin.....	Heavily damaged, burned.....	Lost.
Downes.....	do.....	Do.
Vestal.....	Badly damaged.....	Do.
Oglala.....	Sunk.....	Do.
Curtiss.....	Damaged.....	Not mentioned by name.
Utah.....	Capsized.....	Lost.

¹ See Hearings, Part 1, p. 70.

In addition, Secretary Knox made a general statement of damage as follows:

Navy sustained damage to other vessels. This damage varies from ships which have already been repaired, and are ready for sea, or which have gone to sea, to a few ships which will take from a week to several months to repair. In the last category is the older BB *Oklahoma* which has capsized but can be righted and repaired.

[7231] Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have is a response from the Navy Department in answer to a question of Senator Ferguson at page 177 of the transcript, in which he asked for a table showing the times at which various points in the Pacific were attacked.¹

The Navy Department has submitted a chart showing the times in local time, Greenwich time and Washington time and a photostatic copy of this chart has been placed before each member of the committee and I would suggest that it be made part of the transcript at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The chart referred to follows:)

[7232] *Time of Jap attacks in the Pacific 7 and 8 December 1941*

Place	Local time	Greenwich time	Washington time
Pearl Harbor.....	7:55 a. m.—7th.....	6:25 p. m.—7th.....	1:25 p. m.—7th.
Singapore.....	3:00 a. m.—8th.....	8:00 p. m.—7th.....	3:00 p. m.—7th.
Khota Baru.....	3:40 p. m.—8th.....	8:40 p. m.—7th.....	3:40 p. m.—7th.
Davao Gulf, P. I.....	7:10 a. m.—8th.....	11:10 p. m.—7th.....	6:10 p. m.—7th.
Guam.....	9:10 a. m.—8th.....	11:10 p. m.—7th.....	6:10 p. m.—7th.
Hong Kong.....	8:00 a. m.—8th.....	Midnight—7-8th.....	7:00 p. m.—7th.
Wake.....	12:00 noon—8th.....	1:00 a. m.—8th.....	8:00 p. m.—7th.
Clark Field, P. I.....	9:27 a. m.—8th.....	1:27 a. m.—8th.....	8:27 p. m.—7th.
Midway.....	9:30 p. m.—7th.....	9:30 a. m.—8th.....	4:30 a. m.—8th.
Nichols Field (Manila).....	3:00 a. m.—9th.....	7:00 p. m.—8th.....	2:00 p. m.—8th.

NOTES

(1) The above times are compiled from existing records. Minor inaccuracies are possible.

(2) There were other attacks on Army and foreign installations of which the Navy has no records.

Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have relates to the question of watertight integrity of ships at Pearl Harbor and inspections of the ships, which have been raised by several members of the committee at pages 160, 242, and 2821 of the transcript.

At page 4437 of the transcript we inserted a partial answer to this inquiry, which was supplied to us by the Navy [7233] Department and which show the schedules of inspections of the various vessels at Pearl Harbor.²

We have also received one additional memorandum from the Navy Department, to which we wrote a subsequent memorandum asking for additional information. I would request that these two memoranda be spread on the record at this point so that each committee member may have it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.
(The document referred to follows:)

¹ Hearings, Part 1, p. 77.

² See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347 et seq., for correspondence on this subject.

2676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
Washington, 11 December 1945

R-#16

Memorandum

To: William D. Mitchell.

Subject: Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels.

1. Pursuant to your request concerning the above matter, the following information has been obtained and is submitted:

(a) An examination of the logs and records of the major vessels at Pearl Harbor indicates that only one vessel did not have an equivalent of the condition "all water-tight openings below the third deck closed" at the time of the attack. That vessel, the USS California, had ten inner and [7234] outboard voids open for maintenance work. Its remaining water-tight openings below the third deck were closed.

(b) The logs of the USS Oklahoma and USS Arizona were destroyed. However information has been obtained through Commander Fuqua, the Damage Control Officer of the Arizona, that on his ship all water-tight doors below the third deck were closed. This was also the condition that prevailed in the USS Oklahoma, according to information stated by the Commanding Officer of that ship.

(c) Material conditions of readiness referred to as conditions "Baker" or "X-Ray" or "Yoke" are higher than the minimum. The minimum requirements are considered to be those prescribed by Navy Regulations, that is, that all water-tight openings below the third deck be closed from 1600 to 0800.

(d) According to the best available analysis in the Navy Department, the USS California is the only ship that might have been saved from sinking by the closing of manhole covers that had been left open for maintenance.

(e) The USS Pennsylvania was in dry dock and is not included within the above general statements concerning the conditions of water-tight integrity that prevailed at that time.

2. If more specific and detailed information on these matters is desired, an attempt will be made to locate and [7235] have present necessary witnesses.

JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

DECEMBER 11, 1945.

Memorandum for Admiral Colcough.

I have just received from Lt. Commander Baecher a memorandum dated December 11, 1945, entitled "Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels."

The inquiry from members of the Committee was broader than this. They have inquired about the charge that some or more of the ships in Pearl Harbor were undergoing a Sunday "inspection", that some had ammunition on shore, for that purpose. The report of December 11th seems too meager on this.

Water-tight doors are only one feature. An ordered "inspection" might indicate a general state of mental unalertness to a possible attack.

Can you not at least answer specifically the "inspection" charge, and name witnesses from the ships who could testify about each vessel.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

[7236] Mr. HANNAFORD. I would like to comment on the final answer in response to our final request, which we have received from the Navy Department.

They have compiled a statement of 20 December 1945 from the logs of various ships, that show that inspections occurred on December 5th and 6th, 1941. I would request that this chart showing the various inspections that were held on the battleships to the extent that logs are available be spread upon the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

Mr. HANNAFORD. I would like to make this additional statement, that the extracts show that on December 5th or 6th each battleship

whose log is available held some type of inspection ranging from a daily inspection, which I take it is a minor type of inspection, to a monthly inspection, which I assume is a more important one.

We have been advised by the Navy Department that the logs for December 7, 1941, which are not extracted in this document which will be made a part of the record, were not included in the extract because the attack occurred earlier than inspections would normally have been held if they were to be held on December 7. The Navy is checking further to find what the actual logs on December 7 show and additional information will be forthcoming.

Senator LUCAS. What do the inspections show with re- [7237]
spect to water-tight integrity?

Mr. HANNAFORD. The water-tight integrity aspects are covered in this memorandum which I have asked to be spread upon the record rather than reading it, Senator. I can read it if you wish me to.

Senator LUCAS. No; I will read it.

(The document referred to follows:)

20 DECEMBER 1945.

Inspections made on U. S. Battleships which were at Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec 1941. These inspections occurred on 5 or 6 Dec 1941 as designated.

U. S. S. Arizona

No log received for Dec 1941.

U. S. S. California

5 Dec 1941

1149 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

6 Dec 1941

1020 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

Made monthly inspection of all indices of smokeless powder on board; conditions normal.

U. S. S. Maryland

5 Dec 1941

[7238] 070 Food inspection.

6 Dec 1941

0800 Made daily visual examination of all smokeless powder samples, violet paper, and test for local heating of magazines on board ship; conditions normal.

1330 By order of the Commanding Officer, Lt (jg) Nelson H. Randall, C-V (S) USNR, was suspended from duty for a period of 5 days from and including this date for improper performance of duty as Communication Watch Officer failing to deliver a dispatch to the Commander Battleships Battle Force. The Commanding Officer further ordered that, due to the exigencies of the service Lt (jg) Randall is restored to duty for the duration of the Annual Military Inspection and Damage Control Practice of this vessel on December 8, 1941 and December 9, 1941.

U. S. S. Nevada

5 Dec 1941

No inspections.

6 Dec. 1941

0705 Food inspection.

0900 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

U. S. S. Oklahoma

No log received for Dec 1941.

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[7239]

U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*

5 Dec 1941

0800 Food inspection.

1150 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

6 Dec 1941

0833 Landing force left the ship to be inspected by Commander Battleship Division TWO. 1045 Landing force returned.

U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*

6 Dec 1941

1155 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

U. S. S. *Tennessee*

5 Dec 1941

1010 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

1445 Secured boiler number 8 after having conducted tests on safety valves.

6 Dec 1941

0745 Commenced embarking Landing Force for Annual Military Inspection.

1130 Landing Force returned aboard. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

U. S. S. *West Virginia*

No log received for Dec 1941.

[7240] Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have relates to an inquiry by Representative Gearhart, at page 879 of the transcript, in which he asked for the log of the U. S. S. *Wright* from November 27 to December 7, 1941.¹

The Navy has furnished us with two copies of this log, which I think should be marked as an exhibit at this time, Exhibit 125 it would be.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be received as Exhibit 125.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 125.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. And without objection I would like to read two extracts from this log and also a memorandum from the Navy Department with relation to them.

On November 27, 1941, the entry at 2024 o'clock reads as follows:

Steaming as before. 2100 sighted unidentified ship bearing 205 true, distance approximately 10 miles on opposite parallel course; average steam 200 pounds; average RPM 87.

The second entry is one that appears at 1216 o'clock on December 7, 1941, and reads as follows:

Steaming as before. 1200 C-C 2, 109 degrees true and gyro; 098 degrees PCC and 098 degrees PSTGC. 1305 secured No. 1 boiler. 1711 sighted plane, bearing 170 de- [7241] gres true on opposite parallel course, distance 8 miles. Plane passed abeam to starboard. 1405 plane sighted off starboard beam on parallel course, distance 8 miles; average steaming 200 pounds, average RPM 84.

Now, the Navy has submitted us a memorandum attached to which is a chart, a map, at which the location of the *Wright* at those two points has been charted.

¹ Hearings, Part 1, p. 339.

With reference to the entry on November 27 where they sighted a ship, the Navy's memorandum says:

As shown by the enclosed chart, the U. S. S. *Wright* was approximately 1600 nautical miles distant from the assumed position of the Japanese striking force on 27 November 1941.

With respect to the entry on December 7, where the *Wright* sighted some planes, the Navy's memorandum says as follows:

As shown by the chart, the U. S. S. *Wright* was approximately 390 nautical miles from the assumed position of the Japanese striking force on 7 December 1941.

I might add that the entry on December 7 does not show whether the planes that they sighted was friend or foe.

Mr. GEARHART. Where was the *Wright* when it was 300 miles from the assumed position of the enemy?

Mr. HANNAFORD. From the chart it appears as though it is pretty nearly due west of the Hawaiian Islands.

[7242] Mr. GEARHART. How many miles?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I cannot read this chart. I would request that the chart be made part of the exhibit as well.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

Mr. HANNAFORD. The last item I have is at page 6363 of the transcript, where Senator Ferguson asked for the reports of Mr. Curtis Munson. I would just like to note that we have handed those to Senator Ferguson yesterday.

Mr. GEARHART. Before we get away from that, will you tell me what detachment the *Wright* belonged to?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I am sorry, Congressman, I cannot. It perhaps is shown by the exhibit itself, Exhibit 6. Have we got a copy of Exhibit 6?

Senator LUCAS. The Navy men can tell you that.

Mr. MURPHY. The *Wright* was 22 north, 163 west C. V. as seaplane tender 300 miles west of Oahu. That is on the morning of December 7 at 8 o'clock.

Mr. HANNAFORD. I am not sure what it was doing, Congressman. The Navy advises me that they believe the *Wright* was on detached duty at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. It was a seaplane tender.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you explain that?

Mr. MURPHY. May I inquire about this Munson business? Is that very lengthy?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I actually have not seen it.

[7243] Mr. MURPHY. Is it very lengthy, the Munson report? You said you had it yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. 20 or 25 pages. I will have it here in the morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further from counsel?

Mr. HANNAFORD. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Senator George has just asked what the Munson report is. It is a report that, as I understand it, the State Department—or as an agent of the President they had a special intelligence system and Mr. Munson was one of the intelligence agents to go out and get information for the State Department and for the President on the Japanese question.

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Mr. MURPHY. Who has got an extra copy?

Mr. HANNAFORD. That concludes all that I have.

Mr. MURPHY. Who has got an extra copy?

Mr. HANNAFORD. We have only one copy of it, Congressman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. May I inquire? The copy furnished Senator Ferguson is the only copy we have?

Mr. HANNAFORD. Yes, the copy furnished Senator Ferguson is the only copy we have. We can have it spread on the transcript.

Mr. MURPHY. It may not be material.

[7244] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I think it is material.

Mr. HANNAFORD. I haven't read it; I do not know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, we can decide that later.

Senator FERGUSON. It shows this, that at least the State Department and the President were not satisfied with intelligence of the Army and the Navy and the FBI and they sent out their own intelligence agents to get certain information in relation to the Japanese both in Hawaii and the Japanese on the west coast.

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't it particularly as to the danger of uprisings among the Japanese element?

Senator FERGUSON. It covered that. It covered the whole question of espionage and counterespionage.

Senator LUCAS. I suggest that it be spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, do you request that it be spread on the record?

Senator LUCAS. It is only 25 pages.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that your request, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

[7245]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 11 January 1946.

Memorandum:

To: Mr. Seth Richardson.

1. In compliance with a request from your office, there is enclosed a photostatic copy of a "Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States" by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

/S/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHEER
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

(Pencil notation:) Received 1/15/46 JMH

Confidential

Subject: Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

Confidential

Confidential

Confidential

[7246] Secret

Confidential

Subject: Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

Secret

Confidential

Confidential

Secret

Confidential

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
November 27, 1941.

OP-16-B-7

Memorandum for the Director

Subject: A Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

A résumé of this report by John Franklin Carter (Jay Franklin) is prefixed to Mr. Munson's report.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Munson stated that he spent about a week in the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districts with the full cooperation of Naval Intelligence Representatives. Mr. Munson stated, "Our Navy has done by far the most work on this problem, having given it intense consideration for the past ten or fifteen years."

Although Mr. Munson's report is a little lengthy, I think it is worth reading. A copy of this report has been routed to Op-16-F, [7247] Op-11, Op-12, and Op-30. Copies will be sent to ComEleven, ComTwelve, and ComThirteen.

HARTWELL C. DAVIS.

Dictated November 27, 1941
Dictated by Commander Davis
Typed by R. Blalock

1st Endorsement

Op-13/PS

Serial No. 041813

(SC) A8-2/EF37

From: Director Central Division.

To: Director Naval Intelligence Division.

Subject: Confidential report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States.

1. Forwarded for information and file.

NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

R. E. SCHUEMANN.

In reply refer to
U-L
Strictly Confidential

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 24, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

To: Director, Central Division, Navy Department.

From: Liaison Officer.

Subject: Confidential report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States.

[7248] At the direction of the Under Secretary, I enclose for the confidential information of the Chief of Naval Operations a copy of C. B. Munson's report entitled "Japanese on the West Coast", together with a covering memorandum summarizing the report. The report, a secret one, was given the Under Secretary personally.

ORME WILSON, *Liaison Officer.*

Enclosure:
Copy of C. B. Munson's report.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

1210 National Press Building

Confidential

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM ON C. B. MUNSON'S REPORT "JAPANESE ON THE WEST COAST"

Attached herewith is the report, with supplementary reports on Lower California and British Columbia. The report, though lengthy, is worth reading in its entirety. Salient passages are:

1) "There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around their waists and make a human bomb out of themselves . . . but today they are few."

2) "There is no Japanese 'problem' on the coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will be [7249] undoubtedly some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported agents. There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese 'crackpot'."

3) "The dangerous part of their espionage is that they would be very effective as far as movement of supplies, movement of troops and movement of ships * * * is concerned."

4) "For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs."

5) "Your reporter, * * * is horrified to note that dams, bridges, harbors, power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded everywhere. The harbor of San Pedro could be razed by fire completely by four men with hand grenades and a little study in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower California might actually die of thirst. * * * One railway bridge at the exits from the mountains in some cases could tie up three or four main railroads."

J. F. C.

[7250]

JAPANESE ON THE WEST COAST

(C. B. Munson)

GROUND COVERED

In reporting on the Japanese "problem" on the West Coast the facts are, on the whole, fairly clear and opinion toward the problem exceedingly uniform. In reporting, the main difficulty is to know where to leave off and what to leave out. One could gather data for fifteen years with fifteen men and still be in the position of the Walrus and the Carpenter:

If seven maids with seven mops

Swept it for half a year—

Do you suppose, the Walrus said,

That they could get it clear?

Whisking up the grains of sand is the wrong approach, yet when your reporter declares there is a sea and a shore and some sand, and that he has sampled the general quality of sand in many varying beaches, do not be too hard in your judgment for him if he has stopped far short of sorting out each layer or tint or even each beach. You have to feel this problem—not figure it out with your pencil. We only cite the sand that our reader may never forget the complexities of even a shovel full of sand.

Your reporter spent about a week each in the 11th, 12th, and 13th Naval Districts with the full cooperation of the [7251] Naval and Army Intelligence and the FBI. Some mention should also be made of the assistance rendered from time to time by the British Intelligence. Our Navy has done by far the most work on this problem, having given it intense consideration for the last ten or fifteen years. Your reporter commenced in the 12th Naval District, which covers Northern California, from thence to the 13th, covering Washington and Oregon, winding up his observations in the 11th Naval District, covering Southern California, where to his mind the whole "problem" finally focuses. Your reporter also turned the corner into British Columbia through a member of the R. C. M. P. and the corner into Mexico through a conference with our Consul at Tijuana.

Opinions of the various services were obtained, also of business, employees, universities, fellow white workers, students, fish packers, lettuce packers, farmers, religious groups, etc. etc. The opinion expressed with minor differences was uniform. Select Japanese in all groups were sampled. To mix indiscriminately with the Japanese was not considered advisable chiefly because the opinions of many local white Americans who had made this their life work for the last fifteen years were available and it was foolish to suppose your reporter could add to the sum of knowledge in three weeks by running through the topmost twigs of a forest.

[7252]

BACKGROUND

Unless familiar with the religious and family background of the Japanese, this rough background summary should be skimmed over as it has a bearing on the question. If the reader is familiar with the Japanese background, it may be omitted.

An American wit once said, "You cannot tell the truth about Japan without lying." The same witticism might be made with reference to the Japanese people, but, like all generalizations, it needs a corrective explanation. A study of Japan is a study in the category of social fully as much as of political science. The study of the Japanese people is one of absorbing interest.

Who are the Japanese people? From when did they come and what emotional concepts did they bring with them? While there might not be unanimity of opinion as to the various strains that go to make up the Japanese of today, one leading anthropologist, Dr. Frederick Star of the University of Chicago, a number of years ago said to the writer, "the Japanese are the most mixed race of people that I have ever studied." The Malay strain is pronounced in the Japanese, especially in the Province of Kumamoto. The Mongol is very pronounced in the upper middle as well as in the so-called higher brackets of society. Then there is the Aryan strain still to be seen in its unmixed form in the 17,000 and more Ainu who inhabit portions of Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands. [7253] These latter are related to the Aryan group in physiognomy and in language. These three strains have produced the Japanese of today.

The Ainu, insofar as we know, was the aboriginal. His social status was changed from time to time as conquering groups drove him farther and farther to the north. These conquering groups came from China via Korea. Japanese history begins with the conqueror Jimmu Tenno, who arrived on a "Floating Bridge of Heaven"—a poetical expression for his coming to Japan by boat. He found a tribal people with a primitive animistic faith of nature worship. He had a superior religion and he was shrewd. He told the conquered people that their reverence for the tribal chief was a true reverence and that he also revered the head of his clan which was the Sun Goddess, whose beneficent rule was seen in her health-giving rays. Thus began what is known as "Shinto" ("The Way of the Gods"), as we know it today. From the days of Jimmu (the first Japanese Emperor) to the present, all Japanese have revered the Emperor as a descendant of the Sun Goddess, whose appearance in Japanese mythology is too complicated to be discussed here.

Another cultural element in Japanese life stems from the introduction of Buddhism in Japan in the sixth and seventh centuries. Buddhism is a foreign religion and made little progress in Japan, even though it was fostered by [7254] the Emperor Prince Shotoku. Buddhism had a very difficult time until some wise propagandist hit upon the idea of incorporating the Shinto Gods into the Buddhist Pantheon. All the Shinto deities were recognized as avatars of Buddha and we have continuing in Japan until the days of the Restoration what is known as twofold Buddhism—a union of Shinto and Buddhism—a union so intricate that Buddhist God shelves in the home have unmistakable Shinto deities and Shinto God shelves have unmistakable Buddhist deities. Japan can never repay Buddhism for its contribution to the cultural life of the people. Its temples were schools wherein those who wished might be taught. It developed the arts and crafts, and was the developer and preserver of much that is beautiful in the cultural life of the Nation today.

While the Shinto and the Buddhist influence, separate and co-mingled, were moving forward, there developed in Japan a feudal type of society. This society was organized under the rule of a tribal person known as "The Great Name" (a land baron). He had warriors or knights known as Samurai. They, the Samurai, preserved order and fought battles to maintain the existence of the clan. Besides the Samurai there was the farmer who raised the food, the artisan who fashioned and fabricated the tools, not only of the farmer but also of the warrior, and there was the merchant; below them there was the eta, and lower still the hinin—whose who [7255] for misconduct or through capture had been reduced in status until they were not considered men, as the term "hinin" implies.

For nearly 1,000 years, this state of society existed with internecine wars of all too frequent and carnal occurrence until early in the seventeenth century when a great man, Ieyasu, appeared and became the founder of what is known as the Tokugawa family. The story of this period is interesting, but time and space do not permit the telling of it here, other than to say it was a period of about 250 years of great peace.

During the Tokugawa period, Confucianism had great vogue. The Samurai children were privileged to attend the few schools which were maintained and where the principles of Confucian ethics were taught, but with one great characteristic change—the Japanese substituted for the chief virtue, loyalty, for filial piety.

Chugi (loyalty) is loyalty, not to an idea nor an ideal, but to a person. In this feudal society personal relationships were supreme, and loyalty was the cardinal virtue.

In the feudal state, as well as throughout all Japanese history, the individual as an individual did not exist. He existed as a member of the clan. The family could dispose of individuals at will, should occasion merit such action. Even life itself could be taken, after the case had been [7256] submitted to the family council. In this connection, one should not overlook the tremendous influence of the dead. The living succeed or fail, are happy or sad, through the influence of the dead who live in the tombs of the village or hover over their familiar haunts. It is well to keep this in mind when estimating Japanese activity. The Japanese believe that the dead remain in the World and that all dead become Gods with supernatural powers, and that happiness of the dead depends upon respectful services that are rendered them by the living.

In a feudal society, the merchant cuts a very poor figure. He was looked down upon by the Samurai and he was inferior to the farmer and the artisan. It is significant that but a very few families of merchants have maintained a good social position. Of these there are the Mitsui, the Iwasaki (this latter being represented by what we know as the Mitsubishi), and also the Sumitomo family.

With the coming of Commodore Perry in 1853 and 1854, the feudalism began to pass away and within 20 years was abolished by Government edict. Although the feudal social system was legally abolished, its influence continues even today.

With the Restoration there appeared a new influence in Japanese life and that was the coming of the Christian missionary with his doctrine of individual responsibility to deity. This was something new to the Japanese system of [7257] society. Heretofore religion centered in the family, and family culture and family faith were a collective thing and not individual. The success of the missionary movement in Japan is remarkable because it brings this new element into the social picture. Wherever Christianity succeeds, it also succeeds in breaking the old family ties and hang-overs of a feudal order. Japan's advance in Government, its development educationally and the vast improvements that we see in society today have been furthered by the application of Western methods of teaching, of Government, etc. But, the Christian influence must not be underestimated nor should one go too far in overstressing its great importance. Christianity is individualistic, and that is one reason why the "powers that be" in Japan today are endeavoring to regulate its activities, if not to change some of its tenets. The Christian Japanese understand America better than any other group because they have been more and more weaned away from the influence of feudalism.

The Japanese are a perplexing people and their study is a very interesting and very enlightening one. They follow the leader—they have done this throughout all the years of their history. Even today, personal ties are stronger than legal ones.

No estimate of the elements characteristic of the Japanese is complete without a word about "giri". There is [7258] no accurate English word for "giri". The nearest approach to an understanding of the term is our word "obligation", which is very inadequate and altogether too weak. Favors or kindnesses done to a Japanese are never forgotten but are stored up in memory and in due time an adequate quid pro quo must be rendered in return. The clever and none-too-scrupulous individual often hangs "giri" upon the unsuspecting, to their hurt and harm. "Giri" is the great political tool. To understand "giri" is to understand the Japanese.

ASSOCIATIONS

The Japanese is the greatest joiner in the world. To take care of this passion he has furnished himself with ample associations to join. There are around 1563 of these in the United States. Your reporter has before him a Japanese publication entitled "The Japanese-American Directory of 1941" at least two inches thick listing the Japanese associations in fine print. Your reporter also has before him lists furnished him in the various Naval Districts of some of the leading associations considered the most important, with full descriptions of their activities as far as known. It is endless to clutter up this report with them.

FAMILY SET-UP IN UNITED STATES

In the United States there are four divisions of Japanese to be considered:

1. The *ISSEI*—First generation Japanese. Entire [7259] cultural background Japanese. Probably loyal romantically to Japan. They must be con-

sidered, however, as other races. They have made this their home. They have brought up children here, their wealth accumulated by hard labor is here, and many would have become American citizens had they been allowed to do so. They are for the most part simple people. Their age group is largely 55 to 65, fairly old for a hard-working Japanese.

2. The *NISEI*—Second generation who have received their whole education in the United States and usually, in spite of discrimination against them and a certain amount of insults accumulated through the years from irresponsible elements, show a pathetic eagerness to be Americans. They are in constant conflict with the orthodox, well disciplined family life of their elders. Age group—1 to 30 years.

3. The *KIBEI*—This is an important division of the *NISEI*. This is the term used by the Japanese to signify those American born Japanese who received part or all of their education in Japan. In any consideration of the *KIBEI* they should be again divided into two classes, i. e. those who received their education in Japan from childhood to about 17 years of age and those who received their early formative education in the United States and returned to Japan for four or five years Japanese education. The *Kibei* are considered the most dangerous element and closer to the [7260] *Issei* with especial reference to those who received their early education in Japan. It must be noted, however, that many of those who visited Japan subsequent to their early American education come back with added loyalty to the United States. In fact it is a saying that all a *Nisei* needs is a trip to Japan to make a loyal American out of him. The American educated Japanese is a boor in Japan and treated as a foreigner and with a certain amount of contempt there. His trip is usually a painful experience.

4. The *SANSEI*—The Third generation Japanese is a baby and may be disregarded for the purpose of our survey.

We must now think back to the paragraph entitled *BACKGROUND*. This is tied into the family of which the *Issei* is the head with more authority and hold over his family than an old New England Bible-thundering pioneer. Their family life is disciplined and honorable. The children are obedient and the girls virtuous. We must think also of the Associations, some sinister, some emanating from Imperial Japan, some with Japanese Consular contacts. It all weaves up into a sinister pattern on paper. This pattern has been set up in a secret document entitled "Japanese Organizations and Activities in the 11th Naval District", and may be scrutinized with proper authorization in the Navy Department in Washington. We only suggest this to our reader in case our words have not built up the proper Halloween atmosphere. It is like [7261] looking at the "punkin" itself. There is real fire in it, yet in many ways it is hollow and dusty. However, your reporter desires to have you know that all this exists before he goes on to the main body of his report on how the Japanese in the United States are liable to react in case of war with Japan.

The Tokio-Sun God-Religious-Family-Association plus oriental mind set-up shows signs of the honorable passage of time.

There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves. We grant this, but today they are few. Many things indicate that very many joints in the Japanese set-up show age, and many elements are not what they used to be. The weakest from a Japanese standpoint are the *Nisei*. They are universally estimated from 90 to 98 percent loyal to the United States if the Japanese educated element of the *Kibei* is excluded. The *Nisei* are pathetically eager to show this loyalty. They are not Japanese in culture. They are foreigners to Japan. Though American citizens they are not accepted by Americans, largely because they look differently and can be easily recognized. The Japanese American citizens League should be encouraged, the while an eye is kept open, to see that Tokio does not get its finger in this pie—which it has in a few cases attempted to do. The loyal *Nisei* [7262] hardly knows where to turn. Some gesture of protection or wholehearted acceptance of this group would go a long way to swinging them away from any last romantic hankering after old Japan. They are not oriental or mysterious, they are very American and are of a proud, self-respecting race suffering from a little inferiority complex and a lack of contact with the white boys they went to school with. They are eager for this contact and to work alongside them.

The *Issei* or first generation is considerably weakened in their loyalty to Japan by the fact that they have chosen to make this their home and have brought up their children here. They expect to die here. They are quite fearful of being put in a concentration camp. Many would take out American citizenship if

allowed to do so. The haste of this report does not allow us to go into this more fully. The Issei have to break with their religion, their god and Emperor, their family, their ancestors and their after-life in order to be loyal to the United States. They are also still legally Japanese. Yet they do break, and send their boys off to the Army with pride and tears. They are good neighbors. They are old men fifty-five to sixty-five, for the most part simple and dignified. Roughly they were Japanese lower middle class about analogous to the pilgrim fathers. They were largely farmers and fishermen. Today the Japanese is farmer, fisherman and businessman. They get [7263] very attached to the land they work or own (through the second generation). They like their own business, they do not work at industrial jobs nor for others except as a stepping stone to becoming independent.

The Kibei, educated from childhood to seventeen, are still the element most to be watched.

WHAT WILL THE JAPANESE DO

Sabotage

Now that we have roughly given a background and a description of the Japanese elements in the United States the question naturally arises—what will these people do in case of a war between the United States and Japan? As interview after interview piled up, those bringing in results began to call it the same old tune. Such it was with only minor differences. These contacts ranged all the way from two-day sessions with Intelligence Services, through businessmen, to Roman Catholic priests who were frankly not interested in the United States and were only interested in making as many Catholics as possible. The story was all the same. There is no Japanese "problem" on the Coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will undoubtedly be some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported agents or agents already imported. There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese "crackpot". In each Naval District there are about 250 to 300 suspects [7264] under surveillance. It is easy to get on the suspect list, merely a speech in favor of Japan at some banquet, being sufficient to land one there. The Intelligence Services are generous with the title of suspect and are taking no chances. Privately, they believe that only 50 or 60 in each district can be classed as really dangerous. The Japanese are hampered as saboteurs because of their easily recognized physical appearance. It will be hard for them to get near anything to blow up *if it is guarded*. There is far more danger from Communists and people of the Bridges type on the Coast than there is from Japanese. The Japanese here is almost exclusively a farmer, a fisherman or a small businessman. He has no entree to plants or intricate machinery.

Espionage

The Japanese, if undisturbed and disloyal, should be well equipped for obvious physical espionage. A great part of this work was probably completed and forwarded to Tokio years ago, such as soundings and photography of every inch of the Coast. They are probably familiar with the location of every building and garage including Mike O'Flarety's out-house in the Siskiyou with all trails leading thereto. An experienced Captain in Navy Intelligence, who has from time to time and over a period of years intercepted information Tokio bound, said he would certainly hate to be a Japanese coordinator of information in Tokio. He stated that the mass of useless [7265] information was unbelievable. This would be fine for a fifth column in Belgium or Holland with the German army ready to march in over the border, but though the local Japanese could spare a man who intimately knew the country for each Japanese invasion squad, there would at least have to be a terrific American Naval disaster before his brown brothers would need his services. The dangerous part of their espionage is that they would be very effective as far as movement of supplies, movement of troops and movement of ships out of harbor mouths and over railroads is concerned. They occupy only rarely positions where they can get to confidential papers or in plants. They are usually, when rarely so placed, a subject of perpetual watch and suspicion by their fellow workers. They would have to buy most of this type of information from white people.

Propaganda

Their direct propaganda is poor and rather ineffective on the whole. Their indirect is more successful. By indirect we mean propaganda preaching the

beauties of Japan and the sweet innocence of the Japanese race to susceptible Americans.

Summary

Japan will commit some sabotage largely depending on imported Japanese as they are afraid of and do not trust the Nisei. There will be no wholehearted response from [7266] Japanese in the United States. They may get some helpers from certain Kibei. They will be in a position to pick up information on troop, supply and ship movements from local Japanese.

For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs. We do not believe that they would be at the least any more disloyal than any other racial group in the United States with whom we went to war. Those being here are on a spot and they *know it*. This is a hurried, preliminary report as our boat sails soon for Honolulu. We have not had a moment even to sort out our voluminous material since we came west. Your reporter is very satisfied he has told you what to expect from the local Japanese, but is horrified to note that dams, bridges, harbors, power stations, etc., are wholly unguarded everywhere. The harbor of San Pedro could be razed by fire completely by four men with hand grenades and a little study in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower California might actually die of thirst, not to mention the damage to the food supply. One railway bridge at the exit from the mountains in some cases could tie up three or four main railroads. The Navy has to crawl around San Pedro on its marrow bones from oil company to oil company, from lumber yard to harbor board, to city fathers, to politicians in lieu [7267] of a centralized authority, in order to strive albeit only partially to protect the conglomeration of oil tanks, lumber, gas tanks and heaven knows what else. And this is the second greatest port in the United States! This is the home base of at least the South Pacific Fleet! This is the greatest collection of inflammable material we have ever seen in our lifetime concentrated in a small vulnerable area! We do not suspect the local Japanese above anyone else or as much as the Communists or the Nazis, but before or on the outbreak of war in the South Pacific someone will set fire to this. If they do not they are fools. The Navy or some unified authority should have complete control of the harbor of Los Angeles, known as San Pedro and Long Beach, from the water's edge in a twenty-five mile radius inland, before the outbreak of war with Japan. That time is now.

We will re-work this report for final submittal later. We have missed a great deal through haste. We believe we have given the high points to the best of our ability. The Japanese are loyal on the whole, but we are wide open to sabotage on this Coast and as far inland as the mountains, and while this one fact goes unrectified I cannot unqualifiedly state that there is no danger from the Japanese living in the United States which otherwise I would be willing to state.

[7268] SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON LOWER CALIFORNIA AND NORTHWESTERN MEXICO

In a conference with the U. S. Consul from Tijuana, he stated that there was no Japanese problem in his district as there were very few Japanese left there. One Rodriguez, former Governor for many years of Lower California, and very partial to the United States, abetted by the American Navy, has set up a shrimp fishing monopoly in the Gulf of California thereby eliminating Japanese fishing (Japan-controlled) in this area. The Consul states that he has sent full reports to the State Department covering the situation there. There is evidently nothing in the Japanese problem across the border about which to be exercised.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON BRITISH COLUMBIA

The following information was furnished by a reliable source but it has not been verified and cannot be vouched for.

The total population of Japanese in Canada is estimated as between 25,000 and 30,000 of whom 23,000 reside in British Columbia. A few of these Japanese are naturalized but the great majority are either native born Canadians or immigrants.

The Japanese population is suspected of having a predilection for Japan although the exact feelings of most of them is unknown. They are not believed to

be a serious threat from a standpoint of armed uprisings in the event of war although there are probably a number of individuals in [7269] the group who would engage in subversive activity.

From a strategic point of view these Japanese are dangerously located in event of war between Canada and Japan. They are situated at the mouths of important rivers and around the entrances of harbors. There are many of them located in the vicinities of important air bases in British Columbia. Japanese communities exist at most of the strategic points throughout the province. They own a total of 2,144 vessels in Provincial waters, 211 of these vessels being over ten tons. As a race they generally look to the Japanese Consul for their guidance in matters pertaining to their welfare and political position in the community.

REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS REGARDING HANDLING JAPANESE QUESTION ON THE COAST

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
December 20, 1941.

(C. B. Munson)

This report should be read in conjunction with your observer's pre-war report on the "Japanese on the West Coast," and his report entitled "Report on Hawaiian Islands." Our report on "Hawaiian Islands" should be attached to and become part of our report on "Japanese on the West Coast." We did not repeat many basic statements originally embodied in the first report ("Japanese on the West Coast") in the later [7270] report ("Report on the Hawaiian Islands") as these statements had already been made and held good in both cases.

We desire respectfully to call attention to a statement of the Secretary of the Navy evidently made to some reporter on his return to Washington after the Pearl Harbor attack as printed in the Los Angeles Times of December 18 and the Los Angeles Herald and Express of December 16 (marked in red, clipping enclosed). This release was a UP and AP release.

We quote, "I think the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway," Secretary of the Navy Knox said. We suggest that this paragraph creates the wrong impression in that it uses the term "Fifth Column." This term is loose and has been widely abused. Should not the term "complete physical espionage" have been used instead? "Physical espionage" is supplied unwittingly by the gabble of Navy wives, by the gabble of loyal second generation Japanese, by the gabble of the postman and the milkman and classified by definite agents of a foreign government. To this may be added years of photographing, sounding and "look seeing" by disloyal and paid American people for the last twenty years. Fifth Column activities, such as in Norway, impugn the loyalty of a certain large proportion of a population. Your observer still doubts that this was the case in Honolulu. [7271] He doubts, for instance, that outside of sabotage, organized and paid for by the Imperial Japanese Government beforehand (i. e. professional work), that there was any large disloyal element of the Japanese population which went into action as a Fifth Column, running around and intentionally disrupting things on their own hook. We draw attention to the remark in the Secretary's report that people of Japanese ancestry employed at Pearl Harbor burnt their hands on machine gun barrels firing at Japanese planes.

What makes this physical espionage so effective and dangerous on the West Coast and in Honolulu, as we printed in our first report, is simply that there are a lot of Japanese in these districts and have been for years. For instance, we are given to understand that the best maps on the Aleutian Islands were and still are Japanese.

Some reaction of an undesirable nature is already apparent on the West Coast due to this statement of the Secretary's. In Honolulu your observer noted that the seagoing Navy was inclined to consider everybody with slant eyes bad. This thought stems from two sources; self-interest, largely in the economic field, and in the Navy usually from pure lack of knowledge and the good old "ent 'em up alive" school. It is not the measured judgment of 98% of the intelligence services or the knowing citizenry either on the mainland or in Honolulu. An observer can only report [7272] what he observes. Your observer must note without fear or favor that 99% of the most intelligent views on the Japanese, by military, official and civil contacts in Honolulu and the mainland, was best crystalized by two Intelligence men before the outbreak of the war. These two

men are Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle of the 11th Naval District in Los Angeles and Mr. Shivers in Honolulu of the F. B. I. Mr. Shivers in Honolulu, since the attack on Pearl Harbor, should know whether he was right or wrong, and we believe he is big and loyal enough to be only interested in finding out in what regards he was wrong and immediately notifying his superiors. In our first report we quoted Alice in Wonderland,

"If seven maids with seven mops
Swept it for half a year,
Do you suppose, the Walrus said,
That they could get it clear?"

The best measured judgment on the local Japanese may be wrong. Mr. Shivers in Honolulu holds the key. An attack is the proof of the pudding. His hindsight should be of inestimable value in shaping policy toward these people on the mainland where an attack has not yet occurred. Your observer guesses by mental telepathy that Mr. Shivers has not changed his point of view. Your observer suspects that Secretary Knox's comparison to the Fifth Column in Norways [7273] stems from either of two things: First, a very busy man being caught by the coattails by a reporter; and second, from the *unknowing* "eat 'em up alive" element amongst whom of necessity he was largely exposed in his hurried visit to determine responsibility.

Your reporter, fully believing that his original reports are still good after the *attack*, makes the following observations about handling the Japanese "problem" on the West Coast.

If Shivers says he was wrong, your observer is wrong too, and this report should be thrown in the ashcan and something much tougher substituted.

[7274]

SUGGESTIONS

A. The loyal Japanese citizens should be encouraged by a statement from *high* government authority and public attitude toward them outlined.

B. Their offers of assistance should be accepted through such agencies as:

1. Civilian Defense
2. Red Cross
3. U. S. O., etc., etc.

This assistance should not be merely monetary, nor should it even be limited to physical voluntary work in segregated Nisei units. The Nisei should work with and among white persons, and (b) made to feel he is welcome on a basis of equality.

C. An alien property custodian should be appointed to supervise Issei (first generation-alien) businesses, *but* encouraging Nisei (second generation-American citizen) to take over.

D. Accept investigated Nisei as workers in defense industries such as ship-building plants, aircraft plants, etc.

E. Put *responsibility* for behavior of Issei and Nisei on the leaders of Nisei groups such as the Japanese American Citizens League.

F. Put the *responsibility* for production of food (vegetables, fish, etc.) on Nisei leaders.

Enlargement of Foregoing Suggestions

A. "High Government Authority," i. e. President or Vice [7275] President, or at least almost as high.

C. *Memorandum Concerning Farm Food Production and Distribution Situation in the Los Angeles Area following December 7, 1941.*—The immediate results at the revocation of all licenses authorizing Japanese Nationals to engage in business was a sharp curtailment of the movement of vegetable produce into the Los Angeles market. This was due to the closing of a number of houses in the local produce market owned or controlled by Japanese Nationals and to a fear on the part of the Japanese Nationals on the farms that their produce would not be received or handled if they brought it in; also due to the immediate blocking of all bank accounts of Japanese Nationals.

It was at once obvious that some provisions must quickly be made to relieve the stoppage of food production and distribution. Under the assumption that they would be asked for advice for a plan of reopening the several closed Issei produce houses under Federal control, a plan was discussed and tentatively drawn up by a group of local produce dealers.

In anticipation of a lessening of these restrictions a press release was issued on December 11th calling upon Japanese farmers to bring their products to market as evidence of their loyalty to the United States and assuring [7276] them that these products would be received by American firms for marketing. Issuance of the General License No. 77 under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940 as amended and Regulations issued pursuant thereto relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 11, 1941, granted a general license under strict banking control for certain Japanese Nationals to engage in the production, marketing and distribution of food products in Continental United States.

As a result of the press release and the issuance of General License above referred to, the local produce market which on December 11th had a total volume of only 30 percent of normal, received 75 percent of normal on December 12th and was virtually normal on December 13th. In spite of the apparent severity of the banking controls set up by this General License, it was generally accepted by all concerned as a necessary thing and discussions were immediately undertaken as to the most effective means of operating under its terms without severe dislocation of the food production program.

Since the new license No. 77 immediately allowed the Issei produce houses to open under their former management in a manner more lenient than had been expected, it was still believed that these houses would be promptly taken [7277] over directly or indirectly by the Federal Government so as to transfer their operations to the control of American citizens. This was particularly expected because of the belief that operation of these houses had been strongly influenced and directed previously by the Japanese Government.

"As discussions were proceeding looking to the setting up of a successful program for gradually taking over these essential businesses by American citizens and as clarification of a few points in the General License above mentioned were being requested, these discussions running over into Monday, December 15th, we were suddenly surprised to receive copies of General License No. 68a under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940, as amended and regulations issued pursuant thereto, relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 15, 1941. We assume that this order may have been issued as a result of the wave of query and protest that may have arisen immediately following the realization of the total freezing situation which occurred immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. At any rate, the effect of General License No. 68a which appears to open wide the doors so far as Continental transactions are concerned, and puts a great number of Japanese nationals back in control, rather than the loyal American citizens of Japanese parentage, many of whom we had expected would be [7278] put in control of these essential businesses.

"It has been and is our belief that the objectionable features of the old control system have operated by virtue of control over consignments of merchandise and credits exercised by the Issei produce houses against the Japanese on the farms. Of prime necessity then is the complete elimination of Japanese national control of the produce houses. How far into the farms the elimination of Japanese National control should extend depends upon the individual circumstances. In some cases on the farm, control has already passed—in some cases perhaps several years back—into the hands of the American citizen children of Japanese parents. It is believed that in many other cases there are on the farms Nisei children capable of assuming complete control and who would have assumed that control very promptly if it had not been for the issuance of License No. 68a previously referred to.

"There are unquestionably a number of Japanese National farmers eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. Some of these have minor children who are not yet capable of taking over the control of the farm. There are also unquestionably instances of Japanese Aliens on farms whose capable sons of American birth are in the United States Army and hence not available for control or operation of the farm. These are some of the reasons why the matter must be approached from the point of view of con- [7279] sideration of the individual cases.

"The statement is made by authoritative sources that Japanese National firms have in the past appropriated for their own use funds that were due Japanese National farmers in one locality in order to extend credit to Japanese National farmers in other localities so that American citizen farmers competing with them could be driven out of business and in turn this second group having been established would be used as a source of funds to repeat the operation in another locality.

"Although there are California statutes providing ample redress for any farmer who believes he has not received proper returns from the commission house, it is reported that Japanese National farmers never make a complaint nor will they allow their names to be used to enable the California officials to properly enforce these statutes. It is extremely doubtful if this condition would exist in relations between Japanese American citizens if they are found ready to avail themselves of the protection and the machinery set up by American laws for preventing such abuses in business transactions.

"The fact that some of the Japanese Aliens are operating as commission merchants without proper license and bond in violation of these California statutes are some of the reasons for placing emphasis on the necessity for proceeding as [7280] promptly as possible toward elimination of the alien controlled distributor houses and in this field there are a great number of loyal American citizens of Japanese parentage capable of taking over with or without immediate control and governmental direction of the operation of these houses."

D. Fishing Industry.—Fishing and produce are the two major industries of the Japanese. Shopkeeping comes third, but is much smaller than the other two. There are many little industries such as sign painting. It is our belief, however, that if the two major industries are reorganized to function properly in safe hands that the other minor industries will either be satisfactorily adjusted to the change along the same line or can be taken up later.

There are distinct differences between produce and fishing. Fishing provides an opportunity for direct contact with the enemy and transmission of information, probably to submarines, although transmission of information to surface vessels is not an improbability. The general practice is that the Nisei do not own or captain fish boats. Japanese and those of Japanese descent own the nets and tools for fishing and organize into gangs while the fish boat operators hire the gangs with their nets. We consider it very dangerous to send all Japanese or all [7281] Nisei crews to sea. The real danger in this lies in the fact that all Japanese crews in the intense competition of following the fish might get into battles with Scandinavian, Czechoslovakian and Italian crews. The fishing people would like to use part Nisei crews—i. e., mixed crews. For this purpose a clearing house of loyal Nisei should be established (Japanese American Citizens League) to guarantee and give clearance to those who fish. Incidentally, the fuel might be limited to the amount necessary for the trip. Of course this is equally true of all Italians and other nationalities who are fishing. Unlike the produce industry less than 25 percent of the fishing is in Japanese hands. There has been issued from Washington an order which keeps all Japanese, including American citizens of Japanese ancestry from fishing. This is palpably hysteria as they are not any much more of a danger than the Italians who are still quite freely fishing.

E. & F. In case we have not made it apparent, the aim of this report is that all Japanese Nationals in the continental United States and property owned and operated by them within this country be immediately placed under absolute Federal control.

The aim of this will be to squeeze control from the hands of the Japanese Nationals into the hands of the loyal Nisei who are American citizens. As there may be a small [7282] percentage of these Nisei who are not loyal, it is also the intention that those Nisei who are put in positions of trust will be passed upon by the unquestionably loyal Nisei who focus in some organization such as the Japanese American Citizens League. It is the aim that the Nisei should police themselves, and as a result police their parents. Whatever organization (Japanese American Citizens League?) wields this influence, it in turn must be rigidly approved by and under the thumb of our government or some group which fully understands the Japanese on the Coast and is appointed by our government. This body should be on the Pacific coast, fully conversant and in touch with local problems and preferably of a military or naval intelligence texture.

Likewise there are many technical aliens (legally Japanese citizens who are loyal to U. S. but prevented by our laws from becoming naturalized). The control should be sufficiently flexible to encourage these on the basis of performance in each individual case.

To illustrate such a case there are two Japanese ministers in the city of Bakersfield, California; one Christian, one Buddhist. The Christian minister is an alien. He came to the United States in infancy, grew up here, and is thoroughly loyal to the United States. The Buddhist minister is legally a U. S. citizen. He

went to Japan in infancy, grew to manhood there, and returned to the United States within the last two years. He cannot speak good English. Which is really the American?

REPORT ON HAWAIIAN ISLANDS BY CURTIS B. MUNSON

Your reporter, after a four weeks' survey of the Japanese problem on the Pacific Coast, sailed for Honolulu, where he spent nine days. There he received the full cooperation of Army and Navy Intelligence Services and the F. B. I. He also contacted British Intelligence based on Singapore. In the civilian field he had many personal interviews with first and second generation Japanese, police chiefs, school teachers, businessmen, contractors, rural officials, etc. The F. B. I. seem to hold the leading place in Honolulu, due to the fact that they have been set up longer on the Japanese question and also due to the personality of Mr. Shivers, their Agents in Charge. He has gone far to develop the confidence of the Japanese and others in himself and his organization there. The Army got going next, and as they have to live with the Japanese on land while the Navy sails the seas, they have earnestly thrown themselves into the task under an able Reserve officer who brings experience in intelligence service in the last war and decided business acumen to bear upon his assignment. The Naval Intelligence, though a late starter, is silently and ably developing an organization whose real power will not reach its peak for [7284] four or five months yet. There is the same cooperation between the Services that is evidence on the mainland.

The consensus of opinion is that there will be no racial uprising of the Japanese in Honolulu. The first generation, as on the Coast, are ideologically and culturally closest to Japan. Though many of them speak no English, or at best only pigeon-English, it is considered that the big bulk of them will be loyal. This is especially so, for in Hawaii the first generation is largely on the land and devoted to it. It may be well to state here in a general way that everyone in Hawaii, especially in the dark-skinned laboring classes, places loyalty to Hawaii first, and the United States second. This is not meant to impugn their loyalty—but they love the Islands. The second generation is estimated as approximately ninety-eight percent loyal. However, with the large Japanese population in the Hawaiian Islands, giving this the best interpretation possible, it would mean that fifteen hundred were disloyal. However, the F. B. I. state that there are about four hundred suspects, and the F. B. I.'s private estimate is that only fifty or sixty of these are sinister. (In all figures given on suspects only aliens are considered. Should it be possible to pick up citizens, this figure would have to be materially increased.) There are also a few Germans and Italians in the Islands who should be picked up. We [7285] do not at the moment remember the exact number, whether it was seven or seventeen. The Army Intelligence showed this reporter a secret map with pins of different colors to denote first generation, second generation, and other nationalities who are suspect, and their distribution in the Islands. Each one of these men's address is known and they showed me that it would be a comparatively easy job to pick them up almost in a few hours, should the necessity arise. There is not the same danger as in Continental United States that if they escaped the first grab that they will completely escape, as of course they have nowhere to go but the Pacific Ocean. There will be, undoubtedly, planted Japanese and agents who are there for the purpose of sabotage. Though sabotage may be expected, it is a self-evident fact that the main things to sabotage in the Islands are the Army and Navy installations, and these are under the protection and complete control of the two services. However, materials are sometimes lacking to build, say protecting guard fences. Outside of the services' installations there are only two things open to sabotage; the commercial waterfront (this does not include Pearl Harbor), and the power stations and power lines. However, these power lines are especially important, for if one transformer is damaged in the Islands there are no replacements, and it would be a considerable time before a replacement could be secured [7286] from the mainland. Hawaii is particularly fortunate as regards water supply, possessing a large artesian flow along with numerous reservoirs. Fortunately, in the Islands there would be no "White" sabotage which could be purchased by the Japanese, as there is on the Coast, outside of the imported white defense workers. There are very few whites who would be anything except loyal.

The danger of espionage is considerable. This is especially the case as many Navy wives are over-garrulous with regard to their husbands' departures and

where they are going. We believe that the Naval Intelligence Service is looking to put a curb on this, and we are sure they can be trusted to police their own family. However, facts can be easily compiled from mail piling up, milk and grocery orders cancelled, along with knowledge of what officer is on what ship and other private information, which might indicate the length of the ship's visit and where headed. This is almost unavoidable in such a compact and small community, though the services bear this in mind. The bottleneck in the Japanese espionage would not be in the gathering of data but how to transmit it to Japan. This was easy when Japanese vessels were touching at the Hawaiian Islands. Now it is very far from easy. It has been suggested that fishing boats might drop oilskin packages at sea to be picked up by Japanese Naval vessels. This has [7287] more the elements of rumor, especially as no such parcels have ever been picked up at sea by the numerous American vessels. It is suggested that the transmittal may be going East instead of West, probably to Mexico or some such likely point. From there it would be an easier task to forward it to Japan. In this connection there is also some suggestion that rumors with sufficient basis in fact to cause the Naval Intelligence to look into it, emanate from Mexico City to the Islands. A sample of this was the story pointing to Mexico City as a source that the Japanese were running submarines off the shore of a certain Island, the crew submerging them and going ashore. With them they brought an end of an electric wire on shore. On M day they would press a button which would set the submarine mechanism to work so it would again come to the surface. The grain of truth which made the rumor interesting was the fact that the shores of the Hawaiian Islands are notoriously deep, rocky, and unsuited for this purpose. The one spot in all the Islands which the chart showed was suitable was the small spot indicated by the rumor. Investigation by the Navy proved there were no submarines sunk on this one sandy-bottom shoal. However, it wasted a good deal of their time, as did some other rumors of this nature. All these rumors had one basic local fact which was true and all seemed to start from Mexico City.

[7288] One important difference between the situation in Hawaii and the mainland is that if all the Japanese on the mainland were actively disloyal they could be corraled or destroyed within a very short time. In the Hawaiian Islands, though there are sufficient American troops and Navy present to overwhelm the Japanese population, it would simply mean that the Islands would lose their vital labor supply by so doing, and in addition to that we would have to feed them, as well as import many thousands of laborers to take their place. Since a large party of the vital and essential work of the Islands is ably carried on by the Japanese population, it is essential that they should be kept loyal—at least to the extent of staying at their tasks. If Imperial Japan were wise, she would devote all her energies in the Hawaiian Islands to trying to induce a spirit of mind which would cause a universal Japanese sit-down strike. She evidently has not thought of this as there is no sign of this type of propaganda. Propaganda, by Japan, is practically non-existent on the Islands.

No report on Honolulu should start anywhere but with the "Big Five." The "Howies" or white people at the head of Island affairs centralize in the Big Five. The native whites who own the Islands are in a general way descendants of white missionaries and traders. Due to these two facts, they had an interest in their labor—Japanese, Philippine, [7289] Hawaiian and Portuguese—and treated them well. Though they paid low wages and made money out of the Islands, there was hardly ever any absentee management. They sent their sons to Yale, Harvard and Princeton, and these sons returned to carry on the work of the Islands. There was never the abuse of labor in the Islands by rich, low white trash which made Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, or the bull pens of Idaho famous and contributed so to the rise of the "isms." You never see today a pair of patched pants in any of the Islands, and a short stroll through the streets of Honolulu—if one eliminates the defense workers imported from the mainland—convinces one that the faces are the fairly contented faces of people who have been, on the whole, not badly treated.

The Islands are really a huge monopoly, centralized under the ownership of five families and an independent or two. These five families are called the "Big Five." The "Howies" include the sons, the management and less fortunate whites of long residence—in a word, all those who go to make up the directing business force of the Islands. These whites, especially the "Big Five," are intelligent and see the handwriting on the wall. They know that this last oasis of paternalistic capitalism is doomed. Naturally they are determined to hold onto it 'til the

last ditch. Due to the fact that the Japanese [7290] Democrats or Republicans, the whites. If the Japanese ever voted on racial lines, it is they. However, it must be said to their credit and the credit that they have never done this. The politics are run by the "Big Five". The people of these Islands being controlled thus, and as a result it must not be a safety in the control of the Japanese "Problem" is seen in the ascending power of the Army and the Navy. It is sure to hasten the end of this "last oasis of paternalism" referred to. Thus we have in the Islands the thought. One is exemplified in the sea-going branch a slight lack of regard for the civilian life on the expressed by saying that it regards the Islands as to be a darn good base, regardless. Of course, this is racial, but it exists in unthinking elements of the exemplified is the thought of the extreme elements which desires to keep control in their own hand. The safety of the Navy or the Army forces is concern and, [7291] we believe, the Intelligence Service responsible service people, take the well-balanced one which we desire to make apparent in our really kindly paternalism of the Islands has a definite deserves credit as a considerable factor in the safety.

The general background and characteristics of the Islands as they are on the mainland. How the situation have tended to ameliorate these in some of the best over-all method of expressing this is. This reporter believes there is this fundamental "Problem" on the Coast and the Japanese "Problem". On the Coast, the Japanese are discriminated against. In Hawaii it is really only on a social and economic basis. In our materialistic civilization one income basis, provided he is willing to wash his hands with his knife. In Hawaii, the Japanese fit in thus among the bulk are dark-skinned of one kind or another are on a higher economic plane than they are on the mainland. [7292] reach a position economically with the whites are not numerous enough to make do resent not being asked to tea. The bulk of the mix socially anyway with stevedores or dock labor on the mainland there are plenty of "Okies" to call the Japanese economically and by education the Japanese may not be superior.

The result of this is that the Hawaiian Japanese inferiority complex or feel the same mistrust of the mainland. While it is seldom on the mainland, the educated Japanese-American citizen who talks to have gained his confidence, this is far from the Japanese there are fully as open and frank and as boys are. In a word, Hawaii is more of a melting pot of brown skins to melt—Japanese, Hawaiian, Chinese. Interesting to note that there has been absolutely no discrimination against the Chinese in the islands due to the Japanese they be any worse toward us?

The extreme Japanese "lover" in Hawaii is probably self-interest. This is because he knows that the Japanese largely on the [7293] fine industry of the Japanese. The Japanese keep control of this as long as possible and is very much for the Army or Navy that there is any danger from the Japanese. The thought in Hawaii is probably due either to an unthinking element which wants its base to be secure and of good consequences, or it is extremely anti-"Big Five" thought.

Imperial Japan has attempted to do the same thing that it attempted to do on the mainland. Anyone interested in the picture visualized on paper should refer to see the F. B. I. in Washington entitled "Japanese Ch...

will show the same network of Reserve officers, Shinto and Buddhist priests, language schools, prefectural clubs and associations, etc., as will be found in the Navy Department in Washington in secret charts entitled "Japanese Organizations and Activities in the Eleventh Naval District." This reporter did not visit any other Island than that of Oahu, in which is found the city of Honolulu. The Service theory is that this is the only really good harbor and so all the defenses have been concentrated on this Island. In order to attack this Island Japan would first have to seize one of the other Islands and then be strong enough to seize, from there, Oahu. If she were strong enough to do [7294] this she would be strong enough to seize one of the other Islands first anyhow. Therefore there has been no spreading of defenses thin over the whole group. There is only one other harbor at Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii, and this is a poor one. Of course, surveillance and small garrisons are maintained on the other Islands of this group. This reporter was advised that he would be more or less wasting time to visit these other islands. There is possibly only one that he was negligent in not visiting, though advised that it was unnecessary. That was the Island of Kaula. The Japanese Communists are more strongly organized on this Island than on any of the others. We believe Japanese Communism is purely economic and on this Island it is not considered a really serious factor. However, this is the Island that Japan would be most likely to seize in the case she felt herself strong enough to have a base for an assault on Oahu.

The best consensus of opinion seemed to agree that martial law should be proclaimed now in Hawaii. We believe that under appointment from the President, the Governor of Hawaii is empowered to declare martial law when he feels the need. Many people in Hawaii felt that the Governor was fairly spineless and would not do anything soon enough. However, the Army Intelligence Head told your reporter confidentially that the Governor would be pretty well guided [7295] by what General Short (Commanding General, Army Forces, Hawaii) told him to do. In other words, he said the Governor was under General Short's thumb. If this is the case, your reporter sees no need to worry on this score, and in line with this, read in the newspapers since leaving Hawaii that the Governor had made some official move which envisaged the posting of guards at all vulnerable points. Your reporter is not in a position to say definitely one way or the other whether the Governor is spineless, whether he is a man of determination or whether (which would be ideal) he is under the thumb of General Short.

There is some danger in Hawaii of race riots. This is largely due to four elements. The Filipinos are intensely anti-Japanese and if they were attacked on the Philippine Islands they have threatened they would kill every Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands. The Intelligence Services, however, have made particular note of this and in conjunction with the sugar plantations, by whom most of the Filipinos are employed and controlled, have lectured the Filipinos kindly but firmly on this point. They have pointed out that if there is to be interference with any of the inhabitants of the Islands it must be by the properly authorized officials of the American Government. The Filipinos seem to have appreciated this and considerably toned down their patriotism. There is a type of Japanese who may be termed the "bright [7296] young thing," a bit loud, and liable to be openly resentful of insult. He is the prototype of his brother on the mainland. He has broken away from the fine character and parental control of his Japanese background while becoming too Americanized without fully comprehending what Americanization means. Fortunately, he represents a small group in the second-generation Japanese and contributes most of the juvenile delinquency which is found in this race. He gets drunk and frequents pool halls. There is danger that drunk sailors may push him off the street and call him a "Yellow-belly," especially if they have just returned from some Naval battle with the Japanese. Where other Japanese would take this in silent anger, this bright young thing might hit back and start some racial trouble. However, it must be said that the Army and Navy have this fully in mind and are very efficiently policing their own families. The sailors are extremely well behaved and it is a matter of common comment and approval. The real danger of racial trouble comes from the defense workers who have been imported from the mainland. Most of these come from the Pacific Coast and contain the dregs of the waterfront element. If they had been able to secure a job on the mainland, they would not have gone to Hawaii. They include many of the "Okie" class and to them any brown-skin is "Nigger." They

do not like the Islands and are only there because [7297] on the mainland. They already have calling them "Negroes" and treating them as such. "Yellow Peril" and to be treated accordingly. The element in the Islands that these people will create a crisis or war is over. The controlling plantations prefer to bring in Filipino labor to take care of plantations caused by the former plantation work. In fact, they feel that all labor for the Islands are Filipinos. Of course, the reasons are pretty self-evident, and easily handled and create no problem. Construction labor recruited from the Coast is a wall pointing to the final destruction of paternalism. The porter is not in a position to state, nor is he able as to what is the best course to pursue. Those who say there is absolutely no danger from the Japanese argue that the importation of Filipino labor would be as the Filipinos are so anti-Japanese. In our mind, however, as soldiers stationed in the Island of Oahu to take care of the Japanese population if it all without the aid of any Filipinos. Still, we must be on guard against the imported coastal riff-raff and do not find ourselves deceived. Besides, a Social Security number entitles a man to change his name twenty times and no information is required. Many men with very bad records are being given Social Security numbers. Diligence have uncovered many men with very bad records. On second thought your reporter casts his vote for

Due to the preponderance of Japanese in the population, a greater proportion of Japanese have been called to the Islands. As on the mainland they are inclined to enlist, the Army is extremely high in its praise of them as recruits. It is to be chiefly afraid that their boys will not be given the same consideration as the whites. Frankly, at first this discrimination still had to be better than a white to gain promotion and eliminating even this discrimination. They have been able to become officers. Recently they picked out a few and put them in charge of white troops. The Army has held their breath. Much to their surprise and reaction from the white [7299] troops and well. Of course, these were especially good officers. They try more. This has been a great thing in strengthening the Japanese in the Islands. They are beginning to feel that they can deal and some of them are really almost pathological.

In summarizing, we cannot say how loyal the Japanese would be if there were an American Naval disaster off the Hawaiian Islands. Doubtless great circumstances if this reporter were there he is not also to save his own skin, if not his face. Due to the large number of soldiers in the Islands to take care of the Japanese, the Japanese will doubtless remain quietly and fairly to them it is only right to say that we believe they would be neutral or even actively loyal.

[7300] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman,

We have had some difficulty in getting into the relation to the Atlantic Conference and the suggestion to the committee that there is one man with respect to that subject, Mr. Churchill, and he is in the country. He can be requested to appear. He has appeared before Congress and given his views and I am sure he will answer questions in relation to those conflicts in the Far East.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to say for the record that Mr. Churchill has been a great figure in this war.

years and that he has come to this country as a place of rest, he so stated in the papers when he arrived in the country, and I think it ill behooves this committee when a great citizen of the world comes to this country for rest that we cannot let him have the rest and instead of that we are going to ask him about the Atlantic Conference when we have an abundance of material on the subject now, with all American officials present.

I don't think it is showing much courtesy to a great citizen of the world.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the other day when I read into the record the statement of Mr. Hornbeck in relation to [7301] the parallel action, it was suggested even by the chairman of this committee that we should get the records from Britain on what that parallel action was and we haven't learned yet from our State Department whether or not any parallel action was taken. In a democracy such as we have here it is up to the people to have all of the facts.

[7302] Senator LUCAS. Does the Senator think it is fair to suggest that Churchill be subpoenaed here, a citizen of another country who happens to be here?

Mr. MURPHY. It makes good headlines.

Senator FERGUSON. I certainly do or I would not suggest it to the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to be more concerned with what happened at Pearl Harbor instead of just putting out headlines. I think this Churchill business is not fair to a great citizen of this world.

Senator FERGUSON. No one is above coming in and telling the facts on as great a catastrophe as we have had at Pearl Harbor. This committee is laboring to get the facts, and when I say "laboring" I mean just that, and if we can get the facts it is up to the committee to get all of the facts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. With two members of the committee having temporarily retired, would it be agreeable, Senator, to carry this question to the full committee?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not care to press it at this moment.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It would be agreeable then to carry it over until the other members are present?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Just another "fishing expedition," that [7303] is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to say a word on this "fishing expedition." I know I have endeavored to obtain some records on occasions and it has been a month or 6 weeks from the time certain records were requested until they were obtained.

Now if that is a "fishing expedition," then, of course, that is what it is.

Senator LUCAS. I am talking about the Churchill request, that it is employed for the benefit of the press and is a "fishing expedition," and I repeat it.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I as one member of this committee, regret the entirely unparliamentary comment of the Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. I don't care what you think.

Senator BREWSTER. I think if we were of parliamentary rules he, of course, would be silenced. Now, the request of the Senator to receive the consideration of this question upon his motives or his purposes, which have been demonstrated by a long record of public and place, have been demonstrated, I think, by the evidence produced which even from Illinois has been pleased to cite with very serious objection.

So, with that in mind, I have a request to subject to a similar charge, which I have had. I have not so far had a reply.

I filed a written request with this committee asking the State Department for the record have not had a word on it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will not the gentleman admit the committee says the Tyler Kent testimony has with this inquiry after talking with Tyler.

Senator BREWSTER. I shall be very happy to with which I am concerned have nothing to do with what the gentleman discussed. I have myself to discuss it with Mr. Kent, and I do not. I think that members of this committee, or are entitled to a reply to a respectful request of this committee as to whether or why the records be produced. The records can then speak for themselves.

I do not care to take the opinion of anybody that. I would like to have the opportunity to do so.

I think even the gentleman on my left has and might very likely like to look at the records.

Mr. MURPHY. I might say, Mr. Chairman, committee, the eminent counsel who has retired stolen documents by Tyler Kent and, in his judgment of the State Department, they have absolutely no Harbor. With over a million and a half words as well as thousands upon thousands of other why we should go into that matter, which view particularly also of a public declaration knows absolutely nothing about Pearl Harbor nothing.

[7306] Senator BREWSTER. I appreciate the tributes. I have not even had the privilege apparently the gentleman has. But, unfortunately, the eminent counsel who has retired under the mandate of the Congress of the United States we are operating, to form our own independent or not matters of this kind are or are not relevant.

I have not indicated at any time a desire to record. I have simply asked for permission in order that I might carry out my legislative duty for myself whether they have any relevance, the gentleman opposes that examination, that perhaps that these may be matters of concern.

Mr. MURPHY. I will say the gentleman is back in the committee and we are having trouble all over again.

Senator BREWSTER. I would like an answer. I would like someone to tell me what the answer is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Obviously several of these matters mentioned will have to be considered in executive session.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I do not intend to inject myself into the [7307] discussion that has been had, but in view of the fact that counsel has offered a number of exhibits that have heretofore been asked for, I would like to inquire whether or not the written request which I made, which was approved by the committee as a fair request, and approved by the counsel of the committee, which purported to request correspondence between the late President and Mr. Churchill, between certain specific dates, whether or not, after the lapse now of a couple of months, that material has been made available, and is there any answer that can be given to the request which I made?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair inquire, does that relate to the letter received from Mr. Acheson, of the State Department?

Mr. KEEFE. No; it is a different matter. The Senator from Illinois will recall the request which I made, and the chairman was kind enough to state it was a fair request at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is counsel prepared to give any reply now to Mr. Keefe's question?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have received a letter from the War Department which you have asked for. The Navy advised me this noon they will have a similar letter over here tomorrow morning. I was on the telephone with the State Department asking them to expedite their delivery of [7308] the information that was requested; to have it here tomorrow or the next day. We have been following that up practically every other day.¹

Mr. KEEFE. I realize counsel has been diligent in the matter, and I have endeavored not to inject myself into it too frequently, but time marches on. It is like a lot of other things we have requested here. We just simply do not get them.

I was going to say, Mr. Chairman, I am going to be insistent on having a statement from Mr. Acheson, or whoever is responsible, sometime pretty soon to my request for the Salisbury report, so we may determine that issue. We have witnesses coming on, and I do not have the report, and I cannot decently and intelligently ask questions in the absence of having the evidence before us.

When can we have an executive meeting when Mr. Acheson can come down and present this Salisbury report so we may determine whether it has anything in it that is relevant and that the committee ought to have?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sure the gentleman remembers the report made to him in committee meeting hereby the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. At some future time, or at some time agreeable to the committee, Mr. Acheson himself can come [7309] down and bring those reports and allow us to look at them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is apparent that the committee will have to have an executive session sometime very soon. We can convey

¹ See Hearings, Part 3, pp. 3839-3842.

these matters that have been brought up here to the chairman of the committee and request an executive session.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one request of the counsel which I think is probably material to a proper finding of the committee in the final analysis.

There has been much information coming from witnesses with respect to the amount of traffic that was received by the Intelligence Department in Hawaii, as well as the Intelligence Department here in the Army and Navy.

I believe if we could have just the number of communications of all types and kinds, including Magic, diplomatic exchanges, messages from the attaches, in various parts of the world that came into the Naval Intelligence Department from, say, November 1 to December 7, as well as the messages in the Military Intelligence Department, and then have the same thing with respect to the Navy and Army Intelligence Departments in Hawaii, it would expedite matters.

In other words, we heard witnesses say, and we know [7310] the same immense responsibility that devolved upon men here in Washington.

It struck me it might be of some value just to know how many messages from November 1 up to the 7th of December they received here in Washington, and how many in Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:13 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, January 18, 1946.

[7311]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7312] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

When the hearing was suspended yesterday, Congressman Cooper was examining Admiral Kimmel.

Do you have further questions, Congressman?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to state to Admiral Kimmel, if you got the impression that I was questioning you rather closely about these matters yesterday, I just want to say I also questioned Admiral Stark and especially Admiral Turner very closely about these things, trying to get all the information I could about this matter.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)—Resumed

Admiral KIMMEL. I welcome the examination.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thank you for the information you gave in response to my questions.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have one thing I would like to present to the committee this morning, if this is the time to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, proceed.

Admiral KIMMEL. In connection with the orders for Admiral Halsey, that were issued to him in November of 1941, I would like to read the order which I gave him. I think it should be in here to complete the record.

I have no comments to make on it except just to read [7313]
the order.

2702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTA

SECRET

280447 Nov. 41

CINCPAC TO: COMTASKFOR 2

COM 14

INFO TO: COMPATWING 2

COMBATFOR

COMBASEFOR

Twelve planes Marine Fightron Two Eleven are to base Wake : Myser 101825 of 10 November X Enterprise provide transportation departure Pearl on 28 Nov from Task Force Eight consisting of Chester Northampton Salt Lake City and Desron Six and Pass Com Force Two to Rear Admiral Draemel with orders Task Force Two normal operations in Hawaiian area X Proceed to arrive 200 miles 0 from Wake at 0700 on 3 Dec X Fly off Marine planes that vicinity receiving info that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl X Enro from Wake pass through Point Afirm four hundred miles south of Patrol planes from Midway and Wake will cover your route and priority while at Wake X Communications radio condition nineteen g Primary Fox continuously X Comfourteen inform Wake that plane arrive there 0830 on 3 Dec and direct Wake report Comfourteen by patch when planes arrive there X Comfourteen furnish this final armation to Comtaskfor Eight X Wake submarine patrol Tambor Trit advised X Narwhal and Dolphin [7314] are enroute Pearl at on 27 Nov they were about 300 miles east of Wake.

That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel want to ask any further que Mr. RICHARDSON. If you would pause before further exa to permit us to put into the record at this time a couple exhibits?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We would like to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have three short dispatch we would like to read into the record in connection with the graph on page 96 of Admiral Kimmel's statement, which is paragraph on page 6797 of our transcript.

The dispatches are as follows:

TOP SECRET

28 NOVEM

From: CINCAF

Action: OPNAV

Info: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN

281430

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singa diplomatic relations are on verge [7315] of being severed words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo ne casts will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japan ican X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupatio or invasion of Malaya and N-e-i XX on Japanese language foreign ne casts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and tw end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi No Kaze Kumori land X Nishi No Kaze Hare X Unquote X British and Comsixteen i above broadcasts.

TOP SECRET

1 DECEM

From: COMSIXTEEN

Action: CINCAF

Info: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN

011422

J-V-J press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero se

tomorrow morning, since there may be important news" unquote XX suggest frequencies seven three two seven X nine four three zero X and one two two seven five X times Tokyo LCT.

[7316] The third dispatch is from OPNAV for action of the Commandant of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, and for the information of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

It reads as follows:

New Tokyo broadcast schedules as follows X J-V-J one two two seven five kc six pm and seven pm to Pacific coast six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X J-H-L five one six zero kc eight pm nine pm and ten pm to China coast X J unit option nine four three zero kc six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X J-H-P one one nine eight zero kc ten thirty pm to Europe X probably Tokyo time.

That is all we have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, these copies furnished us, I only see the first one here.

Mr. MASTEN. The first two have been furnished you this morning. We haven't had time to have the third duplicated.

Senator LUCAS. Can counsel tell us the significance of that last message?

Mr. MASTEN. As I understand it, these are instructions to the monitoring stations, the last message.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel, as to the second message, that of December 1, do [7317] we have a memorandum of what was broadcast on the 7th?

Mr. MASTEN. We do not; not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you tried to find out?

Mr. MASTEN. These only came to my attention last night.

Senator FERGUSON. You just received them last night?

Mr. MASTEN. They came to my attention last night.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why they didn't come to your attention before? They seem to be in relation to the winds message.

Mr. MASTEN. I think they have been down in the office in connection with getting together the documentary papers on the winds exhibit that Mr. Mitchell spoke of some time ago. In view of the statements made in Admiral Kimmel's statement in this connection, it was thought desirable to have them before the committee this morning.

Senator BREWSTER. Is this the so-called winds message or is it another one?

Mr. MASTEN. I understand this is the same as the intercept that appears on page 154 of exhibit 1.

Senator BREWSTER. That was the initial winds message.

Mr. MASTEN. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say for the record that this second page about which question has been asked is in the naval narrative. My recollection is that [7318] there was never anything happened on the morning of December 1 when there was supposed to be a special broadcast. At least we never got word of any.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper, are you through?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George would be next, but he is temporarily absent.

The Chair recognizes Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask only one or two questions to clarify some matters in my own mind.

In legal or legislative procedure—

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't hear you.

Mr. CLARK. I am sorry.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am deaf.

Mr. CLARK. I say, in legal or legislative procedure I would probably understand what would be meant by "surprise attack." I am not so sure that I do understand its full significance in military parlance. Would you help me out a little on that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I know of no particular significance in military parlance that isn't contained in the words themselves. It is a surprise attack. They tried to get in to a point of attack without being discovered, to, if possible, catch people off balance. A surprise attack is just—I [7319] take it the words express what it is. I know of no other meaning.

Mr. CLARK. Does it involve almost necessarily the element of the unexpected?

Admiral KIMMEL. Insofar as they are able to make it, yes; yes, I would say so.

Mr. CLARK. Now, a surprise attack had long been listed as the chief danger to the base at Pearl Harbor, had it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't hear you, sir. I am sorry.

Mr. CLARK. That is all right. I say a surprise attack had long been listed or estimated to be the chief danger to the military establishment at the Hawaiian Islands, had it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not only to the Hawaiian Islands but any place in regard to the Japanese. The Japanese were known to make surprise attacks whenever they could. The only difference betwixt the Japanese and any other nation in that respect was that they were liable to do it without a declaration of war.

Mr. CLARK. Well, could the establishment at Pearl Harbor or the Hawaiian Islands have been attacked successfully in your opinion otherwise than by a surprise attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course, a surprise attack always gives the attacking force a great advantage. We have seen [7320] that dozens of times.

Mr. CLARK. Well, what I have in mind, sir, is to compare the likely success of a surprise attack by air with any other kind of attack that was possible at the Hawaiian Islands.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think that other kinds of attack would have been possible in the Hawaiian Islands. It depends entirely on the forces they have available, and had these carriers been discovered by patrol planes, had we found them, it is highly probable—well, I won't say highly probable, but it is quite possible that they could have launched their planes and started the attack before we could have done anything about it.

Even if it hadn't been a complete surprise the attack could have been launched.

Mr. CLARK. Well, as between a surprise attack by air and a landing attack, what would you say as to the likelihood?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, well, I would say that a surprise attack by land was much less possible than a surprise attack by air. The very nature of air makes for the ease of a surprise attack, the rapidity with which it can be delivered. There is no question about that, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I understand that in former times war games were conducted there with a surprise attack by air featured in the war games. Are you familiar with that?

[7321] **Admiral KIMMEL.** Oh, yes; we had many exercises in which we sent planes in to attack the installations on Oahu.

Mr. CLARK. What time were those planes sent in usually, what time of day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, at various times, but the early morning, the forenoon sometime, was probably the best time, primarily because that gave the carriers a chance to recover their planes during daylight and to have the following night to get away from the range of the land based aircraft and from any attacking forces, and have the night to dodge and get out.

[7322] **Mr. CLARK.** I was just a little interested, Admiral, in the background upon which a surprise attack by air had been fixed as the No. 1 danger to our set-up at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. A surprise attack by air was one of the forms of attack that could have been made, that is all. We felt, I think, that the Japanese didn't have the forces or the logistic support to send a very great number of troops and train, and all that kind of thing across the ocean at that particular time, and do other things that they would have to do, and the air attack was one of the things that they could do.

It was within the realm of possibility, that is what I mean.

Mr. CLARK. In your judgment, is that why a surprise attack by air was fixed as the No. 1 danger?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no, not in order of probability. I thought that what they were going to do in case of war in the Pacific at all, were against the United States, was to have a mass submarine attack in the operating areas around Pearl Harbor.

Mr. CLARK. Why, in your judgment, did the military authorities fix a surprise attack by air as the No. 1 danger to Pearl Harbor?

[7323] **Admiral KIMMEL.** Well, I couldn't give you exactly why they fixed that as the No. 1 danger. As a matter of fact, I never considered it the No. 1 danger in the order of probability by any means, and I feel that the other people scarcely felt that either.

They felt that they should be in the best case to defend against air attack because a hit-and-run attack was always within the realm of possibility.

Mr. CLARK. I think in the course of your testimony you may have said that an attack on the Philippines, or Thai, or Kra Peninsula might be in the nature of a surprise attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; I think so. It could be.

Mr. CLARK. You wouldn't say that after the message of November 27 had designated those points as likely points of attack, would you?

Admiral KIMMEL. There were many points in Thai, in the Philippines, and the Kra Peninsula that they could have hit, any one of which might have been a local surprise.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, a local surprise—

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all that a surprise attack can be, is a local surprise.

Mr. CLARK. But you wouldn't say that after an attack in those directions had been forecast in this message that [7324] then an attack in those directions would be a surprise, would you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they would endeavor to make it a surprise attack; yes, sir. The fact that we had forecast it—well, put it this way: If we had been convinced in Pearl Harbor of the probability of an air attack in Pearl Harbor it would have still been a surprise attack, so far as the Japanese, their best efforts could make it. They didn't know what we thought nearly as well as we knew what they thought, or at least was known in Washington.

Mr. CLARK. You mean the Japs would have been surprised to know that you were prepared for it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; but they would have endeavored to make it a surprise attack, no matter how much we were expecting it, and when you are expecting an attack over months and months and weeks and weeks, no matter how alert you are, it is possible for the enemy to make a surprise attack, and we have seen that time without number in this war, where they did make surprise attacks, after war had been declared and on places where they could have expected an attack. They were nevertheless surprises in the sense they hadn't done all the things they could have done if they had known the attack was coming at a particular time.

I think that Halsey's attack on the installations in [7325] Manila and the ships, the vast number of ships that he sank out there, was in the nature of a surprise attack. That was after war had been going on for a couple of years.

Mr. CLARK. I think you have stated in your testimony that the attack at Pearl Harbor on the 7th, was a surprise to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I thought they weren't coming at that time.

Mr. CLARK. Now, will you please state just what disposition you would have made of your forces, including your ships and planes and the use of radar, if at any time between the 27th of November, and the 6th of December you had been convinced that there was going to be an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I have set that forth in considerable detail in the statement which I have submitted.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I listened rather carefully and it didn't seem to me that it was entirely covered. That is why I ask you the question now.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well—

Mr. CLARK. May I interrupt you just a moment?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. A high naval officer has testified before [7326] this committee as to what dispositions he would have made had he been in command at Pearl Harbor as you were, and had received the message of November 27.

Admiral KIMMEL. Plus the information he had.

Mr. CLARK. No, no, the question was submitted to him as to what action he would have taken if he had been in command under conditions then existing and had received the message of November 27. He has stated what dispositions he would have made.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. By way of comparison, I would like to have you state just what dispositions you would have made of everything at your command if you had been reasonably sure at any time between the 27th of November and the 7th of December, that a surprise air attack was going to be made there.

Admiral KIMMEL. In that event, I would have considered that my mission was considerably changed. I would have thought that the most important thing that I could do under those circumstances was to intercept and destroy this Japanese detachment that was expected to come to Hawaii. I would have put to sea with the fleet and I would have maintained them in a position where they could be in the best intercepting position. I would have used all of the [7327] facilities of the patrol planes, by planes afloat. I would have kept my carriers in the Hawaiian area. I would have abandoned the overhaul of the *Saratoga*, which was in the nature of—she was not entirely out of commission. She was able to get about all right.

I would have had her brought back to the area and joined up. And I would have had the three carriers, the patrol planes covering the approaches to the fleet and the approaches to Hawaii, and I would have gone ahead and exhausted the patrol planes and thereby curtailed my chance to carry out the raid on the Marshalls, because I would have considered the attack force as a primary objective at that time.

[7328] **Mr. CLARK.** What use, if any, would you have made of your radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar on the ships at sea would have been in constant use. I have no doubt that the Army would have—if they had felt the same way that I did at the time, and they probably would if I felt that way, they would have used their radar to the limits of its capacity.

Mr. CLARK. Well, as commander in chief of the fleet you would have insisted on that, would you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have advised them. I had no power to insist beyond the matter of advice.

Mr. CLARK. Did you consider the situation as between the United States and Japan any more serious and any more likely to break from and after the 27th of November than it had been prior to that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think I did. The situation was becoming increasingly serious. I was not convinced from the information I had that Japan was going to attack the United States at that time. There was that possibility and we guarded against it, to what I considered the best way with the information I had and my conviction at the time.

Mr. CLARK. You tell the committee now that as this situation became more tense and serious you now have the feeling that you did everything that you reasonably could have [7329] done to have anticipated and at least minimized the effect of this attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had known the attack was coming, if I had been convinced——

Mr. CLARK. Admiral, I beg your pardon, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not understand, sir. I want to answer you.

Mr. CLARK. I want to ask you this: You have said that you considered the situation to be becoming more tense from and after the 27th of November.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now I am asking you whether you are now telling the committee that under those conditions——

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, wait a minute. I had better qualify what I said slightly.

Mr. CLARK. All right, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. The message of November 27—after I received that I considered all the previous messages and that the situation in the Pacific was becoming more tense. As the days passed after November 27 and nothing happened within the next few days I was not so certain that something was going to happen. I was watching every single thing I could to get any indications, and the indications then followed out the line in the message which had come from the Navy Department [7330] ment that they were probably going down into Thailand to make another advance down there and see what could be done, but I was not convinced—as the days passed I was even less convinced—that they were going to attack the United States.

Mr. CLARK. Well, then, their going into Thailand had been prophesied or communicated—the likelihood of that had been communicated to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Mr. CLARK. I say, the likelihood of their going into Thailand had been communicated to you by the Chief of Staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. There was nothing in the nature of a surprise about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I thought it could be a surprise even if they went there, and then there were several other places that were mentioned, any one of which could have been a surprise attack by the Japanese.

Mr. CLARK. Well, we have been over that somewhat, so I will get back to the other proposition.

Admiral KIMMEL. Put it this way, sir: If they had known that an attack definitely was going to come against the Philippines at a certain time, the defending forces would have had a great advantage, because they would have known it at that particular time, and they could have gone out on an all-out [7331] alert to culminate at a particular instant, you might say, and so it could be at any other place.

Mr. CLARK. I understand that. I appreciate that fully, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. But you had the record before you that the armed services had classified a surprise attack as a number one thing. Now, what I want to ask you is, getting back to my question, in the light of all the circumstances before you from the 27th on you now tell this committee that you think of nothing else that you could or should have done as commander of the Pacific Fleet that would have either averted or minimized this attack on Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I think that is true. I feel that way; yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Isn't the essence of this whole controversy that everybody from the higher officials here in Washington on down through the lieutenant who disregarded the radar message, just muffed the situation, let the Japs outsmart them?

Admiral Kimmel. I think you should draw those conclusions, sir, rather than me.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the further examination of Admiral Kimmel the Chair wishes to make a statement.

[7332] Late yesterday afternoon, in the absence of the chairman, who had to leave before the hearing was concluded, the suggestion was made that Mr. Winston Churchill, former Prime Minister of Great Britain, be asked to appear here as a witness. The Chair does not wish at this moment to discuss the propriety of that suggestion, but wishes to state that as chairman of this committee he will neither issue a subpoena for Mr. Churchill nor send him an invitation to appear here as a witness unless ordered to do so by the committee.

Inasmuch as the matter was brought up in a public session, the Chair thinks it ought to be settled in a public session; and if any member of the committee desires now to make a motion instructing the Chair either to subpoena Mr. Churchill or to invite him, the Chair will entertain that motion at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I now move that the chairman of the committee, in behalf of the committee, invite Mr. Winston Churchill to appear before this committee at a time that is agreeable to him and also to the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. I am not prepared to pass upon this [7333] myself in quite as expeditious a fashion without consideration and discussion. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the reasons, if I may make this observation, why the Chair brought this matter up at this time is in view of the fact that he thinks that the question of whether Mr. Churchill is to be either subpoenaed or invited here ought not to be bandied around and held in suspense. He thinks it ought to be settled by the committee, and it ought to be settled promptly, and that is why the Chair brought it up.

The Senator has moved to lay that motion on the table. As many as favor that motion say "Aye." (Chorus of ayes.)

Those opposed, "No." (Chorus of noes.)

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to have a roll on that.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a roll call on that. The Chair will call the roll.

Senator BREWSTER. Particularly in view of the fact that one of the highly reliable papers in this country misquoted me this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not interested in that. That happens to me every day.

Senator BREWSTER. That is why I wanted it on record.

[7334] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will call the roll on the motion to lay the Senator's motion on the table. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Aye.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The motion is defeated.

The Chair will now call the roll on the motion of the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson, to instruct the Chair to invite Mr. Churchill to appear as a witness. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No.

[7335] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to vote "No" on that previous motion. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Present.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Aye.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Aye.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair votes "No". The motion is lost and that settles that. Proceed with the examination. Senator George is recognized. The committee will be in order. Senator George.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make this [7336] statement in view of the fact that I voted "Present" on this resolution, that the people of the country have had an opportunity to see an expeditious handling and disposition of public business and I hope that perhaps we have that reflected on the floor of the Senate as well as before this committee in the handling of public business also.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair appreciates that observation and always appreciates the observations of the able member from Wisconsin.

Senator LUCAS. That might apply to the House, too.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might suggest in view of that that the Congressman from Wisconsin is no doubt interested in the expedition of business before both Houses of Congress and he might exercise his influence on the Committee on Rules, a body of which he is a member, to expedite business in that body.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not a member of the Committee on Rules.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Exercise your great influence.

Mr. KEEFE. I have tried to exercise my influence on that great committee. I see the member of the Rules Committee on our side is here and he has taken a back seat in this discussion here. I have no influence on the Committee on Rules.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George is recognized.

[7337]. Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, since I was not here at the opening this morning I desire to ask Admiral only a very few questions.

Admiral Kimmel, referring to the message of November 27, to the part of it that gave direction in the language beginning "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment," may I ask you if "deployment" or "defensive deployment" are technical terms within the knowledge of naval officers?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Do they have any special significance?

Admiral KIMMEL. None that I know of.

Senator GEORGE. What, Admiral, did you understand by "defensive deployment," forgetting for the time being the words that follow it, which I wish to question you about, because the word "preparatory" to doing something else is used there, but what did you understand by "defensive deployment"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never read the "defensive deployment" except in connection with the remainder of the sentence, the defensive deployment in order to accomplish something and that something was the attack on the Marshalls.

Senator GEORGE. Now, may I ask—the language is "to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to something else."

[7338] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is exactly what I did to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator GEORGE. And you understand that "appropriate" meant something that in your judgment you thought would best accomplish the order given you in this directive here?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did, indeed. The "appropriate" was left entirely to my discretion.

Senator GEORGE. Well, now, let me ask you with reference to WPL-46.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Where was that prepared, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. WPL-46 was prepared in the Navy Department. It was a basic war plan, Navy basic war plan.

Senator GEORGE. Here in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Here in Washington and based upon what was prepared, as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, what was "WPAC-46." WPAC-46 was the implementation of the plan that was prepared in the Navy Department and that WPAC-46, prepared by my staff and approved by me, had been submitted to the Department and had been approved by them.

Senator GEORGE. So that the requirements of your implementation plan were known here in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Known to the Navy Department?

[7339] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Will you say—I believe it is in the record form of an exhibit but I am not sure—what the main requirements of WPL-46 were? I am not asking for detail. I am asking for information.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you will find that set forth in my statement on page 11 of my statement. That is a copy of the basic plan in WPL-46.

Senator GEORGE. The statement that you made in the beginning of your testimony?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. WPL-46. Would you mind saying in your implementing order or plans in the main required?

Admiral KIMMEL. My implementing plans in the main were for the fleet to depart immediately after hostilities commenced to conduct reconnaissance and air raids on the Marshalls. They had other supporting things to do, but that was the primary mission that they had in the Pacific Fleet at that particular time.

Senator GEORGE. You say after hostilities commenced?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Well, now, this directive was, "Execute appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out assigned in WPL-46."

[7340] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right. That is what I did.

Senator GEORGE. And that has been detailed in your statement before the committee?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, in great detail, what I did and what I did it.

Senator GEORGE. And that was your interpretation of your order supplementing or implementing WPL-46 which had been approved here in the Naval Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And was understood here by Admiral Stark when he formulated or sent to you this message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I say "Admiral Stark." Whoever sent the message to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, in the message of November 24 there was specific direction to take any particular action, was there, or was there not to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there was one there. There was one direction:

Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.

That, I think, could be termed a "directive."

[7341] Senator GEORGE. Had that appeared in any previous message received by you from the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean the injunction as to secrecy?

Senator GEORGE. The injunction as to secrecy.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I think so.

Senator GEORGE. You think there had been previous messages?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That carried the same injunction?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the one on October 16 this sentence occurs:

In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployment as will not disclose strategic intention, nor constitute provocative action against Japan.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, you probably covered it in your general statement but you are more familiar with that statement than any member of the committee would be from having heard it or having read it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have any knowledge prior to December 7 of the answer made by the State Department on November 26?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. The only information I had on [7342] that subject I got from the newspapers.

Senator GEORGE. You had nothing by way of letter or dispatch?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not a word.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have any information concerning the message from Tokyo to the Japanese to which the November 26 State Department document was a reply?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know it existed. I did not know until I read the testimony of Mr. Hull before this committee that Mr. Hull considered that a Japanese ultimatum. I had no knowledge whatsoever of that message, of that note.

Senator GEORGE. And you had never seen any text of that message or of our State Department reply of November 26—

Admiral KIMMEL. I had seen neither one, sir.

Senator GEORGE (continuing). Prior to December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Prior to December 7.

Senator GEORGE. Nor no summary of the contents?

Admiral KIMMEL. No summary whatsoever.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have any letter from Admiral Stark that gave you the contents of the November 26 reply of our State Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator GEORGE. How long, Admiral, had your implementing plan, that is, carrying out WPL-46, how long had it been in the [7343] Navy Department and when was it approved?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was approved on September—I will get the exact date. My plan WPAC-46 was approved by the Navy Department on September 9, 1941.

Senator GEORGE. I believe I have no other questions, Admiral.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, Admiral.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, you have told the committee that your appointment as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in January 1941 came as a complete surprise to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, and it did.

Senator LUCAS. You so expressed yourself very forcibly along that line in a letter to Admiral Stark?

Admiral KIMMEL. Immediately after I learned of my prospective appointment.

Senator LUCAS. You have told the committee in your statement that you first met the President of the United States in 1918.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. If I told you any such thing as that it was in error. I did not intend to tell you any such thing as that. Would you like me to tell you when I first met him?

[7344] Senator LUCAS. Yes, indeed, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. In 1915 I was serving as fleet gunnery officer in the Pacific Fleet on the staff of Admiral Thomas B. Howard, who was then commander in chief. Mr. Marshall, who at that time was Vice President, and Mr. Roosevelt, who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, came to San Francisco to open the San Francisco and San Diego expositions which were in celebration of the opening of the Panama Canal.

Wallace Beathoff, a lieutenant from Admiral Howard's staff, was detailed as an aide for Mr. Marshall. I was detailed as an aide for Mr. Roosevelt.

Senator LUCAS. What was your rank at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was a lieutenant at that time.

I traveled with Mr. Roosevelt to the San Francisco Exposition and from there I went with him to San Diego. I had a very pleasant time.

Senator LUCAS. How long were you with Mr. Roosevelt?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was with him about 10 days. At the end of that time I went back to my duty as fleet gunnery officer of the Pacific Fleet.

Subsequently, in 1916 I came to Washington on duty in the gunnery office of the Navy Department, what is now the Office of Fleet Training. I saw Mr. Roosevelt, oh, three or four times during the time I was here, and in 1917 I went [7345] over to the British Grand Fleet to take some gear that we had developed and subsequently I went on Admiral Rodman's staff as his gunnery officer in what became known as the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet.

In September, I think it was, of 1918 Mr. Roosevelt came over to visit this detachment and he was entertained at luncheon by Admiral Rodman, and I was present. I saw him then and I had no further conversations with him until June of 1941, 6 months after I had been appointed commander in chief.

To make the record complete, I did pass Mr. Roosevelt at the White House in a receiving line once or twice, but that is all.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the last time you saw him before you saw him in June 1941—

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not understand you, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The last time you saw Mr. Roosevelt before you saw him in June 1941 was in 1918 in England?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the harbor of Rosyth, which is near Edinburgh in Scotland.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever see him after that meeting in 1918 until you saw him again in 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Except when I saw him at a White House reception; no.

Senator LUCAS. You had no conversations with him during [7346] all of those years or any communication, as I understand it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. What State are you from, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Kentucky.

Senator LUCAS. And when were you appointed to West Point?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was appointed to the Naval Academy in 1900.

Senator LUCAS. The reason I made that mistake, I read somewhere that you originally wanted to go to West Point.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. And finally landed in the Navy.

Admiral KIMMEL. My father was a West Pointer. He wanted me to go there.

Senator LUCAS. As a matter of curiosity, by whom were you appointed?

Admiral KIMMEL. By Henry D. Allen.

Senator LUCAS. And was he a Congressman?

Admiral KIMMEL. Congressman from the Second District of Kentucky.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know whether he was acquainted with the President or not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could not answer that question; I do not know.

[7347] Senator LUCAS. Well, do you recall, Admiral Kimmel—

Admiral KIMMEL. At that time I was not.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall, Admiral Kimmel, reading in the press or hearing it rumored about that you were such a close and intimate friend of the President that he jumped over 46 admirals who had more seniority and grade in order to give you this job?

Admiral KIMMEL. I read that many times. I thought if it was to be answered it should be answered by somebody else besides me.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it was rumored around here at that time, and rumors and gossip are pretty free around Washington and other places, that your appointment was purely a political one and only because you were a Democrat and because you were the President's aide at one time.

Admiral KIMMEL. I know those rumors; I mean I heard those rumors. I heard—well, I will pass it.

Senator LUCAS. Go ahead.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will say it; yes. I heard that the reason I was appointed commander in chief was because my wife was a niece of Senator Barkley, and my wife had never seen Senator Barkley.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you know of the testimony before the committee here by Admiral Stark and Admiral Richardson [7348] who recommended you as one of the men to take charge of the Pacific

Fleet in the event anything happened to Admiral Richard know of that testimony?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have heard something of that kind

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is obvious from the testimony of and others that these statements and these rumors and th that went around immediately following the disaster to Pearl were false and without any foundation in either fact or truth

Admiral KIMMEL. They were misrepresentations and lies

Senator LUCAS. Well, of course, I am talking about the proposition that you were appointed solely for political reasons because you were a Kentucky Democrat.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. You are entirely correct.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that lays another one of these false on the shelf.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I am glad to have it laid.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, on page, I believe it is 2 or 3 probably, of your statement you stated:

When I assumed command the decision to base the Fleet in the Hawaiian Islands was an historical fact.

I presume you want the committee to understand by that statement that you were in no way responsible for having the fleet in Pearl Harbor when you took command?

Admiral KIMMEL. I hadn't that particular thing in mind as a fact. I was not responsible. I had nothing to do with the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. Before I leave the President, I would like to go back and ask you one more question with respect to the conversation that you had with him in June 1941 when you returned from your tour to Washington to discuss the Pacific situation. As I recall, it was quite a lengthy conversation with the President.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did, yes, sir; not very lengthy but, of course, an hour.

Senator LUCAS. And one of the chief things that you discussed at that time with President Roosevelt was the decision that the Navy Department made to take from your fleet a division of battleships, cruisers and destroyers?

Admiral KIMMEL. I expressed myself as forcibly as I knew on that subject.

Senator LUCAS. Will you elaborate for the committee a little as to what the President said in connection with that decision that was made by the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. My best recollection is that I brought up the subject of the transfer of this detachment from the Pacific to the Atlantic and protested against it and the [7350] President said:

Well, they told me that that could be done all right and you could do it with this reduced Fleet.

As nearly as I can recollect my reply I said, "That is ridiculous, nobody in his right mind could ever make such a statement." "Well," he said, "that is what I thought, too," and that ended the conversation. I did not press it any further.

Senator LUCAS. Well, after that conversation there was no further discussion or any attempt to move this division of battleships and cruisers and destroyers?

Admiral KIMMEL. It remained in the Pacific.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir. Who do you mean by "they"?

Admiral KIMMEL. "It," I said.

Senator LUCAS. Oh, yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. The division of battleships remained in the Pacific and the rest of the ships they had contemplated taking. My recollection is that at that time they contemplated taking three battleships, an aircraft carrier, another detachment of cruisers and a couple squadrons of destroyers. The proposal never became absolutely concrete but that is as nearly as I can recollect what the proposal was.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, Admiral, I want to talk with you about another statement that you made in your—

[7351] Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield right at that point?

Senator LUCAS. Yes; I will yield, Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. You asked what the admiral meant when he used the word "they." Now, in his subsequent answer he has used it several times, "they wanted to divert certain parts of the Pacific Fleet."

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Who do you mean by "they" when you are speaking "they wanted to divert"? Are you talking about—

Admiral KIMMEL. He did not say they wanted to divert. I said he said they had told him.

Senator LUCAS. Who are "they"?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I presume he must have meant some officials of the Navy Department or perhaps some of his Cabinet. He did not elaborate.

Senator LUCAS. I see. Now, returning to your statement that you made before the committee you said:

My appointment was in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence upon my part in the decision already made many months before to keep the Fleet in the Hawaiian waters.

Will you elaborate just a little on that for me?

Admiral KIMMEL. I meant that nobody said to me that, "I will appoint you if you keep the fleet in the Hawaiian waters," [7352] or any such thing; nothing of any description. There were no conditions attached to my appointment as command in chief.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission the question was asked there as to why the fleet was—or rather the discussion was had before that committee about the fleet being in the Hawaiian waters. There had been some discussion of that between Admiral Richardson and the President previous to the time that he was relieved of his command.

Now, on page 565 of the Roberts' testimony, which is in that bound volume there—what is the number of that exhibit?

Mr. MASTEN. That is not an exhibit, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In that bound book, on page 565, you made this statement after discussions off the record:

Admiral KIMMEL. Why the Fleet is in Hawaiian waters? All the senior officers of the Navy have recognized the increased possibility of a surprise attack against the Fleet when the Fleet is operating and based in the Hawaiian waters. These facts were forcibly brought to the attention of the authorities in

Washington by my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, in answer to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations under date of May 27th reading as follows—

[7353] and then you proceeded to give the committee what was believed to be the essence of that letter.

Have you ever had an opportunity to examine Richardson's statement since that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think I have; yes.

Senator LUCAS. It is not quite in accord with the statement made there, is it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true, it is not.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, Admiral Richardson at that time wanted to move the fleet back to the Pacific coast for a number of reasons?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true; you are quite right.

Senator LUCAS. But the security of the fleet was not involved in any of those reasons?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was not in his written letter.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I am talking about.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, he talked about—

Admiral KIMMEL. That is my recollection at least.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that is correct and I wanted to call attention to that statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Because you were apparently in error then in assuming what you did before the committee and I take it that was because of your lack of the actual knowledge as to what was in the letter.

Admiral KIMMEL. At the time I was speaking from memory.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir. Now, on the next page of that same statement, admiral, you state:

Now, those same conditions obtained up to the time of the attack here on the 7th. I knew that the Navy Department and the administration in Washington insisted on keeping the Fleet out there. I knew the vulnerability of the Fleet here. I thought that was appreciated by the Navy Department as well as by me but it was one of the things that I felt it was beyond my power to do.

You recall, of course, making that statement, I presume, before the Roberts Commission?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Do you care to make any further explanation of that statement at this time, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. In all of my time as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, the particular thing was before me and I did all in my power to rectify it and the thing that would have helped me most and the thing that I tried to impress on the Navy Department was that what I needed out there was information; I needed the information upon which to base my actions and if I had had the information which was—I recognized the vulnerability [7355] of the fleet largely due to the fact that we had only one base and to the limitations of fuel and other things, which I have gone into here before, what I hoped and believed that the information would come in time to at least alleviate the situation.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I presume you did not discuss the question of the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor when you came here in June 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I discussed that.

Senator LUCAS. With whom did you discuss that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I discussed it with the Chief of Naval Operations, with the Secretary, and I had some conversation with the President about it. I just pointed out the situation which he was fully cognizant of before I told him about it, and I accepted the risks. You cannot be safe; but I did not anticipate what happened by any means.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at least you stated before the Roberts Commission and you so state now that you knew of the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor as a result of what was transpiring between the United States and Japan at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew of the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor as to the physical location of the fleet, the physical environment, and I did everything I could to remedy [7356] that situation.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, you have spent considerable time in explaining to the committee that the fleet was handicapped through lack of trained men. You said you could not spare qualified officers without assuming an enormous risk.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I take it you were making that statement based upon the fact that if the fleet remained intact you wanted qualified trained men to fight either a defensive or an offensive war.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I wanted a trained fleet ready to fight.

Senator LUCAS. And you wanted the complements completed on every ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Now, in this situation I pointed out, I thought, as clearly and as forcefully as I knew how, certainly as clearly and as forcefully as I knew how and I think plainly, what the situation was in the fleet and when the decisions were made here I accepted them and went ahead to do the best I could do, but it was my duty to point these things out. That I did. There was one phase that I was particularly insistent on and that was that—and I never could quite understand why we were unable to—why they were unable to keep the numbers in the fleet up, not the trained [7357] men, you see, but the numbers and we never had the complements that we considered necessary. Now, that is not a question of trained men. That is a question of numbers of green, of good material, you see.

Senator LUCAS. You stated that you had a number of men on those ships who had never fired a shot in their life; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. From time to time, yes; and that was the compelling reason why I had to maintain this training program.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you, Admiral, how many men did you have on the battleships that were struck at Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th of December, roughly, if you cannot give the exact figures?

Admiral KIMMEL. The numbers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Anything I can give you would be a——

Senator LUCAS. I think it is probably in the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you can find that. I would prefer not to because I might be wide of the mark.

Senator LUCAS. Well, how near were the battleships and other ships that were struck in Pearl Harbor on December the 7th up to the complement that you desired; what percentage?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, unless I knew the numbers and the complement I could not very well tell you that, but if what you [7358] are driving at is that we had sufficient men to man the ships under the conditions of repelling an attack at anchor in Pearl Harbor, we did have a sufficient number. We had a sufficient number to man the guns there at that time, but that was not the object of my setting this lack of men forth.

Senator LUCAS. I understand.

Admiral KIMMEL. If we had had trained crews, the cost of going from a training status to an all-out security status would have been much less. Now, once you get a trained fleet you do not have much to do to keep them polished up. Do you understand, sir?

[7359] Senator LUCAS. I understand.

You had a sufficient number of men on these battleships and other ships that were in the harbor to take care of them and repel the attack that was made. What you did not have was a sufficient number of men for an all-out, over-all training which would have been necessary in the event you had to go on the offensive at sea.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. In that connection I would like to point out we did not have spare patrol plane crews out there, and we had been using our utmost endeavors to get spare patrol plane crews.

At the time, as I pointed out, we were required to supply the mainland, for distribution to other places, 12 patrol plane crews per month. So we were never able to catch up, to get the screws for the navel patrol planes.

The same thing obtained in the case of submarines. What we endeavored to do was to get the spare crews for submarines, and those were the two services that were arduous, and the submarine was a very arduous service.

Senator LUCAS. As I recall, you made a request from the Chief of Naval Operations for an additional 9,000 or 10,000 men.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not make the request. I informed him that the fleet was 9,000 men short of comple [7360] ment, and we could use an additional 10,000.

When I used the term "10,000," I had in mind filling up all of the training activities on shore, on the island of Oahu, and these patrol plane crews, the submarine crews, and what not.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this: If those men had been furnished to you, is it a reasonable assumption that more men would have been lost at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not think so.

Senator LUCAS. Your battleships would have been filled, would they not, with a complete complement on the morning of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they might have had a few more men there. I do not see how you can arrive at the conclusion that more men would have been lost.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the more men you had on these battleships and other ships that went down, the more men you would probably have lost. That is the point I am assuming. It may be an unwarranted assumption.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is a reasonable assumption if you lose a certain percentage of your men, and you increase the number of men and still lose the same percentage, why, you would lose more men.

Senator LUCAS. The point I am making is, if you had [7361] had the 9,000 or 10,000 men that you thought were necessary, it would have been no aid to the defense of the harbor on that particular morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Under those particular circumstances, I told you, sir, that they had ample men to man the guns and to use all the offensive power they could inside of Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. And any additional men would not have affected the case one way or the other?

Admiral KIMMEL. On that particular morning. It might have affected many other things.

Senator LUCAS. That is the reason we are here, because of that particular morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. How is that?

Senator LUCAS. That is the reason we are here, because of that particular morning on December 7. That is what we are talking about.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, Senator Barkley is not quite clear, and perhaps I did not make it clear myself, with respect to the number of men that you requested, or that you said you could use. Was it 10,000 in addition to the 9,000, or was it the total of 10,000?

Admiral KIMMEL. The total of 19,000.

[7362] Senator LUCAS. Total of 19,000?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I was not clear on that myself. Thank you, Senator Barkley.

Now, Admiral, in this statement that you made before the committee, which is a very powerful statement, you told the committee you recognized the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet in every category of fighting ships.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is an accurate statement.

Senator LUCAS. That would be true if you wanted to consider it ship by ship and tonnage by tonnage?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. We demonstrated, after the war started, that we were inferior many times in tonnage to the Japanese Fleet, but we went on and were successful, and victorious over them.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. So it is not always a question of tonnage versus tonnage.

Admiral KIMMEL. By no means. You are quite right.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you also stated that the ships that you had were deficient in antiaircraft weapons.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[7363] Senator LUCAS. And you have also told us that in April 1941, when the 3 battleships and 1 aircraft carrier and 4 cruisers and 18 destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and sent to the Atlantic.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Now, let me ask you this question.

You appreciated the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. You have told us these three things, and many others.

Did these facts showing the inadequacy of manpower, the inadequacy of ships, planes, shortage in antiaircraft guns, all of these things cause you to use more diligence in providing measures for the fleet's protection from submarine or air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I did everything I could to bring the fleet up to fighting efficiency.

Senator LUCAS. You were conscious, of course, of these things, as you expressed, from time to time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, of course I was.

Senator LUCAS. And it seemed to me that as a result of your knowledge of the situation, and your letters to and from the Chief of Naval Operations, that it demanded more diligence and more vigilance on your part, and I presume you did do that very thing.

[7364] Admiral KIMMEL. I did.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this question. You have detailed to great extent in your statement before the committee these different shortages. Do you use the inferiority of the fleet, the shortage in planes, ships, tankers and other equipment as a part of your defense for what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and particularly the mobility of the fleet.

Senator LUCAS. It seems to me that these factors of weakness standing alone should have made you and your command more sensitive, and more wide awake to any kind of attack, including a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did everything that I felt I could possibly do. You noted the shortages in the fleet. The most critical shortage was in planes, long-range reconnaissance planes, and long-range attack planes. That was the thing that I had stressed over and over again.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall now how many long-range reconnaissance planes on the morning of December 7 that were ready to make the search?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think we could have mustered, according to Admiral Bellinger—I think his figures were 49. They might have been supplemented by 6 B-17 Army bombers, and that was all.

[7365] Senator LUCAS. Do you recall now when the last time was that you used any of these planes for search, reconnaissance work on any wide-scale basis?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I used them for search in reconnaissance work in the week immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, covering the advance of the ships which were going to Wake and Midway. There were reconnaissances made as part of the training on several days of the week of December 6. That is in the statement, I think. They were in the north and northwest sector, or in the northwest sector.

Senator LUCAS. But you had no regular schedule of reconnaissance going out from the Island of Oahu from November 27 to December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I did not.

Senator LUCAS. Or December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I could not maintain that reconnaissance, except for a very short time, and I think that is very well set forth

in the statement and in the testimony of the people who knew the condition of the planes at the time, and I knew the condition of the planes at the time myself.

Senator LUCAS. Under the joint plans that you had agreed to with General Short it was your duty to maintain an air patrol against enemy forces in the approaches of Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. And in that same [7366] estimate you will find a statement that with the forces available we could do that only when an attack was known, within narrow limits, known to be probable within narrow limits.

Senator LUCAS. Well, do you recall, Admiral, when you were there in 1940, when Admiral Richardson was in command, that he had such research planes going under an alert order that was issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. He never had any search under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, except the search which he conducted in response to the alert sent out by General Marshall in June of 1940. He had, for training purposes, a search made up to a distance of 180 miles, in a sketchy kind of search, and that was to carry out the maneuver basis under which we were operating at that time.

He has so testified.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

Admiral KIMMEL. When the alert, the order from General Marshall came out to General Herron, they increased that reconnaissance to 300 miles. At no time did they have, in my opinion, any real reconnaissance flying from Pearl Harbor that would have been successful, except by chance, in discovering an attack in time to be of any real use.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at least they carried out the [7637] order and made the attempt to do reconnaissance work in 1940, did they not? Whether it amounted to anything or not, they did attempt that reconnaissance work?

Admiral KIMMEL. They attempted that reconnaissance work because they were told to be alerted, or take an alert against an overseas raid, and they continued as long as that order was in effect, and to them that meant that an attack was imminent, an overseas raid on Hawaii was imminent, and had I received such an order later I would have used every means at my command to cover whatever I could cover.

Even at this time they had a reconnaissance out to a distance of 300 miles in only a partial sector.

Senator LUCAS. You do not believe that the war warning message sent to you on November 27, in which there was the request that you use the appropriate necessary defensive deployment, directed you to do any reconnaissance work?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not specifically; no. They told me to take an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46, and that I did.

Now the Navy Department should have known, and did know beyond doubt, that I had no means to conduct a search over a considerable period.

Senator LUCAS. I agree with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now I might have made a token search [7368] and I might have been able to come here and say I made a token search. It was not worth anything but I made it, and therefore I am all right.

I did not do that. I have never done that kind of thing, and I will not do it.

Senator LUCAS. Not even though you were commanded to do it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will not do anything that I consider futile and expending effort unnecessarily.

Senator LUCAS. Did you consider it futile and expending effort unnecessarily in the summer of 1940 when they did carry on that reconnaissance work?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think it was ineffective. They had an order to do it and they did the best they could. That was a direct order.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I understand. Did you consider the command that was given to General Short by General Marshall, in which he definitely requested reconnaissance, a part of your command?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection—I have not seen that dispatch for some time—is that was to make such reconnaissance as may be practicable. I think that was the term that was used.

Senator LUCAS. I have forgotten the exact wording of it, sir.

Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense [7369] Command quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

You saw this message, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; I saw that message.

Senator LUCAS. You discussed it with General Short at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. How's that?

Senator LUCAS. Did you discuss it with General Short at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population,

and so forth.

Now you do not consider that message which came from Marshall, which talked about reconnaissance and which under [7370] the joint agreement was your duty, you did not consider it was your duty to start a lengthy search at sea for any hostile enemy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not. I would like to call your attention at this time to the fact that on the 29th I received this same dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, which he sent for action to the commander of the Pacific northern naval coastal frontier and Pacific southern naval coastal frontier, and in it it says, "Army has sent following to commander, western defense command." Now that meant to me that the Puget Sound area and the San Francisco area were placed in the same category by General Marshall as the Hawaiian area.

Senator LUCAS. I made a slight mistake in reading to you, Admiral. the message that went from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders on the western coast. I would like to have the record

corrected so it shows it was the message of the 27th from General Marshall to the commanding general, Hawaiian department. The language is practically the same, so I will not go over it again.

Senator BREWSTER. Does the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Should it not appear in the record at this time that on the following day, November 28, Admiral [7371] Kimmel received a copy of this Army wire containing additional instructions regarding his activities? I assume that wire or the radio of November 28 is in the record, but that does contain the complete Army order.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. Then it contains additional instructions apparently for the information of Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is right. I think that was the 29th, not the 28th.

Senator BREWSTER. The one we have says November 28.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he received it the 29th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator BREWSTER. The last part, after the "XX."

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. It apparently contains additional instructions for your command.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Senator LUCAS. Well, developing the point that has been made here by the Senator from Maine, do you recall those additional instructions that you received and whether or not they changed in any way the instructions you received on November 27 and November 28?

Admiral KIMMEL. The additional instructions which I received from the Chief of Naval Operations in this message [7372] were WPL-52, the end of the quote, you see, just before this, and then the Chief of Naval Operations went on on his own:

WPL-52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.

Now that applied to the shooting orders which were in effect in the Atlantic and in the Southeast Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier.

Now in addition it says:

Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 as far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

Now in the first place, they told me that no shooting orders were to be issued in the Pacific, and to undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I was going to say. In other words, in the message of General Marshall to General Short which you discussed with General Short, it definitely said that Japan had to commit the first overt act before you could start in shooting.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[7373] Senator LUCAS. This does not change that phase of it very much, does it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It does not change that phase of it very much, but those orders were first issued to General Short and I would have thought they applied to me without this message.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. But with this message, any doubt I may have had was dispelled because the Chief of Naval Operations said, for my information,

Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act—
and again repeated—

be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

Senator LUCAS. Incidentally, those additional messages kept talking about the serious danger with Japan, and when they told you not to commit the first overt act, it was a pretty fair indication that war was pretty close at hand, was it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not entirely, because I interpreted their admonition not to make an overt act as still a desire on the part of my Government to avoid hostilities with Japan.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you construe that message to be, notwithstanding all of these messages that you [7374] received in the past, that not to commit an overt act meant that we were still trying to retain peace with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not to upset the applecart.

Senator LUCAS. They upset it for us.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; very definitely. I think they were finally upset, though.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; they were, Admiral. We all agree on that.

I want, Mr. Chairman, to read into the record just briefly at this point a memorandum or two dealing with reconnaissance that was used in 1940 when Admiral Richardson and General Herron were in command out there.

Let me ask you this, Admiral: Do you recall how many planes were being used for reconnaissance by the Army in Hawaii in 1940?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no figures on that.

Senator LUCAS. Now, on July 1, Mr. Chairman, General Herron sent to the Chief of Staff in Washington this message:

Alert on two weeks today. All quiet locally, no ill effect on command except cumulative hours on plane engines and impaired overhaul facilities due to move from Ford Island.

On July 8, another message from General Herron:

[7375] Three weeks of alert completed today with no unfavorable reaction on personnel but a good deal of wear on motor transportation. No developments in local situation.

On July 10, General Strong sent this to General Marshall—or General Strong, on the advice of General Marshall, sent this to Herron:

The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogram in the Chief of Staff's secret code be dispatched to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department:

"Your five July 8. Can you not avoid undue wear on motor transportation by putting present alert stations on a permanent basis without unfavorable reaction on convenience or morale of personnel? If this meets your approval, submit an estimate for the necessary construction of temporary type—"

And so forth.

On July 15, 1940, another message from General Herron to the Chief of Staff:

Alert entering fifth week. As now conducted, it is without undue strain on personnel or materiel including motors. New construction unnecessary. Navy continues cooperation by outer aerial patrol.

Finally, Marshall advises Herron on July 16:

You are authorized, at your discretion, to relax [7376] alert provisions except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness, and second aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an alert basis on short notice.

Now, General Herron wrote a letter on August 21, 1940, to General Marshall, in which he said, on the question of alert, the following:

The alert has now been on two months. The only present measurable loss is in the weathering of the hundreds of miles of field wire in place, largely for anti-aircraft purposes, but that is probably worthwhile.

This is all in Exhibit 52, from which I am reading.

On September 6, General Herron wrote to General Marshall the following:

DEAR GEORGE: Your note of August 28th has just reached me here, where I have come to collect my wits and obtain a little perspective. Wish you could do the same!

My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that "the alert" as now carried on here, does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that the season of individual target practice and instructions is about [7377] over, the maneuvers of numerous small units camped along the beaches will build up naturally and easily the effectiveness of the alert.

I would like also, Mr. Chairman, at this point to call attention to page 4462 of the record, in which the Navy Department—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The record in this hearing?

Senator LUCAS. The record in this hearing, in which the Navy Department furnished the Senator from Illinois the number of planes that were attached to the Pacific Fleet in 1940 and 1941, that were capable of running a long-distance reconnaissance.

In that tabulation without going into the number of planes that they had, I direct the committee's attention to this one fact: In addition to whatever Army planes were doing search work at that time, and apparently they were, under the letter that I have read into the record here sent by General Herron to General Marshall, Admiral Richardson also had out security patrol from Barber's Point as of June 30, 1940, in a 300-mile circle, 180° running north and south in a circle that went to the northwest and south from that point.

Now, it is true that he only had six patrol planes that were in operation, and each plane each day covered a total [7378] distance of 922 miles, and one as far north from Barber's Point as 226 miles, and that far west. I merely bring that to the attention of the committee because I believe it is pertinent to this inquiry.

Now, Admiral, I do not suppose you care to make any comment on what I have read into the record?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume what you read is perfectly accurate.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you whether or not you knew on December 5 and 6—

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). There is one thing I might say. I do not know whether it is of any importance, but Admiral Richardson, prior to the time I took command, discontinued any patrols he had

out except the patrol over the operating area, and that I continued in effect.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. I understand that. The order of alert had practically ceased.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. The long-distance search was discontinued after the alert was more or less called off?

Admiral KIMMEL. The 300-mile search was discontinued.

Senator LUCAS. They did carry on that search for a number of weeks?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[7379] Senator LUCAS. For whatever good it was?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, you can always carry on a search as long as you have one plane.

[7380] Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this question: What is a dawn patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we started these searches of the operating areas near dawn and that was the dawn patrol. It went out a distance, oh, I think, about 300 miles.

Senator LUCAS. What time would they leave in the morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Just about dawn; depending upon the season of the year.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have such a dawn patrol in operation at any time during the first week in December there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator LUCAS. Was it operating on the 6th and on the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. In what direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. The southern although over the operating areas which we considered it necessary to search.

Senator LUCAS. But there were no long distance reconnaissance planes, such as have been testified to here two or three times, either on the 6th or the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. They went out the 300 miles, and you have frequently referred to this patrol that Admiral Richardson and General Herron established, as a long-distance patrol, and that was to 300 miles.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you, how many reconnaissance [7381] planes were operating on the search on the morning of the 6th and the morning of the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. I haven't those exact figures, but I think about five or six, and in addition on the morning of the 7th I recall there were several patrol planes out operating with the submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announces that the hour of 12 has arrived. In view of pending matters in the Senate some members of the committee from the Senate have indicated that they would like to be on the floor from 12 on.

In view of that the committee will recess here until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:03 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[7382]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Lucas, will you proceed with the examination of the Admiral.

**TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES
NAVY (Retired)—Resumed**

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, before the recess for lunch we were discussing the question of reconnaissance by Army and Navy planes in and about Pearl Harbor the week preceding the attack.

I should like to ask you whether or not you had any conversations with General Short following the receipt of the war warning message on November 27 with respect to long-range reconnaissance to be carried on by the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume I discussed that with General Short. If you ask me specifically what I said to him and what he said to me, I could not answer you.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. You must understand, sir, that we had had an agreement over a considerable period of time and that agreement, and the limitations of the agreement, were perfectly well-known to General Short and to me, and the point in that was that we were not going to institute a long-range reconnaissance until such time as we knew, within narrow time [7383] limits, the time that the attack was to be expected.

Senator LUCAS. Was that contained in the agreement, with respect to the narrow limit of the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that was stated in the estimate of the situation, which might be termed a part of the agreement; yes. It was a question of forces that we had available, and until the number of planes was, we will say, multiplied by about 4, we would be unable to conduct any long-range reconnaissance over a long period of time.

In connection with all this patrol affair I would like to invite your attention to the fact that on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of the week preceding the attack we did, in fact, send out patrol planes in the northwestern sector to a distance of about 400 miles. After that time these patrol planes required overhaul and upkeep, and they were taken in for that purpose.

I stated in my statement that these were new planes, 54, as I recall the number, and all of them had been supplied to us within the month preceding the attack.

These new planes were experiencing shake-down difficulties. They had no spare parts. They had some trouble with broken engine sections, and there were certain alterations required in the planes before they were fully ready for war service.

Those alterations had not been completed by December 7. [7384] When we got these new planes we sent back the planes which we had out there, and these planes relieved them.

Now reverting again to Richardson's patrol, which we touched on here this morning. In 1940, June of 1940, General Herron received this order from the Chief of Staff to alert his command against an overseas raid, or words to that effect. Of course that was a specific order and Richardson was asked to cooperate in this. Richardson had no other orders except to cooperate against an overseas raid.

Naturally he used every facility he had to do the best he could with it. My orders were very different. My orders were to take a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the raids in the Marshalls.

Richardson's orders at that time, or General Herron's orders, had no implications and nothing in his orders beyond conducting a reconnaissance.

I just wanted to point that out, and I think that makes considerable difference.

[7385] Senator LUCAS. That may be true, Admiral. As I understood you to say this morning, on the question of an appropriate defensive deployment, it did not necessarily mean, in your opinion at that time, that you should use these planes for reconnaissance and search?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I might say that the "appropriate defensive deployment," and "defensive deployment" used in that letter, I mean that dispatch, was a strategic matter, not a tactical matter. It was a strategic defensive deployment—I mean our understanding was—and that was primarily to make sure that when we deployed the fleet, or put them in any position that they would not take on an offensive character or anything that the Japanese could consider as offensive.

That, coupled, with the other admonitions that I had about doing nothing, to commit no overt act or anything that could be construed as such, meant, in other words, that I was not to go down to the Marshalls and sit right on them right away.

Senator LUCAS. Now, when this war-warning message came on November 27, did you discuss the question of long-range reconnaissance with the key officers of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I am quite sure I did. We discussed that so many times, and our policies were so well [7386] known, that very little discussion was required. We had gone up and down this scale dozens of times. We knew what we could do.

Senator LUCAS. Did you discuss that with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could not say I did, specifically; no.

Senator LUCAS. In the hearings before the Roberts Commission, the chairman of that commission asked General Short this question:

When you had your discussion, sir, from November 27 to December 7, with the Navy commanders, were you informed of what scouting forces they had out?

General SHORT. No, sir. I usually knew they had task forces out. They usually talked about it.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no discussion about increasing the patrol?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any call upon you for additional planes?

General SHORT. No. There was no time when we refused planes to them. They understood perfectly well they would be made available if necessary, if we had them.

Now, at any time, did you call on General Short for planes to carry on any long-range reconnaissance?

[7387] Admiral KIMMEL. Not during that period. Furthermore, I reported to the Chief of Naval Operations, in a dispatch of the 28th of November, I think it was that there were just six Army B-17 bombers that were in operating condition on the island of Oahu at the time, and those were the only planes that General Short had which were suitable for long-range reconnaissance, and I knew it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Admiral KIMMEL (continuing). And, furthermore, I might add at this time that Admiral Bellinger received a daily report on the avail-

ability of planes from General Martin, and General Martin received a daily report of availability of planes from Admiral Bellinger, and I was kept reasonably well informed of the status of the planes.

I do not mean in detail, but in general.

[7388] Senator LUCAS. Did the Congressman want to say something?

Mr. MURPHY. My impression was that you were going to send them away from Oahu entirely.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't there a communication that you were going to send the 12 B-17's away from Oahu, but only 6 were in condition to run?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, it came up, to be sure, in connection with our plans to use the B-17 bombers if and when they became available on the island of Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake; and we had hoped to get those B-17's out there to augment our forces, particularly we were hoping to be able to get some B-17's to operate from Wake to make the reconnaissance of the Marshall Islands.

The B-17's were very much faster, had a higher ceiling, and were in every way more suitable for reconnaissance than were the patrol planes.

It is quite true that this report was made in connection with that. Nevertheless, what I was trying to point out was my knowledge of the B-17's at the time and the fact that the Navy Department had that same knowledge available.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, leaving the recon- [7389] naissance for a moment, I take it it goes without saying that you knew that Pearl Harbor was our most important outpost in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You also knew that Pearl Harbor and the fleet was the hub of our Pacific strategy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you knew that the fleet was the most important cog in our defensive and offensive war machine in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I think that is true.

Senator LUCAS. And you also knew that it was the greatest single factor in the protection of our possessions as well as the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and I was planning to so use them as rapidly as I could.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you went into command of the Pacific Fleet in February 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. February 1, 1941.

Senator LUCAS. February 1, 1941, with that thorough knowledge and understanding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I had had that full knowledge and understanding for a long time before I became commander in chief.

[7390] Senator LUCAS. As commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, it was your sole responsibility to take every precautionary measure under all circumstances to properly protect that fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I did.

Senator LUCAS. You were commander of the fleet long enough to know and properly evaluate the fleet's strength and its possibilities both on the offensive and defensive?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and I found that strength leaving much to be desired.

Senator LUCAS. With all of these facts, Admiral, admitted, do you want the committee to understand that every consideration was given the fleet, that the fleet had received every consideration at your hands when naval strategy was being discussed, from November 27 to December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Not only from November 27 to December 7, but from the time I became commander in chief and long before that.

Senator LUCAS. You want that to include from the time you became commander in chief?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. When you became commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, there was an operating schedule of ships [7391] that had been ordered by Admiral Richardson, whereby one half of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor and one half of the fleet would be at sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. When you took over and became commander of the fleet you changed that operation schedule?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I didn't. I changed that operating schedule after I found that even operating one half the fleet out and one half in, that I was depleting the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor. I couldn't keep up the oil reserves with the means I had to transport oil from the coast, and do the various other things we had to do with the tankers.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand now that you want the committee to know that the reason for the changing of the schedule was due to the reserve supply of oil on the island of Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was one of the principal factors in the decision.

Senator LUCAS. What were the other factors, if I may inquire?

Admiral KIMMEL. The other factors were the necessity for having the fleet in port a little more to make these alterations which were rapidly coming on from our war experience.

[7392] Senator LUCAS. In other words, due to the stress of the deteriorating conditions between Japan and this country, there was a continuous change in connection with attempting to get the fleet more ready for war, and that caused the ships to be in port more than otherwise; am I correct in my understanding?

Admiral KIMMEL. I tried to balance everything. I tried to get the most out of the time that we had. And the fuel situation alone would have demanded that I do what I did. The other factors were to be considered, and we took full advantage of the fact that the fuel situation demanded we keep them in port.

Senator LUCAS. It so happens that on the morning of December 7, two-thirds of the fleet were in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am not sure as to the numbers that were in Pearl Harbor. I think that is a little high. I think a little over half.

Senator LUCAS. Well, all I have is the records that I have examined, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Perhaps you are correct.

Senator LUCAS. I may be in error about that. If I am you can correct it upon further investigation. But it is my understanding from reading the record that two-thirds of the fleet that was based at Pearl Harbor was in the [7393] harbor on the morning of December 7, when the attack came.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I haven't those figures in front of me, but I think that is not entirely accurate.

Senator LUCAS. It may not be, sir, and if so, you may correct it. I should be glad to have it that way.

Now, after you received the war warning on November 27, did it occur to you to change the operation schedule in any way whereby fewer ships might be in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did change the operating schedule to the extent of carrying out those tasks which we thought were demanded at that time.

Senator LUCAS. With respect to the carrying out of those tasks which you say were demanded at that time, as I recall those messages that came from the Chief of Naval Operations, they placed the direct responsibility upon you to say whether or not those movements were feasible and practicable, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. And with the information I had, I thought they were. Otherwise, I would not have done it.

Senator LUCAS. But I rather reached the conclusion from your statement that you read to the committee, Admiral, that you assumed that that was a direct command from the [7394] Chief of Naval Operations here in Washington.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in naval circles, and I think military circles, a suggestion from a senior is little short of a command. I realized that I had discretion in the matter. I thought his suggestion was good, and therefore I carried it out. And I wouldn't have hesitated to differ with him had I seen any good reason for doing so.

Senator LUCAS. Those two messages that came directing you to take the task forces to Wake and Midway in the event you believed it impracticable and not feasible, came after the war message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Came, I think, on the same day.

Senator LUCAS. I understood you to say in your direct statement those two messages were taken into consideration by you, and rather qualified the war warning message.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. My recollection is that those messages, one of them came in before the war warning, 23 hours, I think I figured up, and the other one was the day after the war warning, in connection with the transfer of planes.

However, that is easy enough to check on. It was almost simultaneously.

Senator LUCAS. I was under the impression both came after the war warning message. I may be in error, and you [7395] may be right. I am not sure.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have got time groups on each one of these.

Senator LUCAS. It may not be so important, although I thought it was.

Admiral KIMMEL. The only thing I have here is the time of origin. I haven't the time I received it, but it would be only a matter of hours at the most.

Just one moment, sir.

The two of them, the time of origin of the two messages in regard to sending these reinforcements to the islands were just about 23 hours before the war warning message.

Senator LUCAS. That is the date of them?

Admiral KIMMEL. All of them are on the 27th. The time group on the first of the island messages was 0040 and the time group on the second one of the island messages was 0038, and the time group on the war warning message is 2337.

Senator LUCAS. Would it have made any difference in your plans out there for defense or offense if those messages came before the war warning, or after?

Admiral KIMMEL. They came so close together—no, it wouldn't have made any difference. The three messages stood. They all originated on the same day as it happened. [7396] Whether one came in just ahead or just afterward, I think would have made no difference.

Senator LUCAS. When you sent the task forces out on these two missions, before you sent them, you had given consideration to the war warning message of the 27th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; yes. And I reported to the Chief of Naval Operations on the 28th, after he knew I had received the war warning in regard to sending the planes to Wake and also told him that I was going to send them later to Midway.

[7397] Senator LUCAS. My thought was that the reason perhaps that they used the words "practicable" and "feasible" was due to the fact that he had already sent you the war warning message and because the war warning message was there it was up to you to determine whether or not you thought under those circumstances those task forces should go out.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he must have known that I couldn't very well get these movements underway before I would have the war warning message anyhow.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Admiral Kimmel, after you received the war warning message of November 27, was there any change at all in the movement or the operation of these ships in and out of Pearl Harbor, outside of the two task forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean any change from the ones we had scheduled for?

Senator LUCAS. Yes. You had a regular schedule, as I understand it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Was that routine of ships entering and leaving Pearl Harbor changed any in any way after you received the war warning message, other than the two task forces we have been talking about?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I couldn't answer that but there was no major change.

[7398] Senator LUCAS. In other words, the war warning message that you received did not cause you to change in any way the movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Except for these task forces.

Senator LUCAS. Except for the task forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Will you tell the committee where Halsey's task force was when Pearl Harbor was struck?

Admiral KIMMEL. To my recollection he was about 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. He was on his way home?

Admiral KIMMEL. On his way to Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. On his way to Pearl Harbor after having carried out the assignment that had been given to him by you on the 28th—was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. There is a rumor, one of those rumors that you hear all the time, there is a rumor that Halsey's task force was delayed in coming back because of some engine trouble, or some other trouble, out at sea. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Never heard of it.

Senator LUCAS. Nothing to it. You would have heard of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I would.

[7399] Senator LUCAS. Assuming Halsey's task force had arrived in Pearl Harbor on the night of the 6th, would they have been anchored in there too?

Admiral KIMMEL. Halsey's task force needed fuel. I would have brought him in for fuel if they arrived because they needed fuel. And, as a matter of fact, I kept Halsey out and he had to send his destroyers in for fuel and I had to send out other destroyers to him to take the places of the ones he had, and after about, oh, not more than 2 or 3 days of operation, I had to bring Halsey in to fuel his carrier.

Senator LUCAS. Where would Newton's task force have been if you had not given him the order to go to Midway on the morning of the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well—

Senator LUCAS. They left on December 6, they left Pearl Harbor on December 6.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know what the operational schedule of those particular ships was in the regular routine on the afternoon of December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't recall that at the present time, sir.

Senator LUCAS. But it is a near assumption that they [7400] might have been in Pearl Harbor on the night of December 6 had they not carried this mission out to Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; they would have been at sea.

Senator LUCAS. They would have been at sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Why do you say that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because that is my recollection.

Senator LUCAS. I see. There is another question that I want to ask you about the task forces as a result of the colloquy which took place on yesterday.

Halsey's task force, as I understand it, went out fully armed and prepared to shoot and sink anything they saw?

Admiral KIMMEL. He so informed me after he returned.

Senator LUCAS. Did he have the power or authority to give the order that you gave him and which you read into the morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. You better ask Admiral Halsey what sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I will ask Admiral Halsey what but you were the commander in chief of this fleet, in a particular time.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. This—

[7401] Admiral KIMMEL. And I didn't want Halsey caught, and I hoped he wouldn't, and I knew Halsey.

Senator LUCAS. You didn't have to give the admiral any orders.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he knew the situation thoroughly.

Senator LUCAS. I know that, but I am just now talking about responsibility out there as commander of the fleet in giving men on task forces of this kind.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[7402] Senator LUCAS. Now, I was wondering what was under the order that you read in the record this morning that you read yesterday to Admiral Brown—who was under those orders these men would have the right and time to arm themselves to the teeth for the purpose of sinking down anything that they might run across that they thought was an enemy?

Admiral KIMMEL. When you send a man on an expedition kind and particularly an admiral, you have got to trust him with things which the situation demands. I had no authority to give any shooting orders and I had been enjoined not to put anything into effect in the Pacific but I did not want them to get caught one of them.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I can appreciate what you were under at that particular time, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The only thought that I had in mind in asking these questions was to discover, if I could, the reason why Admiral Halsey sailed under one set of orders and Admiral Newton apparently under another set of orders.

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Halsey made his own interpretation of my suggestion that he use his common sense when he sailed as far as to go and in view of everything I think he made a wise selection.

[7403] Senator LUCAS. Under any circumstances—

Admiral KIMMEL. Excuse me. Another point, though, I tried to indicate was that Halsey was going about 2,000 miles.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I know it.

Admiral KIMMEL. That Newton was going only 700 miles and the chances of trouble that Halsey might get into were very much less than anything that Newton had.

Senator LUCAS. Well, under any circumstances and irrespective of how they interpreted those orders, Admiral Kimmel was the one who had to be held responsible in the final analysis for whatever happened.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I have been held responsible.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in your statement to the committee on page 63 you said the following:

The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midway did more than reinforce the air defenses of the islands. It permitted a broad area to be scouted for signs of enemy movement along the path of the advance of these task forces to the islands and their return to Oahu. In addition, they were in an excellent position to intercept any enemy force which might be on the move.

Now, do you believe that Newton's task force was in a position, assuming his testimony is correct, was in a position [7404] to intercept any enemy force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, regardless of his testimony the location in which he was and the track that his course followed put him in a position where he was to the westward, a little bit north of west of Oahu and any force coming to Oahu or on its way there, having once been discovered, Newton could have been directed to take an intercepting course and that is what we endeavored to do with him on the morning of December 7. The only trouble was that we made a mistake due to the information we received and thought the Japanese attack force was down to the southward instead of the northward.

Senator LUCAS. But the point I am making—

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I will yield, Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. Just for clarification. In one of your questions referring to the Newton task force I understood you to say that that sailed on the 6th of December. My understanding has been up to this time that it sailed on the 5th of December.

Admiral KIMMEL. They did sail on the 5th.

Mr. KEEFE. So that the record may be clear on this point in connection with this cross-examination—

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not notice that.

[7405] Mr. KEEFE (continuing). The testimony is that it sailed on the 5th. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir. I had not noticed that.

Senator LUCAS. I thank you, Congressman. That is correct.

The point that I was attempting to make, though, Admiral, and only using your statement to the committee to do so, was whether or not Newton, assuming his testimony was correct, if he was just coasting along on routine duty, as to whether or not he was in a position to intercept anybody in the event he had met a hostile enemy?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was fully fueled, he was fully armed, he was zig-zagging against submarines, he had up an air patrol and I presume that he could have gone into action in a matter of, oh, a couple of minutes at most.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if this statement is correct, and I read it into the record yesterday, on that mission he was given no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war other than the ordinary routine and the only point I am trying to make is whether or not, if that is correct, whether or not his force would not have been destroyed before he could have gotten into action?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had had orders in effect for a long [7406] time about the arming of planes and I presumed Admiral Newton was carrying those orders out.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if Newton's testimony is correct the task force undoubtedly—

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon, sir. May I make an observation?

Senator LUCAS. Certainly.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are not quoting from Newton's testimony. You are quoting from a—

Senator LUCAS. I am quoting from the appendix to the narrative statement of evidence at the Navy Pearl Harbor Investigation.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I think you would get a more accurate presentation if you wanted to get Newton's original testimony.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that may be true, but is there any doubt in your mind now from Newton's testimony that I take it you have read that he testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding the preparation for war other than ordinary routine? Is there any question about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, my contention is that the ordinary routine should have been sufficient under the orders under which he was operating.

[7407] Senator LUCAS. You think he should have been prepared then in every way?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Then if there is any question of failing to perform the duty under the order that you gave him, then it is on Admiral Newton?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say so.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Senator LUCAS. I will yield for a question.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if the responsibility would lie on Admiral Newton under those circumstances, if it was Colonel Bundy's duty and General Gerow's duty to check the Short reply, why the gentleman feels that the responsibility lies on General Marshall?

Senator LUCAS. On General Marshall? Well, I don't want to get into that argument right now.

Now, one other question, Admiral, or two. You spent considerable time explaining to the committee how you made a daily memorandum from November 30 on as to what should be done within the next 24 hours.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. And you were really on a 24-hour war alert after November the 27th, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not quite understand what you mean [7408] by that.

Senator LUCAS. Well, something in that war message on November the 27th caused you from that time on to issue a daily 24-hour memorandum of some kind.

Admiral KIMMEL. I prepared—I had prepared a memorandum on the steps which we would take immediately that hostilities commenced. I did that as a precautionary measure and I think it was a wise thing.

Senator LUCAS. I agree with you, Admiral, and the only point that I am making is that you went on that 24-hour basis immediately following the war-warning message that you received on November the 27th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes.

Senator LUCAS. And that was the first time that you had gone on a 24-hour warning basis of this kind or——

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. We had done it but not quite as systematically as I insisted on doing it at that time. We always had a summary of what we were going to do but I reduced it to—well, to a little better system, that is all.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you had not been writing out a message or a memorandum up to that time, had you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I had not been writing out a memorandum, but they had been keeping it in the war plans. About the only difference here was to be sure that the staff duty [7409] officer at all times had that in his hands.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, in that memorandum that you prepared on the morning of December the 6th there were seven specific items referring to the movement of air force in and about Hawaii.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I presume the seven is correct, but there were several.

Senator LUCAS. I am now turning again to your testimony before the Roberts Commission on page 146 of that rather voluminous document that is before the committee. This question was asked:

Admiral REEVES. As I have checked it, there are several specific items referring to the movement of air force in this memorandum.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was to be put into effect in the case of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was the action you took on what date?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was approved by me on the morning of 6 December.

Admiral REEVES. That was the direct result of the warning of November 27?

[7410] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. You took these war preparation measures on that morning as a result of that warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; as the result of that warning and the general situation I wanted to know—I was keeping a running record of what——

Admiral REEVES. Well, would you say that these measures that you have taken are anti-sabotage protection? Did you have anti-sabotage in your mind when you took these measures to despatch forces all along?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Then, you took the warning of November 27 to mean more than protect yourself against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you discuss that with the Army commander?

Admiral KIMMEL. What I was going to do here? I think I didn't show him this. I discussed a great many things with the Army commander.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not hear that, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

General McCoy. Did you discuss that with the Army commander?

[7411] Admiral KIMMEL. What I was going to do here? I think I didn't show him this. I discussed a great many things with the Army commander.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. And that is correct. You did not, as I understand it, discuss any of these daily messages or memoranda that you prepared with General Short.

Admiral KIMMEL. What I meant was that he and the others had not seen this memorandum which I had prepared. Some of the things would have been of interest to him and all of those I think I did discuss with him at various times, but so far as showing him what we had drawn up there, it was a crystallization of our ideas, that is all.

Senator LUCAS. And you conveyed the crystallization of those ideas on to General Short, I take it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say so, the things that he was interested in.

Senator LUCAS. Did you see General Short every day and discuss with him the military and naval situation around the island of Oahu from the time you received the war-warning message up to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not see him every day, but to the best of my recollection betwixt November 27 and December 7 I had conferences with him on four or five different occasions.

[7412] Senator LUCAS (reading):

General McCoy. Do you remember on what dates immediately prior to the attack you had conferences with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would be difficult for me to say that, sir, but I think I can look at some of these dispatches and approximate the—

General McCoy. Now may I help you? General Short made a statement to us that he had conferences with you on certain days. Could you have that looked up, the dates? Would that be here or at the hotel?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is probably at the hotel, General.

Who was Mr. Schneider? Was he one of your men?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know who Mr. Schneider was.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Admiral KIMMEL. We had several conferences.

General McCoy. My remembrance is that he spoke of a prior conference with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. What kind of conference, sir?

Senator LUCAS. Prior conference.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

[7413] Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

General McCoy. Immediately prior to the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct.

General McCoy. And we asked him to give us some idea of what you talked about,—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. —to see what effect these dispatches had on the two of you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Talking it over together.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And the dispatch that we had particularly in mind, I think, at the time, was this one that was the war warning on the 27th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Apparently General Short didn't remember that at all. He had received no copy of it. That is, he had the record looked up. He didn't remember it at all, but he said he felt that you must have mentioned it to him, although he couldn't remember it, and his records and his file over there do not show that it was ever furnished him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, General, I not only sent that war warning to General Short, to the best of my know- [7414] ledge and belief, but—

General McCoy. I understand from your records that you had sent him a paraphrase.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would that paraphrase use the term "war warning," do you think?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, sir; we had a paraphrase, or he read it, because they were not the same in literal wording, but "war warning" was in both dispatches, the paraphrase and the original.

General McCoy. It made no impression, as I remember, on General Short, however.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I don't think it did.

General McCoy. He said, however, that he felt you had shown everything you had received.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was going to add, General, that I believe that in my own office I showed him these dispatches and discussed them with him.

Is that still your best memory on that question, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you can search your record a little further—

Senator LUCAS. I am going to.

Admiral KIMMEL. (continuing). And find that I subsequently testified that on the afternoon of November 27, when I received this war warning, I immediately sent for—well, my Intelligence officer brought it in. I told him to prepare a paraphrase of it and give it to General Short. That he did and the message was delivered to General Short's headquarters, there is no question about that, on this afternoon or evening of November 27. [7415]

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Admiral KIMMEL. And General Short subsequently, I think, arrived at the same conclusion.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator LUCAS. He may have arrived at the same conclusion thereafter but at this particular time he apparently was not certain as to whether or not the message was ever delivered and you were.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I was certain. I was certain then and the only trouble was that at that particular instant I wanted it checked to make sure that my subordinate had carried out the orders I gave him. I subsequently found out he had.

Mr. MURPHY. I believe the record will show that the gentleman, the admiral, referred to Layton as being an idiot because he did not carry out the order which he was given, I believe. He was given it and told to deliver it personally [7416] but did not deliver it personally. He gave it to a subordinate and the subordinate did not deliver it personally. He gave it to some other subordinate of the Army, according to the testimony.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. And the record will show the admiral calling Layton an idiot before the Board because he did not do what he was told.

Senator LUCAS. Well, is there any question about whether or not Short did finally get the message?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is no question but what he received it.

Senator LUCAS. I now turn briefly to the radar question which has been discussed quite a little.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that, sir?

Senator LUCAS. I am going to talk to you now about radar for just a few moments. After November the 27th, Admiral, when you went on a 24-hour alert, I call it that, maybe that is not quite correct, did you have any conversation with General Short about the condition of the Army warning service at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. My best recollection is that I was informed by General Short at about this time that he could give us a coverage of 150 to 200 miles. Subsequently General Short [7417] corrected

me to say that he had told me a hundred miles. At any rate, I was informed that the Army radar was manned and that, as far as I was concerned, suited me.

Subsequently I found that the Army radar had been manned daily from 4 o'clock in the morning until 6 p. m. and eventually changed to 4 in the morning until 4 p. m. This is all second-hand. I did not go to the place to see it. That eventually, the day before the attack, one of General Short's subordinates told them they need not man it after 7 o'clock and up to and including Saturday preceding the attack they had been manning it from 4 o'clock in the morning until 4 in the afternoon.

I did not inquire of General Short the hours that he was keeping in manning his radar, nor did I inquire of him the status of his information center. That was an Army responsibility. I had been informed that the radar was in operation and I presumed that General Short—and I always thought he was perfectly competent to set the hours for manning his radar.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, in view of the deficiencies and the inadequacies and the vulnerability of the fleet that we have testified to here and all agreed on wasn't it almost your duty to find out definitely whether or not the radar was working in line with the warning that was given in that war message?

[7418] Admiral KIMMEL. I thought I knew. You must trust somebody. I couldn't do everything.

Senator LUCAS. I appreciate that you must trust someone, but under the orders that you were operating on at that time and the agreement that you entered into for the coastal defense of the island it was the duty, as I understand it—if I am wrong you will correct me—for the Navy to have a liaison man between the Army and the Navy so that they could properly obtain just what those who were experimenting or operating radar were doing. Am I correct about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. The responsibility for the information center and the Army radar was entirely an Army function. I received a letter from General Short, as I testified to already before this committee, on August 5 requesting that I detail a liaison officer to work with his forces in the development of radar. I did so detail an officer, Commander Curts, who was my fleet communication officer at that time, and this liaison officer, my understanding of it at the time, which was never changed, was that he was to furnish them with technical advice and information. He was in no wise to be a watch stander in the information center.

Senator LUCAS. Who was to be a watch stander?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a function of the Army; and the Army commander, if he wanted a naval officer in there, he could [7419] have requested a naval officer, and one naval officer would not have been sufficient. He would have required several.

And, furthermore, had he requested these several watch standers to stand watch in the information center he would undoubtedly have submitted that request to Admiral Bloch, who was the commandant of the district and the man who was working with him in connection with all those affairs.

I believe that Admiral Bloch has stated he never received a request

Now, I would like to make clear that the man sitting in the operations center and the people to whom the Army refers as liaison officers were in effect officers detailed to stand watch in the information center. An Army officer who had the information in regard to the Navy planes could have done that job, in my opinion, quite as well as a naval officer could have done it and, likewise, an Army officer detailed—I mean a naval officer detailed to follow Army planes. The only advantage in having a naval officer to look out for naval planes or an Army officer to look out for Army planes was that they probably knew the means of getting information. They could not sit in the information center and tell which planes were operating. They had to get that information from the people who were ordering the operations and directing the operations.

[7420] Now again I would like to add there was one other thing that I did. A few weeks, I forget the exact date, before the attack a member of my staff came to me and said the Army had requested the services of Lieutenant Taylor. Lieutenant Taylor was a young naval officer who had been operating with the British and who had some knowledge of the operation of an information center, and I sent Lieutenant Taylor to report to the Army and they had complete control over his movements from that time until December 7 and how much longer I have forgotten. At any rate, Lieutenant Taylor did everything that he could to assist the Army in getting organized and improve their center. I felt that having done those things I had done all that I could to assist the Army in getting their radar business in operation.

Senator LUCAS. My inquiries have been directed to radar primarily for this reason: Everyone knew about the vulnerability of the fleet out there.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Everybody knew that there was no long-range reconnaissance going on.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Everybody knew that there were no surface ships that were patrolling wide areas because it was not feasible to do that.

[7421] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. There were no submarines at that particular time.

Admiral KIMMEL. Because we did not have any.

Senator LUCAS. You did not have any.

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Senator LUCAS. So the only one thing that you really had on the 6th and the 7th that would have given you any information at all about the approaching planes and a surprise attack was the radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, and, as a matter of fact, we found out—I found out on the Tuesday following the attack that they had picked up these planes.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Well, now, you found that out after the attack had taken place and that brings me right back to the question that seems to me important—it may not seem to you with all the responsibilities you had—as to why it was when you knew at that particular time that radar was the only weapon that you could depend upon to discover approaching enemy planes, that you and General Short did not have a little better understanding with respect to the transfer of

these messages when they came in on radar? You have gone over that and you answered it rather fully.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have answered it and I might answer that [7422] when you know something when you don't really know it, you are in a pretty bad way, and I thought I knew.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. You thought you knew and you were depending upon someone to give you that information in the event that it came in.

Admiral KIMMEL. And you have always got to depend on someone if you are going to get anywhere. You cannot do everything.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you stated, I think, on yesterday that you did not talk to General Short about a matter of this kind because that was an Army matter and—

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, not only because it was an Army matter but because I had confidence in General Short.

Senator LUCAS. You did not hesitate, Admiral, to talk to General Short when the Army proposed the exchange of Army troops for marines on the outlying bases?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I did not hesitate to talk to General Short at any time on any subject that I considered necessary to talk to him.

Senator LUCAS. Isn't it a fact, now, that on the morning of the 7th and on the day of the 6th that information on that radar was more important to the protection of the fleet than any outlying bases outside of Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. Again I come back to the fact that I [7423] thought the radar was manned, that is all I can answer to that and when you—I don't know what other answer to make.

Senator LUCAS. All right, Admiral. I want to read this bit of testimony before the Roberts Commission upon this point. Page 630. [Reading:]

The CHAIRMAN. And you probably knew or should have known that the Army warning service was not in shape to give you a warning, or to give them a warning, of distant airplanes, so there just was not any machinery for warning here; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought that the operations of the radar, Army radar, which was reported to me in the maneuvers that we had, that they had been able to pick up planes taking off from Maui and picking them up this side from Hawaii and following them all the way in, in these exercises that we had. They told me that they picked up planes from our ships coming in, and we had several attacks on Pearl Harbor where we had them carry out and had the carrier run in and make the attack and the carrier run the planes in.

I had been informed that they had picked them up and that they had followed them in, and I thought the radar warning was in very good shape.

I knew that some of the radar warning net was not [7424] what they wanted it to be, and we were pushing in every way we could to get that radar warning net perfected, and within a week before this attack took place I knew that my staff had taken a very effective part in urging the District and the Army to do certain things in connection with it, and particularly the District, and young Taylor, I gave, as I told you about today.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And he had come down and told us also and some other people from the District and from the Army, and we were working on the perfection of the warning net, and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, while I think your information is incorrect as to that, the fact is that in the week of December 7th and the days prior to that, and on the morning of December 7th, you were quite confident that you would get a definite warning of distant planes; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought we would get some warning of distant planes.

General McNARNEY. And as a responsible officer you did not assure yourself of that fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate commanders and when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them.

General McNARNEY. Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had the system of mutual cooperation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And in the method of mutual cooperation, is it necessary for one commander to know what the other commander is doing or what his plans are?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General MCCOY. Was there an officer on your staff detailed to the radar warning service room to keep you informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General MCCOY. How did you expect to be informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar warning service was the function of the Army and the Naval Base Defense Officer. I had a staff who were active and trying to do the best. It is a physical impossibility for them to do everything, and I thought that they had developed it and handled it.

If I had it to do again, of course, I would check it a good deal more than I did.

Does that statement still stand?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had it to do again under the conditions [7426] that I then knew I would have done differently, yes, certainly, because that is a perfectly natural thing.

Senator LUCAS. That was hindsight?

Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly.

Senator LUCAS. Now with respect to this liaison man I want to call your attention to section 7 of the joint coastal frontier defense plan and this is under the "war and defense plans." [Reading:]

U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five:

On July 28, 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations. The plan provided in part.

And section 7 of that plan is as follows, a part of it:

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army air- [7427] craft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations.

It seems to me that is rather plain as to what should be done with radar on behalf of both the Army and the Navy.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, this question of Navy liaison officers, the number that they required in the information center was a thing for the Army to determine and for them to request a detail of liaison officers when they wanted them. I thought they had what they needed and in all of the drills that we had had before, and we had had many, the results as reported to me showed that the information center was working. It was far from perfect, but it was working and they had put the information out. I did not inquire into those

details and the responsibility for getting information to the information center was certainly in the hands of the cause it was their function to do so.

Senator LUCAS. Well, let me ask you this, Admiral: kind of an agreement that looks good on paper and is fine but in practice it just does not work out?

[7428] Admiral KIMMEL. No, I would say that this was based on getting all the things that we knew we put everything in bang-up shape and they were in practice in that condition as rapidly as they knew how.

Senator LUCAS. Well, of course, there is always some there not, where you have a joint command of this kind out details, where the Army and the Navy are definitely to do certain things?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, there is always difficulty out any operations where a number of people are involved had made an agreement and everybody that I know of the time was doing their best to effectuate those agreements.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the radar went into operation after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. It was in operation before

Senator LUCAS. Yes, it was in there, but the chairman's question:

He knew what the conditions were, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think he probably did.

The CHAIRMAN. And as the radar system is now running the officer sitting there at the board to inform you of anything that

[7229] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I said this because I presume correct, and the naval officer would have been there, I presume as a matter of fact, I did not know but what he was there.

I think it might be well to say at this point once more information center and the radar had operated in drills exercises and I thought it was on a reasonably efficient basis reports I had received led me to believe that.

Senator LUCAS. You did have these air drill exercises?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; we had the air drill exercises.

Senator LUCAS. Where radar was involved?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. These air drill exercises were based upon possibility of an air raid on the island?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. We had the drills and at the information center—to the best of my knowledge and belief the information center had been manned on all the drills and they very satisfactory results.

Senator LUCAS. For instance, in a statement that was the Roberts committee—

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Senator LUCAS. In a statement that was made at [7430] the Roberts committee, on page 602 Justice F

But you did not discuss the possible air attack with him?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think, sir, we discussed a possible air attack on occasions. We held these drills. For a long time we held them then there was some difficulty about getting all elements to take part

raid drills, so we adopted the scheme of setting a date considerably ahead of time, so all of us, particularly the Army aircraft, could take part to the fullest extent, and that had been in effect for—the air-raid drills started, oh, I should say in March at the latest.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Now, how long did those air-raid drills continue?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean the duration of each drill?

Senator LUCAS. No. Take the date of December 6: When was the last air raid drill that you had previous to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I should say within a couple of weeks of the attack.

Senator LUCAS. A couple of weeks of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; we had them weekly for some time [7431] and then due to difficulties in getting all elements to take part we finally decided that once every 2 weeks would give better results.

Senator LUCAS. According to a memorandum that was just handed to me by counsel it shows that the last air drill you had was on November the 12th, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. That would be about right, I imagine.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is part of exhibit 120.

Senator LUCAS. That is part of exhibit 120.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Before that you had a drill on October 27.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Before that October the 13th. Can you tell the committee why the air drills ceased after November the 12th?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot. I did not know they had ceased.

Senator LUCAS. Well, this is a report from P. N. L. Bellinger, January the 1st, 1942 [reading]:

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO

To: Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941.

Subject: Data Requested by Board.

1. In accordance with your request I am sending [7432] herewith six copies of Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941.

2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as follows: The first one beginning on April 24, 1941, and running through November 12, 1941. There were some dozen or 15 drills in there.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I did not follow up the schedule of air-raid drills exactly when they were conducted, and they were not suspended to the best of my knowledge and belief. They may have been deferred somewhat for some reason beyond my knowledge at the present time.

Senator LUCAS. Well, was that one of your responsibilities, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I was responsible for everything out there.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I say that with the utmost kindness, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg pardon?

Senator LUCAS. I say that in the utmost kindness. I was trying to find out whether or not that was one of your responsibilities.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not consider that the holding of air-raid drills was one of my responsibilities and that I had indicated my approval and desire that the air-raid drills continue. I left [7433]

it to General Short and Admiral Bloch as to when they would schedule the air-raid drills and I paid very little attention to carrying out the schedule, but I did pay considerable attention to the results which they obtained from them.

Senator LUCAS. You further stated:

They were held as often as practicable thereafter, and we held these dress rehearsals, you might call them, along about once a week and then once every two weeks because we wanted to get the two elements into it without conflicting with the training and the various operations.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. They came to me—Admiral Bloch, I think it was—came to me and said he would like to change the weekly drills to biweekly drills and he gave his reasons for it, which appealed to me and I thought it was a good idea that one drill every 2 weeks thoroughly carried out was much more valuable than a drill conducted once a week with only a few elements that could take part.

Incidentally, I might invite your attention to my order of 2CL-41 and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was charged, among other things, with the coordinating of anti-aircraft fire, with the base defense by (1) holding necessary drills. Do you remember that?

Senator LUCAS. I do, sir. I would like to have you an- [7434] swer this question: As I have followed the testimony and followed these hearings I have gained a very distinct impression that it was your purpose and your definite purpose to have this fleet trained down to the last minute, so to speak, in the event that war came between this country and Japan.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. We put on extra steam. Every command I ever had while I was in the Navy I endeavored to get it ready to fight and when the situation became more and more critical we redoubled our efforts.

Senator LUCAS. I am just wondering whether or not your determination and your overzealousness to have this fleet trained to the moment, which was certainly commendable, that you probably did not lose sight of the vulnerability of the fleet, because of the lack of airplane protection, and because of the lack of radar and these things that we did not have, apparently.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, you can arrive at your own conclusion. That is your right.

Senator LUCAS. I do not say that that is my conclusion, but I was just thinking along that line because I have followed you very closely. Admiral, and I know how intense you have been in this hearing and I know how intense you were all through your naval career, and you had a fine one, there is no doubt about that, and I was just thinking about putting [7435] myself in your shoes at that particular time and knowing that war was imminent, whether or not the training of the fleet there did not overshadow everything else?

Admiral KIMMEL. What, sir?

Senator LUCAS. The training of the fleet did not overshadow everything else.

[7436] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I do not think so. I think that the steps I took at this time, and the reasons which I have given to the committee—well, they can speak for themselves. I cannot add anything to them.

Senator LUCAS. In this same statement, you said, about the possibilities of an air raid:

I confess, and so stated, I considered an air raid on this place as a possibility, but by no means a probability.

Now, it seems that everybody was talking about air raids, you drilled for air raids, you drew up in your joint coastal frontier defense plans certain surveys indicating exactly what was going to happen. Isn't that true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we did. One of our objects in that was not only to explore the matter thoroughly but to bring it so forcibly to the people in Washington and everywhere that action would be taken to make that base perfectly secure under all contingencies.

Now, then, if I had not done that, I would have been properly subject to considerable censure.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. The point is every week and every day I had to balance one thing against another. I could not do everything, and everything I did cost me something. I did not have an unlimited number of dollars to buy the [7437] things I wanted, if I may illustrate it that way.

I had to buy the things I could with what I had.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, regardless of what you had under the circumstances, with the information you had available at that time, you would have still been taken by surprise?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not understand that question.

Senator LUCAS. I say regardless of any deficiencies or inadequacies, you might have had in ships and planes and what not, you would have still been taken by surprise with the information available that you claim you had at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. No, sir. I think that is wrong. If I had had an adequate patrol, an adequate supply of patrol planes, if I had had an adequate supply of Army B-17 bombers, then the necessity for doing what I did would not have existed. It would have been an entirely different proposition.

I had to conserve my meager forces for what I thought was the most useful purpose I could put them to.

Senator LUCAS. That is correct, and that was in the training of the fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Senator LUCAS. That was in the training of the fleet [7438] for action?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no; I think you are mistaken.

Senator LUCAS. That is what you really did. I mean you were really training that fleet, eliminating long-range reconnaissance, and concentrating primarily upon getting the fleet ready?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, no. In what I have set forth, I have completely failed in giving my views if that is all you have gotten out of it. I was conserving these patrol planes for uses which I had for offensive operations, and had I had available, we will say, 200 patrol planes and 120 B-17 bombers, the situation would have been entirely different. I could have used the patrol planes then, and still had a sufficient number left to conduct the offensive operations.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I want to read into the record at this point, just one part of this Martin-Bellinger report. It is found on page 35 of the appendix to the narrative statement. It is as follows—and these were the estimates, the evaluations that they were making with respect to the air raid, and this was approved by you in September 1941, as I remember.

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces probably [7439] composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier, and that, in a dawn air attack, there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

[7440] In other words, that was an exact prediction by these two men as to what happened; isn't that true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is always possible, as I have tried to point out in my testimony here, that no matter what you do the enemy may effect a tactical surprise.

I might invite attention in that connection to the fact that when General MacArthur landed on Leyte that was a tactical surprise, and when General MacArthur went to Lingayen Gulf that was a tactical surprise. The Japs thought they were going to land to the southward. All through the war we had many instances of tactical surprises.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I think that the statement you made yesterday, that you did not think there was going to be a surprise attack, that with the hazards that the Japs would have to meet they would never go through with it, and you were surprised, everybody in Hawaii was surprised, and probably everybody in America was surprised when they finally hit us at Pearl Harbor on December 7; isn't that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is a fair statement.

Senator LUCAS. I want to read just for the record an editorial in the Chicago Tribune.

Did you read any papers out there in Hawaii, Admiral, when you were commander of the fleet?

[7441] Admiral KIMMEL. Did I read the papers there?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw the Chicago Tribune. I wish I had.

Senator LUCAS. I did not ask you about that. I just asked you if you read any newspapers from time to time out there.

Admiral KIMMEL. I read the local papers, that is all, and some magazines.

Senator LUCAS. I want to show you how one section of the country were thinking about Hawaii at this particular time. That coincides with all of the evidence that I have heard here practically with respect to this surprise attack.

Everybody out there talked about this surprise attack, everybody had air drills for it, they tried to determine when and where it was going to happen, and yet when it happened everybody was surprised.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the Senator from Illinois will say this represents the thinking of this section of the country, the Chicago Tribune editorial?

Senator LUCAS. Well, the Senator from Maine can put his own interpretation upon this editorial after I read it into the record. It is rather interesting, and it is along the lines that we have been talking

about here, and shows how [7442] some people were thinking and how a great newspaper was thinking at this particular time, and I think it is pertinent to this inquiry to read it into the record.

It is a part of a long editorial on Monday, October 27, 1941. The editorial is entitled, "Mr. Knox Spies a War."

The editorial proceeds:

And so now Mr. Knox wants the country to believe that we may be at war with Japan at any moment.

Remember that is October 27, 1941, about the time you had your last air drill out there.

War for what?

Nations, unless they are governed by fools, do not go to war, and particularly modern war, except for interests so vital that the life of the nation is threatened by their loss. They fight to defend those interests or to take them from their opponent. The objective must be worth the treasure and blood expended before the dreadful risk is considered. What vital interests of the United States can Japan threaten?

She cannot attack us. That is a military impossibility. Even our base at Hawaii is beyond the effective striking power of her Fleet. She may threaten the Philippines but the Philippines are of so little vital interest to this country that we have already arranged to give them their independence [7443] within five years.

And what has Japan that we want? Nothing.

I read that into the record just merely to show what a great newspaper was telling the people at that particular time with respect to Hawaii, that it could not be attacked. Apparently that is what everybody thought, that it could not be attacked at that particular time. It surprised everybody.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have got one or two more questions that I want to ask the admiral and then I am through. I regret that I have taken so long.

These are just some conclusions, Admiral. Is it a fact that all of these deficiencies and inadequacies that you have explained at great length placed upon you the highest degree of diligence in the protection of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, yes.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe under all the circumstances that between November 24-27 and December 7 you exercised that high degree of care and caution that was automatically imposed upon you when you took over this fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I did.

Senator LUCAS. From November 24 until the hour of the attack did you exercise that superior judgment necessary for one of your rank and position when you knew the war was practically imminent?

[7444] Admiral KIMMEL. I did.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe that on the day of the attack you were guilty of any neglect of duty?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, Admiral, you are now telling the committee under solemn oath that you did not commit any mistakes or commit any errors of judgment from November 24 to December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say that is a reasonable conclusion, and it is a conclusion that the Naval Court of Inquiry, composed of three

Admirals, selected by the Secretary of the Navy, came and submitted their report to the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. Do you assume any responsibility for the loss of ships, property, and lives of our men on that tragic day?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was commander in chief of the fleet and I cannot escape the responsibility which goes with that position, but I cannot escape the responsibility due to any dereliction on my part.

Senator LUCAS. I presume you will agree with me that the attack on Pearl Harbor was the worst naval defeat in all the history of the United States Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say maybe that is correct.

[7445] Senator LUCAS. Notwithstanding that this was a far-reaching sea disaster, you now contend that with the resources you had available to you you did all that any prudent commander could do to prevent or to minimize the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is a fair statement.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

The Chair wishes to say that the counsel have asked the committee hold a brief executive session to consider the matter and if they wish to bring to its attention immediately after we adjourn this afternoon.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel, a few moments ago you made a suggestion from a senior in the Navy is a little short of what I was wondering if you regarded a suggestion from the Secretary of the Navy, the constitutional officer in charge of the Navy, as a command?

Admiral KIMMEL. A suggestion from the Secretary of the Navy to whom?

Mr. MURPHY. To the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Would you consider that a command?

Admiral KIMMEL. That would depend somewhat on the circumstances under which it was made. If I received a suggestion from the Secretary of the Navy I would do my best [7446] to carry it out.

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring particularly to the letter from the Secretary of the Navy, which had the approval of the Secretary of War, which stated that there was a probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, in fact that an air attack was the most probable threat to the Harbor. Was that a command to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I gave great weight to what the Secretary said in his letter, and I was very much encouraged by that letter, because I hoped and believed at that time that the deficiencies which the Secretary himself had pointed out would be remedied as rapidly as our resources in this country would permit.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did not consider what he said in his letter, in December of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Secretary's letter suggested the possibility of an air attack, and shortly thereafter I received the report from the Chief of Naval Operations which told me, in fact, that no air attack on Pearl Harbor would be made by the Japanese.

the foreseeable future. That came, as I recall, shortly after this letter from the Secretary, and I took the letter from the Secretary in the way that it was meant. I believe it was meant to put ourselves [7447] in a proper condition in Hawaii to repel any and all attacks that might be made on it.

I have here the exact text of the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations. He quotes Mr. Grew's warning, and says—

Mr. MURPHY. That letter, Admiral, I am already familiar with, and it is already in the record on several occasions, but I will be glad to have you read it again.

Admiral Kimmel. I just want to make my position clear, that is all.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it is most appropriate that that should be done. The Congressman is pursuing this line of inquiry and I think the record should be complete. I think he should read that.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. I am glad to have him read it.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

The office of Naval Intelligence places no credence on these rumors. Furthermore, it has no data regarding the present disposition and deployment of Japanese Army and Navy forces. No more against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, I refer you to another letter, the letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, was the same Secretary of the Navy, was he not, in command [7448] of the United States Navy, as a member of the Cabinet, on December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Mr. Knox; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the Secretary of the Navy said to the Secretary of War:

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be

- (1) air bombing attack.
- (2) air torpedo plane attack.

Now when did you decide that the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War were incorrect in their estimate of the situation at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have given my views on that at great length.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have you state them right now, if you will, for the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg pardon;

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have you state your views on that matter right now on the record, at this point, please.

Admiral KIMMEL. When I received the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have just quoted I was very much influenced by it. When I received, further, the letter of February 15, I think, in which he told me unqualifiedly that torpedoes could not run in the waters of Pearl Harbor, that eliminated the air torpedo attack from my consideration.

[7449] In the months that followed I had to reestimate the situation, and due to my knowledge of the difficulties of overseas raids from Japan and the means they had to accomplish it, I arrived at the conclusion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was not probable. That was very shortly after I received the Secretary's letter.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you had by February decided that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, in their judg-

ment as to what the dangers were at Pearl Harbor, were in error; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was always the possibility of such an attack. I agreed in toto with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that we should so arrange our defenses at Pearl Harbor, and should have supplied to us the means for this defense so that the air attack would be practically impossible.

Now, in connection with Mr. Knox's opinions, Mr. Knox told me when he came to Pearl Harbor that he was surprised, very much surprised when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and he repeated, I think, in public on several occasions that he was surprised.

Mr. MURPHY. I agree, Admiral, that Mr. Knox said that, and a great many other people said that. I am now asking, however, when you ceased to believe that the Secretary of War [7450] and Secretary of the Navy were in error? I take your answer to be that you changed your opinion when you got the letter in February about the possibility of an attack by a torpedo plane, as well as when you got the letter from Admiral Stark about the unlikelihood of an attack subsequent to the so-called Peruvian message. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. After that, did not you have an admiral of your fleet, and one of the officer airmen in the Navy, the No. 2 man in the Navy, under your command, make a survey as to the unlikelihood of an attack at Pearl Harbor, and did not he say that an air attack was the most probable, subsequent to these two items that you have already given?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; he did.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you disagree with your air expert?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not disagree with the estimate, because I believe in making an estimate of the worst thing that can happen and provide against it to the best of your ability.

Now, then, when it comes to the time to take action you must balance probabilities against possibilities.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a fact, Admiral, is it not, that the No. 2 airman in the United States Navy says that the most likely attack at Pearl Harbor was to be an air attack? [7451] Isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was his opinion.

Mr. MURPHY. And he was in your fleet, wasn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. And that was his particular—

Mr. MURPHY. Domain?

Admiral KIMMEL. Domain.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And he was quite right in making such an estimate.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. And then on December 17, 1941, you asked his opinion on the availability and possibility of using planes as of and prior to December 7, did you not?

Mr. KEEFE. December 17?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; on December 17 you asked him to prepare and had him prepare an estimate of the situation as it was prior to December 7? I mean exactly that.

Admiral KIMMEL. I wanted a record of his views at that particular time, and I asked him to set them forth. I knew all of the essential features of that myself before December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, however, Admiral, that you did have an estimate made, did you not, on December 17?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I had a letter submitted by him on December 17, because I wanted it made a matter of record.

Mr. MURPHY. I beg your pardon; it was December 19, and [7452] I stand corrected.

Admiral KIMMEL. It may have been the 19th, but it was about that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now, then, in that particular letter which Admiral Bellinger gave to you, on page 2, paragraph 4, or note 4, I find the following—first, the first paragraph, paragraph 1, "Availability and disposition of patrol planes on morning of 7 December 1941", and then in paragraph 4—

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MURPHY. Excuse me.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask if we have copies of these letters?

Mr. MURPHY. I got mine as a member of this committee at this table. I assume you have got what I have got.

Senator BREWSTER. Was that furnished to the other members?

Mr. MURPHY. I got it sitting in my chair at the table.

Mr. MASTEN. What is the date of it?

Mr. MURPHY. December 19.

Mr. MASTEN. That is Exhibit 120.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I have already read, Admiral, paragraph 1, and .. I now read paragraph 4:

All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine-gun ammunition.

[7453] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I now go to paragraph (e), on page 4:

Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive expansion training operations and improvement of the material military effectiveness, at the same time preserving the maximum practicable availability of aircraft for an emergency. Under the existing material and spare parts situation, continuous and extensive patrol plane operations by the PBY-5's was certain to result in rapid automatic attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes immediately available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which there were no replacement.

Then again I read paragraph (f):

In this connection it should be noted that there were insufficient patrol planes in the Hawaiian area effectively to do the job required. For the Commander of a search group to be able to state with some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection, would require an effective daily search through 360 degrees to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 15-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16-hour flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 200 patrol planes, adequate spare parts, and ample well-trained personnel would be required for such [7454] operations.

Now the fact is, Admiral, that on December 19 you did get the estimate of Admiral Bellinger as to the appropriateness of having reconnaissance subsequent to November 27, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not understand that question.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read it, Mr. Reporter?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I got it. I asked for it. I was a matter of record. He was the man who knew most; had been informed of this condition, I knew of the condition December 7, and I wanted it made a matter of record for such occasions as this.

Mr. MURPHY. He was the air expert at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. He was not the only air expert at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Halsey had been at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Was not he the one in charge of the Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. In charge of what?

Mr. MURPHY. The Air Force, the air defense force at Pearl Harbor. Was not that his assignment?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, he was in charge of the Patrol Wing, was the patrol wing of the fleet.

[7455] Mr. MURPHY. Was not he the air base defender?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh yes, yes, he was the air base defender that is right, yes, and as such he was charged with the these patrol planes, and such Army patrol planes as were assigned to him for the purpose of conducting long-range reconnaissance bombing operations.

Mr. MURPHY. He was the very officer of the Navy who was to make any reconnaissance that should be made, and who was to get the Army's planes, to use them in the event a reconnaissance was made, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Notwithstanding that fact, and notwithstanding the fact that you discussed the war warning message with the heads of your men, you never consulted your air man, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was not the only air man we had. I was rear admiral in charge of this patrol wing. If you did not tell him about the war warning, that is correct. I did not tell a great many other admirals about the war warning. I did not tell a great many other people in Hawaii about the war warning. Admiral Bellinger was there directly under my orders, and I did not give him any orders that he required.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I am not inquiring about orders now, I am inquiring about a staff consultation, in view of the fact that you were coming from Washington, to discuss with your air staff the possibility of taking any measures appropriate to the occasion when a war warning having arrived.

Admiral KIMMEL. He took the measures that I considered necessary.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, he took what orders you gave him, but there was no consultation with your air defense officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that there was a plan under consideration there not, before December 7, to have a separate air department in the Navy and you opposed it, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. A separate air department in the Navy.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. We have some correspondence to that effect.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know of any movement in the Navy, any serious movement to have a separate air department in the Navy.

Mr. MURPHY. Will counsel tell me the number of the exhibit that is the correspondence about a separate air force, and the letters from Admiral Kimmel? Do you have that?

Mr. MASTEN. I haven't that here, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I think there is such a letter. I will [7457] produce it in the morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am perfectly willing to give my views, if that is what you are driving at.

Mr. MURPHY. I am only interested, Admiral—

First of all let me say this: I think it is highly regrettable that circumstances are such that a man who rendered honorable service for 40 years in the United States Navy should have to be answering my questions, and I am only asking them because of the occasion of my being here, and because of what happened on December 7. I am only interested in what your views were, what your views as commander in chief were up to and including December 7, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was endeavoring to give you those as honestly as I can.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, Admiral. Now, then, did you write a letter in which you opposed a separate air force in the Navy prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did I oppose it?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Most emphatically, yes. I still oppose it.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. If there had been a separate air arm in the Navy on December 7, Admiral Bellinger would have been in the consultation in order to determine the appropriate- [7458] ness of the reconnaissance, would he not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I think the man I would have consulted would have been the senior airman in the fleet, and that was Admiral Halsey, and I did so consult him.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, even if you had a separate air force you would not have a consultation, I take it, with the man responsible for the air base defense and the man responsible for having a reconnaissance started, and the man responsible for calling on the Army for reconnaissance planes? Even under those circumstances he would not be consulted; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are laboring somewhat under a misapprehension.

Mr. MURPHY. It may be. I am only a layman and you are an admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. As a matter of fact, so far as this activity is concerned, Admiral Bellinger was the air base defense officer and Admiral Bloch was the naval base defense officer, and Admiral Bellinger, for ordinary purposes, was directly under the command of Admiral Bloch. I just want to get the organization straight in your mind. The man who was responsible, insofar as the Navy was responsible for the defense of the base, was Admiral Bloch.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will check the record with you a [7459] little on that, Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Mr. MURPHY. I say, let me check the record a little bit on that. There seems to be a little confusion on that. It may be in the record.

[7460] Admiral KIMMEL. I gave orders at times directly to Admiral Bellinger, that is perfectly true, and I did to a great many subordinates, but that doesn't alter the organizational set-up.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that as soon as the air raid occurred at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Bellinger immediately assigned two men to the interceptor command, didn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume he did. I don't remember.

Mr. MURPHY. There were no men there before from the Navy, were there, before the raid, but two immediately afterward?

Admiral KIMMEL. There were men there. I told you about one of them, at least, that I sent over to help. And that assignment of these men to the Air Interceptor Command was the duty of Admiral Bloch and Admiral Bellinger, to furnish and supply the Army with whoever they could to help them in the Air Interceptor Command.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand, you assigned a man to headquarters as a liaison between the Navy and the Army. Taylor was assigned?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no.

Mr. MURPHY. And Kurts?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. Taylor was not a liaison.

Mr. MURPHY. Taylor was assigned as a technical man. [7461]
I am sorry.

Admiral KIMMEL. He was assigned as a technical man. Kurts was also a technical man. Kurts was a technical man insofar as matériel was concerned. Taylor was a technical man insofar as operations were concerned.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that Admiral Bellinger, who did not know about the war warning up to December 7, immediately assigned two men to the interceptor command right after the air raid, didn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume he did if you say so.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am quoting from the record, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you also said a few minutes ago that when you sent a man on a mission you trusted him to do what the situation demanded?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't you expect that the Chief of Naval Operations would expect the same of you as commander in chief of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think he did.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there seems to be quite some confusion in the record as to the amount of discussion that occurred between you and General Short from the time of the receipt of the war warning message down to and including December 7.

[7462] Is it your impression that you discussed those warnings with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is most certainly my impression that I discussed the warnings with General Short, and in the discussions which had to do with the island bases, the transfer of personnel, and matériel out there, the activities of General Short at Canton, and Christmas Islands, it was inevitable that we would discuss all phases of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, on November 27 in the morning you and General Short were together for 3 hours. Do you recall that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall exactly the time, but we were there for some time. Where did you get the record?

Mr. MURPHY. I will read it to you, Admiral. I will give you the day and date and the page.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is approximately correct, anyhow.

Mr. MURPHY. It is my understanding that you met for 3 hours on November 27, and that the meeting was before the receipt of the war warning message.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the morning of November 27 was before the receipt of the war warning message; that is right.

Mr. MURPHY. And the purpose of your meeting then was [7463] to discuss the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. That was the time, before you received the war warning message, that you asked McMorris what the possibilities of an air raid on Oahu were?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have testified before, and I will testify again, that I don't recall that. It may very well have occurred.

Mr. MURPHY. I will quote the record for you on that. You met again on December 1, and again on December 2, and I believe on December 3, and at those meetings your discussions were of the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. And other matters.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, a great deal of your time was taken up with a discussion on the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, on December 3 you came in to General Short with an eight-page letter; you remember that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't remember the date. I did go over there one evening.

Mr. MURPHY. That was also with regard to the outlying islands, and the possibility of whether the Marines or Army would take over?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[7464] Mr. MURPHY. Now, there has been testimony in the record, true or not I don't know, to the effect that one of the men present at the meeting testified, and I don't say it is true, but it is in the record, to the effect that when it came to who would take over command, that you said the Army would "take over your dead body."

Admiral KIMMEL. I made some such statement as that, as a matter of emphasis.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, there was still a difference on December 3, between you and General Short as to who would be in command if the Army went in there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt that because there was some Navy question, that they were islands, you should be in command, and General Short felt that if the Army went in the Navy wouldn't command it. He was going to?

Admiral KIMMEL. As I remember, General Short stated about that time that he didn't want to send his people out there——

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. If they did, he felt he should command it.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And in my letters and dispatches to [7465] the Navy Department subsequently, I suggested to them that the question of command should be settled in Washington.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you also suggested, didn't you, that it be put over for a while, that if there was going to be a settlement, there ought to be an express direction from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. I suggested that it be put over for a while, not on account of the command.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. We could have ironed that out, but for other technical reasons which I set forth in the letter.

Mr. MURPHY. Construction of air fields?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Supply difficulties?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. It is all in the letters. I wrote two letters on December 2, one a personal letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, one an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I would like to direct to one part of your statement in which you say you did not expect an attack on Hawaii? Do you recall that? I believe it is on page 37. You were asked about it by Mr. Cooper yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. While the gentleman is looking that record up, the Chair will announce that in view of an [7466] important engagement of one of the members of the committee, the executive session referred to will not be held this afternoon.

Mr. MURPHY. You said at page 37, Admiral:

In these circumstances, no reasonable man in my position would consider that the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.

Isn't it a fact that you have already testified in a previous hearing that you expected a mass submarine attack on Pearl Harbor, subsequent to November 27, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I testified that I thought a mass submarine attack was a thing to be guarded against, it was a thing that could have been carried out simultaneously with the other operations that I believed that Japan might undertake, and, furthermore, it was something well within the capacity of the Japanese submarines.

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't that because of the November 27 message?

Admiral KIMMEL. What was that?

Mr. MURPHY. Was that because of the war warning, that you felt that way?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was not only because of the war warning, it was because I felt that any time we got into war with Japan that there would be many submarines in the [7467] operating area.

Mr. MURPHY. Because of your statement, Admiral, I am having difficulty. It is my understanding that the war warning was a war warning, and it is my understanding that you took very definite and positive measures as a result of it.

But as I remember your statement, you don't now feel that the war warning was a war warning.

Now, did you or did you not think it was a war warning? I mean the message of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. You ask me did I or did I not believe it was a war warning. I never said I didn't believe it was a war warning. I said the words "This is to be considered a war warning," did not add anything to the message. It merely characterized the information which that message contained.

Mr. MURPHY. Did it make you believe, if it was a war warning, that war was imminent?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did it what?

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read the question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't think that war was imminent. I thought it was more probable than it had been before.

[7468] Mr. MURPHY. But you said a bit ago that it was a war warning, and if it was a war warning, when you get a warning that war is coming, it ordinarily would occur imminently?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; because I had messages throughout the year which I considered war warnings.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me direct your attention, Admiral, to page 645 of your testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Lieutenant, you will find it as page 645 in ink, and 301 typed.

I am now directing your attention, Admiral Kimmel, to question 91 on page 301. Do you have it before you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have it before me.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Question. Did the receipt of Exhibit 17, which is the dispatch of November 27, 1941, in any way change your estimation of the situation in regard to Japanese intentions?

Answer. My estimate of Japanese intentions after the receipt of this dispatch of November 27, was as stated in the dispatch that a move would take place within the next few days in the form of an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. I estimated from this and all other information available [7469] to me that if an aggressive move eventuated against a United States possession, it would be made against the Philippines, and if it were made against the Philippines I felt there was a very good chance that a mass submarine attack would occur in the Hawaiian area.

I thought an air attack was still a remote possibility and I did not expect an air attack to be made on Pearl Harbor at this time, due to the tenor of the dispatches and other information available to me, the difficulties of making such an attack. And the latest information I had from the Navy Department and other sources was that the greater portion of the carrier forces were located in home waters.

I considered, of course, that one of the primary causes for the dispatch was as stated, that negotiations had ceased. Consequently, when the press indicated further conversations were continuing between the Japanese ambassadors and the State Department, the warning lost much of its force. I further assumed that no ultimatum had been given by the United States Government to Japan, because I had been informed that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations had submitted a recommendation to the President that no such ultimatum be delivered.

I had no knowledge of the contents and tenor of the [7470] note handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese ambassadors on November 28th until long after I returned to the United States.

Now then, Admiral, I come back to your quote on page 47. [Reading:]

In these circumstances, no reasonable man in my position would consider that the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack on the Hawaiian area.

Is that consistent with what you say here :

I felt there was a very good chance that a mass submarine attack would occur in the Hawaiian area.

Admiral KIMMEL. Perhaps I should have said an air attack. I was talking in this statement about the type of attack that did occur.

Mr. MURPHY. In that connection, let me come back to your air expert. Didn't your air expert say that even the presence of one submarine would very likely indicate the presence of airplanes and certainly the presence of an attack from more than one submarine would more likely indicate the presence of an air attack. Isn't that what your air expert told you in the Martin-Bellinger report?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not only did the air experts make such a statement as that, but you find in 2CL-41 some such statement as that

[7471] Mr. MURPHY. Then you disregarded the Bellinger idea and 2CL-41 that if you had one you wouldn't have the other in view of this consideration; isn't that so?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't.

Mr. MURPHY. Both of those say if you have submarines you will have air. Here you say you are going to have a mass submarine attack, but no air.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to point out to you now that there wasn't any submarine attack prior to the airplane attack on Pearl Harbor. There was not. A submarine was discovered, and our people attacked the submarine. The submarine didn't attack any ships outside.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, that is not the question. I am going to come to that submarine and go into it.

Admiral KIMMEL. But that is the question.

Mr. MURPHY. No. My question is this: There is nothing in the Martin-Bellinger report, and there is nothing in 2CL-41 which says that in order to have an air attack you must have submarines, but that if the Japs are going to have submarines and make an attack, then they would like have an air attack.

Now, then, if you expected a mass submarine attack, why couldn't you also expect airplanes?

Admiral KIMMEL. I tried to explain that at great [7472] length. The mass submarine attack was well within the capacity of the Japanese.

I thought they would probably have it, and at no time did I consider that a mass submarine attack had to be accompanied by an air attack. We were only taking possibilities and you could have one without the other. You could have an air attack without a submarine attack.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, all I am saying is this, isn't it so that in 2CL-41 and in the Martin-Bellinger report it is said that the presence of one submarine or more submarines by way of an attacking force, one or more, that the likelihood is that there will be also an air attack; isn't that in both?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. It said an air attack may be accompanied by—where is it?

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read what it says, Admiral, please?

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

A single submarine attack may indicate the presence of considerable surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by carriers.

That is in my own order.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right, and it was subsequent to your estimate of the situation in the Martin-Bellinger report from your air expert in which they pointed that out?

[7473] Admiral KIMMEL. I had much advice besides his. I considered his along with the other I had.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I direct your attention, Admiral, to the Martin-Bellinger report, Exhibit 44, subsection 8, on page 3, paragraph B.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It does say there, does it not, it appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that appears there.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Admiral, I would like to go with you, if I may, to the testimony of General Short before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

By the way, before I go into that, did you ever hear of any difficulty which existed between General Herron and Admiral Richardson by way of General Herron never being able to ascertain whether or not Admiral Richardson was having reconnaissance, and if he was having it, where it was?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard anything about it.

Mr. MURPHY. I just asked you the question. I don't know. I have never seen anything on it except a question asked of General Short in this record by one of the Board, and I will come to that specifically. You don't recall [7474] any such difficulty, do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, why didn't you tell General Short about the message you got that the code machines were being destroyed?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have explained that. That was consistent with what I believed would accompany an expedition down the Asiatic coast.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know that General Short said this, at page 1620 of the record of the Roberts Board:

The thing that would have affected me more—
speaking about the message from Marshall—

The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter—

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute, please.

[7475] Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Page 1620.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to direct your attention to page 1620, Admiral, at which Justice Roberts, as chairman, said to General Short, referring to the Marshall message on December 7:

Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would have stirred you up, General Short?

The only thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing, that they are going into an entirely new phase and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say, of three or four days. That would have been extremely significant to me, the code machines, much more significant than just the ultimatum.

Then he goes on to talk about another matter which I will go into later.

General Short considered that a highly important matter, the fact that the Chief of Naval Operations had seen fit to send you subsequent to the war warning a message that code machines were being destroyed. You had that information. You said you didn't give it to General Short and you didn't tell anybody else to give it to him. Who could have given [7476] it to him if you didn't order it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I might say that if the Navy Department had considered this message of such prime importance they might at least have told me to deliver it to General Short.

Mr. MURPHY. But, Admiral—

Admiral KIMMEL. May I complete?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Pardon me.

Admiral KIMMEL. The message which I got on December 3 I think was the one he was talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think you understood, Admiral. I am talking about the reaction to the message of December 7 at which time Short said if he had had prior dispatch about the codes being burned and the machines being destroyed that it would have been of great significance to him.

Admiral KIMMEL. You haven't read any such testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't understand me, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And that was in the message which General Short received after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. But the fact is, Admiral, that you knew [7477] they were destroying the codes and you had heard it from two or three different sources before December 7.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. No, no.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me refer you, Admiral—

Admiral KIMMEL. What they said in the previous message to me, which came on December 3, was they had been ordered to destroy most of their codes and ciphers, not all.

Mr. MURPHY. Why didn't you tell General Short that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why didn't I?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't consider that of any vital importance when I received it and furthermore, if the War Department, or the Navy Department, had considered it of such vital importance as they now say they do, they should at least have taken the precaution to tell me to give this message to General Short. I tried my best to keep General Short informed of all matters but in a matter of this kind I used my own judgment about it. I had no objection to his knowing. I presumed he had gotten it. I didn't order it given to him because it didn't strike me as being highly significant at the time I received it.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you were supposed to play golf with him on Sunday morning, weren't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[7478] Mr. MURPHY. You were friendly with him. Why wouldn't you tell him?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am talking about this message where "most" were destroyed.

Do we have that message of the 7th?

There is a difference there.

Mr. MURPHY. While your assistant is looking, you didn't think the message of Marshall on the 7th was very clear either, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Was very clear?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought it could have been a better message, yes, when I saw it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, while they are looking——

Admiral KIMMEL. May I get this first?

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, here is a message of General Marshall. This is General Marshall's message:

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what significance the hour may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly.

And in this you will notice that he gives a flat statement, [7479] not that they destroyed most of their codes and ciphers, but they are to destroy their code machines immediately.

That is quite a different message from the one I received on December 7 and I believe—on December 3, I mean—and I believe that is the message to which General Short is referring in his testimony on page 1620.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you had word to the effect that you could authorize the outlying islands to destroy their secret papers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't that indicate the coming of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily. One of the reasons that they authorized that was because they found my communications set-up had given them some very secret codes and they wanted them destroyed right away because they never should have had them.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 4:30. The Chair supposes that the member can't finish?

Mr. MURPHY. No. It will be quite lengthy.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m. the committee recessed until 10 a. m. Saturday, January 19, 1946.)

[7480]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, JANUARY 19, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson, and Brewster, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7481] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Murphy was in the process of examining Admiral Kimmel. Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES
NAVY (Retired)—Resumed

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. I think before you begin counsel have two or three documents they want to make a part of the record.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, I find in checking the transcript on the three dispatches that were read into the record yesterday, the third of which appears on page 7316, that I neglected to state the date of the dispatch. In order that it may be clear on the record I would like to state that that dispatch, No. 282301, is dated November 28, 1941.

As Exhibit 126, we would like to offer three documents which have been distributed to the committee this morning, the first of which is dated February 3, 1941, and is entitled "General Order No. 143, Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States," signed by Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy; the second is a single page containing excerpts from Navy regulations; the third is a document entitled "Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions, 1941."

All of these have to do with the general duties and responsibilities of the commander in chief of the Pacific [7482] Fleet and his staff. We would like to offer those as Exhibit 126.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see any paper here that contains only one sheet.

Mr. MASTEN. It is the third page of the collection of documents the first of which is entitled, up in the upper left-hand corner, "General Order No. 143."

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about those others.

Mr. MASTEN. It is the third page of that collection, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see.

Exhibit 126 will be filed.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 126.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 127, we would like to offer a collection of several letters and memorandums having to do with the air situation in Hawaii after December 7, 1941. At page 77 of Exhibit 113 there is a letter dated January 7, 1942, from the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to the commander in chief of the United States Fleet regarding the aircraft situation in Hawaii. We would like to offer these as additional information regarding the situation after December 7, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection they will be filed as [7483] Exhibit 127.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 127.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 128, we would like to offer a collection of letters and memoranda, six in all, having to do with the prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii. This matter came up at page 6966 of the transcript, and these letters or memoranda are the only documents that we have thus far discovered in this general connection. The first is a letter dated June 4, 1941, addressed to the Attorney General and signed by the United States attorney for the District of Hawaii. We would like to offer these as Exhibit 128.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so filed.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 128.")

Mr. MASTEN. And finally, at the request of Senator Ferguson, we would like to offer as Exhibit 74-A a memorandum dated December 4, 1941, to the Secretary of State signed by Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, regarding a conversation between the first secretary of the British Embassy and an officer of the Far Eastern Division on December 4, 1941. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 74-A. Exhibit 74 has to do with warnings to nationals.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so filed.

[7484] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 74-A.")

Mr. MASTEN. That is all we have.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, there has been quite a deal said in the record about establishing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, and as to whether it should have been or should not have been. I think it is pertinent to read into the record at this time a report of the United States Congress on why Pearl Harbor was established.

Now, reading from "U. S. Congress, House Committee on Naval Affairs, Establishment of a Naval Base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands," dated 1908:

The Committee on Naval Affairs, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 18120) to establish a naval station at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, report the same with the recommendation that it do pass without amendment.

The Hawaiian Islands afford the only possible location for a strong naval base in the central Pacific Ocean for a distance of over 4,000 miles from our western coast.

Pearl Harbor is beyond question one of the best, if not the best, natural harbor in the world. It has a depth of water of over 60 feet and an area of nearly 10 square miles, and capable of floating the combined navies of the world. It [7485] is not only landlocked, but, by reason of the topography of the surrounding ground, ships lying in this harbor are out of view from the open sea. It is the only practicable site for a naval base in the Pacific Ocean, and is the recognized key to naval supremacy in those waters. Its equipment as an operating base is a prerequisite to the most successful operation of our fleets whether offensive or defensive.

For over sixty-five years the United States Government has officially recognized the strategic importance of the Hawaiian Islands and the necessity of preventing their occupation by any other nation.

Beginning in 1842 President Tyler gave notice to all European nations that the United States would never consent to their occupying Hawaii or establishing any naval base there.

This "Monroe Doctrine of the Pacific" was reiterated by Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, in 1851, and by William L. Marcy, the great Democratic Secretary of State, by James G. Blaine, and by William McKinley.

Captain (now Admiral) A. T. Mahan, writing in 1893, came to the conclusions: "To anyone viewing a map that shows the full extent of the Pacific, * * * two circumstances will be strikingly and immediately apparent. He will see at a glance that [7486] the Sandwich Islands stand by themselves in a state of comparative isolation, amid a vast expanse of sea; and again, that they form the center of a large circle whose radius is approximately the distance from Honolulu to San Francisco. * * *

"This is substantially the same distance as from Honolulu to the Gilbert, Marshall, Samoan, and Society Islands, all under European control except Samoa, in which we have a part influence. * * *

"To have a central position such as this, and to be alone, having no rival and admitting no rival, * * * are conditions that at once fix the attention of the strategist. * * * But to this striking combination is to be added the remarkable relations borne * * * to the great commercial routes traversing this vast expanse.

"Too much stress cannot be laid upon the immense disadvantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling station well within 2,500 miles, as this is, of every point of our coast line from Puget Sound to Mexico. Were there many others available we might find it difficult to exclude from all. There is, however, but the one. Shut out from the Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown back for supplies of fuel to distances of 3,500 or 4,000 miles—or between 7,000 and 8,000 going and coming—an impediment [7487] to sustained maritime operations well nigh prohibitive. * * * It is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defense of a coast line—of a sea frontier—is concentrated in a single position, and the circumstance renders doubly imperative upon us to secure it if we righteously can."

Twenty-two years ago, by the reciprocity treaty with King Kalakaua, the United States acquired the right to establish a naval base on Pearl Harbor.

Ten years ago this nation, foreseeing the likelihood that they might fall into the hands of an Oriental nation, annexed the Hawaiian Islands. This momentous action was taken primarily because of the strategic value of the Hawaiian Islands and for the purpose of establishing a strong naval base on Pearl Harbor.

Since that time a magnificent site for a naval station, consisting of over 600 acres of land, has been purchased by the Federal Government, and a 30-foot channel has been dredged through the channel bar.

The War Department has also acquired ample sites for fortifications at the channel entrance, and the first battery is now under construction.

Up to the present time no beginning has been made toward the actual construction of a naval base on Pearl Harbor. Year after year the needs of the Naval Establishment in other [7488] directions have been permitted to crowd it out of the naval bills.

In the judgment of your committee the new developments on the Pacific and among the nations that border its shores make it imperative that a strong operating base be established for our Navy at Pearl Harbor without further delay.

A naval base at Pearl Harbor is not designed primarily for the protection of Hawaii. Its main purpose is to form a buffer of defense for our entire Pacific coast and to make possible our naval supremacy upon the Pacific.

An enemy in possession of Hawaii could harass and threaten our entire western coast. On the other hand, with our own fleet operating from a well-equipped base at Pearl Harbor, no fleet from the Orient would find it practicable to threaten our coast, because of the stronghold left in their rear and of the prohibitive distance from their coaling base.

The equipment of Pearl Harbor is therefore a matter of national prudence and not of extravagance. It affords the nation's least expensive way of defending our Pacific coast. It will constitute one of the strongest factors in the prevention of war with any power in the Far East.

Your committee has received memorials from all of the strongest commercial organizations on the entire Pacific [7489] coast, urging that the development of Pearl Harbor be provided for at this session of Congress.

The national importance of this measure is emphasized by the fact that commercial bodies from the Central West and from New York City have also memorialized Congress on this subject during this present session.

The question of a naval base in Hawaii is not comparable with the same problem in the Philippines. Hawaii is both a permanent organic part of our nation, and is also a source of revenue; during the past eight years Hawaii has paid more than \$9,000,000 into the Federal Treasury.

Every consideration, whether of national honor or policy, demands that Pearl Harbor be made impregnable and equipped as a naval base immediately.

With a naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii would be our great defensive outpost; in the hands of an enemy it would double the nation's cost for naval defense.

Mr. MURPHY. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. KEEFE. As I understand the procedure, Admiral Kimmel was under cross-examination. I am wondering whether the counsel is now presenting testimony or whether we are going on with the examination of Admiral Kimmel. If he is making out a case for himself of some kind here we ought to know about it and all of us can spend the rest of the next week introducing excerpts from opinions of this person and that person and the other person. I did not think there was any dispute about the facts that have been set forth here in that naval report of 1908 as to Pearl Harbor. I just wonder how far counsel is going to go in reading all this material into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair cannot answer that question. It occurred to the Chair that instead of reading the document it might be printed as a part of the transcript at this point so that it will be in the record. It is not my understanding that there is any controversy over the fact that Congress established Pearl Harbor as a naval base.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you through, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that my reason for putting this in is not to destroy my voice nor to take the time of the committee. If I did not think it was [7491] pertinent I would not have put it in, and the fact is that there has been a great deal in this record, as well as throughout the country, about some unusual situation that the President of the United States had ordered the fleet to Pearl Harbor, and there has been testimony of Admiral Richardson as well as Admiral Kimmel as to why the fleet should be at Pearl Harbor, and this is the basic document as to why the United States Congress established the base at Pearl Harbor, and if it is not interesting to the gentleman from Wisconsin it may be to the American people. It is to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the only point is whether a document that is admitted as an official record of Congress should be read rather than printed as a part of the transcript.

Mr. MURPHY. My only reason, Mr. Chairman, in reading it is so that the other members of the committee will know what I am putting in the record—of course, they can read it later—and so that Admiral Kimmel will know what I read, and I expect to ask some pertinent questions about the matter that I read.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I am inclined to agree, I would like to say, with the gentleman in the importance of this thing and we have, I think—and I would like to say this as a member of the minority—that we have shown considerable latitude to members of the majority in introducing [7492] what they deem proper and pertinent and I should be reluctant to see any restrictions imposed upon any individual member as to what they deem to be pertinent.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been no restriction imposed upon any member whether he is a member of the majority or minority. The only point is whether these official documents should be read or put in the record for the sake of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, if the Congressman wants to ask questions on this I think he should read it into the record so that the witness will be familiar with the text of it and then he will be in a position to answer questions. I assume that counsel is going to ask some questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it has been read and therefore it is all done and he can proceed to ask questions about it if there are any, and I presume there are.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct the committee's attention to a report on the inspection of the naval shore establishment in 1929 and 1930 by Ernest Lee Jahncke, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. I am not going to read the report but there were recommendations at that time back in 1930 that the Nation was slow in getting Pearl Harbor in the condition it should be in which to meet the enemy. I won't read that. Anyone who wants to read it can read it.

[7493] Now, then, Admiral, I direct your attention to an exhibit which was placed in the record this morning referring to the aircraft scouting force and dated December the 8th, 1941. Will you kindly look at that?

Mr. MASTEN. It is Exhibit 127, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Exhibit No. 127. I direct your attention, Admiral, to page 2, on the second page of the exhibit.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I have an opportunity to read this a moment, please, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, surely. I am referring particularly, Admiral, to the letter of the 22d, on the second page of the exhibit, dated December 22, 1941, and signed "C. L. Tinker."

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. I say I am referring particularly to the letter of the 22d, on the second page of the exhibit, dated December 22, 1941, and signed C. L. Tinker, T-i-n-k-e-r, brigadier general.

Admiral KIMMEL. I see it.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to go over with you the items in that letter and go down first to paragraph 1, section f. On December 22, 1941, the order directed that all planes be camouflaged. Were the planes camouflaged before December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better ask General Short about that.

[7494] Mr. MURPHY. I am asking about Navy planes. Were the Navy planes camouflaged?

Admiral KIMMEL. I read a letter into the record the other day dated in September in which I directed the dispersal of all Navy planes in Oahu and to proceed with the camouflage measures. I am not familiar with the steps that were taken. I presume they were camouflaged; I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. You do not know yourself whether or not the Navy planes were camouflaged—

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not.

Mr. MURPHY (continuing). Prior to the morning of December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, paragraph 1, specification a:

Ordered immediate wider dispersal of airplanes, supplies and personnel.

And that is exactly what you had done with the Navy planes, isn't that so? I say that is exactly what you had ordered for the Navy planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph b:

Directed surveys to be made of additional fields for operation of aircraft on the Island of Oahu.

c. Required the movement of pursuit into Hickam [7495] Field area for more positive protection in the event of adverse weather at the former base at Wheeler Field.

d. Moved—

Admiral KIMMEL. Are you asking me about paragraph b?

Mr. MURPHY. No, no, I am reading it into the record, Admiral, because it pertains to the Army.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I see.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph d:

Moved obsolescent B-18 and A-20s to Bellows Field to eliminate the airplane congestion at Hickam Field. A-20s were later moved to Wheeler Field.

e. Moved one squadron B-17s to Wheeler Field to further relieve congestion at Hickam Field.

Paragraph f is about the camouflaging of the planes already referred to.

g. Directed plans be completed for air transport of aircraft ammunition to Maui and Molokai, capable of dispatch on two hours notice.

h. Have issued orders on alerts as follows:

1. 30 before sunrise to 0800, and one (1) hour before sunset to 30 after sunset $\frac{1}{3}$ Army Pursuit and Navy fighters in air.

That was not done prior to the 7th? I say that plan was not in effect prior to December 7?

[7496] Admiral KIMMEL. No; that plan was not in effect prior to December 7, and my information is that they tried this for a few days and were forced to abandon it because the planes and crews could not stand up.

Mr. MURPHY. We will go into that. I am glad to have your information.

Admiral KIMMEL. Isn't that correct, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know. I never saw this before. You say that this plan of the 22d was put into effect and abandoned?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am talking about this particular section which you have just read.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In regard to having the planes in the air and warmed up and ready. My recollection is that in a report submitted by the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, he reported that they had tried that and that they had to abandon it after a short time on account of wear and tear on both crews and planes.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask for a copy of that report. We certainly ought to have it. It is pertinent.¹

Admiral KIMMEL. I have seen it somewhere. I cannot put my fingers on it at the moment.

Mr. MURPHY. I am going to request the Navy liaison officer to [7497] produce that report so that it can be made an exhibit, and until such time, I will proceed reading, Admiral:

All other Army and Navy planes including pursuit excepting searching planes warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

That was not done prior to December 7, was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot speak for the Army planes.

Mr. MURPHY. The Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph 2:

Between 0800 and one (L) hour before sunset:

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit in air.

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

All other Army and Navy planes including fighters excepting searching planes on one hours notice.

3. One (1) hour after sunset, 30 minutes before sunrise ¼ planes on one (1) hours notice, ¾ on four (4) hours notice.

e. I have visited all operating airdromes, made ground reconnaissance of areas where additional airdromes are to be located, have discussed tactical operations, administrative problems, morale and rewards with all major commanders.

[7498] j. I have conferred with Com. Pat. Wing Two and expect to submit to the Department Commander within twenty-four hours revised plans for the employment of the Air Force in the Hawaiian area.

k. I have directed that plans be made and they are well under way for the use of certain elements of the Air Force in offensive operations.

1. Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing, directed to have striking force of minimum of 18 B-17's available at all times.

In connection with that, Admiral, it would be difficult to have 18 prior to December 7 when they only had 6 in commission, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not follow you.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read it, please?

(Question read.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a fact they only had six in commission on the 7th, is that right, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was my understanding and my belief at the time; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph m:

Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be arranged.

[7499] Admiral KIMMEL. I think this will be all right, sir.

¹ See letter from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5484.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, Admiral. Now then I read paragraph m:

Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be arranged.

It is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that you had asked for that equipment before December 7, but were unable to obtain it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have lost you, sir. I do not know where you are right now. I am trying to keep up.

Mr. MURPHY. I am now referring to paragraph m of the same thing I was reading, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. "m"?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I see.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be arranged.

The fact is that you did not have the equipment at Pearl Harbor but had requested it before December 7, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask to have spread on the record at this point, Mr. Chairman, from Exhibit 112, a letter dated January 7, 1942, and I refer particularly to page 4 thereof, [7500] paragraph 7.

Admiral KIMMEL. Let us catch up, please, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Page 4, paragraph 7, Admiral, which is page 80 in the exhibit.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it now.

Mr. MURPHY. A letter from the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to the commander in chief, United States Fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. And I would like to read, Admiral, in connection with what you said that there was a change in the plans that were recommended, in Exhibit 127 the following, paragraph 6 on page 3:

With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain necessary long-range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force, and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering submarine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having on hand for search alone at least three times the number of planes that are needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around this if material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the other can do more.

Then paragraph 7, which describes the search actually [7501] being made and that it had to be reduced to the following basis, which is therein outlined. That would be in accordance with what you said before, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Probably this is what I was talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, I am referring to volume 35 of the testimony in this case and particularly to page 6489. The reason why I am referring to this is at page 6489, which was while Admiral Stark was on the stand and during the course of the morning hour, the distinguished Senator from Michigan had read into the record several messages about the bomb plot and about the reports, regularly and irregularly, at Pearl Harbor to which you have referred.

Incidentally, I think you should have gotten that information, but in order to show what was before the people at Washington, at page

6489 and at 6490 I refer to the general situation, referring to Puget Sound, to San Diego, to the Panama Canal and to Alaska and the Philippines.

Did you know, Admiral, or do you know now that there were messages about those particular areas that were not ship location messages?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have heard—I have not seen the messages, all the messages, but I have been informed, and I believe that in one of those localities were there [7502] messages of the same character and content as those that were requested by the high officials of the Government of Japan, nor did the high officials of the Government of Japan show any such anxiety as to the location of ships in other localities.

Mr. MURPHY. I would agree with you, Admiral, that there was no other message which talked about the plans as to berthing ships, but I ask you to refer to Exhibit 2, at page 34, if you will.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. That is a message from Buenos Aires to Tokyo—or to Panama, rather—

Mr. KEEFE. From Tokyo to Panama?

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman on the left has made a statement before I started a question and he was going to try to cut me off. We are all men. Now let us not have this needling going on. I want to conduct a fair examination and I do not propose to be cut off.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman did not hear the remark.

Mr. MURPHY. I did.

Mr. KEEFE. I did not hear any such remark as that at all, and if he did, he does not hear well. That is all I have got to say about it.

The gentleman has asked a question which I did not [7503] understand, and I wanted to understand it. I ask the reporter to read the question so that the members may know what the question is.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the reporter will read the question.

Mr. KEEFE. Let us see what it is.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask to have it stricken.

Mr. KEEFE. I should like to have it settled, Mr. Chairman, because the gentleman has caustically referred to my interruption and I think the interruption was thoroughly justified.

If the gentleman wants to throw the question out and start over again, I have no objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us proceed, gentlemen.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, I am referring to exhibit 2, page 34, and to the message which is on that page. It is from Buenos Aires to Toyko, and dated the 23d of September 1941. It is Circular No. 146. Then it says:

Buenos Aires to Tokyo #416.

Strictly secret; C. O. R.

When Minister Yamagata was in Panama he was asked by the Italian Minister there to deliver some maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone for him, which he did. Since then, we had Usui go to Chile to take charge of those maps and upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian Ambassador. At the same time, we requested that we be given [7504] copies of them.

Recently, these copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this delivery, Assistant Attache Kameda and Usui were present to ascertain that they were exact copies of the originals). And we entrusted them to our Navy's courier Tatuma who is returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru.

The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon the arrival of these papers in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect through (our Embassy in Rome?)

Minister Yamagata has already advised Chief of Bureau Terasaki regarding this matter. The Navy has also sent a report.

That would be an inquiry which would be rather pertinent—whether they wanted maps of the Panama Canal—wouldn't it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I see nothing which indicates that the Government of Japan wanted maps of the Panama Canal. That follows the pattern of Japanese espionage over many years.

[7505] Mr. MURPHY. You say if you saw the one about Pearl Harbor, in the month of September and translated on October 10, about the bomb plot, that would have changed your whole plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. This is one in September also, looking for maps of the Panama Canal, maps and charts.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Would that indicate a special interest in the Panama Canal?

Admiral KIMMEL. The difference, I think, is that in the one case this was information which had been gathered by the local espionage units in the ordinary course of their duties, and was being sent to Tokyo. I can see nothing in this message, and any other messages that I have had access to, where the Government in Tokyo was seeking and demanding this information at that particular time.

Now, incidentally, I think this message might well have been supplied to me as well as the others. I did not mention it at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, Admiral, as I understand you, the distinction you make is: It is significant if Tokyo asked for it, but not significant if it is supplied to [7506] Tokyo?

Admiral KIMMEL. Significant that Tokyo asked for it and related information on several occasions.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me come again to the Panama Canal.

At page 36, from Panama to Tokyo. This is a message dated October 2, 1941 [reading]:

Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts to the Pacific Area the "Panama Air Depot" located at France Field was transferred to Curundu Heights (immediately adjacent to Albrook Field).

Rear Admiral Sandler, Commander of the 15th Naval District, since the extensive activities on the Pacific end of the Canal, made public on the 1st a statement to the effect that because of the increase of naval supplies a four-story warehouse built on pier 18 (it will be completed the middle of November), the ammunition unloading pier (west of pier 18) consisting of 32 buildings and the existing buildings in the neighborhood of the Balboa drydock would all be taken over as warehouses. Furthermore, the petroleum supply tank at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope (the railroad junction from which the line branches to Colon and Ft. Randolph) on the Atlantic side (recently it is believed that these tanks have been camouflaged) have been taken over.

[7507] There are intelligences at hand concerning the construction of a food storage depot at Corozal which would contain sufficient foodstuffs to supply the Canal Zone for a six-month period, even though shipping routes between this point and the United States are severed.

Would that mean anything to you if you were at Washington and you had these series of messages about that particular area?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think this is in the same category as the previous message.

Mr. MURPHY. They are talking about camouflaging oil tanks and the like, and giving certain vital military information to Tokyo there, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. They are giving military information to Tokyo.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Do you think that you should have had that message also?

Admiral KIMMEL. I see no reason why it should not have been supplied to me.

Mr. MURPHY. You were awfully busy as it was without reading hundreds of additional messages, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had a sizable staff out there.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

[7508] Now, I refer you, Admiral, to page 122 of the same exhibit 2, this being a message from Tokyo to Mexico, from the Tokyo Jap Foreign Minister to Mexico, Koshi, dated June 23, 1941. No. 106 [reading]:

Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have career attache Kihara make an official trip to Panama. (It might be well to have secretary Yoshimizu accompany him).

Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the Naval Attache, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns.

Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their #62 from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip get in touch with them regarding date and time of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.)

Would not that show an unusual interest on the part of Tokyo in the Panama Canal?

Admiral KIMMEL. That shows an interest; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And would not that have been before the authorities in Washington when they were wondering where [7509] the Japanese were going to strike, if they were going to strike?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume it was before them.

Mr. MURPHY. Don't you think that adds a chapter, at least, to your impression about the bomb-plot message, that that directed that the attack was going to happen at Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I see nothing here requesting specific information of ships in the harbor, or their location in the harbor, and that type of information is good just so long as the ships remain where they are. This information is information of more or less permanent installations which will be good for a long time.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, Admiral, however, that the authorities in Washington, on deciding where the Japs were going to strike, did have this before them, as well as the bomb-plot message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I presume they did.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to now refer you, Admiral, to page 125 of the same exhibit. This is a message from Vladivostok to Tokyo, dated July 3, 1941 [reading]:

Report on recent naval activities in this area.

Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and [7510] are engaged in naval preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality. However, naval exercises are limited to only one section of the force for there are many ships which are undergoing repairs. Evidently the preparations are intended for defense against Japan.

I am wondering, Admiral, if that kind of a message had been sent by Japanese espionage from Hawaii to Tokyo, if there would have been an attack on Hawaii. They say there the Russians are prepared to meet any eventuality. They could not have said that about Hawaii, could they? You were not prepared to meet any eventuality on Hawaii, were you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are a better judge of that, or the committee is a better judge of that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you had nothing at all to take care of an oncoming air raid by way of reconnaissance, did you, or any radar working at the time, or any watchers on the hills, at the observation posts, or any pursuit planes in the air, or any ships out scouting to the north from which they came, you did not have that, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. The evidence answers all of those questions very conclusively.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, there was a message from [7511] Hawaii to Tokyo saying that there was still a good chance as I recall it, that there was no reconnaissance being made and still a good chance for a raid on Hawaii. That was a message sent to Tokyo, wasn't it, before the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Which was translated after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. It was, at any rate, sent to them?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think some such message was sent.

Mr. MURPHY. So that as to Hawaii, they had a message that there was still a good chance for an attack, but as to Vladivostok they had a message that the Russians were prepared to meet any eventuality, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not read that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it says—let me read it to you—

Admiral KIMMEL. "By enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality."

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; "by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality."

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot read there anything except exercises.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we may differ on that, but at any rate it says there, "to meet any eventuality."

[7512] Admiral KIMMEL. I only speak of the language here; that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. It says—

in naval preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality.

Of course, that may not mean what I think it does, but it is English, and we can both interpret it.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to the fact—

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). Certainly in the Hawaiian area we had had exercises designed to meet any eventuality.

Mr. MURPHY. You had exercises right along up to November 20, and after November 20 you had no more exercises, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. With the Army. You did not have any exercises after November 20, did you, with the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall those details, but we had exercises designed to meet any eventuality, up to and including December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that you had no exercises with the Army after November 20, did you, of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know. You have some records on that which I presume are correct.

[7513] Mr. MURPHY. All I know is what was put in the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking now about an air-raid drill. That is by no means the only exercise to meet eventualities.

Mr. MURPHY. It was a very important one, wasn't it, Admiral, reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; it was important, and we held the drills regularly and as completely as possible.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Admiral, I direct your attention to page 6491 of the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. Page what?

[7514] Mr. MURPHY. I am just putting this in the record. I am referring to page 6491 of the printed record at which reference is made to page 38 of Exhibit 2.

Admiral KIMMEL. Page 38?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. That is another message from Panama to Tokyo, dated October 6, 1941:

The result of my investigations, as I reported in my secret letter No. 142, are as follows:

1. The airplane bases which the United States is constructing are located at La Chorrera in Panama province, (please refer to part 4 of my #149) Chitre in Herrera province, Monsabo in Los Santos province and at Remidios and Las Ra-Hasu in Chiriqui province.

2. The Panamanian airports already constructed which will be converted into military establishments are the ones at David in Chiriqui province and Paidonya outside the limits of Panama City.

3. Airports which have been surveyed but because of the poor condition of the terrain have not been constructed, are the airports at Guarare in Los Santos province and at eight other projected points.

Does that also show an additional interest on the part of Tokyo in the defenses of Panama?

Admiral KIMMEL. They are always interested in the [7515] defenses of Panama.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like also to refer to page 39 of the same exhibit, from Panama to Tokyo, dated October 18, 1941, where the statement is made:

In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th.

And again:

I found that construction is going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have lost you, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read the whole thing. I have been reading only the high lights.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. I will read the whole thing:

Ship movements from the 14th to the 18th:

Moving toward the Pacific: 4 American, 1 British freighters; 2 American tankers.

Moving toward the Atlantic: 4 American, 2 British, 1 Dutch freighters; 1 American tanker, 1 American passenger steamer. Recently ships have been going through the canal at night.

In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end [7516] on the 10th. (Naturally they do not allow us to inspect the forts.) I found that construction is going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and 8 barracks to accommodate 200 men each.

At Corozal, 4 two-hundred-men barracks, 55 two-family officer's quarters and a 500-patient hospital are nearing completion.

That again would show an active interest of Tokyo in the Panama Canal area, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It shows an interest, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I direct your attention to an entry on page 40, from the Panama Canal, or from Panama to Tokyo, dated October 18, 1941, and you will find in that particular message, Admiral, without my reading it, a reference to gun emplacements at Panama.

Admiral KIMMEL. A reference to what kind of place?

Mr. MURPHY. Gun emplacements.

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume so. I haven't read it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 51. That particular message, while it is dated November 22, 1941, it is translated December 5, 1941. Of course that was before the Japs but not before Washington, but I think [7517] it shows the course of conduct of the Japanese.

You will find the following:

The United States Government is going on the assumption that the attack on the Canal will be made from both air and sea.

Do you see that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I see it.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to direct your attention to page 52, a message from Panama to Tokyo, dated November 22, 1941:

The anti-air defenses (?) on lock #1, which is now being used, are being improved. (Of course, there are anti-air defenses (?) at lock #3.) The naval defense area patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene (on ?) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands.

That would seem to divide up Panama a bit, wouldn't it, as to air defenses, and as to what they have in each section?

Admiral KIMMEL. The message speaks for itself there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, Admiral, they talk about anti-aircraft defenses on lock 1, and again on lock 3, and then talk about the naval defense area, don't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[7518] Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, on page 6493 of the record, in order that the committee, or whoever desires to read in the record the messages which are along the lines to which I have referred at the Panama Canal, covering Alaska, covering the Philippines and the other areas, are referred to by me by page numbers.

The stenographer has copied into the record all of the entries referred to by the distinguished Senator from Michigan, but he has not copied into the record the references which I have given, but only shows the page numbers.

I ask at this point the entries on the pages referred to on page 6493 be spread in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.
(The messages referred to are as follows:)

[7519] From: Manila
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
#532

Re your Circular #1793.*

I am reporting to you below information which I have been able to get, though it may be somewhat incoherent.

1. There are many tall buildings in the city, to the upper stories of which admittance is forbidden. It is thought, therefore, that anti-aircraft guns have been placed in them. It is fairly certain that guns have been placed on the Great Eastern Hotel (some have actually seen ten disguised machine guns on the top of it), the (hitchcock?) Avenue Hotel (this is the former Marco Polo Hotel), and on the Insular Life and the Trading Commerce. Besides these, I presume guns have been placed on top of the Capitol, the Municipal Building, the post office, etc. (I believe that the army and navy both have in their possession a map giving the locations of the tall buildings in the city).

2. A person has seen during the evenings in the latter part of July, 36 anti-aircraft guns being transported to Camp Murphy.

ARMY 21461 Trans. 8/26/41 (6)

* Not available.

[7520] From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
September 22, 1941
#623

Re my message #618.*

The *Phoenix* left port the morning of the 22nd.

ARMY 22771 Trans. 9/27/41 (6)

* See SIS #22772.

From: Davao (Kihara)
To: Tokyo
September 26, 1941
#135

Upon my arrival to take up my post here, I heard the following report concerning Zamboanga*:

Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyers and submarines enter that port from the South Seas every Saturday. After they have lain at anchor for one or two days they leave again for the South. In summing up the statements of members of the crews of these boats, it appears that these warships ply the waters from Jolo^b to Tawao^c and Tarakan^d on the island of Borneo.

ARMY 24468 Trans. 11/7/41 (6)

* A city on the island of Mindanao.

^b Name of the island connecting the main Philippine group [7521] to Borneo

^c Town in British North Borneo.

^d In Netherlands Borneo.

From: Tokyo
To: Davao
October 2, 1941
#62

Re your #105^a.

Please wire me the location and movements of fishermen and ---- since your last report.

ARMY 2597 Trans. 12-4-41 (6)

* Not available.

2782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Manila
October 4, 1941
#318

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.

ARMY 23207 Trans. 10/8/41 (6)

[7522] From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo
1 November 1941
(RE your #318)

Strict guard is being maintained hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows:

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino ---- (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

[7523] 2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3,000 workmen are being used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000 infantry troops left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are being built there and the docks are being enlarged.

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is said that even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur?) and by the middle of October there were less than two kilometers that had not been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day and night and the progress is amazing.

4. In Iba there are 30 or 40 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several score of altitude planes (?) it is said.

Details by Mail.

[7524] *JD-1: 5681. "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest."

(SIS #23207)

JD-1
24382

(H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT)

From: Manila (Nihro)
to: Tokyo
November 4, 1941
#727

Intelligence.

1. Since about a month ago little by little brown [7525] soldiers have been arriving at the Stotsenburg Barracks. The number at present is about two or three thousand. In view of the fact that these soldiers speak Spanish, they may be "Iko's." I understand that they are not very friendly with American soldiers. We are now secretly investigating where they have come from.

2. Taralao.* Recently the Miguel Air Field has been extended to form a rectangle about 1,000 meters long.

* Tarallo, Camarines Province.

3. All the wooden bridges on the national highway between Taralao and Lingayen^b have been replaced with concrete bridges.

4. At the foot of a hill situated to the north of Teralao (the hill overlooks the Lingayen Gulf) about 200 barracks have been constructed. I understand that new barracks are being built at Ste Ignatia.

5. From what I hear the American soldiers stationed at Stotsenburg maintained an arrogant attitude toward the Filipinos and, since there have been two or three cases of assault on Filipinos, the Filipinos are furious.

ARMY 24626 Trans. 11/12/41 (6)

^a Pangasinan Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands on Lingayen Gulf.

[7526] From: Tokyo

To: Manila

5 November 1941

#355

For Secretary Yuki

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:

These items in regard to each port of call:

- (1) Conditions at air ports on land.
- (2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
- (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
- (4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

JD-1: 6424 (F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (6-AR)

24696

From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

#754

According to a report handed on to me by a Japanese [7527] who has lived in the Province of Ilocos Norte for some fourteen or fifteen years, the following has been ascertained.

1. At the present time there are approximately 400 Philippine soldiers and seven or eight officers stationed in Laoag^a. It is being rumored, however, that the Philippine troops will be increased to approximately 1,700. At the present time they are constructing additional barracks.

2. There seems to be no indication that they plan the expansion of the present civil airport in Laoag (length 1,200 metres; width, 850 metres) nor are they stationing any military planes at that field. Aside from a reconnaissance flight nightly (one plane) over the coastal area in the vicinity of the city, no extensive activity is in progress.

3. Though it is said that Claveria^b and Burgos^b are being equipped with -----, the details are unknown. (I am continuing my private investigations in this connection.)

ARMY 25064 Trans. 11/21/41 (6)

^a Seaport in the Province of Ilocos Norte on the Island of Luzon, P. I.

^b Towns on the northern shore of the Island of Luzon, P. I.

[7528] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

#755

A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines Norte^a is as follows:

1. In that area at the present time there does not seem to be many troops stationed. Only about 60 members of the Philippine Patrol organization, with headquarters in Daet^b, are located in that area. Every day five or six of these patrolmen are dispatched as a relief unit to Paracale^c and Jose Panganiban^d.

^a Province near southeastern extremity of Luzon.

^b City on southeastern extremity of the Island of Luzon.

^c Seaport in the province of Camarines Norte.

^d English spelling. Cannot identify.

2784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2. The Civil Airport at Paracale is not being used at the present time. Insofar as the military air field at Daet is concerned, though one or two military planes landed there during February of this year, from that time to this there has not been a single military plane alight on this field. As this field is located right on the beach, should it be necessary it is said that naval planes could land in the shipping lane just off the beach as well.

3. On the point of land, San Muricio*, north of Jose Panganiban it is rumored that they are equipping ---- with ----, but this has not been verified. (I am continuing my secret investigations.)

[7529] 4. Twelve or thirteen coastal reconnaissance planes were seen to have flown over the area within a period of three days. Toward the latter part of last year 13 American freighters are said to have entered the port of Panganiban. Since then, almost on the average of once a week, American freighters sail from Batjanas† to Hondagua‡.

ARMY 25162

* English spelling. Point of land cannot be identified.

† Seaport in southwestern Luzon.

‡ Seaport on Lopez Bay off Lamon Bay.

From: Toyko

To: Manila

15 November 1941

#368

Strictly confidential.

Re your #746*

Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, and also please make investigations again as to their number.

(SIS #24850)

JD-1: 6753 25236 (H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AR)

*JD-1: 6545. Reports 32 B-19 bombers in the Philippines.

[7530] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

15 November 1941

#767

1. It has been ascertained that the ship of my #757*, paragraph 2, was a British transport, the AWATEA which entered port at the same time under convoy, (12000 or 13000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board). Both ships sailed again on the evening of the 14th, destination unknown.

2. On the afternoon of the 14th, 4 destroyers, 11 submarines, 1 minelayer, entered port.

3. Ships in port on the 15th:

A Manila:

MADDO

Portland

BUKKU

BERU

BERU**

HON

WOHOTOSU

8 destroyers

20 submarines

1 minelayer

[7531] B. Cavite:

TON

PASU

SIS #24780

JD-1: 6754 25237 (H) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (AR)

*JD-1: 6503. Re movements of U. S. Naval and British Naval craft in Manila area.

**BERU repeated.

• From: Manila

To: Tokyo

15 November 1941

#767

We are retransmitting our machine telegram of the 14th with indicator 97720 because of a mistake on the plug board, as follows:

The following is from a report of a Japanese resident of Cebu.

1. At present there are about 300 American and 2500 Filipino soldiers stationed there. (There are four barracks each with a capacity of about 500 or 600 soldiers.)

2. The airport has an area of about 196 acres but is being enlarged (by use of convict labor). [7532] About 12 planes (of medium size) used by the Philippine Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12 or 13 American Army planes (monoplanes—whether they were scout planes or pursuit planes was not clear), are now stationed there. In addition to these there is one large bomber in the hangar (double type, capacity 40 planes.)

3. The headquarters of the former patrol force are being used as the commissariat storehouse and all sorts of provisions are being stored there.

4. On the 22nd of September, about 20 American warships anchored on the northwest coast of the Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle of October two destroyers and one cruiser entered Cebu harbor and early this month, one oil supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a camouflaged cruiser of the 10,000 ton class, entered port and anchored for two or three days. It has been recognized that occasionally two or three American ships anchor around the south of Mactan, Bacol, and Panglao.

5. There is an open drydock at MAKUGAA (operated by Chinese) capable of handling ships up to 10,000 tons.

JD-1 6587 24933 (H) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT)

[7533] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 22, 1941

#785

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the *President Harrison*) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and material.

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila—Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu*; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.

Cavite—Houston (?); Canopus.

ARMY 25471 Trans. 11/29/41 (6)

* Kana spelling.

From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 24, 1941

#789

1. Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount of military stores was removed from the "port [7534] area" during the "black-out" of the night of the 21st. Forty or fifty civilian buses (carrying the "mark" of the Manila Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal Province district. Investigations are being made to find out if these were loaded with troops.

2. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd, 60 light tanks (carrying one gun two—) and 20 ammunition trucks were seen leaving (Quezon Bridge?). These light tanks and ammunition trucks were seen on the 21st grouped near the headquarters of the "port area" military police. It is conjectured that (troops?) arrived on military boats recently entering the harbor. An English language "bulletin" of the 24th stated that a large number of light tanks and ammunition trucks had left at 4 and 6 o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd in transit for Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in Pampanga Province. I believe that these had been landed sometime around the 21st. The final destination of these tanks and trucks is now being investigated.

3. At present it is seen that there are two or three hundred American army trucks near the "port area" which have been imported at short intervals, creating a hurried atmosphere. Also, troops have newly arrived at (certain places in ?) the hills within the city. They are evidently American reinforcements. Feeling among the people in general has become tense.

ARMY 25530 Trans. 12/1/41 (6)

2786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[7535] From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo
26 November 1941
#790

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland * (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.
2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.
3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

JD-1: 7035 25708 (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR)

*Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons.

From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo
27 November 1941
#797

The Portland, BUKKU *, 2 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on the 26th (?). Destination unknown.

JD-1: 7082 25782 (H) Navy. Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

*Probably Black Hawk.

[7536] From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941
#799

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day.

ARMY 25764 Trans. 12/5/41 (6)

[7537] Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, was it not your feeling while you were commander in chief of the fleet, that you had an attack force mission to perform and that you should not be obliged to participate in the defense of the Hawaiian Islands as such; I mean the base itself?

Admiral KIMMELL. I felt, and I believe all the Navy felt, that the real mission of the Pacific Fleet was offensive, and I think that nothing has ever occurred to change that conviction in the minds of any responsible naval officers.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, I would like to refer your attention to a letter which you wrote, and in which you objected to having the combined houses for the Army and Navy.

By the way, there was a proposition, was there not, that the Army and Navy commanders, the commanding general and commander in chief of the fleet at Hawaii be housed together in the same building? That was made prior to December 7, was it not?

Admiral KIMMELL. My recollection of that is that that referred to an information center.

Mr. MURPHY. No, I think you will find it is beyond that.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Murphy, that is Exhibit 123.

[7538] Mr. MURPHY. Will you get that exhibit for the admiral, please?

(The document was handed to Admiral Kimmel.)

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have Exhibit 123 before you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have Exhibit 123.

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to the second page of that exhibit, being a letter from the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute. Will you say that again?

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to the second page of the exhibit, a letter dated November 3, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[7539] Mr. MURPHY. From the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to the Chief of Naval Operations, by way of the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph 1 says:

It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a).

That was a plan to combine how much of the Army and Navy, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection of all this is that that was a common information center. Under date of the 15th of October 1941, you will see a dispatch. He says:

Your dispatch 140400 to BUDOCKSX request consideration be given to construction of combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii such as CINPAC COMFOURTEEN COMTRAIN COMSUBFOR COMPATWING and parallel activities of Army. CNO considers contemplation of Army and Navy activities in one building of proper construction constitutes great advantage for emergency operations. Comment with recommendations including location and estimate of cost requested.

Mr. MURPHY. Was not that to combine all of you in one building? [7540]

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a combined operating center.

Mr. MURPHY. It says, "operating activities * * * of CINPAC COMFOURTEEN." Would not that put you and Admiral Bloch together in the same building?

Admiral KIMMEL. If that had been carried out, yes. That is what it says.

Mr. MURPHY. I say that is the recommendation, is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would not necessarily put me and Admiral Bloch in the same building. It would put the operating staffs necessary for the Army and Navy together in one building.

Mr. MURPHY. In the November 3 letter Admiral Bloch says:

I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefitted by being in a common office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

That was his version of it there, wasn't it, at the bottom of the page, in paragraph 5, about the fifth line up from the bottom?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. Referring to the letter of November 3, 1941, paragraph 5, the fifth from the last line.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. What about it?

[7541] Mr. MURPHY. It says there:

I do not believe that the Commander in Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefitted by being in a common office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

So that his impression apparently was that they were discussing putting all three of you in the same building, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they were discussing that.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. The operating agencies.

I might shorten up your work here if you want to, however.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. You mean by saying it was adopted after December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was adopted?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, wasn't it, after December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not in that form, no. I do not know what was done after December 7 definitely, because I have not been out there since, and I haven't talked it over with people, but my general feeling at the time, and as I have expressed it in here, I think I have expressed it in some of these letters—I have not had a chance to read them recently—but the fleet commander should not be concerned with the immediate operation of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. You had a naval admiral and an Army general, and fleet [7542] commander in my opinion should have been free to do other things besides concerning himself with the details of the defense of Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. That is exactly what I am coming to. In other words, that was your feeling on December 7, and prior thereto, and in your letter of November 3, the first endorsement dated November 3 on page 2 in that exhibit, under paragraph (f), I mean paragraph 3, subparagraph (f).

In objecting to a combined operating center for the Army and Navy—you say—

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute.

Mr. MURPHY. Excuse me. That is paragraph 3 (f).

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You say there, "in objecting," and so forth, paragraph 3. Then you say:

On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages among which are the building—

and then I go down to (f)—

It would have at least a psychological tendency to divert Fleet units to defensive tasks.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you did not feel that the planes of the fleet should be used for the purpose of defending that base, did you? You felt that Admiral Bloch should have his own planes and the Army should have their planes, that absolutely and primarily it was an Army obligation and [7543] that you should be left to go on with your preparation to fight, because that is what you thought you were out there for, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but I made plans to utilize every facility, every naval facility that happened to be in Pearl Harbor in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I think that the plans that I made show that most conclusively.

Mr. MURPHY. You did object to Washington to the fact that you had to do that, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly I objected, and I objected because I wanted to have those planes free for other things, and I knew that even with all the planes and everything we had that we were forced to make a choice as to what we could and should do.

Mr. MURPHY. You complained to Admiral Stark; and Admiral Stark, in effect, kind of agreed with you but said, "There is no choice. We have to do it," did he not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. That was an old problem, because it existed back in 1940 with Admiral Richardson, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; it existed always.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to read into the record from a letter dated November 28, 1940, a letter to Admiral Stark from Admiral Richardson. I would like to refer to the second [7544] paragraph, Admiral, which reads as follows:

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This fight on the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and I think it can easily be provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships at present are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

In that connection I would like to direct your attention, Admiral, to the discussion of the torpedo nets at Hawaii.

Mr. MASTEN. That is Exhibit 116, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Exhibit No. 116. Do you have your copy of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, there was a letter in February that gave you the impression that there was no danger of a torpedo attack at Pearl Harbor. Do you recall that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Gave me definite data, which was conclusive, that there was no danger of torpedo attack in Hawaii or in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. By the way, there was reference made, when counsel was questioning you, to Whitehead torpedoes that were purchased by the Japs. Is it not a fact that the Japanese had perfected those torpedoes in 1931 for the [7545] specific purpose of being used in an attack on Pearl Harbor? Of course, we did not know about that.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course, I did not know about that, but if that be true, this is the first time I ever heard it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it is my impression, and only an impression, that in the record a statement is made that the Japanese perfected this torpedo for use against Pearl Harbor in 1931. Of course, the Navy did not know about it, and I am not criticizing the Navy.

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. MURPHY. But I am putting it in the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are a little bit in error.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. My understanding, although I do not know, is that they took some Whitehead torpedoes that were manufactured in 1931 and shortly before Pearl Harbor they succeeded in so altering them as to make them suitable for use in the waters of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. It may be so.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is the correct statement.

Mr. MURPHY. I am glad to have you say that. My only reason for going into it, Admiral, was, I was wondering if the Japs were plotting an attack on Pearl Harbor in 1931. Some people in this country would have us believe that they started [7546] to prepare on November 26, 1941.

I am referring, Admiral, to this group of letters in Exhibit 116, and you have already covered the letter written in February that led you to believe that there was absolutely no danger from torpedoes.

This reference has been made to the letter in June. Do you remember that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. The letter of June 13.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Where they discussed Taranto. Now, both the opinion of Admiral King and a great many opinions are to the effect that the idea was then abandoned.

I now direct your attention to the letter of September 16, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute. It appears I haven't got that letter.

Mr. MURPHY. You say you do not have the letter?

Mr. MASTEN. Is it in the same exhibit?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. What is the date of it?

Mr. MURPHY. September 16, 1941, a letter from Admiral Ingersoll.

Mr. MASTEN. I think you will have to read from the copy [7547] you have, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Under date of September 16, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. A letter was written from Admiral Ingersoll, Acting Chief of Naval Operations, to the Bureau of Ordnance, and in paragraph 1 the following may be found:

It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of the problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and draftsmen be assigned exclusively to planning improvements in net and boom designs and to development and experimental work.

Then again in paragraph 2:

In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the desirability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other suggestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be laid and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes.

At any rate, that indicates that the Chief of Naval Operations in September 1941 was trying to get a net that could be used, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Which could be what?

Mr. MURPHY. Which could be used if they had perfected [7548] one?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I knew nothing of this letter. I never saw it until recently.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you also find, Admiral, a letter in October following this?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume so.

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder if you would be kind enough to read the October letter? It is lost in my exhibit. It is a short letter.

(The document was handed to Mr. Murphy.)

Mr. MURPHY. I find a letter dated October 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, and paragraph 2 reads as follows:

Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval Operations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up, towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested, does not appear to solve this question; a reduction in the number of moorings, at present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required.

You did not know about that letter either, Admiral, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I did not know about it.

[7549] **Mr. MURPHY.** My reason for putting it in the record is to show that the Navy had a very active interest in perfecting a net and that the Navy should not be subjected to the criticism which they have received from some quarters that they were derelict in not trying to get a net for Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were obtaining nets to be used in all harbors, I presume. Their efforts were not confined to Pearl Harbor by any means.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And the fact that that letter is in existence shows that they were working for a net. It doesn't show where they were going to put the net. I presume they would have sent some to Pearl Harbor. I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. It showed they had an active interest in the development of a good torpedo net; isn't that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like now to refer to a letter dated December 30, 1940, from Admiral Bloch to the Chief of Naval Operations, in which he says in paragraph 1:

In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with [7550] the equipment and forces at hand.

Then I desire to read only a part of paragraph 2, in which it states:

The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers, and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers.

Again at the end of the paragraph:

For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

I would like also to read from a letter dated January 4, 1941, from Admiral Richardson as commander in chief of the United States Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, paragraph 2:

As neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of an attack by hostile aircraft.

Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to the basic exhibit of Navy dispatches. That would be exhibit No. 37. [7551] I direct

your attention, Admiral, if you will, to a dispatch in that exhibit where you were notified that the Japanese were going to proceed to attack sometime prior to November.

Yesterday we were discussing the significance which you attached to the messages about the destruction of the codes and you said at that time that the reason why you didn't pay particular attention to the first message about the codes was that it said that only some, not all, but most of the codes were being destroyed; do you recall that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I do.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you did have a subsequent message, however, which did say that the machines were being destroyed, didn't you?

The first dispatch of December 3 said that they were told to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. There was also a dispatch on the 3d which said that they were to destroy the machine.

Admiral KIMMEL. There was a qualifying word in there and it referred to a particular machine.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will read it exactly.

Circular 2444 from Tokyo 1 December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December Second Washington also directed destroy X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied.

Wouldn't that be a highly important and significant message in view of the developments at that time, to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. You will note on your copy that the word "purple" was inserted by Mr. Gesell on December 17, 1945, and "there no longer being any necessity for maintaining it a secret." Gesell's amendment is found in volume 26, page 4559.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking what was before Admiral Kimmel before December 7.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I am trying to show exactly what was before Admiral Kimmel and what was before Admiral Kimmel was that the Japs had ordered the destruction of one particular machine which was by no means all they had.

Mr. MURPHY. I take it then that when you heard about the purple code, which was their most precious one, their ultra code, you didn't know what "purple" meant, was that it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I didn't know what purple meant.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ask Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I asked my intelligence officer.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he know?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, he didn't know.

[7553] Mr. MURPHY. Did you ask Washington then?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I didn't. My intelligence officer finally found one officer on the Island of Oahu who told us it was one of the Japanese very secret machines, which one I did not know at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, wouldn't that, in view of the war warning, indicate to you that trouble was afoot and that war was coming?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a step but it was by no means a conclusive step.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you had other messages too about the destruction of codes, didn't you, from your own intelligence officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the afternoon of December 6 my intelligence officer came to me and told me that they were burning papers outside of the Japanese consulate. Such reports had been made to me three or four times in the course of the year. The first time I received such a report I was considerably concerned and attempted to find out all I could about it and on succeeding reports of that nature I also attempted to find out about it.

When this report was made to me I knew nothing about any information that the FBI may have obtained and I did not see the dispatch that was sent by the commandant of the district [7554] until after the attack.

Now, whether or not they were destroying codes, I do not know. There was nothing definite that came to me that they were destroying codes. The report that came to me was that they were burning papers once more.

Mr. MURPHY. Did the FBI man talk to you before you went to the hotel that night, the night of the 6th? There was an FBI man who I understand talked to General Short before he went into Schofield Barracks. I was wondering if that same FBI man talked to you before you went to the hotel?

Admiral KIMMEL. He did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you did have reports besides the one of the 6th about the destruction of codes, from your own intelligence officer, didn't you, Admiral? Didn't you have messages showing you that they were being destroyed at other posts in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I had some, and I had a message authorizing me to destroy codes on the outlying islands.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know, Admiral, that the Navy code was much more difficult to break than the Army code?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean our own Navy code?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, your own Navy code, was a much better code and harder to break than the Army code?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I didn't know it at the time. I [7555] had an idea that the Navy code might be better. I thought we had a better communications system than the Army had.

Mr. MURPHY. The Army says so.

At any rate, you did have a message from Batavia about them destroying codes and machines there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the message I just read, I think.

Mr. MURPHY. No, the one of the 6th was the one from Honolulu. I am now talking about one of a couple of days before December 1. You had a message from Batavia about them destroying codes, in your intelligence report?

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that?

Mr. MURPHY. I will get it for you. It is in the fleet intelligence report. The one that goes up to December 2, as I recall it.

Lieutenant HANIFY. I have that exhibit, sir. It is Exhibit 115.

Mr. MURPHY. From October 27 to December 2, 1941.

Lieutenant HANIFY. I haven't found the reference yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. In this message that we have just been discussing, the one of December 3, 1941, it talks about the destruction of the purple machine. "Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo." Is that what you are referring to?

Mr. MURPHY. No. There is a separate message in your intelligence report.

[7556] Lieutenant HANIFY. The last item in that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. On December 2—

Lieutenant HANIFY. United States Ambassador at Bangkok?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. On December 2, 1941, the intelligence report that was placed you show the United States Ambassador at Bangkok on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes. That showed that our Ambassador there was quite concerned about war coming, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Bangkok is in Thailand. He was concerned that they might get his code down there when they attacked Thailand. I might say that was the least significant of all of them.

Mr. MURPHY. Didn't it indicate to you that he felt down there that war was coming on December 2? You said yesterday that when nothing happened in several days the importance of these things started to become minimized in your mind.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a precaution that he might well have taken.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't see any particular significance to that?

Admiral KIMMEL. You will recall the information I had about the conspiracy of the Japs to induce the British to come into Thailand and attack them. That was all part of that picture.

[7557] Mr. MURPHY. Yes; that was also in that same group of messages, wasn't it? That was placed before you within 2 or 3 days of this other one. Admiral, do you have the intrigue message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I have it here.

Mr. MURPHY. That was just a few days before, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. The day before.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you speak in your statement about the winds code and the winds code execute. You knew the details of the winds code, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew the winds code had been set up.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew that we were looking for it and trying to find out if there was an execute message?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. You had a dispatch on the 28th of November giving you that in detail, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Telling you exactly what it would mean and showing, if there had been an execute, it would mean that there was a rupture in diplomatic relations; Isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. At least that, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, it is your opinion, is it not, that there was an execute message? You say so in your statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. My opinion, yes. I took my opinion [7558] from the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry. I quoted them on it. I don't recall that I gave any opinion.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the assertions in your statement which led you to believe that you had been misled were based in part upon the belief by you now and at the time you made your statement that there had been a winds code execute; isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I based that on the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry who heard all the evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, if there had not been an execute message it would considerably alter your statement to that effect?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would not alter my statement that the Naval Court of Inquiry found as a fact that the winds message execute had been received.

Mr. MURPHY. If it is a fact, Admiral, that there was no execute message, would it alter your statement that you have made to this committee that you were misled to that extent?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I became convinced that the Naval Court of Inquiry was in error and they had conclusive evidence that it never had been received it would alter my statement to that extent.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, speaking about the Naval Court of Inquiry, [7559] were you given a fair trial there?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was, indeed.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you given a fair hearing before the Roberts Commission?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was permitted to testify before the Roberts Commission. I didn't have any counsel.

Mr. MURPHY. You had somebody beside you, didn't you? Didn't you have Admiral Theobald with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was assisting me with the papers. He was not counsel. And he said he was not counsel.

Mr. MURPHY. He said he wasn't counsel, but he did volunteer quite a little information?

Admiral KIMMEL. And Mr. Roberts said he wasn't counsel.

Mr. MURPHY. But he was at your side, getting papers and making statements occasionally to clarify the picture, wasn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, for which he was—all right.

Mr. MURPHY. They asked him to be sworn?

Admiral KIMMEL. They asked him to be sworn so that he would be a witness.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; as long as he was giving information.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There were some distinguished admirals on that Board, on the Roberts Board, were there not?

[7560] Admiral KIMMEL. There were two admirals on the Board; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you have any reason, Admiral, to feel that they weren't able admirals?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MURPHY. Up to the time that you saw their report did you have any grievance against them or any criticism to make of their capacity to sit? Up to the time you saw their report and differed with it, had you any particular criticism of the ability of those two gentlemen?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were able officers.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, were they competent to sit on this board?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were.

Mr. MURPHY. Now the Army Board, you appeared before that, didn't you? The Army Pearl Harbor Board, you testified before them, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you treated all right there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I was not permitted to hear the testimony of other witnesses before the Army Board nor to introduce evidence. I merely testified before the Army Board.

Mr. MURPHY. The Navy Board; how were you treated there?

[7561] Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy Court of Inquiry?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was permitted to have counsel, I was permitted to introduce evidence, I was permitted to cross-examine witnesses, I was permitted to confront witnesses.

Mr. MURPHY. That was ordered by the Secretary of the Navy and you were given every right that you wanted to demand, that you required, or that you requested, except that it was not made public?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was given full facilities to present my case to the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Mr. MURPHY. Now do you know of any reason why Admiral King and Secretary Forrestal would differ as they did, and The Adjutant General of the Navy differ as he did, with the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to go with you, if I may, to the testimony of General Short before the Roberts Commission. I direct your attention—do you have it?

Lieutenant HANIFY. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Can you make that available, Counsel?

In the meantime I will read—would you prefer to have a copy before you? I am going to ask you some questions. I think in fairness to you you ought to have a copy before you.

[7562] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think I ought to have a copy. I would like to see what it is you are reading from.

Mr. MURPHY. While they are going downstairs to get a copy I will go into some other things, Admiral.

Admiral, in your statement you complain, apparently, about the tenor of the messages that were sent to you from Washington; first, the messages about the economic sanctions in July, and then the messages in October about the change of Cabinet, and then the other messages in November, and you say that each of them were in effect a war warning.

Wouldn't you think the responsibility was more on the Japanese than it was on the officials at Washington for that series of messages? Wasn't it the conduct of the Japanese that prompted those different messages which appeared to be war warnings?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to say.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a fact that you did expect to be told about the change in Cabinet and what might happen in October, October 16?

Admiral KIMMEL. I expected full information, yes. I was glad of any information I could get.

Mr. MURPHY. You certainly expected to be told about the economic sanctions in July, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly.

[7563] Mr. MURPHY. And on each of those occasions they would have to have a message of pretty serious import to describe that occasion to you, wouldn't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Would Washington be to blame for the series of messages or the Japanese?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't blame anybody for the series of messages. I set forth what I had.

Mr. MURPHY. Except that you see to complain about having had some messages prior to the war-warning message.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well—

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if it wasn't the Japanese that caused that instead of somebody in Washington.

You did have a message from the Chief of Naval Operations about code machines or codes being destroyed, before, Admiral, didn't you?

I refer to a message in July 17, 1941, reading as follows—

Lieutenant HANIFY. Which exhibit, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. 37, page 9:

17 July 1941.

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF

Info: CINCPAC

[7564] The time has come blank Tokyo to Vichy twelve July two seven four and two seven five list six terms of ultimatum to be answered by twenty July X Japan will send necessary Army Navy air forces to southern French Indo China X French turnover naval and air bases listed in Jonab or seven July X Expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move about freely X French withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible clashes X Vichy authorize French Indo China military to arrange details with Japanese either before or after landing X Colony to pay Japan twenty-three million piastres annually to meet cost of occupation XX Tokyo to Vichy fourteen July two eight one Army now planning advance on or about twenty July XX Tokyo to Saigon and Hanoi sixteen July circular one five one eight formal demands presented to Vichy on fourteen X Reply asked by twentieth X Japan intends carry out plans by force if opposed or if British or United States interferes X Kanju Maru being held at Saigon to evacuate all Japanese there sailing early dawn twenty-four July X Burn codes X Japanese in northern area evacuate or move into Hanoi end of this.

[7565] Would that indicate that since war was coming in that direction that the Japanese were ordering the codes be destroyed and wouldn't that indicate—

Admiral KIMMEL. Let me say, I haven't seen this message for a long time.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the only part I am interested in is the fact that they seem to be going to advance.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am trying to find out what he is talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it is a Navy message.

Admiral KIMMEL. Who is to burn codes, and how? Can you make out?

Mr. MURPHY. My assumption is that OPNAV is telling what has happened between Tokyo and Vichy. They are talking about what they are going to do. They are going to make an advance, and before they make their advance—

Admiral KIMMEL. There must be something missing, because I can't see that it makes any sense, so far as the burning codes business is concerned. I don't know what that is.

Mr. MURPHY. My only purpose is to ask you, as between an ordinary layman and an expert, if it wasn't a fact that the advance at that time meant war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Your command of language is better [7566] than mine, I think.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. You should be able to understand what the message means. It is plain English. It says "burn codes." I can't make out what kind of codes he is talking about. There must be something missing. I can't see that it makes sense.

Mr. MURPHY. My trouble is that when I read the one in December about burning codes, from everything I have read, I thought that meant war, but apparently it didn't mean war at Hawaii, because burning codes you said didn't have much significance to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, this "burn codes" here in July didn't bring on war, at least. I don't know what it meant. There is something about burning codes.

Mr. MURPHY. You say it didn't bring on war. They did go into Indochina. They took over there, didn't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as far as I am concerned, I don't understand what they are talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a fact that after this message, shortly thereafter, they did go into Indochina and take over?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but who burned the codes?

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, I am only dealing with [7567] what messages are before us, and my only reason in talking about burning codes, if you didn't understand it, did you ask Washington then, in July, to explain it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought I understood it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will counsel check that and get us the original?¹

Mr. MASTEN. That is the one on page 9?

Senator LUCAS. You are going to find out who burned the codes?

Mr. MURPHY. I am interested in whether or not we are getting accurate information. It is hard enough to keep up with accurate information.

Admiral KIMMEL. From memory, I don't remember the message. I probably saw it; if it was addressed to me I certainly saw it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, do we have the copy of the Short testimony?

Before the Roberts Commission, Admiral, General Short was being questioned about what he would have done if he had had all of the material which was asked for. He was also asked what the Navy would have done if the Navy had all the material they had asked for. The general was reluctant to answer the question, but he did say to the Roberts Board that even if the Navy had had all that it [7568] wanted and had asked for in his opinion there still would have been no reconnaissance on that morning. Would you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I take the statement that you have made, and I presume it is correct, I haven't read it, but I do not agree with his conclusion as you have stated it.

[7569] Mr. MURPHY. I refer to page 1637.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. Where is it?

Mr. MURPHY. Excuse me just one minute. I beg your pardon; page 1641, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. 1641?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; 1641, at the bottom of the page.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

¹ The document was supplied to Representative Murphy. See p. 5134.

Mr. MURPHY (reading) :

General McCoy. If you had been furnished with all of the things that you felt necessary, would that have made any difference in this particular action?

General SHORT. I do not believe it would.

Admiral STANDLEY. Right there: In case the patrol planes that were necessary to make the effective off-shore patrol were here in sufficient numbers, do you still think that no change would have been made in the plans?

General SHORT. None whatever, because you couldn't tell when some of them might have been ordered away. If they had been left they just simply would not have called upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in most of our exercises the assumption was that they had enough to make the patrol, so they made the patrols and called up on us to execute the bombing mission, because [7570] they considered that our B-17s were more effective as bombers than their own planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but in this estimate they stated definitely that there were not sufficient forces to make a continuous air patrol as required in war.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't be—

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, if you had had that force here do you think under the circumstances you would have been making that patrol every morning? Not you, I mean, but the Navy.

General SHORT. But the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. The combined effort, yes.

General SHORT. Well, I think that would be a fair question to ask the Navy. I don't hardly think under the conditions that they would; I think that they would have been doing it as an exercise now and then in connection with us. I do not believe that they would have been doing it habitually if they had had them, but I don't know. It would be a fair question to ask them.

And then down below:

Admiral REEVES. Before you go to that, General, let me ask General Short this: On the other hand, if you had had material and [7571] fully equipped radar stations, would you have been operating them throughout the day or would you have operated them as you did on the morning of the 7th?

General SHORT. I probably would have operated them just as I did.

Now, do you agree, first, with General Short that if you had had the planes that you wanted that you would have continued the same schedule of operations on the morning of the 7th as you did?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not agree with any of his conclusions here about that. I most certainly do not.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, Admiral, that General Short testified before the Roberts Board that he implicitly believed that you were having reconnaissance on that morning, although he did not know the details of it and, as I understand it, you testified that you implicitly believed that you were getting radar protection for 200 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, if there had been a conference between you and General Short on what to do and into detail after November the 27th, would you have been led to believe that you were getting a 200-mile coverage at all times on radar and would he have been led to believe implicitly that there was a reconnaissance?

[7572] **Admiral KIMMEL.** Let us get the beginning of that. That is a little bit too long for me.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a long question.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; a little too much there.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Read the question, please.

(Question read.)

Admiral KIMMEL. There was a conference, not only one but several of them, at which we discussed all phases of the Pacific campaign and the defenses of Hawaii and I have covered that very thoroughly in

previous testimony and in the statement which I submitted to the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. You have read, have you, General Short's testimony before the Roberts Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. Have I what?

Mr. MURPHY. Have you read General Short's testimony before the Roberts Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have read some of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't he tell them that you did not discuss details, that you spent your time on discussing the outlying islands; that he had never seen the war warning message of the 27th and that he thought there was reconnaissance, but he did not know the details?

Admiral KIMMEL. He changed that testimony considerably later, as you will recall.

[7573] Mr. MURPHY. Before the Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Mr. MURPHY. He changed it in subsequent hearings, but I was wondering if he testified to it before the Board. He did say that it was his recollection that he had seen the message, but he did not know whether he had or not, as I remember it.

Let me go into it exactly; I think it is important. I direct your attention to page 38 of the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What record?

Mr. MURPHY. Of the Roberts hearing, General Short's testimony. General Short there said that since the beginning of the emergency there was only one alert and that was at the time of the freezing of assets in July. At that time General Short placed the Army on an alert against—

Admiral KIMMEL. Where are you reading from?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not reading yet. I am giving this as preliminary to try to save time.

In July, after the message about the freezing of the assets, General Short immediately put out his sabotage alert. As I understand it, at that time the Navy did nothing special; is that right? You took no special precautions?

Admiral KIMMEL. What date was that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. In July, after the message about freezing [7574] the assets.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall now just what action we took at that time, if any.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, as I understand it, you were on a sabotage alert for many years; the fleet had done everything they could to stop sabotage, and there was no need of getting into any additional precautions about it; isn't that so?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true; that part of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Whereas the Army did go into a sabotage alert, and they put men out to protect the utilities, and as I understand it, they never stopped protecting them right down to November 27, whereas you did not have any special precautions at that time.

Admiral KIMMEL. I had many precautions, but our problem in regard to sabotage in the Navy and the Army's problem were entirely separate and distinct; very different.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, in October, when you got the message, you did go in and take special precautions and make special assignments, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. As I recall, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. The Army, so far as you know, did not take any steps at that time, did they?

[7575] Admiral KIMMEL. I do not now recall.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to page 46. At the bottom of the page, about 10 lines from the bottom of the page, General Short says:

The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known by me.

Do you see that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I saw that.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign it to a certain sector, say maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600 miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say, that was a matter that was not under my control.

General Short did so testify, didn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it is so recorded here.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. I now direct your attention to page 47, about one-third of the way down:

General SHORT. From March 21—

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

From March 21 on we had repeatedly carried out exercises along that line. We had a minimum of one exercise a week, and sometimes exercises more frequently than that, but we were working constantly to perfect that coordination. This has no direct bearing, but to show what we were trying to do, that same agreement provided that when we were using fighters over the Island of Oahu then they turned their fighters over to my command. We were trying to get a coordinated whole in that.

Now, I am reading, Admiral, but I do hope that the counsel will check on the date of November the 20th as being the last exercise.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The 12th.

Mr. MURPHY. November the 12th?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. As the last exercise, and I am wondering why if you and General Short had plans to have an exercise every week and sometimes oftener than that throughout the year, there was not at least an exercise held to get ready after the war warning of the 27th.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to answer that. I told you that that was a matter handled by the commandant of the district and the commanding general.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention, Admiral, to page 54 at the bottom of the page, the last paragraph:

So, while I do not remember exactly asking a specific question as to the location of the Japanese carriers, I had a very decided impression that at that time there was nothing in the situation that the location of the

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Japanese carriers was worrying us at that time. In fact, the question came up very definitely by a question of Admiral Kimmel's. During his conference on the 27th with General Martin, his chief of staff, Colonel Mollison, the question was asked, and I would like to read it since his statement is more definite than my recollection:

"I certify that on November 27, 1941 I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defense of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

"Admiral KIMMEL. 'McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?'

"Captain MCMORRIS. 'I should say none, Admiral.'"

At that time there was no exception taken to that statement by either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch, and apparently the Navy felt that they had definite information of the location of carriers and major ships of the Japanese and that there was no question in their minds of the [7578] possibility or probability of a surprise attack upon Oahu.

Now, the fact is, Admiral, that at least one person there in the affidavit says that the purpose of that meeting on that morning was about Wake and Midway; isn't that so?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct and that was before the receipt of the war warning dispatches you will recall.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. But we did discuss—in the discussion about the sending of planes to Midway and Wake it was inevitable that we should discuss the Pacific situation and we did discuss it and this one little passage here is an indication of the fact that we did so discuss it.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever discuss the question of a raid with McMorris in the light of the war warning to see if that would change his judgment? He said there was no danger of a raid before he knew about the war warning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. But then came a war warning. Did you ask McMorris for his judgment in view of the fact that war is coming?

Admiral KIMMEL. I discussed all phases of the situation with McMorris almost daily; not almost daily but daily, and we went over the whole situation and at no time did McMorris [7579] recommend to me that we put out these planes for reconnaissance purposes, and he would have done so had he considered it necessary. He is a very able, outspoken officer and a man in whom I had the highest confidence.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you discuss that subject with General Short and was McMorris asked as to whether or not his view would be qualified in view of the war warning, before General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did I discuss it before General Short?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot now recall.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot recall any specific discussion, but I am sure it took place.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to the same page:

General SHORT. At that time there was no exception taken to that statement by either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch, and apparently the Navy felt that they had definite information of the location of carriers and major ships of the Japanese and that there was no question in their minds of the possibility or probability of a surprise attack upon Oahu.

In other words, you were not even discussing Oahu at that [7580] time, were you, I mean as such? Your problem—well, I think General Short is wrong myself on that one, because one contradicts the other.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, of course it does.

Mr. MURPHY. I am not going to question you on that.

Now, I direct your attention to page 58. You gave some testimony relative to the flight of the B——

Admiral KIMMEL. One moment.

Mr. MURPHY. I am not referring to any particular part yet, Admiral. This is preliminary.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right; go ahead. What is this?

Mr. MURPHY. You gave some testimony relative to the fact that the Army had sent B-17's from the west coast to Hawaii and you said that they did not even have guns ready to shoot and you apparently criticized that, or at least said that that would mean that they were not worrying about attack. There was a question of ammunition and there was also a question of a crew.

Now, on this page I would like to refer to the testimony of General Short relative to where he says the crews would not be enough to man the guns——

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is this?

Mr. MURPHY. I will get it for you. At the bottom of the page, in the last paragraph, about 10 lines up:

[7581] The crews——

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait. I think I had better clear up something right now.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw these B-17's that came to Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know of my own knowledge anything about the condition of their guns.

Mr. MURPHY. I am not going to ask you that question. You have already testified that they were cosmoline.

Admiral KIMMEL. I testified that that was reported to me.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And no statements were made and, so far as I know, they have never been contradicted.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right, I am not challenging that. My question here is that General Short says that the crews would not be enough to man the guns even if the guns had been in shape to fire and even if they had ammunition and I want to ask you that for this reason: There is much ado made in this record, as I recollect, by yourself and by others about the fact that the B-17's had come from the coast to Hawaii without being able to protect themselves.

General Marshall said that the reason why that occurred [7582] was that there was a question of the amount of gasoline, we did not have planes as good then as now, and that there was a question of how much gasoline they could possibly carry and they wanted to have as much as possible because they thought they could not cover that distance; they were having winds at the time and the distance basis.

Now, as I understand it you testified that that would lead to the inference that they did not fear an attack and you said that they had the guns themselves there on the ships but they were cosmolined and could not fire.

Now my question is to you as an expert. General Short said they did not have enough crew to fire the guns and they did not have enough ammunition—did not have any ammunition. What would the relative weight be of a sufficient number of men to fire the guns, a complete crew and ammunition and would that interfere substantially with the amount of gas they could carry? Now, do you understand my question?

Admiral KIMMEL. I understand your question, and I do not know enough to answer it. I think you can get complete and full answers from people who knew the characteristics of the B-17's at that time. However, I certainly was under the impression and the belief that they could have taken on a full crew and ammunition and still have had ample gasoline to make the trip from San Francisco to Hawaii. Now, I am not familiar [7583] with the details, but from all the evidence which was presented to me and from all that I believed before Pearl Harbor and afterwards, that is what I thought. I do not know whether that is true or not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, my only reason in asking you the question, Admiral, was that you had discussed the cosmoline question and the fact that they were not able to fire and I agree with you that—

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I did not discuss cosmolined guns because I believed then and I still believe, although I cannot prove it and I am not qualified as an expert, but I believed that the B-17's could have made the trip with guns and ammunition and a crew.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir; I will.

Senator BREWSTER. I presume that is a thing about which there need not be any question or controversy. There must be some competent authority to determine it and I am wondering, Does the gentleman contemplate having counsel prepare a statement?

Mr. MURPHY. I presume General Arnold can answer it. I think General Short will be able to answer it. We are having an airman here, General Arnold, but there is a conflict in the record now, I think, between the Admiral and General Marshall.

[7584] Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MURPHY. I think the record and the testimony conflict, because General Marshall said the reason they did not do these other things was because of the difficulty with gas and there you think they could have had the full crew and the ammunition and the gas at that time.¹

Admiral KIMMEL. I want you to understand that I am not able to testify accurately on it. I am merely testifying as to my understanding from conversations I have had.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to page 69 in which General Short says—

Admiral KIMMEL. It might be interesting to find out what condition the B-17's that came out subsequent to December 7, what condition they were in when they came out.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the last ones we have were those that came that morning and they were in the same condition.

¹ See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5184 et seq.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, you will recall, of course, that they quickly reinforced places out there with a number of B-17's and B-25's, and so forth.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I would be surprised, although I know nothing about it, I would be surprised if they went out there unarmed.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, will counsel check that, the condition [7585] of the B-17's that went out to Hawaii immediately after the attack, as to whether they had a full crew and ammunition and guns not cosmolined but ready to fire and a proper bore sight?

Now, I direct your attention to page 69, Admiral, a question to General Short, speaking about the air warning center:

General McCoy. Could you state whether there was a naval officer there that morning?

General Short. There was not, for some reason, a naval officer there during the period four to seven. There had been on previous days, and as a matter of fact the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea to have a little more of that, and they had arranged—the interceptor command and the Navy and the whole group had worked out, on just a volunteer basis, of continuing that training every day until four o'clock in the afternoon, but decided that on Sunday they would only work until seven, but the Navy had been instrumental in even extending that period, and it had been agreed that they would work right through until four o'clock. I had not ordered that, but that was just something they were doing on their own.

Now, you have previously testified, as I understand it, that you do not know whether there was a Navy man there on that morning.

[7586] **Admiral KIMMEL.** Not of my own knowledge, no.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, then we will go into that with another witness, but at any rate General Short said that you had a Navy man there, as I read his testimony, on other days but not on the morning in question.

Now, immediately after the attack the interceptor command station did work 24 hours a day, didn't it, with Navy men present, or would you know that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume they did, if it is in your reports.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 73:

General McCoy. Yes. Is it in actual operation today?

General Short. Oh, yes, 24 hours of the day.

Now, there is one statement on that page that may be a typographical error, but it is an important one if it is. I direct your attention to page 78 in which General Short is testifying and about the middle of the second paragraph he says:

Admiral Halsey had an airplane carrier up to the north.

This is before December 7. Do you see that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I see it.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there any reason why General Short would think that an airplane carrier was up in the north waters?

[7587] **Admiral KIMMEL.** I am unable to state. He had access to all the information on the movements of our own ships that we had ourselves.

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to page 109, on which General Short says in the middle of the first paragraph:

Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly ever step out of his house without hearing planes.

Do you see that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there anything in any of these messages about publicity that in any way influenced your judgment as to what the Navy should have done after November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had to take that into consideration in what I did.

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to November 30, in which the Honolulu Advertiser in a big headline across the top of the page says, "THE JAPANESE MAY STRIKE OVER THE WEEK END."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Would there be much concern about publicity after that headline in the papers in Honolulu?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Honolulu Advertiser carried a good many headlines like that.

[7588] Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate on the 30th of November you said that after November 27 you got your information from the papers and that they, in effect, made you think that there was less danger of an attack, and I am wondering about this particular one, "The Japanese may strike over the week end; Kurusu bluntly warned the Nation is ready for battle," if that would make you think less of the likelihood of war or more?

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course, the Honolulu Advertiser said they might strike over the week end. The week end came and passed, and they did not strike, and you will read—my recollection of those headlines in the Honolulu papers is that that eased off considerably after that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you said yesterday you did not know about Mr. Hull's attitude and this testimony of the foreign expert about Tokyo's mad dog madness.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. You said yesterday you did not know about the Hull attitude to the effect that they were mad dogs, about the madness of the war lords in Tokyo. Wouldn't that be along the same line?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not in the same language, and this was a newspaper article.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. By the way, would you give [7589] a newspaper article more importance or greater weight than you would to a command of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; of course not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did let newspaper articles influence your judgment, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Everything that I saw and heard influenced my judgment to some degree, and I tried to differentiate betwixt the source and the reliability of everything I heard. In the newspapers in Honolulu and on the radio I heard that Mr. Hull was talking to, I forget exactly, but that he was having conversations still with the Japanese Ambassador, he called him down to talk to him, Mr. Welles talked to him, all in that week, and I think that is contained in the—that was in the papers, and it is also contained in the volume called Peace and War, I believe it is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your answer on that question, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[7590]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Does counsel have something at this point?

Mr. MASTEN. We have two letters that we would like to add to Exhibit 113, which we distributed to the committee.

The first is dated February 21, 1941, from the commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet to various commanders of the fleet.

We would like to offer that as Exhibit 113-A.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 113-A?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 113-A.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113-A.")

Mr. MASTEN. The second letter is one dated October 31, 1941, headed "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41," having to do with the organization and missions of the several task forces. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 113-B.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113-B.")

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED) (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything, Admiral, before examination is resumed?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have nothing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania is recognized to continue his inquiry.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel, after receipt of the war warning message to the Army, which was not so worded, however, but the message of the 27th of November, General Short made a reply to Washington, and, as I recall it, you referred to that reply in your statement to the committee. Are you familiar with the wording of that reply?

Admiral KIMMEL. Generally, yes; I would like to refresh my memory on it, if I may.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you refer to exhibit 32, page 16. I beg your pardon, page 12; do you have that, admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have it now.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, after General Short received the message of November 27, he sent a message to Washington reading as follows:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.

Now, did you see that dispatch, that you can recollect, [7592] subsequent to November 27, the answer of General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw that dispatch until after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings.

Will you get that for the Admiral, please?

In my opinion, it is one of the most important entries in any of these volumes.

General Grunert to General Short:

In your message of November 27—

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that?

Mr. MURPHY. The middle of the page, question 134. Do you have that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. General Grunert to General Short:

In your message of November 27, you say, "liaison with the Navy." Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?

General SHORT. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had, and what they were doing.

General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long distance reconnaissance?

[7593] General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff.

Did you know then that General Short had notified Washington and meant to infer by that telegram that he expected you were conducting the proper reconnaissance after November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. General Short knew that I was going to conduct a reconnaissance and that I had the means to conduct a reconnaissance only for a very short period, and when an attack on Hawaii was known to be probable within narrow limits—and I never knew at any time that an attack on Hawaii was probable within narrow limits—that was also a part of the estimate of the situation and was well known to everybody that had anything to do with it.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think if you and General Short had held the proper kind of conference—

Admiral KIMMEL. We did.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me finish. Do you think he could have made a statement such as he makes at page 359?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't explain why General Short made his statement.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to page 1633 [7594] of General Short's testimony.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have it.

That would be in the photostatic section.

Mr. MURPHY. Doesn't General Short say—do you have your copy, counsel?

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral Kimmel is using our copy.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand that at page 1633, General Short makes the statement that he did not know what the Navy was doing.

Admiral KIMMEL. General Short?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better put in what he said.

Mr. MURPHY. I will get exactly what he said.

I have myself confused the papers. I thought I wouldn't have to refer to that again, Admiral.

Well, I can't find it. I will pass on that one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Perhaps you could use counsel's copy.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you want to see this copy?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; I would like to see page 1633, if I may.

Mr. MASTEN. Very well.

Admiral STANLEY. Well, as a matter of fact, this [7595] shows that your search was not being made, and these orders indicate that they were not to be made in peacetime, and they were only to be made in case of initiation of a hostile attack.

General SHORT. Frankly, I do not know how much search the Navy made, as the whole business of search was tied in between the ships and the planes, and it was their responsibility, and I do not know when their task forces—as I say, they have two task forces out at the time. I don't know what instructions their task forces had as to search. I assumed that when their task force went out, if it located Japanese ships, it would report to them.

Admiral STANLEY. But his search from Oahu itself, which in wartime was to be an all around search, did you know that that was not being carried out?

General SHORT. I didn't know just what the Navy was doing, frankly. I knew they had task forces out and I assumed any searching they did was tied in with the task forces.

Would that indicate to you that General Short knew whether you were conducting reconnaissance or not?

[7596] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that indicates to me the testimony that General Short made at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to page 1638, General Short again testifying:

General McCoy—

At the bottom of the page.

Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General McCoy. I would like to ask a few questions: In view of what happened and looking back on it are you satisfied with the adequateness of the system in operation?

General SHORT. I think the system is all right. I think we made a very serious mistake when we did not go on an alert against an all-out attack. I think our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not.

Do you think you made a mistake in not going on an all-out alert?

Admiral KIMMEL. In view of what happened, yes; of course.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to page 108, General Short's testimony before the Roberts Board.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is the number?

Mr. MURPHY. 108, Admiral. I am sorry to take you [7597] around the lot but this is a big proposition and it is a big record, Admiral. This is at the top of the page, the first question:

General McNARNEY. As I remember, you stated in your statement that you assumed that the Navy was sending out the proper reconnaissance covering the proper areas. Did you know that they were?

General SHORT. I knew it was their full responsibility, that if they could not do it they would call on me for bombers to assist them. That was in the definite agreement. I didn't think that I had a right to call on them for a daily report of what they were doing. They had task forces out all the time. I don't know just where they went, and I don't know just what they did when they went out. That was a naval problem.

General McNARNEY. Didn't you feel it was part of your responsibility for the security of your command that you should have that information available?

General SHORT. I didn't feel that they had certain information in regards to the location of Japanese boats. I felt sure that if they had anything to indicate any Japanese carriers or anything within a thousand miles or probably closer than the Mandate Islands, which are 2100 miles, they would have told me, and I did not feel [7598] that it was my business to try to tell Admiral Kimmel

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how he would conduct his reconnaissance. I think he would have resented it very much.

Would you have resented it if General Short asked what reconnaissance was being conducted in view of the war warning of the 27th of November?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have supplied General Short with all the information I had and all the information of all I was doing very cheerfully and I must point out again that if I had had any information on the location of a Japanese ship within a thousand miles of Pearl Harbor I certainly would have passed that information on to General Short.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to page 114 of the same record, at the top of the page, in the third line.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, there General Short said:

I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian [7599] waters and informing me of the fact.

That, incidentally, is one of General Short's statements by way of summary. Do you think he is justified in making that statement about the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I think he is scarcely justified because he knew that we did not have the means to conduct a reconnaissance over long periods of time and that we had to know within narrow limits when an attack was going to be made in order to have any search that was worthy of the name.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to page 130.

Admiral KIMMEL. As far as the task forces that were out, we did conduct reconnaissance in connection with those task forces and we did everything within our power to discover any Japanese ships that might have been within the area. We did not have the means to conduct a reconnaissance which would have been effective and I did not want and I thought it wise not to expend the facilities I had in a partial and an ineffective search.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 130, Admiral, General Short says in the last two lines of the last paragraph:

We figured—

Do you have that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. (reading):

General SHORT. Not if it stopped at 500 miles, no. [7600] Our plan and the plans we had sent in to the War Department called for reconnaissance out to a thousand and fifty miles.

Now, you sent a letter to Admiral Stark, as I remember, in which you stated that you were having regular tests with the Army and that you were having liaison with them. Do you remember that? Let me get it exactly.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know which one you refer to, but I sent many letters to Admiral Stark.

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring now to the one of June 4, 1941, as follows:

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held.

The second page of that group shows under date of June 13:

Memorandum for General Marshall:

Enclosed is the arrangement of Kimmel and General Short with regard to joint air operations. You will recall our talking about it and it looks to me extremely good.

My question is, in view of that letter of yours to Admiral Stark and that being sent to General Marshall and in [7601] view of what General Short said about what he meant by liaison with the Navy, don't you think Washington would be justified in thinking liaison with the Navy meant that reconnaissance was being had?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I do not. That liaison with the Navy statement is a very indefinite statement and the message from General Marshall to General Short said, "Report action taken" and if he wanted to know what action was taken I would consider that an entirely inadequate report. Unless General Marshall, when he received that message, thought that the alerting against sabotage was all that was required at that time I would say that then that was an inadequate report.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did hear me read what General Short intended to convey by it, didn't you, a little while ago?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is it?

Mr. MURPHY. You heard my question before? You heard me read what General Short meant to convey by the words "liaison with the Navy"?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, if you will, please, to page 143 of the same record.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. In the middle of the page, Admiral Standley to General Short:

[7602] You don't remember having seen or heard of a message that started out, "This is a war warning"?

General SHORT. No, sir, I didn't see it.

Admiral STANDLEY. That message never got to you?

General SHORT. No.

General MCCOY. Didn't it instruct the admiral to inform him?

General SHORT. May I ask the date of that message?

The CHAIRMAN. November 27.

General SHORT. It may have been the same. It may have been the same as my message of the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. No. It started out, "This is a war warning."

General SHORT. I don't remember seeing it. I think I would remember seeing that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I asked you whether you thought you had been apprised of that message but you said you did not recall, that you had been in conference with the Navy officers and supposed you had seen it.

General SHORT. Oh, I was in conference for two or three hours. If they got that later in the day—

The CHAIRMAN. You were in conference with them again later than this?

General SHORT. Yes.

[7603] The CHAIRMAN. They may or may not have shown it to you, but that is the best you can say on that?

General SHORT. I do not know whether I saw it or not. I am not sure.

Admiral KIMMEL. As a matter of fact, that message, or a very accurate paraphrase of it, was delivered to General Short's headquarters on the evening of November 27, 1941, there is no question of that. I think General Short covered that very completely in his subsequent testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the same board?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I do not know about the same board.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I direct your attention to page 355 and 366 of the Army board in the same volume but over in the next section, 355 and 366.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. At the bottom of the page:

General SHORT. Because of the information I had from the Navy and the Navy strength that was there, I was not exercised at any one time as to the possibility of an immediate attack. I realized that there was a possibility of a considerable part of that navy being moved out at some time and that the danger would become very acute. With that in mind, I made a special effort to bring the anti-air equipment up to date and to get enough [7604] coast artillery personnel that we would not have to have dual assignments, and to get the aircraft warning service functioning.

Now, my question is, isn't it more likely that there would have been an air attack with the fleet in the harbor than with the fleet out of the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is very difficult to say but I would like to observe at this time that had the attack been made on Hawaii, and if there had not been a ship in the port, they could have done serious damage, and if they had destroyed the oil which was all above ground at that time and which could have been destroyed, it would have forced the withdrawal of the fleet to the coast because there wasn't any oil anywhere else out there to keep the fleet operating.

Mr. MURPHY. There were 4,000,000 gallons, weren't there, not bombproof?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. There were 4,000,000 gallons not bombproof or protected by bombproof covers?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was nothing there that was protected by bombproof covers at this time.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, if they were going to come all the way from Japan, they could, of course, destroy the base, which would have prevented you from operating, or they could [7605] have come with the fleet in the base and destroyed the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It is hard to say which they might have done or whether they would have come if the fleet was out.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am saying that if they had destroyed the base and the facilities in the base and destroyed the oil there it might well have been even worse than it was.

Mr. MURPHY. Incidentally, there is a letter from a very distinguished admiral in the Washington Post today on that question. I am just calling that to the attention of the committee. A very distinguished Senator had something to say about it; Admiral Hart talks about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not say that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I saw that, but I am not going into it. If somebody else wants to they can.

At page 361, Admiral, of the Army Board—I might say I am almost through—page 361.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. At the bottom of the page. General Frank to General Short.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General FRANK. Were you advised that there was a Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th, [7606] and 30th of November?

General SHORT. No, sir. In fact, as I remember the thing, I was led to believe that there was a task force of Japanese out somewhere to the south of Japan, but not in those Islands. My feeling was that it was more directed toward the Philippines.

General FRANK. You had no knowledge?

General SHORT. At least, I don't remember that I had any. That is my recollection, that my information was that the Japanese ships were either in their home ports or had been sent to the south.

General FRANK. Would you not have been concerned if you had gotten the information that there was a Japanese force—

General SHORT. In the mandated islands? Yes, yes.

General FRANK. There was a piece of information that Navy had that they did not give you?

General SHORT. Yes, that may have happened. Did they have definite information to that effect, or was it rumor?

General FRANK. It was information that is reported in the Roberts report, of which they were sufficiently confident to notify the Navy Department in Washington.

General SHORT. In a report from Kimmel, you mean, [7607] or from the Asiatic Fleet?

General FRANK. From Kimmel to Washington.

General SHORT. To Washington? Well, I don't remember it, if he gave it, and I think I would have remembered it, because I do remember that we talked about the location of the fleet during that period, and as I remember it, it was rumored that the Japanese ships were partly in their home ports, and that what were not there they thought were proceeding to the south.

General FRANK. The basis of your feeling of security then was the belief that the Navy was effectively at its job?

General SHORT. I would rather say, a confidence, than a belief—a confidence that they were working at their job and doing it effectively.

Now, do you remember telling General Short about this expedition and the possibilities of aircraft carriers in the Marshalls?

Admiral KIMMEL. The facts of the matter in regard to that are that the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District on November 26 made a report to OPNAV:

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise AIRRON Twenty Four at least one carrier division unit [7608] plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet

and that went from the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to OPNAV and I had a copy of it.

At the same time the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District in Manila reported on November 26, 1941:

Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in Mandates. Our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area.

Now, in that connection, the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District was in a more advantageous position to intercept Japanese

communications than were the people in Honolulu, and not only the Chief of Naval Operations but I, myself, gave more weight to the opinions given by commandant, Sixteenth, on matters of that kind, and for the reasons I have tried to state here than I gave to that of the commandant, Fourteenth. They made their estimates independently, but the commandant, Sixteenth, had more accurate and more detailed information than was ever available to the commandant, Fourteenth.

[7609] On November 24 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, and "information" various other people:

Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addressees is often conflicting because of necessary fragmentary nature. Since COMSIXTEEN intercepts are considered most reliable I suggest other reports carefully evaluated be sent to COMSIXTEEN for action, OPNAV for information. After combining all incoming reports COMSIXTEEN direct dispatches to OPNAV info CINCPAC, based on all information received indicating own evaluation and providing best possible continuity. Request CINCAF issue directive necessary to fulfill general directive.

Now after I had received those two dispatches I thought it was highly improbable that there were any carriers at all in the mandates, and I now believe, after all the returns are in, that there were no carriers in the mandates.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, is it fair to say that at that time there was some dispute between the Intelligence forces at Manila and Intelligence forces at Hawaii as to whether or not there were carriers in the Marshalls and that you did not inform General Short about that situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have informed General Short if I had believed there were any carriers in the Marshalls. [7610] I did not believe it, and I did not inform him.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, in order that the record on the first telegram the admiral referred to may be complete, would it not be well to have the reporter spread it on the record in full at this point?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I read only a part. It is a long message, but I have read all the parts that I believe to be pertinent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The reporter will spread the whole message on the record at this point.

(The first two messages referred to are as follows:)

From: Com 14
Date: 26 November 1941
Decoded by A. V. Pering

For Action: OPNAV
Information: CINCPAC
CINCAF
COM 16

280110
COPEK

For past month Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a task force which comprises following units: Second Fleet, Third Fleet including First and Second Base Forces and First Defense Division, Combined Air Force, Desron Three, Airron Seven, Subron Five, and possibly units of Batdiv Three from First Fleet.

In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and [7611] French Indochina Force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama, Bako, and Takao.

Third Base Force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive communications with Second Fleet Commander.

Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved on to Hainan.

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako.

Second Base Force appears transporting equipment of Air Forces to Taiwan. Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and submarine division or squadron.

Crudiv Seven and Desron Three appear as an advance unit and may be enroute South China.

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airron Twenty-four at least one carrier division unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet.

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South-eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

TOP SECRET

November 26, 1941

From: Comsixteen

To: CinCPac, Opanav, Comfourteen, Cincaf

[7611-A] Morning comment comfourteen two one ten of twentysixth X Traffic analysis past few days indicate Cinc Second directing units of First Second Third Fleets and subforce in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections X For purposes of clarify units expected to operate in South China area will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to as Second Section X Estimated units in First Section and Crudiv Seven X Airron Six Defense Division One X Desron Three and Subron Six XX Second Section Crudiv Five X Cardiv Three Ryujo and One Maru X Desrons Two and Four X Subron Five X Desdiv Twentythree X First Base Force of Third Fleet Third Base Force at Palao X Fifth Base Force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudix Six and Batdiv Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX Balance Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including Desron Five will take station in Formosa Straits or further south X There are slight indications today that Desron Three Crudiv Seven and Subron Six are in Takao area X Combined airforce units from empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon Takao and other bases on Taiwan and China coast X Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in Mandates X Our best indications [7611-B] are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kura area X Our lists indicate Cinc combined in Nagato X Cinc First in Hyuga and Cinc Second in Atago in Kure area X Cinc Third in Ashigara in Sasebo area X Cinc Fifth in Chichijima area X Comdr Subforce in Kashima in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South China Fleet appears to have been strengthened by units from Central or North China probably torpedo boats XX [7612] Southern Expeditionary Fleet apparently being reinforced by one base force unit XX Directives to the above task forces if such are directed to individual units and not to complete groups X Special calls usually precede formation of task force used in area operations X Cinc Second X Third and Cinc Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles X Traffic from Navminister and CNGS to Cincs of fleet appear normal X Evaluation is considered reliable.

Mr. MURPHY. Just a few words about your previous testimony. I direct your attention to page 630, that is the typewritten 630, of the Roberts Board. As I understand it, the Chairman asked you this question:

In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it was not going to get any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I lost you again.

Mr. MURPHY. At the top of the page, the first question.

Admiral KIMMEL. "The Chairman", you mean?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it

was not going to get [7613] any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

You meant by "no, sir" that they should have known they were not going to get any warning, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as I now reconstruct that testimony——

Mr. MURPHY. After 4 years or 5 years——

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute.

[7614] Mr. MURPHY. I might, to clarify your thinking, Admiral, say the way this has been set up, they have one sheet, then they have a correction sheet, and then after showing all of this for 200 pages, they have another statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to say something in connection with this at the present time, and it may serve to clarify the situation a little bit. After I had given my testimony before the Roberts Commission, I waited for an opportunity to revise and correct my testimony, and after 3 or 4 days, I asked that I be given an opportunity to correct my testimony.

I was finally given permission to come to the Royal Hawaiian Hotel alone, to correct my testimony. When I got there, and the testimony was submitted to me, I found it inaccurate in many respects. The recording of it, I mean. I spent all that afternoon and the next day I came back, and I brought a yeoman with me, and Admiral Thiebold, and we worked for some time attempting to reconstruct this testimony.

It was very badly recorded, and I do not know whether this testimony is the result of some of the poor recording or whether it is after I had attempted to correct it and bring it into some kind of order.

[7615] Mr. MURPHY. I might say for the benefit of the committee that both statements are in this exhibit here, your corrected statement and the other statement. Just how much they differ, I am not going to take the time to check, several hundred pages.

Admiral KIMMEL. They did differ to a considerable degree. I had submitted, amongst other things, a 16-page statement which I read, and when my testimony was first submitted to me, that had been entirely omitted from what purported to be my recorded testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. What I meant by what I said, Admiral, is I do not think I should be expected to go through that. I assume that there are a number of corrections, because you said so, and I certainly take your word on the matter.

The record shows that you did submit this several hundred pages after the hearing was concluded, and requested that it be submitted, but that the Board took both instead of taking what you claimed was the correct one.

Admiral KIMMEL. They refused to change the testimony as recorded, although I knew and told them it was in error, and they attached my statement to their report. At least I was so informed.

Mr. MURPHY. They took the position, did they not, that they should have it both ways, the way it was reported [7616] by the recorder, and the way you claimed it should be?

Admiral KIMMEL. Although they knew full well as recorded by the recorder, it was inaccurate and incomplete.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to page 636. That is the typewritten page.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have 636. Is this corrected or uncorrected?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure whether this has been corrected or not, but let me ask you this [reading]:

The CHAIRMAN. If you had known that no radar was working on December 5, 6, or 7—

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute. Let me find where it is.

Mr. MURPHY. The third or fourth question down.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

The CHAIRMAN. If you had known that no radar was working on December 5, 6, or 7, would you have altered your distant patrols in any way?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I doubt it.

Would that be a correct answer to that kind of question?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the way I would answer that question now is that I was doing all I could with the patrols at that time, in the light of the information I [7617] had. The reason I probably said "I doubt it," was because I could not.

Mr. MURPHY. The next question is:

The CHAIRMAN. Then if no radar was working on that morning, there was no method of warning of a raid on these islands; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct. If I had known that no radar was working, it would have been a factor to consider, but what I would have done under those conditions, I do not like to state.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought it was working?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the short of it. I thought it was in working condition.

Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to your letter of December 12, 1941. Do you have that before you, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In your letter you say in the first paragraph:

Briefly, we had considered an air raid on Hawaii as a very remote possibility—

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that please?

Mr. MURPHY. In the first paragraph.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it now.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Briefly we had considered an air raid on [7618] Hawaii as a very remote possibility, particularly at the time that it occurred. There were ten BP in the air that morning. They, of course, could not adequately cover 360 degrees of arc, and their primary effort was directed against the submarine menace that everyone fully recognized.

In our endeavor to avoid wearing out both personnel and planes, we had made periodic sweeps to the northward and westward, but none were made on the morning in question.

That was exactly the position you had on December 12, 5 days after Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not understand.

Mr. MURPHY. I say that is exactly the same position you had on the 12th of December, 1941, and the same position you take before this committee?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in the next paragraph you say:

Full precautions were taken by all ships at sea.

Did you mean to include there the ships in the harbor? I do not believe you did, but did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the words "full precautions were taken by all ships at sea," explain themselves, and I am happy to state no casualties were incurred by any of [7619] them.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is all ships in the harbor were on alert 3, which did not provide for the antiaircraft guns being fully manned; isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That has been exhaustively gone into here, and I would like to repeat once more that from one-quarter to one-half of the guns opened fire immediately, and the remainder of the guns were firing on all ships depending upon the different ships. Some of them got all guns in action in 4 minutes, and others took as much as 7 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY. But you did say, Admiral, did you not, in the second to the last paragraph, at the bottom of the page, "The ships in the harbor opened fire very promptly, but the first attack wave was practically unopposed"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did state that. I was in error. That was a very few days after the attack, and I had gotten very few reports by that time.

Even if I did not indicate it, anybody would know that in such a short time as that, I was unable to get all the facts straight.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not a fact, Admiral, that if the men were at the antiaircraft guns before the wave of planes came over, if they were alerted, that the damage [7620] would have been less by the damage that these additional guns could have done in about 3 or 4 minutes?

You state also in the paragraph before that,

The Army antiaircraft guns were not manned.

Was that a correct statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had found that out by that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, I ask that this—

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). Where is that?

Mr. MURPHY. That is the third to the last paragraph, Admiral, on the bottom of the first page.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of the first page?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. You said, "The Army antiaircraft guns were not manned."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that was the information that I had at the time. You must realize my information on all this situation, when I wrote this letter, was very sketchy.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find, Admiral, that General Short agreed with you, that there were skeleton crews there for sabotage purposes, but not to man the guns strictly as such.

Admiral KIMMEL. This, you must understand, excluded all of the information I had gained after the time I wrote the letter.

Mr. MURPHY. I am agreeing with you, Admiral.

[7621] Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, there is a paper that has been presented to the committee which shows the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor; Singapore; Khota Baru; Davao Gulf, Philippine Islands; Guam; Hongkong; Wake; Clark Field, Philippine Islands; Midway,

and Nichols Field, Manila, all occurring between the time of the attack on Hawaii, and the 8th of December, Washington time.

I think that should be spread on the record, and I ask that it be done at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be done, without objection.

(The table referred to is as follows:)

[7622] *Time of Jap attacks in the Pacific 7 and 8 December 1941*

Place	Local Time	Greenwich Time	Washington Time
Pearl Harbor.....	7:55 am—7th.....	6:25 pm—7th.....	1:25 pm—7th.
Singapore.....	3:00 am—8th.....	8:00 pm—7th.....	3:00 pm—7th.
Khota Baru.....	3:40 pm—8th.....	8:40 pm—7th.....	3:40 pm—7th.
Davao Gulf, P. I.....	7:10 am—8th.....	11:10 pm—7th.....	6:10 pm—7th.
Guam.....	9:10 am—8th.....	11:10 pm—7th.....	6:10 pm—7th.
Hong Kong.....	8:00 am—8th.....	Midnight—7-8th.....	7:00 pm—7th.
Wake.....	12:00 noon—8th.....	1:00 am—8th.....	8:00 pm—7th.
Clark Field, P. I.....	9:27 am—8th.....	1:27 am—8th.....	8:27 pm—7th.
Midway.....	9:30 pm—7th.....	9:30 am—8th.....	4:30 am—8th.
Nichols Field (Manila).....	3:00 am—9th.....	7:00 pm—8th.....	2:00 pm—8th.

Notes: (1) The above times are compiled from existing records. Minor inaccuracies are possible. (2) There were other attacks on Army and foreign installations of which the Navy has no records.

[7623] Mr. KEEFE. As I recall this exhibit, it lists a statement from the Navy in an attempt to fix in columns the various times when these attacks took place Washington time and Greenwich time, and it lists the attack on Pearl Harbor as taking place 7:55 a. m. Am I correct in that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is Hawaiian time, not Greenwich time.

Mr. KEEFE. That is Hawaiian time. Now I want to call attention to the fact that in the official Navy report published sometime after Pearl Harbor, about a year or so, they fix the time at 7:55, but further state that an attack had taken place at Kaneohe some minutes prior to 7:55.

I want to call attention to it now because there is a dispute in this record as to the exact time when the first flight of planes attacked, and you will find it in the official Navy report.

So that this record will not be considered to be entirely conclusive upon that subject, and I, as one member of the committee, cannot accept it as conclusive, as to showing the exact time, because of the fact that the official naval report contains the language which I have indicated.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Keefe, so the record will be clear, what is the date of the report that you are speaking of?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I have it in my file. I cannot give [7624] the exact date, but I will bring it in here next week.

Mr. MURPHY. I really think we ought to have that, in order to make it clear.

Mr. KEEFE. It was published in full in the New York Times, and that is what I have a copy of, the New York Times.

Mr. MURPHY. May I inquire which is the official Navy report?

Mr. KEEFE. This is a report that was published by the Navy about a year, I would say, after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. I think we ought to get a copy of that, if that is the official one. I have been looking for it for some time. I would like to see it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I ask Congressman Keefe to hand us his copy and then we will contact the Navy and get the official copies for distribution.

Mr. KEEFE. I will bring that here Monday, Mr. Counsel. I have it. I had it here before and I raised questions about it at the time when the Navy man was on the stand, Admiral Inglis.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If Mr. Murphy will allow the Chair to inquire as to the document which has been spread upon the record that was furnished by the counsel, that is a document [7625] from the Navy Department, is that correct?

Mr. MASTEN. I understand, Mr. Cooper, that that was furnished us by Commander Baecher from the Navy. I, myself, had not seen it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was distributed to the members of the committee here. I recall seeing it, and I have a copy of it.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt at this point—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, I will be glad to.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with this matter of time, I think it may be a matter of considerable importance and significance as to the timing of the attack on the Philippines. There have been suggestions from highly responsible sources that the times here given may be somewhat inaccurate. So I would appreciate having whatever official report they are based on made available in this examination.

Possibly it may be desirable subsequently to have testimony of some of those who were participants in the situation at the Philippines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, we will report later on the more accurate information as to those times.¹

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel has heard the observations [7626] made by the various members of the committee, and I am sure he will do all he can to meet those suggestions.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not have available a copy of the original Honolulu Advertiser of Sunday, November 30, 1941. I do have what appears to be a correct duplicate of it from the Christian Science Monitor of Thursday, September 28, 1944, and I ask that this photograph appear in the record, to show what was before the people of Honolulu and I assume before the commanding general of the Army and commander in chief of the fleet on that morning 1 week before Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received in the record.

(The illustration referred to faces this page.)

[7628] Mr. MURPHY. I would like to read into the record from a letter of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark the following:

I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5314-5315.

8, 1944]

Jap Weekend!

CLIPPING MAIL ROOM
 From New York City, N.Y.
 To New York City, N.Y.
 From New York City, N.Y.
 To New York City, N.Y.
 From New York City, N.Y.
 To New York City, N.Y.

ger

FINAL
EDITION

86TH YEAR, NO.

Nov. 28, 1944

PRICE, TEN CENTS

KUARNED NABATTLE

Foreign Affairs

Honolulu Pap
Alert Ear

Expert Attacks Tokio Madness

Headlines in the Sunday Advertiser, 1941, published a warning that the Japanese struck hard, show anticipatory action by the Japanese. The two-column story on the front page at the time of President Roosevelt's telephone conference with Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, with the announcement that the Japanese might cut shorter in Washington.

Another top story recorded a widely held belief that the Japanese might, at any moment, worsened in the Far

WARM SPRINGS, Ga., Nov. 28. (UPI)—President Roosevelt talked to Secretary of State Cordell Hull by telephone tonight. Secretary Hull said, and added that the President may cut short his visit here and leave for Washington Sunday.

It was understood that the President has received several reports on the Pacific situation since his departure from Washington yesterday.

NEW YORK, Nov. 28. (AP)—Elihu Bennett, former adviser to the state department, said tonight that the United States and Japan always have been and always will be engaged in a "struggle for Japan's political freedom" and that Japan's political leaders are ready to meet the Japanese challenge to fight it out.

In a speech before the foreign policy association, Bennett called the United States policy of withdrawing from the Far East "including granting of Philippine independence."

"While the mad imperialism of Japan would accomplish by what would almost certainly come to pass by the operation of economic forces," he said.

British Reveal Naval Help To Reds In Arctic

Sinking of Eight Nazi Ships by Pair of Subs First Action Reported

By HENRY A. MOORE
 LONDON, Nov. 28.—The Admiralty today announced that the British Navy had sunk eight German ships in the Arctic waters during the first action reported by the British Navy. The ships were the German ships, "Graf Zeppelin," "Graf Zeppelin," "Graf Zeppelin," "Graf Zeppelin," "Graf Zeppelin," "Graf Zeppelin," "Graf Zeppelin," and "Graf Zeppelin." The ships were sunk by the British Navy during the first action reported by the British Navy.

I also wish to read from page 7 of the letter of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark.

Mr. MASTEN. Is that part of Exhibit 106?

Mr. MURPHY. Part of the general group of letters contained in that exhibit.

Now I would like to refer to a part of your statement, Admiral, in which you refer to a letter to Admiral Stark asking for more detailed information as to the international situation. Did not you say in your letter that you did not expect any categorical instructions from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made certain observations along that line. I think the best thing to do is to read it.

Mr. MURPHY. It is in your statement at page 79.

Admiral KIMMEL. This letter was, incidentally, on the 26th of May 1941.

The commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of [7629] Government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against [7630] the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it may be a cardinal principle that the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

Mr. MURPHY. You did say you did not want any categorical instructions? You did say that, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not say I did not want any categorical instructions. I gave the reasons why I thought that problems could best be solved by giving me the information rather than giving me categorical instructions. One or the other was certainly necessary.

Now in that connection, I was at times given categorical instructions, and you will find one, for instance, in the dispatch of November 26, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. What was that, Admiral?

[7631] Admiral KIMMEL. It is dated 270038.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read the categorical instruction?

Admiral KIMMEL. Page 55 of exhibit 112, and in that dispatch, suggesting that we send reinforcement to the islands, this passage occurs—I will read the whole thing.

In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats. Essential spare parts, tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, had you not already said that to the Chief of Naval Operations—that because of the difficulties there, you could not possibly get up in there? Did you not say that in your correspondence—that it would be difficult to get boats up in there, that there was danger of submarines, and difficulty in getting close enough to do [7632] anything but they would have to fly out to the ship.

Had you not told Admiral Stark that previously? Is not that repeating what you had told him?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall whether I specifically told Admiral Stark, but it was certainly information which he could have had and which I probably did give him. But then these are categorical instructions about things that certainly could have been worked out in Honolulu and Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did not think that was a wise procedure, did you? Why did not they let you work that out?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no objection to it. I had no criticism of it. I do not mean to make a criticism of it, I merely am trying to show you that I did receive categorical instructions.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I refer to your letter of September 12, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. I find in your second paragraph, Admiral, about the middle of it—

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is this?

Mr. MURPHY. In your second paragraph on page 1, about the middle of it.

the question arises as to just how much we can [7633] discount the threat of Japanese action.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will have to find it. I have lost you.

Mr. MURPHY. About the eighth line down the second paragraph.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right in the middle of a sentence.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action.

Now at the end of paragraph (a), the last sentence—

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait just a moment, please.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you want me to read the whole letter?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think in order to make sense you had better.

Mr. MURPHY. I tried to tie it up with what you have down below. I will read the whole letter.

Dear Betty—

Admiral KIMMEL. I mean at least start reading with the beginning of the paragraph.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read the whole letter, Admiral, and then there will not be any question about it.

DEAR "BETTY",

We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?

I noted that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for surface raiders east of 100 degrees west, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course, I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of United States-Japanese rapprochement and the absence of and specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders?

Now it is this next sentence that I want to ask you about.

[7635] Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. It is this next sentence that I want to stress:

In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now my question is: If you felt he was the only one who could answer the question, why did you not feel that way when he said "This is a war warning"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have told you several times that I thought I knew what the war warning meant. I would not have hesitated to ask for clarification if there had been any doubt in my mind at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. You also say, Admiral, on page 2, in the third sentence:

I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet.

Did you thereby mean to say that the fleet, where it was, was a deterrent to Japanese action?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you ought to read this whole letter. You cannot take out one little passage from a letter and ask questions on it; it has got to be taken as a whole [7636] and not separated from its context.

Mr. MURPHY. Apart from the letter, Admiral, did you think the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to Japanese action?

Admiral KIMMEL. I felt that the strength of the fleet in the Pacific was what primarily affected the Japanese. Its location in Hawaii, in the opinion of the best minds in Washington, was that the fleet at

Hawaii was a deterrent to Japanese actions. I felt that they were perhaps better able to judge that than I was.

Mr. MURPHY. I am directing that inquiry to you, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you feel that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to Japanese action?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I will put it this way: The strength of the fleet in the Pacific was what governed Japan. After the fleet had been in Hawaii for over a year it might well have been interpreted as a sign of weakness if they had brought it back to the coast. That, however, I very much doubt.

Mr. MURPHY. You did say, Admiral, on the third page of that letter, did you not, at the end of the paragraph:

Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific?

[7637] Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that?

Mr. MURPHY. The last sentence in the first paragraph on the third page:

Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific—and the Pacific is still very much a part of the world situation.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is difficult for me at this time to interpret every word I wrote more than 4 years ago, but I will give you my interpretation now for what it is worth, and my interpretation is that when I said "here" I meant the Pacific.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me ask you this question, Admiral: In view of the success of the strategy that was adopted by those in Washington and those in command of our Army and Navy by sending ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and using them as we did use them, in view of the success we had, do you think now that it was a wise policy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I feel that after December 7 a very considerable number of ships suitable for the early stages of the Pacific campaign, which were carriers, fast cruisers, destroyers, and fast battleships, were sent to the Pacific, and that added to the forces that they had out there—I haven't the figures, but I am quite certain that a considerable number was sent from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

[7638] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the strategy that was used by those in command did result in victory, did it not, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; there is no question about that.

Mr. MURPHY. In that connection, and as my parting final question, I would like to refer to your letter of January 28, 1942.

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). The disposition of ships prior to December 7, particularly those in the Pacific, was changed considerably after December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to refer now, Admiral, to the last paragraph of your letter of January 28, 1942.

Admiral KIMMEL. January 28, 1942?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, Admiral, the third paragraph. I think if I read it to you it will be all right, Admiral. In that paragraph you say this:

I desire my request for retirement to stand subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service.

So that after forty years and eight months of honorable service you held yourself out during the war to contribute to the war effort in any way you possibly could, isn't that right? You proffered your services to those in authority?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the letter speaks for itself. [7639]
I do not want to comment on that.

Mr. MURPHY. You do not want to go further on that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have nothing to add on to that except what is already in the record.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, I have no further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster, of Maine, will inquire, Admiral.

Senator BREWSTER. I want to comment first that the exacting character of your examination——

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot hear you, sir. I am sorry.

Senator BREWSTER. I will get a little closer to this thing. I do not know that I can get accustomed to it.

I appreciate, as you do, that perhaps necessarily over the past few days, this entire week now, there has been much that is repetitious in the very extended examination. I do not want to single out any of my colleagues by undue mention, but I do want to say Mr. Cooper, who is perhaps of the most belligerent variety, has questioned you in his customary style. But you do not want to interpret it as personal to you, as he went after other witnesses in the same way.

When I went before him as a witness one time in the House, he offered to throw me out of the room. I say that so you will understand in questioning we are seeking the truth.

[7640] Admiral KIMMEL. I can appreciate the belligerency. I may have indulged in that sometimes myself. I do not object to it.

Senator BREWSTER. Now if I repeat some of the questions that have been gone over before, or that may seem to have been covered, I apologize. I will try to be as brief as I can.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to give you as full information as possible.

Senator BREWSTER. Have you testified so far, Admiral, as to your whereabouts on Saturday evening, December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. As to where I was when?

Senator BREWSTER. On Saturday evening, December 6. That is the question we asked of Admiral Stark and General Marshall, and they have been able to tell us, so I want to ask you.

Senator FERGUSON. What year?

Senator BREWSTER. That is in 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will tell you. In the forenoon of December 6 I was in my office and I discussed the situation during most of the forenoon with Admiral Pye and, as I recall it, I had my Fleet Intelligence officer come in and give us a survey.

In the afternoon I spent most of the afternoon talking to Captain Morris, Captain Delaney, and Captain Smith, all in my staff, and then I went home to my quarters.

[7641] I went to a dinner at the Halekulani Hotel in Honolulu. I was the guest of Admiral and Mrs. Leary. There was a party of about a dozen people there.

I left about 9:30 and went to my quarters. The Halekulani Hotel is about 20 to 25 minutes by motor from my headquarters. I spent

the rest of the night in my bunk, until I was called in the morning to get this report about the submarine, and then the airplane attack a few minutes later.

Senator BREWSTER. And you were accessible all that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; my staff knew where I was. My staff duty officer knew where I was and, so far as I know, I missed nothing that came in.

Senator BREWSTER. The Halekulani Hotel is immediately adjacent to the coast defense batteries, isn't it, in that vicinity?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I believe there is an Army coast-defense battery there; yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Now we will go a little into the matter of the submarines that appeared off Pearl Harbor, and also to those that entered the harbor, the one that entered the harbor and was sunk.

There has been previous testimony about a map recovered from the submarine sunk at Bellows Point.

[7642] Admiral KIMMEL. Adjacent to Bellows Field.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; Bellows Field. It purported to show the route of a Japanese submarine around Pearl Harbor during the early morning hours, between 4 and half-past 5 in the morning. Has that come to your attention at any time?

[7643] Admiral KIMMEL. I remember something about it. I don't know whether I ever saw the papers on it or not. But the best opinion that I have been able to get on the subject is that this Jap commander had laid down his courses and speeds and times he expected to pass various places in the harbor, and that he had this list of ships and where they were berthed all plotted in there when he went down to go into the harbor; that he made a miscue somewhere and instead of getting into the harbor he ran aground on the north coast. That is what I believed then; that is what I still believe.

I do not believe that any Japanese submarine would have entered Pearl Harbor except to shoot.

There was no reason. It didn't make sense. They could see from the hills, so why risk a submarine going in there.

And besides, if a submarine had stuck up a periscope in Pearl Harbor, in the narrow waters there, where boats were running constantly, where the look-outs were scanning every inch of the place, that submarine would have been discovered at once, just as the one was that did enter, and the minute its stuck up a periscope, the people began to shoot at it.

It doesn't make sense to me that they would go in and [7644] without examining any evidence, I would strongly discount anything except the most positive evidence that the Japanese were stupid enough to send a submarine in there merely for purposes of observing.

Senator BREWSTER. One of the entries alleged to be on this map, the original of which I understand we will have available, was interpreted as saying in Japanese, "I saw it with my own eyes."

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Senator BREWSTER. "I saw it with my own eyes." That was one of the entries on the map. As though the officer had apparently made it in the enthusiasm of his success.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I have talked to some of these Japanese scholars, and I think there is considerable difference of opinion as to

the exact translation of those Japanese notations. I don't know whether he entered or not, but it doesn't make sense to me. I don't believe he did.

Senator BREWSTER. What about the condition of light at 10 minutes of 5 in the morning? What was the time of dawn then?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I have forgotten just exactly what time dawn was. Sunrise was at 6:27, and dawn must have been, oh, a half an hour before that, maybe.

[7645] Senator BREWSTER. Would a submarine periscope before 5 o'clock in the morning have been readily visible?

Admiral KIMMEL. I doubt it very much; I doubt it.

Senator BREWSTER. That might lend some credence to the possibility that he might have been in there and not have been discovered.

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't think he could have seen much himself.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I take it a battleship against the skyline would be somewhat more visible than a periscope.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are quite right about that. My conclusion is based on the fact that he would gain nothing by it.

You must remember that these Japs could go up in the hills and look down in the daytime and see everything.

Senator BREWSTER. In what was termed an official account of the incident prior to Pearl Harbor, compiled under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the book which I have here, it was intimated that one of the grounds for saying there might have been a report by this submarine commander was that, as I recall, a ship, which he identified mistakenly as a carrier, and which was, I believe, the Utah, received a great deal of attention from [7646] the Japanese. These two naval officers who wrote this book indicated that that might indicate that the Japanese thought they were attacking a carrier. Did that theory ever come to your attention?

Admiral KIMMEL. I heard something of that kind.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with this [indicating] book?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am not familiar with it. I have read it hastily, and the comments I have heard do not give it a very high mark for accuracy.

Senator BREWSTER. What was the situation as to the submarine net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the first place there was no submarine net in the entrance to Pearl Harbor. There was a torpedo net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. That is different. And the torpedo was to prevent any submarines or other craft from coming up off the entrance and flying a torpedo which would have run up into the area where the ships were berthed. The net was being operated, and the orders for the net were issued, and under the control of the commandant of the district.

My understanding was it was being operated.

Now the details of what happened there on that morning are not known to me personally, and I never investigated [7647] it thoroughly, because I never had time.

Senator BREWSTER. It is my understanding that the evidence shows that the net was open from approximately 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock that morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I believe that is true, but I am talking about what I know now.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. From my own investigations.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I hesitate to give evidence based on something I read, and that is somebody else's evidence.

Senator BREWSTER. If that were correct, would that be, so far as you know, unusual?

Admiral KIMMEL. I wouldn't know why it had been kept open for that length of time, and in view of my order to exercise vigilance against submarines which I issued on the 28th, I think it was—I was surprised when I saw that testimony.

Senator BREWSTER. Were the torpedo nets such as would have detected the entrance of a submarine of the character the Japanese used, the one that entered the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Senator BREWSTER. It wouldn't have been able to go [7648] under the net?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I am not positive of. I would judge it probably couldn't. At one time somebody had reported to me that it was deep enough in one spot for the submarine to have gotten under the net. On further investigation I think that is very doubtful.

Senator BREWSTER. Was it unusual that you did not have a submarine net there?

Admiral KIMMEL. We didn't have a submarine net, because all the submarines of which we knew were so large that if they entered that channel, the periscope would show; they couldn't go down far enough without having their periscope showing. And these were a surprise type, and I described them in very sketchy terms here the other day.

They were very small and were able to submerge in the channel, and in the waters of Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you permit an interruption?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that what has been described to this hearing as the midget submarine?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, the midget submarine.

Senator BREWSTER. That was a new development in naval warfare?

[7649] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and a very ineffective one, in my opinion.

Senator BREWSTER. Had other countries been using it prior to that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know of any in recent years. I believe way back before the Civil War they had a one-man or a two-man submarine, something of that kind, but it was a thing that we did not expect, and as far as I was concerned, and I believe that is true of everybody else, we didn't know that any such thing as that existed.

Senator BREWSTER. There was the message of December 6, 1941, authorizing the destruction of confidential papers.

Have you testified as to when that was received? Regarding the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will look at it. I couldn't tell you when that was received, but to the best of my recollection I never saw it until

after the attack. It is an even bet as to whether I saw it before or after the attack.

I think I didn't get it until after the attack.

Senator BREWSTER. That was my understanding, but I thought it should appear in the record as to whether it was delivered in Hawaii before December 7.

Do you know what the record shows on that?

[7650] Admiral KIMMEL. I have no record upon which I can definitely state that. I can only state my recollection.

Senator BREWSTER. I inquire on that because the Roberts report, on page 8 of the Senate document, that is referred to as one of the items that might be considered in creating concern in your mind; I thought it ought to be established definitely as to whether it was a matter that had come to your attention prior to that time.

Admiral KIMMEL. Incidentally, I might point out, in the Roberts report, they added, you notice, the wording here, it says "In view of the international situation."

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Roberts report reads, "In view of the tense situation."

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. There is a little added impetus given in the Roberts report over what the dispatch itself shows.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. At any rate, if I did receive this before the attack, it was no more than I would have expected under the circumstances.

You may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of emergency.

And that was not particularly alarming.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know whether or not that message was sent deferred so that it didn't have priority?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that it was.

Senator BREWSTER. That is my understanding.

Admiral KIMMEL. Those things are eliminated from here, and you should have it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that message was sent deferred. You are right. I had forgotten that.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Now, what is the significance of a message being sent deferred, both as to its expedition, and as to its significance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, a deferred message comes after they have cleaned up all the messages of priority. It is routine. My understanding of "deferred" is that it goes out after every other message has been cleared.

Senator BREWSTER. Would that have any significance as to its importance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Senator BREWSTER. That it was of lesser importance?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was of lesser importance, the [7652] deferred message.

Senator BREWSTER. In your letter of October 14, 1941, concerning the Pacific Fleet confidential letter, on page 4, you stated:

The battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that now? What page, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Page 4 of your letter.

Lieutenant HANIFY. Which paragraph?

Senator BREWSTER. I haven't that before me. It is referring to the mooring of the battleships singly.

The testimony before the Robert committee; have you that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, sir; I have it now.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, do I understand that it was not possible to have them moored singly at this time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I presume that is correct. Otherwise, they would have carried out this order. I can't tell you now what the considerations were, but I presume it was because available berths did not permit the single berthing, they had to double them up.

Senator BREWSTER. There had been no alteration in your orders, so far as that was concerned?

[7653] Admiral KIMMEL. This order was in effect on the day of the attack.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, in the Hewitt narrative, you are quoted as stating that you told Admiral Stark and the President of the dangers to the fleet blocking the harbor and so forth.

You are quoted on page 367 of the Navy testimony to the following effect:

The only real answer to an air attack was not to have the fleet in port when an attack came, that it took two to four hours to sortie, and once an attack was started, it would be completed before they could change the disposition of the fleet. In general he said he felt that the fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor, but he made no protest and made no recommendations for withdrawal for any of the battleships or carriers.

Is that a fair summary, in the Hewitt report of your statement to the President?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did make that statement to the President, that the only real answer to an air attack, so far as the fleet was concerned, was not to be in Pearl Harbor when the air attack came, but there were other considerations, and I still think that the best answer is not to have the fleet in Pearl Harbor when an air attack comes there.

[7654] Senator BREWSTER. Now, the further statement:

In general, he said he felt the fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor—I take it that would, apparently, apply as a general policy.

the fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor, but made no protest and made no recommendations for withdrawal of any of the battleships or cruisers.

Did you go that far with the President?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am just trying to think. Where does this come from?

Senator BREWSTER. Take your time.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to know where it comes from.

Senator BREWSTER. That is the Hewitt narrative and it is on page 367 of what is called the Navy testimony. It is cited here in this compilation. Apparently, this is the Hewitt summary of what you were supposed to have said.

Did you testify before the Hewitt and Hart inquiries?

Admiral KIMMEL. I testified before the Hewitt inquiry? I testified neither before the Hewitt nor the Hart inquiry. When the Hewitt inquiry was started, as I have said before, I tried to be made an interested party, and have the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Now, he didn't get that from anything before the Hewitt [7655] inquiry. He must have taken that—that is his conclusion from other testimony that I gave, and it must have been either before the Roberts Commission, or the Navy Court of Inquiry.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, he apparently attributes it to page 367 of the Navy testimony.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is where it is then, I presume. If you want to find out what I said, I think it is much better to go to page 367 of the Navy testimony than to take conclusions that Admiral Hewitt drew.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, the point which I am making is that the Admiral Hewitt report is one of the factors in these proceedings, and whether or not it is a fair presentation of your viewpoint or your testimony, I thought might be a matter that would invite your comment.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I am glad to comment.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Admiral KIMMEL. In general, my recollection is that I told the President that the only answer to an attack on the fleet in Pearl Harbor was not to have the fleet in there. I was pointing out to him the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor as a base, not only in regard to the fleet but with regard to the whole situation out there. I went into it fairly thoroughly. I did not recommend that he [7656] withdraw any ships from Pearl Harbor, and I accepted the hazard and I tried at that time, when I accepted that hazard, to impress upon everybody the extreme necessity under those conditions to keep me fully and completely informed.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to keep the record straight. There is no 367 in the Hewitt narrative given to us.

Senator FERGUSON. It is page 367 of Admiral Kimmel's previous testimony. It is this testimony that has been handed to us.

Mr. MURPHY. I just wanted to show that.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a boiled-down version of what he said.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate it is not at page 367 of the Navy narrative.

Senator FERGUSON. That is true. It was given in the Navy testimony.

Senator BREWSTER. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for the correction. We certainly want to keep the record as straight as we can.

Admiral KIMMEL. Did I answer your question?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, except this: What comment did [7657] the President make on it at the time of your presentation? I don't think you have testified about that.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think he generally agreed with me about it. I had no disagreement on that subject.

Senator BREWSTER. Did he give you the reasons why he felt it nevertheless should stay there, in spite of a certain lack of security?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't ask him his reasons, and he volunteered none.

Senator BREWSTER. You have stated that keeping the fleet in Pearl Harbor was in no way a condition of your taking command?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true. I never had any conditions imposed upon me before I took command, and the only conditions I had afterward were the orders I received, all of which have been placed in evidence here. Most of which, I should say.

Senator BREWSTER. What did you understand as to why Admiral Richardson was relieved of his command?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never knew and Admiral Richardson——

Senator BREWSTER. I didn't ask you that. I asked you what you understood?

Admiral KIMMEL. I know. I wanted to preface my remarks with that.

[7658] Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never knew, but I did know that Admiral Richardson had come to Washington, and he had had an interview with the President and that he had disagreed with the President, and he came back to Pearl Harbor.

I believed at the time that, or just before I received my notification that I was to be made commander in chief, that Admiral Richardson was going to stay there. I hadn't any idea he was going to be relieved. I have known Richardson very well for many, many years. He is a man I have always admired very much.

I knew his views about taking the fleet to the coast rather than Pearl Harbor; I knew that his primary reason for wanting the fleet to go to the coast was that he thought it could be more expeditiously and quickly prepared for war there than it could at Pearl Harbor. That was his prime objective.

I knew also that he knew the conditions that obtained at Pearl Harbor as did every other experienced naval officer who ever went out there, and it was something that was not new. It had been there for many, many years, and had been the subject of conversation in the Navy and in naval circles for a long time.

Senator BREWSTER. Were you a subordinate of Admiral Richardson at that time? Had you been serving under him? [7659]

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I was a subordinate of Admiral Richardson. I had command of the cruisers of the battle force.

Senator BREWSTER. You were in that way familiar with his views on the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. That wouldn't necessarily make me familiar with his views, but Admiral Richardson told me various things because he wanted to.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you have any substantial disagreement with him on his views in that situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't. I felt, as I said in my statement, that after the fleet had been out there for so long, I was particularly concerned about getting the fleet so that it could get ready to fight, no matter where it was gotten ready, and I didn't want any further delay in getting busy on it.

Senator BREWSTER. That is, you were confronted with a condition and not a theory?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir; very much so.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, what about the significance of the change in routing of the merchant shipping around November 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had been routing merchant ships, [7660] escorting them for some time. I forget the exact date, but it was over a period of months.

Senator BREWSTER. Was that escort initiated by you or from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. From Washington.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And about November 25, we got orders to route the shipping down through Torres Strait as a matter of precaution, and to take them further from the Japanese homeland, and that was continued up to well long after December 7.

Senator BREWSTER. That did involve several thousand miles further travel by the merchant shipping, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a step that wouldn't have been taken, except from necessity, because it added, yes, several thousand miles, to the trip.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Now, further quoting the Hewitt narrative, as it is called, quoting from Hart's testimony, it states:

Kimmel's orders to Halsey when he left for Wake, and asked how far he wanted him to go, was "use your common sense." Admiral Smith stated that before Halsey left he asked Kimmel what he should do in case he met Jap forces.

[7661] Admiral Kimmel said in that case he was to use his own discretion. Admiral Halsey replied that those were the best orders he had received, to keep his movements secret, and if he found even the Japanese sandman he would sink it.

That was within the discretion of Admiral Halsey under the order which you had given to him, was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I had given Admiral Halsey, as I testified here the other day—

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In his conversation with me after he came back from Wake, he said that when he asked me how far he could go, I said "You will have to use your common sense." By that I meant whatever situation arose he would have to take care of.

[7662] Senator BREWSTER. That left him with a very large discretion?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, Admiral Smith before the Hart committee said he thought there had been too much "crying wolf," that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson.

Does that express to some extent your feeling as to the situation as far as apprising you of danger was concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. To some extent, yes; because I think you will find Admiral King made a statement that was a sameness to the warnings that went, a sameness—

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I noted that sameness.

Senator BREWSTER. When did you learn that Admiral Hart was in receipt of the intercepts and of the ability to decode them?

Admiral KIMMEL. I learned of that after, sometime after the naval court of inquiry had completed its proceedings. I don't know the exact date.

Senator BREWSTER. Was there ever any discussion with you or by you about securing decrypting facilities for Pearl Harbor covering the purple or any other code?

[7663] Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't know the purple code by that name. I knew in general of the set-up. I knew what we were capable of doing in Washington and I knew that the primary decrypting and decoding was done in Washington by a much larger force than we had at Honolulu and supplying us with the necessary code machines, or what not, whatever might have been necessary, was only a part of the problem. The remainder of it was to supply us with trained and efficient personnel in such numbers as to handle all this. And it appeared to me then that if all this was being done in Washington and they were supplying me with information, that that was a solution to the problem.

Senator BREWSTER. But you did not know that Admiral Hart had these facilities for decrypting and analyzing the code?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't know it at the time.

Senator BREWSTER. In your judgment would it have been feasible for those messages to have been sent to you by courier with practically complete security?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could see no reason why there shouldn't have been complete security if they were sent by courier. That is always a thing that you have to balance everywhere, the security as against getting the information where it will do the most good, and I have always been [7664] one of the school who feels that the information should be used, taking all the precautions.

We had a naval code which was pretty secure. I don't know whether the Japs ever broke any of them or not. Or anybody else. But certainly sending it by naval courier would have been a very secure method, I should say.

Senator BREWSTER. And the planes were flying back and forth from the Pacific coast to Hawaii at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Quite regularly.

Senator BREWSTER. So that it would have been a matter of 1 or 2 days to get material through under normal conditions?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, even in bad weather they could have done it in 4 or 5 days.

Senator BREWSTER. And had there ever been any difficulty as far as your office was concerned in the leakage of information that was supplied you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't understand.

Senator BREWSTER. Had there ever been any difficulty as far as you or your office were concerned in the leaking of information which had been supplied, so that they would have any occasion for concern?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know there were no leaks.

That is something that no man can answer categorically, [7665] that there were never any leaks.

Senator BREWSTER. No. Whether there had ever been any complaint.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, there was never any complaint that came to my attention.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There is some testimony about your hearing a Navy wife reporting something about your operating procedures. My impression is that in the record there is something about you putting some kind of a regulation into effect and then shortly afterward, in a public place in Honolulu, you heard some Navy officer's wife repeat it.

I don't want to misspeak, that is an important statement, but I think I can get you that in the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is an entirely different type of information from that which we are talking about here. One of our greatest difficulties out there was the Navy personnel and the Army personnel talking. And I think that is a common trouble that we have everywhere.

As I recall it, I issued some kind of an order cautioning all of them not to talk, to keep their mouths shut, and not to know so much. And I even went to the extent of doing this, we had a Navy directory they used to get out out there, [7666] and I restricted the distribution of this directory so as it couldn't get into the hands of unauthorized people.

[7667] **Senator BREWSTER.** If the so-called magic messages were being sent to the British Admiralty by Washington would that affect your opinion as to whether or not they might safely have been entrusted to the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I know of no reason why they should not have been supplied to the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, and I think he was quite as much entitled to them as the British Admiralty was.

Senator BREWSTER. On page 538 of the Roberts Commission as corrected you were reported as testifying:

The Secretary of Navy has stated that a special warning was sent by the Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet on the day preceding the surprise attack. The fact that such warning was not delivered to me indicated that the Administration did not expect an air attack on Oahu.

Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is correct, and I would like to add a little. When Mr. Knox came to Honolulu after the attack one of the first things he asked me was, "Did you get the dispatch that the Navy Department sent out on Saturday night?"

Senator BREWSTER. December 6 that was.

Admiral KIMMEL. December 6th. "Did you get Saturday [7668] night the dispatch the Navy Department sent out?" I said, "No, I received no such dispatch." "Well," he said, "we sent you one." "Well," I said, "I am quite certain I did not receive it. However, there is always a possibility that my communication outfit might slip up and I will check." "Well," he said, "I am sure we sent one to the commander in chief of the Asiatic station, and we either sent it directly to you or for your information," and then he asked me if I decoded all dispatches going to the Asiatic station.

I told him no, that that was something we did not do normally and that it would be highly improbable that we would try to decode a

dispatch addressed only to the commander in chief of the Asiatic station, but that I would check up.

I did check up, and I found that no such dispatch had ever been sent to me and had never been received in my communication organization, and I subsequently found that no such dispatch had ever been sent to the commander in chief of the Asiatic station.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you ever take the matter up further with Secretary Knox to find out what was the explanation of that apparent misunderstanding?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never did. I had not received the dispatch and at the time I did know it was something that was water over the dam as far as I was concerned. I did not make [7669] any attempt to find out anything more about it at that time. I assured myself that we had never received it and subsequently I found that it had never been received in the Asiatic either, so the only conclusion that I could draw was that the dispatch, if it had ever originated, had gotten bogged down somewhere in the Navy Department.

Senator BREWSTER. But that matter has never been sufficiently explored to find out the basis for the misunderstanding, as far as you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. As far as I know it has never been. I know no more about it than I have told you right now.

Senator BREWSTER. Secretary Knox' visit was within a very few days after the event, was it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot hear you, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Secretary Knox' visit was within a very few days after December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Secretary Knox, I think he arrived out there on the 12th; it was about the 12th. I believe the 12th was the day.

Senator BREWSTER. And he seemed at that time to have a very clear recollection that he understood a message had been sent?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, he was quite positive at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, on page 568 of the Roberts testimony you are quoted as saying that the Army radar network had picked up many unknown planes at or about six A. M. [7670]

Was that, do you know, a discrepancy, or what is the explanation of that as distinct from the 7 o'clock report?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall now, sir. It is quite possible that I had been misinformed as to the time, and I think that the testimony which has been subsequently developed is probably better than my testimony. I was merely giving my opinion as far as time goes. I had only been informed about this.

Senator BREWSTER. When Secretary Knox talked with you at that time regarding the Saturday night message was General Short present so far as you recall?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am not sure but I believe he was. Captain Smith was present.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Admiral KIMMEL. And I believe Admiral Bloch was present at the same time and Admiral Pye. I am quite sure Captain Smith was there.

Mr. MURPHY. The record shows that General Short and Admiral Kimmel were together talking to the Secretary during the conversation and that then the Secretary later talked to General Short separately and went over the line of each officer, but they did talk at length together for some time.

[7671] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is quite true. General Short and the Secretary, Admiral Bloch, Captain Smith, and maybe two or three other people were present during at least one interview we had.

Senator BREWSTER. I have a message here labeled "Message No. 042000, December 4th," I take it. I will show it to you and ask you whether you can interpret it. It does not mean very much to me [handing document to witness].

Admiral KIMMEL. I am afraid you will have to get somebody that knows more about this thing than I do to make sense out of that.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I will ask somebody to look it up over the week end and perhaps we can get it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will look it up and try to find out, if I can, something about it.

Senator BREWSTER. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall that message at all.

Senator BREWSTER. You can take the number of it there.

Admiral KIMMEL. See if we can find that, what that is.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, as I gather from your testimony, Admiral Kimmel, you feel that the people in Washington had far less reason to be surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 than you did?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that it a perfectly reasonable [7672] conclusion with the information which they had and which I did not have.

Senator BREWSTER. I think the testimony of most of them who have spoken regarding this has indicated that they certainly were as much surprised as you, if not more so. The attitude of mind of official Washington and in the White House, one excerpt we have bearing directly on it is the New York Times of October 8, 1944, purporting to quote Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt when she stated as follows in what is marked as a direct quotation:

December 7th was just like any of the later D-Days to us. We clustered at the radio and waited for more details but it was far from the shock it proved to the country in general. We had expected something of the sort for a long time.

That impression had been conveyed to you from neither official or unofficial sources, I gather.

Admiral KIMMEL. That thought you mean?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, that you were expecting something of this sort for a long time.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, and I might add a little here. Another thing that Secretary Knox said to me in the presence of these officers was that they were all surprised in Washington, that nobody in their estimates of what would happen in the Pacific [7673] had ever mentioned an attack on Pearl Harbor, not even Kelly Turner. Those were his words.

Senator BREWSTER. Does that refer to Admiral Turner?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. The dispositions of the ships and the alerting effect on December 7 were your best judgment as to the action consistent with your various responsibilities on the basis of information then available to you after careful consultation with your highly competent staff and consideration of all factors; is that statement true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is absolutely true. I had discussed this thing daily with my staff, not only after November 27 but practically all the time I was out there.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, this was a continuing decision throughout the preceding 11 months?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. In the light of the diplomatic and military situation and the continuing responsibilities to make the fleet ready for war; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. It was something that we had to re-appraise almost daily.

Senator BREWSTER. Whether or not the offensive function of the fleet in the event of war was the reason for its existence?

[7674] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; a fleet that was not trained would have been useless.

Senator BREWSTER. That would be recognized by all competent naval authorities as to the functions of a fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Senator BREWSTER. Would it be possible for anyone to appraise the wisdom of your decisions and the disposition of the fleet without knowledge of all the offensive functions of the fleet under the war plan then governing the program of the United States in the event of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I considered my primary responsibilities out there offensive action which we expected and hoped to undertake and no man can get a proper view of my responsibilities and the problems which faced me without having the complete text of the WPL-46 and my operating plan, WPAC-46, which contains not only defensive measures but primarily offensive measures.

Senator BREWSTER. I call your attention to Exhibit 44, "Copies of Defense Plans," which were submitted to our body, extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) and in section 7 of that, "Tasks, The Pacific Area, Army Tasks." Then we come to subsection 35, "Navy Tasks," in which we find A, B, C, D, and E missing. They go on with the outlining of F, G, and H, with apparently some other initial- [7675] ing subsequently thereto.

Now, that invited my attention at the time and I asked counsel regarding it as it impressed me that if you were under a responsibility for carrying out offensive action with that fleet you must at least take that into account. I take it that was the purpose of your orders, to be prepared to carry out what your plan specifically called for and subsequently when we secured A, B, C, D, and E we found some very considerable responsibilities resting on you which I will read:

a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying [7676] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

Now, those are rather large orders, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and in that connection I might say that prior to the commencement of these hearings we found out what they were submitting to counsel and my counsel went to Mr. Mitchell and pointed out to him that these defensive measures divorced from the others did not give a true picture of my responsibilities, of the problems that faced me; that it was necessary to have these additional things brought to the attention of the committee. After that and when it was distributed to the committee my counsel again went to Mr. Gesell and informed him that we felt this was not a full presentation of the picture which was necessary to be drawn if they were to find out what my responsibilities were in the premises, and beyond that we went no further.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know what reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you regarding that matter?

Admiral KIMMEL. What, sir?

Senator BREWSTER. What reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you, regarding that request?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know as he made any reply, but he did not do anything about it.

[7677] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I am quite interested because I raised this very question early in the hearing as it impressed me that we would be utterly unable to form a balanced judgment on whether or not you had made a wise decision unless we knew what your responsibilities were and if your primary responsibilities were to carry out aggressive warfare all over the Pacific Ocean, out as far as the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines, and all that, I assume that must be taken into account. I was unable to secure recognition of that by the counsel at the time and I am very much interested to know that you apparently had presented a similar and what seems to me a well-warranted request and I think that it will be in order to find out, if possible, why it was that this information was not made available to us initially by whoever was responsible.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I don't know anything about it.

Senator BREWSTER. No; I know you do not.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Mitchell made a statement to the committee that the reason it was not was he thought the committee was primarily concerned with defense obligations made as to Pearl Harbor. Then he was pressed by the committee and he and Mr. Gesell then made available to the committee the complete war [7678] plans of the Pacific and the complete plans covering the entire situation and we have that.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you through?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand counsel had this entire matter before them and only furnished us this deleted version, or did they have to go back to the Navy and get the entire matter? And I would like to know whether they requested the entire record at first.

Mr. MURPHY. I am sure I cannot answer that. I can only say that Mr. Mitchell said at first all they wanted to present was the defense of Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel find that out?

Mr. MURPHY. And then they gave us the whole plan and we have it and have had it for some time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Hannaford can answer the question specifically.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; we will hear from Mr. Hannaford.

Mr. HANNAFORD. Mr. Chairman, WPL-46 was received as an exhibit in the Naval Court of Inquiry and all of those exhibits have been available to counsel from the very beginning. We asked the Army and Navy to make extracts from it and reproduce them rather than reproduce the entire document, because [7679] it is very voluminous, and that is the document which is now in evidence as exhibit 44 and it was received and distributed to the committee. Thereafter, at the request of the committee we had the entire document duplicated and that was also distributed to the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. When was the latter distribution made?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I cannot tell you that, Senator. I can check that from the record. I think it was distributed about the time Admiral Turner came on the stand.

Mr. MURPHY. Several weeks ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Can I inquire from counsel as to whether or not it was counsel's request to leave out certain things, the so-called deployment under WPL-46?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I cannot tell you that, Senator, because I do not believe I discussed the details of drawing that document up.

Senator FERGUSON. Could we have that topic requested?

Mr. HANNAFORD. Well, there is nothing in writing that I know of, Senator, requesting how exhibit 44 should be made up.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how would the Navy know how to make it up if it was not in writing?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I assume that it was as a result of an oral conversation, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Were you present at this conversation [7680] with Mr. Gesell and Mr. Mitchell regarding the reproduction of the war plans?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I was not, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, may I have counsel's attention? The fact is, it is already before the committee now.

Mr. HANNAFORD. It certainly is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And has been for several weeks.

Mr. HANNAFORD. It certainly has.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I would like to have you locate the date when that subsequent one was made available and I will appreciate a statement from Mr. Gesell regarding the conversation when this was

requested because when I initially requested this report I was met with a rather firm response. It was intimated that that was not at all essential. I haven't located the point in the evidence where that was done but I hope to.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find we have had it about a month.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, the first copy I received was on November 17. That was something over 3 months ago.

Mr. MURPHY. That was 4 days after we were in the hearing, November 17.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to [7681] whether or not the entire plan, WPL-46, has been marked an exhibit? Is it Exhibit 114, or was it withdrawn?

Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit 114 is WPAC-46, the Pacific implementation of Rainbow 5.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this in evidence?

Mr. MASTEN. WPL-46? No, not entirely.

Senator BREWSTER. What is this? This one has the "114" scratched out.

Mr. MURPHY. We have the complete Pacific war plan. I think we have every page and every word of every plan for the Pacific and have had for about a month.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel whether or not this complete instrument is now an exhibit in the case, the one that Senator Brewster read from, WPL-46? He read paragraph 35 as I recall it.

Mr. MASTEN. It is not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I move that it become an exhibit, with an exhibit number identifying what Senator Brewster read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let us have counsel identify what it is.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, if the counsel can describe it to their own satisfaction. It is quite a document.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did it come from?

Senator BREWSTER. It was given to us by counsel.

[7682] Mr. MURPHY. I think the record should also show that each member of the committee has been furnished a list of the exhibits before them and we have had the list covering all of the exhibits for quite some weeks.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is not an exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I would like to have made an exhibit.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no reason in the world why this should not be made an exhibit if the committee wants to have it made an exhibit. This is WPL-46. It is not expurgated or changed or modified, it is all here and if this instrument is to be made an exhibit, why, we will send it down and have it duplicated and distribute it to the members of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that it has already been distributed. Every member of the committee has a copy of it.

Mr. MURPHY. I think the record will show that it was submitted to the members of the committee with a statement by Mr. Gesell that it was not being made an exhibit; that it was rather bulky to duplicate. Each member of the committee got a copy. I think you will find that in the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then there is no reason, Mr. Chairman, why this cannot be made an exhibit and given a number.

[7683] Senator FERGUSON. I so move.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered, but with every member of the committee having a copy of it is there any reason for having it copied again?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. The exhibit number would be 129.

Mr. MURPHY. The exhibit was distributed the day that Mr. Keefe cross-examined Admiral Stark, and he referred to it in his questioning when he spoke of the fortification of Guam.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 129.")

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral Kimmel, you were under some necessity of conserving, so far as possible, your resources on account of the emphasis on the war in the Atlantic, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not understand quite, sir. I am sorry.

Senator BREWSTER. You were under the necessity of conserving your resources on account of the emphasis on the war in the Atlantic. You had been told at various times that the war in Europe was the primary emphasis under any war plans that we might carry out, is that not true?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is a fair statement, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. In your statement of the case on page 10 you included this statement which I would like to read for [7684] purposes of reemphasis and to invite your further comment, as it seems to me to have a considerable significance in connection with the decisions you were obliged to make. [Reading:]

The Joint Army-Navy War Plan primarily emphasized the defeat of Germany. Admiral R. K. Turner, War Plans Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations in 1941, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, described the objectives of the War Plan in these words:

"The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the principal Associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe."

Was that what you understood to be the policy of the United States during the year preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not have that available to me in Pearl Harbor prior to the attack. What I did have available to me was the statement of principles in the basic war plan of the Army and Navy, rainbow No. 5, which is quoted on the fol- [7685] lowing page.

Senator BREWSTER. On page 11.

Admiral KIMMEL. And that is not very much different. This is a little franker but not very much different from the statement of principles laid down in the basic war plan.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, how would you interpret the significance of that statement by Admiral Turner that we were going to initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us? How would we go about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I wouldn't know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to state at this time that I believe today will be the last day that Mr. Hannaford will be with us as a member of our legal staff. Is that correct, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I feel sure I voice the sentiment of all members of the committee when I express deep regret that we are to lose his valuable services as a member of our legal staff. We appreciate the splendid efforts that he has exerted. He has served with great ability and credit and distinction throughout the period that we have been working on this matter, and we regret exceedingly that he has to leave us and we want him to know that he leaves with our deepest appreciation for all that he has done and the valuable services [7686] that he has rendered the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I get the date of this Admiral Turner's memorandum that is quoted on page 10 of Admiral Kimmel's original statement?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you prepared to give the Senator that information, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot give you the date immediately, but it is in the Hart testimony. You will note the notation at the bottom of the page.

Senator BREWSTER. Page 251.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading) :

Hart testimony, Admiral R. K. Turner, page 251, 252, question 10.

Senator FERGUSON. But I wanted the record, if possible, to show at this point the date that that statement was made; not made as a witness, but actually made by Turner.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was made as a witness by Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not the date I want. I want the date that he made it originally, the idea when it was to take place.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I could not give you that. I do [7687] not know.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I want to make one request of counsel, that they ask the Navy to supply us with a comparative statement of the number of ships in Pearl Harbor during January 1941 compared with December 7, 1941, as to whether or not it is not a fact that there were more ships in the harbor in January of 1941 at one time than there were on December 7, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will please take note of that request.

Senator BREWSTER. It may appear now that the complete copy of WPL-46 was made available to the committee on December 20, 1945, after the original limited copy had been made available to us on November 17, and had been the subject of some discussion, according to the record which the counsel has just furnished me.

May I ask the Chairman about the printing of the record, as to what progress is being made? That is quite a job and it would seem essential.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a matter that Senator Barkley has been looking after personally, and I regret I am not prepared to give that information, but I am sure he can.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

[7688] Mr. KEEFE. It has been suggested that it might be a good policy to continue these hearings into the night so as to complete Admiral Kimmel. I wonder if the Chair entertains such views?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair had not. We have run now till past 4:30, so the committee will now stand in recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn can I make one request?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Before the recess I asked for photostatic copies of the intercepted messages bearing date of December 6, regardless of their time of translation. That was over a month ago.

Just before the recess I was called on by Attorney Masten of our counsel and the Army liaison officer. They explained to me what the problem would be in developing the picture that I had asked for, and for the accommodation and for the purpose of lightening the work I modified my request considerably. As a result of that interview I was promised those photostatic copies the next day. Three or four weeks have gone by and I haven't received them. I was wondering if somebody has them—if there is somebody on our counsel's staff that can supply me with them.

[7689] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is counsel prepared to give the gentleman the information he is requesting?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Gearhart, it was my understanding that the only thing you wanted, which you had a chance to look at, was the document which was introduced subsequently, I have forgotten the exact page number, which covers certain of the intercepts in Exhibit 2 relating to Hawaii. If there is anything else you want, I am sure we will be glad to get it.

Mr. GEARHART. Do I understand that the intercepts that I have asked for have been photostated, each one of the papers relating to the particular intercepts that I have requested, and that they have been introduced in evidence in this case?

Mr. MASTEN. No; there have been no photostats that—

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I know the intercepts that have been presented to this committee. That is where I got the information that caused me to make the request. What I want is the photostats of all of those messages which were dated December 6 regardless of their date of translation. I want to see each paper relating to those, each individual intercept, so that I can make a study of them.

Mr. MASTEN. As I said, my understanding was that you had abandoned that request and you no longer wanted those photostats; that the data which was subsequently introduced before the committee was all that you wanted. [7690] If you want to change that, we will be glad to cooperate.

Mr. GEARHART. No; I don't want to be understood as changing anything. I am limiting my request to include certain definite messages appearing upon certain pages in the exhibit and you told me and the Army officer assured me that they would be in my hands the next day. A month has gone by and I haven't seen them.

Mr. MASTEN. Well, we will endeavor to get them for you Monday.

Mr. GEARHART. With that assurance I subside.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock Monday.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p. m., Saturday, January 19, 1946 an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Monday, January 21, 1946.)

[7691]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
*Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,*
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee, met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7692] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

I have been advised by telephone that the chairman, Senator Barkley, is unavoidably detained and unable to be here this morning. He had to be out of town over the week end and on account of weather conditions was unable to get back this morning as he had expected and expects to get in during the day.

I also understand from Senator Ferguson that Senator Brewster had to be out of town over the week end and on account of weather conditions he was unable to get back this morning as he had expected and will not be able to resume his inquiry at this time. So, with that explanation, the Chair will recognize Mr. Gearhart of California.

Before that, however, does counsel have anything at this time to present to the committee?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything you want to present before the examination is resumed?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I have not.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart of California will not inquire.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Murphy has something to present at this time.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request. [7693]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to request counsel to produce for this inquiry any word in any testimony by any witness in this proceeding from the date of December 7, 1941, to the present time about a so-called lost message to Hawaii alleged to have been sent, apparently, on the night of December 6, and my reason for bringing that up is the papers

of the country have had headlines about a lost message and the quotation by a member whom I do not want to quote until he is present, the distinguished Senator from Maine, and I would like to know what the facts are if counsel can ascertain anything. I haven't, in reading all the records.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All the information we have is what the Congressman heard with reference to the conversation Admiral Kimmel had with Secretary Knox on his arrival at Honolulu, plus the fact that two people associated with Secretary Knox, Rear Admiral Beatty, and, I think, Captain Dillon—I am informed—say that Knox talked to them about having written such a message.

My people are endeavoring to get a conference between Dillon and Beatty and me for the purpose of ascertaining whether they know any more than that. Further than that, it [7694] will be absolutely impossible for counsel to search this record from the beginning to find any piece of testimony at this time. It is all we can do to keep a foot and a half ahead of the examination of the committee on current witnesses, but I think that when I talk with Beatty and Dillon I will have gathered together all the proof that we have with reference to the message that Secretary Knox is supposed to have sent to Kimmel.

I have instructed my people to go into the Secretary of the Navy's office and ascertain, if they can, any stenographer or person in the executive staff there that could have written any such message, and we are going to do all we can to find it, and when I do get some information I will let Congressman Murphy know immediately.

Mr. MURPHY. I may say that, if it will help counsel, I have gone over the record pretty carefully, and the only reference I see by the witness on the stand to any message of the 6th is a statement that there was a message sent to Admiral Hart, but I see not a word of testimony in any previous hearing by the witness referring to any alleged lost message to him.¹

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart will proceed with his examination.

[7695] **TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL,
UNITED STATES NAVY (Retired)—Resumed**

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the thoroughgoing examination of yourself and your comprehensive answers to questions of the distinguished counsel, Mr. Richardson, and the other members of the committee who have preceded me, there are just a few topics that I want to ask you a few questions about by way of emphasis more than as an endeavor to bring out new facts.

There has been a very studied effort, it would seem to me, on the part of some members of this committee, almost a frantic effort, to develop the idea that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was, in some way or another, a deterrent to the Japanese.

I would like to explore that idea a little. My first question is, Do you think the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was a deterrent to the Japanese?

¹ See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5146, for a memorandum from the Navy Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. They made an attack, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you consider that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to the Japanese on November 27 and November 28, 1941, when the Japanese Fleet left the Kuriles on the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to state how much of a deterrent it was. I think the facts speak for themselves.

[7696] Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you if you think that the presence of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian waters was a deterrent to the Japanese on November 5 and November 7 of 1941 when the Japanese Government issued its operational order No. 1 and operational order No. 2 for the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the facts speak very well.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you whether or not the presence of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian waters during the spring and early summer of 1940 was more or less of a deterrent to the Japanese when, by order of the Chief of Naval Operations, your three best battleships, one carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached from your fleet and transferred to the Atlantic?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it would have been much more of a deterrent had they retained those ships in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. If it had any influence upon the Japanese as a deterrent it would have become more so if they had added to your fleet rather than subtracted from it as our relationships with that country were fastly deteriorating, is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When the order came for the detachment of those ships you were foreclosed by the Chief of Naval [7697] Operations from discussing the subject with him by his telling you abruptly that he was not starting an argument, he was telling you what to do?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now what was the purpose of the Japanese Fleet in making the attack in the Hawaiian area? I ask you to answer that question in the light of hindsight and in the light of all that occurred, and in the light of what they did following the attack.

What would you say was their purpose in making the attack in that area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Their purpose was to do as much damage as they could to the fleet.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Their purpose was to immobilize the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. And in that one objective they were successful, they immobilized our fleet for practically 1 year, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I do not think they were entirely successful in immobilizing the fleet, because the ships that were most useful in the early stages of the campaign—and I speak of the carriers, the cruisers, and destroyers—suffered very little damage.

[7698] Mr. GEARHART. What you mean by that, Admiral, is that we still, after the attack, had a very powerful fleet left?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I mean, too, that the battleships in the early stages of the campaign in the Pacific were not particularly useful.

It was only during the latter stages of the campaign that they became useful.

Now if we had had some battleships in the Pacific with sufficient speed to accompany a fast carrier task force, they would have been useful in the early stages, and they were useful when they finally got ships of that character out there. But the primary ships in the early stages of the campaign, and the ones that did the damage and the ones we thought would be useful—and I think I pointed that out in my correspondence—were the fast, light forces, and the carriers and the submarines, of course.

[7699] Mr. GEARHART. Yes; and even though conceding that our fleet perhaps was not in condition to go to the relief of the Philippines, even if we had not suffered these losses, after we suffered the losses, the opportunity of performing such a mission was eliminated until the ships could be repaired. Is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in my opinion, if there had been no damage whatsoever to the fleet at Pearl Harbor, it would have been disastrous to send the forces that we had in the Pacific to the relief of the Philippines, and I have some distinguished company in that opinion.

Mr. GEARHART. I know you have, and that is for the reason that our air defense in the Pacific was not developed so we could risk going through the Japanese mandated islands, on many of which we knew they had established powerful bases?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true as to air defense. But the fleet supply train, the oilers, the supplies of all descriptions that are required by a big fleet, we had no means of transporting them over long distances in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. But the purpose and the objective of the Japanese was to make certain that our fleet was immobilized to the extent that it could not go to the aid [7700] of the Philippines, or become and remain a menace on their flank while they were doing other things?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes; in general that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. And the reason they wanted to immobilize the American Fleet for a definite period—or it may be for an extended period of time, if not definite—was to give them time to conquer the Philippines and Hongkong, and other bases to the south of the Philippines?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I think so.

Mr. GEARHART. And as it turned out, the Japanese were able to complete those conquests in the southwestern Pacific before the American Fleet and the American Army—American forces of all kinds and types—were ready to go to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. GEARHART. Then instead of the American Fleet being a deterrent to the Japanese in Hawaiian waters, it was, in effect, a direct invitation to the Japanese Government to come there and put our fleet out of commission for a certain length of time, if not permanently, is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am afraid you are indulging in a little hindsight now, sir. What you say was borne out by [7701] events, I admit that.

Mr. GEARHART. I think so, and of course, we have got to make allowances for hindsight. I am indulging in it myself, Admiral, as well as asking you to do so at times.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we all do it. We cannot help it.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, consider for the moment, the transfer of the fleet to our west coast. Let us assume that it was transferred to the west coast at the time that Admiral Richardson asked that that be done; that would not have lessened the problem one whit, insofar as the Japanese were concerned, of demobilizing our fleet while they were making their conquest in the southwestern Pacific, the problem, of course, would still have been theirs?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; the problem would still have been theirs.

Mr. GEARHART. And the problem of the Japanese would have been a very much more difficult one than the one they confronted at Hawaii, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say so, insofar as immobilizing the fleet on the west coast is concerned, but as I pointed out here the other day, I think even with the fleet in Hawaii, they might have done more damage to us had they destroyed the base at Pearl Harbor. You cannot get some- [7702] thing for nothing, anyway.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, there would be no objective for the Japanese to come to destroy the base at Pearl Harbor because that would not relieve them of any of the burdens that they had in the attack to the southwest, would it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; that is right.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, if the fleet was not there, the Japs would not have come, in all probability; is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a possibility.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And if they were still intent upon immobilizing the fleet, and the fleet was on the west coast, say at Long Beach, their fleet would have had to travel 2,000 miles more to the attack, and in traveling 2,000 miles more, the chances of detection of their mission would have been greatly increased, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and if it had been on the coast, the necessity for air patrols, the area to be patrolled would have been halved.

Mr. GEARHART. I did not hear the last part of your answer.

Admiral KIMMEL. I say it would have been halved.

Mr. GEARHART. Halved?

Admiral KIMMEL. Would have been just about half as [7703] much, because you had a land mass on one side, and all you had to do was to patrol the sea, whereas in Hawaii, you had 360° to patrol.

Mr. GEARHART. You had a circle to patrol in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. While we had 180° to patrol on the west coast.

Mr. GEARHART. And furthermore, you had more room to deploy your ships if you were stationed, say, at Long Beach, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not believe I got the question.

Mr. GEARHART. You would have had a greater ocean space in which to deploy your ships while in port, would you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there were more entrances at Long Beach. They could have gotten out more rapidly.

One of the advantages of having them stationed on the coast was that we had several ports in which detachments of the fleet could go from

time to time. There would have been several ports; San Francisco, Long Beach, San Diego—three ports at least in the southern part—and also the ports in Puget Sound, and there would have been a much better chance, I think, to keep the Japs guessing a little bit, about where they were at all times, because one of the factors—and there was nothing you could do about it— [7704] was we had only that one port in Pearl Harbor where all the ships had to return to sooner or later.

Mr. GEARHART. And on the Pacific coast you had many ports where the fleet could have been scattered under such conditions that you could have them reassemble at a designated rendezvous, if necessary?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Of course it is hard to say what the Japs would have done if the fleet had been on the west coast as recommended by Admiral Richardson, and as I think you said you would have liked to have had it, although you knew that had been decided for you in Washington at the time you took command, it is hard to say what the Japs would have done?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a speculation, sir.

[7705] Mr. GEARHART. Because they have done a lot of foolish things during this war, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; they did a great many foolish things.

Mr. GEARHART. Nothing quite so foolish as their attack on Hawaii, in its consequences?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that was the greatest mistake they made.

Mr. GEARHART. But it is your opinion, as it is mine, that had they attempted to immobilize the fleet by coming to the west coast to attack it, their chances of success would have been reduced almost to the point where even an ensign of the Japanese Navy would probably have considered it too great a chance to have undertaken; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Their difficulties would have been very much increased; very much increased.

Mr. GEARHART. So far as the physical evidence is concerned—the physical evidence at Pearl Harbor and on Oahu—the Japanese had only one target and that was the American Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is evident from the attack itself.

Mr. GEARHART. There is no evidence that they were on a mission to destroy any of the permanent installations on the islands?

[7706] Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that the damage to permanent installations was negligible.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And much of that might be due to poor marksmanship and excitement, don't you think?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there was much of it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, so much for this theory that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent.

Now, Admiral, you have from time to time during the course of your testimony adverted to several Japanese intercepts which the Washington people had in their possession and within their knowledge, which were not passed on to you as information. Neither was the substance of those intercepts conveyed to you in the way of directives. I will ask you this question: Following that up a little further, when you received a copy for information of the shooting orders which had been issued by Admiral Stark to the commanders of the Atlantic Fleet,

when you received a copy of them, did they call your attention to or send you a copy of a Japanese, Italian, and German agreement of November 28, 1940, or treaty of alliance, the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact?

[7707] Admiral KIMMEL. Of what date was that again, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. I think November 28, 1940.

Admiral KIMMEL. Wasn't that September of 1940?

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was not the Comintern Pact, that was the Three-Power Pact.

Mr. GEARHART. I will have to make that correction. The tripartite agreement of 27th of September 1940.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. They called your attention to it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, that took place before I became commander in chief. I do not know whether they called that to the attention of the then commander in chief. However, I knew about it. I knew the essential features of it as applied to our business. I don't know where I got the information.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that it has never to this date been printed in the English language, so far as I know or infer from the letter from the State Department that I received just a few days ago, whatever you knew about that agreement was hearsay, was it not?

In other words, did you ever have the text of it before you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have never seen anything about it [7708] that I can now recall, about the Three-Power Pact, in a communication from the Navy Department, if that is what you mean.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. But I did know the provisions of the pact. I am unable to state now when I—I say I knew the provisions—I knew that Germany, Italy, and Japan had agreed to declare war on any nation which attacked any one of the three during the European war, and I think Japan had an exception that she was not going to attack Russia in case she came in. But the pact was clearly aimed at the United States. I knew that much, and that is about all I did know.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that is the substance of it, but you never had the words, the letter of the treaty, before you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no recollection of it. Whether one was sent to the commander in chief or not in September 1940 I don't know; or subsequent thereto.

Mr. GEARHART. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I want to read into the evidence this tripartite agreement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The gentleman may proceed.

Mr. GEARHART. (reading):

THREE-POWER PACT BETWEEN GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN

The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan consider it as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each [7709] nation of the world be given its own proper place. They have therefore decided to stand together and to cooperate with one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend this cooperation to such nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to

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give to their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows.

ARTICLE 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

ARTICLE 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

ARTICLE 3

Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their [7710] efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

ARTICLE 4

For the purpose of implementing the present pacts, joint technical commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay.

ARTICLE 5

Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

ARTICLE 6

The present Pact shall come into force immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At the proper time before expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, if one of them so requests, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Pact and have [7711] hereunto apposed their seals.

This is interesting.

Done in 3 original copies at Berlin, on the 27th day of September, 1940, in the XVIIIth year of the Fascist Era, corresponding to the 27th day of the 9th month of the 15th year of the Showa era.

JOACHIM VON RIEBENTROP

CIANO

(Signature of the Japanese Representative)

[7712] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, might I interrupt for just a moment?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I call attention to the fact that on page 165 of Foreign Relations of the United States which is a book already in evidence, the text of this Three-Power Pact which the Congressman has just read, appears as set forth.

Mr. GEARHART. The text or the substance?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The text.

Mr. GEARHART. The text does?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. I was advised by a letter, which is attached to the text I read, that printed copies were not available in the State Department, and so I assumed it had not been printed, although in another part of that document you have just referred to appears a discussion

of this instrument, with the assertion that section 3 was plainly directed against the United States.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will say, Mr. Chairman, to the Congressman, that glancing at this copy here, it does not contain, in fact, that it was the particular year of the Fascist rule to which you referred. It stops entirely with article 6.

[7713] Mr. GEARHART. I will ask, Mr. Chairman, that the letters which are attached to this document, which I will hand to the reporter, letter from the State Department dated January 18, 1946, and a further statement in reference to it from the State Department be included in the record with the text of the instrument itself.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The letters referred to follow:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., January 18, 1946.

In reply to refer to
RP 028 American White.
Book/1-046.

MY DEAR MR. GEARHART: Reference is made to your letter of January 9, 1946, requesting a copy of a Treaty of Alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan.

There is enclosed a copy of a translation prepared in the Department of State of an announcement as published in the "Reichsgesetzblatt" of November 28, 1940, containing the text of the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940. Printed copies [7714] of the text of the Pact are not available in the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ DEAN ACHESON,
Acting Secretary.

Enclosure: Three-Power Pact—Department of State translation.

The Honorable BERTRAND W. GEARHART,
House of Representatives.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C.

CENTRAL TRANSLATING DIVISION

(Translation)

TC No. 15150

Source: "Reichsgesetzblatt", Part II, Berlin, November 28, 1940, No. 41, P. 279

ANNOUNCEMENT

Concerning the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan on
November 25, 1940

On September 27, 1940, at Berlin, the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan was signed by Representatives with full powers of the German, Italian and Japanese Governments. The Pact came into force upon signature. It [7715] is published below.

Berlin, November 25, 1940.

THE REICH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
VON RIBBENTROP

Mr. GEARHART. Again directing your attention to article 3, to the words:

They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Within the category and the definition set forth in these words, the United States is plainly included, is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you considered that as an element in all of the evidence, the force and effect of which was that the relationships with Japan were fastly deteriorating?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was an element, but, again, I felt that Japan would be governed in her action by her own best interests, and she would hesitate to violate that pact if she thought it was to her advantage to do so.

Mr. GEARHART. I think you are entirely correct. The [7716] Japanese would have double-crossed their Axis partners, if they thought they could advance their own interests in the Pacific by so doing.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And if they could have obtained an agreement from the United States to disregard the John Hay open-door policy in China, if they had been able to induce the United States to, by agreement, tear up the Nine-Power Pact, which required all the nations that signed it, 27 in number, to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China, and if they could have gotten the United States to tear up the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact which outlawed war as an instrument of international policy, had gotten us to promise in an agreement with them to lay off while they were conquering the Pacific Southwest, they would have double-crossed Germany in your estimation, in the light of hindsight?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they would have double-crossed Germany any time it was to their advantage to do so.

Mr. GEARHART. What would have been your opinion if you had been supplied a copy of the intercept, which was not sent to you, the intercept which appears on page 205 of exhibit 1, in this proceeding, the intercept which contains paragraph No. 3, appearing on the top of page [7717] 206, if they had immediately supplied you a copy of that intercept, which was received by our Washington authorities on the 30th day of November 1941, and translated on the 1st day of December 1941, would it not have brought back the tripartite agreement to importance, in your considerations, and I read it:

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever.

Referring to the United States.

In it, there is one insulting clause which says no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power, it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time, the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and [7718] has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

Now, if you had had that information conveyed to you on December 1, 1941, that would have been an important item of evidence, added to the other intercepted messages which were denied you, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That clearly conveyed the information to the United States, or those who received it in the United States, not you, that Japan was standing up to its obligation under the anticomintern tripartite treaty, and that she regarded the United States as an enemy, and that she regarded our proposals to her as an insult?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you analyzed the so-called Hull message to the Japanese of November 26, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Have I analyzed it?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. In other words, have you read all the words, the verbiage, and reached a conclusion as to what it means in substance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I have gotten a fairly good idea of it since I have read it; yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Wasn't it just the opposite in effect [7719] to the Japanese-tendered agreement of November 20, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it was; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You will agree that the Japanese agreement would have required the United States to have abandoned the time-honored principle of the John Hay open-door policy; it would have required the United States to have torn up the Nine-Power Treaty to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China, and it would have required the United States to have consented to Japan using war as a means of international policy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[7720] Mr. GEARHART. Thank God we didn't do that, and we didn't, did we?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. GEARHART. By rejecting that we stood up for the highest and noblest of America's traditional principles, did we not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I never criticized what they did.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Hull called that an ultimatum. Now, to turn to his reply to that ultimatum and analyze it. That would have done just the opposite of what the Japs wanted. That would have required the Japanese to have respected the John Hay open-door policy in China and would have opened its ports to the ships of other nations. It would have required Japan to respect the political independence and sovereignty of China. It would have compelled the Japanese to withdraw their armies and abandon the use of force as a means of international policy. Would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The answer is, of course, apparent: Why is the Hull message, therefore, any less of an ultimatum than the Japanese message, which meant the same thing.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the important part is that the Japanese so regarded it.

[7721] Mr. GEARHART. That is true. That appears all through the Japanese writings and intercepts. And I am proud of the fact that they did, because America was standing up to its time-honored principles. I agree to "millions for defense but not a cent for tribute." I agree with "freedom of the seas" and for every noble aspiration that this country has ever announced to the world. It is a pity that Mr. Hull insists upon saying that it is not an ultimatum.

It means, when you say it is not an ultimatum, that we are willing to treat, to compromise, and deal, on those great propositions, and I, as one American, I am not ready to give anything, not one whit on any of the those principles.

I am not passing upon the question of whether or not the timing of the delivery of that message was right in view of the fact that our military and naval authorities were begging for time. That is an entirely different question.

Now, I am going to conclude my examination by reverting to an old subject with you. Just like as to the point of the deterring effect of the presence of the fleet at Hawaii, certain members of the committee have frantically endeavored to overstress and give meaning that nobody at the time had accepted, to the so-called war warning message.

Now, I am going to ask you to go along with me and let's analyze this. [7722] Senator LUCAS. I wonder who is testifying here this morning, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GEARHART. Whenever you heard the wheel squeak it needs a little grease and I am giving it to you right now.

Well, I don't have the mysterious document, it seems to have gotten out from under my eye at the moment.

Mr. MURPHY. You may use mine.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, here it is.

Now, to get the full meaning of a document it is necessary to read it through, is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't hear that.

Mr. GEARHART. I say, to get the full meaning of any document you have to read it through?

Admiral KIMMEL. You have to read all the document; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Supposing you got just one line in the message that reached you upon November 27, 1941:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

Would that have told you with whom we were going to have war?

I am asking you to confine yourself to the words alone. We are going to take this apart right now.

You got a message and it said "This is a war warning." You know, as a reasonable individual of considerable educational [7723] attainments, that there are around 52 or 54 nations in the world, don't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I never thought of it that way.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that line doesn't tell you what country in the world is going to start a war, does it? Let's stick to the letter of the word and go no further and draw nothing on your imagination, but applying the reasoning of a reasonable man. With just those words before him, it wouldn't tell you who you were going to war with, how many nations would participate in that war, it doesn't tell you where the war was going to occur, whether it was going to break out simultaneously everywhere, or whether in certain parts of the world, or whether in a single part of the world.

Admiral KIMMEL. Such a message as that would have been quite indefinite.

Mr. GEARHART. So because it doesn't tell us when, where, or who with a war was going to occur, you have to read on to the next sentence, don't you, to get that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You have a very general statement before you, with just the phrase "this is a war warning."

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

[7724] Mr. GEARHART. It is so general, it wouldn't help you at all?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not very much.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then, to find out who it is with, we get the next sentence:

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

That puts a lot of nations out of the consideration, and centers your thoughts upon Japan and Japan alone, doesn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So this general message has been narrowed down to a very specific message referring to Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. But it doesn't tell you where the war is going to break out, up to now. It doesn't tell you with whom Japan is going to be associated, if with anybody, but it does narrow it down to Japan. So, you have to find out where the war is going to be by reading another line, and you have a right to read it all, and it is your duty to read it all, is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; it must be read all together.

[7725] Mr. GEARHART. There is more.

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

Now, the war's scope has been restricted from all other nations of the world, down to one nation, and to one place on the face of the earth, hasn't it, and that is the southwest Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is what it appears to say.

Mr. GEARHART. And that is the interpretation which a reasonable man, acting in the light of experience would give to a document such as that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, of course, in designating the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, that does not exclude Hong Kong; it does not exclude the Burma Road; it does not exclude Java, or possibly Singapore, because they are all in the same area of the territory which is defined by the places that are mentioned. Isn't that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it would be interesting for you [7726] to know that your interpretation of that document as limiting the place of the attack to the southwestern Pacific, is precisely the same interpretation which the courts would have given that document if it

had been submitted to them in a judicial dispute. The rule of interpretation which you applied to that is exactly the same interpretation which over a thousand years of jurisprudence the courts have given to documents of that kind.

A general statement followed by a specific limitation, always limits the interpretation in the courts to the things of the same character of the specific things mentioned.

I am not going to spend much time on a lot of intricate legal questions, but this is one of the best settled in all of the lines of decisions of our courts. The rule of interpretation is known as the ejusdem generis rule.

Let me quote from one of the standard lawbooks, Black's Law Dictionary, for its interpretation of ejusdem generis, for the benefit of anybody who may read the record:

In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to [7727] be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

And to show how far the courts go in applying that sort of interpretation, I read the second line after a great many cases are cited in this particular legal work:

The rule, however, does not necessarily require that the general provision be limited in its scope to the identical things specifically named.

That is why your war message would be enlarged to include the Burma Road, Java, Singapore, and all of those other areas.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. No. The gentleman is not going to start a legal argument. If you want to make a legal speech, you can do it later.

Mr. MURPHY. You are making a speech about the law, and I would like to correct it.

Mr. GEARHART. You would be a great help to the Supreme Court.

I turn to volume 14, of Permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, page 135, under the heading of Ejusdem Generis:

Principle of 'ejusdem generis' is that general words following enumeration of particular things are applicable only to things of same general nature.

[7728] That is a case from Oregon.

From a case in Texas, we find.

Under "ejusdem generis rule" general words following particular words will not include things of a superior class.

Now, one from California:

The rule of "ejusdem generis" requires that words of general description following words of particular description be interpreted as applying to things of similar character.

And:

Under the rule of "ejusdem generis" the general words applied to persons or things contained within the general genus of the particular person or things, enumerated, and are not limited to any particular one.

That is from a North Dakota case.

Then one from Illinois:

The rule of "ejusdem generis" is that general words following an enumeration of particular cases apply only to cases of the same kind as expressly mentioned.

Now, what counsel (Mr. Murphy) was jumping around for, itching to interpose, was to point out to you that it is clearly without the sense of the text, of course, it will not be limited to the precise words. But that brings us to this question of surprise.

[7729] Even though there is an abundance of evidence for the first several years after this tragic event that nobody was surprised in Washington, the President told about the impending attack, as you remember, was reported in the Stimson Diary, just 2 or 3 days before it happened, that we were going to be attacked by Japan.

He told Mr. Willkie that we were going to be attacked in 2 or 3 days in the famous letter that was received here in evidence.

"You better make plans in the light of the pending attack," that was sure to come. Also, in view of the fact that Mrs. Roosevelt said that they were not a bit surprised in and around the White House, that they sat by the radio listening to the radio. And, I don't know whether it is hind-thought or not, but now, in the course of this hearing, Admiral Stark says he was surprised. He was the commander in chief, and he was the man who wrote that message to you.

Now, if he intended to include Hawaii in that warning to you, would he have been surprised when the attack came?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to answer that. I think the evidence presented answers that very well.

Mr. GEARHART. General Marshall, so he said, was very much surprised when the attack came.

Admiral KIMMEL. So I understand.

[7730] Mr. GEARHART. And we have been informed by certain witnesses that the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, was very surprised when the attack came in Hawaii.

The point I am making, and I don't know whether you like it or not, but I want to make it—I think the American people should know—how can they condemn the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for being taken by surprise when everybody above him, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, all insisted that they were surprised.

I guess you don't want to comment on that.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think what you say is quite pertinent, and I think what you say is accurate.

Mr. GEARHART. I think that is all. Thank you very much. I see the Senator from Michigan is here, and he will inquire.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Kimmel, you have in your possession certain war plans; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Those plans were known as Rainbow 5, [7731] and they related to the Orange power, which was Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Rainbow 5 included more than that, but it included Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What other powers did it include? Being a war plan, it anticipated that certain things would be done if we had a war with what powers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as I recall, it was Germany, Italy, and Japan. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And as far as it possibly could be done, you had to carry it out if we got into war, you had to carry out that plan; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get orders to mobilize your fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I never did.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you have mobilized your fleet without carrying out that war plan or any part of that war plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. If we had received an order to mobilize that would automatically put into effect the provisions of the war plans short of hostile action.

[7732] Senator FERGUSON. Now, did that war plan provide what steps you were to take in case of hostilities with the orange power, or Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. The war plan did provide that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, provided there was a war between America and Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a method of putting that plan into effect after a declaration of war, was there some provision in the plan that after a declaration of war you were to take certain steps?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as far as the United States was concerned, the only way the United States could declare war was by an act of Congress; isn't that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that as far as we were concerned that war plan would take effect after we had declared war on Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes, sir, but—

Senator FERGUSON. But it also provided, did it not, that if Japan declared war on us the war plan would come into [7733] effect?

Admiral KIMMEL. I must say right here that after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor I issued an order to all ships and stations to execute the WPL-46 against Japan. I may have anticipated the Congress but I thought it was necessary to warn everybody in unmistakable language, and I did so.

Senator FERGUSON. Japan could declare war in two ways upon us, one by her legislative act or body and the executive branch or by an attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I considered that when they attacked Pearl Harbor they declared war on us and took every choice away from us.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the plan was in operation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In that kind of case you didn't have to wait for any formal notice from the Secretary of the Navy or from Admiral Stark?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know whether I had any legal obligation to wait, but I didn't wait.

Senator FERGUSON. But prior to that time you had certain duties as a peacetime commander in chief, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. What was that?

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that time, prior to the [7734] attack, you had certain duties to perform, as commander in chief of our fleet, in peacetime?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when they gave you a war warning, did they put into effect this plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I was expressly enjoined to make a preparatory deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Senator FERGUSON. So that instead of putting into effect this war plan it went further and warned you only to prepare for putting it into effect?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is what words say.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did that war plan provide what you were to do in case England or the British possessions were attacked?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever try to find out what you were to do in that case?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you want to know that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because I wanted to know what our action would be following war betwixt Great Britain and Japan, [7735] and because I knew of the conversations which we had had, and I wanted to definitely know what we would do in case of such a war.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew that in the Atlantic we had what was known as a shooting war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I knew that.

Senator FERGUSON. And shooting orders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was in effect in certain parts of the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. The southeast Pacific, a restricted area, about 700 miles off the coast of South America.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that apply to the Japanese as well as the German and Italian Governments?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did not apply to Japan; no.

Senator FERGUSON. So there was no shooting war in effect so far as Japan was concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Anywhere?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did want to know then what our attitude would be in case of a war between Britain and Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Also I wanted to know what [7736] our attitude would be in case of war betwixt Russia and Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. And also between the Netherlands and Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not definitely; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say "not definitely," did you ever find out to any extent?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the letter which I received from the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 25 that question was still undecided in his mind. I have read that message before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you got an order about escorting some ships, did you not, so far as the United States was concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. On the bottom of page 28 one of the tasks assigned—and that is the exhibit put in Saturday; what is that number?

Mr. MASTEN. 129.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got it before you? Page 28.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Route shipping of Associated Powers within the Fleet [7737] control zone.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain that to me. That was one of the tasks.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the fleet-control zones were to be established after the outbreak of war, and we were to tell them where to go, when to arrive, when to depart, the route they were to take through those zones, so we would know at all times where our own shipping was, and that would be the associated powers.

Senator FERGUSON. When you included "our own" you meant also the associated powers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We were escorting British and Dutch ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the Pacific?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. We escorted a Dutch ship; at least one.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a message somewhere, and I haven't it at my fingertips now, of what we would have done in case there was an attack on a Dutch ship. Do you recall that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I remember something about that.

Senator FERGUSON. We were escorting a Dutch ship at that [7738] time?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did escort a Dutch ship, as I recall, from Pearl Harbor down to Moeresby in New Guinea.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know about what time we escorted that Dutch ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, it was sometime in the summer, I think. I forget the date. That can be determined very readily.

Senator FERGUSON. I will try and find that message, Admiral.

Had you any message or information about the United States sending some Army troops to New Guinea on the Dutch possessions?

If I can take a moment I will try and find that.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. On the 26th of November did you know that in announcing that the United States would cooperate with the Netherlands in protecting bauxite mines in Dutch Guiana and by sending a contingent of the United States Army there, the White House explained that this action was taken—

because disturbed conditions in the Pacific made it inadvisable for the Netherlands to strengthen the Dutch Guiana defense by drawing upon the defense forces now stationed in the Netherlands East Indies.

Senator LUCAS. May I inquire what you are reading from?

Senator FERGUSON. I am reading from "The Situation in [7739] the Far East, a general summary on November 26, 1941, to the Secretary of State."

Senator LUCAS. Is that an exhibit in the hearing?

Senator FERGUSON. No; it is not.

Senator LUCAS. Whose summary is it?

Senator FERGUSON. It isn't signed. It has got the initials "G. A." Who would that be?

Mr. MASTEN. George Atcheson, it might be. I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to see it, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. No; I don't care to see it. I just wanted to identify the document.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just asking him about it. I don't care to put the instrument in.

I am asking if you ever heard of that, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. I may have heard of it. I don't recall it now. I have no recollection of it at the present time.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard of the plan proposed to buy New Guinea and give it to the Japs?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I never heard it, and I didn't know anything about—I don't know anything about it even now.

Senator FERGUSON. You had never heard of it until I asked the question?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

[7740] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if Dutch Guiana is in the Pacific. It is in the Caribbean.

Senator FERGUSON. It is in the Pacific. Did I say Dutch Guiana? It is New Guinea.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought you said New Guinea. That is what I took you to mean.

Senator FERGUSON. You had never heard of any such plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I have no knowledge of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, as to the document I read here, Dutch Guiana is in the Caribbean, the bauxite mines. You understood that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I was thinking of the Pacific all the time.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to change that. It reads:

In announcing that the United States would cooperate with the Netherlands in the protection of the bauxite mines in Dutch Guiana—

that is in South America?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

by sending a contingent of the United States Army there, the White House explained that this action was taken [7741] because disturbed conditions in the Pacific made it inadvisable for the Netherlands to strengthen the Dutch Guiana defenses by drawing upon the defense forces now stationed in the Netherlands East Indies.

Admiral KIMMEL. I misunderstood. I had in mind New Guinea. I think I did hear something about that, but whether I read it in the newspaper or where I got the information I don't know. But I did

know something about that. I did hear something about it, but that was outside of my province and I didn't consider it of any great moment to me.

[7742] Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know prior to the 7th of December—and the testimony is of General Marshall here—that we were putting certain air bases in the Pacific in the British possessions and the Dutch possessions, and we were sending bombs there and oil and gas?

Admiral KIMMEL. Do you speak of Christmas and Canton?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that we were undertaking some work out there, and I knew that General Short was directed to do certain things, and we assisted him in that, particularly in supplying him with fuel, the ships; he brought a ship out there, and we had to supply it with fuel—or chartered a ship, I should say.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would it be correct to say that your first and your chief objective in the event of an American-Japanese war was an attack upon the Marshall Islands to divert the Japanese from the Malayan barrier which comprised vital possessions of the Dutch and the British, who would be our allies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Mr. Churchill had on—

Admiral KIMMEL. That was if and when we got into the war.

[7743] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Mr. Churchill had on the 25th of August 1941 said: "It is certain that this has got to stop." I had better get the exact quote from the newspapers. I will read from the New York Times as of Monday, August 25.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of what year, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Monday, August 25, 1941. This was a broadcast:

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed, but this I must say, that if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourself unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

Were you familiar with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Whether I saw that or not, I saw some statements made by Mr. Churchill along that very same line.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what was the Malay barrier as far as you understood it? What did it consist of?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as I understood the Malay barrier it was a general term to include the Malay States, [7744] Sumatra, Java, Borneo, New Guinea, and the adjacent islands.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it include the Kra Peninsula, the Kra Isthmus?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is a Malay State; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And it included Singapore, did it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it include the Dutch East Indies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, would the attack on the Marshalls accomplish the chief purpose of the American war plan that you then

had, if that attack occurred after Singapore had fallen to the Japanese?

Admiral KIMMEL. That would have been a little late.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would it have been a little more than a little late?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it would have been, in my judgment, if I had waited too long.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. Well, now, was that one of the reasons why you were trying to find out in advance what you were to do in case they attacked the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would have also been late after the Japanese had gone into Borneo and Java, would it not?

[7745] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, was the Marshall operation and its value contingent upon it being undertaken before the Japanese had breached the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, certainly before they had had a chance to take those land areas which comprise the Malay Barrier. It had to draw the forces away in time, before they had conquered that country and before they had gone down there really.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, is that why you were interested in the movement and why the United States was interested in the movement south?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was very much interested, yes. I wanted to know what they were doing and where they were headed for.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you also want to know what you were to do in case you were sure that they were going south?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you ever find that out prior to the attack on the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. What I was to do?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; not definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now you come back to those words [7746] "Not definitely." Did you ever find any information on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not except what has been presented right here, and the war plans and other places. I wanted to know what we were to do. I did not find out.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, in the war plans that Senator Brewster questioned you about, page 35, or section 35, here was one of the Navy's tasks. It is on page 23 of the appendix.

Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I find it first, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you have it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is page 23 of the appendix. It is appendix I. It is the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, section 8, "Tasks continued" under 35, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I have it now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you were to—

Support the task forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of

positions in the Marshalls and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

[7747] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did that task depend upon your first knowing that America was in the war by virtue of an attack or declaration of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did. I had no authority to act until I received definite word from my Government. I had no authority to act at all and if the—I will put it this way: Had the Japanese made an attack on the Kra Peninsula, had they made an attack on Java, I would have been unable to do anything until I got orders to move.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Admiral Hart on the 6th—that is on a Saturday—had inquired about what we were to do in relation to three or four incidents in case of an attack on other than our territory?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that he reported to the Navy Department that he had learned from Admiral Phillips of certain commitments made by our Government of which he had never been informed and asked for further information.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, that very thing you had been inquiring about before, had you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had not found it out?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had not found it out.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know about that inquiry?

[7748] It is in exhibit 40 now before us. Did you know about that inquiry of Admiral Hart prior to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that came to me after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. After the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. It reads in this way:

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the message introduced as exhibit 40.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not get that until after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That came to me after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you here when I asked Admiral Turner some questions? Were you here when he was examined?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I was not present.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you aware that Admiral Turner had informed the Japanese Ambassador in August—or, no, in July, and I think the exact date was July 23 or 24,— [7749] that the United States would not tolerate, in view of its policy of aiding Britain and its interpretation of self-defense, a Japanese threat to the Malay Barrier?

Admiral FERGUSON. I did not know that he had made any such statements.

Senator FERGUSON. You never had any such information?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you ever told that Admiral Stark was called to the White House by the President on July 24 and that then he heard a statement by the President to Japan to the effect—which statement was that if Japan attempted to get Dutch oil by force, the British and Dutch would fight and there would then result a most serious situation between the United States and Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't remember ever having been informed of that conversation.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Is that Stark's testimony?

Senator FERGUSON. It is in volume 2 of "Foreign Relations".

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever had that information?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

[7750] Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you would have had that information in relation to Admiral Turner's conversation—and, by the way, a copy of that was sent to the President, was sent to the Secretary of State and was never disputed as far as Turner was concerned and he was never called on the carpet, or it was never taken up with him that he was wrong in that—and this other conversation that Stark heard from the President to the Japanese—if you had known of that would you then have known the policy of America in case of an attack upon the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have been most helpful to me and if I had known all the circumstances and the fact that that was the policy of the Government; yes, it would have helped immensely.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you as a peacetime commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet trying to carry out the policy of America?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And your endeavor was at all times to learn, if you could, what our policy was?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you also had to know at the same time if you wanted to be an efficient officer what the policy of any proposed enemy or contemplated enemy, let me put it [7751] that way, would be?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we wanted to know everything we could about the enemy, everything that was available.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, were you advised that on August 17, when the President returned from the Atlantic conference, that the President called the Japanese Ambassador to the White House and told him in diplomatic language, and it was rather blunt and in writing, that a Japanese threat or show of force against the Malay Barrier or any movement in the Pacific would compel the United States immediately to take any and all steps necessary to protect our rights?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not know about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that such a message was delivered after the return of the President?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Any message?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; not to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you advised that responsible leadership was intercepting secret Japanese messages wherein the Japanese Ambassador was advising his Government that it must expect armed opposition from Great Britain and the United States should Japan move against the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was never informed of that.

[7752] Senator FERGUSON. You never had any information on that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you aware from your own judgment, like Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner have stated here, that Anglo-Dutch-American embargoes on Japan oil supplies, regardless of their justification for such embargoes, constituted an actual and a logical cause of war with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I thought that the embargoes would irritate Japan considerably and I knew about the embargoes.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you think it would irritate them enough, as has been stated by Admiral Stark, that we should have anticipated war over that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily; no.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not go that far?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In the previous hearing the witness said that he thought it was another step on the road to war.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way you want to put it, just another step?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think there is very little difference betwixt that and what I have just said.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, another step would not be [7753] definite unless we knew how many steps we were away from war.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at that time about how many steps were we away from war, if we can clear that up?

Admiral KIMMEL. That depended upon the attitude of our Government and the attitude of the Japanese Government and had I known what was known in Washington I could have estimated much more accurately how many steps we were away from war.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you fully aware on November the 27th that the Japanese had concentrated for an attack upon the Malay barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was so informed.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in the so-called war warning message they told me that they were and in the—well, we had various reports of the Japanese fleet moving. We had the war warning message, we had the ONI bulletin of December 1 and various other information which showed that they were, the fleet was on the move.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you aware that such an attack, even the obvious preparation for it, was a direct defiance of the formal and explicit warning against such movement given by the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know of the formal and explicit [7754] warning given by the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. So, therefore, you could not evaluate this movement, is that what you are telling us?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I could not properly evaluate it.

Senator FERGUSON. You could not properly evaluate this movement?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were advised on November 24 to expect an immediate Japanese attack upon the Malay barrier and any other place in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. On November 4?

Senator FERGUSON. Twenty-fourth.

Admiral KIMMEL. Twenty-fourth?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the first message.

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't think that said Malay barrier. It said an attack in any direction, or something of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. You had better look at it. It is exhibit 37.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

A surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

That is what the message of the 24th says.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

Indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines [7755] or Guam is a possibility.

That was what it said.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way the message read?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, under date of November the 25th Admiral Stark wrote you a letter, did he not, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you got that letter on the 3rd?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were advised by Admiral Stark after he had a conference at the White House that he was damned if he knew what the United States was going to do should Japan attack the Malay Barrier without at the same time attacking possessions of the United States.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the essence of his—

Senator FERGUSON. That is the essence of what he said?

Admiral KIMMEL. Of his statement; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, with that kind of language to you—

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't know what we were going to do.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). And your knowledge that they were going to the Malay Barrier, at least concentrating to do that, you did not know what steps you could or should take under War Plan No. 5 or 46, as the case may be, [7756] is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, between the date of that letter and its receipt you had been instructed, had you not, to prepare to attack the Marshalls after Japan had committed an overt act against the United States because you got it on the 27th? You got a message on the 27th, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So between the 25th and the 3d you had this message, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the manner of ordinary naval strategy, would the Japanese expect an attack by the Pacific Fleet on the Marshalls in the event the United States should implement its direct and specific warning to oppose a Japanese movement against the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think they probably would expect attacks on the Marshalls. That is reasonable, yes. They, of course, I hoped did not know what we were going to do.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You always have to anticipate, do you not, that Japan knew what our war plan in the Pacific was?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean the statements that had been made to them?

[7757] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in broad outline; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. We knew that they had spies, did we not, not only in America, but in Hawaii and on the west coast in America and for that matter here in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Or should have anticipated that they had.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, even now I doubt if they had access to our war plans.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know or did you anticipate that they could be intercepting our messages?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is always a possibility.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, for instance, from Tokyo to Berlin on November the 30th we knew here that Japan said this in that message:

What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan they conferred with England, Australia, and Netherlands and China. They did it repeatedly. Therefore it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan along with Germany and Italy as an enemy.

That is on page 206, Exhibit 1.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I don't know what they referred to [7758] there. I never thought that, as I read that that—

Senator FERGUSON. But you never had that message before the attack, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; I never had the message. I mean now, after I know about these things, that it never occurred to me that that referred to our war plan, particularly as to details of the war plan. What I took it to mean was the broad plan that we—put it this way: That message, in my opinion, referred to the collaboration and the fact that we were allying ourselves with Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, and so forth. That was what I understood that plan to mean. I had known of that before the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, we had talked here about the so-called missing fleet, and I think you said that was a misnomer, but it was the ships that at least we did not know about, the carriers, their location. Was your anxiety about the location of these certain missing Japanese units predicated in any way on the expectancy of meeting up with such a unit in that projected attack on the Marshalls? You had a war plan, did you not, what you were to do?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. When we started off—our expeditions to the Marshalls were largely to get the units of the Japanese fleets to come over there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any idea as to how important or how vital Singapore was to the Malay Barrier? [7759]

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I thought it was a very important post out there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether our leadership in Washington—did anyone here in Washington advise you on December the 6th that a Japanese invasion fleet of sixty-some vessels had been sighted and was within a day or 14 hours—I think the message read “fourteen hours”—of striking distance of the approaches to Singapore? It is the so-called Winant message.

Admiral KIMMEL. What message was that?

Senator FERGUSON. Winant. At 10:40 the State Department received it here in Washington.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I never got that message, but I got information along that same line.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you show him the message? It is the Winant message that came into the State Department on the 6th of December. It reads this way:

British Admiralty reports at 3 A. M. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers; Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.

(Signed) WINANT.

[7760] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there was a message from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to OPNAV on December 6 which said:

Report by CINC China “25 ship convoy with escort of 6 cruisers and 10 DD’s Lat 08-00 N, 106-00 East at 0816 GMT Today. Convoy of 10 ships with two cruisers and 10 destroyers 07-40 North, 106-20 East two hours later. All on course west. Three additional ships 07-51 North 105 East at 0442, Course 310. This indicates all forces will make for Kohtron.” Sighted by my scouting force anchored Camranh Bay—30 ships and one large cruiser.

Now, I had that, and Kohtron, where he sighted these ships, was located—where he said these ships were headed is in Indochina—not so very far from the Thai border.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Admiral, now what could that mean to you with the knowledge that you had when you tried to find out what we were going to do if they attacked the British possessions, what could that message, with the other information, mean to an admiral commander in chief?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, what it meant to me when I saw this thing, “Forces moving for Kohtron,” that was the estimate there, we followed out what the Navy Department had told me that the most probable places they would go into was into [7761] Thai and they were concentrating their forces over there to go into Thai.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you did not know, Admiral, what the United States was going to do in case they attacked there, why in the world would they send you that message? That was another power. We were a separate and distinct nation. Why would that message be sent to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, this message was sent to OPNAV because OPNAV had directed the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to get this information and the commander in chief Asiatic Fleet had carried out his orders to get the information.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Admiral, why would they be sending it to Washington? America is an independent and sovereign power. Why were we concerned if we did not have a war plan in relation to that attack? Why would it be sent here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, those were some of the problems there that I had.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize they were your problems and you were trying to find out what we were going to do.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I was.

Senator FERGUSON. And you told us now that you never did find out.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

[7762] Senator FERGUSON. You were positive about that, that you never got an answer as to what we were to do.

Admiral KIMMEL. The last answer I had on that subject before the attack was what you have just read here a few minutes ago in Admiral Stark's letter of November 25, which I received on December 3.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. He also had a memorandum which had been given to the President which says that the only plan we had was to conduct a defensive war in connection with the British and the Dutch for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; I had that.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the memorandum of November 5.

Admiral KIMMEL. I see.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that give you information as to what you were to do?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did not; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or what America was to do in case of an attack only on some other power?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; it did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the President by [7763] direct order had ordered three ships to go into the Gulf of Siam or off the Coast of China to watch for this movement into the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had known that would that have indicated you did have something to do in case of that kind of an attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that the commander in chief of the Asiatic had been ordered to send some planes over to scout, but I did not know that the—

Senator FERGUSON. Three men-of-war?

Admiral KIMMEL (continuing). Ships had been sent over.

Senator FERGUSON. Three men-of-war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, you can call them men-of-war, yes. They had the character of men-of-war, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. They were ships with sailors and guns?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a perfectly natural thing for us to do on the basis that we wanted to know what the Japanese were doing;

we wanted to know whether they would come to the Philippines or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how would it tell you whether they were coming to the Philippines, and I would like to have you look at the message on page 49 of Exhibit 37:

[7764] Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. Men-of-War are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice.

The President is even telling them how to make men-of-war.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not see that message.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I knew nothing about that. All I knew about was the airplane scouting out of there of the patrol planes, which was at the time, I considered, a very good move to find out what they were doing out there and whether they were coming to the Philippines or not.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, if you had known of this message of the President, from OPNAV to CINCAF, information no one mentioned, would that have indicated to you an answer to that question as to what we were going to do in case of an attack upon the Malay Peninsula?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have been useful information. It would have still been short of any authoritative statement of what our intentions were.

[7765] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for a moment there, just for information?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Doesn't our record show that these three ships were never sent?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, but the fact of going to send them, ordering them to be sent by the President himself, would that have been significant to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That would have been useful information; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that the presence of the Japanese force before the approaches of Singapore required the responsible leadership in Washington to act immediately or to back down from the former position it had taken with Japan as of Sunday, August the 17th, 1941? I will repeat that question. I will repeat it, Admiral.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me just a moment, Senator, before you go into that. I just call attention to the fact that the President's message, I understand, is to be read in the two Houses about 12 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to recess now?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Senator George has suggested that we would all like to hear it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I would.

[7766] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I assumed Senator Ferguson would, too.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not through, but we will come back later.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand that it will probably be agreeable for us to recess at this point until 2 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. It is perfectly agreeable and I will try and repeat that question to you this afternoon.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is news to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will recess at this time until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[7767]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (Retired)—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Kimmel, my last question was, Did you know then that the presence of this Japanese force before the approaches to Singapore required the responsible leadership in Washington to act immediately or to back down from the former position it had taken with Japan as of Sunday, August the 17th, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you had known that, would this fact that they were moving toward the Kra Peninsula made a difference with your action?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is a difficult question to answer because there were so many things that I did not know, but I am quite sure that such a knowledge would have affected my action to some extent.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you had never before you—you had nothing before you, had you, that the United States Government intended to back down from any stand or any policy that it had?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, if the policy was such [7768] that we should have anticipated that if they attacked the Kra Peninsula it would mean war with America, should we not have then at the same time anticipated a co-attack on America?

Admiral KIMMEL. That would appear to be reasonable; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know why no one seems to have anticipated that if they attacked the Kra Peninsula they would not also attack America at the same time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at any time after November the 25th, 1941, did the chief of naval operations, that is Admiral Stark, advise you that instead of being damned if he knew what the United States was going to do in the event that Japan attacked the Malay barrier after bypassing American positions, he did know what the United States was going to do? You see, he wrote you that letter on the 25th.

Admiral KIMMEL. If he had informed me that he knew what the United States was going to do and what they were going to do, it would have been of great assistance to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we had an instrument go in here in evidence last Friday or Saturday. Would you let me have the instrument that went in?

Mr. MASTEN. Which is it?

Senator FERGUSON. The one with regard to the disposition in relaxation to exchange of nationals. [7769]

Mr. MASTEN. Here it is. Exhibit 74-A.

Senator FERGUSON. 74-A. It is the 4th of December 1941 and it is Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Just one sentence from it in relation to an agreement with Japan while we are not at war, to get our nationals out in case we are going to war.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I find that on my copy, please, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It is on page 2. The words, "Such attempt." Britain is trying to get us to take parallel action with them or joint action as our desires may be.

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean beginning with "Although it is possible"?

Senator FERGUSON. No. "Such an attempt might." Do you find it? Are those pages the same? They may not be the same.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I see it. I have it now.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Such attempt might, at this time, be advisable also in that it would be definite indication to the Japanese Government of the firmness of the American position in the present crisis and would be one means of impressing upon the Japanese Government the seriousness with [7770] which we view the present situation.

Now, that being true, that coercion there would indicate to the Japanese Government that we were acting with Britain and considering this as one, shouldn't we have anticipated that if they attacked one they would attack both?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is reasonable; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now we go to the end of it and this is on the end and it is signed by "M. M. H." who, I understand, is Maxwell M. Hamilton:

As the making of such an approach—

and they are speaking now about getting nationals out of Japanese territory in China before the declaration of war, before the shooting starts, and I will read:

As the making of such an approach would be interpreted by the American public as a definite indication—

then this is inserted in—

that this Government—

meaning America—

expects war between Japan and the United States, the Secretary may wish to speak to the President in regard to the advisability of this Government's making such an approach at this time.

Now, that is dated on December the 4th, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, from all that you have learned wherein the messages were intercepted and was known in Washington, have you any doubt that war was imminent and that we knew we were going to war? [7771]

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no doubt, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, did you get this message so that it would indicate that we did not want the American public to know that we were going to war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I received no such message; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You received no such message?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, can you account for the fact that you did not get any of this other information that it was along the same line, that they did not want the American public to know that we were going into war? Would that answer some of these questions?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know why I did not get the information, sir. I have never been able to figure it out.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were told this, were you not, that you were to do nothing that would arouse the population of Hawaii to indicate that we were going to war?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was contained in messages which came to me; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, as an admiral in the Navy, how could the fact that General Marshall or Admiral Stark would have alerted you on Sunday morning, say between 7 and 9, [7772] that that message was received, how could the intercepting of that message by the Japs have changed the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to state. I cannot see how it would have changed the situation in the slightest, except that it would have helped us considerably.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But suppose the Japanese fleet had learned at 7 o'clock in the morning, that is 7 our time, on Sunday, which was 5½, is it, 5½ hours before?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Which is 5½ hours before their ships came in, their airplanes came into Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose that they had flashed to that fleet the fact that the Hawaiian Islands were fully alerted and knew that there was something going to happen and our ships would have gone out, how would that have interfered with the Japs other than probably to have stopped them coming in?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't understand how it would have interfered in the slightest degree.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, as an admiral, then, as an expert, you cannot tell us why that would have interfered with our defense?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I indicated that very clearly in [7773] my statement, sir. I cannot understand why I did not get those messages—that information, I mean.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, did you know that on Saturday night about 9 o'clock the President sent a message to the Emperor? Did you get that on the radio?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not know that until after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did give us the answer that you knew of several other things that were being negotiated back and forth during the period between the 27th and the 7th, that there were negotiations on?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I knew from the public press.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all I got.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Well, now, at any time in the year 1941 and from any authoritative source had you been advised that the task of the Pacific Fleet should be in the event of an outbreak of war in the Pacific which did not involve a Japanese attack directly on American possessions—did you know what your task would be in that case, from any source?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any instructions in the event of such a contingency?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

[7774] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any instructions or plans for the Asiatic Fleet in such a contingency?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not get that last.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any instructions to Hart's fleet, the Asiatic Fleet, in such a contingency?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, or did you not know, that the Atlantic Fleet and the South Pacific Fleet were engaged in what the English language has always defined as a war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew the shooting orders which had been issued to the Atlantic Fleet and to the Southeast Pacific detachment.

Senator FERGUSON. Southeast Pacific, yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any shooting in the Pacific outside of those two areas, that Southeast Pacific? Did you know of any shooting prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Only the orders I issued myself about depth bombing submarines.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any other actual shooting?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't been able during the noon [7775] hour to find that message in relation to the Netherlands ship, someone indicating that a definite ship or some Netherlands ship—that we would go between them in case there was any shooting.

Admiral KIMMEL. I recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what kind of an order do you interpret that to be?

Admiral KIMMEL. The way I interpret that order is that you would go in betwixt an attacking force and a Netherlands ship and if they shot at you—

Senator FERGUSON. You would shoot back?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why, I would probably shoot back.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, that would create at least an incident, would it not, an international incident?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, it probably would.

Senator FERGUSON. And there would be little use then of talking about the first overt act, wouldn't there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Japs would have shot first.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. Even though you would have run between the mark that he was shooting at and that wasn't our mark.

that did not belong to this country, you would consider under those circumstances that the Jap shot first?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have to know all the circumstances first.

[7776] Senator FERGUSON. On the 18th of November 1941, there is this message, in exhibit 37—

Admiral KIMMEL. What is the date, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. The 18th of November 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It reads:

In convoy with American Flag vessels, placing of *Bloemfontein* is authorized until international conditions on and subsequent to 25 November become defined, and clarified, however, any further direct or Great Circle routing between Hawaii and the Philippines should not be used. Until further advised by department routes south of Mandates should be prescribed.

Do you know why they used the date there "subsequent to November 25"?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that we had a message that we intercepted from the Japs showing that the dead line date was the 25th of November?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I never had anything like that.

Senator FERGUSON. So then if you received this message what would that November 25 mean? It was for your action—CINCPAC.

[7777] Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know what November 25 meant, but I was concerned, when I received this, with the orders I received to put the *Bloemfontein* in the convoy with American-flag vessels.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a Dutch ship, was it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That was a Dutch ship.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the fact that we put that ship into our convoy would indicate that we were taking parallel action? Did you take it as such?

Admiral KIMMEL. My memory is not entirely clear, but I think we had some matériel, or personnel, or something on this ship that we wanted to get through, on the *Bloemfontein*.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think we had some soldiers on that ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall that, as to just what it was. On one of these Dutch ships that we used, we had some fliers that were going out to China.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not get that word.

Admiral KIMMEL. Aviators.

Senator FERGUSON. Fliers. I did not get the word at first.

Admiral KIMMEL. I forget which one it was.

[7778] Senator FERGUSON. Who would know what was on that ship that we were using our convoys to take out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the only place you could find that now would be in the Navy Department. I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Masten, would you let me have that Formosa information on the fleet?

Mr. MASTEN. That has not been offered yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you offer it in evidence as Exhibit 130?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we would like to offer at this time, as Exhibit 130, a collection of memoranda and communications obtained from the files of the State Department regarding reconnaissance by Japanese aircraft over American possessions in the Pacific, together with a dispatch dated November 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of State forwarding a note from the Japanese foreign office protesting the flight of an American airplane over Taiwan on November 20, 1941, and the reply of the State Department to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo to that message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received as Exhibit 130.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 130.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that the same document that was distributed to the committee Saturday?

Mr. MASTEN. It is.

[7779] Senator FERGUSON. Would you get a copy of it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

Senator FERGUSON. The first item on that is dated October 27, 1941 and reads:

British sources report 2 Japanese aircraft carriers, one of which is the Kaga, operating in mandated islands. Following planes reported there:

Now we did not have possession of the mandated islands, did we?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not have possessions in the mandated islands?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. None, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why this kind of report was sent to our Navy Department then?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I believe they were exchanging information about this time.

Senator FERGUSON. The next one is dated November 21, 1941:

Source New Zealand Naval Intelligence: On November 16 and 17 planes, apparently Japanese, were sighted over Gilberts.

Were the Gilberts under our control?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were British possessions, the [7780] Gilberts.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this information sent to you prior to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am just trying to read it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; if you will read it all.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the next one is November 24, 1941:

Dependable reports here of reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on November 15 by monoplane with tapered wings, single tailfin, twin engines. Next day repeated by monoplane flying boat silver color number of engines unobserved.

That was not over our territory, was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the Gilberts again, the British possessions.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now the next one is a complaint over our planes, where Japan made a complaint. It is dated November 29, 1941.

2880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

I have the honor to state that according to a report from the Japanese Naval authorities, an American airplane flew over Garanbi on the southernmost tip of Taiwan Island at 12:30 p. m. November 20, 1941, and after circling at an altitude of 2,000 meters flew away southward at 12:45 p. m. the [7781] same day.

It is believed that the Japanese Government cannot overlook such a violation of Japanese territory by an airplane and it is therefore requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned.

Also I particularly bespeak Your Excellency's solicitude particularly the recurrence of such incidents at this time when the international situation is tense and the untoward events to which they might give rise are unpredictable.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Signed by Togo, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is sent to the Department of State only and signed by Grew.

Had you known of that wire?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or that event?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you know of our reply where we made a complaint on December 6, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the last page. It reads:

Your 1868, November 29, 6 p. m.

The Foreign Office note has been brought to the attention [7782] of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

In connection with this question, you may be interested to know that the Navy Department has been informed by the Governor of Guam that about noon on November 24 an unidentified two-motored airplane circled the southern extremity of Guam for about ten minutes flying at an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet.

In other words, instead of our replying to the complaint that they made we said, in effect, "One of your planes flew over our territory." That is what it amounts to, doesn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is what it appears to amount to.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was any scouting over Guam or Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. Guam or Midway, did you say?

Senator FERGUSON. Guam or Midway. This shows that apparently there was some scouting over Guam.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no recollection of any report having been received to that effect. It is possible I did get it, but I am quite sure I never got anything about Midway.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know if there was any scouting over the Philippines?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Over our territory?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

[7783] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask the Senator to ask counsel if they haven't evidence that the Admiral did have knowledge of this business in the South Pacific, and also Guam?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am not positive about Guam.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel also to look up any record from the Navy or Army showing any scouting planes or observation

planes of the Japs over the Philippines prior to the time of the attack on the Philippines.¹

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find there is definite information about them being over Guam, and there is definite information about them being over the southern route, and that was under discussion, as to whether they should protect the shipping there.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are correct about planes on the southern route. I do not recall exactly, but I have no recollection of this particular message.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not know about this message.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not know about this message either, Admiral, but I remember something about Guam. I will get it.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, did you know that the Japanese Ambassadors here to America, the Japanese Foreign Minister [7784] and Japanese press indicated that they expected the United State to proceed in the Pacific as it had in the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific in the event of an Anglo-Japanese war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Will you repeat that, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you know that the Japanese Ambassador here to America, or Japanese Foreign Minister and the Japanese press, had expressed themselves to the effect that they expected the United States to proceed in the Pacific as it was proceeding in the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific in the event of an Anglo-Japanese war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew what we were doing in the Atlantic on that shooting order?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I knew what we were doing in the Atlantic, and whether I read anything like that in the newspaper I am unable to say at the present time.

However, I do not think I got it either way.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it occur to you at that time, having this example of the Atlantic, that the Japanese naturally and logically would expect the same formula in the Pacific? In other words, did not we have a policy that they should [7785] have anticipated and expected we would carry the same thing out in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, no; I did not not think that they would, because I had been led to believe we were keeping out of war in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. What brought you to that conclusion?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, all the correspondence I had that we did not want to tackle two wars at once. We wanted to confine it to the Atlantic, we did not want to go into the Pacific. That was my impression prior to December 7, that I am talking about now.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you really did not come to the conclusion at any time prior to the attack that we were going to have war in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not come to the conclusion that war was imminent. I did not come to the conclusion that we were forcing the war, or that we were in any way forcing the war. In answer to your question, therefore, I did not consider that the Japanese would

¹The information was furnished Senator Ferguson. See pp. 5359 to 5361.

expect us to take any such action in the Pacific as had been taken in the Atlantic.

Senator FERGUSON. Now after reading these, intercepts, Exhibit 1—do you know what I mean? That is the printed copy.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. The intercepts I did not get.

[7786] Senator FERGUSON. The intercepts you did not get?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that Japan would anticipate that we were going to carry out the same thing in case they got into a war with England?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that would have been a reasonable conclusion on their part, or something along that line.

Senator FERGUSON. As of December 6, and as a result of the information and instructions sent to you from Washington, and particularly the Stark letter you got on December 3, which was mailed the 25th, did you visualize naval action in the Pacific by the United States following the pattern of the naval action in the Atlantic?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not, not following the pattern of the naval action in the Atlantic.

Senator FERGUSON. Now Japan had a fighting Navy in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this factor the vital one in the difference between the conditions in the Atlantic and those in the Pacific: Germany did not have a fighting Navy in the Atlantic, except submarines, did they?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; they did not. They had certain ships that could have done great damage to our convoys in the [7787] Atlantic, and the Italians were putting up considerable trouble in the Mediterranean at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Because they had a fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they had a fleet there. Also, in all justice, it must be said there was a question as to what Vichy was going to do, and they had quite a fleet, and that was a factor in the Atlantic.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you aware, Admiral Kimmel, that on December 6 information from Singapore to the Asiatic Fleet was to assist the British then in Singapore, and that Admiral Hart was making arrangements to such effect at the time an attack against Singapore was at hand?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe there is any evidence to that effect. I may be wrong about it. I do not believe there is any evidence before this committee that Admiral Hart was getting ready to assist the British in event of an attack against Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. I call to the attention of the Senator that he wired about the talk he had with Admiral Phillips.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there was an Admiralty message that came from the British Isles to us, and then there was a reply dictated, to be sent—according to the memorandum—after the actual attack.

[7788] Senator LUCAS. That is true.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, for the explanation of both Senators, there was an Admiralty dispatch sent to Admiral Kimmel on November 1 about what the British were going to do but not about what we were going to do.

Senator LUCAS. The only thing I am making any complaint about at all—it may not be serious—is the erroneous assumption that Admiral Hurt was to attack. Admiral Hart can testify about that himself.

Senator FERGUSON. I am speaking now about the arrangement that he was making. He had sent out these flying missions to get the information, and he asked for the information. The information was made up here before the attack came. So someone knew here in Washington before the attack came what was to be sent to Admiral Hart in reply to his inquiry, whereas you had made a similar inquiry and, as I understand it, you had no information sent to you, that you received, or sent to you that you did not receive, prior to the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I had no information, and I am not familiar with any details of what Admiral Hart did down there, nor what reply he received.

[7789] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. To try to get the record straight, it is my impression that that which you read this morning, "I don't know what we will do, but in my judgment we will do anything," it is my impression that you stated this morning and you seem to state now that that referred to what we were going to do if there was an attack on the Malay Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The question to Admiral Stark was what would happen if we went to war with Russia, and that was the answer he was giving.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 5130 of the record, Mr. Mitchell quotes the reply of Admiral Hart as follows:

The five parts of your dispatch beginning with 070327 approved with comment as follows:

X Part one approved X Part two approved but CNO invites attention to possibility that the major Japanese attack against Philippines may come from the eastward and that a Japanese concentration may be established Halmahera or Mindinao approximately in accord with ideas expressed in WPL-44 X.

What was WPL-44? Is that a misprint in here?

[7790] Admiral KIMMEL. I think it must be a misprint.

Senator FERGUSON. It must be WPL-46.

Admiral KIMMEL. The only one I know about is WPL-46.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think it is most pertinent in connection with what you are now asking that you refer to page 354 of volume 2 of the Navy Narrative in which there is a discussion of this very question, the Admiralty dispatch, and what we would do, sent to Admiral Kimmel. I don't know whether you have that in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't at the moment.

At least, Admiral, you didn't know of this reply to Admiral Hart?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that I didn't know anything about that until after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the attack on the approaches to Singapore—that is, Malay—was about 9 o'clock Hawaiian time, which was several hours after the attack on Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I knew that at the time; yes, sir. I knew it was after the attack on Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. That was almost a simultaneous attack?

[7791] Admiral KIMMEL. Close to it; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You would consider it as such, within a couple of hours?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it appears that there was a simultaneous attack on Britain and America?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall just what time the Philippines were attacked?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no knowledge of that through official channels. It has all been published. My information is not authoritative, but my recollection is about 9 o'clock in the morning out there Philippine time, which was about, oh, 5 or 6 hours after the attack at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, how do you account for the fact, with the years of experience that you had, and the knowledge you had on the 7th, and the knowledge that ships were moving on Malay, that you didn't anticipate an attack simultaneous, or within a few hours or minutes by the Japs on both the British and the Americans? It is indicated on the 6th that within 14 hours there was going to be a movement on Malay, which came to sometime Sunday morning.

As an admiral, with your experience, and the knowledge [7792] you had, how do you account for the fact that you didn't anticipate a concurrent attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean with the information which was actually available to me?

Senator FERGUSON. With the knowledge you had; yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I covered that as thoroughly as I knew how in all my testimony here, and I don't know how to answer it any more clearly than I have. I had forces in the Pacific which I employed to meet what I considered the probable dangers, and to accomplish the most I could in hurting the enemy in case we got into war.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this knowledge you had show the parallel action that now is disclosed in the instruments that were known here in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't know that the parallel action had—if you call it that—

Senator FERGUSON. Whatever you call it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Had gone to any such extent as I now know. I knew that we were having staff conversations. We had had staff conversations. Now, what I wanted to know was what we were actually going to do in certain contingencies. I didn't find that out.

Senator FERGUSON. From your viewpoint, as an admiral, knowing what you knew Washington knew about this parallel [7793] action or joint action, would you have anticipated a concurrent or simultaneous attack if they were going to attack Britain?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Michigan constantly refers to Washington knowing about taking parallel action with Britain. I submit that there isn't any evidence in this record up to this time that shows that the official Government of the United States, and

the official Government of England ever agreed upon any parallel action to be taken by way of a warning against Japan.

Notwithstanding that, the Senator from Michigan, with every witness that he has examined, assumes always that such parallel action was taken. I do not believe it is quite in keeping with what is fair to put that sort of a question to a witness who was not totally familiar with what was going on in Washington. To assume with this witness that parallel action was taken, and to let him answer on that assumption, is not in keeping with what seems to be fair.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course it is unusual to have one member of the committee object to the questions of another member of the committee, but I want to say this, that I am just endeavoring to find out what action was taken.

Now, I endeavored to get whom I consider the only [7794] living witness to what took place originally at the Atlantic conference. I am not going to discuss that question. He is not going to be called because the majority of the committee has declined to call him, Mr. Churchill, who is the only man I know of in this country who can tell us what action the British took, or what action was agreed on to be taken.

Now, I will ask this question, forgetting about the word "parallel action": Knowing what you do now, about these messages in this country at the time; knowing now that the Foreign Relations book and the other information shows what took place on the 17th of August—what took place all along the line, not what you knew at the time of the 7th, but what you now know was in Washington in the possession of those in authority—would you have anticipated a simultaneous attack on both and, therefore, if we knew in Washington that there was going to be an attack on the Malay Peninsula that we should have anticipated an attack on all our possessions in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, if I had known all that was known in Washington, I think I would have anticipated such an attack.

Senator FERGUSON. There is one question which I would like to have answered to my satisfaction, and to the [7795] satisfaction of every member of this committee.

It is: How could this attack take place as it did, and not be anticipated by those who were in charge of defending the life and the possessions of America?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you answer it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when Secretary Knox met you in Hawaii, you said he said something to you about "did you get the message that was sent on the 6th to you?"

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. About the attack. He was referring to the attack? Or what was he referring to? How did it come about? Tell us about it so that we can get some idea?

Admiral KIMMEL. I took it that he was referring to a warning which had been sent out on the 6th. That was my understanding of what he was talking about at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, can you recall who was with you when Secretary Knox made that statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think Captain Smith was there, now Vice Admiral Smith. My recollection is Admiral Bloch was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Was General Short there?

[7796] Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Beatty—Captain Beatty.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where Captain Beatty is now? Is he up in Maine at the Portsmouth Navy Yard?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so. Not at Portsmouth Navy Yard. He has gone to sea now, I believe.

Well, I had better say that I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, owing to that remark, I would like to have Admiral Beatty as a witness in this case, and I think that ought to be made known before he goes to sea.¹

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will take notice of the request of the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would also in that connection, have Admiral Hart as a witness.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hart?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. We have been talking about him quite a bit, and I think he should be called as a witness.²

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will take notice of that request by Congressman Murphy.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have just been informed that Admiral Beatty has headquarters at Portland, Maine, and that he is in command of the destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet. I give you that information for what it is worth.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Admiral Beatty one of your [7797] officers?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. He was aide to Secretary Knox.

Senator FERGUSON. So he came to Hawaii from Washington with Secretary Knox as his aide?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you talked to Admiral Beatty since the time you saw him in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I talked to him in New York some months ago.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you have a conversation with him at that time about this so-called warning that was sent on the 6th? Did he mention that he knew anything about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; he mentioned something about it at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say, if you recall, or the substance of what he said?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he was vague about what the warning was. He never saw it, and he didn't know, as I recall, exactly where Mr. Knox got his ideas about it. But he recalled that Mr. Knox had made the statement, and that Mr. Knox, I think, believed always that some such message was at some time either prepared or started from the the Navy Department.

[7798] Senator FERGUSON. And Admiral Beatty indicated that his conversations with Mr. Knox were such that he came to the same conclusion?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; he came to the same conclusion.

¹ Adm. Beatty's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3814-3826.

² The testimony of Senator Hart, formerly Admiral, commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 4794-4828.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the substance of what he said?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you throw any other light at all on that purported warning message of the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot. I know nothing about it. The conversations with Mr. Knox at the time were not important to me. He made the statement. I never thought anything more about it for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, we can all recognize surprise in a man, although at times it is pretty hard to describe, but when you said you hadn't received it, did you see any surprise as far as Mr. Knox was concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, at first he insisted that he had sent it and that I must have received it, and I was a little concerned over my communications system, that it might have been at fault, and when he spoke at the first, I didn't know whether my people were at fault, or what, and I proceeded to investigate.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

[7799] Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Do you have the Roberts' report here, counsel?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield? I would like to clear a matter up.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I am wondering why, if this Knox incident occurred, there wasn't some reference to it by the admiral before the Roberts Board, because before the Roberts Board he spoke about a message on the night of December 6 having been sent to CINCAF, but nothing at all about any discussion of messages ever going to Hawaii.

Admiral KIMMEL. Because, by that time I had convinced myself that I had never received the message, and that message about which I spoke as having been sent to CINCAF—I still thought when I went before the Roberts Commission that such a message had been sent to CINCAF, and that because Secretary Knox told me so. That was all the evidence I had. I think I so stated.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Kimmel, you couldn't be mistaken could you, that Secretary Knox was talking about a message sent to Admiral Hart?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I had better tell the story again—

Mr. MURPHY. May I add this—Senator, will you yield?

[7800] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There is, I think, one other pertinent observation, and that is that there is testimony that when Philips, who was the Chief of Staff of General Short first talked to General Marshall on the phone, he is quoted in the record as saying, "Did you get the message we sent last night."

I don't know whether you know about that or not, but that is in the record, where Philips spoke about a message "last night," and it is my understanding that Marshall at that time was referring to his own message on the 7th rather than the night of the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, before the Roberts committee—beginning with the sentence before:

Expedition is approaching Thailand for MacArthur. The Secretary of the Navy has stated that a special warning was sent by the Department to CINCAF on the day preceding the surprise attack. The fact that such a warning was

not delivered to me indicates that the Administration did not expect an air attack on Oahu.

I am reading from page 27 of Admiral Kimmel's previous testimony. It is page 538 at the top.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel's testimony where, Senator? [7801] Senator FERGUSON. The large volume presented to us. Before the Roberts Commission.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Admiral has testified more than once. I wanted him, Admiral, to direct your attention to which testimony he was referring to.

Admiral KIMMEL. I understood what he was reading.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, where did you get the idea that a message was sent to Admiral Hart? That is CINCAF?

Admiral KIMMEL. When I told Mr. Knox, after I had investigated, that no such message had ever been sent to me, then he said, "I am sure it was sent to CINCAF."

Senator FERGUSON. But at first he insisted it was sent to you also?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; he did. And then he asked whether I would decode all the messages that went through to CINCAF. I told him not unless we were, not unless they were addressed to me, or to me for information, at least, that there was a large volume of messages and a great many of them didn't concern us.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you only decoded those that were either action for you, or information for you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Generally speaking; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

[7802] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think I have the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

[7803] Mr. MURPHY. In the Knox report you will find, in column 1—I am reading from the New York Times, Saturday, January 5, 1946. Under the heading "Defense plans were prepared," it says:

General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight—

That is, General Short.

General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight before the attack failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made.

Now, then, later on—

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment, that I may clear the record.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is on page 6223 of our transcript. I have it before me.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. I want to come to the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Under the fourth column, in the New York Times, under the heading paragraph 2:

The Army and Navy Commands had received a general war warning on November 27 but a special war warning sent out by the War Department at midnight December 7 to the Army [7804] was not received until some hours after the attack on that day.

So he is apparently referring to one of the messages, and not to a "lost" message, as the papers of the country carried it over the week end.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 6223 of the record (reading):

General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him un-four or five hours after the attack had been made.

Was Secretary Knox talking to you about a War Department message or a Navy Department message?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was talking to me about a message which he thought originally was addressed to both the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and that was my understanding of what he said.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was a Navy Department message then?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume so.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, he didn't—

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't inquire any further into it than what I have said.

Senator FERGUSON. He didn't indicate that he was talking [7805] about a War Department message to General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He talked about it being sent to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. And to the commander in chief of the Asiatic.

Senator FERGUSON. And the commander of the Asiatic?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you talked to Admiral Beatty— what is his first name?

Admiral KIMMEL. Frank; Frank Beatty.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. Rear admiral.

Senator FERGUSON. When you talked to him did you get any light on whether or not he thought that it was a Navy Department message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the last time I talked to him he appeared to be confused about it; I mean about what actually happened, but there is no question in my mind, at least, about what Mr. Knox said to me. I have tried to give you that exactly. I am unable to interpret it any further than I have already done.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all we want.

Now, here is one that went out late Saturday evening. That is, on the 6th, 12:43 at noon on the 6th.

[7806] In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands, you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should, of course, be maintained until the last moment.

Was Hawaii one of the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Was Hawaii one of our outlying Pacific islands referred to in that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. What we would term the outlying islands were Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake. This was a message which you called my attention to yesterday, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Which we spoke of. And that message you also reminded me had been sent in a deferred status.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand; that is correct.

Admiral KIMMEL. They certainly wouldn't send a message that they considered highly important in a deferred status.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that was actually received? Was it Monday?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I would say that that was received—I think I didn't see that until after the attack.

[7807] Senator FERGUSON. After the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I told you yesterday. I can't swear to that, but it is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Can counsel get us just when that was received in Hawaii? I want to know when it was actually received and translated there as a deferred message. There is something in the record that it was received as late as Monday. I haven't that before me now.

They are going to get when it was received, Admiral.¹

Your knowledge is that you never saw that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is my belief at the present time. As I say, I can't swear to it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It is my understanding that Admiral Ingersoll sent that, and here in the Navy Narrative it says it was sent priority, so I think there is a dispute on it. I will get the page.

Senator LUCAS. Will you get the photostat?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator give me the date of the message?

Senator FERGUSON. December 6.

Senator GEORGE. December 6, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. December 6, 1941.

[7808] Now, Admiral, in conclusion I want to ask you if there is anything that you want to put on this record now, either new or in correction of anything that is on it, so far as you are concerned, so that you will now feel that you have had a full hearing before this committee.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have nothing further to say.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your answer?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have nothing further to say.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel then that you have had a full hearing before this committee?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. I wouldn't want any man to feel that he didn't have such a hearing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Full enough to satisfy you, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and more so.

Senator FERGUSON. On this message of the 6th that I read to you, exhibit 37, page 45, who would naturally or ordinarily receive that in Hawaii? It was for action CINCPAC, that is you, and it was for information CINCAF, that is Admiral Hart, and it was from OPNAV, which was Admiral Stark.

Admiral KIMMEL. That would come to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, tell us the machinery out there, what happened to it when it came over the radio.

¹ See memorandum from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 9, p. 4288.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, when it came over the radio it [7809] went to communication officer. They had it decoded. And it was presented to me and to the members of my staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was your radio, that is, your Navy radio, in operation 24 hours a day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that if this was sent at noon, or any hour of the day, it should go out on your radio and be picked up by your radioman, and if it was deferred you say then it would be among the last or the last to be decoded and given to you? What did you call those not deferred—priority?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that there were four classes of messages in effect at that time. There was the ultra priority, there was a priority message, there was a routine message, and then the deferred message, in that order.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to read from page 613 of the Navy Narrative, volume 2, referring to this message:

Admiral Noyes testified that the above dispatch to Admiral Kimmel was treated as a priority dispatch.

That will be found in the naval court of inquiry record at page 1040 and 1042.

Admiral Kimmel testified that he presumed he had received [7810] the above dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations prior to the attack.

That is at page 327.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well—

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have an answer to that?

Admiral KIMMEL. The only thing is that the photostatic copy of the message which was supplied to us during the naval court of inquiry indicated that it was in a deferred status, and that is where I got my idea it was deferred, and where you probably got your idea. I certainly am unable to state now from my memory whether it was a deferred or priority dispatch. I also said that I had testified here that I do not recollect whether it was received before or after the attack, I thought afterwards, and I judged that from the time of its origin, that it probably came in at night, and if it did and was deferred it certainly wouldn't be such as they would wake me up for it.

Mr. MURPHY. The exhibit is 22 among the naval court of inquiry exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. I agree with the Congressman and the Senator from Illinois that this is—

Admiral KIMMEL. I want it understood with regard to this dispatch I haven't looked at the papers recently and I am testifying from memory.

[7811] Senator FERGUSON. I think it is important and I think the other members think it is important that we know exactly when this message was received and whether or not you received it. One of the disappointing things, I think, in this hearing is that we don't find time stamps as to the sender and the receipt of messages. That is one thing that is important when we are dealing with hours as we are here on the 6th and 7th. It is disappointing to find that your messages are not time stamped.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[7812] Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you can't place responsibility.

Admiral KIMMEL. The time of origin here is not necessarily the time it was sent, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel let me see the original message?

The liaison officer of the Navy—I have just talked to him—would like to make another search as to how the original message is classed. That is, the one that is delivered to the transmitter. The one that is delivered to the sender of the coded message. So that we will know definitely whether it was a priority, first class, or a deferred message.

And then I would like to have counsel also get a search at Hawaii as to whether or not it was delivered to Admiral Kimmel, and when it was translated.

This is not clear.

Admiral KIMMEL. This was a message that I had when I testified before the naval court of inquiry. I mean, that transcript of it, that photostat.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That indicates it was sent deferred. I took that as being correct.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if it isn't marked Priority 1, 2, or 3, whatever it is, then it goes deferred?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is it.

Senator FERGUSON. So this, not being marked, this photostatic copy, it indicates to you, as it indicates to me, that it went deferred?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But I want another search made to see whether or not there is any other message showing that when it got to the place, it was to be sent to, whether it went actually under priority. I think that is material.

That is all I have.

Mr. MURPHY. May I make the request that the testimony of Admiral Kimmel as contained in this volume [indicating] be marked an exhibit and be incorporated by reference in the record?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that may be done.

Mr. MASTEN. It will be Exhibit 131.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 131.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will now inquire, Admiral.

[7814] Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, before asking any questions of Admiral Kimmel, I want the record to show that in connection with the offer of an exhibit which purported to show the times of the attack on various localities which was offered yesterday or the day before, ostensibly from naval information, that I stated at that time that the Navy had issued an official statement about a year after Pearl Harbor, and that I had read it in the New York Times, but could not at that time fix the date.

I now have that paper from my files, dated Sunday, December 6, 1942. It states:

The Navy Department today issued the following statement on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, last.

And in this statement appears this language:

At 7:55 a. m., on December 7, 1941, Japanese dive bombers swarmed over the Army Air Base, Hickam Field and the Naval Air Station on Ford Island. A few minutes earlier the Japanese had struck the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay.

Now, I have had information from several books that have been written on the subject which indicated that the first attack took place on the naval air station at Kaneohe Bay, and fixed the time considerably earlier than [7815] 7:55, and I bring this information to the committee merely to indicate that in the official Navy release issued 1 year after Pearl Harbor, they indicate that the first attack did take place on Kaneohe Naval Air Station some minutes prior to the attack on Hickam and Ford Island, and so on.

The question still arises as to the exact time that the attack took place on Kaneohe Naval Air Station, and on that, before the hearing is concluded, I hope to be able to submit some very definite proof as to the exact time.

Now, Admiral, I think you have had a hearing that has been full to overflowing, you have been doing a lot of talking and I have been trying to keep step, but as the last member of the committee, I always just catch the drippings, after the bird has been plucked right down to the bone.

So at least we have come to what is the beginning of the end of the ordeal to which you have been subjected.

So far as I am concerned, you have acquitted yourself magnificently.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

Mr. KEEFE. What I shall ask you is merely to try to clarify one or two things that have bothered me to some extent in connection with this long cross-examination.

I would like to have you state specifically and [7816] clearly for the purposes of the record, the exact functions of the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, which at the time of Pearl Harbor was Admiral Bloch.

Now, so that you may know, and I don't want to have any confusion on the subject when we get through, I am somewhat confused in my own mind, because it appears that your testimony heretofore has indicated that you gave certain orders, and that certain orders went to Admiral Bloch who was commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and that he in turn had certain relations with the general in command, General Short, and that orders might go direct from Washington to Admiral Bloch and hence to General Short, and he might report directly to Washington, rather than you.

I am confused as to this relationship, and I would like to have you straighten it out for purposes of this record.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I will endeavor to do so, sir, but the organization is not easy to understand, I must admit.

The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had duties which fall into two broad categories:

First. Those which have their origin directly in Navy regulations, or joint Army-Navy war plans.

Second. Those which have their origin directly in [7817] specific orders issued by me as commander in chief of the fleet.

In the first category are the following duties:

Under Navy regulations, the commandant is a direct representative of the Navy Department in all matters affecting district activity. In short, he is in charge of the naval shore establishments and naval local defense forces. Under war plans, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, were commanders of the Hawaiian coastal frontier which included Oahu and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu.

In this connection, Admiral Bloch and General Short prepared a joint coastal frontier defense plan for the Hawaiian coastal frontier.

That set forth various Army and Navy missions in some detail.

This Hawaiian Coastal Frontier included all of the Hawaiian Islands. The duties which I assigned specifically to the commandant were correlated with his general status under war plans and naval regulations.

I placed him in command of Task Force 4 of the fleet. Its mission was to organize, train, and develop the island bases, Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra, in order to [7818] insure their own defense and provide efficient service to the fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

I designated him naval base defense officer. His duties were set forth in my order 2CL-41:

The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consisted of several 3-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of 5,000 yards with center in the middle Ford Island.

The Army, assisted by certain units of the Marine Defense Battalions, as may be available will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of 3-inch gun positions.

In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all fleet aviation shore based on Oahu will augment the local air defense.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, without going into all of the technicalities of these—

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I was trying to—that is all in this order, which you can read, and I will skip that part of it there, and say:

The commandant of the 14th Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer. As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over Naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) assisting the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) holding necessary drills.

(3) giving all arms for:

attack, blackout signal, all-clear signal.

(4) informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) arranging communication plan.

(6) notifying all Naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

On page 2, under "Sortie and Entry," under subsection 2:

The Commandant 14th Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the entrance channel and the swept channel.

[7820] The commandant controlled the movements of all ships within Pearl Harbor and was charged with maintaining the patrols which were required within the harbor. He operated the torpedo defense net, and he had control of the destroyer patrol which we maintained at all times of the entrance to the harbor.

[7821] Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, with that rather meticulous description of his rather broad responsibilities may I ask you whether what you have now read into the record or stated to be his duties results from your order, or is that the result of an order from the command in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it was both.

Mr. KEEFE. Then he acted in a sort of dual capacity, did he not?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was under my orders, he was subject to my orders, and he was one of the officers of the fleet and responsible to me for all of his duties in connection with fleet activities. In the administration of the navy yard, the shore developments there, he was responsible directly to the Navy Department. That is generally the broad division.

Mr. KEEFE. But he had a dual capacity. With respect to certain of his activities he had a direct responsibility to Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As to certain other responsibilities he was under your command, directly under your command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. To perform the functions and duties which you have outlined; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. He also administered the harbor control [7822-7823] post, which was one of the other things I did not mention.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, then, there was an agreement between the Navy and the Army for joint defense of Pearl Harbor, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not get that question, sir. I am sorry.

Mr. KEEFE. There was an agreement between the Army and the Navy, an agreement for the joint defense of Pearl Harbor, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, under that defense plan the Army was represented by General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And Admiral Bloch represented the Navy as commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is correct; is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, you had a staff out at Pearl Harbor, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was Admiral Bloch a member of your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was one of the task force commanders, not a member of my staff proper.

[7824] Mr. KEEFE. How many men constituted your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the time of Pearl Harbor I had approximately 50 commissioned officers and maybe 175 enlisted men.

Mr. KEEFE. That was all staff personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in the higher echelons of your staff can you give me the names and the rank of the men that served on your staff prior to December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Capt. W. W. Smith was my chief of staff. He served on my staff. He was afterward commander of the cruisers of Task Forces 8, 11, and 17 and for his services there he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

Mr. KEEFE. That is subsequent to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Do you want that data?

Mr. KEEFE. I want it, yes. What is his rank today?

Admiral KIMMEL. He is a vice admiral today.

Mr. KEEFE. So that as captain and chief of staff—he was a captain when he was chief of staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he subsequent to that went into active duty in charge of certain cruiser detachments?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[7825] Mr. KEEFE. And for his services was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and promoted to vice admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he after that came to the Navy Department as Director of the Naval Transportation Service and from that job he went to the command of the surface force of the Pacific, which is a very big job.

Mr. KEEFE. And he now holds the rank of what you say?

Admiral KIMMEL. He now holds the rank of vice admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, who is the next man on your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was Capt. C. H. McMorris and Captain McMorris was my war plans officer and for his services on the staff of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet from February 1941 to April 1942 he was awarded the Legion of Merit. He was commanding officer on the *San Francisco* from May 1942 to October 1942 and for his exploits there in the Aleutians in the fight he had up there he was awarded the Navy Cross. From December 1942 to June 1943 he was commander of the cruisers of Task Force 8 and 16 and for the services there he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. He then went in June of 1943 to be chief of staff for Admiral Nimitz, where he remained until the end of the war.

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. His present rank is vice admiral.

[7826] Mr. KEEFE. So he went through the war after Pearl Harbor from a captaincy to vice admiral and with the distinguished services that you recorded?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

My operations officer was Capt. Walter DeLany and he was awarded the Legion of Merit for duty on the staff of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet; from February 1941 to June 1944 he commanded the U. S. S. *New Orleans* and then in November of 1942 he came to Washington as Assistant Chief of Staff to the commander in chief of the United State Fleet here in Washington and he is now a vice admiral.

Capt. Willard A. Kitts, Jr., was the gunnery officer on my staff. He is now a rear admiral and Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

He was awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a second Legion of Merit for services on the staff of the commander in chief Pacific Fleet from February 1941 to September 1942. He was awarded the Navy Cross for services as commanding officer of the *Northampton* and he was awarded the Legion of Merit for services as commanding officer of the *Nevada*.

Capt. Lyon McCormick—

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. Kitts' present rank?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

[7827] Admiral KIMMEL. Rear admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Capt. Lyon McCormick was the assistant war plans officer on the staff, and he was awarded the Legion of Merit for his services on the staff of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, from April 1941 to January 1943 and then from January to August 1943 he commanded the *South Dakota*, and then from October 1943 to March 1945 he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for logistic plans here in Washington. He now commands Battleship Division 3.

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. His present rank is rear admiral.

Capt. A. C. Davis, U. S. N., was my aviation officer and he was awarded the Legion of Merit for duty as fleet aviation officer on the staff of commander in chief, Pacific, for duties from April 1941 to June 1942. He was awarded the Navy Cross for services as commanding officer of the *Enterprise*. He commanded the fleet air base at Quonset Point and in February 1943 extending to August 1944 he was assistant chief of staff here for operations, of the commander in chief, United States Fleet, here in Washington.

From August 1944 to July 1945 he was chief of staff and aide to commander, Fifth Fleet, and in July 1945 he was ordered to the command of Carrier Division 5. He is now a rear admiral.

[7828] Do you want any more?

Mr. KEEFE. Those are the topmen on your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Those are the principal men; yes, sir. There are others.

Mr. KEEFE. And all of the men on your staff that you have listed have evidently rendered conspicuous and distinguished services in the prosecution of the war and have been awarded various medals of distinction and have received promotion?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, and if you would like to have it I can give you my principal task-force commanders at this time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I would like to have that, too. I would like to have now, Admiral, so that I can understand you, I would like to have those men who served on your staff and who were called into consultation on the problems that confronted you as commander in chief of the fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Those are the ones I am giving you now, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield just for a correction?

Admiral KIMMEL. There is Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr. It is hardly necessary to recite his exploits.

[7829] Mr. KEEFE. Who, sir?

Admiral KIMMEL. Halsey.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, Halsey; sure.

Admiral KIMMEL. As commander, aircraft battle force, from June 1940 to March 1942 he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. As commander of South Pacific air and South Pacific force from March 1942 to June 1944 he was awarded a gold star in lieu of a second Distinguished Service Medal and the Army Distinguished Service Medal.

From June 1944 to a short while ago he was commander of the Third Fleet and for that service he was awarded a gold star in lieu of a third Distinguished Service Medal and a gold star in lieu of a fourth Distinguished Service Medal.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he on your staff, too?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was a commander of aircraft of the battle force at that time and also in command of Task Force 2, one of the three principal task forces I had out there. He was not on my staff but he was a man I consulted with frequently.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the point I want to get at. Did you consult with Admiral Halsey with respect to the problems that faced you as commander in chief?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did indeed, at length.

Mr. KEEFE. Frequently?

[7830] Admiral KIMMEL. At length and frequently.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, now, give us some of the other men.

Admiral KIMMEL. There was Admiral Claude C. Bloch, United States Navy, retired now. He was a rear admiral at the time, and from April 1940 to March 1942 he was commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Since that time up to the time of his retirement a very short time ago he was a member of the Joint Board of the Navy Department.

There was Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, United States Navy, who commanded Task Force 3. From February 1941 to April 1942 he was commander of the scouting force of the Pacific Fleet and commander of Task Force 3 while I was there, and for the services he was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal.

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. His present rank is vice admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the present rank of Admiral Halsey?

Admiral KIMMEL. The present rank of Admiral Halsey is a fleet admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. Fleet admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And what was the rank of Bloch at the time he retired?

Admiral KIMMEL. He retired as an admiral.

[7831] Mr. KEEFE. A full admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. A full admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Vice Adm. William S. Pye from June 1940 to September 1942 was in command of the battle force of the Pacific Fleet and commander of Task Force 1 under me.

From November 1942 to the present time he has been president of the Naval War College at Newport.

Rear Adm. William L. Calhoun was in command of the base force when I was in command of the fleet and he was in command of the base force from December 1939 to February 1942 and for his services there was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal. From February 1942 to March 1945 he was commanding the surface forces of the Pacific and for that he was given the Legion of Merit.

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. He is now a vice admiral. That appears to be all of the principal ones.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't think you covered Admiral Newton.

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you cover Admiral Newton?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Newton was in command of a division and I restricted my consultations on all these matters to [7832] the people that I have named here to a very large extent, not that I wanted to keep anything from Admiral Newton or anybody else out there, but physically you just can't get more people than that in.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, who selected these men for the positions which you have indicated while they were under your command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as far as task force commanders, they were selected by the Navy Department, but my staff I selected.

Mr. KEEFE. It has been remarked to me that perhaps this list of distinguished naval men is the most distinguished list of advisers that have been assembled at one time under any man's command. Do you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I know of none that are better. There may have been others just as good.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in carrying out your command there as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet the purpose of having these staff officers was for your aid, assistance, and advice?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And in addition to that you had these task force commanders designated by Washington, including such men as Admiral Halsey and the others to whom you have re- [7833] ferred, who were available to you for constant consultation and advice?

Admiral KIMMEL. And whom I consulted frequently and showed them the secret dispatches I received and my correspondence with Admiral Stark.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in arriving at determinations as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, those decisions, I assume, were arrived at as the result of extended consultations with your staff and with the various task force commanders whom you have named?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true, sir. I asked the advice of my staff and of my principal task force commanders. However, I want it clearly understood the decisions were mine, that was my responsibility.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand that exactly and I think that should be quite clear, that any person who is invested with responsibility may seek advice from any sources that are available but the final decision rests with the person upon whom the responsibility is placed and that was you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I did not want to appear to be shoving off any responsibility for decisions upon anybody else.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield for a correction?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I will be happy to.

[7834] Mr. MURPHY. The record as it now stands would make it appear, as I have listened to it, that the Admiral consulted with all of the men named and who have subsequently had distinguished records. The fact is that the Admiral did not consult with Kitts, who was in charge of the guns; at least the record so states.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you so state. What do you state, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, when I said I consulted with these men, I consulted with these officers in their proper sphere. It does not mean that I consulted about every phase of the thing with everybody there, with everybody that was there.

Kitts was a gunnery officer and I consulted with him on all gunnery matters. If he means that I consulted with him as to what I did betwixt November 27 and December 7, I did not. I did not say so.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you consulted with those who were specialists in the fleet involving the subject matter under consideration?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that a fair statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has made a big point out of the fact that you did not consult with your air [7835] arm out there, the head of your air arm, I recall in his cross-examination. You had a staff adviser for air, did you not, on your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You have named him this afternoon?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. What was his name?

Admiral KIMMEL. Davis was his name, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. The point that I am trying to understand is this: while you refer to your decisions and your orders and your interpretations, the final decision that you came to, while it was your order and your responsibility, was arrived at as the result of consultations with this distinguished staff that you have referred to?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All of whom participated to a greater or lesser extent in the decisions which were reached with reference to the particular fields in which they were specialists, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And all of those men who served on your staff at Pearl Harbor have gone on since that time to render greater [7836] and more distinguished service and all of them have been promoted in the service of the United States, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to get one other thing clear. Reference has frequently been made to the fact that you subordinated the defense of Pearl Harbor to the war training program, at least that is the interpretation that I am to place, and I do place, upon many questions that were asked you.

Is it or is it not a fact that the Pacific Fleet was constantly being drained and deprived of its trained personnel in 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. And you complained about that fact, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; extensively.

Mr. KEEFE. That the Pacific Fleet was being used as a training base to train personnel and officers for the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made some such statement as that in a letter of November 15 that I wrote to Admiral Stark, as I remember.

Mr. KEEFE. In your opinion and in the opinion of your staff officers was it necessary to continue the training program to the greatest possible accelerated pace there in 1941?

[7837] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, reference has been made to the message of November 24 received by you in which it says, without reading it—it has been read many times—"Indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction," and then follow the words "including an attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, the message of November 24, am I correct in assuming, was intended to apprise you that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction might be expected by the Japanese with the possibility that they might even hit the Philippines or Guam?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And at no time in any of these messages, including this and the messages of the 27th, was the Hawaiian area ever mentioned?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Nor any other of our outlying possessions, including Panama and the Aleutians?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The only reference to a possible attack on American possessions is the reference to the possibility of the Japanese extending their attack to the Philippines or Guam?

[7838] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the information you got from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I had, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when these messages came in, Admiral, just so a layman and a man not too well versed in military tactics may understand it, was it customary for you to call your staff together and discuss the meaning of these messages?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. These messages were routed to selected members of my staff. They did not go to all members of the staff because they were very secret. It went to the War Plans, the Operations, and, of course, Intelligence and the Chief of Staff.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, now, then would you get together and discuss it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And was that the common practice?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that while the decision as to the interpretation to be placed upon the message fundamentally was yours, that final interpretation resulted from the joint opinion of the members of your staff with whom you constantly consulted?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is the way a staff operates.

[7839] Mr. KEEFE. It is a board of directors meeting, then, similar to that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I have been advised, Admiral—I do not know whether you recall it or not—that out there in Hawaii on this Saturday afternoon there was a big football game. Do you remember it?

Admiral KIMMEL. When was that, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. On the 6th of December. The Shriners' annual charity football game between a mainland team and the University of Hawaii was played. Do you recall that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I do not recall it. I did not go to it. On December 6?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not go to it. I did not know about it, or if I did, I had forgotten it.

Mr. KEEFE. You testified what you did and where where you were on December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Afternoon and evening?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You remember that, do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What did you do? You were at your [7840] quarters when you received word of this attack, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I was in my quarters when I received word of the attack and I bounced out of the door and saw the planes coming in and by the time—I watched there for maybe 4 or 5 minutes and then I got into the car and went immediately to my quarters, which was about, oh, four or five hundred yards away.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you give any orders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I issued some.

Mr. KEEFE. The fleet went into immediate action?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. It went into action without any orders from me. They required no orders to get into action.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I think the evidence is that within 3 minutes in some cases their guns were firing.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were in action by the time I got out on the outside of my quarters.

Mr. KEEFE. I think that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, there has been some testimony about the joint coastal frontier defense set-up, and I am wondering if we have here in the room, general order No. 143.

[7841] Mr. Masten: That was introduced. That is in evidence, Mr. Murphy, in one of the recent exhibits.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you read that?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is it?

Mr. MURPHY. The effect of general order No. 143, although you had set up a coastal frontier, was to prevent the establishment of a coastal frontier force, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. There were very few coastal frontier forces that I remember.

Mr. MURPHY. No. Isn't it a fact that by an order you stopped the establishment of coastal frontier forces, general order No. 143?

Mr. MASTEN. That is Exhibit No. 126.

Mr. MURPHY. May we have it, please? That order reads, as I understand it:

For the present, naval coastal frontier forces as prescribed in General order No. 143 will not be formed.

In other words, you had a coastal frontier set-up but the forces were never formed. I would like to know whether or not that is a fact. I am referring particularly to 358.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking about General Order No. 143?

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring particularly, Admiral, to [7842] the testimony before the naval court of inquiry at page 358, question number 324. As I understand it, at that time you were being questioned by counsel for Admiral Bloch.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And there had been considerable testimony, as there has been here, about the establishment of joint coastal frontiers. I take it from question 324 which reads as follows:

Please read the first sentence of paragraph 4.

Answer by **Admiral KIMMEL** (reading): "For the present naval coastal frontier forces as prescribed in General Order No. 143 will not be formed."

And I was wondering if the effect of that order of yours was not in the end that you had frontiers but you had no forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had nothing to do with that order. That was General Order No. 143 issued by the Navy Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Do we have that 143 here? May I see it?

Mr. MASTEN. It is Exhibit 126, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Admiral, what order was it that prevented the establishment of naval coastal frontier forces?

[7843] Apparently order 143 would have set them up, but some order came out that they were not to be formed, and I would like to know what order it was and who signed it.

Do you know, Admiral, what order it was that prevented the establishment of naval coastal frontier forces, who it was that stopped them at Pearl Harbor? Do you have here a copy of the directive of July 1, 1941?

Mr. KEEFE. Let him answer one question at a time.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is question 323.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read it, Admiral:

Question. I refer you to Exhibit 4, the directive of July 1, 1941. Just read the first sentence of paragraph 4. It may refresh your recollection.

Answer. (Reading:) "The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 of WPL-46 are hereby established."

Question 324:

Question. Please read the first sentence of paragraph 4.

Answer. (Reading:) "For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier forces, as prescribed in General Order No. 143, will not be formed."

Now we have a great deal—

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait just 1 minute.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes..

[7844] **Admiral KIMMEL.** I think the naval coastal frontiers "were prescribed and are hereby established," it says.

Mr. MURPHY. That is it. We have had a great deal of testimony here, and I have been reading a great deal about the naval coastal

frontier, but I am wondering what significance it all has if there never were any forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they were established. It says so here. We did not furnish them forces.

Mr. MURPHY. There were no forces to carry it out. It was merely a piece of paper, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, but the plans and responsibilities of the coastal frontier commanders were prescribed.

Mr. MURPHY. But no forces to carry them out?

Admiral KIMMEL. But the forces were very meager, and I think we have testified to that, but the coastal frontier forces were prescribed and were established.

Mr. MURPHY. It says here they were not formed. I would like to know who issued the order and what order stopped them from being formed.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a Navy Department order.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have the naval liaison officer produce here the order which stopped the formation of the naval coastal frontier forces after they set up a command.¹

Admiral KIMMEL. As I recall it, they did not establish [7845] the naval coastal frontier forces because they did not have them.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to know who stopped them and why.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois may inquire.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, the Congressman from California indulged in a number of hypothetical questions with respect to the fleet being based in Pearl Harbor when you took command. I should like to ask you also a hypothetical question along that line.

Assuming on December 7, 1941, the fleet had been withdrawn to the Pacific coast; and, further, assuming that the Army in Hawaii had been alert to sabotage; and further assuming that the defenses of the island were in the same condition as found on that day; would you say that under those hypothetical conditions the Japs could not only have surprised the island with an air attack but, had they wanted to take a chance, they could have also approached the island with a landing force?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not believe that they would have been successful with any landing there.

Senator LUCAS. The question is, could they have taken that chance and would their opportunities have been better, had they wanted to do so, if the fleet in its entirety had [7846] been based on the west coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say they would never have attempted to occupy the island of Oahu so long as the fleet was in being.

Senator LUCAS. So long as what?

Admiral KIMMEL. So long as the fleet was in being either on the Atlantic coast or anywhere else.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You mean on the Pacific coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the Pacific coast, yes; that is right.

Senator LUCAS. Well, assuming for the sake of this question that they had attempted a landing under those conditions and they had been successful, then our position in the Pacific would have become extremely vulnerable, would it not? I am just assuming now that

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5295.

they could make a landing and were successful in it. In that case our position would have been extremely vulnerable, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have been necessary for us to retake the islands, and I believe, with my knowledge of the forces they had available and their capabilities, that it would have been such a hazardous undertaking that they never would have tried it. If they had taken it, if they had been successful, then it would have presented a very serious problem for us.

Senator LUCAS. That is the question that I address myself [7847] to.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I think you can find some naval expert who would testify that it was a possibility, under the hypothetical question that I have given to you here.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but a "possibility" covers a lot.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. It covers the surprise attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. That was only a possibility.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. But it happened.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In the event they had made a successful landing in Hawaii it would have meant that we would have lost, of course, all of the outlying islands and probably the Japs would have had little or no trouble in taking Australia, New Zealand, and all the other islands in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. If they had occupied the islands, yes. I do not believe they could have done it.

Senator LUCAS. That is my assumption, that they could.

Now another question. At about the time the surprise attack occurred, is it not a fact that there was a serious controversy existing not only in the Congress but with the [7848] naval men as well, with respect to the relative strength of battleships and air power?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the time of the attack?

Senator LUCAS. At the time of the attack, yes. Was not there a controversy existing at that time as to whether or not a battleship could be destroyed by air power, if it were at sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; I do not believe so. I think they felt that the battleships could be destroyed by air power. Certainly after the experience in the Atlantic with the *Bismarck*, if I remember, where she was stopped by airplanes and placed immobile in the water and was unable to get away. To be sure she was polished off by some battleships.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. But the air power is what stopped her there, if I remember correctly.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I base that statement upon what occurred before the Naval Affairs Committee immediately following the beginning of the war, and on the testimony of a high naval officer at that time who gave to the committee this information. You will recall that the *Prince of Wales* went down and was not escorted by air power. I am correct in that, am I not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[7849] Senator LUCAS. And the admiral told us that Admiral Phillips, as I remember, who was I think the captain of that ship, has always contended that he feared no air power whatsoever if he could have his battleship at sea where he could maneuver and use the offense that he had in the way of antiaircraft batteries.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think that our Navy knew much more about air power, and the possibilities of air power, than did the British service.

Senator LUCAS. That relative strength between battleship and air power was not then, I take it, in the minds of the naval officers in Hawaii at that time? You knew the strength of air power, as far as your ships were concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we did not know it then as definitely and as well as we did later, of course, but we gave air power a big weight.

Senator LUCAS. One further question and then I am through, Admiral. Admiral Kimmel, do you bear any ill will against the late President Roosevelt because of your retirement from the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask two questions, Mr. Chairman.

[7850] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I just want to spike what I think is another rumor. It is a false one. Was there anyone in Washington in any authority whatsoever who issued any order to you which obliged you to have the fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Now on page 1133 of the naval court of inquiry you were asked the question as follows:

Had you known of a probable break within 10 days or two weeks after the note of 26 November was delivered, would you have recommended this operation for these two ships?

Referring to the *Lexington* and *Enterprise*. Your answer was:

I think maybe the break alone, I might have considered it worth while to take a chance and let them go, because they were a fast force and could get away, and had within themselves, each one of them, considerable fighting power; but had I thought that there was a very good chance of an air attack on Oahu at the time, I might have had a different idea about it.

That is a correct statement, isn't it, of your attitude?

Admiral KIMMEL. I feel I would not have a different idea.

Mr. MURPHY. Just one last question, Admiral Kimmel.

With the tense situation, such as it was from November 27 [7851] on, would you have been content to have the fleet remain, two-thirds of it, in the port at San Diego, considering the fact that your first move was to the Marshalls under the war plans. Considering the fact that you had already been stripped for action about 8 months before, with the war warning and tense situation, would you have been content to have two-thirds of the fleet remain at San Diego?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a difficult question to answer. I think it would have been much more difficult to attack it on the west coast than it would be on Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. My understanding of Admiral Richardson's testimony was that his problem was he wanted to get the ships stripped for action, and he wanted to get certain equipment. It is my understand-

ing that the ships were stripped for action in about April, so that would satisfy Admiral Richardson's first requirement. I do not understand his testimony that he would still keep the fleet at San Diego with the crisis coming in international relations, four or five thousand miles or thereabouts from the Marshalls where you were supposed to go to work.

Admiral KIMMEL. It had that advantage by keeping it at Pearl Harbor, there is no doubt about that.

Mr. MURPHY. If you were going to go to the Marshalls how many more miles would you have to cover to go from San Diego [7852] to the Marshalls than you would from Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say on a direct route, and just guessing at it, maybe 1,500 miles more.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think you would be just as well off at San Diego as you were at Pearl Harbor to carry out the mission to the Marshalls? That was your first place to go, wasn't it, under the war plans?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; we could get there faster from Pearl Harbor than we could from San Diego; that is right.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions by members of the committee?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to inquire from Admiral Kimmel whether or not the war warning message of the 27th, as part of the padding—do you know what I mean by the padding to a message?—I find on the original here two words. The first word is "Hell's" and the last word is "loose."

Admiral KIMMEL. Those words don't mean anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the message that you actually received at Pearl Harbor, the war warning message of the 27th, had those two words on it, the first word "Hell's" and the last word "loose"? Do you remember [7853] that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard of that before. I never saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. Look on the original message, at those two words. The first word is "Hell's" and the last word "loose." They go well together.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is the first time I ever saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they ever on your message?

Admiral KIMMEL. "Hell's—loose"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw that until this minute. I never saw it, at least. I wish I had.

Senator FERGUSON. It would mean something if it had been on your message, as coming to you, but it is merely the padding part of it going to the sender.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I never saw that before.

[7854] Senator FERGUSON. You never saw it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not mean I never saw these messages, but I never read that part of it.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you would say on your original message as delivered to you, the words "Hell's loose" were not on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I would like to ask you whether or not from the 1st of November, any Japanese nationals were removed from Hawaii, to your knowledge?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not to my knowledge, no.

Senator FERGUSON. I note that there was some 1,400 of the Japanese nationals taken from the Philippines, from the 1st of November.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am not positive about that, but I do not recollect it.

Senator FERGUSON. And that there were reports that all remaining Japanese nationals, except those belonging to the official establishments, had been removed by the Japanese Government, had to leave the Netherlands East Indies, and some 1,100 British nationals were reported by the press to be planning to leave Shanghai on November 28 for Australia.

Did you have those facts before you?

[7855] Admiral KIMMEL. I do not now recall, sir. I knew they were evacuating nationals from the mainland, and I knew this *Tatu Maru* was bringing back some American nationals from Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to those so-called padding words, is this a fair explanation, that the man who decodes leaves off these so-called padding words?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, he does.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would account for the fact that you never got the message reading "Hell's loose"?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is one other thing that I wanted to go into. I wanted to know whether or not you knew about when it was that they alerted Singapore?

Admiral KIMMEL. When did they alert Singapore?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Was that called to your attention?

Admiral KIMMEL. I recall something in the newspaper about it within the week preceding December 7. What it was now, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that mean anything to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it meant that they were preparing for eventualities down there.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew what those eventualities [7856] were because you knew the vessels were going there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had never had an answer to the inquiry you made as to what that meant to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Netherlands Government, on December 1, notified our Government that the Netherlands East Indies had ordered a comprehensive mobilization of its armed forces? Was that ever called to your attention?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that on December 2 our State Department knew of press reports in Japan that the Japanese Government had decided to continue the Washington conversations?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I saw something like that in the Honolulu papers.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know that at the same time—

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the only information I had, however.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). At the same time that that was appearing in the press, that this message was intercepted by us here, the message from Tokyo to [7857] Washington the 1st of December:

Re my 857 the date set in my message 812 has come and gone—

That is the 29th date—

and the situation continues to be increasingly critical.

This is on page 208 of Exhibit 1.

Admiral KIMMEL. I remember that.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have advised the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. The above is for only your information. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the United States Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124.

There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the Capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far East situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never received that message with the information it contains at all.

Senator FERGUSON. So that while we have in a report [7858] of December 4 that on December 2, according to press reports, the Japanese Cabinet decided to continue the Washington conversation, we intercepted a message that showed that that is a fraud, in fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And that that did not mean any such thing as that, and that the date of the 29th is mentioned "has come and gone, and the things are growing more critical."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that kind of message as intercepted here and shown on page 208, from Tokyo to Washington, is that a significant message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. That they did mean business?

Admiral KIMMEL. A very significant message. I mentioned that in my statement, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the date when the *Prince of Wales* was sunk?

Admiral KIMMEL. I believe it was December 8.

Senator LUCAS. It was later than that.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that we received information that the *Prince of Wales* was going down there, and it was indicated that she was the ship that could catch [7859] anything and kill anything, that the British believed that, and so notified us?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I knew that the *Prince of Wales* was on the way down there. I do not know about this other thing you mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know that the British were of the opinion, that Mr. Churchill was of the opinion, that she was the ship that could catch anything and kill anything?

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Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is what he said publicly.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what he said publicly, I believe. I heard that since.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add three things, in view of the question of the Senator from Michigan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I would like to call your attention to page 354 of the Navy narrative, referring to a message of November 1, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am lost. I cannot keep up. I will try to.

Mr. MURPHY. I will be brief.

[7864] Admiral KIMMEL. I have page 354 now, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to refer, first, to the message of November 1, 1941.

The Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, and that message, as I understand it, told you about the British sending a new commander in chief over into the eastern fleet. Is that right? Do you remember receiving that message? It is dispatch 311955, in which the Admiralty dispatch was quoted.

Admiral KIMMEL. Have you got that dispatch?

Mr. MURPHY. I do not have it right here.

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot identify it unless I see the dispatch.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask that dispatch 311955 be spread at this point in the record.

(Dispatch No. 311955 follows:)

[7860A] From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16
Date: 1 November 1941

This is admiralty dispatch one seven one nine affirm slant two eight action to cincs nore Portsmouth Plymouth William affirm Rosyth China *easy* inter sail affirm affirm and William inter Mediterranean Baker five hypo fox *easy* option cast queen sail negat option inter slant cast Dover affirm cast negat Baker negat zed negat roget *cast* negat sail Canada fox option cast negat affirm sail option force *twelve five* info negat option inter slant cast Simonstown and Washington spenavo x paren *affirm* paren it has been decided to replace the appointment of cinc China by a new appointment styled cinc eastern fleet x paren Baker paren while Japan remains neutral the duties of cinc eastern fleet will be colon dash paren inter paren sea command and administration of eastern fleet see para paren fox paren below and of naval forces and establishment on China station at present carried out by cinc China paren inter paren the preparation of plans and war orders for whole eastern theatre in collaboration with cinc far east cinc *easy* inter affirm cast negat Baker negat zed negat Baker and US and Dutch authorities x the eastern theatre is defined in para paren hypo paren below paren *cast* paren on outbreak of war with Japan or when directed by admiralty cinc eastern fleet will in addition to above duties assume strategic control of all British and Dutch naval forces with exception of local defense allied commanders in eastern theatre subject to following colon dash paren inter paren while distribution and general plan of employment of naval forces throughout the eastern theater is responsibility of cinc eastern fleet cinc of each station will retain operational control of naval forces other than eastern fleet operating on other stations paren inter paren dominion and associated powers have right to withdraw or withhold forces from strategic control of cinc eastern theatre provided prior information is given latter x [7860B] paren dog paren the degree of strategic control exercised by cinc eastern fleet over naval forces of USA should latter be a belligerent will be governed by such agreement as may be in force at the time between US and Great Britain paren *easy* paren in order that cinc eastern fleet may fly his flag afloat he will be provided with a chief of staff

and a chief of staff officers x the former will deputize for cinc eastern fleet at Singapore in his absence semicolon the latter will remain afloat paren *for* paren It is possible that a part of the eastern fleet may be assembled in eastern theatre before outbreak of war with Japan x the disposition of any such units within eastern theatre will be the responsibility of cinc eastern theatre who will delegate operational control of them while employed on stations other than China station as he considers necessary x units which are to be considered forming eastern fleet will be promulgated by admiralty in due course paren *George* paren the above arrangements will come into force when ordered by admiralty paren *hypo* paren the eastern theatre comprises colon dash paren one paren while US are non belligerent the existing East Indies China Australia and New Zealand naval stations paren two paren if US are belligerent the existing East Indies China Australian New Zealand naval stations bounded north and south by the following lines colon dash the parallel zero three zero degrees north from the coast of China to meridian of one four zero degrees east down latter to equator along equator to one eight zero meridian and down latter x the Pacific ocean to east of this line will be an area of US strategic responsibility paren *jig* paren my zero zero five zero slant one one may my two zero two four one three may my zero five three three one nine may to all addressees are cancelled paren King paren cinc sail affirm pass to senior officer force *George* on arrival.

[7861] Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, the purport of that message was to tell you what the British were going to do about their defense in the Pacific, the far Pacific. You have no recollection of the message yourself?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot identify it from this.

Mr. MURPHY. I will also ask you whether or not you recall receiving the letter from Admiral Stark on the 7th of November in which Admiral Stark said:

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific.

Admiral KIMMEL. I received that. I think it is in there.

Mr. MURPHY. I will ask you if you also received a letter from Admiral Stark of November 14 in which Admiral Stark said:

Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen?

Do you recall receiving that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think I recall that.

Mr. MURPHY. You also received the estimate, did you [7862] not of the 5th of November 1941, which was the estimate submitted to the President?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 358 of the same volume. On November 18, Admiral Stark sent a dispatch to you—and I am only asking this in connection with the November 25 deadline. You did get a message, did you not, on the 18th of November, saying:

Until international conditions on and subsequent to 25 November become defined and clarified any further direct or Great Circle routing between Hawaii and the Philippines, should not repeat not be used. Routes south of Mandates should be prescribed until further advice by Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. I received that dispatch.

Mr. MURPHY. After you received that, Admiral, did you not get in touch with Washington and suggest that, in your opinion, it would be all right to send ships by Guam, and did not Washington answer you and say "no" that the situation in the Pacific was too dangerous, or tense to go by way of Guam, and you should continue the southern route?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume that is correct. I do not remember all of the details of it now.

[7863] Mr. MURPHY. I refer to the dispatch reading as follows:

Your dispatch 220417. Pacific situation unchanged comply my 181705. Guam cargo should be sent to Manila then trans-shipped for Guam. Make other arrangements personnel in Chaumont for Midway and Wake. Bloemfontein and Holbrook obtain water enroute at Tutulla Suva, or other port as expedient.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you thought things were in such shape that they could be sent direct to Guam, and Washington said no, and told you to send them on another route, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. You have jogged my memory a bit. My recollection now is that I felt it was necessary to get to Guam, to sail 1,500 miles from Manila in an area which is considerably closer to Japan than was the route from Oahu to Guam direct, and I saw very little additional hazard in shipments going to Guam, going from Oahu direct rather than all the way around through Torres Strait up to Manila, and across this 1,500 miles.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, Washington said the situation was tense and you should not go the way you suggested but to go the southern route?

[7864] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and I carried out the orders.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence, because I asked some questions on it, the matter of the purchase of New Guinea as a means of settling our difficulties with Japan. I will read it. It is not long.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask now, before the Senator reads it—

Senator FERGUSON. I just offer it to make it clear.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask one question.

As I understand it, this is E. Stanley Jones offering to pay \$200,000 to buy peace?

Senator FERGUSON. This has got nothing about that Stanley Jones.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

[7865] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. It is dated November 18, 1941. The letterhead is Department of State, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. SECRETARY.—

it is marked "strictly confidential."

Mr. SECRETARY. Herewith another idea which might possibly be of constructive value in your discussions with the Japanese Ambassador. The proposal might cause Japan to feel that she was being given sufficient "face" to enable her to agree in good faith to remove all her troops from China.

At first blush the proposal may appear to represent "appeasement". However, Japan would under the proposal sell to the United States, ships which we very much need. Also, the sale by Japan of such ships to us at this time would mean a very practical step by Japan away from her Axis alliance with Germany.

The Australians and the Dutch would be perturbed by such a proposal, especially at first glance. However, it is also to their interest that additional shipping be made available to us and that Japan's offensive striking power be lessened.

We would of course have to discuss this with the Australians and the British (and the Dutch if their territory [7866] should be involved) before making any mention of the proposal to the Japanese.

I send this forward in the light of your request that we explore all possibilities.

M. M. H.

That is Maxwell M. Hamilton.

This is the proposal:

November 17, 1941.

It is on the same stationery.

PROPOSAL FOR THE EXCHANGE OF CERTAIN TERRITORIES IN THE PACIFIC FOR JAPANESE SHIPS

Agreement might be reached between the United States and Japan (with the assent of the other countries concerned) along the following lines:

I. Japan to purchase New Guinea.

1. The western part (belonging to the Netherlands)
- or
2. The southeastern part (Papua) (under the Government of Australia)
- or
3. The northeastern part (now administered by Australia under a mandate from the League of Nations). (The mandate for this territory might be transferred to Japan, Australia being compensated for a relinquishment of its rights by Japan.)

or

All three.

II. The United States to furnish funds to Japan for the purchase of these territories.

III. Japan to reimburse the United States through the transfer to this Government of merchant ships or possibly certain categories of naval vessels.

Such an arrangement would of course be reached only in conjunction with an agreement on the part of Japan to withdraw its forces from China and to follow general courses of peace.

Note in regard to the mandated territory of New Guinea: Neither the Covenant of the League of Nations nor the text of the Mandate for New Guinea contains any provision with regard to the manner of revocation of a Mandate or the transfer of a Mandate from one mandatory to another. The Mandate for New Guinea provides, however, that the Mandate may be modified with the consent of the Council so it would seem that the Mandate might be transferred in like manner by the Council with the consent of the mandatory. The Council is now in suspension, but if desired a special session could probably be convened. Alternatively, it would seem that the mandate might be transferred—or sovereignty over the territories might actually be vested in Japan—by the Principal Allied [7868] and Associated Powers—that is, the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan—these powers having conferred the Mandate for New Guinea upon Australia.

Mr. MURPHY. Whose idea was that, Senator? Was that E. Stanley Jones' idea?

Senator FERGUSON. Not that I ever heard of.

Mr. MURPHY. Was it the official policy of the Government to try to buy New Guinea?

Senator FERGUSON. It is suggested by Hamilton as one way to settle things.

Mr. MURPHY. Nobody took it seriously, did they?

Senator FERGUSON. My next question was going to be to counsel, as to whether we have any follow-up on this to show what was done with this instrument?¹

Mr. MASTEN. I have never seen any, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try to find out what was done with it?

Mr. MASTEN. I think your request covered it. As I remember it, your request was that everything sent to the Secretary from the Far Eastern Division during the period November 1 to December 7, 1941, be furnished. Was not that document included among those that came in in answer to your request?

Senator FERGUSON. This is November 18.

¹ See footnote 1 on the following page.

Mr. MASTEN. The request was from November 1 to December 7, 1941.

[7869] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. I think the documents the State Department sent you covered all they could find, so presumably that was right in those documents. That is all I know about it.

Senator FERGUSON. I just offered this so the record will be clear on it.

I want to ask counsel another question. Can we find out now whether or not that had ever reached the President?

Mr. MASTEN. The proposal you have just read?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. We will try to do so.¹

Mr. MURPHY. I found out from inquiry there were lectures around the country at 25 cents a seat, I think, on that subject.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral, when the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, extended the Atlantic shooting orders to the Pacific off the west coast of South America, you were required by the order that was furnished to you to supply some naval contingents for that purpose, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Some what?

Mr. GEARHART. Supply some naval ships for that purpose.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[7870] Mr. GEARHART. About what time of the year did this occur?

Admiral KIMMEL. When did that occur?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; late summer?

Admiral KIMMEL. That can readily be established, but my recollection is it was in September or October.

Mr. GEARHART. The late summer or early fall?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is all contained in the dispatches which fixed it definitely.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; and then aside from having already detached the three best battleships that you had, three cruisers, nine destroyers, and one carrier, you were required by this order to make a further numerical reduction of the fighting strength of your fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you remember at this time just what you had assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations for this raider service off the west coast of South America?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did I do what, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Do you recall at this time the number of ships you were required to detach for that purpose?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was three ships, three of the old [7871] light cruisers. That is my best recollection now.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as I remember that order, it directed those ships to enter an antiraiders campaign off the west coast of South

¹ In Hearings, Part 10, p. 5147, Mr. Masten states that the State Department advised the committee that no action was taken on the memorandum and it did not reach the President.

America, but, as I remember it, the order does not say anything about the nationality of those ships that were to be the subject of an attack. Was there any order, other than the copy that was introduced in evidence, which would indicate the nationality of the raiders that were to be attacked and shot at by the American contingents that you were detaching for that purpose?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is the German and Italian.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

[7872] Mr. MURPHY. Why not the Japanese?

Mr. GEARHART. It was limited to the Germans and Italians?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions by members of the committee?

(No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I believe you will agree there is some indication here that the committee is trying to dig up everything it can about this question that is now presented to us.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have observed a tendency in that direction.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel for the committee have any questions to ask of Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. KAUFMAN. No questions of Admiral Kimmel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel for Admiral Kimmel have any questions that he desires to ask?

Mr. RUGG. We have none, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything further that you desire to present to the committee, or any further information that you desire to give us?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I have nothing further.

[7873] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you most sincerely for your appearance and the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to present to the committee your side of the question, and the information you have prepared to submit to the committee for consideration.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that full, ample, and complete opportunity has been presented to you here to present your side of the matter?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your appearance. You may be excused.

The committee has not yet adjourned, however. You will wait just a second.

I want to ask counsel, is General Short prepared to appear as the first witness tomorrow?

Mr. KAUFMAN. I understand that he is, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that true?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. Yes, sir. General Short will be here in the morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This is Colonel Karr speaking?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Short will be here as a [7874] witness in the morning?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. Yes, sir; as far as we know.

Mr. KAUFMAN. May we, Mr. Chairman, have Mr. Masten put some documents in the record?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; certainly.

Admiral, you may be excused, if you desire.

We appreciate your patience, and your assistance to us.

(The witness was excused.)

Counsel may proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we received the following memorandum from the War Department, and to it are attached certain documents which have been distributed to the committee. I would like permission to read into the record the memorandum, of which we have only one copy, and to offer the attached documents as an exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may so proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. The memorandum reads as follows:

1. On 23 December 1945, the War Department received from General MacArthur's headquarters twelve reels of microfilms containing a Japanese file relating to the negotiations between the United States and Japan prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. This file was found in the possession of Mr. Isono, Director of the Archives of the Japanese Foreign [7875] Office; it was stated to have been prepared by Mr. Osono, at the direction of the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, immediately after the declaration of war. The file appears to cover the negotiations during the period March 1941 through 8 December 1941. Nearly all the documents which it contains are in Japanese, although there are some statements, memoranda, etc., in English text.

2. Since the films arrived in Washington, four of the twelve reels have been enlarged and photostated by the War Department. Those four reels contain 872 separate frames (each frame constituting a photograph of a single page), which make up a total of 255 separate items in the file. The file is not arranged in exact chronological order, and the 255 items bear dates ranging from June through December.

3. Examination, by qualified Japanese linguists, of the photostats made from the four reels discloses that they contain the following:

a. The Japanese text of 227 diplomatic messages. Practically all these messages were sent either from Washington to Tokyo or from Tokyo to Washington, although there are a few between Tokyo and other points. All but four of the 227 messages were intercepted by the U. S. Army or Navy at the time of transmission in 1941. The four [7876] messages which were not intercepted have been translated by the War Department during the past few days; none of them appears to be useful to the Committee, but the War Department will, of course, make them available to the committee if that is desired.

b. A small number of statements, or drafts of statements, in English text, which have already appeared either in "Peace and War" or in the second volume of "Foreign Relations of the United States."

c. A few miscellaneous items, including the following which may possibly be of some interest to the Committee:

May I say these are the documents that have just been distributed:

(1) A memorandum entitled "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 A. M., December 8, 1941."

(2) A memorandum entitled "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 A. M., December 8, 1941."

(3) A memorandum written by Mr. Matsumoto, Head of the Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entitled "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council [7877] December 8, 1941."

Translations of the above items have been made by the War Department during the past few days, and are attached as Inclosures 1, 2, and 3.

4. The War Department is continuing the processing of the remaining eight reels of the microfilms and will inform the Committee as promptly as possible of their contents.

(S) HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSO.

Colonel Duncombe is the Army liaison officer.

I will not read, unless you wish me to, the six pages of documents enclosed.

[7878] The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is not necessary to read them, but I want to ask, do you want them spread on the record at this point or filed as an exhibit?

Mr. MASTEN. In view of the possibility that some of these other reels may contain information which we might wish to make an exhibit, I suggest that these be given an exhibit number, and, if any other pertinent material appears, we can then add it to the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. I move that be done. If at that time it becomes vital to the hearing to have that other material, why, then we can insert it at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done.

Mr. MASTEN. We will offer these, then, as Exhibit No. 132.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be received as Exhibit No. 132.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 132.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. MASTEN. I have two other short items here that I can dispose of now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. MASTEN. At page 5604 of the transcript there was a reference in Admiral Stark's statement to a telegram dated [7879] February 7, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to the State Department, and a request was made at page 6434 of the transcript for that telegram. Copies have been distributed to the committee this afternoon, and I suggest that it be spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Tokyo

Dated February 7, 1941

Rec'd 12:55 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

180, February 7, 11 p. m.

Following the Embassy's telegram No. 827, September 12, 1940, I respectfully submit the considerations set forth below, by way of once again taking stock of the political and military situation in the Far East as viewed from the angle of this Embassy.

One. As concrete manifestations of the rapid progress of Japan's policy of southward advance we are confronted with the following recent developments, factually reported:

[7880] (a) The presence of Japanese naval vessels in Camranh Bay and of one or more Japanese cruisers, a seaplane tender and destroyers in the Gulf of Thailand, as well as rumors of a Japanese landing force at Songhkla, a Thai base not far from the northern frontier of the Malay States.

(b) Progressive military encroachment by the Japanese in Indochina, including control of the air ports, mediation in the dispute with Thailand, and reports that Japan expects to be paid for her mediatory services through the granting of special facilities in the use of naval bases.

Two. These developments represent the logical extension of the steps already taken during the past two years involving Japanese seizure of Walchow, Hainan, the Spratley Islands and Northern Indochina. They represent the Japanese technique of

GREW

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[7881]

MMM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Tokyo

Dated February 7, 1941

Rec'd 12:40 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

181, February 7, midnight.

tentative sallies and thrusts in the desired direction, followed by pauses to feel out the effects and results of the accomplished steps. Differentiating in effect the nibbling policy foreshadowed in the Embassy's telegram under reference, a policy which is now obviously achieving progressively increased momentum under Nazi stimulation.

Three. By following this policy Japan has edged her way cautiously to a position from which with some added preparation could invest Singapore, establish a bypass for supplying axis ships in the Indian Ocean and eventually launch an attack on Singapore. Such an assault may well be planned to synchronize with the expected German all out offensive against the British Isles. While conservative strategy would appear to counsel delaying such a single handed Japanese assault on Singapore pending the outcome of developments in [7882] Europe, nevertheless we must reckon with the present headstrong do or die spirit of the Japanese military leaders and their categories to achieve their objectives before either the United States or Great Britain could or would intervene.

Four. The importance of Singapore to the immediate defense of British Isles has been effectively set forth in the Department's unofficial memorandum dated December 4, 1940.

GREW.

MMM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Tokyo

Dated February 8, 1941

Rec'd 2:02 p. m. 7th

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

182, February 8, 1 a. m. (continuing our 181)

and without further argument may be accepted as fundamental. In view of the fact that Great Britain cannot today or presumably in the near future spare further important naval vessels for the defense of Singapore, it would seem to follow logically that our expressed policy of supporting the British Empire dictates measures on our part to prevent the control of that strategically essential base from passing into hostile [7883] hands.

Five. In this connection it is believed that the whole structure of the morale of the British in the Far East, the Netherlands East Indies and the Chinese Nationalist Government depends in large measure upon hopes of eventual American assistance. The Dutch are under great pressure in Batavia and the British in the Far East may be confronted with acute pressure, even suddenly, in the near future. It is axiomatic that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Should [7884] the Dutch morale suffer a sudden collapse, the task of rehabilitating this morale would be difficult if not impossible. Without effective Dutch determination, the defenses of the East Indies and Singapore would become problematical. Chinese morale has held up astonishingly well during the past 3½ years, but the effect of the fall of Singapore would have to be regarded as virtually a death blow to the Chinese Government. The effect of such a blow upon the British position in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East would be incalculably dangerous.

GREW.

WWC

[7885]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From: Tokyo

Dated February 8, 1941

Rec'd 2:03 p. m., 7th

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

183, February 8, 2 a. m.

Continuing our 182.

No. 6 The nature of the measures to be taken by the United States and the moment for their inception are matters of high strategic policy not within the competence of this Embassy to determine. We believe, however, that the point to be discussed is the taking of half measures of a character which would evoke all the possible undesirable results without proving effective. I have expressed the opinion that the principal question before us is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese southward advance, but when. Increased American naval concentration in the Far East would entail inevitable risks of war. Those risks constitute an imponderable factor which cannot be appraised with assurance, and they should not be undertaken unless the United States is prepared to face war. On the other hand we believe that those risks are less in degree than the future dangers which would inevitably confront us if we were to allow the Japanese advance to proceed indefinitely [7886] unchecked. We also believe that the Japanese are counting upon the quiescence of the United States. The moment decisive action should be taken, if it is ever to be taken, appears to us to be approaching.

(End of message.)

GREW.

NPL

[7887] Mr. MASTEN. We have received a memorandum from Commander Baecher, the Navy liaison officer, responding to a request by Senator Ferguson for the names of the officers in charge of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations on the night of December 6-7, 1941, and their hours of duty. This memorandum states that the names and hours of duty of those officers are as follows:

Commander (now Captain) A. Hobbs, U. S. Navy; hours of duty, 1145-1900.

Commander (now Rear Admiral) C. D. Glover, U. S. Navy, hours of duty, 1900-0200.

Commander (now Captain) J. L. Wyatt, U. S. Navy, hours of duty, 0200-0800.

Commander (now Captain) M. J. Gillan, Jr., U. S. Navy, hours of duty, 0800-1400.

Senator FERGUSON. Are these on the 6th?

Mr. MASTEN. That covers the 6th and 7th. For example, Commander Glover's period was 1900-0200. That is 1900 on the 6th to 0200 on the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. The memorandum also states that a search of available records does not reveal that there was any duty officer on the night of December 6-7, 1941, in Admiral Turner's office, the War Plans Division.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were these men that you read first?

[7888] Mr. MASTEN. The persons whose names I read first were in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. That is in Admiral Stark's office?

Mr. MASTEN. Presumably Admiral Stark's office, although the memorandum does not so state.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it say where they were?

Mr. MASTEN. I am advised that the officers whose names were first read were on duty in Admiral Stark's office.

To go on, there was no watch maintained in Admiral Turner's office after working hours at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you find out for us what were the working hours in Admiral Turner's office?

Mr. MASTEN. We will ask the Navy what the expression "working hours" on that day means.¹

That is all we have.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not give us the Navy Intelligence. I will now make the request that you get the same kind of information on Navy Intelligence.

Mr. MASTEN. We will ask the Navy what that is.¹

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:45 p. m., January 21, 1946, the committee recessed to 10 a. m., of the following day, Tuesday, January 22, 1946.)

¹ See memorandum in Hearings, Part 9, p. 4010.

Part 7—January 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946—follows.

×

44.P31:P31 H.7



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 7

JANUARY 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 AND 29, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
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JANUARY 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, AND 29, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE , Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY , Representative from Pennsylvania
SCOTT W. LUCAS , Senator from Illinois	BERTRAND W. GEARHART , Representative from California
OWEN BREWSTER , Senator from Maine	FRANK B. KEEFE , Representative from Wisconsin
HOMER FERGUSON , Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK , Representative from North Carolina	

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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¹ Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
 . Sworn statement presented to committee.

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[illegible]

[7889]¹

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7890] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. General, will you hold up your hand?

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED²

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. General, the Chair understands that you have a statement here which you desire to read, or to have read, due to the fact that you have been somewhat indisposed.

If you would like to have someone else read it, it would be entirely agreeable to the committee, or if you wish to read it yourself, why, you may proceed.

General SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I have been in the hospital with pneumonia, and have not entirely recovered my strength, but I shall make every effort to go through my testimony before this committee without interruption.

I prefer to read it myself.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

General SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the members of the committee for giving me, after 4 long years, the opportunity to tell my story of Pearl Harbor to the American public. I appeared before the Roberts commission but was not permitted to hear the other witnesses nor given the privilege of cross-examination. I was not [7891] given the opportunity to read the evidence taken before the Roberts commission until August 1944. I appeared before the Army Pearl Harbor board, but again was not permitted to hear the other witnesses nor given the privilege of cross-examination; however, I was furnished a copy of the hearings except for the

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

² Subtitles and consecutively numbered footnotes in General Short's testimony were supplied by him; footnotes indicated by * were supplied by the staff of the committee.

part considered top secret. The Army board labeled certain evidence top secret and I was never permitted to see that until this committee was about to meet. Both boards took testimony off the record which has not been made available to me.

Before taking up my statement in detail, there are a few points that I would like to mention for emphasis. These will be elaborated upon later.

1. On Pearl Harbor day I was carrying out orders from the War Department as I understood them.

2. At no time since June 17, 1940, had the War Department indicated the probability of an attack on Hawaii. In none of the estimates prepared by G-2 War Department was Hawaii mentioned as a point of attack, but the Philippines was mentioned repeatedly.

3. There was in the War Department an abundance of information which was vital to me but which was not furnished to me. This information was absolutely essential to a correct estimate of the situation and correct decision. [7892] My estimate of the situation and my decision were made without the benefit of this vital information. Had this information been furnished to me, I am sure that I would have arrived at the conclusion that Hawaii would be attacked and would have gone on an all-out alert.

4. When I made the decision, based on the information available to me, to go on alert to prevent sabotage (No. 1), I reported measures taken as follows:

Reurad 472 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

The War Department had 9 days in which to tell me that my action was not what they wanted. I accepted their silence as a full agreement with the action taken. I am convinced that all who read the report thought that my action was correct or I would have received instructions to modify my orders.

I would like to pass out at this time a chart. Copies of these charts, in colors, will be placed on the bulletin board. They are not large enough to be very readily seen from there.

I have had several charts prepared that may be of assistance to this committee in the course of my testimony.

Chart No. 1 is a chronological summary. It shows my appointment to Hawaii in December 1940, my conversations in Washington in January 1941, and the period of my command for 10 months from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941. [7893]

It traces my 10 months of effort to strengthen Hawaiian Defense. As I mention these efforts in the course of my testimony, a glance at this chart will show how the particular matter fitted into the chronological picture.

At the foot of the chart are listed the various requests and requisitions I made of the War Department, most of which were disapproved. An "X" on the chart indicates the date of disapproval of my request. The committee may see at a glance that by December 7, the picture clearly showed that the War Department was not favorably considering my efforts to strengthen the great Hawaiian outpost.

The chronological summary also shows the "alert" messages and the replies, beginning July 8, 1941. It shows the step-up in traffic from the 24th to the 28th of November. And it portrays graphically the 9 days

of silence which the War Department maintained after I sent my second sabotage-alert report.

It shows, also, the December 4 sabotage report, which was sent by General Martin from Hawaii on December 4, but for some reason never reached the War Department until December 10.

(The chart referred to is included in "Exhibit No. 134.")

[7895] General SHORT. Introduction:

1. *Appointment to Hawaii*

The Chief of Staff selected me as the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. I was first notified in December 1940. I held conferences in Washington, D. C., with General Marshall the first week in January 1941. I also conferred with General Gerow in the War Plans Division. I talked with some officer about the equipment of the Hawaiian Department. I talked with Colonel (now General) Spaatz about the Air Corps problem.

2. *Assumption of command*

At the time I assumed command on February 7, 1941, the Hawaiian Department was amply prepared for defense against the submarine danger and against sabotage and espionage, but was not adequately prepared for defense against an air raid, either by bomber or by torpedo planes or both.¹ On February 7, 1941, the Chief of Staff sent me a letter, detailing his policies regarding the Army mission in Hawaii and stressing his interest in strengthening our air power and anti-aircraft defense. In that letter he deplored the [7896] fact that all defenses would be inadequately equipped because of the over-all shortage of aircraft and anti-aircraft equipment.²

EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSES

3. *10 months' efforts.*

During the 10 months immediately following my assumption of command, in full cooperation with the Navy, I made strenuous efforts to improve the defense system of the Hawaiian Islands.

4. *Agreements with Navy*

A joint agreement with reference to the employment of the air forces was concluded with the Navy, and has heretofore been called to the attention of this committee. Pertinent extracts have been selected by the counsel for the committee and introduced here as exhibit 44. Committee exhibit 13, the air study dated August 20, 1941, is also before the committee. These agreements specifically placed the responsibility for distant reconnaissance upon the Navy and provided that the Army, when called upon, should furnish to the Navy any available aircraft for assisting in this reconnaissance. It specified also that when Army planes were detailed to assist in the distant reconnaissance they would act directly under the orders of the Navy and report to the Navy [7897] the results obtained in carrying out the mission.

¹ See letter, Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, and reply by the Secretary of War, Joint Committee, Daily Record, vol. 5, pp. 720-723.

² Letter, Marshall to Short, February 7, 1941, committee exhibit No. 53, "correspondence between General Marshall and General Short," pp. 1 to 3.

5. Statement to Roberts commission.

At the time that I was called before the Roberts commission, I prepared and submitted to them a large document marked as their "Exhibit No. 7." I am submitting a copy of this long document to this joint congressional committee, in order that you may have it available in your own records and in order that I may refer to it in this statement.

6. Statement to Roberts commission

At this time I want to call attention to pages 28 to 48, inclusive, of exhibit 7 of the Roberts commission and to the exhibits lettered "V" through "Z," and "1A" through "1R," as annexed to that exhibit 7. On those pages and in those exhibits, I developed at some length and in considerable detail, the nature of my effort to improve Hawaiian defense.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, pardon an interruption.

Do we have before us this exhibit from the Roberts testimony that the General is referring to?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. Reference was made to it the other day, Mr. Chairman, and indication was made by Mr. Masten that there were only five copies available.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the one, is it?

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is the one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

[7898] Go ahead, General.

General SHORT (continuing):

7. Statement to Roberts commission

I think it unnecessary at this time to read all the factual data that I previously collected for the Roberts commission. Those who wish to check the details are referred to the statement which I made to the Roberts commission. I believe that it will be sufficient if I summarize briefly my efforts to increase the defenses of Hawaii.

8. Letter to General Marshall 19 February 1941

My initial study of the problem was incorporated in a letter to General Marshall on February 19, 1941, and is copied on pages 4 to 9, committee exhibit No. 53, "Correspondence between General Marshall and General Short."

9. Airfield bunkers

On February 19, 1941, a letter was sent to the War Department recommending that \$1,565,600 be allotted for the purpose of providing protective bunkers and the necessary taxiways and hard standings for our aircraft. On September 12, 1941, the War Department promised \$1,358,000, but these funds were not to become available until January 1, 1942, nearly 30 days after the attack. As a result of the delay of this project, on December 7, 1941, it was impracticable to disperse the planes adequately at Hickam Field or to protect them from an air raid. Bunkers at Wheeler Field [7899] had been constructed with soldier labor.²

² See exhibit "W" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

10. *Military roads and trails*

On February 19, 1941, I requested \$1,370,000 for construction of military roads and trails. Up to December 7, 1941, only \$350,000 had been allotted to us.⁴

11. *Coast artillery*

On February 18, 1941, I requested two regiments of mobile coast artillery. As a result, the War Department, in May 1941, authorized certain increases in the coast artillery garrison, to be gradually furnished us between June 1941 and March 1942. The War Department, however, disapproved our request of February 25, 1941, for an increase in enlisted men of the 251st Coast Artillery Regiment from 1,181 to 1,450.⁵ This was an intiaircraft regiment.

12. *Kaneohe Naval Air Station*

In February 1941, the Army assumed responsibility for the defense of the naval air station at Kaneohe Bay. General Marshall concurred with this change in the defense plan. On April 14, 1941, a letter was sent to the adjutant general recommending procurement of a 12-inch gun battery for the Kaneohe Bay area. I requested an increase of the war strength [7900] garrison to 71,500 to provide appropriate defenses for Kaneohe Bay and for station complements. This request, as well as our subsequent letters, did not receive favorable consideration from the War Department.⁶

13. *The Infantry*

As early as April 25, 1941, I requested the organization of two triangular divisions in place of the Hawaiian division (square), the formation of station complements at Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter, and the activation of an air-defense command. At this time the square division was outmoded and no longer in use in the mainland units. On May 29, 1941, the War Department reduced our initial war garrison to 58,000. I immediately protested and asked that the allotment be increased to 71,500 and repeated my request for station complements. These requests met with disapproval, except that authority was granted in July for the organization of the two triangular divisions,⁷ with a reduced over-all strength remaining at 58,000 instead of 71,500 as requested by me.

14. *Additional airfields*

Proper air defense and training urgently required the construction of additional airfields. Numerous letters were [7901] dispatched between April 5, 1941, and May 14, 1941, with specific recommendations for 10 airports. Up until the time of the attack, no funds had been specifically allotted by the War Department, although plans had been approved. By directing that an air field be constructed at Kahuku, delay was occasioned by protracted negotiations. In an effort to start fields without waiting for the receipt of funds, I directed the use of soldier labor at Molokai, Burns, Morse, and Barking

⁴ Exhibit "1A" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

⁵ Exhibit "1J" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

⁶ Exhibit "1C" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission; letter, March 18, 1941, General Marshall to General Short, p. 18, committee exhibit No. 53.

⁷ Exhibit "1L" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

Sands. I considered the immediate improvement of Bellows Field vital for the protection of Oahu and so informed the War Department. The War Department approved plans for the project but did not immediately allocate funds. However, the district engineer was directed to take all possible steps until such time as the specific funds were made available. By this makeshift means gasoline storage tanks were completed and a 5,000-foot runway was half completed on December 7, 1941.⁸

15. *Landing strips*

On June 21, 1941, the War Department's attention was directed to the necessity for landing strips at Wheeler Field. In spite of a prolonged exchange of communications on this subject, no funds were allotted or received for this [7902] purpose. Limited improvements were made by soldier labor.⁹

16. *Radar*

The aircraft warning service was regarded as probably the most important single defense project. The priorities granted to us, however, made it impossible to complete the permanent radar stations prior to the time of the attack.¹⁰

17. *Priorities*

The priorities situation also rendered it impossible to obtain supplies except from the mainland, with delivery delayed 6 to 8 weeks even under the most favorable conditions. We made repeated efforts to correct this situation, but no success had been made up to the time of the attack. In this respect, as well as all others, the War Department reserved to itself full control of the determination of the strategic importance of the various defense projects and in the case of aircraft warning material did not favorably consider my request that a higher priority be granted to us.¹¹

18. *Camouflage of airfields*

On July 15, 1941, we requested funds for camouflage treatment of airfields. The War Department, apparently acting upon their estimate that air attack was improbable, had furnished us no funds for this purpose prior to December 7, 1941. The effectiveness of camouflaging which we were able [7903] to do was limited by our inability to buy the necessary materials.¹²

19. *Field fortifications*

Along the same line, our request for funds for field fortifications and camouflage was also denied by the War Department. No funds were given us for this purpose.¹³

20. *Advance procurement funds*

In July 28, 1941, we requested a revolving fund allotment of \$1,000,000 to permit advance procurement of essential materials. In September the Deputy Chief of Staff allotted \$500,000 for this fund, but before any materials could be secured the War Department di-

⁸ Exhibit "1B" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

⁹ See p. 83 and exhibit "1D" of exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

¹⁰ Exhibit "1E" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

¹¹ Exhibit "1F" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

¹² Exhibit "Z" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

¹³ Exhibit "Y" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

verted the money for housing at Kaneohe Bay. As a result, no reserve supplies, except lumber, had been accumulated.¹⁴

21. Air depot

Our air depot at Hickam Field was extremely vulnerable to attack. Therefore on September 10, 1941, I recommended that bombproof facilities for aircraft repair be constructed, costing \$3,480,650. On October 27, the War Department informed me that:

* * * It is a policy that such facilities will not be provided.¹⁵

[7904] During the attack, this air depot was a main target and suffered tremendous damage. Immediately after the attack, funds were provided, and underground, bombproof facilities were begun.

22. May 1941 maneuvers

During our May 1941 maneuvers, it was found that our then existent defensive field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14, 1941, a tentative Standing Operating Procedure was issued. In letters dated October 10 and 28, General Marshall suggested certain changes in this defense plan, relative to the Air Corps mission, which suggestions we adopted in the final draft of the S. O. P., dated 5 November 1941.¹⁶ Due to this plan and the familiarization of all units with it, all personnel down to the last man were able to act promptly in the execution of their missions when the raid took place. This they did in a most creditable manner.

23. Standing operating procedure

The Standing Operating Procedure of November 5, 1941, was issued to comply with paragraph 159, FM 100-5, issued by the War Department on May 22, 1941, which states:

In every unit, *standing operating procedure* is prescribed by the commander whenever practicable.

[7905] This procedure covers those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The adoption of such procedures will save time in the preparation and issuance of orders, minimize the chances for confusion, and errors when under stress of combat, and greatly simplify and expedite the execution of operations in the field.

the value of having a standing operating procedure was fully demonstrated at the time of the attack.

I wish to pass out chart No. 2 at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This [indicating] is the chart you refer to, General?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe all members of the committee have it.

General SHORT. This chart will summarize for the committee the requests I made of the War Department and the amount I was granted.

It shows that I requested a total of some \$22,953,697 for projects which the responsible officers in Hawaii considered vital for national defense.

¹⁴ Exhibit "1G" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

¹⁵ Exhibit "X" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.

¹⁶ See pp. 42-45, Committee Exhibit No. 53, Correspondence between General Marshall and General Short.

It shows that the War Department granted us only \$350,000—for roads and trails.

The grants totaled about 1½ percent of the requests.

That situation speaks for itself.

I want to add that beginning December 7, 1941, right after [7905] the attack, I was given a blank check for everything I needed.

(Chart No. 2 appears in "Exhibit No. 134.")

[7907] General SHORT. "Preparation of the civilian population for defense."

24. Civilian defense program

From page 43 through page 48 of the statement which I submitted to the Roberts commission, I discussed the civilian defense program of the islands. The committee may examine that statement for an outline of this phase. The defensive measures to enable the civilian population to meet any emergency which might arise were covered under the following headings:

- (1) Production and storage of food.
- (2) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
- (3) An agreement with the Red Cross for it to purchase and store in Honolulu \$200,000 worth of medicines and surgical supplies and equipment for use in any possible emergency.
- (4) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage.
- (5) Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in the vicinity of central industries.

[7908] *Governor Poindexter's letter.* I think the best summary of my work in preparing the civilian population to meet any emergency is found in the letter of Gov. Joseph B. Poindexter, dated December 28, 1941, which I should like to quote in full: ¹⁷

SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII

EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS,
Honolulu, 23 December 1941.

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National De- [7909] fense from a military standpoint, but it has only been since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

¹⁷ See exhibit 7, Roberts commission, pp. 47a to 47c.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) *The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act* by a special session of the Legislature called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this Act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

2) *The production and conservation of food:*

[7910] Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island-grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) *The medical facilities* for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. [7911] Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) *Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters* for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) *An auxiliary police force* to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. The work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) *Legislation authorizing a home guard* was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could be and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

[7912] (7) *There were many other matters* too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

(s) J. B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.

[7913]

PRE-WAR ALERTS

26. Marshall-Herron alert

Prior to the time that I assumed command in Hawaii, General Marshall had definitely indicated his intention to direct personally any genuine prewar alert. As commanding general and as a matter of training I was, of course, fully authorized to conduct drills, maneuvers, and practice alerts. Numerous maneuvers, general and special practice alerts were, in fact, held. However, as a part of my orientation, on the day before I assumed command, General Herron, my predecessor, acquainted me with the relation which had existed between himself and General Marshall during the all-out alert which began June 17, 1940.¹⁸ In that alert, General Marshall had directed the alert and had closely supervised its continuance, as disclosed in committee exhibit No. 52, Communications Between War Department and General Herron Concerning 1940 Alert. The following message began the alert:

June 17, 1940. No. 428. Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with *possible* trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. [7914] Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

ADAMS.

27. Supervision by Chief of Staff

The record is clear that at the time of the 1940 alert the Chief of Staff had sufficient time and sense of personal responsibility toward the Hawaiian Department to order and to supervise the Hawaiian alert. In addition, he had information which caused him to state that—

* * * In any event it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions.¹⁹

28. Expected action of Chief of Staff

In was my expectation that if the Chief of Staff once again had information causing him to expect a "trans-Pacific raid" against Oahu, he would follow the course he had previously set as an example. I felt that a Chief of Staff who had personally supervised the long-continued 1940 alert would certainly have the time and interest not only to read and to understand my succinct report "Reurad four seven two 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy", but to send further word in the event that he disagreed in any way with the measures I had taken in obedience to his November [7915] 27 directive. At the time that the previous alert had been modified, on July 16, 1940, the Chief of Staff had thought that the sabotage menace continued, even though the air raid danger had subsided. He had said that he wanted the Air Corps training resumed in such manner that the "aerial patrol measures" could be reestablished on short notice.²⁰

¹⁸ Affidavit of General Herron, p. 212, Clausen report.

¹⁹ P. 13, committee exhibit No. 52.

²⁰ P. 18, committee exhibit No. 52.

THE WAR PLANS

29. *Rainbow Five.*

The basic war plan was called Rainbow Five by the Army and WPL-46 by the Navy. This plan could be put into effect only by the War and Navy Departments.²¹

30. *Local defense plan.*

The joint coastal frontier defense plan for Hawaii was approved by Admiral Bloch and me on 11 April 1941, based, of course, on the Rainbow Plan. Under this plan, the Navy undertook responsibility for "distant reconnaissance."²² No part of this joint plan would take effect until the War Department ordered M-day under the Rainbow Plan, unless it was ordered in effect from Washington or by mutual agreement of the Army and Navy in Hawaii.²³ Due to my knowledge of the attitude of the War Department, I would never have ordered any part of the plan into effect [7916] without consulting it, as long as communications were open and time permitted. Under the circumstances preceding the attack, the War Department, with far more intimate knowledge of the nature of the Japanese situation, had not ordered M-day, had not put the Rainbow Plan into effect, in whole or in part, and had expressed no dissatisfaction with my report of a sabotage alert. The only conclusion I could draw was that it did not want the war plans implemented because of the possible alarm to the public or the danger of provoking the Japanese. Their silence I took as concurrence with the degree of alert I had adopted.

INFORMATION FURNISHED HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

31. *Information in general.*

I want to outline for the committee the information which the War Department furnished me during the critical 10-day period preceding the attack.

Pass out chart No. 6, please.

(Chart No. 6 is included in "Exhibit No. 134.")

[7918] General SHORT. Chart No. 6 is an attempt to show on the map the important factors which entered into my estimate of the situation—the things which led me to think that the Japanese were not going to attack Hawaii.

1. The last official prediction of an imminent trans-Pacific raid on Oahu was the Marshall-Herron alert of 1940 (shown by a broken line on the map from Japan to Honolulu.)

2. The current information in November 1941 from Washington pointed to a Jap attack on Russia, Siam, Kra, the Philippines, or Borneo—shown by heavy dark arrows stemming from Japan.

3. The current information also indicated that the probable danger in Hawaii, Guam, and Samoa was "internal attack"; that is, hostile action in the form of sabotage and subversive activities.

²¹ Sec. IX, par. 53, Rainbow Five; sec. VIII, par. 40a, Rainbow Five.

²² Par. 18, 1, Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, April 18, 1941.

²³ Par. 15, c, (2), Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, April 18, 1941.

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4. Meantime, Hawaii was a focal point in transporting troops, B-17's and air crews to the Philippines. The planes were always sent to Hawaii unarmed, but when sending them out to the more dangerous area of the Philippines, we were instructed to arm them.

5. Discussion was going on about Army troops moving out to Christmas and Canton to relieve the Marines—shown by a dotted line on the map.

6. The Marshalls were the nearest Jap territory.

[7919] With such a picture, the committee can get a better idea of the considerations which weighed on my mind.

32. Background since 1940 alert

As a matter of brief background, the committee should recall the precedent set by the Marshall-Herron alert of 1940. They should also bear in mind the message from The Adjutant General on July 25, 1941 which is shown in committee exhibit No. 32 (reading):

WASHINGTON, D. C., 152A July 8, 1941.

C G HAWN DEPT FORT SHAFTER TH

Nine two four seventh AGMO for your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese govt has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups period This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia period Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out period Neutrality [7920] pact with Russia may be abrogated period They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August period Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

ADAMS.

This is the only message sent direct by the War Department to me which indicates that "magic" sources were being used by the information center. It also is the only message received from the War Department that made a definite estimate as to probable Japanese action.

I should like also to read the message of July 25, 1941 received through Naval Intelligence, shown in committee Exhibit No. 32. This is addressed to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark. [Reading]:

This is a joint dispatch from the CNO and the chief of staff US army x Appropriate aches deliver copies to commanding generals Hawaii Philippines and Caribbean defenses command and to General Chaney in London xx You are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan x It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain [7921] material x It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk x Japanese assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement x It is not repeat not expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time x United States flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan x CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities x Action being initiated by the United States army to call the Philippine army into active service at an early date xx This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate navy and

army subordinates x Spenavo CinCPac CinCLant CinCAF Com Fifteen Spenavo London xx.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, would you pardon an interruption there? What is the page of that which you just read?

General SHORT. That is on page 2 of Exhibit No. 32.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And what was the page of the other [7922] one you read?

General SHORT. The other was page 1.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Page 1?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. May I have the page number which you are reading from now?

General SHORT. Page 2 of Exhibit 32.

Mr. GEARHART. No, I mean of your statement.

General SHORT. Page 16 of my statement.

Also, on October 20, 1941, the Army had informed me that they expected "no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy"²⁵ in spite of the fact that the Navy Department had predicted possible hostilities on October 16, 1941.²⁶

These two messages are so diametrically opposed in their views that I should like to read them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you please give the page every time you read one?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. On page 3 of Exhibit 32 a message sent by Ingersoll to Admiral Kimmel dated October 16, 1941.

[7923] The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third aedes inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities X Acknowledge XX.

That was a quite definite prediction of hostile action on the part of Japan.

Now, the Army message reads as follows; page No. 4, exhibit 32:

WASHN, D. C., 1234P Oct. 20, 1941.

20th Following War Dept. estimate of Japanese situation for your information Stop Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat [7924] no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

ADAMS.

33. Sabotage versus air danger

General Marshall's testimony made a strong point of the fact that in the correspondence between him and the Hawaiian Department, sabotage was not mentioned but that the letters were confined largely to aircraft and antiaircraft defense. He stated that he did not understand the reason why sabotage then should later be emphasized.

²⁵ Radiogram, 20 October 1941, Adjutant General to Short, p. 4, committee exhibit 32.

²⁶ Radiogram, 16 October 1941, CNO to CINCPAC; p. 3, committee exhibit 32; p. 20-B, exhibit 37.

The reason that sabotage was never discussed in my letters to General Marshall was the fact that we had in Hawaii all of the equipment necessary to prevent sabotage. Our letters were written to emphasize the need of aircraft and antiaircraft defense. The Secretary of the Navy had stated in his letter to the Secretary of War on January 24, 1941, that defense against sabotage had been provided for satisfactorily. I agreed fully with this statement. There was therefore no reason to make requests upon the Chief of Staff with reference to equipment or material for antisabotage measures.

34. Nov. 24 message to Kimmel.

On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message from the Chief of Naval Operations, concurred in by the Chief of Staff:

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable [7925] outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military force, indicate, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action. Inform senior Army officers in respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.¹⁷

This message indicated possible movement in the direction of the Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy.

35. Nov. 27 message to Kimmel

On November 27th the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet the following message which was made known to me:

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of [7926] of their naval forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned to WPL 46. Guam, Samoa, and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.¹⁸

You will notice that whereas the message of the 24th indicated a possible attack on Guam, by this time they had decided that the movement was entirely to the south and they indicated only sabotage arrangements on the island of Oahu.

While this message is headed "War Warning," it should be noted that Navy War Plan 46 was not placed in effect by the Navy Department, but a defensive deployment was ordered in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned under Navy War Plans 46. This indicated that later directions would be received if it became necessary to carry out this plan. Japanese action toward the south was indicated. I want to emphasize the following sentence from the message:

You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46.

¹⁷ Message November 24, Navy to Kimmel, p. 28-B, exhibit 37.

¹⁸ Message November 27, Navy to Kimmel, p. 31-B, exhibit 37.

[7927] Such defensive deployment would necessarily include distant reconnaissance.

36. Do-Don't message

On November 27 I received the following radiogram from the Chief of Staff which, on account of its conflicting instructions, the Army Pearl Harbor Board called the "Do-or-Don't message":²⁹

No. 472. Negotiations with the Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they [7928] pertain to Japan. Limit the dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."³⁰

The impression conveyed to me by this message was that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii and be regarded by Japan as an overt act. That this opinion was in accordance with the views of General Marshall is shown by the following quotation from his testimony:

So far as public opinion was concerned, I think the Japanese were capitalizing on the belief that it would be very difficult to bring our people into a willingness to enter the war. That, incidentally, was somewhat confirmed by the governmental policy on our part of making certain that the overt act should not be attributed to the United States, because of the state of the public mind at the time. Of course, no one anticipated that that overt act would be the crippling of the Pacific Fleet.³¹

No mention was made of a probable attack on Hawaii since the alert message of June 17, 1940. An examination of the [7929] various Military Intelligence estimates prepared by G-2 WD, shows that in no estimate did G-2 ever indicate the probability of an attack on Hawaii.³² There was nothing in the message directing me to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack. "Hostile action at any moment" meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile action.

37. Sabotage emphasis

The only additional information received from the War Department after the receipt of message No. 472 (November 27) was contained in three messages on sabotage and subversive measures. The first from G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaiian Department received November 27 read as follows:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only.³³

²⁹ Line 5, p. 123, report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board; also line 20, p. 1, Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

³⁰ Message November 27, No. 472, from Marshall; p. 7, exhibit 32.

³¹ Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, vol. A, p. 41.

³² Exhibit 33.

³³ Message November 27, No. 473, War Department G-2 to Hawaiian Department G-2: p. 10, exhibit 32.

This message was erroneously paraphrased in the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, page 133, to indicate that hostilities were "probable."

38. Report by General Short

I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Staff November 27:

[7930] CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington D. C.

Reurad four seven two 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

SHORT.³⁴

I wish to point out that this message reporting measures taken referred by number to the message which I had received from the War Department. If the War Department had checked the message carefully, there could have been no possible mistake that it was in reply to War Department message No. 472 which directed a report of the measures taken. War Department message No. 472, November 27, was the only message addressed to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall." The message of November 27, No. 473, signed "Miles," was addressed to G-2, Hawaiian Department, and did not call for a report. My message No. 959, November 27, was addressed to the Chief of Staff, referred by number to No. 472, and stated that I was reporting measures taken. It is difficult to see how there could have been any possible confusion as to the message which was being answered. Failure to check my message No. 959 to determine to which War Department message it was a reply probably came about only because all who read the message believed the action [7931] was correct. General Marshall, in his testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, stated:

We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indochina and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipate also an assault on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defense there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack.³⁵

39. November 28 Sabotage message and report

On November 28 the following message, relating entirely to sabotage and subversive measures, was received from the War Department:

HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

482 28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department (see paragraph three MID SC 30-45). Also desired that you initiate forth all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage. This does not, repeat not, mean that any illegal measures are authorized. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not, repeat not, affect your responsibility under existing instructions. ADAMS.³⁶

When this message was received from the War Department I felt that it had been prepared after consideration had been given to my message reporting measures taken pursuant to War Department mes-

³⁴ P. 12, exhibit 32.

³⁵ Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, vol. 1, p. 9.

³⁶ November 28, message No. 482 from The Adjutant General; p. 18, exhibit 32.

sage No. 472. I sent the following message in reply and was careful to refer directly to the War Department number, "482":

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

Re your secret radio 482 28th, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph 3 MID SC 30-45) and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection [7933] of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated June 19, 1941, requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section 67 of the Organic Act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June 20th confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June 30th, 1941, enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary [7934] in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

SHORT."

40. General Arnold's radiogram

On November 28 General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, sent to the commanding general, Hawaiian Air Forces, a message relating entirely to sabotage and subversive activities, similar in tone to War Department message No. 482, signed "Adams."³⁸ General Martin, replying to this message on December 4, gave a detailed report of measures taken by him against sabotage and subversive activities and added:

This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage."

We received no reply disagreeing in any way with the action reported.

41. November 28 to December 7, 1941

From November 28, 1941, until [7935] the war began, I received only one more message from the War Department, that of November 29, 1941, regarding preparations to move two Army pursuit squadrons on short notice, and informing me that the Army would take over the defense of advance Pacific bases, except for furnishing antiaircraft equipment. This message stated that Christmas and Canton Islands would be garrisoned from Hawaii, and replacements would be sent from the United States.⁴⁰ This was the last information from the War Department until the final message from the Chief of Staff of December 7, which arrived 7 hours after the attack.

I do not believe that message has been placed in evidence.

³⁸ P. 17, exhibit 32.

³⁹ P. 14, exhibit 37.

⁴⁰ Message, December 4, No. 1033, General Martin to General Arnold; p. 19, exhibit 32.

⁴¹ No footnote supplied in official transcript.

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[7936] Mr. KAUFMAN. Counsel for General Short has suggested that we offer in evidence at this point a telegram from the War Department to General Short dated November 29, 1941. The request was made by counsel for General Short.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do we have copies for the committee?

Mr. KAUFMAN. We have photostats; and I think they have been handed around to the members of the committee this morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel desire that the message be read at this time?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Either read into the record, or marked as an exhibit. I suggest it be read into the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Suppose you read it into the record.

Mr. KAUFMAN (reading):

[7937] Standard Form No. 14A [Stamped] SECRET FROM WAR DEPARTMENT
Approved by the President Bureau: A. G. O.
March 10, 1928. AG 381(11-29-41)MC-E
TELEGRAM. EHB/cdm-1712
Official Business—Government Rates NOVEMBER 29, 1941.
Cablegram Sent No. 489, 11/29

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference his dispatch number two eight zero six two seven to Chief of Naval Operations period In view of information contained in above dispatch comma the movement of the two Army pursuit squadrons as indicated in War Department cable number four six six comma November two six comma one nine four one comma will be suspended period These squadrons should however be prepared to move on short notice period Paragraph War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing antiaircraft equipment period Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference requirements and areas to be defended period War Department has also assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton period It is contemplated that you will form base defense units from the Hawaiian garrison [7938] specially organized as task forces for particular areas period If these units are moved from Oahu comma necessary replacements from the United States will be furnished period Report your conclusions and recommendations to the War Department at the earliest practicable date.

Based on: WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41.
Green cy w/d & destroyed by burning.
12/30/41, CDM-1705.
[Stamped] SECRET.

ADAMS.
OFFICIAL: SECRET
Signature illegible
ADJUTANT GENERAL.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the name of that man at the bottom of the telegram?

Mr. KAUFMAN. The notation here is "signature illegible."

General SHORT. I think it was General Wall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It does not look like "Wall" on my copy. It looks more like "Williams."

Mr. MURPHY. Does the record now show there is a notation that the signature is illegible?

Mr. KAUFMAN. There is a notation on the mimeographed copy. On the photostatic copy there is a signature, but I cannot make it out.

General Short believes that it is the signature of [7939] General Wall.

General SHORT. I may be wrong, but it looks like "Wall," the last four letters.

Senator BREWSTER. What are his initials?

General SHORT. I do not know.

Senator BREWSTER. Isn't there somebody that can clarify that? I think there is somebody in the War Department that can tell whose signature it is.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Somebody suggested "Sullivan." We will make an effort to find out whose signature it is.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering, Mr. Chairman, what difference it makes who signed it, as long as it came from the adjutant general.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what I was going to ask. General Adams was the man who sent it?

General SHORT. General Adams was the man who sent it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Adams' name on it means to you that the adjutant general of the Army sent it to you?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And this other signature did not mean anything to you at the time, did it?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. I think in view of the fact that it has appeared at some times that the chiefs in the [7940] offices did not always know what their subordinates were doing, we certainly ought to establish, at any rate, who signed this. It does not seem that would be beyond the possibility of determination.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The counsel has stated he will endeavor to secure that information. You may continue, General.

Senator FERGUSON. May I make one inquiry of counsel? In the lower left-hand corner of the telegram, the "green cy W/D and destroyed by burning 12/30/41 cdm-1705," what is that?

Mr. KAUFMAN. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any character that that refers to?

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am told the "green cy" refers to green copy.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you ascertain what that means?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.*

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; proceed, General. Give us the page where you will resume.

[7941] General SHORT. I am resuming on page 24 of my statement. The message sent by the Chief of Staff of December 7, which arrived 7 hours after the attack, was as follows:

HAWAII DEPT FT SHAFTER, TH

529 7th Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P. M. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

MARSHALL "

42. Delay of December 7 Message

The message was filed at 12:18 p. m., December 7, eastern time (6:48 a. m., December 7, Honolulu time). It was received by the R.C.A. in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m., December 7, and delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at 11:45 a. m. (Delivery was undoubtedly delayed by the Japanese attack.) The deciphered message was delivered to the adjutant general, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 p. m., December 7.

* P. 21, exhibit 82.

*See memorandum from the War Department in clarification of this document in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5296.

Delay in deciphering due to not being marked "Priority" in Washington. Thus, this vital message was received 7 hours after the attack.

[7942] If this message had been sent by scrambler telephone there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in the air, thus, at least, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial attack at 8 a. m. This would not necessarily have lessened the naval losses. The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio in code instead of telephoning it in the clear and putting it through in the minimum amount of time indicates that the War Department, even as late as 6:48 a. m., December 7th, Honolulu time, did not consider an attack on Honolulu as likely enough to warrant drastic action to prepare the islands for the sneak attack.

Senator LUCAS. Pardon me, General Short. There is one statement you made there with respect to the word "Priority" that I do not find in my copy.

General SHORT. That is not there. Since writing the statement I have seen the photostatic copy of the message as it was received in Hawaii and there is no indication of any mark of priority or urgency, or anything.

Senator LUCAS. Will you kindly refer to page 24 and read that statement again, in order that I may correct my copy here?

General SHORT. The deciphered message was delivered to the adjutant general, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 p. m., [7943] December 7. Delay in deciphering due to not being marked "Priority" in Washington.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, sir.

General SHORT. I might say that General Powell, who is one of the witnesses and who was the signal officer in Honolulu, will have a photostatic copy of the message as received. I believe also that it is shown in the Clausen report in that condition.

43. *Staff procedure re communications*

It is standard staff procedure and doctrine that all important or emergency messages should be sent by all available means of communication, which in this case would have included the scrambler telephones which had been frequently used between the War Department and Fort Shafter. Colonel Phillips and General Marshall did confer by scrambler phone later in the day on December 7, 1941. If security would be violated by sending the information by phone, then the War Department should have issued the necessary alert orders which they would have known that I would have issued at once if I had the information which they possessed. In support of this position, I quote from the War Department Field Manual on signal communication:

* * * Choice of the means employed in each instance depends on the situation. Exclusive reliance upon [7944] any one means is unwise because special and unforeseen circumstances may render that means inoperative when most needed. Plans of all commanders will make advance provision for prompt employment of effective and reliable alternate means; and the simultaneous operation of several means will minimize the ill effects of complete interruption in any one. * * *

⁴⁴ Italics supplied; par. 8b, FM 24-5, p. 4.

ACTION TAKEN—NOVEMBER 27 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

44. Alert plans

The standing operating procedure, headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941, provided for the following alerts:

SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. * * *

14. *Alert No. 1.—a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without. * * *

I want to make clear that under alert No. 1, we had skeleton crews at all anti-aircraft guns, capable of conducting fire on the enemy, and that .30 cal., .50 [7945] cal., and pistol ammunition was immediately at hand for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles, and machine guns. Three-inch ammunition was readily accessible to all but four batteries. This ammunition was in casemates from 20 to 75 yards from the batteries. As part of alert No. 1, the interceptor command and the aircraft warning service functioned from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., the most dangerous hours for an air raid.

15. *Alert No. 2.—a.* This alert is applicable to a more serious condition than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided. * * *

16. *Alert No. 3.—a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands. * * *

45. Conferences November 27

When I received the November 27, 1941, message signed "Marshall," I immediately talked it over with my chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, and then made my decision to order alert No. 1. This decision was then communicated to G-2 and to the echelon commanders. On that same afternoon, I conferred on the matter with General Martin and with General Burgin. [7946] The general contents of the radiogram were also made known to the two division commanders through staff officers. In view of the restrictive orders against wide dissemination of the information, I withheld it from the other Army personnel. At the same time that I ordered alert No. 1 into effect, I directed that the interceptor command, including the aircraft warning service and information center, should operate from 4 a. m. until 7 a. m. daily. In addition, the six mobile stations operated daily, except Sunday, from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. for routine training and daily, except Saturday and Sunday, from 12 noon until 4 p. m. for training and maintenance work.

46. Alert No. 1: Consideration

In making the decision for alert No. 1, I considered several matters.

(a) *Navy conversations.*—From repeated conversations with the Navy, I knew that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be either in their home ports or proceeding south. I had no information suggesting that some ships might have been detached to proceed eastward. Our information also indicated that Japan had no land-based bombers capable of proceeding from their nearest island, some 2,100 miles away.

(b) *Task force reconnaissance.*—It was known that the Navy usually had two or three task forces at sea. The carriers [7947] with the task forces normally scouted 300 miles at each side, a total width of 600 miles. Two task forces would thus cover 1,200 miles of ocean in the vicinity of Oahu. The Navy also had reconnaissance from Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands. I thus felt that air attack was highly improbable. On the morning of November 27, I conferred with Admiral Kimmel concerning the messages we had each received from Washington with reference to Wake and Midway. Admiral Kimmel and I discussed reinforcement of the Wake and Midway garrisons by Army planes. Such reinforcement would have weakened the Oahu defense. The Admiral asked his war-plans officer, Captain McMorris, what he thought were the chances of a surprise attack at Honolulu. The captain answered, "None." General Martin and Colonel Mollison were present with me at this conference. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, who were present, expressed no difference of opinion with Captain McMorris.⁴³ Reconnaissance, as directed in message No. 472, November 27, was a function of the Navy under the joint agreement approved March 28 by Admiral Bloch and me. That the Chief of Staff recognized that this was the case is shown by the following quotations from his testimony:

[7948] General MARSHALL. Distant reconnaissance—was a naval function, and the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be provided.⁴⁴

General MARSHALL. * * * As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in detaching units to serve under the Navy. * * *

General RUSSELL. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. That is right. That is my view.⁴⁵

(c) *Training mission.*—The factor of training was also considered. Use of Alerts 2 or 3 would have seriously interfered with our training mission. The soldiers and officers of my command were in large part relatively new to the Army and to their specialized tasks. Regular training was essential. The War Department message had not indicated in any way that our training mission was modified, suspended, or abolished, or that all troops were to go immediately into tactical status. [7949] The Hawaiian air force in particular had the mission of training combat crews and of ferrying B-17's to the Philippine Islands. On September 8, 1941, we sent 9 trained combat teams to General MacArthur. Before November 27, we had sent 18 trained teams to the mainland and we had 17 more teams ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes. Twelve more combat crews had to be trained for planes expected to arrive at an early date. Only 6 of our 12 flying fortresses were in condition and available for this important training. It was thus imperative that General Martin be allowed to make maximum use of these planes for training. If war were momentarily expected in the Hawaiian coastal frontier, these considerations would give way. But every indication was that the War Department expected the war to break out, if at all, only in the

⁴³ Compare, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 4, pp. 284, 285.

⁴⁴ Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. A, p. 26.

⁴⁵ Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, p. 43.

⁴⁶ Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, p. 47.

far Pacific and not at Hawaii. In fact, on November 26, 1941, a radiogram from the War Department had ordered me to equip two B-24 airplanes for a special photographic reconnaissance mission over Truk and Jaluit in the Caroline Islands, with particular attention to the location of naval vessels, submarines, airfields, airplanes, barracks, and camps. If attacked, the crews were directed to use all means in their power for self preservation. These planes were to be sent to Honolulu unarmed, but I was directed to insure that both were "fully equipped with gun [7950] ammunition upon departure."⁴⁷ The first of these two planes did not arrive in Hawaii until December 5, 1941. Presumably, had the War Department in the meantime decided that Hawaii was a zone of danger, they would have armed the plane before sending it to me. General Martin wired back a request that the second B-24 bring necessary equipment other than the guns and ammunition which we could supply.⁴⁸

I would like now to pass out chart No. 4. I want this committee to see graphically the picture as I had it in my mind and as all of us in Hawaii saw it at the time.

There was a large number of Japanese aliens and of citizens of Japanese extraction. There were thousands of these people all around us and near to every military and naval installation.

Most of these Japanese were loyal. Many were disloyal. Sabotage was "first to be expected in point of time", as General Marshall put it.

Chart 4 shows the major installations. Each black square represents an important camp, airfield, or naval yard. Each round black dot represents 1,000 persons of Japanese extraction. Each grey dot represents 1,000 other residents.

My figures are taken from a 1943 census study based [7951] on the population figures of 1940.

(Chart No. 4 is included in "Exhibit No. 134.")

General SHORT. (continuing):

(d) *Sabotage danger*.—The danger of sabotage was paramount in my mind and seemed to me to be the chief danger which the War Department feared. Sabotage had long been considered our primary danger in Hawaii, because of the large Japanese population, many of whom were under suspicion of disloyalty.⁴⁹ Thirty-seven percent of the population was of Japanese descent, or probably 161,000. Of these about 40,000 were Japanese aliens. Many of the Japanese lived in very close proximity to air fields and other defense installations. Sabotage might reasonably be expected for several months prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Antisabotage defense is best carried out where there is little dispersion of the command. Planes must be grouped on landing mats and on the apron. The fact that man-proof fences and searchlights had not been installed around the air-fields made the protection of the planes from sabotage much more difficult when the planes were dispersed in bunkers. Funds for fencing air-fields had been finally allotted by the War Department but too late for installation of fences prior to attack. That the War Department

⁴⁷ Message, 26 Nov. 1941, No. 465 (RCA No. 831 US Govt), quoted on pages 304-305, Vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr.; page 6, Ex. 82.

⁴⁸ Message December 5, 1941, to General Arnold.

⁴⁹ Compare, Hawaiian Defense Project Revision 1940, committee daily record, vol. 6, pp. 966, 967; also exhibit 44.

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was equally conscious of the danger of [7954] sabotage is shown by the following quotations:

In the aide memoire handed to the President by the Chief of Staff May 3, 1941, was the statement—

* * * In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control, of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East."

General Marshall in his letter to me of February 7, 1941, stated:

* * * The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation * * *."

(e) *Herron alert precedent.*—The precedent of the Herron alert of 1940, to which I have already alluded, and the general War Department policy of centralization were important factors in my mind. I felt and I still feel that if the Chief of Staff wanted an all-out alert in Hawaii, he would have ordered it himself and not expected me to make the decision, knowing as he did how relatively limited was my information as compared to that available to him. Questioned by Mr. Keefe, General Marshall gave the following testimony before this committee:

Mr. KEEFE. Well, when you issued the alert on the 17th of June 1940, you used the language, "To deal with possible trans-Pacific raid."

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, now, then, let us put it this way without splitting words: General Marshall, on the morning of the 28th of November you had tremendously more information as to the possibility of an attack by the Japanese than you had in June 1940?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. If you had information in June 1940 as to the possibilities of a trans-Pacific raid, you had a mountain of evidence on the 27th of November, did you not, to the same effect?

General MARSHALL. That is correct."

Message No. 472, November 27, was referred to so frequently by General Marshall as a command directive that I feel there should be a comparison of this message with the Herron message and with the Navy message of November 27.

[7956] I have prepared a chart for comparison of these three messages and have attached it as annex A to this prepared statement. An inspection of the chart comparing the three alert messages makes it readily apparent by the Army Pearl Harbor board designed message No. 472 of November 27 as the "Do-Don't Message."

I would like you to turn to that chart. I would like to make some remarks in reference to it.

Taking up the comparison of the three alerts—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you give us the page, General?

General SHORR. It is the very last thing in the statement, annex A.

At the time of the Herron alert, there were no negotiations going on between Japan and the United States, so no information was given on that subject. The Navy message stated, "Negotiations have ceased. Aggressive move by Japan expected within next few days." That was a very positive and definite statement. The Army message stated:

Negotiations appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility will be resumed.

⁵⁰ Exhibit 59: daily record, vol. 17, p. 2888.

⁵¹ Exhibit 53, pp. 1 to 3.

⁵² Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3713.

Now, the papers indicated that they had been resumed on December 1, 2, and 5. However, I had no information from the War Department. The War Department knew that [7957] while they had outwardly been resumed, they were defacto ruptured, and the Japanese emissaries had been told to keep up the illusion that the negotiations were going on, so that we would be misguided. That information was not in my hands.

The alert message of June 17 made an estimate of Japanese action as a possible trans-Pacific raid. That is what they probably thought the danger was. The Navy message of November 27 stated:

Amphibious expedition against Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo indicated by known Jap task forces.

This message also made a direct estimate of the probable Japanese action.

The Army message stated:

Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment.

Now, this was not in any sense an accurate statement as to the probable Japanese action, considering the information that was known in Washington. Mr. Hull stated that he considered the document from the Japanese of November 20 as an absolute ultimatum, and from then on it was just a question of putting it off. They knew that that meant war.

[7958] General Stark stated before this committee that he made up his mind in the fall that war was inevitable. The "future action unpredictable" in this message did not reflect those two opinions in any way.

Now, I will take up the question of missions and orders as given in the three messages. The alert of June 17, 1940, stated:

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers and agents.

Maintain alert until further orders.

It stated exactly the type of alert that was desired, which were defensive missions.

The Navy message stated:

Consider dispatch a war warning. Execute appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Again, a definite directive.

Take a look at the Army message. It states:

US desires Japan commit first overt act. This should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Should hostilities occur, carry out tasks Rainbow Five.

Everything is qualified. No definite directive without qualification.

All messages contain certain miscellaneous instructions.

The Herron message stated:

Instructions for secret communications with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

The Navy message stated:

Inform District and Army authorities. Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

The Army message of November 27 stated:

Report measures taken. Limit dissemination to minimum essential officers.

Those are the only two unqualified statements in the message. The "report measures taken," when that report was made, no attention was paid to it.

Now, analyze the last:

Limit dissemination to minimum essential officers.

It does not say to limit to minimum essential officers and men. It says "to minimum essential officers."

Now, if you took up alert No. 2 or No. 3, under No. 2 you could not send a plane in the air to shoot down Japanese planes without telling the crew that they were to shoot [7960] down Japanese planes, and telling them why. You could not put your anti-aircraft in position and tell them to shoot down Japanese planes without giving them a definite order, and telling them why.

Alert No. 3 would have sent every man to his battle position. You do not send soldiers into battle without telling them why they are there. So that instruction alone literally interpreted would have prevented the use of alert No. 2, or alert No. 3.

We come now to the follow-up of these messages, which is a very important factor. The Herron alert of June 17, 1940, states:

Frequent instructions and request for information from War Department for several weeks.

The committee Exhibit No. 52 shows those in detail.

The Navy message of November 27:

On December 3 two messages with reference to Japanese instructions to destroy codes were sent. On December 6 authority was granted for outlying islands to destroy all secret and confidential documents.

Now, as to the Army message of November 27, no checkup was made to even find out what my report of measures taken meant. No additional instructions were given from the 28th of November under after the attack.

[7961] The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Short, it has been suggested that we might recess until 2 o'clock. You might possibly get a little tired.

General SHORT. Thank you very much.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will recess at this point to 2 o'clock this afternoon.

General SHORT. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Yesterday, at the beginning of my examination of Admiral Kimmel, I made the statement, which I quote from the record:

In your testimony you have acquitted yourself magnificently.

My attention has been called to the city edition of the New York Times which reports that incident as follows:

The Admiral was applauded by spectators when Representative Keefe, Republican of Wisconsin, told him, "In your testimony you have acquitted yourself insignificantly."

I want the record to show that I have discussed this matter with Mr. White, who wrote the article, and I am certain that he sent the quote correctly, and either in transmission or in composition some error was made which completely changes the statement to such an extent that I feel it is necessary to have the matter corrected. I hope that in the later editions of the New York Times that very serious error will be noted, and that it would not be sent out to their readers as indicating that I have accused Admiral Kimmel of acquitting himself insignificantly, which caused the audience in the [7963] room to voice their approval by spontaneous applause. The whole thing just does not make sense, and I know the New York Times will see that it is properly corrected.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee can correct its own mistakes but it cannot correct those made outside. However, I am sure that the great newspaper, New York Times, will make the necessary correction in this case.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, at that point, I am wondering what the committee is doing about protecting itself, because there are a great many misquotations in the record itself. I know there are a great many in my own questions. I am wondering if we have anybody proofreading the record, and what steps we will take to correct the misquotes in the record, because there are a lot of misquotes in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I have noted some misquotes in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It might be advisable for members of the committee to read over their own questions in the daily record and call the attention of the reporters to any mistakes that may be made.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, in the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives each member is furnished a copy of the daily record with the pages marked on the back where his name appears, or his corrections. He can [7964] turn through the pages under his name and very readily take out his own without having to read everything that is in the whole record. I do not know whether anything like that is practical here or not, but that is the practice that is followed there.

The CHAIRMAN. It would not be difficult for each member of the committee to find his own interrogation, and if there are any mistakes to call the attention of the reporter to them.

The Chair is advised that General Short wishes to be excused for the remainder of the day after he finishes his written statement, because of his recent illness. That is entirely agreeable.

The Chair wishes also to announce that immediately following that there will be an executive session of the committee, at which he hopes all members will be present.

Go ahead, General.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed**

General SHORT. Proceeding on page 33:

[7965] *47. Confirmation of sabotage alert*

After making my decision for the anti-sabotage alert, several other things occurred which confirmed my opinion that I was complying exactly with the wishes of the War Department.

(a) *Report to and acquiescence by War Department.*—As directed, I reported that I had alerted the Department to prevent sabotage and had established liaison with the Navy.⁵³ No reply disagreeing with my report was sent to me. If the War Department felt upon receipt of my report that my alert against sabotage was not sufficient to meet the situation, it should have immediately ordered me to provide against an air raid or against an all-out attack. No steps of this kind were taken by the War Department, and I had every reason to believe that they approved fully of the measures I had taken, inasmuch as they had 9 days before the attack in which to give me additional instructions or direct that an all-out alert against an air raid or an all-out alert be put into effect. General Marshall, when asked by Mr. Keefe, if it wasn't his responsibility to check up on the measures taken by General Short as reported in reply to message No. 472 of November 27, stated:

[7966] General MARSHALL. Now, in this particular case, a very tragic thing occurred, there is no question about that, there is no question in regard to my responsibility as Chief of Staff. I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed yourself.⁵⁴

When questioned further by Mr. Keefe with regard to General Gerow's responsibility in the matter, General Marshall stated:

He had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility.⁵⁵

As shown in the following quotation, General Marshall admitted that since no objection was being raised by the War Department, I had the right to assume that my action was approved:

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that when an overseas commander is ordered to take measures as he deems necessary and to report measures taken to you, is he correct in assuming that if his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would thereafter inform him specifically of the difference?

General MARSHALL. I would assume so.⁵⁶

[7967] With reference to my report that the Department was alerted to prevent sabotage, General Marshall testified:

It did not register on Colonel Bundy, it did not register on General Gerow, it did not register on me and it carries Mr. Stimson's initials also.⁵⁷

For 9 days from November 27 to December 7 this reply apparently did not register on any of the responsible officers.

⁵³ Message, 27 November, Short to Marshall, exhibit 32, p. 12.

⁵⁴ Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3726.

⁵⁵ Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3728.

⁵⁶ Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3443.

⁵⁷ Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3732.

I want to emphasize also that my report was clear and concise, as required by War Department rules:

General GEROW (reading): "The merit of a report is not measured by its length. A concise presentation of important points usually is all that is required."

Senator FERGUSON. Would General Short's reply comply with that regulation? General GEROW. Yes, sir.⁴²

In spite of General Gerow's confession that this report of mine was in conformity with directives, he still contended that somehow he had misunderstood it. When asked how it should have read in order to be clear to him and his staff, he answered:

Well, I think, sir, if the message had read simply, [7968] "alerted against sabotage only," it would have been perfectly clear.⁴³

The only little word "only" seems to have been the missing link in General Gerow's mind. He was unwilling to read my message and admit it meant what it said, no more and no less.

(b) *Further sabotage messages.*—The three messages on sabotage and subversive activity convinced me that the War Department was cognizant of the measures I had taken, approved of the action, and wanted to be sure that my measures against sabotage and subversive acts were complete but that no illegal acts were committed in carrying them out. I believed, and I had good reason to believe, that since the War Department specifically mentioned subversive activities as a threat to Hawaii, they would also mention a "trans-Pacific raid" if they had thought it to be one of our immediate dangers. The fact that the War Department sent to the Hawaiian department three separate and distinct messages on November 27 and 28 with reference to sabotage is conclusive evidence that the War Department considered it as a very serious threat.

[7969] (c) *Ferrying unarmed planes.*—As late as December 6, 1941, the War Department was ferrying planes to Hawaii, unarmed and unprepared to fight. In fact, 12 B-17 airplanes under orders from the War Department left Hamilton Field, Calif., in two squadrons at 9:30 p. m., December 6, Pacific time (12:30 a. m. December 7, eastern time), and at 10:30 p. m., December 6, Pacific time (1:30 a. m., December 7, eastern time). None of these planes was equipped with ammunition or defensive armament. The machine guns were cosmolined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, copilot, navigator, engineer, and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning the machine guns, even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition. It cannot be imagined that the War Department wished to send these planes to Honolulu unarmed when they already had information of a pending Japanese attack. The only inference that can be drawn is that while the War Department had information of a pending attack, General Arnold, the Chief of Air Corps, who ordered these planes to Honolulu, and who, I understand, was present at Hamilton Field at the time of their departure, did not know of the critical situation in the relations between the United States and Japan.⁴⁴ [7970] These planes actually arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the first attack. Four of the 12 planes were destroyed or damaged without being able to fight.

⁴² Daily record, vol. 25, pp. 4256-4257; quoting par. 46, FM 101-5, p. 30.

⁴³ Daily record, vol. 25, pp. 4420-4421.

⁴⁴ Compare Marshall's testimony, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. A, pp. 20-21.

(d) *Conferences with Navy.*—In my conferences with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch between November 27, 1941, and December 7, 1941, nothing further developed to indicate that an attack might be expected in our coastal frontier sector. The Navy war warning message of November 27, shown to me by Admiral Kimmel, indicated that in the continental districts and at Guam and Samoa the Navy Department feared chiefly the sabotage danger.⁶¹ On December 1, 1941, we conferred for a long while regarding the suggestion from Washington that Army troops relieve the Wake and Midway Marine garrisons, to make them available for landing operations. On December 2, Admiral Kimmel came to my quarters with an 8-page letter he had prepared on this Wake and Midway problems.⁶² On December 3, we conferred at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters on a radiogram I was sending to the War Department with reference to the relief of Wake and Midway.⁶³ During this period, November 27 to December 7, the Navy made no request for Army planes to help conduct long-distance reconnaissance. [7971] At that time I was convinced that the Navy either knew the location of the Japanese carriers or had enough information so that they were not uneasy. I felt that they could handle the situation.⁶⁴ My liaison officer to the Navy, Major Fleming, held another conference with Colonel Pfeiffer of the Marine Corps on December 4, 1941.⁶⁵

Will you pass out chart No. 5, please.

(Chart No. 5 is included in "Exhibit No. 134.")

[7973] General SHORT. This chart collects the time data on a 24-hour clock. It shows the December 7 "1 p. m." message which was received in the War Department about 9 a. m. Washington time, which was 3:30 a. m. Hawaiian time.

The events of the submarine sinking, the radar misinterpretation, and the action at the time of the attack are charted.

After the third attack, the "1 p. m." message arrived. It had been delayed by the coding, by the commercial transmission, by the attack, and by the fact that it was not marked "urgent" or "priority." Other priority messages were first decoded by my message center.

[7974] This time element was so important that I would like to run over this chart in some detail.

We notice first on the chart the fact that the War Department had in its possession at 3:30 a. m. Honolulu time, the 1 p. m. message stating that the other matter was to be delivered at that hour. It was 3 hours and 15 minutes from that time before anything happened in Honolulu.

Then we had the destruction of the two-man submarine.

About this same time, at 6:48 a. m. General Marshall wrote a message which was not delivered until after the attack.

7:20 a. m., planes reported. The Opana radar station picked up the planes from the north, and it was misinterpreted by the control officer.

7:55 a. m., the first attack in Hickam Field and other installations.

8 a. m., the first of the unarmed B-17's from Hancock Field, Calif., arrived at Hickam Field.

⁶¹ Exhibit 37, p. 31B.

⁶² Compare p. 301, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.

⁶³ Compare pp. 301-302, 394, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.

⁶⁴ Compare p. 303, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.

⁶⁵ Compare pp. 302, 394, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.

Incidentally, the first plane to land, the pilot was killed by the Japanese.

At 8:03 a. m. my chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, reported the attack.

At 8:05 a. m. the first enemy plane was shot down.

[7975] At 8:10 a. m. the alert by that time had been transmitted to all of the major echelons, and Schofield Barracks had been attacked, and a plane was shot down there.

By 8:30 a. m. the infantry divisions were proceeding to their battle positions.

At 8:50 a. m. the first of the pursuit planes took the air to combat the Japanese.

At 9 a. m. the second attack struck. At the same time the civilian surgical teams started reporting at a hospital for work.

By 10:30 a. m. the third attack took place.

When this was over, at noon, the civilian ambulance teams started evacuating women and children from the threatened-attack places, and it was not then until 2:50 p. m. that Marshall's warning message was received, practically 11½ hours after the War Department had its information, the information in its possession when we received this vital information.

48. Events early on December 7, 1941

Two events occurred early on the morning of December 7, which, if interpreted differently at the time, might have had a very decided effect upon the action that followed.

49. Submarine in Pearl Harbor

About 6:45 a. m. a two-man submarine entering Pearl Harbor [7976] was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack or notified the Army, time would have been available for the dispersion of the planes. However, the naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The Army was not notified until after the attack.

50. Radar schedule

After the aircraft warning service information was closed at 7 a. m., December 7, the Opana station remained in operation. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, Second Lt. Grove C. White, Jr., O396182, Signal Corps, had obtained permission of the control officer to have all stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941.

51. Misinterpretation of radar

At 7:20 a. m., December 7, 1941, the telephone operator at the information center received a call from the Opana radar station stating that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu from North 3 points East. Lt. Kermit A. Tyler then talked on the telephone with Private Lockard of the Opana station and said that it was not anything of importance. At 0700 all the men at the information center except the telephone operator had folded up their equipment and left. When the Opana operator phoned [7977] at 0720, Lieutenant Tyler thought the flight indicated was either a naval patrol, a flight of Hickam bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the United States.

52. Misinterpretation of radar

If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Japanese, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to warm up the engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler made no report of this matter to me and as far as I know did not report the incident to the control officer, Major Tyndall, after the information center was manned about 8:30 a. m. This matter was not brought to my attention until the next day when it was too late to be of value. Had this incident been reported to the control officer at 8:30 a. m. on the 7th, he would have informed the Navy and it might have enabled them to locate the carriers.

[7978] I might say at this point, at that time there was no device in existence for determining whether a plane picked up by the radar was friend or foe. A few months later such a device was put on the planes.

ACTION AT THE TIME OF ATTACK

53. Beginning of attack

At 7:55 a. m., December 7, the enemy planes attacked Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Wheeler Field. At 9 a. m. a second attack was made, and a third about 10:30 a. m., each lasting approximately 15 minutes. At 8:03 a. m. the chief of staff reported the attack, and by 8:10 a. m. an order had been given to all units (major echelons) by telephone to put alert No. 3 into effect.

54. Antiaircraft artillery

All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. These crews were able to conduct antiaircraft fire. All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles, and machine guns. Three-inch ammunition had been placed in positions accessible to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C. (AA).

55. Automatic weapon batteries

The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Harbor, and Cape Malakole fired on the enemy planes [7979] during the 8 o'clock raid. The first enemy plane was shot down at 8:05 a. m.

56. Hawaiian air forces

During the first attack men started pulling planes out of the fire, and at 8:50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off.

57. Twenty-fourth Division

Troops of the Twenty-fourth Division at Schofield were attacked at 8:10 a. m. The troops of this division promptly returned the fire and with success—one plane being shot down with a rifle. At 8:30 a. m., the division started moving to its battle positions to repel a possible landing attack.

58. Twenty-fifth Division

The Twenty-fifth Division opened antiaircraft fire almost immediately. It also moved into battle positions at 8:30 a. m.

59. Value of prior training

All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed in the standing operating procedure, with precision and with remarkable speed. The value of our prior planning and training, which had made everyone familiar with the plans, was brought out very clearly.

60. Civilian surgical teams

At 9 a. m., the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler General Hospital.

[7980] **61. Civilian relief committee**

At 12 noon the civilian relief committee began the evacuation of Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, and Schofield, and continued throughout the afternoon and part of the evening. Most of the women and children were moved to school buildings, although a few from these posts and all of the women and children from Shafter, Tripler, Ordnance Depot, and Signal Depot were sheltered in the incompletd underground Interceptor Command Post.

62. Seizure of foreign agents

During December 7 the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I. and G-2 were arrested and confined at the immigration and quarantine stations as follows:

Japanese	-----	370
Germans	-----	98
Italians	-----	14
Total	-----	482

Incidentally, there were only four of the listed agents that were not picked up on this first day.

62. Clearing airfields

The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field just as soon as the first attack diminished.

64. Creditable action of command

Every officer and [7981] man under my command performed his duty in a most creditable manner. The deeds of courage on the part of both the military and civil population is a matter which I hope that history will eventually disclose.

INFORMATION NOT SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT

65. Policy to withhold information

As this joint committee's investigation has already revealed, there was a vast amount of highly significant information available in the War Department which no responsible military man could exclude from consideration in forming an estimate of the situation. The War Department was aware of the fact that I did not have this information and had already decided that I should not get this information.⁶⁶ It was therefore their duty not only to make the estimate of the situation but to make the decision as to what military action it required, and to give me orders to go on an all-out alert instead of permitting my sabotage alert to stand. This was in line with their centralized peace-

⁶⁶ Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. C, p. 199.

time control system. It is my firm conviction that they did estimate the situation, that they expected only sabotage and subversive activities in Hawaii, and that on reading my report, "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy," they dismissed the matter from their minds because I had done exactly what they desired.

[7982] 66. *No magic to Hawaii*

A definite decision had been made by the War Department that neither the Japanese intercepts nor the substance of them should be given to the commanding general in Hawaii. The following testimony of General Miles makes such decision clear:

Mr. GESELL. What steps were taken to distribute the intercepted messages to the Commanding Officer at Hawaii?

General MILES. There were no steps taken to distribute these messages to that General.

Mr. GESELL. Do I understand from your answer that these messages as intercepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii by the Army?

General MILES. They were not. In some cases the substance, of some messages, were sent to Hawaii, and almost always in naval code, I think always in naval code, because the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army code.

Mr. GESELL. Who made the decision that these messages should not be sent to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is concerned?

General MILES. That followed from the general policy laid down by the Chief of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of these messages or our ability to [7983] decode them should be confined to the least possible number of persons; no distribution should be made outside of Washington.

Mr. GESELL. Was that determination by the Chief of Staff in writing or simply an expression of policy?

General MILES. As far as my recollection goes, it was simply an expression of policy.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted in connection with the formulation of that policy?

General MILES. I do not now remember but I imagine that I was.⁶⁵

67. *Hindsight evaluation*

I do not want to attempt to summarize or even to list all the information here which the War Department had but which I did not have. I want to refrain from hindsight evaluation of this information. But I also want to call the committee's attention to some very obvious items which had they been given to me, would have necessarily changed the picture which I then had of the crisis between the United States and Japan.

68. *Military commitments in Far East*

I did not know that United States Army officers at Singapore had made tentative [7984] military commitments, not approved by the President, that the United States would fight, along with the Netherlands and the British, to defend the Dutch East Indies and Singapore.⁶⁶

69. *Japanese knowledge of United States policy*

I did not know that the War Department knew that the Japanese suspected or had somehow learned of this joint military program. Intercept No. 1243, dated 3 December 1941, published in joint com-

⁶⁵ Daily record, vol. 12, pp. 2091-2092.

⁶⁶ See Marshall-Stark report to Roosevelt, 27 November 1941; Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, pp. 9-12; compare Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 5, pp. 449-450.

mittee Exhibit No. 1, page 227, disclosed to the War and Navy Departments, at least by December 5, that the Japanese did realize that such joint military action would occur. As early as November 12, the people in Washington had in their hands intercept No. 1066, printed on page 111 of committee exhibit No. 1, which disclosed that Japan had been semiofficially told that—

If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan—

[7985] and that the American Government had, and believed, reports that—

* * * Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. Kurusu will have any effect on the general situation.

If this information is connected up with the knowledge gained of the definite Japanese intention to expand southward, it is clear that the War and Navy Departments must have known that war was a certainty, and that they, with this exclusive intelligence, wanted to make the estimate and decision as to American military defensive action. This explains their care in ordering me not to disclose intent, alarm the population, or do anything which Japan could use as propaganda that the United States had provoked war.

70. November 20 ultimatum

I had not been told, but Washington knew, that the Secretary of State regarded the November 20, 1941, Japanese proposal as an ultimatum⁶⁹ and that from then on it was merely a question of trying to stall off the final break as long as possible and, quoting Secretary Hull: in the hope that somewhere even then something might develop suddenly and out of the sky.⁷⁰

71. Deadlines

I did not know, but the War Department knew [7986] that the Japanese had set a deadline after which their armed forces would move. On November 26 a translation of intercept No. 188, on page 174 of Exhibit No. 1, disclosed that—

* * * our forces shall be able to move within the day—

in the event that the United States-Japanese negotiations were not successfully terminated by 25 November 1941. The first Navy translation which told of the November 25 deadline was made as early as 5 November 1941.⁷¹

On 17 November, an intercept was deciphered which included this sentence:

I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change.⁷²

On 22 November, a translation of a 19 November intercept showed that Kurusu and Nomura still regarded the 25 November deadline as "an absolutely unalterable one."⁷³ This message also contained considerable discussion about evacuation of Government officials and their

⁶⁹ Testimony of Mr. Hull, joint committee daily record, November 28, 1945, vol. 7, pp. 1186, 1181.

⁷⁰ Testimony of Mr. Hull, joint committee daily record, November 28, 1945, vol. 7, p. 1195.

⁷¹ See No. 736, committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100.

⁷² Intercept 16 November 1941, pp. 137-138, committee exhibit No. 1.

⁷³ Intercept No. 1140, 19 November, p. 159, committee exhibit No. 1.

wives. The 25 November deadline was then extended to 29 November, by an intercept of 22 November, translated the same day. But the Tokyo Government [7987] became more emphatic, saying:

This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."

On the 28th of November it was learned in Washington that in 2 or 3 days a report would be sent from Tokyo in answer to the "humiliating" American proposal after which—

* * * the negotiations will be de facto ruptured."

This same intercept, moreover, showed a design to hide the fact that negotiations were broken off.

72. Code destruction

Another thing I did not know is the fact that the Japanese were under orders to destroy their codes and code machines. The War Department knew of this code destruction as early as 1 December 1941 and knew specifically of the orders to destroy the codes in the United States on 3 December 1941.⁷⁶ I should certainly have been told of this intelligence. The following testimony of General Miles makes it plain why the Japanese messages ordering the destruction of their codes did not reach the commanding general in Hawaii:

[7988] Mr. GESELL. The Army did not send any messages to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. What is the explanation of that?

General MILES. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

Mr. GESELL. It is a fact, is it not, General Miles, that none of these messages contained any instructions for the Navy authorities to show the information to the Army representative at Hawaii?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GESELL. And that was the practice where joint messages were sent sometimes as we have seen, was it not?

General MILES. That happened on one or two occasions, yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army authorities [7989] at Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Any instruction to the Navy?

Mr. GESELL. To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that the Army would be certain to receive them?

General MILES. No, sir; that was not considered necessary."

73. Ships in harbor report

While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me know about the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track of our naval ships, they should certainly have let me know that the Japanese were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor, which might indicate more than just keeping track, because such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack in Hawaii. As early as October 9, 1941, G-2 in Washington

⁷⁶ Intercept No. 812, 22 November, p. 165, committee exhibit No. 1.

⁷⁷ Intercept No. 844, 28 November, p. 195, committee exhibit No. 1.

⁷⁸ Intercepts Nos. 2436, 2444, 2443, 867, pp. 208, 209, 215, committee exhibit No. 1.

⁷⁹ Daily record, vol. 18, pp. 2220-2222.

knew of this Japanese espionage.⁷⁸ This message, analyzed critically, is really a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor.⁷⁹

[7990] 74. *Winds code*

I was not informed, but the War Department knew, of the so-called "winds" code or of the fact that the so-called implementing message had been received, definitely confirming the fact that diplomatic relations would be severed between Japan and the United States.⁸⁰

75. *Hull's "ultimatum" to Japan*

I was not informed of Secretary Hull's note of November 26, proposing a 10-point plan which the Japanese considered an ultimatum.⁸¹

76. *War considered inevitable*

I did not know that sometime in the fall of 1941 the Chief of Staff had come to the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable.⁸²

77. *Jap reply—13 parts*

Critical information (the first 13 parts of the long Japanese memorandum) finally terminating relations with the United States was received in the War Department by 9 p. m. on December 6. The so-called "pilot" message from Tokyo to Washington December 6, 1941, No. 901,⁸³ had been received in the War Department sometime during the [7991] afternoon of December 6. This message stated definitely that the long Japanese memorandum would be sent as message No. 902 and would be presented to the Americans as soon as instructions were sent.

78. *Part 14, Jap reply*

The fourteenth part of the long memorandum and the short message of the Japanese directing the Ambassador to deliver the long memorandum at 1 p. m. on the 7th were in the hands of the War Department between 8:30 and 9 a. m. December 7.⁸⁴ This message indicated a definite break of relations at 1 p. m., and pointed directly to an attack on Hawaii at dawn. Had this vital information been communicated to Hawaii by the fastest possible means, we would have had more than 4 hours to make preparations to meet the attack which was more than enough for completing Army preparations. The Navy might have had time to get all ships out of the harbor.

79. *Delay of December 7 message*

Not until 7 hours after the attack was I informed that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver the 14-part memorandum to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m., December 7. This message was received in the War Department from a naval courier between [7992] 8:30 a. m. and 9 a. m., December 7 (3 a. m. to 3:30 a. m. Honolulu time). This message definitely pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor at 1 p. m., Washington time. If this message had been

⁷⁸ Army intercept No. 28260, 24 September 1941, p. 12, committee exhibit No. 2.

⁷⁹ Daily record, vol. 12, p. 2101.

⁸⁰ Intercepts Nos. 2353, 2354, 19 November, committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 154, 155; testimony of Captain Safford, United States Navy, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. C, pp. 126-135, 152-157, 173.

⁸¹ Hull's note, 26 November 1941, joint committee exhibit No. 1, intercept No. 1189, pp. 181-182.

⁸² See Army Pearl Harbor board, vol. A, p. 40.

⁸³ Exhibit 1, p. 238.

⁸⁴ Exhibit 1, No. 902, p. 245, and No. 907, p. 248; Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. A, pp. 13-17.

delivered to me by the most rapid possible means of communication I would have had 4 hours, more than enough time, to fully alert the Army forces against an air raid.

80. Delay translation December 6 Pearl Harbor message

A more prompt decoding and translation of one of the December 6 intercepts would have pointed out clearly to the War and Navy Departments that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was planned. After discussing the lack of barrage balloon defense, the consul at Honolulu reported as follows to Tokyo:

* * * However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.⁸⁸

I would like to set up my conclusions. There will be a certain amount of repetition, but I think it is desirable.

CONCLUSIONS

81. Obeyed instructions

On December 7, 1941, I was obeying [7993] my instructions from Washington as I understood them, and as the War Department had every reason to know that I understood them, and was acting in accordance with the information which was available to me at that time. Little information was available to me. The little that was given to me in the War Department message of November 27 did not give an accurate picture of the prospects of war. The War Department knew definitely by 9 p. m., December 6, that the hour had struck and that war was at hand. By 9 a. m., December 7, the War Department knew the hour of attack. None of this information was given to me.

82. War Department responsibility

If for any possible reason the War Department felt that it could not give me the information, then it was the responsibility of the War Department to direct me to go on an all-out alert particularly since it well knew that we were on an antisabotage alert. The Hawaiian Department was not provided with agencies for obtaining Japanese information outside of Hawaii, and was dependent on the War Department for such information.

83. War Department estimate

When the War Department was informed that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against sabotage, it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, subsurface, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection [7994] against sabotage and subversive measures. This action on the part of the War Department definitely indicated to me that it approved of my alert against sabotage. The War Department had 9 more days in which to express its disapproval. The action of the War Department in sending unarmed B-17's from

Hamilton Field, Calif., on the night of December 6, to Honolulu confirmed me in my belief that an air raid was not probable.

84. Reasonable reliance on report

Confirmation of my view that the War Department's silence and failure to reply to my report of November 27 constituted reasonable grounds for my belief that my action was exactly what the War Department desired, is contained in General Marshall's testimony before this joint committee on December 11, 1945:

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that when an overseas commander is ordered to take "such measures as he deems necessary and to report measures taken to you", is he correct in assuming that if his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would thereafter inform him specifically of this difference?

General MARSHALL. I would assume so.⁸⁶

[7995] *85. Distant reconnaissance plan*

The joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier places upon the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex No. 7 to the joint coastal frontier defense plan provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the Army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance. During the period November 27 to December 6 the Navy made no request for Army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the locations of the Japanese carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval ships and planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without the assistance from the Army. It is noted that the Navy Department, both on October 16 and on November 27, directed Admiral Kimmel to make preparatory defensive deployments, and that Admiral Kimmel had several task forces at sea and was conducting considerable reconnaissance.⁸⁷ He did not have [7996] sufficient equipment to conduct complete reconnaissance. General Marshall has testified here that even during the war the Hawaiian Islands had never had sufficient equipment for complete perimeter reconnaissance.

86. Army-Navy cooperation

During this period I held frequent conferences with the commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the probability of an air attack by the Japanese. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them

⁸⁶ Daily record, vol. 21, p. 3443.

⁸⁷ Exhibit 37, pp. 20B and 31B.

aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the probability of an air attack.

87. Expectations from War Department

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to inform me by the most rapid means possible if a real crisis arose in Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the message would remain in the hands of General Miles and Colonel Bratton without action from 9 a. m. till 11:25 a. m., and [7997] that when action was finally taken the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, delivery, etc., or if I had been directed by telephone to go on an all-out alert for a dawn trans-Pacific raid, without being told the reason, I would have had approximately 4 hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

88. Follow-up of orders

When any department of the Army has issued an order on any matter of importance, it has performed only one-half of its function. The follow-up to see that the order has been carried out as desired is at least as important as issuing the order. The War Department had 9 days in which to check up on the alert status in Hawaii and to make sure that the measures taken by me were what was desired, which it did not do. The check-up would have required no more than a reading of my report of measures taken.

89. Supervision by Chief of Staff

Repeatedly, from the time I took command in Hawaii in February 1941, the Chief of Staff had written me at length advising me on policies and details of operation. However, after October 28, 1941, with the War Department receiving information almost daily which [7998] indicated that war was imminent, he communicated to me none of those personal messages containing the inside information.

90. Erroneous estimate of situation

My decision to put the Hawaiian Department on an alert to prevent sabotage was based upon a belief that sabotage was our gravest danger and that air attack was not imminent. I realize that my decision was wrong.⁸⁸ I had every reason to believe, however, that my estimate of the situation coincided with that of the War Department General Staff, which had the signal advantage of superior sources of intelligence as to enemy intentions.

91. Hindsight value of information withheld

I know it is hindsight, but if I had been furnished the information which the War Department had, I do not believe that I would have made a mistaken estimate of the situation. To make my meaning clear, I want to add that I do not believe that my estimate of the situation was due to any carelessness on my part or on the part of the senior Army and Navy officers with whom I consulted. Nor do I believe that my error was a substantial factor in causing the damage which our Pacific Fleet suffered during the attack.

⁸⁸ Compare Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, testimony of General Short, vol. 38, p. 4440.

92. Intelligence complacency

I have been more than astounded [7999] to learn the complacency of the War Department General Staff with relation to so-called magic intelligence. The War Department could have devised a method to paraphrase the information obtained and send it by courier to me, without, if they chose, disclosing to me that it resulted from an ability to decipher Japanese messages. I want to quote for the committee the following pertinent paragraph from the Operations Manual then current:

From adequate and timely military intelligence the commander is able to draw logical conclusions concerning enemy lines of action. Military intelligence is thus *an essential factor* in the estimate of the situation and in the conduct of operations."

General Marshall and Admiral Wilkinson have pointed out that the security of our cryptanalytic ability was risked for the slight, temporary exultation of shooting down Yamamoto's plane. Surely, then, supplying the data to me and to Admiral Kimmel would not have been inconceivably risky.

93. Opinion of Judge Advocate General

I want to quote for the committee one paragraph from the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army concerning this intercept intelligence:

[8000] But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board argues that had this additional information been transmitted to Short it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any substantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or, in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance the message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor report" irregular and the further message of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship movements (Top [8001] Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities which we have a right to expect in an officer at the head of the War Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to Short."

94. Adequate sabotage defense

I had been furnished adequate means to prevent sabotage. I used those means with complete success, as the testimony has shown. No one can say to what extent sabotage would have occurred if the Army had not taken such measures to prevent it.

95. Inadequate means for air defense

I had not been furnished adequate means to defend against a surprise air raid. The War Department was aware of the inadequacy of

" Italics supplied; par. 194, FM 100-5; dated May 22, 1941, p. 40.

" Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, 25 November 1944, committee exhibit 68, p. 45.

our aircraft and antiaircraft defense establishment. The following table will show at a glance how inadequate our air defense was at the time.²¹

[8002] I would like to offer at this time a table showing the type of equipment that was actually available on December 7, the number that we required to complete our plans and the amount of equipment that was actually on hand in December 1942.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, is that information you are seeking to offer now different from the table that is in your statement?

General SHORT. It is, in that it has the additional equipment that was present at Hawaii in December 1942.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that table, is that different from the one appearing in your statement?

General SHORT. Just the third which it adds.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It adds another column?

General SHORT. It adds another column.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, if this statement given here is a correct statement about there being no bombers in Hawaii on December 7?

General SHORT. No; no torpedo bombers.

Mr. MURPHY. No torpedo bombers?

General SHORT. We had no torpedo bombers.

[8003] Mr. MURPHY. It shows no bombers at all. My impression is there were 37.

General SHORT. The B-17's were bombers.

Mr. MURPHY. Are those the only ones then?

General SHORT. Those were the only bombers. We had B-18's that were 7 years old, that were distinctly out-of-date, with a maximum speed of 150 miles per hour and I did not include those because the air people did not feel that those were proper equipment to fight with.

Mr. MURPHY. We will go into that later with you as to what I had in mind.

Senator LUCAS. General, you said "December 1942."

General SHORT. I am making a comparison of what they had provided at the end of another year.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, do you have copies of this new table that you want to refer to now?

General SHORT. I have only one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or can you give us this third column?

General SHORT. I will give you the third column.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you can give us the third column slowly so that we can insert it on here, that might serve the purpose.

General SHORT. All right, sir. I would like to call attention to the fact also—

[8004] The VICE CHAIRMAN. How is the third column to be headed?

General SHORT. "On hand December 1942."

I would like also to call attention to the fact that in December 1942 the Japanese had several months before been decisively defeated at Midway and that the danger of an attack was far less than it had been on December 7, 1941.

²¹ The required number of planes is based on the "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii," dated 20 August 1941, committee exhibit 13, daily record, pp. 1013 to 1050; the antiaircraft requirements are stated in my letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 15, 1941, exhibit 53, p. 15; also Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, pp. 21, 23.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, it would be helpful, I think, if you would give us the third column just exactly as it appears here. For instance, "B-17D Planes."

General SHORT. I will give each one in turn if that will be satisfactory.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. B-17 planes: Available on December 7, 6, required 180; in December 1942 there was only one B-17 plane but there were 40 B-24 planes, which was a very comparable plane.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One B-17 and—

General SHORT. 40 B-24's which would accomplish the same purpose.

Interceptors and fighters: There were 105 available on December 7; required according to our plans 185; and in December 1942 they had 200.

Torpedo bombers: There were none available on December 7, 36 were required according to our plans and there were [8005] still none on hand in December 1942.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. None?

General SHORT. None; yes, sir.

3-inch antiaircraft guns: There were 82 available on December 7, 98 required by the plan. In December 1942 there were only 40 3-inch antiaircraft guns but there were 44 90-millimeter guns, which was a much more powerful gun, able to accomplish much more.

37-millimeter antiaircraft guns: On December 7 there were 20 available. There were required under our plans 135. In December 1942 there were actually 276.

50-caliber machine guns: Available December 7, 109; required according to our plan 345; actually available in December 1942, 793.

I wish to point out that the 50-caliber machine gun was the most effective weapon against planes coming in very low over the water, and that the number that they had in December 1942 was more than seven times the number that we had on December 7.

I am presenting this table because there has been a statement before the committee that we had all that was necessary to defeat the Japanese attack.

The seriousness of this shortage of equipment is best borne out by recalling that our equipment was inadequate to [8006] protect the Pacific Fleet, even had we been on an all-out alert such as that which the Chief of Staff had ordered in June 1940. I want to quote General Herron's testimony on this point.

General FRANK. * * * Let us assume that in 1940, when the Army was in that alert, that there was a real menace and that an attack had come similar to the one that came on December 7th with the Army on the alert and the Navy not. What do you think would have happened?

General HERRON. Well, approximately what happened on December 7th. The dive bombers would have come in. The Army could not have stopped them with its three-inch guns posted up on the hills. They necessarily would bring more planes than we had. If we had 50 combat planes they would bring 150, surely.²³

96. Army failure—Heroism of troops

Due to the fact that the War Department did not make available to Hawaii the information in its possession, the Army forces in Hawaii were unable to prevent the terrific destruction caused by the Japanese

²³ Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 3, p. 234.

attack. However, the fine action of the Hawaiian troops when struck by the surprise attack should not be overlooked. Every officer and man did his full duty with promptness, pre- [8007] cision and efficiency. All organizations moved quickly to their battle positions and took up their prescribed duties. Acts of heroism were the rule, not the exception.

97. General Staff reorganization

I trust that the reorganization of the War Department General Staff will lead in the future to prompt evaluation and use of all items of intelligence concerning possible aggressive movements by foreign military powers.

98. Unjust War Department treatment

I do not feel that I have been treated fairly or with justice by the War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for the disaster. My relatively small part in the transaction was not explained to the American people until this joint congressional committee forced the revelation of the facts. I fully appreciate the desire of the War Department to preserve the secrecy of the source of the so-called magic, but I am sure that could have been done without any attempt to deceive the public by a false pretense that my judgment had been the sole factor causing the failure of the Army to fulfill its mission of defending the Navy at Pearl Harbor. I am sure that an honest confession by the War Department General Staff of their failure to anticipate the surprise raid would have been understood by the public, in the long run, and even at the time. Instead, they "passed the buck" to me, and I have kept [8008] my silence until the opportunity of this public forum was presented to me.

99. War Department's 4-year silence

The War Department had 4 years to admit that a follow-up should have been made on the November 27 message and on my report of the same date, but no such admission of responsibility was made public until General Gerow and General Marshall testified before this committee.

100. First opportunity to present story

I want to thank all the members of this committee for the thorough manner in which you have tried to bring out the facts and particularly for the opportunity to present my story to you and through you to the American public.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will excuse you at this time, General, until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

General SHORT. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee desires to have an executive session and the spectators will depart as rapidly as possible.

(Whereupon, at 3:15 p. m., January 22, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 23, 1946.)

[8009]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[8010] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. General Short, do you have anything to add before counsel begins to question you?

General SHORT. No, sir. I have not had an opportunity to see if there are any clerical errors in the transcript. I would like later on if I find any to submit those.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then counsel may proceed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Before proceeding with the examination of General Short I would like to have certain documents marked in evidence.

Yesterday General Short in his statement offered as an exhibit the batch of papers that he had used before the Roberts examination. It was agreed that with respect to this exhibit it need not be duplicated but I would like to have it given a number. The next number is 133.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel desires to offer that as Exhibit 133?

Mr. KAUFMAN. As Exhibit 133.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 133.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 133.")

Mr. KAUFMAN. General Short in his examination used five charts yesterday and I ask that they be marked as Exhibit No. 134.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

[8011] (The charts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 134.")

Mr. KAUFMAN. I ask that there be marked as "Exhibit 135" a compilation made by counsel as to the details of the time of sending and the receipt of the messages commencing on November 27. Copies of this have already been distributed to members of the committee. That is Exhibit 135.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 135.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 135.")

Mr. KAUFMAN. I ask that there be marked as Exhibit 136 the report of Eugene V. Elder, Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps, relating to the operation of the radio sets and radar equipment. I ask that that be marked Exhibit 136.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 136.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 136.")

Mr. KAUFMAN. I ask that there be marked as Exhibit 137 the reports from the War Department as to the operation of the radar station in Hawaii and the alert of the radar station commencing November 27, 1941. This has been requested by Congressman Gearhart at pages 259 and 260 of this record.¹ Copies of this have already been distributed to the members of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the number?

[8012] Mr. KAUFMAN. Exhibit 137.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 137.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 137.")

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now may I proceed with the examination of General Short?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel may proceed with the examination of General Short.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, will you please state for the record your experience in the Army?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

I was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry, March 13, 1902. My appointment was made upon the recommendation of the president of the University of Illinois, from which university I had graduated in 1901.

I was assigned to the Twenty-fifth Infantry and to duty in the continental United States. I served in the Philippines from August to December 1907. I was assigned to the Sixteenth Infantry in December 1907 and returned to the United States.

I served in Alaska from 1910 to 1912. I was secretary of the School of Musketry from November 1912 to March 1916. I served with the Pershing expedition in Mexico from March [8013] 1916 to February 1917.

I served in France and Germany from June 1917 to June 1919. I went to France as a captain of the Sixteenth Infantry in the First Division. I was in the first group of officers sent to the British and French fronts and to the British and French schools.

I participated in the organization of the corps schools and of the Army Machine-Gun School in France. I was promoted to major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel during my service in France. I served on the general staff at GHQ, General Headquarters of the A. E. F., having charge of the training and front-line inspections of machine-gun units. I was made assistant chief of staff, G-5, Third Army, when it was organized and sent into Germany.

I was an instructor at the Command and General Staff School from July 1919 to February 1921 at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. I was placed on the initial General Staff eligible list and detailed on the General

¹ Part 1, p. 109.

Staff in February 1921. I served on the General Staff with troops from February to June 1921. I served on the War Department General Staff from July 1921 to August 1924.

I attended the Army War College from September 1924 to July 1925. I served in Puerto Rico as a lieutenant colonel, Sixty-fifth Infantry, from July 1925 to July 1928. I was in charge [8014] of the G-3 section, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, from August 1928 to September 1930. I served in the Bureau of Insular Affairs as financial officer and later as executive officer from October 1930 to June 1934. I commanded the Sixth Infantry at Jefferson Barracks from July 1934 to June 1936. During 2 months of this period I acted as executive officer of the national matches in 1935.

I was assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning from July 1936 to January 1937; promoted to the grade of brigadier general on December 1, 1936. Commanded the First Brigade from March to December 1937. Commanded the First Division from January 1938 to September 1940, except during periods of maneuvers when I was commanding a corps.

I was promoted to major general March 1, 1940. I organized and commanded the Fourth Corps in maneuvers at Fort Benning, Ga., marched the corps to Louisiana and participated in maneuvers from March 1940 to May 1940. I commanded a provisional corps of National Guard and participated in maneuvers from August 1940 to September 1940. I organized and commanded the First Corps at Columbia, S. C., from October 1940 to December 1940. I commanded the Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941; was promoted to the grade of lieutenant general February the 8th [8015] upon taking command of the Department. I retired as a major general February the 28th, 1942.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, when were you informed that you had been selected to command the Hawaiian Department?

General SHORT. In December 1940.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And who so informed you?

General SHORT. I had a personal letter from the Chief of Staff.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And after the receipt of that letter did you come to Washington to confer with the Chief of Staff.

General SHORT. Not immediately.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When did you do so?

General SHORT. I came to Washington the first week in January to confer with the Chief of Staff.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And at that time were you told by the Chief of Staff as to the probable dangers in the Hawaiian Department?

General SHORT. My conference with the Chief of Staff was rather brief and he did not go into my mission to any considerable extent at that time but he wrote me a long letter on the day that I assumed command detailing his idea of my mission.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Were you informed before you took command of the Hawaiian Department that there would be a change in [8016] the command of the Pacific Fleet?

General SHORT. I was not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When were you informed about that for the first time?

General SHORT. After I reached Honolulu, probably 2 days—I think that I knew it 2 days before I took command.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The letter that you referred to is the letter by General Marshall to you dated February 7, 1941, and is part of exhibit 53?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it was in that letter that the Chief of Staff told you about the probable developments and probable dangers of the Hawaiian Department?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; not pointing at any particular time, but as I got the idea, if hostilities did eventuate that those were the probabilities.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the next to the last paragraph of the Chief of Staff's letter of February 7 is as follows:

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved [8017] in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

It was in that letter that the Chief of Staff made those statements?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that your first instructions, written instructions from the Chief of Staff was that the main hazard was a surprise air attack and a probable submarine attack?

General SHORT. He mentioned in order there—he did not say what he considered the order of priority, but he mentioned sabotage first.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Sabotage and the risks involved in a surprise raid by air and submarine?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is all in the one sentence.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And he winds that sentence up by stating:

This constitutes the real perils of the situation.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in addition you knew at that time of the deterioration of the relations as between the United States and Japan?

[8018] General SHORT. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you regarded and the Hawaiian Department was regarded as one of the most important outposts of the United States?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You recognized that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then there followed between you and the Chief of Staff a series of communications commencing on February 7, 1941, and ending on October 28, 1941, all of which correspondence is included in exhibit No. 53.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the purport of that correspondence was constant advice and direction to you from the Chief of Staff in connection with preparation of the Department for a surprise attack by air?

General SHORT. I would say in preparation for any kind of an attack by air.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And particularly a surprise attack by air?

General SHORT. Yes. He only emphasized that, as I remember, once, that it was a question of getting the necessary things to meet any air attack.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You will not say that the purport of the correspondence between you and the Chief of Staff laid particular emphasis on the possibility of a surprise attack by air? [8019]

General SHORT. In that one paragraph he did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am talking about the rest of the correspondence commencing in February of 1941 and ending in October of 1941, whether or not the emphasis in all of those communications was not with respect to the possibility of an attack, of a surprise attack by air?

General SHORT. I would say it was with reference to the possibility of any attack by air, surprise or otherwise.

Mr. KAUFMAN. By air?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8020] Mr. KAUFMAN. And you recognized, as the result of that correspondence, the probability of the attack by air in the event of hostilities with the Japanese?

General SHORT. At least the possibility.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now what were the conditions in the Hawaiian Department at the time that you took over the command?

General SHORT. There was still much to be done to prepare the defenses against an air attack. My letter of February 19 set forth these conditions very briefly to General Marshall.

Now I would like to add, I am not reflecting on any previous commander that may have made efforts to get all of these things, but the fact is those things existed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The fact is after you took command, and in recognition of the possibilities of an attack by air, it was part of your problem to make the department ready against such possibility of attack?

General SHORT. Very definitely.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you made efforts in that direction?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you made requests of the War Department for additional material and equipment and men for the purpose of strengthening that department?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And some of your requests were granted and [8021] some were not granted?

General SHORT. Very few were granted; most were not granted.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The requests for pursuit planes were granted, were they not?

General SHORT. We got a considerable increase in pursuit planes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And your request for radar equipment was granted?

General SHORT. Not completely. I asked for a higher priority, which would have advanced the date of receipt, and that was not given to me.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The fact is, however, you did get three mobile sets?

General SHORT. I got six mobile sets.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Six mobile sets and three stationary sets?

General SHORT. I do not believe the stationary sets were complete. I think certain parts were still missing.

Mr. KAUFMAN. At least one of the stationary sets was in operation at one time or another prior to December 7?

General SHORT. All six of them were in operation at one time or another.

Mr. KAUFMAN. All six were in operation at one time or another?

[8022] General SHORT. Of the mobile sets.

Mr. KAUFMAN. All six of the mobile sets were in operation and at least one of the stationary sets was in operation?

General SHORT. No, sir; no stationary set was in operation, to my knowledge.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now on page 3 of your statement, and thereafter, you lay particular stress on the efforts that you made for the procurement of additional material and equipment for the Hawaiian Department?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And those efforts were the expected efforts of a commander in the field to strengthen his Department?

General SHORT. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Against the possibility of air attack?

General SHORT. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You were doing what was expected of you to be done?

General SHORT. And what I thought was essential.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And most of the material that you made a demand for was so as to better protect the Department against a possible air attack?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, as a matter of fact, you know, don't you, that the Hawaiian Department got priority in material [8023] and men in 1941?

General SHORT. Up to a certain point, and then they started sending all the B-17's to the Philippine Islands, and they even took them away from us to send there. I might add also, that as late as about December 2 they asked me if I could afford to send 48 75-millimeter guns and 120 30-caliber machine guns, and that they would replace them.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, as a practical matter, General, if you had had the additional material there on December 7 it would not have made any difference, because the material that you did have was not used on December 7?

General SHORT. It would have made a great deal of difference if I had had additional material, and if I also had the information that the War Department had.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now will you tell us, General, what was the principal duty of the Army in the Hawaiian Department?

General SHORT. It was to defend the Island of Oahu from surface attacks, air attacks, sabotage, internal disorders such as uprisings, with particular attention to the defense of Pearl Harbor and of the fleet when in the harbor, and always supported by the Navy.

Mr. KAUFMAN. One of the principal duties of the Hawaiian Department was the protection of the fleet when the fleet was in the harbor?

[8024] General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And we might summarize the duties of the Hawaiian Department as follows: To protect the island from invasion of any kind, or an attack of any kind?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And to protect the fleet when it was in the harbor?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the installations of the fleet while it was in the harbor?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that particularly including the fuel supply around the harbor?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The fuel supply was in large tanks without any protection of any kind?

General SHORT. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Which created an additional problem for the commander of the Hawaiian Department, isn't that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Because of the recognition by the commander that a destruction of the fuel supply would render the fleet impotent?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8025] Mr. KAUFMAN. Now as commanding general in that field you received broad directives from the War Department?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it was your duty to determine the manner of performance?

General SHORT. In the main things the War Department also required the opportunity to approve my plans. They were sent to Washington for approval.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But with respect to a directive, the commander in the field had the responsibility of determining the manner of performing the directive issued to him?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and the War Department also had the responsibility of furnishing him with the information available.

Mr. KAUFMAN. We are talking about different things, General. We are talking fundamentally about the duties of a commander in the field. He gets his directives from the War Department?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the responsibility as to the manner of performance is his?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. He reports to Washington as to the method of performance, and sometimes he gets instructions and sometimes he does not? [8026]

General SHORT. I may also add that the manner of the performance of his duties necessarily will be influenced by the essential information provided him. It necessarily must be so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now on pages 14 and 26 of your statement you state, in substance, that if any general alert was to be invoked in the

Hawaiian Department you assumed that General Marshall was going to supervise such alert; is that right?

General SHORT. He had very definitely done that in the June 17 1940, message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The fact is, as you state on pages 14 and 26 of your statement, that you expected that if a general alert was going to be invoked for the Hawaiian Department General Marshall was going to supervise it?

General SHORT. I expected him to do one of two things: Either to order the general alert or to give me sufficient information to justify me in ordering it.

[8027] Mr. KAUFMAN. And you assumed that because he ordered the general alert in 1940; is that right?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you also assumed it because in 1940 he, to some extent, supervised the alert that was invoked there?

General SHORT. He followed it up there directly, to know what was going on.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you make inquiry from the Chief of Staff as to whether or not he would supervise an alert?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you make inquiry from the Chief of Staff as to whether or not he would directly order an alert?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You recognized, of course, that conditions had changed very materially from the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941?

General SHORT. But I also recognized that a thing that would be dangerous in 1940, would be dangerous in 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You did recognize, however, that conditions did materially change?

General SHORT. Very materially.

Mr. KAUFMAN. From the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941?

[8028] General SHORT. Very materially.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that the Chief of Staff and the War Department in Washington had many problems in 1941 that they did not have in 1940?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that that required a greater reliance by them on their field commanders in 1941?

General SHORT. It also required a greater reliance and more exact requirement of performance of duty by the general staff.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, coming back to the question of the recognition of the possibility or probability of an air attack on the island are you familiar with the correspondence between Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson?

General SHORT. I am.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Which is exhibit 10 in this proceeding?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When did those communications first come to your attention?

General SHORT. Probably within the first few days after my arrival at Honolulu.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you recognized the concern of the Secretary of the Navy that everything be done to protect Pearl Harbor, and the fleet against an air attack on the [3029] island?

General SHORT. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you are familiar with the directive made by the Secretary of War in his communication of February 7, 1941, directing that a study be made, and that all preparations be made against such a possible attack?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It was as the result of the communications of the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War that the joint coastal frontier defense plan was worked out?

General SHORT. The modifications of it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The modifications of it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the modification of the coastal frontier defense plan is annex 7 as part of exhibit 44 in this proceeding. Did I adequately describe it, General?

General SHORT. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you turn to that plan? Under item 1, General, it says:

In order to coordinate joint defensive measurements for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization, the following agreement is made.

[3030] Do you have that language in mind?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that one of the first things after you took command of the Hawaiian Department was to work out this agreement with General Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it contemplated the preparation of this plan of defense before a declaration of war, and before general mobilization.

General SHORT. It made provisions for it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It made provisions for it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it was something you had in mind in connection with the working out of this agreement?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that the plan was good even though the performance may not have been good?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Not that agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch clearly contemplated specific things to be done 1, by the Army, and 2, by the Navy?

General SHORT. I do not know whether you would say that was the order. The order probably would be reversed.

[3031] Mr. KAUFMAN. What is that?

General SHORT. The order perhaps would be reversed on account of the things that the Navy was expected to do.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, the fact is, irrespective of the order, that the agreement contemplated well-defined activities?

General SHORT. Very definitely.

Mr. KAUFMAN. For the Navy and the Army?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And those activities were to be put into effect by joint agreement whenever the occasion arose?

General SHORT. The first provision would be from Washington, if they put the basic war plan into effect, or any part of it. That would be the normal procedure.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, it would not be put into effect by Washington would it?

General SHORT. It would be ordered into effect, the basic plan would be ordered into effect, which would direct us to put this into effect.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Or else that particular part of the agreement could be put into effect as a result of joint action by you and Admiral Bloch?

General SHORT. That is true, but when you consider [8032] the instructions we had from Washington, indicating that they were very anxious not to provoke Japan, I do not believe they wanted us to put into effect any part of the war plan that had not been indicated from Washington.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The plan contemplated activities even before a declaration of war, or general mobilization?

General SHORT. Well, at least before a declaration of war.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it also says, "and before general mobilization."

General SHORT. They were at liberty to put any part of their plan into effect.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you and Admiral Bloch could yourselves have put into effect if you determined that it was necessary?

General SHORT. But we would have had to keep in mind that desire of Washington not to provoke Japan.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, with respect to this agreement that was made between you and Admiral Bloch for joint activities, did you report that plan to Washington?

General SHORT. We did, and it was approved.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that Washington knew that so far as the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Commander of the Hawaiian Department was concerned, they had worked [8033] out a plan for joint activities to be effective before war was declared or before there was a general mobilization?

General SHORT. That is correct; possibly to be effective before it could be made effective.

Mr. KAUFMAN. To be effective before it could be made effective?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And they knew that your plans with the Navy were completed?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in order to be put into effect, it could be put into effect as the result of an agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and I believe certain portions were actually directed to be effective from Washington. In the Navy message of October 16, and the Navy message of October 27, the Navy directed the commander of the fleet to take defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out war plans 46, which necessarily would have included, and did include very considerable reconnaissance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I think we will come to that, General. What I am concerned with is as to whether or not with [8034] respect to this agreement, it contemplated that it could be put into effect by you and Admiral Bloch, if you determined to do so.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that would have require agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch to put it into effect?

General SHORT. Or a directive from Washington that required it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Or, Washington could direct one of you to put it into effect?

General SHORT. Or certain parts of it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Or certain parts of it, and if Washington did direct you to put it into effect, it would have again contemplated agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch that each of you was doing the part provided for in the plan?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, coming down to the summer of 1941, you read in the paper, of course, about the deterioration of relations as between the Japanese and the United States?

General SHORT. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you knew of the freezing of Japanese funds in the United States?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8035] Mr. KAUFMAN. And you knew of the oil embargo against Japan?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the embargo against scrap and ammunition?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did that create in you a consciousness that trouble might come with Japan?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; but I was also told by the War Department that they did not expect a reaction causing the use of military forces on account of these acts. In their message of July 25, they stated definitely they did not expect a military reaction.

Mr. KAUFMAN. They said that in July 1941?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; on July 25.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And did you get any further advice from Washington that they did not expect military action?

General SHORT. No, sir. The only further advice that might be construed to that effect was on the 20th of October after the joint message had been sent on the 16th predicting certain attacks by the Japanese.

The War Department sent me a message on the 20th stating, while the situation continued to be tense, that they did not expect any abrupt change in the relations [8036] between the United States and Japan.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, after this message from the War Department on the 26th of July—is that correct?

General SHORT. The 25th.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The 25th of July 1941, there was nevertheless, great concern about the air defenses at Hawaii?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. As a result of which, General Martin made a report in August of 1941, which is Exhibit 13 in this proceeding. Are you familiar with that report?

General SHORT. I am very familiar with it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in that report he made many suggestions for the improvement of the air defenses in Hawaii?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you approved that report, did you not?

General SHORT. I went over that report very carefully, and personally added the 36 torpedo bombers to what we required.

After talking it over with General Martin, he agreed with my suggestion. I reviewed that report very carefully before it went to Washington.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You approved that report, and this is [8037] a photostatic copy of your approval of that report [handing document to General Short]?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I will ask that that be marked as an exhibit. A copy of it has been handed to the members of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received. What exhibit number will that be?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Exhibit 138.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 138.")

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, on the basis of the report of General Martin, another agreement was made between the Army and Navy with respect to the use of planes for reconnaissance and other things, and that is known as the Martin-Bellinger agreement, is it not?

General SHORT. I do not think that was made as the result of the study. That was just a natural follow-up on the agreement that Admiral Bloch and I had made.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct.

So that we have it, General, in connection with your appointment, you recognized the importance of the Hawaiian Department; you recognized the deterioration of relations between Japan and the United States throughout the summer [8038] of 1941, you had in mind the letter from the War Department of July 25, that they did not anticipate any action by Japan, and we come now to the telegram that you received from the War Department, the one of November 27. Have you got it before you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Before you received this telegram, did you see a telegram sent to the Navy Department dated November 24?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I was a little uncertain whether I had actually received it, or just had it read to me, but a naval officer before the Roberts board stated that he definitely gave me a copy, which he undoubtedly did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. In the hearings before the Roberts Commission your recollection was that you had not seen the telegram of November 24?

General SHORT. I believe I stated that I remembered seeing it, but I had been unable to find it in my headquarters, and I thought perhaps I had not actually received it.

But in view of what the naval officer stated, I am sure I must have actually received it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain Layton testified that he had [8039] actually given it to you.

General SHORT. Actually delivered it to me, and talked to me about it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You saw it and you did receive it, according to the testimony of Captain Layton, prior to the receipt of the telegram of November 27?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. From the War Department?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that on the 24th you received information from the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, as follows:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

That was a definite statement, was it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It goes on to say:

This situation, coupled with statements of Japanese Government, and movement their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive move in any direction including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.

Now, I take it from your statement, General, that you said that language excluded Hawaii, because of the mention [8040] of the Philippines or Guam.

General SHORT. What I intended to say was that I felt certain that if the Navy Department believed an attack on Hawaii was probable, they would have mentioned it, the same as they did the Philippines. "In any direction——"

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, they said——

Senator BREWSTER. Let him finish.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am sorry.

General SHORT. "In any direction" might mean anywhere in the world, but they specifically stated that they did expect an attack toward the Philippines or Guam. I believe if they had been convinced of the same thing in Hawaii, they would very definitely have included Hawaii specifically, and not leave it to be included in the "in any direction."

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, do you mean to say, General, that with information of that kind, you were justified in not going on an all-out alert?

General SHORT. I think very definitely that I was. The fact that the War Department did not even inquire or give me any direct information to justify it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. This was directed to be sent to you for your information?

General SHORT. That is correct.

[8041] Mr. KAUFMAN. A specific direction to you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that when the Navy Department said "aggressive movement in any direction," did it not mean in the direction in which they directed this message to go for information?

General SHORT. I would not say so. If you take it literally, I feel absolutely confident, if they had any idea that Hawaii was to be directly included, if there was a direct probability that they would have said so. There would be no purpose in leaving me to guess.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you expect the War Department to be able to tell you the exact place of an attack?

General SHORT. I believe the War Department actually had the information 4 hours before the attack, so they could have told me the exact place.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, we are 2½ weeks before the 4 hours of the attack. We are on the 24th of November, General.

General SHORT. The War Department could at least give me their best estimate, and I would like, when you get to November 29, to read to you what the man who wrote the estimate had to say about it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Coming back again, General, to the 24th, [8042] you said that the failure in this dispatch to name Hawaii as the place of possible attack, the same as the Philippines of Guam excluded from your consideration Hawaii as a probable point of attack.

General SHORT. It indicated to me that they did not feel that Hawaii was definitely a point of probable attack. It was a possible place of attack, of course, but I am 100 percent confident, if they had believed it was a probable place of attack, they would have so stated it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did it prompt you to ask for any instructions from the War Department?

General SHORT. It did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. We go now to the telegram of November 27. That was a direct telegram to you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It states.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

That is a very definite statement, is it not?

General SHORT. It is a very indefinite statement. It says that they are to all practical purposes, but there is a possibility that they may come back. And they did [8043] come back. I knew it only from the papers. I knew that the negotiations were continuing.

The War Department knew definitely there was a de facto rupture, and the Japanese were just stalling. They intercepted a message that told them that very positively.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You regard that as an indefinite statement?

General SHORT. A very indefinite statement.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then it follows, with the statement: "Action unpredictable."

It says:

Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment.

Was that an indefinite or definite statement?

General SHORT. Certainly, when you say a thing is unpredictable, it is not a definite statement. You say that something is possible, and they did not indicate the type of hostile action, they just said "hostile action," and I would say again that is a very indefinite statement.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You did not believe that that was sufficient to put you on notice to go on an all-out alert?

General SHORT. I did not. I thought the War Department was perfectly capable of writing a positive and definite instruction if they wanted to give one.

[8044] Mr. KAUFMAN. You did not make any inquiry from the War Department?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, you did get a definite instruction in this dispatch, did you not?

General SHORT. I got certain missions assigned, as will appear later in the message.

[8045] Mr. KAUFMAN. It says:

If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is a definite statement?

General SHORT. That is a definite statement if they didn't go ahead and modify it by the next sentence. Then you change it into an indefinite statement.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But that statement, you agree, is definite?

General SHORT. If you stop there I agree that is definite.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then it says:

This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

General SHORT. You immediately have qualified it and it is no longer a definite statement. It is an indefinite statement.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You have one definite statement and one indefinite statement?

General SHORT. They are joined together.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did what you claim to be inconsistencies in that statement prompt you to make any inquiry from Washington?

[8046] General SHORT. It did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you didn't do so?

General SHORT. No, sir. I was satisfied of one thing, that their prime desire was to avoid war, and to not let any international incident happen in Hawaii that might bring on war.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It says:

You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population.

So that you did have a broad directive?

General SHORT. Always qualified.

Mr. KAUFMAN. We will come to that. You did have a broad directive to take such action as you deemed necessary?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But to do it in such a way as would not alarm the civilian population?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was a complete and concise directive to you, was it not?

General SHORT. The first part was a very concise directive. When you qualify it, then there was always a question about [8047] whether the manner I was going to do it in would alarm the public.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The second part referred to the manner?

General SHORT. The manner; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That, again, did not prompt you to make any inquiry from the War Department?

General SHORT. It did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you didn't make any?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The record shows, General, that this dispatch was decoded in your signal center at 2:22 Hawaiian time.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that Colonel Phillips took that message to you at 2:30 on that day.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. On the morning of that day you had had a meeting with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that meeting was before you had received this telegram?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you received this telegram according to the testimony of Colonel Phillips at 2:30 and according to the record the only person with whom you conferred about [8048] this telegram and the order that you gave was with Colonel Phillips, your chief of staff?

General SHORT. But almost immediately afterwards I conferred with my G-2 and with my air force commander and my antiaircraft commander, within, I would say, the next hour to an hour and a half, all three of them.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You put in the alert No. 1 within 30 minutes after the receipt—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Of the dispatch and before conference with anybody except Colonel Phillips?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you replied to the War Department before you had had any conference with anybody other than Colonel Phillips?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you replied to that before you had conferred with Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch?

General SHORT. I had conferred very fully with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and at the time we conferred we all knew exactly what was in the message of November 24 and there was not one additional bit of information of the enemy in this message that was not included in the message of November 24. We knew nothing more than we had known from the [8049] message of November 24.

Mr. KAUFMAN. At any rate, you replied to this telegram to the War Department before you had conferred with Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch or any part of your staff other than Colonel Phillips?

General SHORT. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in that telegram your report of action taken was—

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, having discussed these telegrams and having characterized some of them as being indefinite or unresponsive, do you think that the War Department was justified in taking from the words "liaison with the Navy" the meaning that you had put into effect the joint coastal frontier defense plan?

General SHORT. They very definitely were not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Why not?

General SHORT. Because, in the first place, it was primarily their function to order it into effect. They knew, I think, that I would have consulted them before I would have considered ordering any part of it into effect if the communications were open. I am sure they would have expected me to phone them and tell them that I contemplated doing so.

[8050] Mr. KAUFMAN. What did you mean by the words "liaison with the Navy"?

General SHORT. I meant that I was keeping in touch with the Navy. I had actually discussed the dangers of the situation over a period of about 3 hours that morning with Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel and there had been no change since that discussion.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, keeping in touch with the Navy was part of your normal function, was it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and I was performing it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It was a part of your normal function that you had been undertaking and doing ever since you had taken charge of the Hawaiian Department?

General SHORT. Also "liaison" is a term that is thoroughly understood throughout the Army and there was no doubt in my mind it was thoroughly understood by the War Department.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, will you state for the record what your understanding of the word "liaison" means in military and naval circles?

General SHORT. We use "liaison" in two different ways. In the way in which I was using it there, where you keep in touch and keep generally informed. The other way was where you have a liaison officer detailed to a headquarters who has the sole mission of keeping his own headquarters informed [8051] as to what is going on.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That, you say, is the well-defined meaning?

General SHORT. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Of the two uses of the word "liaison"?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. One is to indicate that you were keeping yourself informed by the Navy.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. As to what they were doing?

General SHORT. The general situation. We were keeping each other informed, you might say, as to what we were doing.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, did you keep yourself informed as to what the Navy was doing?

General SHORT. I think at that particular point I was extremely well-informed because we had discussed for a period of approximately 3 hours the whole situation in the Pacific, looking toward Midway and

Wake, and the dangers that were involved in sending carriers out there for relief. We discussed every phase of it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The telegram of November 27 says:

You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Let us go to the first directive. You are [8052] directed to undertake such reconnaissance——

General SHORT. As I deem necessary.

Mr. KAUFMAN. As you deem necessary.

Did you take any reconnaissance at that time?

General SHORT. I did not deem any was necessary because it was the Navy's function, definitely agreed upon in the plan, to conduct the long-distance reconnaissance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you make inquiry from the Navy as to whether they were at that time making reconnaissance?

General SHORT. I knew they were sending out three task forces. I discussed it fully with them that morning. They were sending a task force to Wake to send out additional Marine planes. They were sending out to Midway to send out additional Marine planes. They were going to send one to Johnston Island. And I actually got permission to send a staff officer along because they were going to conduct a landing exercise which I wished my G-2 section to understand. I knew they were making perimeter reconnaissance from Johnston and Wake to Midway. I did not know the details of that reconnaissance but I knew it would take place.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You knew that the task force to Johnston Island did not leave until December 5?

General SHORT. It was later, but the other two were leaving early.

[8053] Mr. KAUFMAN. Admiral Halsey left on the 29th?

General SHORT. The 28th or 29th.

Mr. KAUFMAN. 28th or 29th.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Those were the only two task forces that were out?

General SHORT. The only two task forces going out right at that time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, the joint agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch contemplated long-range reconnaissance from the islands, did it not?

General SHORT. It contemplated it not just from the island. Whatever long-range reconnaissance was necessary. And, as I understand Admiral Kimmel's attitude, it was that with the perimeter reconnaissance from Johnston, Wake, and Midway, there was a very great saving in planes, that he could accomplish more than he could with the same number of planes from Oahu. And it was a logical thing to do, not to send them all out from Oahu.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, let us come back to the 27th of November. You were directed to take reconnaissance?

General SHORT. As I deemed necessary.

Mr. KAUFMAN. As you deemed necessary?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8054] Mr. KAUFMAN. In other words, in order to have reconnaissance, effective reconnaissance, radar stations have to be in operation, do they not?

General SHORT. The radar did not make distant reconnaissance. We thought at that time it was limited to 75 or a hundred miles. We discovered that under very exceptional circumstances we actually got 132 miles. It was not an instrument for distant reconnaissance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was not put into alert, was it?

General SHORT. That was put into alert during what I considered the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock a. m. daily.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And did you report that to the—

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Just putting the radar station into operation is not effective unless there is the information center that works with it?

General SHORT. The information center was working with it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was working with it?

General SHORT. Was working with it; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, General, did you later on that day see the dispatch that Admiral Kimmel received from the Navy Department?

[8055] General SHORT. Yes, sir. I think Lieutenant Burr testified that he actually brought it to me personally.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was after you had replied to the War Department?

General SHORT. Probably sometime in the next hour or two.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when you saw the words "war warning" did that create any impression on your mind?

General SHORT. No more so than the fact that they had said before that the Japs would probably attack.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Had you ever in your experience seen a message to a field commander using the words "This is a war warning"?

General SHORT. No, sir; but I knew that the Navy messages were habitually rather more aggressive than the Army. On October 16 we had a message in which they said Japan would attack. On October 20 I had one from the War Department saying they didn't expect any. My message said nothing about a war warning and his did. I think the Navy messages were inclined to be more positive, possibly you might say more alarming, in the context.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that the war warning, you just regarded it as aggressiveness of the Navy, and paid no particular attention to it?

General SHORT. No particular attention to those words.

[8056] Mr. KAUFMAN. I direct your attention to the telegram to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet which says:

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

That is for information, is it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and indicated definitely to me they were attacking toward the Western Pacific.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then it goes on with a directive to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. To—

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I thought sure that that included distant reconnaissance and as I remember Admiral Kimmel told me that he had tightened up all along the line, as I think he expressed it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you had occasion to see Admiral Kimmel within a few days after the receipt of the dispatches of November 27?

General SHORT. I had a conference with Admiral Kimmel on December 1. I had another conference with Admiral Kimmel [8057] on December 2. I had another conference with him on December 3.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you—

Senator BREWSTER. Let him finish.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. I was going to say, one of my staff officers, my staff officer used for liaison with the Navy, had a conference with his gunnery officer on the 4th. I think that was the last conference we had before the attack.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, did you at any time tell Admiral Kimmel that you had alerted only against sabotage?

General SHORT. I don't know that I said that specifically. However, there was never any doubt in my mind that he knew exactly the status. Lieutenant Burr was detailed as a liaison from the Navy to the G-3 section. He sat in with our G-3 section, which was our operations section, which controlled all the alerts, all the war plans, everything of that kind. He knew everything that my staff knew. He had just one duty and that was to keep his headquarters informed of exactly what we were doing.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, can you account, General, for the testimony given by Admiral Kimmel before this committee to the effect that he did not know that you had alerted only against sabotage? He testified further that he thought you [8058] had gone on an all-out alert and that he didn't know that you had anything else but an all-out alert.

General SHORT. The only way I can account for that would be poor staff work on the part of the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District. As I say, their liaison officer must have known exactly. We had furnished them with 10 copies of our staff operating procedure, which somebody in that naval staff certainly must have dug into and known what it meant. Why it did not get to Admiral Kimmel I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. General Short, will you give the committee the name of that liaison officer?

General SHORT. Lieutenant Burr. I don't know his initials. B-u-r-r.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, General—

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest, in the interest of saving time, that counsel ask General Short at this time what an all-out alert would mean to an observer who knew nothing about it. What would they have to do so that someone in Hawaii would know that they were on an all-out alert if one was ordered and they went on such an alert.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What would be an all-out alert, General?

General SHORT. An all-out alert would cause every officer and every enlisted man in every organization to move to battle [8059] positions. Men would be moving all over the islands, in helmets, full

field equipment, by motor, and otherwise. There would be men on every road.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And do you feel that was contrary to the instructions of the War Department not to alarm the civilian population?

General SHORT. I would say that it would mean to the civilian population and any Japanese agents that we were taking up our definite battle positions. There couldn't be any mistake about it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Even though it was done under the name of war games, or whatever you wanted to call it?

General SHORT. If we had had time to make a previous announcement, which we usually did if we were going into maneuvers, and a little build-up, we probably could have deceived the average citizen. We probably could not have deceived a Japanese agent who had the message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So you want the committee to understand that you had that problem in mind, so as not to circumvent or go contrary to the decision of the War Department?

General SHORT. I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Counsel, as long as you are going into that, I suggest that we might complete the picture and ask the witness why he didn't go into alert No. 2, which provided [8060] protection against a submarine and an air attack. Alert No. 2.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, will you first describe what alert No. 2 was. We have No. 1, against sabotage, and No. 3, an all-out alert. What was alert No. 2?

General SHORT. Alert No. 2 was a defense against sabotage and uprisings and, in addition, a defense against an air attack or against an attack by surface and subsurface vessels.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us why you didn't put that into effect?

General SHORT. All of the coast artillery, all of the antiaircraft artillery, and all of the air would have immediately taken up their duties as described in that alert. Part of the coast artillery was right in the middle of the town. Fort de Russy was within two or three blocks of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. The public couldn't help seeing that they were manning their seacoast guns. Placing live ammunition. Some of the guns were practically in the middle of the park. The bombers would have all gone to outlying islands, except the B-17's which could not, because the landing gear was not along. So there would have been a considerable amount of activity. Again perhaps the average citizens wouldn't have understood fully but if there was a Japanese agent, who knew what he was looking for, he would have known perfectly.

[8061] Mr. KAUFFMAN. Congressman Clark has a question.

Mr. CLARK. That answers what was in my mind, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And there were plenty of Jap agents in Hawaii?

General SHORT. We knew there had been a total list of 239 consular agents. We had their names very definitely. We had the names of probably 70 or 80 more that we were confident were Japanese agents. I might add in addition to that opportunity of alarming the public if we placed men at seacoast guns and at antiaircraft batteries with an explanation that they were to be prepared to fire immediately upon notice against Japanese, if we told our airplanes to be warmed up to

be ready to go up and attack Japanese planes it is inconceivable that in some way the Japanese agents would not have picked up the information.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You knew that there was certainly no need for two-hundred-odd consular agents of the Japanese there, that their function was other than what their names indicated?

General SHORT. Their function may have been twofold. Some of them may not have been espionage agents. The Japanese, as we knew, were very much interested in keeping the Japanese-Americans as Japanese and I think, to a considerable extent, these agents were propaganda agents for Japan; some of [8062] them espionage; all of them propaganda.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You did not think, General, that it might have been very well to indicate that the men were taking battle stations as the means of probably heading off an attack, did you?

General SHORT. I did not think it would comply with the War Department message. It might have been very desirable but they had indicated that they did not want that kind of thing done.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, as commander in the field you certainly had the power to inquire from Washington and to make known your plans, didn't you, if you wanted to do so?

General SHORT. They had indicated very definitely that they did not want to alarm the public and that they did not want to provoke Japan.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that you did not feel that you should have even made that suggestion to the War Department?

General SHORT. I felt definitely that they did not want it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, on the following day—

General SHORT. May I add something before you leave that message?

Mr. KAUFMAN. By all means, sir.

General SHORT. There were two things in that message [8063] that you did not mention. One was "report measures taken." Now, that told me, said to me that if I reported the measures taken and they were not what the War Department thought they should be that I would unquestionably get additional instructions.

The other was, "Limit this highly essential information" or "highly secret information to the minimum officers"; not officers and men but officers. You could not possibly go into alert No. 2 or alert No. 3 without directly violating that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, in connection with that, General, in your statement you state in paragraph 90 that your decision on the 27th of November in the light of hindsight was wrong.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the purport of your argument in your statement is that although you made an error you complain that Washington did not correct your error; isn't that the purport of your argument?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; if you are not furnished information you in all probability will make an erroneous estimate.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And your argument throughout your statement is that although in the first instance the error was yours Washington should be partly responsible for not having [8064] corrected your error?

General SHORT. I would say wholly responsible.

Mr. KAUFMAN. All right. It does not relieve you of the responsibility, however, does it, General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; I told them exactly what I was doing. I had no reason in the world to believe that they did not approve of it. The Chief of Staff has himself stated before this committee that I had a right to assume that he would tell me if the action were not what he wanted.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You say that you made a full report as to the action taken by you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; I said I made a report.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You made a report?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in that report you intended to make it a complete report, did you not?

General SHORT. I intended for it to be complete enough for them to understand without question.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in that you told them that you had alerted against sabotage. Now, the radar warning system had nothing to do with sabotage, the sabotage alert, did it?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is an action that you took that you did not report to Washington.

[8065] General SHORT. I did not report that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you did not report the fact that it was only running on a partial time basis?

General SHORT. I did not report it at all.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You did not report it at all. You did not think it was material for Washington to know that you were only carrying your radar station for 3 hours a day?

General SHORT. My basic report was of an alert against sabotage, which indicated to them that I was not alerted against an air attack or against a landing; all-out attack.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then why was the radar alerted on the 27th of November?

General SHORT. There were two very good reasons. The first reason is the Martin study had decided that the 3 hours, 2 hours immediately preceding dawn and 1 hour after were the dangerous hours. The radar was very new, the men were just beginning to be trained. If there was any possibility, it was a factor of sabotage, and it also was an opportunity to train the men at the most important time and to make them train a little harder because it was tied in with another alert.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Have you anything further to say about the November 27 message before I leave it, sir?

General SHORT. No, sir. There is one thing that I think [8066] it would be appropriate to take up at this time to indicate that the officers——

Senator LUCAS. What was the question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

General SHORT. The question is all tied in with this message as to why I did not assume or estimate that Japan was about to attack Hawaii.

I have here a mimeographed copy from volume 2 of the Clarke report. Before I read this I would like to explain that General Kroner, who was then Colonel Kroner, was the head of the military branch of G-2. He was the officer who was responsible for maintaining information and for the preparation of estimates as to probable action.

Hawaii was not mentioned as a place of probable attack in the current information and intelligence sent me in November and early December 1941.

In this connection I want to quote for the committee the testimony of Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, the chief of the intelligence branch in War Department G-2 from July 1941 up to the time of the Japanese attack.

The testimony I quote was given on September 13, 1944, before Col. Carter W. Clarke. It is found in the so-called Clarke investigation. I recently borrowed the War Department copy. I am informed that the committee has the only other [8067] copy of the Clarke report. I quote from page 5 and pages 9 and 10 of General Kroner's testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Did you have access to a source of information which we know as Top Secret or the British know as Most Secret?

Gen. KRONER. Meaning communications information?

Col. CLARKE. Signal intelligence.

Gen. KRONER. No, none whatever.

Col. CLARKE. You mean you didn't get it or your Branch didn't get it?

Gen. KRONER. I personally as Chief of the Branch did not get it. I was aware that something, which later I found out to be of this nature, existed, but I was given to understand, particularly by Col. Bratton and Col. Pettigrew, who sometimes handled the matter for Col. Bratton, that he received information from Col. Minkler, whom I knew to be in the Signal Corps, which perhaps had to do with Japanese troop movements, which he by long custom and by General Miles' special desire, was to handle himself directly with Gen. Miles.

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one more question. In any estimate from the time you took over the Intelligence Group up to and including Pearl Harbor, was there ever any prediction or forecast made of a possible [8068] attack on Pearl Harbor?

Gen. KRONER. None to my knowledge. I have in mind the last estimate that was made before Pearl Harbor, which was an estimate covering a future period from December 1 to sometime in 1942.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you consider it a capability of the Japanese to successfully attack Pearl Harbor with bombers?

Gen. KRONER. No. The matter was discussed——

Col. CLARKE. Did you identify this document?

Gen. KRONER. Yes. I identified it—this is the document to which I referred—IB 150, November 29, 1941.

That is in Exhibit 33 under estimates dated November 29, 1941. [Reading:]

This particular estimate was considered by the whole division, not only the Intelligence Group but by General Miles himself, as perhaps the most important we had ever gotten out. That importance lay not in so much the danger that we saw from Japan, although danger in that field was pretty thoroughly discussed, but primarily because Gen. Miles wishes to focus War Department thought on the defeat that could be administered to the Nazi powers. In the preparation of the estimate [8069] each geographic section in the Intelligence Branch prepared its part. Colonel—now Brigadier General—Thomas J. Betts put the several estimates together and did what we called "polish them up." He and I discussed the lines of action and capabilities of all the warring powers and especially of each potential enemy to the U. S. A., and I took them to Gen. Miles where they were finally altered to suit him or approved. This particular estimate does not include in the lines of action open to Japan an attack on Pearl Harbor, and I remember that so distinctly because when the

word came through the radio on that fateful Sunday, December 7, that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor, I was sitting in my office in the Munitions Building reading from this paper the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my point of view, I feel that Japan's potential capability against Pearl Harbor was left from this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any information which would lead us to believe that they were capable of or planned to do so.

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one final question again just to reiterate the fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. Bratton did with this most secret material or to whom he showed it.

Gen. KRONER. That is correct, except to Gen. Miles.

[8070] I want to call attention to the fact that these two officers who were responsible for the preparation of this estimate, General Kroner and Colonel Betts, in spite of the fact that General Kroner was the head of the Military Intelligence Branch, were denied access to the "magic" and for that reason he did not consider Japan capable of making an attack and did not believe that they were going to do so.

I was in the same position with reference to "magic." I had no access to "magic." I had access to even less information than General Kroner did and General Kroner has made it perfectly plain that the absence of access to "magic" had caused him to draw the conclusion and to write to the estimate that way and the reason it was left out of the estimate was not, as General Miles said before this committee, because it was too obvious to be put in, but because they did not believe Japan was capable of making the attack considering the information they had.

Mr. MURPHY. May I inquire at this point whether or not General Kroner was a subordinate of General Miles?

General SHORT. He was. He was in charge of the intelligence branch directly under General Miles and he took this estimate to General Miles and General Miles accepted it.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, we distinguish between chief of the intelligence branch and head of the intelligence branch?

[8071] General SHORT. No, sir. The G-2 was divided into several branches.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate General Miles was head of Intelligence?

General SHORT. He was head of all G-2.

Mr. MURPHY. All Intelligence?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And this man was called Chief of the Intelligence?

General SHORT. Of the Military Intelligence Branch.

Here is another short radiogram that I would like to introduce at this time because it shows the attitude of G-2 and what they thought between the time of the sending of this message and December 7. This message was dated December 5, 1941, No. 512, addressed to G-2 Panama Department:

U. S.-Japanese relations strained STOP Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Signed "Miles."

Now, that was only 2 days before the attack and apparently Miles, who was head of G-2 at that time, did not consider that the rupture of Japanese relations was imminent.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am told that this has never come before the committee before.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it.

[8072] Mr. KAUFMAN. It has been read into the record by General Short and is dated December 5, 1941.

To Panama Canal Department:

U. S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS STRAINED STOP WILL INFORM YOU IF AND WHEN SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IMMINENT.

MILES.

That was not sent to you, was it, General?

General SHORT. That was not sent to me but I read it to show that at that time Miles did not believe the severance was imminent, 2 days before the attack.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And is something that you have found that supports your contention—

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN (continuing). That other people came to the same erroneous estimate as you did?

General SHORT. And people who had much more information than I had even.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, can Mr. Masten, who was here earlier with us, can he explain on this record why the War Department, why the Intelligence branch, did not deliver that to the committee and why it was not called to the attention of the committee before Miles took the witness stand and before General Marshall and others were on the witness stand?

[8073] Can he explain why we get this information after witnesses have been here instead of before? I think here is an appropriate place to place their information now in the record as to this incident.

Mr. MASTEN. Senator, I have no personal knowledge to answer the question that you asked. I understand from Colonel Duncombe, the Army liaison officer, that it is his impression that that was delivered, that they had delivered it to us, but we will have to look and see. I understand that the exhibit which I think is—

Senator FERGUSON. As I understood it we were to have all messages.

Mr. MASTEN. Excuse me, Senator. Exhibit 32, which is the only exhibit containing Army messages from Washington, states specifically that it is restricted to messages between the War Department and Hawaii. Now, to my knowledge, there has not been any effort made to compile an exhibit of the messages from the War Department to Panama or to any of the other places.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then that we do not have all the messages to Panama and we do not have all the messages to the Philippines? This is very material as I see it, that this committee has all messages sent out in relation to this war or anticipated war.

[8074] Mr. MASTEN. Well, as I say, Senator, I have no personal knowledge of the precise answer to your question. There are a number of other photostats in the office and I will have to check them up.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, then, we will ask you to check it. It is now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess until 2 o'clock, General.

General SHORT. Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the members of the committee are requested to meet in the Finance Committee room in executive session at 1:30.

(Whereupon at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[8075]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Before the examination of General Short is resumed, the Chair wishes to announce that in the interest of expedition in the hearings that instead of calling personally the members of the staff of General Short and of Admiral Kimmel, consisting of some 15 or 20 witnesses in all, who have heretofore testified on numerous occasions in regard to this inquiry, that a complete record of their testimony heretofore taken will be filed as an exhibit as a part of the record of this hearing with the right of any member of the committee who wishes to inquire of any particular witness who has heretofore testified concerning his testimony heretofore given, shall have the right to bring it to the attention of the committee and have the right to have the committee act favorably upon that request, with the further understanding that any previous witness whose testimony is filed as an exhibit, who is called before the committee and orally examined by any member of the committee will then be subject to general examination by the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, there was a further understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. And, also, the Chair omitted to say that counsel for Admiral Kimmel and counsel for General Short were consulted by the committee and agreed to that procedure.

[8076] Mr. KEEFE. So that there may be no mistake in the record, Mr. Chairman, I think the further qualification should be added, that the resolution adopted by the committee does not include the record of the Clausen investigation and affidavits.

The CHAIRMAN. Clausen, as the Chair understands it and as the committee understand it, was not a member of the staff of either Admiral Kimmel or General Short and therefore this resolution would not apply to him.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will now proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, at the conclusion of the morning's session a question was asked regarding a telegram dated December 5, 1941, from General Miles to the G-2 of the Panama Canal Department, as to when that telegram had been made available to counsel for the committee.

During the noon hour we have looked into this matter and have received this memorandum from the Army liaison officer. It reads as follows:

With reference to the message from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Panama, dated 5 December, referred to at the close of this morning's session, the paraphrased text of that message is set forth on Page 285 of Volume D of the top-secret transcript of Proceedings Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. That transcript [8077] was delivered to the committee on 9 October 1945. Also, a photostatic copy of the same message was delivered by the War Department to the committee on or about 1 December and at the same time a copy was delivered to Captain Ford, General Short's counsel.

HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lieutenant Colonel.

I have checked the files of counsel and find that one of the two sets of these volumes has at all times remained in counsel's office available to the members of the committee. The other set was delivered on October 11 to Senator Brewster and is still in his possession.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. You may proceed, Counsel.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed**

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, coming back—

General SHORT. May I add just one thing in regard to that message in regard to General Miles?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. I would like to state that I have no information as to whether General Miles followed up the December 5 message by any warning before December 7, even though he had all the magic intelligence.

I do not know why Miles sent this message to the Panama [8078] Canal but not to Hawaii, but it shows that his interpretation of the alert messages was the same as mine, that relations were only strained with no threat of attack on Hawaii.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, as I understand it, you have testified that after the message of November 27 that you did not invoke the joint defense plan.

General SHORT. That is correct. I would like to add though, however, that I considered that the naval message of October 16 and of November 27 did invoke part of it where they told him to take a defensive deployment preparatory to WPL-46.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But so far as you are concerned you do not want to be understood as having taken any action under that war plan?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, I direct your attention to the testimony that you gave at page 380 of the Pearl Harbor board hearings. You were asked by General Grunert—

General SHORT. May I see it?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the witness' testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor board?

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

[8079] Mr. KAUFMAN. Page 380. Have you got page 380?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I direct your attention to this question by General Grunert:

In your message of November 27th you say "Lialson with the Navy." Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?

To which you are reported to have answered:

To my mind it meant I was definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, what information they had and what they were doing.

QUESTION. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?

ANSWER. Yes, without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have effected it because they signed a very definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as by our Chief of Staff.

In the light of the testimony that you gave at page 380 do you want to change any of the testimony that you gave this morning?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You do not. I asked you this morning whether the interceptor command had been activated at the [8080] time of the activation of the radar station on November 28 and you told us this morning that it had been.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you please account, if you can, for the testimony given by General Davidson at pages 170, 178, 179, and 196 of the Roberts Commission and the testimony of Colonel Phillips at page 232—

General SHORT. May I see that testimony?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. We do not have copies of it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You do not have a copy of that?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. Of the Roberts Commission? No.

Senator LUCAS. May I suggest to counsel that you take one of those pages at a time and show them to General Short? He is asking about a number of pages there. It seems to me it may be a little more convenient.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It might be in that same volume there.

General SHORT. No, that volume is my testimony only.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I can change my question with regard to that.

General Davidson and General Phillips testified before the Roberts Commission that the interceptor command was not activated until the 17th of December, 10 days after the attack. Can you explain their testimony?

General SHORT. Yes. General Davidson and Colonel Powell [8081] and Colonel Meehan had been sent to the mainland to learn what was the method of operation in this country. It was entirely new. We had just two officers in the Army and one naval officer who had any conception of what a communication center and an interceptor command consisted of. They were the only two, as far as I know, who had ever seen it. That was Major Bergquist and Major Tindall of the Army and Commander Taylor of the Navy, who had had considerable work with the British and had been loaned by the Navy to work with us.

What we were doing was operating under verbal orders and they had full authority to make changes, they were trying to work the thing out to what they thought was being done in the States because they had been back and seen it a little previously, the two of them, with full authority to change it from day to day and we had purposely waited the return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell before putting it in a written order as we did not want to issue a written order one day and have to modify it materially the next day.

They came back I think on the 3d or 4th of December, got their reports in on—I know General Davidson got his report in on the afternoon of the 6th, so that there had been no time to have them go over the procedure and put it down in writing. They went ahead and operated for the next 10 days on the same verbal orders and at the end of that period they [8082] felt positive enough as to what they wanted to do that we put it in written form. It was

entirely experimental and we were trying to arrive at what we thought was the correct thing with the limited information we had.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, for the sake of accuracy, as I understand it the question was directed to page 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings. Is that right?

Mr. KAUFMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What page?

Mr. KAUFMAN. General Davidson's testimony at pages 170 and 178 of the Roberts record.

The question, General, is as to whether or not the interceptor command was in operation prior to the 17th of December?

General SHORT. It was definitely in operation but it was operating on verbal orders in an informal way, but that Major Bergquist and Major Tindall had full authority to make changes because they were the only two in the Army that really knew anything about it.

[8083] Mr. KAUFMAN. Then how do you explain the testimony of Colonel Phillips that it was not activated and did not start operating until the 17th day of December?

General SHORT. I think he must have meant that the formal order had not been issued.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the same thing for General Davidson?

General SHORT. The same thing.

I know from talking with General Davidson, there was no doubt in his mind that it was operating just the same before as after.

Mr. MURPHY. I think, Mr. Chairman, you will find in the testimony of General Short it was being operated on a volunteer basis.

General SHORT. I believe not. I would like, if Mr. Murphy has any such reference to my testimony, to have it quoted exactly, because I do not believe I ever made such a statement.

Mr. MURPHY. When I come to the examination I will do it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then your answer is now that it was being operated on an experimental basis?

General SHORT. Experimental, informal basis, under verbal orders to make changes from day to day as it proved necessary.

[8084] Mr. KAUFMAN. Can you explain the testimony that Admiral Kimmel gave here the other day to the effect that he understood the interceptor command was working fully and complete?

General SHORT. I will say again, if he understood that, it must have been due to poor staff work on the part of the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District, because their liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, sitting in G-3, must have known exactly what we were doing.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Between November 27, and December 7, did you activate your fighter planes?

General SHORT. The fighter planes were always activated.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Under whose direction was that, General?

General SHORT. The fighter planes were under the command of General Davidson when he was there. I am not sure who was the next senior to him, and was in command while he was away. It was possibly Colonel Flood, but I am not positive.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, were not the fighter planes bunched on the field for more easy protection against sabotage?

General SHORT. They were grouped for protection against sabotage. They were not armed, and warmed up and immediately available to take the air.

[8085] Mr. KAUFMAN. They were not available at any time between the 27th of November and December 7?

General SHORT. All day long, they were functioning in training. Probably most of the time during the training hours some one squadron would have been able to take the air immediately, but not fully armed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, will you explain this, that if your radar was alert, what good it would have done if your pursuit planes were not ready to take off during the time when the radar was in operation?

General SHORT. If the information had gone to them when it was first picked up, they would have had 35 minutes, which would have been plenty of time to disperse the planes.

It would not have been time to get them in the air, but we would have had time to disperse the planes and the loss would have been much less.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, I am not now talking only about the 7th of December; I am talking about the period between November 27 and December 7.

General SHORT. I am saying at any time that the radar picked it up, and I would have been notified. I would have had 30 minutes and the same would have been true. We could have dispersed the planes.

[8086] Mr. KAUFMAN. Only 30 minutes?

General SHORT. 30 or 35 minutes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you know that the radar equipment is not complete without the pursuit planes having the ability to take off.

General SHORT. That has nothing to do with radar equipment.

The interceptor command would not be functioning completely without that, that is true.

[8087] Mr. KAUFMAN. So your interceptor command was not working between November 27 and the 7th of December?

General SHORT. It was working, but not prepared to take the air immediately.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you do anything between November 27 and December 7 to inform yourself precisely as to what Admiral Kimmel was doing?

General SHORT. I talked with Admiral Kimmel on 3 days when we were talking about a more dangerous part of the Pacific, as we regarded it, than Honolulu, and I knew where his task forces were going out; I knew certain reconnaissances he was making on the perimeter, and as I said, he had made the statement to me that he had tightened up all along the line.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You knew he had to rely on you for long-range planes?

General SHORT. No; I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You did not?

General SHORT. I had 6 planes and he had approximately 50. I knew if he wanted my planes for long-range reconnaissance that he would have asked for them, and I would give them to him, but I did not know that he relied on that 6 rather than his 50.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, did anything happen between the 27th [8088] of November and the 7th of December to require you to change your estimate?

General SHORT. Nothing. In fact, the things that happened tended to confirm my estimate.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, on the 27th of November, after the receipt of this message from the chief of staff, you got a message from General Miles, did you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Page 10 of Exhibit 32.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was a definite statement, was it not, that negotiations had come to a practical stalemate?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it was a definite statement to you that hostilities may ensue?

General SHORT. May ensue; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After giving you the information, then, he talks about "subversive activities may be expected."

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I might add that that apparently was the form of hostilities that he expected me to be interested in there. That would be the inference.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Your inference was that the hostilities that he said might ensue pointed only to subversive activities?

General SHORT. Pointed to subversive activities. If [8089] he wanted to point out anything else that would have taken place I would expect him to say so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did not he say two things: "Hostilities may ensue," and "Subversive activities may be expected"?

General SHORT. Subversive activities are a form of hostilities. It is the form of hostilities apparently that he was worried about there.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was your interpretation?

General SHORT. That was my interpretation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, did you have in mind, on November 27 and following that date, the Navy reply that all shipping was to be routed through the Torres Straits?

General SHORT. I think that ships were turned to the south. I do not think that I knew exactly Torres Strait, but I knew they were going to the south from Honolulu.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And did you have in mind the fact that those ships were being escorted by naval ships of Admiral Kimmel's fleet?

General SHORT. I think I knew that there were some escorts; yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you have in mind that on November 26 you were ordered to equip two B-24 bombers for photographic reconnaissance through Truk and the Jaluit Islands?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and I remember very definitely [8090] that they sent them unarmed to Honolulu and directed me to arm them after they got there.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was an unusual mission for you?

General SHORT. It was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Although you had that in mind, you did not connect it with any of the telegrams you received?

General SHORT. I figured if they would send them to Honolulu unarmed and they directed them to be armed from there on, that they would not consider that Honolulu was in the same dangerous area as the Pacific to the west.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When were you first advised, General, that the Japanese consuls in Hawaii were burning their papers?

General SHORT. I did not remember the incident until the day after the attack, but in view of the testimony of two members of my staff I probably did hear that they were burning papers on Saturday morning. It seems that at the staff meeting an assistant G-2 did report that they had been burning papers. However, my G-2, in his testimony before the Roberts Commission, stated that he thought nothing of it, because we habitually burned papers every day to keep anything from being left around about our codes, and he said he reported it to me. It probably made the same impression on me that it had made on him. There was no question of codes in connection with it—simply papers.

[8091] Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you receive any information from the Navy that they had been advised that the Japanese consular posts at Hong Kong and Singapore, and other places, were ordered to destroy their codes?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You received no such information from the Navy at all?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you recall a telegram directing you on your G-2 to communicate with Commander Rochefort respecting the so-called winds code?

General SHORT. I never saw such a radiogram and never heard anything about it until 2 or 3 years afterward.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And your G-2 did not report that incident to you?

General SHORT. He did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you remember on the evening of December 5 Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell called on you and Colonel Fielder and gave you a report on the tapping of the so-called Mori message?

General SHORT. It was not on the 5th, it was on the evening of December 6, sometime along 6:30 or 7 o'clock in the evening.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what did he report to you at that time?

[8092] General SHORT. He brought a message, or, rather, a translation of a telephone conversation that had been picked up by the FBI. I read the message carefully, and Colonel Fielder read the message carefully. I asked Bicknell if he had any idea as to the interpretation of it, the meaning of it, and he said he had not, but that he knew Mori, that he suspected Mori and for that reason he was rather positive that it meant something.

But no one of us could figure out what it possibly meant, and I do not believe anybody up to this day has been able to draw any definite conclusion.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did not Colonel Bicknell tell you that he regarded that as being very significant?

General SHORT. But he could not tell me what the significance was. He thought it was significant only because he did not have any confidence in this Dr. Mori.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you tell Colonel Bicknell a few days after the attack that he was right about the message and you were wrong about it?

General SHORT. I have seen that statement of his, but I do not remember it. If I said it I would have had only one point, that it had to be significant, but he was never, as far as I know—and I talked

to him about it several times—able to indicate to me, or to anybody else, what the significance [8093] of the message was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, on the morning of December 7, who first reported the attack to you?

General SHORT. I heard the first bomb and thought it was perhaps a naval exercise that I had forgotten about. Then when the second one dropped I ran out on an upstairs porch of my quarters where I could see Pearl Harbor and I could see some smoke. About that time my chief of staff, who lived next door, ran in to my quarters and called to me that it was the real thing, that he just had a phone message from Hickam and Weaver Field. That was anywhere from 1 minute to 3 minutes after 8 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. After what?

General SHORT. After 8 o'clock.

Mr. KAUFMAN. On that morning you had 32 antiaircraft batteries stationed around Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. I have forgotten the exact number.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Is it a fact that only 4 of the 32 antiaircraft batteries got into action prior to the time of the third attack?

General SHORT. That is not true.

Mr. MURPHY. Section VIII, page 11.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, have you seen Section VII of exhibit 5 of this proceeding, being reports made from your [8094] headquarters, showing that 4 of the 32 anti-aircraft batteries fired at any time during the three attacks?

General SHORT. That is not signed. I do not know who made it. But I have here an exhibit, exhibit No. 7 signed by C. K. Wing, Colonel, Fifty-third Coast Artillery Brigade, who commanded all of the anti-aircraft batteries. He gives in detail when the battery was alerted, when it was ready to fire, when it opened fire, and when it brought down any enemy planes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Have you a copy of that?

General SHORT. It is in exhibit 133. I believe it is 1-s or 1-t, if you look into the table of contents. It is in the Wing report.

Mr. KAUFMAN. In the record submitted to you in the Roberts commission?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It has been marked in evidence here this morning?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. It was made out December 20, and gives great detail, and I think Colonel Wing is in a better position to give that information than anybody else, because it was his immediate command.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you say that the paper that I have just referred you to, being section VII of exhibit 5 of this [8095] hearing, is not true?

General SHORT. I have not looked it over in detail, but if it states that only four batteries fired is not correct. This, I am sure, is the most accurate statement that is to be found of what took place, the one I have in my hand. It is annex S.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, does that set out your staff as it existed between November 27 and December 7?

Senator LUCAS. Counsel, before you leave that last point, I wonder if we are going to put that into the record and make it a part of the transcript?

Mr. KAUFMAN. It is in the record as an exhibit, sir.

General SHORT. I have a signed copy here, if you wish to put it in the transcript, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to have it.

General, just give me briefly, without reading it, what the document says, in view of the question asked by counsel.

General SHORT. I will just take up a few batteries. Here is the way it gives it: At Fort Weaver, headquarters, Second Battalion, Ninety-seventh Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft, alerted 8:10, ready to fire 8:13, engaged enemy at 8:14. Ammunition fired: .30 caliber ball 407 rounds; .30 caliber armor piercing, 117; .30 caliber tracer, 53; pistol, 12.

Now it goes through every battery.

[8096] Senator LUCAS. How many batteries were there fired?

General SHORT. I am not sure. The 32 is probably correct. I can count them here. I am not sure without counting them up.

Senator LUCAS. I think it is important, in view of the previous statement that only four were in operation. It seems to me the committee at this time ought to know how many actually were fired at that time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, let us take the statement, General, that you give us here.

General SHORT. All right, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The Second Battalion, according to your report, was alerted at 8:10, was ready to fire at 8:15.

General SHORT. 8:13, I think it is.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is one battery?

General SHORT. That is four batteries.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Four batteries. Battery G of the Ninety-seventh was alerted at 8:10?

General SHORT. Ready to fire at 8:30, and engaged the enemy at 8:30.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was one battery?

General SHORT. That was one battery.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Battery F of the Ninety-seventh was alerted at 7:55 and was ready to fire at 8:55, an hour later, is that correct?

[8097] General SHORT. Apparently that is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that is one battery. Battery G of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at 8:15 and was ready to fire at 10:30.

General SHORT. They had to move, apparently, to some distance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. They were ready to fire at 10:30, according to this report.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And Battery H of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at 8:30 and was ready to fire at 11:45. That was after the third attack, was it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, the preceding one was after the third attack?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The marine detachment—

General SHORT. You say the marine detachment?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes. The marine detachment was alerted at 8 o'clock and ready to fire at 8:10.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, was that an Army responsibility, the marines?

General SHORT. They worked under the Army.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The general says they worked under the Army.

Mr. MURPHY. They are not on this exhibit, then, are they, [8098] the Army exhibit? We have only the Sixty-fourth, the Ninety-seventh, Ninety-eighth, and Two Hundred and Fifty-first and the AA batteries.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. The marines are under the Navy ordinarily.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Probably, according to the general, they were under his jurisdiction at that time.

General SHORT. The antiaircraft fire was coordinated so that the Marine Corps guns on shore operated under our command.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then we have the Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery at Schofield that was alerted at 8 o'clock and was ready to fire at 8:55.

Mr. MURPHY. What battery would that be?

Mr. KAUFMAN. They were alerted at 8 o'clock and ready to fire with their automobile rifles—I assume that means automatic rifles, does it not?

General SHORT. I haven't got just where you mean. It probably does. Where do you mean?

Mr. KAUFMAN. The Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, Schofield Barracks.

General SHORT. Yes. Certain of them were equipped with automatic rifles.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then the First Battalion of the Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, Battery B, was ready to fire at 9:55. That [8099] was after the second attack?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And Battery D of the First Battalion, Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, was ready to fire at 10 o'clock.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And Battery C was not ready to fire until 10:30.

On the next page, Battery M of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at 8:15 and was ready to fire at 11:55. That was after the third attack?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the Second Battalion of the Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, Battery F, was not alerted at all but was in position and ready for action at 1315. That is 1:15?

General SHORT. That is 1:15.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And Battery G at 1:15, and Battery H at 1:30.

And the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery, Battery B—

General SHORT. You are overlooking the fact that from their camp there they did open fire at 8:04 and brought down a plane. They were not at their assigned positions, but they entered into the combat. All the units were alerted and they all fired and brought down planes.

[8100] Mr. KAUFMAN. That fire was with small arms, rifles?

General SHORT. It was with machine guns undoubtedly.

Mr. KAUFMAN. We are talking about anti-aircraft batteries.

General SHORT. Those are batteries of anti-aircraft guns.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That would mean that the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery was not ready to fire until 11:45?

General SHORT. It had fired its guns and then moved on to assigned positions.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It does not say that here, does it?

General SHORT. It says in the first paragraph that all units opened fire at 8:05 and brought down planes. They were apparently all in their positions.

Mr. KAUFMAN. All it says is that the units were alerted at 8:05 when fired upon by single enemy planes.

General SHORT. Better read the next sentence.

Mr. KAUFMAN (reading).

All units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That makes no reference to the anti-aircraft batteries.

General SHORT. I am sure it means with the automatic rifles and machine guns.

Mr. KAUFMAN. With respect, however, to the batteries [8101] of the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery, none of those batteries were ready for firing until 11:45?

General SHORT. That is right, after they moved.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After the attack was over. What time was the third attack over, General?

General SHORT. Oh, there is a variation in estimates. Sometime around 11 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest that the tank farm was ready at 11 o'clock?

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. The tank farm at Schofield Barracks. The tank farm is the only one before 11:45. That is at 11. You notice it is the second to the last one. That would be Battery G of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Battery G?

Mr. MURPHY. It is Battery G of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery on this exhibit.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The tank farm?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, tank farm, Schofield Barracks, 11 a. m. That is the only one before 11:45. I just wanted that corrected.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now Battery A of the Ninety-seventh Coast Artillery fired 130 rounds of .30 caliber at one enemy plane at 8:35. Was that by machine gun or rifle or what?

[8102] General SHORT. What is this you are reading from now?

Mr. KAUFMAN. The next paragraph after the second battery of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery.

General SHORT. 1,500 rounds.

Mr. KAUFMAN. 1,500 rounds of .30 caliber?

General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. At one enemy plane off-shore at 8:35?

General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was that rifle or machine guns?

General SHORT. That was undoubtedly machine guns. They would not fire rifles at that distance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Sand Island. The anti-aircraft detachment of Battery F, Fifty-fifth Coast Artillery, present at Sand Island when the attack started, was ready for action at 8:15. The battery fired 89 rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft and shot down two enemy planes at 8:15.

Let us go back to the first item on this memorandum. Fort Weaver, Headquarters Second Battalion, was that one battery or four batteries, as you indicated? Was it not only one?

General SHORT. It may possibly have been only one. I read it the Second Battalion, and it apparently was the headquarters of the Second Battalion.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that going through this list, as we have just gone through the list, would you state that it is [8103] accurate?

General SHORT. This, I think, is absolutely accurate.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Is it not accurate as stated in section VII of exhibit 5?

General SHORT. I do not believe that it is.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That only four of the batteries were ready to fire prior to the end of the attack?

General SHORT. I am sure that that is not an accurate statement.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now I counted them through here and I do not find any more than four or five prior to the time of the completion of the attack. General, I will try to check that after the hearing.

General SHORT. I think if you will check it carefully you will find that there were more than that. More planes were brought down by those outfits.

Mr. KAUFMAN. More than four out of the 32 batteries?

General SHORT. I think so; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How many more would you say?

General SHORT. I have not checked it carefully enough to be able to tell.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I request that the exhibit of the General be spread on the record at this point, and that immediately afterward we have spread section VII of exhibit [8104] 5 on the record, that was prepared by the Army as the Army exhibit.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be done.

(The matter referred to follows:)

HEADQUARTERS 53RD COAST ARTILLERY BRIGADE (AA),
OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 December 1941.

Subject: Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 December 1941.

To: General Short.

1. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1 S. O. P., H. C. A. C., 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of the East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun batteries. All anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded.

2. a. FORT WEAVER. Headquarters 2nd Battalion 97th C. A. (AA).

Alerted 0810

Ready to fire 0813

Engaged enemy at 0814

Amm. fired

407—.30 Cal. ball.

[8105]

117—.30 Cal. A. P.
53—.30 Cal. Tracer.
12—Pistol.

South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat NO interruption in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle and automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by officers and men.

BATTERY G 97th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at fixed battery at Fort Weaver.

Alerted at 0810

Ready to fire 0830

Engaged enemy 0830

Fired 30 rds—3" A.A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball Amm. One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:50 A. M. During this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while engaging the enemy, he stayed at his post although ordered to take cover. Lieutenant KING states that the battery fire broke up and definitely turned back one formation of 15 enemy planes. Casualties—One (1) Officer dead—Killed while proceeding through Hickam Field to his battle position. Four (4) enlisted men wounded.

BATTERY F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed Battery Closson, Fort Hamehameha, T. H.

Alerted 0755, and moved to Battery position across [8106] Pearl Harbor Entrance.

Ready to fire 0855

Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920

Amm. fired

27—3" A. A., H. E., M. K. fuse M3.

Approximately 400 rds. .30 Cal. ball.

Approximately 130 rds .30 Cal. A. P.

BATTERY G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter, battle position at Ahua Point.

Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort Kamehameha.

Ready to fire 1030

Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030

Amm. Fired

Approximately 50 rds. of .30 Cal. ball.

BATTERY H 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter. Its battle position is at Fort Weaver.

Alerted 0830

Ready to fire 1145

Engaged Enemy 2100

Amm. fired

40 rds .50 Cal. ball.

40 rds .50 Cal. A. P.

30 rds .50 Cal. Tracer.

MARINE DETACHMENT: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver. Operations were in cooperation with South [8107] Group although not tactically assigned.

Alerted 0800

Ready to fire 0810

Engaged Enemy 0810

Amm. fired

Approximately 5000 rds. of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer.

Approximately 450 rds. of 20 mm A. A.

This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4-engined bomber by causing enemy plane firing on its tail to pull out and cease its attack. Much shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc.

b. 98th COAST ARTILLERY, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Alerted at 0800

The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855.

3004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1st Battalion 98th C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action at the following time:

B-68 0955
D-98 1000
C-98 1030

[8108] *BATTERY M 64th*, stationed at Fort Shafter, was alerted at 0815, moved to Wheeler Field, and was ready for action at 1155.

2nd Battalion 98th C. A. (AA).—This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the following times:

F-98 1315
G-98 1315
H-98 1330

c. CAMP MALAKOLE 251st C. A. (AA).—All units were alerted at 0805 when fired upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down.

1st BATTALION 251st C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action as follows:

B-251 at West Loch 1145
C-251 Ewa Beach 1145
D-251 South of Ewa 1145

2nd BATTALION 251st C. A. (AA), was in position as follows:

E-251 Navy Yard
F-251 Navy Recreation Area
G-251 Tank Farm
H-251 Navy Yard

[8109] At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting down one plane. 100 rds. of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds. of .50 Cal. were fired on the second plane.

d. FORT KANEHAMEHA.—Battery A, 97th C. A. (AA) fired 1500 rds. of .30 Cal. at one enemy plane offshore at 0835.

e. SAND ISLAND.—The AA Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at Sand Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery fired 89 rds of 3" AA and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815.

f. FORT SHAFTER.

(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—3000—.30 Cal.

(2) Enemy planes were fired on at 0700 and 1000 by Battery A, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended 1000—.30 Cal.

(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons Batteries of the 64th C. A. (AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows:

B-64 at Aiea 1000
C-64 at Allamānu 1030
D-64 south of Allamānu 1100
[8110] F-64 at Pearl City 1105
G-64 See Par. 2 a. above
H-64 See Par. 2 a. above.
I-64 at Allamānu
K-64 at Hickam Field.
L-64 at Hickam Field
M-64 See Par. 2 b. above.

All of these units except M, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to 1145. Ammunition expended as follows:

3", 23 rds.
.50 Cal., 2361 rds.
.30 Cal., 2821 rds.

g. FORT BARRETTE.—Battery H, 97th C. A. (AA), was stationed at Fort Weaver. The battery was alerted at 0755, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830 and arrived at Fort Barrette at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small arms fire at Fort Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment on guard at Fort Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0910 by small arms fire.

3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2245.

4. AMMUNITION.

Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the [8111] Brigade had in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition, the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all units of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at Aliamanu Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 1200 rounds per battery, by 1015.

(Sgd) C. E. Wing
C. E. WING,
Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA),
Commanding.

[8112] ACTION AND DISPOSITION OF 53RD CA BRIGADE (ANTI-AIRCRAFT) ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

64th CA (AA) Regiment

All 3-inch gun batteries and automatic weapons batteries of the 64th CA (AA) were alerted at Fort Shafter at 8:15 a. m. and were in position as follows:

Battery

"A" (Searchlight) at Honolulu	10:00 a. m.
"B" (3-inch) at Alea	10:00 a. m.
"C" (3-inch) at Aliamanu	10:30 a. m.
"D" (3-inch) south of Aliamanu	11:00 a. m.
"E" (Searchlight) at Ewa-Pearl Harbor	Time not known
"F" (3-inch) at Pearl City	11:05 a. m.
"G" (3-inch) at Ahua Point	10:30 a. m.
"H" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver	11:45 a. m.
"I" (37 mm.) at Aliamanu	Known only that batteries were in position before 11:45 a. m.
"K" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field	
"L" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field	
"M" (37 mm.) at Wheeler Field	11:55 a. m.

97th CA (AA) Regiment

Batteries of the 97th CA (AA), except Battery "A" at Fort Kamehameha, were stationed at Ft. Weaver. They were alerted between 7:55 and 8:10 a. m. and were in position ready to fire as follows:

[8113] Battery

"A" (Searchlight) at Ft. Kamehameha	8:34 a. m. (Engaged enemy with small arms at 8:34 a. m.)
"F" (3-inch) at Ft. Kamehameha	8:55 a. m. (Engaged enemy at 9:00 a. m.)
"G" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver	8:30 a. m. (Engaged enemy at 8:30 a. m.)
"H" (3-inch) at Ft. Barrett	10:20 a. m.
"B", "C", "D", "E" and 3rd Bn not yet organized.	

98th CA (AA) Regiment

Batteries of the 98th CA (AA) Regiment were stationed at Schofield Barracks with the exception of Battery "D" which was stationed at Camp Malakole. They were in position ready to fire as follows:

Battery

"A" (Searchlight) at Schofield Barracks	Time not known
"B" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks	9:55 a. m.
"C" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks	10:30 a. m.
"D" (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump, South of Ewa	11:45 a. m.
"E" not yet organized.	
"F" and "G" (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air Station	1:15 p. m.
"H" (3-inch) at Waiolu High School	1:30 p. m.
3rd Bn 98th CA (AA) not yet organized.	

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[8114] 251 CA (AA) Regiment (less 3rd Bn)

All units of the 251st at Camp Malakole were alerted at 8:05 a. m. Batteries of the 1st Battalion were in position and ready for action as follows:

Battery

"A" (Searchlight) at Ewa-----	Time not known
"B" (3-inch) at West Loch-----	11:45 a. m.
"C" (3-inch) at Ewa Beach-----	11:45 a. m.
"D" (3-inch) at South of Ewa-----	11:45 a. m.
"E" (50 cal.) at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor-----	12:41 p. m.
"F" (37 mm.) at Navy Recreation Area-----	12:30 p. m.
"G" (37 mm.) at Tank Farm, Schofield Barracks--	11:05 a. m.
"H" (37 mm.) at Navy Yard-----	12:05 p. m.

AA Det Battery "F" 55th CA

This detachment was at Sand Island when the attack started and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a. m., shooting down two enemy planes at that time.

[8115] Mr. KAUFMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

General SHORT. You asked a question about this [indicating].

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes; I want to finish that.

With the permission of the chairman, may I suggest that this be made an exhibit? I would like to ascertain something about the chart. Does that state your staff of officers and is it correct?

General SHORT. I think that chart is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. May we have that marked as an exhibit?

The CHAIRMAN. You want that made an exhibit?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What number will it be?

Mr. KAUFMAN. May we have it spread in the record at this point instead of having it marked as an exhibit?

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The chart referred to faces this page.)

[8117] Mr. KAUFMAN. I also offer in evidence at this time two reports made to General Short. It has been distributed to the members of the committee today.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that made a part of the testimony?

Mr. KAUFMAN. No, sir. Just as an exhibit. That will be exhibit 139.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 139.")

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Short, I wish to ask you a few questions. You were commander of the Army in Hawaii prior to the arrival of Admiral Kimmel to take charge of the fleet?

General SHORT. No, sir; he took charge of the fleet, I think, a week before I arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. You followed him?

General SHORT. By about a week.

The CHAIRMAN. In command of the Army forces?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were assigned there during the whole time up to the attack?


[8118] General SHORT. That is correct.

ORGANIZATION OF THE HAWAIIAN
DEPARTMENT AT THE OUTBREAK
OF THE WAR

XXXX (LT. GEN. W. C. SHORT)

HAWAIIAN
DEPARTMENT

CHIEF of STAFF
COL. W. C. PHILLIPS



The CHAIRMAN. Did your duties require you to remain on the island constantly?

General SHORT. I was never out of the Hawaiian group. I made visits of inspection on the outlying islands.

The CHAIRMAN. You were going from place to place within the territory under your jurisdiction?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. During the entire time?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What proportion—I am asking you this question because I was unavoidably absent when Admiral Kimmel's testimony was concluded, and did not get an opportunity to ask him any questions at all—what proportion of the time you were at Pearl Harbor—Pearl Harbor was your headquarters?

General SHORT. Fort Shafter.

The CHAIRMAN. Fort Shafter; on the island of Oahu?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How much of the time during your presence at Fort Shafter, or on the island of Oahu, was Admiral Kimmel in the harbor at his headquarters?

General SHORT. I think he was in almost constantly. He was undoubtedly out at sea for a few days at a time, [8119] but I do not remember specifically. I think the greater part of his time he was in his headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. He spent most of his time there on the island, at Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And was only out at sea when his flagship went out?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any time during that nearly a year from the time you took over in the Army and Admiral Kimmel took over in the Navy, when Pearl Harbor was completely empty of naval vessels?

General SHORT. I do not know, sir. Naturally you could see the vessels in Pearl Harbor every time you drove along the road, but I could not say definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. During this year, from February on up until the 7th of December, you and Admiral Kimmel conversed in a general way about the situation?

General SHORT. We talked about the situation, I think from every angle, more or less. We talked many, many times about it.

The CHAIRMAN. How many times would you say a week during that year?

General SHORT. I probably saw him officially at least [8120] once a week, and I usually played golf with him every other Sunday, and we talked of all kinds of things around the course at that time.

[8121] The CHAIRMAN. You talked over the international situation on the fairway?

General SHORT. Over everything, in effect; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, as time went on toward the 7th of December, did he and you both recognize that the situation was becoming more tense?

General SHORT. I think from July 25 on, when the sanctions were put into effect, that we both felt it was tense, from then on.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't have to have any message from Washington in order to know that?

General SHORT. No. We read the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And you got general information from Washington, sizing up the situation as did the admiral?

General SHORT. Not very often. The number of messages were very limited, but we did get them.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get letters as well as cablegrams?

General SHORT. I didn't get letters on the international situation. I got letters from General Marshall, but usually pertaining to measures that were being taken to strengthen our defenses.

The CHAIRMAN. There is voluminous correspondence between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. It fills a [8122] volume as thick as Blackstone's Commentary. Did you have any such correspondence as that?

General SHORT. The correspondence between General Marshall and me, I think, is all in this exhibit here, exhibit No. 53.

The CHAIRMAN. When does that start?

General SHORT. That correspondence started on, the first letter was written by General Marshall on the 7th of February, and the last letter written by him was on October 28.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was there any touchiness between Admiral Kimmel and you—

General SHORT. We were extremely friendly.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish the question before you answer, please.

General SHORT. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any feeling of touchiness between Admiral Kimmel and you that might have prevented either of you from making a too detailed inquiry into what the other was doing, lest he be offended?

General SHORT. I don't think there was at all. I think that maybe either one of us wouldn't have wanted the other prying into business he thought didn't concern him in any way, but our relations were extremely friendly. [8123] I think I could have asked Admiral Kimmel anything that really concerned me and—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, the national defense concerned both of you, did it not?

General SHORT. Oh, yes; no question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Concerned you both.

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And as the situation grew worse, presumably would concern both of you more and therefore any inquiry from either as to what the other was doing would not necessarily be prying into his business, would it?

General SHORT. I was thinking, Senator, more in the way of asking him as to details, how they performed certain things, that he might possibly have figured wasn't my business.

The CHAIRMAN. In his testimony before the Grunert committee, I believe it was, Admiral Kimmel made the statement, or testified in effect that he hesitated sometimes to ask you in too much detail for fear he might be regarded as trying to pry, although I don't think he used that language.

General SHORT. I think he probably meant the same thing that I am trying to say, that if I would have asked him how often he opened the hatches, for instance, of [8124] his ships and made an inspection, he would have thought that it was not any business of mine.

The CHAIRMAN. But as to how many ships he might have in the harbor—

General SHORT. Yes; I think anything of that kind there would be no question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it necessary to allude to that subject in the former investigation?

General SHORT. Well, I don't know. If you will remember, in General Marshall's first letter to me, he talked considerably about Admiral Kimmel, the type of man he was. He wanted to be sure, apparently, that I did get an understanding to begin with, and get off, so to speak, on the right foot.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. And I think I took that into consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. He sort of warned you against the Admiral's bluntness?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he wanted you to take note of that in making the proper approach?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and I think I tried to carry that out; and I think our terms were excellent.

[8125] The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any such characteristics as might have embarrassed the admiral in approaching you?

General SHORT. Well, I might have, but he wasn't told about it.

The CHAIRMAN. He wasn't warned against you?

General SHORT. I don't believe he was.

The CHAIRMAN. I note in your statement that you have followed the pattern rather closely, in a sense, adopted by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, that if he had had all of the information that was available in Washington, he might have acted differently; you take the same position, that if you had had all of the information that was in Washington, you might have acted differently?

General SHORT. I am sure that we have taken that position absolutely independently, because, if you will take my statement, the statement I made before the Roberts commission, the first 50 pages I dictated, I had never talked with Admiral Kimmel during that period, and you will find the same claims that you will find in my statement here.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you and Admiral Kimmel consult or confer about this hearing?

General SHORT. Oh, I have talked to him frequently about this, but at the time of the Roberts hearing we [8126] were both so busy—I think I had 3 days, and spent most of the nights preparing that large volume that I have turned in to you, so you can see I had very little time to consult with anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it customary, or is it required, or is it military or naval practice that the commanders in the field shall be given copies of diplomatic messages sent back and forth between their Governments and other governments?

General SHORT. I wouldn't say that it was, but they at least, if it is anything that is going to affect them, it seems to me they would always

be given the substance, even if they were not told where it came from.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you read all of the intercepts that Admiral Kimmel recited in his statement that he thinks he should have been entitled to see?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Outside of the message carving up Pearl Harbor into the five divisions in which ships were located, is there anything in any of those messages which pointed to an attack upon Pearl Harbor any more than upon any other place?

General SHORT. That was the most definite thing, and then the fact that the delivery of the message was at 1 [8127] p. m., Washington time, which would be shortly after dawn in Honolulu, which I think was an indication—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you couldn't have gotten that one any sooner than you got it, could you?

General SHORT. Yes; we could have gotten that, we could have gotten it—they had it all decoded in the War Department between 8:30 and 9 o'clock in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. That was decoded in the Navy Department?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; but it was received in the War Department between 8:30 and 9 a. m.

The CHAIRMAN. General Marshall testified as to the time when he received it.

General SHORT. That is correct, but General Miles and Colonel Bratton had it in their possession from at least 9 o'clock to 11:25 a. m., and did nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General Miles testified as to what he did, and Colonel Bratton will, I suppose.

At any rate, there were none of these messages that are complained of because of their nondelivery in Hawaii, these intercepts, that gave any indication of an attack on Pearl Harbor, except the one dividing up Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. They all indicated, most of them, an [8128] attack somewhere.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But I am talking about Pearl Harbor.

General SHORT. I think those two things are the really definite things that pointed to Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. And the other intercepts related to the more tense situation as it developed?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But did not give indication as to where or when any attack would be made.

General SHORT. Well, I think you could get an indication possibly of when. You knew when they set deadlines that something was going to happen.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a conclusion that might have been drawn, that when they set a deadline of the 25th and then moved it up to the 29th, you could draw the conclusion that something was going to happen?

General SHORT. Anybody who was familiar with the weather conditions in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and happened to think

along that line, I think would have drawn a direct conclusion, because about that time of the year the weather gets very bad out in the Aleutian Islands. I happen to have spent 2 years in Alaska, and know that. And to a Navy man that might well mean that the condition [8129] was getting to the point where the fueling of ships at sea would be hazardous.

The CHAIRMAN. The weather in Alaska wouldn't necessarily indicate whether the Japanese were going to make an air attack or whether they would make it at Hawaii or the Panama Canal or Puget Sound.

General SHORT. It would only indicate the difficulty of proceeding by that northern route.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if anybody familiar with the weather in Alaska had sat down to speculate on it, he would have speculated they wouldn't send the six ships through that route?

General SHORT. Not later than that. It was getting about the limit on where it would be bad after that.

The CHAIRMAN. But even that speculation wouldn't have told you anything if they were coming to Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. If they went by the northern route, they would be probably going to either Seattle or Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this message that the Navy Department sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 24th was shown to you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, while it was shown to you for information, it was also shown to you for your guidance?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8130] The CHAIRMAN. Under the mutual arrangement that you were supposed to have out there either one of you who got an important message or a directive from Washington was supposed to show it to the other?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To keep one another advised?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you got this message of the 24th of November, which has been read time and time again into the record, but which states:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with the statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action. Addressees to inform senior army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.

and so forth.

Now, this is a message saying that an aggressive attack may be expected in any direction, including two places; it doesn't exclude any other place, does it?

[8131] General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It emphasizes—

General SHORT. It emphasizes those two places, and when some other place is equally important, I feel that if they intended to include the other place they would mention it.

3012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't a careful interpretation of that message mean that the Japanese were calculated to make an aggressive movement in any direction, and that "any direction" means the Philippines or Guam, as well as every other place, but that they emphasized those two places?

General SHORT. I would say that it was possible in any direction, but probable toward the Philippines and Guam because they were singled out.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is a matter of interpretation.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The word "including" means, for instance, if I want to sell some stock, I advertise I have a lot of stock for sale, including a horse and a mule; that wouldn't mean that all the rest that I had for sale wouldn't be sold?

General SHORT. That is true; but that would definitely emphasize the horse and the mule.

[8132] The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I wouldn't want to overlook selling them.

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In this message of the 27th—which was shown to you also, was it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And for the same purpose?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a little stronger:

This is to be considered as a war warning.

General SHORT. There is one very significant thing there, though. You notice that Guam was included in the probable attack, or possible attack on the 24th, and in that message they talk about Guam only in terms of sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. It would indicate that they were dwelling even more on the Southwest Pacific.

Guam, which was very close to Japan, had been eliminated.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this. Everybody in Washington, all the high officers in Washington—Navy, Army, Intelligence, War Plans, General Staff—all saw these intercepted messages, but as to which Admiral Kimmel [8133] complains and you complain not having been transmitted to you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They all have testified that, notwithstanding those messages, they did not really expect an attack at Pearl Harbor and were surprised when it came.

Do you think that if you had gotten all of those, or if the admiral had gotten them, or both of you together had gotten them, you would have reached any different conclusion from that reached by everybody in Washington?

General SHORT. I think there was a possibility because Pearl Harbor meant a little more to us. We were a little closer to the situation, and I believe we would have been inclined to look at that Pearl Harbor information a little more closely.

We might not have made the correct decision, but I believe there was more chance that either we or someone on our staffs would have had the idea.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that Pearl Harbor meant more to the admiral and to you and that therefore you were more concerned about it.

If that is true, why did you rely for the action you took upon some definite instruction from Washington instead of exercising greater judgment and discretion in doing what [8134] you could do with what you had?

General SHORT. Because they were my only sources of information. I had no source of information outside Hawaii, except the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you mean to say that with your general information and sizing up the situation during the whole year that you would take no action that meant anything in the way of preparation until you got meticulous detailed instructions from Washington to do it?

General SHORT. I mean that I knew that the War Department had many sources of information. They had military attachés. They got reports from the State Department and the Commerce Department.

They had a certain number of agents scattered around in the Far East. If they were in a position to get information that I had no access to at all, I had every reason to believe that their judgment would be better than my just arriving at a conclusion from reading the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we had military attachés and ambassadors in Tokyo, but due to the secretiveness of the Japanese Government, we didn't get much information.

General SHORT. That is true. I didn't know whether they were getting much or getting little.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[8135] Now, let me get down to the message that you got yourself from General Marshall, which you call in your statement, the "do-don't" message.

General SHORT. The Army Pearl Harbor Board was the one that designated it that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean by that description to rather ridicule the message that Marshall sent to you, by calling it the "do-don't" message?

General SHORT. The Army Pearl Harbor Board gave it that term, because of conflicting ideas presented, because of the fact that practically everything they gave was qualified, except two things. It was not my terminology. I adopted it. I adopted it from the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not original with you, then?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this message to you, No. 472—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [reading]:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese might come back and offer to continue.

That was the day following the delivery of the 10-point note to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull?

[8136] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which he delivered on the 26th?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That was our policy in all departments. All of you understood that if war had to come that our own country desired that Japan precipitate it instead of our country precipitating it; that is correct, isn't it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You understood that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is what the Secretary of State, the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, and all of the high officers understood that if there had to be hostilities, we didn't want to start them; isn't that true?

General SHORT. I very strongly got that impression from that message.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States [8137] desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy could not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures—

As might be necessary under the circumstances.

General SHORT. It made, however, a rather difficult situation. If we discovered a carrier 800 or a thousand miles out at sea, it would have been a very fine point whether under that we should attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you didn't have to pass on that fine point, because you were just in charge of the Army?

General SHORT. Yes, I might have had to furnish bombers to do the bombing.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. Admiral Kimmel would be the one.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a naval decision.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

Prior to hostile Japanese action—

This is not a request. It is not an intimation. It is a direction: you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance—

[8138] In general broad terms, that doesn't mean to look out after sabotage, does it?

General SHORT. No, sir; but long distant reconnaissance, by the agreement with the Navy, was definitely a Navy problem, and General

Marshall agreed that under that construction all I had to do was to turn over my planes to the Navy if they were called for.

The CHAIRMAN. When did he agree to that?

General SHORT. I have the quotation. He was asked, I think, before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

The CHAIRMAN. He hadn't agreed to that before this took place?

General SHORT. No, but he said that was his interpretation, the same as it was mine.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

Undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.

In reply to that message—then it goes on to say:

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five.

And so forth.

[8139] In reply to that message—which I believe was the next day, was it?

General SHORT. No, sir; it was the same day.

The CHAIRMAN. The same day?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You cabled him that you had taken steps against sabotage and had created liaison with the Navy?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you regard that reply as responsive to General Marshall's dispatch?

General SHORT. I did. There was one very important part of that message you didn't read.

The CHAIRMAN. I tried to read it all. What part did I omit?

General SHORT (reading):

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. That was a direction for you not to spread it around in the vicinity.

General SHORT. You couldn't possibly take up alert No. 2 or alert No. 3 without telling all of the enlisted men what they were out there for, who they were to shoot at.

The CHAIRMAN. You had Army practices from time to [8140] time that involved these alerts, did you not?

General SHORT. But we didn't give them live ammunition and tell them to shoot at a Jap plane, if one came over.

The CHAIRMAN. The population, hearing these guns firing, wouldn't know whether they had live ammunition.

General SHORT. This limited information wouldn't have allowed me to disclose that to an enlisted man—merely to "minimum essential officers."

The CHAIRMAN. If General Marshall knew, as you say he knew, that you had no responsibility as far as reconnaissance was concerned, why do you suppose he directed you to institute reconnaissance and take every step you thought necessary to protect yourself?

General SHORT. Because he did not write that message. I would like to read what he said in regard to that. This is a quotation from General Marshall:

Distant reconnaissance. —was a naval function, and the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be provided.

That is one quotation. There is another quotation from before the Army Board.

[8141] The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if it is true that you could understand this message and you knew what it meant when it said for you to institute reconnaissance——

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The words are simple, there is no ambiguity about it. If you knew and you knew he knew that all you could do about that was to make your planes available to the Navy——

General SHORT. That was exactly it.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Why didn't you in your reply to him say either that you had made the planes available to the Navy or you had not done so and why you had not done it, instead of just saying that you had taken steps against sabotage? Sabotage can be carried on where there are no actual hostilities between two nations. That is something that all the spies in Hawaii could indulge in, blowing up an installation on the ground or things of that sort without war being actually declared.

Why in your reply to General Marshall did you limit this to sabotage instead of saying something about reconnaissance, which is the only specific thing he mentioned in his direction to you?

General SHORT. I was directly obligated by the agreement with the Navy to furnish these planes. It had been approved [8142] by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and it did not seem to me that it was necessary to reiterate that because without they told me that—there was also a provision in that agreement that if the agreement were to be abrogated it would be in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that a written agreement?

General SHORT. That was a written agreement signed by Admiral Bloch and me, approved by General Marshall and by Admiral Stark and it had a provision that any abrogation must be in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot understand then why if General Marshall knew that you had no duty in regard to reconnaissance that he put this in this instruction to you and that if you knew he knew that why you did not call his attention to it in your reply to him so that he would not be under any misapprehension?

General SHORT. Yes, I think I can possibly explain that. In the first place, General Marshall was out of town when the message was drawn. In the second place, this message was written basically for General MacArthur in the Philippines and then adopted to the rest of us, and in the Philippines they had no such agreement. The Army was responsible for reconnaissance and they got together with the Navy and agreed upon what sectors that each would cover.

[8143] Mr. MURPHY. Will the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you regard it as the duty of a high commanding officer in the field—a man of your rank and you obtained that rank after long, distinguished service, as the admirals in the Navy

do—if there was any possibility of misunderstanding a direct instruction given by the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations to the high-ranking commanding officer in the field, that it is the duty of that ranking officer in the field to call that to the attention of the originating officer and clarify it instead of just sitting around waiting for further instructions?

It seems to me there ought to be some liaison between the two respective offices; if there is any misunderstanding or misapprehension or any lack of comprehension that ought to be brought to the attention of the other office so as to clarify it immediately. Now, it seems that after you received this message on the 27th you made no further effort, and so far as the naval end of it is concerned, they made no further effort to ascertain just what it was that Washington had in mind when they gave these instructions about reconnaissance and defensive deployments and all that language that has been used here in this hearing.

What have you to say about that? That bothers me, General.

General SHORT. I believe that Admiral Kimmel felt full [8144] responsibility for the reconnaissance; I think he realized that it was his full duty.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, inasmuch as this message had come to you about reconnaissance didn't it ever occur to you that you ought to advise General Marshall that under the agreement the naval end of it had assumed full responsibility for reconnaissance and that it was not a part of your responsibility, so that he would not be expecting you to do it?

General SHORT. Frankly, I believed General Marshall would have known it.

The CHAIRMAN. You believed he would have known it?

General SHORT. I believed he would have known it because he personally approved that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if that is true this language in here, this direct instruction to you to institute reconnaissance, was just idle words, it didn't mean anything so far as he was concerned, you think?

General SHORT. You will notice it says:

Such reconnaissance as you may deem necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. No; that is not what it says:

You are to take such reconnaissance and other measures.

General SHORT. I think the "deem necessary" applies to all. I don't think there is any question of it in reference to any part of it.

[8145] Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think I have something precisely in point. I would like to read from page 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, General Grunert to General Short:

In your message of November 27th you say "liaison with the Navy." Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?

Answer. To my mind it meant I was definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, what information they had and what they were doing.

Question. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long distance reconnaissance?

Answer. Yes, without any question whether I had sent that or not it would have effected it because they signed a very definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as by our Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you say about that answer to that question?

General SHORT. Well, I want to finish the quotation that I started to read from General Marshall because it was taken before the Army Pearl Harbor Board also.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

[1846] General SHORT. This is from the testimony of General Marshall. This is the testimony on distance reconnaissance.

As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in detaching units to serve under the Navy.

General RUSSELL. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. That is right. That is my view.

In other words, I think he had the same view of the responsibility that I had there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why, General, and can you tell the committee why it was that there was no reconnaissance on the 6th of December, the day before the attack?

General SHORT. I believe, it is my impression that Admiral Kimmel was making a considerable reconnaissance.

The CHAIRMAN. He said that there were some Navy planes flying to the south.

Senator LUCAS. No; patrol planes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about patrol planes. I am talking about reconnaissance, long-distance reconnaissance.

General SHORT. I think all of his reconnaissance from Johnston Island to Wake Island to Midway was very definitely distance-reconnaissance. He was doing it on the perimeter in [1847] place of flying them out and back from Oahu. He could accomplish more with the same number of planes.

The CHAIRMAN. He could accomplish more with the same number of planes if he had had them at the right place at the right time.

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But he could not accomplish more with them down to the south if the attack was coming down from the north. It seems to me there was no reconnaissance from that direction.

General SHORT. It is apparent the Navy had not considered that because you will recall Admiral Richardson stated before this committee that his reconnaissance extended from 10 degrees west of north down to the south. He did not think his reconnaissance ever went to the east or north.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. I am through. Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I suppose as usual we do not want to detain General Short too long and we will quit at 4 o'clock as we have been doing?

The CHAIRMAN. Unless General Short is willing to go on further.

General SHORT. Just at the pleasure of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless there is some reason for the members on the House side wanting to quit at 4 there is no reason [8148] that I know of why the Senators would want to quit in view of the situation in the Senate.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, while General Short is on the stand we have suspended heretofore at 4 o'clock and I think we ought to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. Do you have something further you want to look at, General?

General SHORT. That is all right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I would like to inquire of you to get some additional information, if I may, please. You had served about 40 years in the Army, hadn't you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated that you went in the military service from the State of Illinois?

General SHORT. Yes; that is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not attend the Military Academy at West Point?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I understood you to say you were recommended by the president of the University of Illinois for a commission.

[8149] General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And commissioned in 1902?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, at the time you were in command of the Hawaiian Department you were one of the senior officers of the Army, weren't you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You at that time held the rank of Lieutenant General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At that time there were very few holding the rank of lieutenant general, weren't there?

General SHORT. I think there were nine, two of whom were air officers. I am not sure.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Certainly there were not near as many as later developed during the war?

General SHORT. No; by no means.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The rank of lieutenant general back at that time was really pretty high in the Army, wasn't it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, on December 7, 1941, General, you held one of the most important commands in the Army, didn't you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Our fortress at Hawaii was one of the [8150] greatest possessions for national defense that this country had?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it was your responsibility to protect that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you received considerable information in the form of correspondence between you and the Chief of Staff, as you have indicated in the booklet that you have up there, during the period that you were in command at Hawaii?

General SHORT. A great deal of information on the defenses, and so forth.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. A very limited amount on the international situation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you kept informed on the international situation from every source that you could inform yourself, did you not?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it was a matter of rather general knowledge that the situation was growing exceedingly tense between the United States and Japan, wasn't it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the situation was growing more [8151] critical all the time. You knew that as you very frankly stated here.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you consider that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable?

General SHORT. I would not go that far. I think I would say that I considered it probable but I thought that Washington, from the message I had, was making every possible effort to avoid war and to avoid an international incident in Hawaii that they must, therefore, still have some hopes of averting it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, that was your very clear and definite impression of the efforts being exerted at Washington?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you also knew what Japan was doing, too, didn't you, General?

General SHORT. I knew that she was pressing down into China and getting on toward the south and that sooner or later might cause a conflict.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you knew that every indication pointed to Japan's further conquests, didn't you?

General SHORT. Without we were able through negotiations to arrive at something that would stop them.

[8152] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But every move Japan was making gave clear indications that she was bent on further conquest, didn't it?

General SHORT. It looked that way.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It looked that way and you understood that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, did you ever consider that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. I frankly felt with the fleet—as large a fleet as we had in the Hawaiian waters—that they would be able to either keep the carriers up there from the vicinity of Hawaii or at least get the information of their approach in time for us to be prepared for the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I did not understand the last part.

General SHORT. I say if they were not able to intercept them that they would at least get information in time to give us sufficient time to prepare for the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You thought the fleet would be able to do that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, it was true that the fleet had certain units out at sea most of the time?

General SHORT. Always, I think.

[8153] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And certain task forces were operating between Hawaii and other islands such as Midway and Wake and Johnston and through that area?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. They also had forces stationed at those islands and they had a certain amount of reconnaissance constantly from those islands.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So then you assumed that the Navy would become aware if any hostile act became apparent and you would receive the information through the Navy?

General SHORT. I expected to; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe on page 3 of your statement, General and subsequent pages—you need not refer to it; I am just going to ask a general question.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On page 3 and subsequent pages of your statement you referred to certain requests made by you to the War Department for additional equipment, material, and so forth.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But the fact that you were not furnished everything you asked for did not relieve you of the duty and responsibility to use what you did have to the best advantage in the defense of your department, did it?

General SHORT. In no way.

[8154] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe General Marshall made one statement here that I think you will agree with at least. He said that no commander was ever quite satisfied with what he got.

General SHORT. That is unquestionably right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They all ask for more than they are able to get and he said it only indicates he was a good officer because he was asking for more than he could get all the time.

Now, I believe on page 15 of your statement, General, under the heading of "War Plan," among other things in that paragraph there you say:

That no part of this joint plan would take effect until the War Department ordered M-day under the Rainbow plan.

Well, now, M-day was war with Japan, wasn't it?

General SHORT. Not necessarily war with Japan but it would be the mobilization toward the preparation for war with Japan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Well, anyhow, M-day was mobilization for war?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you say that no part of the joint plan had to be put into effect until the War Department ordered that on M-day?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8155] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, this did not prevent you from using every possible means for a proper defense of your command, did it?

General SHORT. Not if the situation I would say was just definitely so that there was no time to communicate with Washington, but if you take their policy I think they expected in all cases to indicate when the plan was to go into effect, and also if you couple that with that express desire not to create any international incidents, not to provoke Japan, I think you naturally would hesitate very seriously as long as there was time to communicate with Washington and the communications were open, to put anything into effect without first communicating with them. That was my attitude.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, naturally, that would generally be true, but at the same time the responsibility rested upon you to defend your Department?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; but likewise an equal responsibility rested upon the War Department to provide me with all the information that I needed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am not arguing with you about the responsibility of the War Department. I am just inquiring briefly about your responsibility as a lieutenant general of the United States Army in command of the most valuable post for the national defense of this country.

[8156] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, it was your duty——

General SHORT. It was mine.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). To defend it?

General SHORT. But my estimate was bound to be made upon the information I had.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; but it was your duty to defend that post that had been assigned to you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Whether any M-day had arrived or whether any instructions had been received from Washington or anywhere else if the occasion arose, it was your duty to defend that command?

General SHORT. And when the definite occasion did arise it never occurred to me to communicate with Washington then.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General SHORT. Because the situation was definitely there. We went into action immediately.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, there wasn't any declaration of war at the time it happened?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There wasn't any M-day put into effect?

General SHORT. No, sir.

[8157] The VICE CHAIRMAN. There wasn't any order to that effect from the War Department?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But when the Japanese attack came you went into action?

General SHORT. Within a minute or two.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, you have been asked a number of questions about these particular messages that were received and

the chairman has just inquired some about the message of November 24 to Admiral Kimmel. You say you saw that and conferred with him about it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And, of course, you saw in that message that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is stated there, isn't it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; but it also points out particular places.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It also mentions other things but those words are in there?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, you say there a little below the middle of the page:

This message indicated possible movements in the direction of the Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy.

[8158] but this is not all that it indicated, was it?

General SHORT. I would say that that was what it indicated—probable. The other was possible. When you say "attack in any direction," that is so indefinite that you cannot point it out as a probable thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, your statement here is:

This message indicated possible movements in the direction of the Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy.

General SHORT. I believe that if the Department had considered Hawaii in the same way, classing it with the probable as the Philippines or Guam, it would have included it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But at least the message said also what is said about the Philippines and Guam?

General SHORT. But in a very general way.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At least you did not accept it as meaning anything but the Philippines and Guam?

General SHORT. That was all that it meant to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was all that it meant to you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. I think that is all it meant to Admiral Kimmel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It referred to the Philippines and Guam and that is all it meant to you and you did not accept it as [8159] meaning anything else?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or as being worth anything else to you?

General SHORT. I realized that any time that there was any Japanese action against the United States that sabotage and subversive action might start in Hawaii even ahead of the action to get the jump on us.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you did not think there was anything in this message—

General SHORT. I did not expect an attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you did not think there was anything in this message that should have meant anything to you except the Philippines and Guam?

General SHORT. And possibly internal disorders in Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In Hawaii?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And so far as all these other words that we used here they were just surplusage as far as conveying any meaning to you?

General SHORT. They were so general and so indefinite that it was pretty hard to say that they conveyed any specific meaning.

[8160] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it did not mean anything to you?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks we will suspend with you until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:03 p. m., January 23, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 24, 1946.)

[8161]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[8162] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Congressman Cooper will resume his examination.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you ready, General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Short, when we adjourned yesterday we had been discussing the Navy message of November 24, with which you said you were familiar.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had given your explanation of what you thought it meant and your ideas about that message. I would now like to consider with you for a little while the messages of November 27. The Chief of Naval Operations also sent a message of November 27 to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

General SHORT. May I correct my very last statement to you before we take that up?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General SHORT. On page 8159 of the transcript you asked me:

Well, you did not think there was anything in this message that should have meant anything to you except the Philippines and Guam?

[8163] And possibly internal disorders in Hawaii—

I added there.

You said then, "In Hawaii?"

And I said:

Yes, sir. And so far as all these other words that we used here they were just surplusage as far as conveying any meaning to you?

General SHORT. They were so general and so indefinite that it was pretty hard to say that they conveyed any specific meaning.

Then you said:

Well, it did not mean anything to you?

General SHORT. No, sir.

I think I should like to correct that that it did mean to me that they definitely expected hostilities but that it did not point to Hawaii. I don't think my answer "It did not mean anything" was a correct answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As full and complete?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It did mean to you then that hostilities—

General SHORT. That hostilities, yes, sir, but not an attack at Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, then, the Navy message of November 27, the so-called war warning message, you are thoroughly familiar with that?

[8164] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you saw it at the time Admiral Kimmel received it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you conferred with him about it?

General SHORT. I am sure that I talked pretty thoroughly about that on the 1st and the 3d—well, the 1st, 2d, and 3d of December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, that was received—

General SHORT. Oh, no. On the 24th you are talking about?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No.

General SHORT. The one on November 27?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the one on November 27.

General SHORT. I talked pretty thoroughly with him about that. We had talked immediately previously on that morning about the situation and the message of the 24th and there was really no additional information of an enemy in the message on the 27th that was not in the 24th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it was received in Hawaii on the 27th, the day it was sent?

General SHORT. That is correct, the afternoon of the 27th.

[8165] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you were familiar with it on that day?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the opening words there:

Consider this dispatch a war warning—

you say it did not mean anything special to you?

General SHORT. It meant no more than saying that Japan was going to attack some place. It is the same thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. And I believe you stated yesterday that you never had seen those words used in any dispatch before?

General SHORT. I did not remember that I had; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I recall that Admiral Kimmel stated that he had never seen those words used before.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I was just wondering why it was that those words that you had never seen in a dispatch before did not mean something more to you than you here indicate?

General SHORT. Well, if you analyze them they really are not nearly as definite, they mean not nearly as much as to say that Japan is going to attack the Philippines or Borneo because you are saying there that war is imminent and you are saying where it is imminent.

[8166] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, this says:

Consider this dispatch a war warning.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a pretty definite statement, General.

General SHORT. Well, I think if they tell you that the Philippines are going to be attacked that is equivalent to a war warning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, that would be definite, too.

General SHORT. I think probably that was the reason that it did not have any particular effect on me, because the one on the 24th had stated that they expected Japanese action in any direction, including the Philippines and Guam.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you had the impression in your mind at the time from the information contained in the Navy message of November 24th that hostilities were indicated?

General SHORT. That the Navy definitely believed they were indicated.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Then 3 days later on the 27th, you saw this message, "Consider this dispatch a war warning."

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. With the knowledge in your mind that you had already been notified that hostilities were imminent?

[8167] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then here comes a message:

Consider this dispatch a war warning.

You did not give any special meaning to that?

General SHORT. I thought it was just a reiteration of what had been said.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Now, that was with respect to the Navy message of the 27th.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, on page 18 of your statement you enter into a discussion of the Army message of November 27, which you quote there on page 18 of your statement.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This was a message from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to you.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you received it on the 27th?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You had the information contained in this message in addition to the information contained in the Navy message of the same date with which you were familiar?

General SHORT. That is correct.

[8168] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, I do not want to go into too lengthy a discussion of this message, because it has been covered so many times in the hearing, and you set it forth here in your prepared statement, but I would like to invite your attention, to get some infor-

mation as to your views about it, to certain words appearing right about the middle of the message, and I will quote them to you:

Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance, and other measures as you deem necessary.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was a direct order from the Chief of Staff to you?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then the words "Report measures taken."

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, in your reply to General Marshall, you reported only that you had alerted your department against sabotage, and liaison with the Navy.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Whether they are the exact words or not, that is what you meant and that is what you said?

[8169] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, do you find the word "sabotage" used anywhere in this message of November 27 to you?

General SHORT. No, sir; but I did in the next 3 messages that I got.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you promptly replied to General Marshall upon the receipt of this message?

General SHORT. That is correct. I also do not find anywhere in there that he said there was a probable attack on Hawaii. That is what caused me to—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, we will get to that in a moment, but right at this point, you say the word "sabotage" is not used anywhere in this message of November 27 to you from the Chief of Staff?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you say you promptly replied to that message without consultation with any members of your staff or anybody else, except, I believe, you talked with Colonel Phillips; is that right?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, with this message before you, and you had not at that time received these other messages, you promptly replied to General Marshall, you alerted your department against sabotage, and "liaison with the Navy."

[8170] General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From this message of General Marshall to you, which does not contain the word "sabotage" anywhere in it, where did you get the idea that all he wanted to know about was sabotage?

General SHORT. The Navy message of November 24 pointed directly to an attack on the Philippines or Guam. It did not point to an attack on Hawaii. That was in my mind. That was received just 3 days before.

There was nothing in this message amending that. The information on the enemy given there "unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment," I felt the information contained in the message of November 24 still stood, that the probable action was toward the Philippines and Guam.

[8171] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I know, General, but as an experienced officer with long and distinguished service of 40 years in

the United States Army, you had right in front of you a dispatch from the head of the United States Army, the Chief of Staff, and you replied to this dispatch.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not reply to the Navy message of November 24.

General SHORT. Nor, sir; but I also knew——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was this dispatch that you replied to?

General SHORT. I also knew from 40 years' experience that if the Chief of Staff believed there was going to be an air attack or an all-out attack on Hawaii he would have said so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to find, General—and I am just trying to get the facts about this thing the best I can, the same as I questioned the other witnesses, my only purpose in serving on this committee is to try to find the facts about the question that is presented to us here—with this message of the Chief of Staff before you, without the word "sabotage" mentioned in it at all, I am just wondering how you got the impression that your reply of "an alert against sabotage" was responsive to this message.

General SHORT. Because there was no information that [8172] indicated anything in Hawaii other than internal disorders. And the man who wrote the estimate on November 29, the two men, Colonel Betts and Colonel Kroner, did not have access to magic, and they drew exactly the same conclusion, that there was not a possibility of an attack on Hawaii, there was no possibility of an air attack on Hawaii, and the only thing of importance was an alert against sabotage and internal disorder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But certainly, General, at the time you replied to General Marshall's message you did not know what Betts and Kroner knew, or whether they knew anything about that.

General SHORT. I did not, and I did not have as much information as he had. I am simply saying my conclusion had been absolutely logical. These two men, the heads of military branches of the United States, drew exactly the same conclusions for the same reasons, and anybody else would if they were not given the magic information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One difficulty with all of us is to separate hindsight or present knowledge from what occurred at the time back there. I realize your difficulty, and we all have that difficulty, but this Kroner and Betts information was not before you then, you knew nothing about it.

General SHORT. It had nothing to do with my decision.

[8173] The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. But there was nothing else before me that caused me to expect an attack on Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Although the words definitely appeared in this message:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary?

General SHORT. And I did. "Hostile action" to me, taking everything that I had had before and everything in that message into consideration, meant the form of hostile action in Hawaii would be internal disorders, that the War Department thought it would be internal disorders.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you undertake such reconnaissance as you deemed necessary?

General SHORT. I did not deem anything necessary in the way of long-distance reconnaissance, because it was a Navy job, and I was ever ready to give them the planes any time they requested, and that was my only function.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. With this directive from the Chief of Staff to you to undertake such reconnaissance, and indicating that the Navy was supposed to furnish long-distance reconnaissance, did you then promptly confer with Admiral Kimmel so you would know whether he was doing it?

General SHORT. I knew that morning what reconnaissance [8174] in general he was taking; I talked with him 3 hours that morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But not after you received the order from the Chief of Staff?

General SHORT. No, sir; but I knew what he was doing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now this same message was sent to certain other commanding generals; was it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The commanding general at Panama, among others; was it not?

General SHORT. I think you will find—I am not positive, but I think probably some of the “don’ts” were left out. I know the message to the Philippines omitted the don’ts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will get to that in a minute. If you will try to stay with me as we go along, it will help me a great deal.

At the bottom of this message appearing on page 7 of exhibit 32, after the name “Marshall,” which appeared on the message to you, it says here:

War Department Message Center: Please send same radiogram to: Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the Panama command?

General SHORT. That is correct.

[8175] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the General in command there replied to the message in quite different form to what you replied?

General SHORT. In all probability he did not have the definite written approved agreement with the Navy that they would be responsible for long-distance reconnaissance. I know that was the case in the Philippines. I do not know that that was the case in Panama.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There was quite a difference between that general’s reply and yours.

General SHORT. There would be necessarily a great difference if I had been responsible for the long-distance reconnaissance, but I was not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But the fact remains there was considerable difference in the replies.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, then, on the same day a message was sent to General MacArthur in the Philippines. That is not identical with the message received by you, but quite similar to it; isn’t it?

General SHORT. Except all the don'ts were left out.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is quite similar to it. The same words appear in it, General:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures [8176] as you deem necessary.

Those identical words appear in the message to MacArthur and to you; do they not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and I happen to know that there was no agreement in the Philippine Islands whereby the Navy assumed the responsibility for long-distance reconnaissance.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But those same words appear in your message and in MacArthur's message?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; but the condition in the two places was entirely different.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And MacArthur's reply to General Marshall is quite different from yours?

General SHORT. Necessarily so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He says:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy stop Ground security measures have been taken stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

You replied that your department was alerted against sabotage, and liaison with the Navy.

General SHORT. I think you ought to also take into [8177] consideration that he had a great deal—not all, but a large part of magic, that he had received a radiogram, that he had held a conference with Commissioner Sayre and Admiral Stark, and that this message was from the President, that repeated estimates had pointed to the probable attack on the Philippine Islands. The situation as painted to him was entirely different from that which was painted to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Back again, General, the same words conveying a definite directive to him, were contained in the message to you?

General SHORT. But the action required would be governed by the situation that existed, which was entirely different.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. In just reading MacArthur's message it would seem that he replied directly to these words contained in both messages.

General SHORT. I think he replied to meet his situation as it existed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, General, on page 20 of your statement you refer to the message of November 27 from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of your department.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the same day that General Marshall's message was sent to you?

General SHORT. Received probably within an hour or less.

[8178] The VICE CHAIRMAN. An hour or less?

General SHORT. Almost the same time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But after you had replied to General Marshall's message?

General SHORT. I think so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now then this message from General Miles, G-2 of the War Department, to your G-2 relates only to sabotage and subversive activities, does it not?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then why did you think General Miles sent you this special message relating only to sabotage if it meant only the same thing as the message General Marshall had sent to you?

General SHORT. General Miles was responsible for giving us information not only about sabotage but information of any probable hostile action. The fact that the information he gave us related only to sabotage indicated that he did not expect other hostile action or he would have pointed it out the same as they did the subversive action.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But the message from General Miles to your G-2 meant the same thing to you as General Marshall's message to you?

General SHORT. It predicted to me the same type of hostile action.

[8179] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. And you see no difference between the Marshall message to you and the Miles message to your G-2?

General SHORT. I did. To me the Marshall message indicated that there was paramount in the idea of the War Department that they must avoid war if possible with Japan and that no international incident must take place in Hawaii that would provoke the Japanese or give them an excuse. There was nothing of that kind in Miles' message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, if you even had not received General Marshall's message, why, you would not have taken any such action, would you?

General SHORT. If I had not received General Marshall's message and only had Miles' message, you mean?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you had not received either one of them you would not have done anything to create a Japanese incident, would you?

General SHORT. I would have been very careful not to, because for months there had been an indication that they were particularly anxious not to provoke the Japanese.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not need any message from General Marshall or General Miles, or anybody else, for you to take that definite course yourself, did you?

General SHORT. I would say that that made it clear; it [8180] was necessary to reiterate their position, because they were very anxious about it. Uppermost in their minds was that they did not want to be responsible for starting a war.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you were not going to do anything to start a war even if you had not heard anything from them, were you?

General SHORT. Not intentionally.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How is that?

General SHORT. Not intentionally.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, General, I believe you have stated that the operation of radar was your responsibility?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I think you stated, in response to questions by counsel, that you had six mobile radar sets and three stationary sets.

General SHORT. No, sir; there were no stationary sets in operation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You had been furnished three, had you not?

General SHORT. Not complete.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you had six mobile sets?

General SHORT. We had six mobile sets.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In operation?

[8181] General SHORT. Yes, sir. And I might state also that the plans for the erection of the antenna, the towers for the sets were not received until—I think they show an endorsement of December 10, so they were not there.

At this time, if I may, I would like to read a telegram that I received here in the room yesterday from a former signal officer. I did not even remember the man——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just one second before you get to that. I just want to try to be clear on one point. I certainly will give you an opportunity to read your telegram. There were six mobile radar sets in operation at the time?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And although three stationary sets had been furnished, they were not complete and not in operation?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to state yesterday, in response to a question by counsel, that you did not know whether the three stationary sets were in operation at that time or not.

General SHORT. I did not mean to convey that. I knew definitely they were not; I knew they were robbing those sets for parts to keep the mobile sets working.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now if you desire to read the telegram you may do so.

[8182] General SHORT. As it happens, I do not even remember this officer. No inquiry had been made of him. I would just like to read the wire that came to me yesterday morning.

It is dated January 22, at Waterloo, Iowa:

Lt. Gen. WALTER C. SHORT,

Care Senate House Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C.:

On Dec 10, 1941 I was transferred to Oakland California as assistant signal officer SFP of E Stop Lying on the Oakland pier for a long time were three 100 ft. radar towers No SCR 271 Stop Several weeks later I received a phone inquiry from Wash DC and instructions for the Transportation Corps to ship same to Honolulu on the next boat Stop It was necessary to use a floating crane to hoist these heavy towers Stop Approximately twenty SCR 271 have since been installed in the Hawaiian Islands Stop In my opinion if these radar towers had not been delayed on the Oakland docks you could have used them to good advantage Dec 7 1941 End

GEORGE D. LEASK,

O-122826 Ex-Major, Signal Corps.

I want to introduce that just to show that those sets were not complete, that the towers had not been received.

[8183] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was three additional sets, wasn't it?

General SHORT. I don't know from his wire whether it was three additional sets. You see, we originally were authorized three sets. It was changed to six. I think the situation was that the three towers were there but that the plans for the erection of the towers and for the footings to be installed by the engineers had not been received and

were not forwarded to Hawaii until sometime about December 10 or 12. I am not sure of the exact date.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, let's be clear in our understanding. You had six mobile sets in operation?

General SHORT. I definitely had six mobile sets.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You had three stationary sets that had not been put in operation?

General SHORT. That is correct; and were not complete in all ways.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But did those three stationary sets have the towers there?

General SHORT. I don't know. This [referring to wire] raises a doubt in my mind. I thought that the towers were there, but the plans were not. This wire here that I just got, raises a little doubt in my mind as to whether [8184] my information was exactly correct, but I am sure that the plans for the erection of the towers had not been received.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you don't know whether the three towers for the three stationary sets were there in Hawaii at the time, or not?

General SHORT. I am not positive.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are not positive?

General SHORT. I had thought that they were.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you don't know whether that telegram just read relates to the towers for the three stationary sets already in Hawaii or the three sets that were to be sent there?

General SHORT. I do not, because there is no statement made.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you. With all six of the mobile sets, radar sets that you did have there—were they in operation on the 7th of December?

General SHORT. I am of the opinion they were. I imagine sometime during the day certain sets were temporarily out of commission because that happened right along. But I don't know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You don't know?

[8185] General SHORT. Don't know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, on page 38 of your statement, General, you refer to radar schedule under No. 50. You state:

Radar schedule.

After the aircraft warning service information was closed at 7 a. m. December 7, the Opana Station remained in operation. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, Second Lieutenant Grover C. White, Jr., Signal Corps, had obtained permission of the Control Officer to have all stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you know that permission had been granted to Lieutenant White?

General SHORT. No, sir; I did not. I had ordered, as part of the interceptor command and aircraft warning service, the operation only from 4 to 7. The additional hours were part of the training program, and for some time they had been exceeding the prescribed hours. They were very keen on making progress, and they had worked well beyond the prescribed hours. There was no training as training prescribed on Sunday, but they had been doing it.

[8186] I think the control officer was entirely within his province in permitting this training to be discontinued. I think that Major Berquist, who was the head control officer, felt that the men had been

using their eyes so many hours, that some of them were having eye trouble.

He testified to that fact before the Army Board.

I think that perhaps was the reason they agreed to cutting out the training on December 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was having eye trouble?

General SHORT. The men who were operating the oscilloscopes; the radar sets.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was this major, who was the control officer?

General SHORT. Major Berquist was the senior man. He and Major Tindall were the only two officers we had that knew anything about it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did that major have authority to issue orders for radar stations not to operate without consulting you, or even notifying you?

General SHORT. He did where the hours were over and above the hours prescribed by me. There was no training prescribed Sunday. They had been doing it on Sunday on their own. I had not issued an order that they would have the training and maintenance work on Sunday. I considered [8187] that he was within his province in calling that off.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then it was purely voluntary on their part?

General SHORT. On Sunday, not the 4 to 7. That was a definite order, but the training on Sunday was voluntary.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you didn't know that this permission had been granted by Major Berquist to Second Lieutenant White?

General SHORT. I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now you also tell about the incident there in which Lieutenant Tyler was involved.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Where he received this message from the man who was voluntarily on duty?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And practicing. That he had observed this flight of planes coming in.

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Tyler made the decision to do nothing about it?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was anything done about Tyler's action in that respect?

General SHORT. No, sir. As soon as I heard it, [8188] which was the next day, I told my chief of staff that I wanted affidavits taken to find out the exact status, but at that time there was no device by which we could differentiate between friendly planes and enemy planes, nobody could have told whether it was an enemy plane or a friendly plane. Tyler was inexperienced. I did not feel there was anything to justify disciplinary action against Tyler, because he had made what he thought was a correct decision.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You knew he was inexperienced?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. There were only two experienced men on the island until the return of General Davidson and Colonel Meehan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Whether they were technically experienced and trained on that, General, you did have plenty of men with mature judgment and discretion?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That could have been discharging these duties that this inexperienced officer was then discharging?

General SHORT. Major Berquist selected certain men he was training as control officers. I think that he selected these men with instructions to call him in case there was any doubt about anything.

[8189] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You think he expected them to do that?

General SHORT. To call him personally; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What did you know was supposed to be done there in the case of receipt of information that might convey vital information to you?

General SHORT. If there had been any doubt in the mind of whoever was acting as control officer, the pursuit planes at Wheeler Field should have been alerted immediately.

If that lieutenant had phoned to Wheeler Field, General Davidson would have turned out the planes without question. It would have been looked into later if it were wrong, but there wouldn't have been any hesitation on his part.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Certainly there was a serious error in judgment there. This inexperienced officer that you referred to——

General SHORT. He should have phoned to Major Berquist because his experience, I think, was probably insufficient for him to make the decision.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you knew he was inexperienced?

General SHORT. I did not know, as a matter of fact, that he was on the board that morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't know who was?

[8190] General SHORT. I didn't know who was on there. The list of officers being trained as control officers was operated by Major Berquist. If he found that a man didn't show aptitude, he was at liberty to throw him off, and call for another officer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you personally know that any of the radar stations were operating that morning?

General SHORT. I didn't visit them that morning, but I had visited the radar stations, at least three of them, personally out in the field.

I had gone through the aircraft warning service several times, the information center, and my orders were ordinarily carried out. When I gave orders, I fully expected them to be carried out.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think that is natural, and I think every Army officer expects that, but one of your main complaints here is that although General Marshall issued you a direct order, he didn't do anything to see if you carried it out.

General SHORT. When you come to the follow-up it depends on how far down you are going. I don't think I could be expected to check on every officer detailed there any more than I would see if the corporal of the guard received his instructions correctly when he went on duty. [8190-A] My follow-up was expected to go far enough, certainly, for me to talk with the commander of the Air Force, and the chief signal officer, which I did. And to know that

they had the picture, and trying to develop the thing in harmony as graphically as possible.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Wasn't your responsibility such that required you to go far enough to see that the job was properly done?

General SHORT. I would say to know in general that it was being properly done, which I did know that they were conducting this every morning. I don't think that my responsibility extended to the point of inspecting every man that went on there as a control officer. It would have been a physical impossibility for me to take not just this, but every other line of activity on the island, and I was responsible for all of them, not just this, it would be physically impossible for me to inspect every detail in every one of them every day; it couldn't be done.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But weren't you required to assume sufficient responsibility to get the job done?

General SHORT. I thought that I was getting it done.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You thought you had done that?

General SHORT. I had the only two men who had ever [8191] seen an installation of this kind supervising it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was your responsibility to see that the job was properly done?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you thought you had taken sufficient steps to do that?

General SHORT. I thought I had.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you found that you had not?

General SHORT. I am not sure, in view of the impossibility of determining the difference between friend and foe that you could have logically said that anybody, no matter how experienced could say that those were hostile planes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you stated a few moments ago, General, that if this inexperienced second lieutenant had reported to General Davidson this information that came to him, General Davidson would have had his planes in the air immediately.

General SHORT. That is not quite what I stated.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the way I understood it.

General SHORT. What I meant was he had the full authority, in spite of the fact that he was a lieutenant, as control officer, had full authority to alert the planes at Wheeler Field. He would just turn them out for [8192] hostile planes approaching. If they had received that report, no matter whether it had any value or not, they would have turned out immediately.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But that was not done?

General SHORT. That was not done.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just one more question on that, if I may.

If the Navy had had out proper long-distant reconnaissance planes——

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They could have been in a position to have found whether they were friendly or enemy planes, couldn't they?

General SHORT. If the Navy had told me that carriers were in Hawaiian waters, then we would have been instantly on the alert and we would have been suspecting everybody.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So it was the fault of the Navy in not conducting proper long-distant reconnaissance so as to be able to supply you the information?

General SHORT. Well, I think, if you are going back to fault, you can go back and say, if they had received the message of the delivery of the ultimatum, at 1 p. m., I think they would have turned out everything for the reconnaissance. I don't think you can take one point and stop there.

[8193] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But the fact remains that if the Navy had been conducting long-range reconnaissance, you thought they were, they would have been in position to supply you the information as to whether these were hostile or friendly planes?

General SHORT. I would not say that, because I knew that the Navy did not have sufficient planes to conduct, for any period of time, a 360-degree reconnaissance. If they had information pinning down probable hostile action to a certain time then they had enough planes that they could have searched practically the whole area for a few hours. As it was, they were searching what they considered was the probable line of approach of the enemy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you had had proper liaison with the Navy, you could probably have known whether these were hostile or friendly planes?

General SHORT. No, sir; I do not think I could.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you want to say something?

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering how that lieutenant could be held responsible for knowing anything when he never heard of these war warnings, never had been apprised of any change in the situation, and had the information that the man on the street had, even though he was the key man in the control station.

[8194] General SHORT. The information of the war warning was given to General Martin. It was talked over thoroughly with him. Probably spent 30 minutes. The Interceptor Command was under him. Whether or not he read the message he saw the "Dessemination to the few essential officers." I don't know whether he gave the information to Major Berquist or Major Tindall or whether he decided that it was limited in that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, General, you state on the top of page 38 of your statement, the very page that I have been asking you some questions about:

At that time I was convinced that the Navy either knew the location of the Japanese carriers or had enough information so that they were not uneasy. I felt that they could handle the situation.

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

General SHORT. There was nothing from them of an alarming nature. Nothing to show that they were alarmed about the situation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you thought the Navy was taking proper care of the long-range reconnaissance matter and when they didn't notify you to the contrary you rested on that assumption?

General SHORT. I thought they were doing everything they [8195] were capable of doing. They found nothing to alarm them. They had transmitted nothing to me. And I accepted it on that basis.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't check on the matter, did you, didn't do anything further?

General SHORT. I knew generally what they were doing but I didn't know specifically what hours they were sending out planes and things of that kind.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You don't think it was incumbent upon you to find out when they were making reconnaissance and definitely what they were doing?

General SHORT. It was Admiral Kimmel's definite responsibility. I thought he was an officer of sufficient experience. He knew more about reconnaissance with surface ships and submarines than I did. I felt that he could be counted on to do his job.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You just assumed that was being done?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; as far as he could do it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You state also on page 38:

About 6:45 a. m. a two-man submarine entering Pearl Harbor was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack or notified the Army, time would have been available for the [8196] dispersion of the planes. However, the Naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The Army was not notified until after the attack.

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You received no information from the Navy at all about this submarine incident?

General SHORT. Until after the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. Mr. Congressman, I would like before we leave the radar to add one thing, if I may.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Be glad for you to.

General SHORT. The radar system in New York City and in Seattle and in San Francisco had been completely installed some time before we received any equipment and, as I understand it, in New York City in order to expedite it they hired experts from the American Telephone & Telegraph Co.—or RCA, rather—who were familiar with this type of equipment, to assist in the installation.

Now, when it came to Hawaii, it was just a question of the officers digging out the thing the best they could from the pamphlets they had on the subject and instructing the men the best they could, which undoubtedly took more time. It looked like the War Department was more interested in developing radar on the mainland than in Hawaii.

[8197] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You think that is a proper reason, then, for you not being more careful about the operation of radar in Hawaii?

General SHORT. No, sir. I think that is the reason why our radar was still in the experimental stage. If we had been furnished it as early as New York and Seattle, we probably would have had it much better developed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The fact is a man voluntarily practicing on the radar that you did have found these planes coming in.

General SHORT. That is correct; but he didn't know what they were.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. As a matter of fact we know that planes were coming in from San Francisco. They came in 5 minutes later. Just a difference in direction of 3 degrees.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was done about Lieutenant Tyler? You said you didn't recommend any disciplinary action.

General SHORT. I did not. I believe, I am quite sure that General Emmons, who succeeded me, did not, because I think he [Lieutenant Tyler] has gone ahead throughout the war and received and been promoted.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is his present rank?

General SHORT. I believe he is a lieutenant colonel.

[8198] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Been promoted from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Now, then, on page 47 of your statement you quote questions and answers there between counsel and General Miles while Miles was a witness before the committee.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One of the quotations there is:

Mr. GESELL. What is the explanation of that?

General MILES. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

You quote that part of the testimony.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you and Admiral Kimmel keep each other thoroughly informed as to all information you received?

General SHORT. I will tell you what the practice was.

[8199] Whenever he received a message that directed the message be transmitted to me or that the Chief of Staff concurred in this message he furnished me with a copy. He did not furnish me with copies of other messages. He frequently, when we were together, told me of some other information but the only thing that I got from the Navy were the messages that he was told to deliver to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All you got from Admiral Kimmel were the messages that he was told to deliver to you?

General SHORT. As far as messages were concerned. As I say, there were times when he picked up items of interest that he told me of.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was more or less accidental?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How about the messages received by you, did you promptly inform Admiral Kimmel of what they contained?

General SHORT. I don't think I received any message that I didn't send to him, because I didn't have more than a half-dozen. I think every message that I got either showed that it was going to him or I sent him a copy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You feel sure then that you kept him fully informed as to all information received by you through messages but he did not do the same thing to you?

[8200] General SHORT. Well, I would say there was this difference. I got such a limited number of messages and only the very important messages. I got a message on July 8, on July 25, and on October 20, and November 27, and then one on the 7th, that came after the attack. I think those five were the only messages from July on that I received pertaining to the situation, the international situation, and I am quite sure that they were all furnished to him, to the Navy. They, on the other hand got, I think, much more information and lots of it, apparently, that they didn't feel I had any interest in or that they assumed I had received.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How about these code messages, about burning the codes, was that conveyed to you?

General SHORT. That was not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was not conveyed to you?

General SHORT. Not conveyed to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Navy had it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And did not tell you anything about it?

General SHORT. No, sir; and there was no direction in those messages that they should.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So unless there was a definite direction in the Navy message to tell you about it, why, you were not told?

[8201] General SHORT. I think that is absolutely correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Now, General, I would just like to ask you this question, with all deference and proper respect but if the messages sent, that is, if the messages not sent to you from Washington which you think should have been sent had made no more impression than the messages that were sent to you from Washington, what difference do you think it would have made?

General SHORT. I don't think that is a correct statement at all. There was never a message received by me that didn't make an impression. It may not have made the impression on me that you get from it or you think it should have made, but I never received a message from Washington that I didn't analyze carefully and make up my mind what the message meant.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you think these messages that were not sent to you from Washington would have been more important to you than those that were sent?

General SHORT. There were two that could hardly fail. The intercept which was the bombing plan of Pearl Harbor and the message stating that the ultimatum would be delivered at 1 p. m., which could have been sent to me 4 hours before the attack, and reached me 7 hours after the attack. Those two messages would definitely have meant something to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, on page 53 of your statement, [8202] General, there is this sentence, and I will read it to you:

During the period November 27 to December 6 the Navy made no requests for Army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance.

That is true, is it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that also led you to believe that the Navy had sufficient planes and was conducting distant reconnaissance as it should have been?

General SHORT. As they deemed desirable and necessary.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

On page 54, you state, under the No. 86, "Army-Navy Cooperation," your last sentence in that paragraph:

With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and the probability of an air attack.

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you have stated several times that you relied upon the Navy entirely in this respect?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; I had no source of information [8203] of my own.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And they never at any time called on you for any assistance so far as reconnaissance was concerned?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, General, I believe you stated here, and it also appears rather clearly in your statement, that you did not have any conference with Admiral Kimmel from December 3 to December 7?

General SHORT. That is correct; no personal conference.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No personal conference.

General SHORT. The liaison officer, Major Fleming, who did a great deal of my business with the Navy, and Colonel Pfeiffer, who was the gunnery officer of the fleet, had conferences about the equipment for Kanton and Christmas.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the last conference between the Army and Navy was December 4?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There was no conference between the Army and Navy in Hawaii between December 4 and December 7?

General SHORT. Well, that would not be true of the ONI and G-2, because the ONI and our contact officer had offices next door to each other, had a teletype system, and on subversive measures particularly they, I think, were usually in touch several times a day on practically all of the subversive activities.

[8204] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you didn't have any conference with Admiral Kimmel after December 3?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And no staff officer or responsible officer with you conferred with the Navy after December 4, you say?

General SHORT. No, sir. I will say, however, that Lieutenant Burr, the liaison officer, was in the G-3 section, and knew everything that was taking place, I am sure.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I mean December 3. December 3 was the last conference you had?

General SHORT. That is what I understood you said.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Somebody suggested that I said December 30.

General SHORT. I understood the 3d.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. December 3 was the last conference you had with Admiral Kimmel?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And December 4 was the last conference that your Colonel Pfeifer—

General SHORT. Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeifer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Had with the Navy?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8205] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, just this question in conclusion, General:

When Admiral Kimmel tells this committee he did not know you had gone on a sabotage alert only, and thought you had gone on full alert, and you tell us you thought the Navy was conducting long-range reconnaissance when they were not, does that look like proper liaison between the Army and Navy?

General SHORT. I still believe they were conducting long-range reconnaissance. Maybe not all you think they should have, but I am sure they were. As to the other, my only answer to that is that they had a staff man in our operating section who was familiar with everything, had no duty, no function, except to keep the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District informed of what was going on, and I am sure that somebody on that staff was informed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The point is, General, do you know about it.

General SHORT. Yes, I have Lieutenant Burr's testimony as to what—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I mean, did you know then it was being done?

General SHORT. I know that he was sitting there with no other duty, had no other purpose in being there except [8206] to tell them what we were doing, and I knew there was nothing being held out from him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the Army man to find out for the Army?

General SHORT. The Army man?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. With the Navy?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. In the Harbor Patrol we had an officer 8 hours a day, Lieutenant Dingle.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Eight hours of the 24?

General SHORT. Yes. Major Fleming was in constant touch. He wasn't sitting in the office, but he was in direct touch with them, and got a great deal of information.

I think that they had a great deal of confidence in him. That was one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was the equivalent of Lieutenant Burr?

General SHORT. No; because Lieutenant Burr—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the Army equivalent of Lieutenant Burr?

General SHORT. We did not have, except at the Harbor Patrol Post, any man who sat in—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not have any Army man who [8207] was the equivalent or opposite of Lieutenant Burr?

General SHORT. We did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now then, was there anything that could have been more important than the very things that you and the Navy did not know about with respect to each other?

General SHORT. I think that I knew in regard to their reconnaissance really practically all that I could be expected to know; that they were using their combination of ships, submarines, and planes, to reconnoiter the waters that they considered most dangerous. They were the ones to make the decision.

Now, as to what they didn't know about my operations, I think it must have been faulty staff work, because they should have known. At least one Navy man was fully informed. Lieutenant Burr unquestionably knew. And, as I say, it was his sole function, sole duty, to get it to them. Now, I don't know inside their staff how they operated.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How about inside your staff, General. You didn't have any opposite to Lieutenant Burr?

General SHORT. I did not have any opposite to Lieutenant Burr but I did have, as I say, Major Fleming who operated at irregular intervals, and I did too; and I had conferences at that particular period, frequent enough that I think anything of importance would have been given to me personally.

[8208] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you know now that the Navy was not conducting long-range reconnaissance in the direction from which the Japanese attack came?

General SHORT. I grant you that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you didn't know back at that time it was not being done, did you?

General SHORT. No; and I don't know any more than the Navy knew that that was the direction they were coming. They had made the decision. I don't know whether it was on account of weather conditions that that was thought the most dangerous direction.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't know at that time that that decision had been made?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, before Senator George proceeds I would like to make one request, in the interest, I hope, of expediting.

I have made a request for the documents from the War and Navy Departments with particular reference to the Judge Advocate General reports on discussions in connection with the Roberts Commission.¹ I have a very full memorandum from the office of our counsel enclosing five items from the War [8209] Department, who, apparently, gave a considerably broader construction to my request than the Navy did.

It seems to me that they are documents of very considerable importance in connection with the historical record dealing with the contemplated action of The Adjutant General as recommended to them. I don't know whether this has ever come to the attention of General Short or not.

Have you ever seen the possible charges that were contemplated in connection with your case?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. How long since you have had those?

General SHORT. I think in the last 2 or 3 days.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I would like to request that these, there are five items, be made an exhibit in this case, in order that they may

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5495 et seq.

be formally a part of the record, and then at any appropriate time General Short may make any comment that he desires regarding some of the comments, some of which are favorable, some of which are unfavorable.

[8210] The CHAIRMAN. Does the Chair understand the Senator to want to make as an exhibit here some informal memoranda in the War Department upon which charges might have been based but were not?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I would not call it informal. It is a formal report of the Judge Advocate General discussing the whole case at length and giving a very comprehensive review of it, analyzing all of it, and it seems to me that this will inevitably in the future be a thing that will be one of the things that will be considered and it seemed to me that it ought properly to be a part of our record. If there is some question about it I would be glad to defer it for discussion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, my only question was your request is to put it all in as an exhibit?

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I was not clear on that. You said there were four or five things.

Senator BREWSTER. Four or five items which are submitted here, which have been submitted.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you are not desiring to pick out part of it?

Senator BREWSTER. Oh, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You want to put it all in?

[8211] Senator BREWSTER. That is right, including the letter from the War Department transmitting it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As an exhibit?

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to be clear.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask the Senator how long that material that he has there has been available?

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel has a suggestion.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, with reference to the situation as to the Navy, I will get the representative of the Navy to make a search to see whether the Adjutant General's office participated to any extent whatever—

Senator BREWSTER. The Judge Advocate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The Judge Advocate's office participated to any extent whatever in relation to the Roberts report or a report on the Roberts report and investigation and he says that he will make a further investigation and report to me. When I get that I will turn it over to Senator Brewster.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how long this material that is now being made an exhibit has been available?

Senator BREWSTER. I should say perhaps 50 pages.

Mr. MURPHY. No, I am asking how long it has been available to the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. I have seen it about 10 minutes. I [8212] received it about 10 minutes ago.

Mr. MURPHY. No other member of the committee has seen it or knows what is in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair suggests that the Senator withhold his request until other members have had a chance to look at it. I don't know that there will be any objection to it.

Senator BREWSTER. That is quite all right. I just brought up the point to be sure that General Short had ample opportunity to examine it before he was cross-examined on it, because naturally you could not give this to him and expect that he would make any comment within a short time, that is all I had in mind. Perhaps it can be adjusted this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be obviously impossible, if no member of the committee ever has seen it, to examine it.

Senator BREWSTER. As an exhibit, I assume it will be available to everybody, but I have no desire to press the request, Mr. Chairman, immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, we will pass on it later.

General SHORT. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General SHORT. If that is material, if this material is being put in it seems to me appropriate that the letters pre- [8213] ceding this and which caused the Judge Advocate General to prepare the opinion he did be put in.

Senator BREWSTER. I would think so; I agree with you and that is what I expected. I am not certain whether all of the correspondence is included here or not but I would certainly say that it should be.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, does the General have that correspondence?

General SHORT. I have it, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Could we see it?

General SHORT. I will state that there is one item of the correspondence that I have not been able to get from the official files. I asked Colonel Duncombe for it and it has not yet been located. It was a personal letter to the Chief of Staff forwarding an application to the Adjutant General, and I have a copy of that letter that I can put in.

Senator BREWSTER. What was the date of that?

General SHORT. That was January 25.

Senator BREWSTER. 26th?

General SHORT. 25th, a personal letter from me to the Chief of Staff and I have not been provided with that official letter by the War Department but I do have a copy of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The year, General?

[8214] General SHORT. January 25, 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Might we see what you have then?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I have here a letter of January 25, 1942, from Oklahoma City, Okla. "Subject: Time." Is that the letter?

General SHORT. That probably is it. May I see it?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General SHORT. That probably is it. That to which I am referring is one that I did not succeed in getting. No, sir; this is the letter that I enclosed with the personal letter.

Senator BREWSTER. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, any additional documents or letters that might be well made a part of the exhibit should be passed upon when the committee passes on the exhibit later on.

General SHORT. Shall these just be turned in or read?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think probably you might turn them in, General. It will be acted upon when the other matter is reached.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just as a suggestion, Senator, why don't you turn the thing over to Mr. Masten and let him get it all together and bring it to our attention this afternoon and then we will know what you want to offer?

Senator BREWSTER. That is precisely what I was going to [8215] suggest. I think that would be the orderly way to handle it and make sure that General Short's counsel can cover the case as completely as they wish.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. General Short, I have not heard all of your direct testimony and very little, practically none, of the cross examination by counsel and at this time, at least, I wish to ask you about only one matter.

I believe it is agreed, so far as your direct statement goes, that the function of the Navy under the joint agreement approved March the 28th by Admiral Bloch and yourself was to provide distant reconnaissance.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. Or deep reconnaissance.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Was there ever any dispute about the function of the Navy?

General SHORT. Never. I am sure that they agreed fully. I think Admiral Kimmel's testimony stated specifically that it was his responsibility.

Senator GEORGE. That was my recollection but I wish to know if there was any dispute or doubt about it. General Marshall also seems to have agreed that distant reconnaissance was a naval function and the Army commander was liable to [8216] furnish them such planes suitable for that purpose as could be provided.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In his examination before the Army board General Marshall made this direct statement also:

As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in detaching units to serve in the Navy.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. You say you only had actually about six planes that were suitable for this type of service or kind of service?

General SHORT. That is correct. I had 12 B-17's but 6 of them had been stripped of parts to keep the planes going to the Philippines going, so we had only 6 that could operate.

Senator GEORGE. Only six?

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral Kimmel was aware of that condition with respect to these planes?

General SHORT. We had an arrangement whereby every day General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger exchanged information as to what planes were actually in condition to operate that day, and I think they [8217] knew every day the exact number.

Senator GEORGE. Now, General, I wish to ask you, because I am not able to quite interpret it, in view of the fact that it was the function of the Navy to provide at least distant reconnaissance, and that fact was known to General Marshall, because he has testified to it not only in this but in prior hearings, what did he mean precisely by his message of November 27, which probably was not received by you until the 28th or maybe later—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No; he said he received it the same day.

Senator GEORGE. Later on the 27th. According to General Marshall's testimony, as I recollect it, it was reported to have left very late on the day of the 27th, but that is immaterial.

What did he mean by this statement to you, this direct directive:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

What did he mean by "such reconnaissance" in that message?

General SHORT. I think that got into that message due to the fact that General Marshall did not write the message. He had approved the arrangement with the Navy, and I am sure that if he had personally written the message or had seen it [8218] before it went out that he would have known that it was the Navy function. I think that is the complete answer as to why that expression was used in there.

Senator GEORGE. Well, were you charged with the duty or responsibility of carrying on any type or kind of reconnaissance?

General SHORT. We were supposed to carry reconnaissance up to 20 miles from the shore. We actually, on account of the planes that we were using, usually sent them not beyond 10 miles, and it depended on the visual ability of the pilot for the other 10. The only value that that had was in connection with submarines because the time element was such that if they had seen an enemy plane it would have been in there before they could have made a report.

Senator GEORGE. It would have been of no service so far as it contemplated—

General SHORT. So far as an air attack went; no, sir.

Senator GEORGE. So far as an air attack went. General, now I would like to ask you this direct question: It just troubles me very greatly.

General Marshall, with the knowledge that you were not charged with the responsibility of carrying on any distant reconnaissance, or deep reconnaissance, nevertheless directed you to undertake "such reconnaissance and other measures as [8219] you deem necessary." Your immediate reply to that message was that you had alerted against sabotage as you have described.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There is nothing in the suggestion "and undertake such reconnaissance," is there, that would bring to your mind the suggestion, rather, that you should simply alert against sabotage? In other words, isn't it inconsistent with the response which you immediately made that you had alerted against sabotage when his direction to you was to take some type of reconnaissance?

General SHORT. Such as I deemed necessary and in view of the fact that it was the Navy's responsibility, fully admitted by them, approved by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations and with a definite provision in that agreement that that would only be abrogated

upon written notice, so it was my best judgment that there was not any reconnaissance necessary for me to take.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I could understand that but what I do not understand is how you could have consistently interpreted this directive here to you to mean an alert against sabotage when the use of the word "reconnaissance" here certainly would indicate something beyond an alert against sabotage as I understand it. I am a mere layman and trying to [8220] understand that situation as it actually existed.

General SHORT. Since I was not—since the Army was not taking any reconnaissance I did not report it because it was a naval function, they were the ones that would make a reconnaissance.

Senator GEORGE. I think that seems to be rather clear, yet General Marshall did approve this message that went to you and in it he refers to "reconnaissance."

General SHORT. As I understand it he did not see that message till the day after it was sent. His name was signed to it. While his name was signed to it it was prepared by General Gerow and the Secretary of War.

Senator GEORGE. General, I do not recall the exact testimony of General Marshall but my recollection was that he did say that he had approved the message although he was absent from Washington until late in the day that the message was dated, down in North Carolina on some sort of inspection trip.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He said he went over it on the 26th.

Senator GEORGE. Yes, but I think it is clear that the function of the Navy was to provide any distant reconnaissance that might become necessary or that might be ordered and I think it is clear that General Marshall himself knew of that understanding and that agreement and I am just curious to know why he should have directed you to take such reconnaissance [8221] as you thought necessary under those circumstances?

General SHORT. Well, I believe he read that message; he said that he thought he saw the message on the 28th after he returned from maneuvers and apparently, if it struck him at all, he did not think it was significant enough to send me a message correcting it because he did not know it before it was sent.

Senator GEORGE. There is no dispute here in this record that you did advise precisely what you had done.

General SHORT. Just exactly.

Senator GEORGE. And that that was in response to a request in that message.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And that thereafter you had no advice that your alert against sabotage was insufficient or inadequate.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. You had known of the warning messages—code messages about destruction of codes or important paper messages sent to you prior to the attack?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, that is all that I have to ask General Short, at least at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

[8222] Mr. CLARK. General, I wish to ask you only a very few questions.

At or about the time you took command at Pearl Harbor it was suggested, I think, by General Marshall that the chief danger to our establishment at Hawaii was an attack by air. Did you agree with that?

General SHORT. I think that I took his suggestion that if an attack came—he stated that there were three things that were of primary importance that would cause the danger and the first thing he mentioned was sabotage; the second was attack by air or submarine.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I have the impression from this record that he listed attack by air as the chief danger.

General SHORT. May I read exactly what he said in that letter? In the next to the last paragraph he states:

Risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air or by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation.

Mr. CLARK. And he goes on to eliminate much danger from a landing attack.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, you agreed with that estimate?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And subsequent events proved it to be correct. [8223]

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. You did not on or about the 7th of December anticipate any surprise attack by air, did you?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. CLARK. You had something to say in your statement about requests made for additional equipment. Do you think that the combined equipment and manpower of the Army and Navy as it existed on the 7th of December was sufficient to have discovered and broken up or greatly lessened the damage if it had been fully employed?

General SHORT. That is very difficult to say, whether we would necessarily have discovered the carriers. If we had been told 4 hours, which was possible, before the attack of the time set for the delivery of the ultimatum we might have been lucky and picked up the carriers.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I don't think you quite get my question, General, if you will pardon me. I am asking you whether from, say, the 27th of November until the 7th of December if full use had been made of all the equipment and manpower available under the joint agreement between the Army and Navy, do you think that the attack might have been discovered or broken up or its effect greatly lessened with just what you had?

General SHORT. I think to have made the maximum use of [8224] that and felt justified in making the maximum use of it we would have had to have something pointing to Hawaii. Admiral Kimmel had orders to make a deployment preparatory to placing War Plan 46 into operation, which was an offensive against the Mandate Islands.

Now, if we had had something that indicated an attack at Pearl Harbor he undoubtedly would have discarded that part and would have devoted everything he had toward the reconnaissance. He apparently did not feel that he could use up all of his planes and maybe

having nothing at the critical time when he got an order to take an offensive action in the Carolines. I think a more positive indication as to an attack on Hawaii would have made him use the types of planes that he had very definitely for reconnaissance and would have given a suitable opportunity of locating the Japanese carriers.

Mr. CLARK. Well, did I understand you to consider the use of the ships in the manner that they were used as constituting a deployment?

General SHORT. Undoubtedly he was using his ships—I don't know just exactly in what way, but he was told to use them as a defensive deployment preparatory to going forward.

Mr. CLARK. There were some ships out, that he had sent to these islands, one of which was on the way back in.

[8225] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And if I have your testimony correctly you have presented that here as constituting a deployment to that extent in that area.

General SHORT. No; I presented that as constituting a reconnaissance.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I meant reconnaissance when I said deployment.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, with those particular ships aside was there not sufficient equipment still on the island to have conducted a considerable reconnaissance?

General SHORT. A considerable reconnaissance but not 360°, and it still would have been a matter of his judgment as to what was the dangerous sector of that 360°.

Mr. CLARK. But the fact that you could not cover the entire 360° would not constitute any reason, would it, for not employing that equipment to the full extent possible?

General SHORT. No, sir. I think probably what influenced him in that was that he felt his job was going to be to take offensive action, that he did not want to get his planes and his crews into such shape that they would not be able to take that when they got the order.

Mr. CLARK. Now, you think that was the reason, or was it [8226] the reason, really, that he was not dreaming of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

General SHORT. He did not expect a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. CLARK. And neither did you.

General SHORT. Neither did I.

Mr. CLARK. And, consequently, this material and equipment and men were not used at the site where there might be a surprise attack, isn't that correct?

General SHORT. I believe that Admiral Kimmel is a more logical person to ask as to why he did not employ his ships and planes.

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

General SHORT. But I feel that unquestionably that the fact that we had had nothing pointing to an attack on Hawaii very definitely entered into his use of his ships and planes.

Mr. CLARK. Just why did you go into an antisabotage?

General SHORT. Because there never had been at any time anything since June 1940 indicating that the War Department believed that an attack on Hawaii was probable, so that left it if hostilities oc-

curred and did not include an attack, then it left nothing but sabotage and internal disorders.

[8227] Mr. CLARK. Would you mind stating what difference in routine or daily action you invoked upon going on an antisabotage alert?

General SHORT. When you went into an antisabotage alert, the men who were placed as guards over all the vital installations like bridges, telephone exchanges, gasoline tanks, everything of that kind, naturally were not continuing in their training, in instruction.

There were also two battalions that remained on a 24-hour alert, with every man required to be present, with the motor transportation there so that they could be moved to any part of the island to put down any possible uprising or disorder.

All of the rest of the men in the Department continued their training.

Now, that was sabotage alert No. 1. When you went to No. 2 you had this same provision against sabotage, but in addition to that you had arrangements to meet a surface, or subsurface, or an air attack. That meant every plane and every man in the Air Corps was devoting his attention to being ready to meet an air attack. You would probably have a squadron of pursuit planes in the air all the time. You would have certain other squadrons warmed up, and they would all be so alerted that they could get in the air [8228] in a certain number of minutes. The planes that would not be in the air would be in the bunkers. The men belonging to the crew would be in the bunkers, would sleep in the bunkers. They had their gasoline there, had ammunition there.

The harbor defense troops would be fully manned, ready to fire upon any approaching Japanese ships. The anti-aircraft guns would be all at the prescribed positions and with full crews and ammunition immediately at hand and ready to fire.

I would like to explain, if I may at this point, that some may have gotten the wrong idea yesterday in presenting that table signed by Colonel Wing. A considerable number of those batteries had to move maybe 20 miles, so that accounted for the length of time from the time they were alerted until they were ready to fire.

That is not part of your question, but I wanted to point that out because that naturally came in with alert No. 1.

Now, you see, in that case the only people who could continue to train would be the infantry divisions. Everything else practically would be alerted.

The infantry divisions could go ahead with their training, because they are not part of alert No. 2.

[8229] When you come to alert No. 3, that is an all-out alert, where every man goes to his battle position, every company and platoon, battalion, of infantry go to their positions, take up their positions, ready to meet an attack, and if their positions have not been developed and improved they would start continuing the development, doing more digging, if they need to, putting out barbed wire in front of them, doing everything to meet a landing attack.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir.

Getting back to the alert you did take, the antisabotage alert, about the only difference there as against what you were doing before would

be to put these particular men on a 24-hour basis rather than regular hours?

General SHORT. I would like to explain that rather fully.

Mr. CLARK. I would like to get clear as to just what difference it made.

General SHORT. Between that and ordinary times?

Mr. CLARK. That is right.

General SHORT. If there had been no alarming condition we would not have had any of those men out over bridges and civilian installations and things of that kind. If [8230] it was just normal peacetimes, I would not have any of that on.

Now, as a matter of fact, beginning July 8, the situation was such that we put considerable number of men out.

When we got this message of November 27, I had the sentinels checked. That was especially true along the water front because we had a very serious situation, that all the gasoline that was available commercially in Hawaii, which meant a great amount, was open to easy sabotage.

I had General Murray, who commanded the Twentyfifth Division, occupy the positions on the south side of the island, and Colonel Fielder, who was the G-2, personally go over the whole situation with respect to sentinels, to recommend changes, and we made a very decided overhaul, and put on a great many additional sentinels. We did a most thorough job, and particularly around the water front where there was danger from fire from gasoline, and so forth.

Mr. CLARK. But that was all precautions against what might take place by people located on the island.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. It did not make any great change in that situation?

General SHORT. Well, it required a considerable number [8231] of more men. There were more men who were not able to go on with their training. We felt it made a very considerable change in that we were much safer as far as any internal action went than we were before, because we spent the whole time in going into that extremely carefully.

Mr. CLARK. That was the extent of the action that you, as the commanding officer, felt that you could take in response to the message you received on the 27th?

General SHORT. With the information I had that was all the enemy action I anticipated, or expected.

Mr. CLARK. Just what was there in this message that caused you to feel there might be more danger of injury from people on the island?

General SHORT. I thought there was more danger of imminent action.

Mr. CLARK. Beg pardon?

General SHORT. I thought there was great danger of imminent hostilities. Since they had never at any time pointed toward Hawaii as a place of attack, and the officers who wrote their estimate on November 29 said they definitely eliminated it, as I saw the thing, our problem was to meet internal disorders.

Mr. CLARK. Could you give the committee an illustration of any internal disorder, you had had before [8232] that?

General SHORT. I had tried to state that we had tightened the ring so that there would not be any. We had succeeded; there never was.

Mr. CLARK. From the time you got there until the 7th of December, there was no internal disorder?

General SHORT. No, sir; but there had been for almost 2 years a considerable number of sentinels on duty watching. There had hardly been a time in 2 years that they had not had considerable guards out against sabotage.

Mr. CLARK. Had there been any sabotage?

General SHORT. No sir; but that is no indication that there would not be. We all knew the possibilities, with the large Japanese population, and I think most of us remembered the sabotage that had taken place in the United States in 1917, and we were determined to prevent that, if possible.

Mr. CLARK. Now, although there had been no sabotage, the only action you took pursuant to this message was to further guard against it?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. Now, if you had gone on an all-out alert, according to your testimony, as I got it, it would have [8233] attracted a great deal of attention on the island?

General SHORT. Unquestionably. We would have troops move under full field equipment over practically every road on the island.

Mr. CLARK. Practically everybody on the island would have known what was taking place?

General SHORT. I think they would. I think we had hundreds of Japanese-Americans actually in the service at that time, in the National Guard regiments. Some of those may have been Japanese agents. We didn't know.

Mr. CLARK. Now, was there anything to keep Admiral Kimmel from noticing that you were not on that kind of an alert?

General SHORT. I think if he had been ashore, he would have noticed it, if we had gone on the all-out alert, because he could not have helped seeing the movement of troops.

Mr. CLARK. But he was ashore, wasn't he?

General SHORT. From his headquarters at Pearl Harbor, I do not know that he could see any traffic.

Mr. CLARK. Well, you mean to tell the committee everybody on the island would have known you were on an all-out alert, except Admiral Kimmel?

General SHORT. Undoubtedly some of the Navy people [8234] would have known.

Mr. CLARK. He says he did not know that you were not on an all-out alert.

General SHORT. I still insist it was faulty staff work on the part of the Fourteenth Naval District if he did not know.

Mr. CLARK. And you did not know that he was making a long-distant reconnaissance?

General SHORT. I knew he was making considerable long-distance reconnaissance. I did not know the exact time the planes were going out, or the exact location of the ships, but I knew he was making considerable long-distance reconnaissance. He told me he had tightened up all along the line. That was the expression he used.

Mr. CLARK. Did you consider that important, General?

General SHORT. I did.

Mr. CLARK. You knew he had not called on you for the use of the long-distance reconnaissance planes under your control?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, and there might have been a very good reason. In the first place, I had only six, and those six planes were the only planes in Honolulu, either Army or Navy, that could go and bomb a carrier that had plane protection, and had any chance to get away [8325] with it, that could fight as well as carry bombs. The Navy patrol planes were too cumbersome. If the carrier were protected with planes in the air in the vicinity they probably would be shot down if they tried to bomb.

The B-17's were the only planes in the whole islands suitable for bombing missions. That might have been his reason for not calling on them for a patrol mission, because if they located a carrier, and he wanted to bomb, they were the only planes that could fight their way through and have a reasonable chance of getting home.

Mr. CLARK. At any rate, you knew he did not call on you?

General SHORT. He did not call on me.

Mr. CLARK. You knew he was hard pressed for planes with which to make long-distance reconnaissance?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. And even with the Army planes, he did not have enough to cover the whole 360°, you say?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. Because of that circumstance, did it occur to you to inquire particularly as to whether this reconnaissance could be made?

General SHORT. Well, as I say, I knew that a considerable reconnaissance was being made.

[8236] Mr. CLARK. I am asking you whether or not the fact he did not call for your reconnaissance planes, did not raise the question in your mind as to whether it was being made to the fullest extent possible with the equipment available?

General SHORT. As I said, I had so few—six—and they were so much the best planes for a bombing mission, if such mission became necessary, that I think it would have been very sound judgment for him not to use those as long as he could avoid it, because they were the ones he would want to drive home the bombing attack.

Mr. CLARK. The fact he did not call on those planes did not raise that particular question in your mind?

General SHORT. No, sir.

If he had felt the need of them badly probably his air men would have asked for every one of my air men, as to whether to send them out or hold them for a bombing mission.

Mr. CLARK. I think Mr. Cooper has already touched on what is in my mind, therefore I will not take the liberty of repeating the question.

Was there anything more important to the proper protection of this establishment in Hawaii than the state of alert the Army was on at the time the long distance recon- [8237] naissance would be conducted?

General SHORT. Certainly the reconnaissance was perfectly important. The state of alert was undoubtedly limited, if I carried out specifically the last sentence in my order, which said:

Disseminate this vitally secret information to the minimum essential officers.

Now, it did not say "officers and men."

The minute you ordered either alert No. 2 or alert No. 3 you had to tell every enlisted man that was put in position why he was there, and what he was to shoot at.

Mr. CLARK. Yes; I understand your position about that because I listened to your testimony. But may it not be that the information not to be given out, that was limited to the officers, was the general information? That does not refer exclusively to the alert. It does not say "alert."

General SHORT. The only information it gave was general information that there was a big chance of hostilities with Japan.

Mr. CLARK. Your position was that you could not have gone on an all out-alert without having gone contrary to this message of the 27th?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. Did it occur to you, if that was your [8238] opinion, that you might ask for a clarification on that?

General SHORT. I thought that the War Department should understand perfectly. They told me to report measures taken. They knew exactly what I was doing. They had 9 days in which to tell me I was wrong, that I should do something more or something less, and they took no action whatever.

Mr. CLARK. In that 9 days, did it occur to you that you might ask them to clarify this apparent contradiction in the message?

General SHORT. I did not think so because it struck me the things that they were primarily interested in were, first, avoiding war; second, avoiding any possible international incident that would give Japan an excuse for going to war, or for using propaganda that we had started the war.

[8239] Mr. CLARK. And notwithstanding the fact that that message, I think you said, was not to jeopardize the safety of the establishment down there?

General SHORT. That was in regard to the first overt act. They did not say that in regard to the dissemination of information.

Mr. CLARK. What I was asking you about was the comparative importance of the kind of alert you were on and the long-distance reconnaissance that was not being made. Was there anything there more important than that, in your judgment?

General SHORT. The long-distance reconnaissance, if it obtained positive information I could have changed my type of alert in a very few minutes. I actually had completed the change in 7 minutes when the attack took place. Our plans were so drawn that everybody understood them to the last man. We had moved into position with those plans so the time required, if we got any information from Washington or from the Navy that indicated an attack on Hawaii, it was simply a question of minutes in going into the correct alert.

Mr. CLARK. In view of the fact that you did not know that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance, or whether it was conducting a long-distance reconnaissance, and in view of Admiral Kimmel's testimony that he did not know you had not gone on an all-out alert, just what did you [8240] mean in the reply to the message of the 27th by saying, "Liaison with the Navy"?

General SHORT. That I was keeping in touch with the Navy, and I thought I knew what they were doing. I still think I knew. Not in exact detail, but I knew generally what they were doing. Frankly, it had not occurred to me that he did not know the type of alert we were on.

Mr. CLARK. But in view of the fact that you did not know precisely what the Navy was doing about long-distance reconnaissance, and that Admiral Kimmel did not know you had not gone on an all-out alert, do you think your statement to the War Department "Liaison with the Navy" would have been justified?

General SHORT. When I made that statement I had no reason to believe he would not know exactly what my alert was, because, as I say, he had an officer there who knew exactly what we were doing, who had no other function except to report it, and I knew from a 3-hour conference that morning exactly what he was doing in the way of reconnaissance. Not in detail, but I mean the general picture. I thought he was covering from east of Midway around west and south to Palmyra.

Mr. CLARK. General Short, I do not know whether it might be an argument for or against unity of command, or anything of that sort, but as a member of this committee I am rather [8241] seriously impressed by the fact that you, as the commander in chief of the Army, and Admiral Kimmel, as the commander in chief of the Navy, in fact did not know what the other was doing about some very vital matters on Pearl Harbor.

If you can clarify my mind any further in that respect I would appreciate it.

General SHORT. I would like to answer that rather fully.

Command by cooperation necessarily depends, to a considerable extent, on the personality of the two commanders. I believe if Admiral Kimmel and I had full information from Washington that our relations were such that we could have made cooperation work. However, I will state, on general principles, in the average situation, that I believe unity of command is a much stronger, much safer proposition.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir; except I do not quite see the unity in actual operation at Hawaii.

General SHORT. Unity of command did not exist in Hawaii until after the attack.

Mr. CLARK. Even in view of the contract that was executed between the Army and the Navy?

General SHORT. There was only one place where we had provision for unity of command and that was when planes were turned over by the Army to the Navy or by the Navy to the Army [8242] That was the only unity of command that was provided. There was no other unity of command. That was cooperation.

Mr. CLARK. Just one thing further I would like to ask you. Why did you not operate the radar for longer hours than from 4 to 7?

General SHORT. Well, there were three reasons. In the first place, the information I had did not cause me to expect an air attack. I really did not expect it, but I decided to operate during the most dangerous hours anyway.

We had a very limited number of trained men. When you operated the information center and the interceptor command you needed your best crew on, because there was no use wasting the time of the people at the information center by putting men on the radar who did not know how to operate it. We needed time during the day for training purposes.

In the third place, we had no spare parts except what we took from the permanent sets that were not in use. If we operated 24 hours a day there was a very considerable chance that by the end of a few days we would not have more than one or two stations that would be capable of operating.

Mr. CLARK. I want to say before I desist entirely, sir, that I have great respect for you and your honorable record as an officer in the Army. I have some sympathy for you for having gotten into a situation of the kind you encountered [8243] at Pearl Harbor. It has been a hard experience for you, sir, and I appreciate the very clear statement you have made to the committee.

General SHORT. I thank you very much. I tried to be perfectly frank with the committee, and I hope I have succeeded.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee at this point will recess until 2 o'clock, at which time Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, General.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[8244]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Does counsel have anything at this point?

Mr. KAUFMAN. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, do you have anything before your examination is resumed?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, General.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

Senator LUCAS. General Short, I have listened with a great deal of attention to the memorandum that you furnished the committee in which you set forth your views concerning this Pearl Harbor disaster. The language that you use in paragraph 98 of your statement expresses in rather terse and forceful terms your views, and I just want to ask you one question on that. [Reading:]

Unjust War Department Treatment: I do not feel that I have been treated fairly or with justice by the War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for the disaster.

Following that statement I should like to ask you whether or not you bear any ill will against the former President of [8245] the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, as a result of your retirement in December 1941?

General SHORT. I do not.

Senator LUCAS. General Short, I desire to call your attention to the November 27 message and even though there may be some repetition there I believe that I should like to ask you a question or two in order to satisfy my own mind.

That message was sent by General Marshall on November the 27th and in that message General Marshall states, among other things, that you are to "undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."

Now, you have been examined with much care upon that one line in the message. I should like to ask you what you understand that "deep reconnaissance" means?

General SHORT. Exactly the same thing as distant reconnaissance. It would be reconnaissance—I would say according to the Martin study it should go to the extent of a thousand and fifty miles. That is what the Martin study determined should be made to be safe.

Senator LUCAS. Now, did you have any planes at your command at that time which would carry out a distance reconnaissance?

General SHORT. I had six planes.

Senator LUCAS. And as I understand it the Navy had 39 [8246] planes.

General SHORT. I believe it was 49. I am not positive.

Senator LUCAS. I think you are correct. At least the Navy had the bulk of the planes to carry out any long distance reconnaissance?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And, of course, as we know, through the joint agreement it was the duty of the Navy to carry out any reconnaissance under any orders that you as commander or Admiral Kimmel as commander of the fleet might have received?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. When you received this message did this statement asking you to undertake such reconnaissance signify anything of unusual importance with respect to our danger from Japan?

General SHORT. It would simply indicate to me that while they had not pointed in any way toward us that they wanted to be a little surer than they would normally be that the Japs were not sending anything in there.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I have that answer read?

General SHORT. It was maybe poorly put in.

Senator LUCAS. Will you read the answer, Mr. Reporter, please?

[8247] (The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator LUCAS. Do you want to clarify that answer in any way, General?

General SHORT. Is that clear to you?

Senator LUCAS. It is clear to me.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know as I understand what you mean by "a little clearer."

General SHORT. Did I say "a little clearer"?

Senator FERGUSON. Or "a little surer."

General SHORT. A little surer.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by "a little surer"?

General SHORT. They were just inclined to take a few more precautions than they would normally take because they felt that hostilities were imminent.

Senator LUCAS. Well, isn't it a fact, General, that when General Herron was there in 1940 long-range reconnaissance was held for some weeks?

General SHORT. It was held, I think, from June 17 through July 16 and then the sabotage part of the alert was continued on for probably another month.

Senator LUCAS. And in that long-range reconnaissance, as I recall, the evidence discloses that both the Army and the Navy participated in that operation but it was under the jurisdiction of the Navy.

General SHORT. At that time there was not a written agreement putting the responsibility upon the Navy. Actually, through a personal agreement at the time they did it the same way but it had not been laid down in written form and had the approval of the War and the Navy Departments.

Senator LUCAS. In the summer of 1940 is the only time that any long-range reconnaissance was ever carried on?

General SHORT. I could not be sure of that. It may be that Admiral Kimmel, when he got a message like the one of October 16, he carried on some. He was carrying on some habitually on the perimeter, which was over a thousand miles out from Oahu. He was sending planes from Johnston Island to Wake Island to Midway, which was well—and part of it well over a thousand miles, so he was conducting habitually some long-range reconnaissance.

Senator LUCAS. Is there any difference in what a patrol plane can do and what a long-range reconnaissance plane does?

General SHORT. I would say exactly the same thing.

Senator LUCAS. The same thing?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you understand that Admiral Kimmel if he were carrying out long-range reconnaissance was doing that as a result of this message or had he been doing that before?

[8249] General SHORT. Well, he had been doing some before. I think from what he told me that he had tightened up all along the line and that he was doing more.

Senator LUCAS. Then this word or, rather, this statement, as I understand it, given to you by General Marshall in his message of November the 27th, did not mean very much to you?

General SHORT. There was one thing that I was responsible for but it was not of much value, and that was the in-shore reconnaissance that went out only 20 miles and was really of value only against submarines. As far as an air attack, it was absolutely valueless. That was our responsibility and we did that in two ways: We had one reconnaissance squadron that did nothing but train in reconnaissance and fly around the perimeter of Oahu and then all of our fighters that were training over the island of Oahu normally were taught reconnaissance at the same time.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever at any time before receive a message signed by General Marshall while you were in command of Hawaii?

General SHORT. I believe that is the only message. I received a good many letters but I believe that was the only message. I am not sure about that.

Senator LUCAS. Well, this is a command message, is it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8250] Senator LUCAS. And there is a distinct difference in Army circles and Navy circles between a command message and one that is merely sent for information?

General SHORT. Yes; but a command message may be sent by the adjutant general as well as the chief of staff, either one.

Senator LUCAS. Did the fact that General Marshall was sending you, for the first time in your career as commander of the Hawaiian Department, a message, make any unusual impression upon you as to the danger that might exist?

General SHORT. I, practically, got from that message that they considered hostilities imminent and that they were particularly anxious to avoid war, if it was possible to do so, and that they did not want any international incident in Hawaii that would either provoke Japan or enable her to say that we were starting the war. I think probably if I thought about the fact that it was signed by Marshall I might have thought that that was his personal angle on the thing, to be sure we were careful to not produce a state of war, not producing the effect that we had started the war.

Senator LUCAS. The mere fact that General Marshall, who was chief of staff of the Army at that time, had his hands in the fire in many different places throughout the world, and of course you knew that it would take time and effort to [8251] send you a message of this kind, seems to me it should have probably fired your imagination immediately on the dangers existing.

General SHORT. Well, that indicated at least his specific interest, and I thought from the message that his first interest of all was to be sure that we were doing nothing to precipitate a war; that it looked like hostilities were imminent and what he was particularly cautioning us against—and I took it it was possibly a very personal desire of his—that we do nothing to precipitate a war.

Senator LUCAS. General Short, what time did you receive this message of November 27?

General SHORT. I think it was sometime after 2 o'clock. I am not sure of the exact time.

Senator LUCAS. In the afternoon?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And where were you at the time when the message came?

General SHORT. I was in my office, in my headquarters.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand the record, you replied to General Marshall within 30 minutes' time after receiving the message.

General SHORT. I made my decision within that time. The message I do not think got out of the Signal Office that fast, [8252] but I made my decision in that time.

Senator LUCAS. And before making your decision you conferred with no member of your staff as to the meaning or the significance of this message?

General SHORT. I conferred with the chief of staff and General Fielder, G-2, yes, sir. I conferred with him before the message went, but I was rather of the opinion that I made my decision before the conference. I am not sure.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if I am in error in that statement of course I apologize to you, sir.

General SHORT. I conferred with the chief of staff definitely, and it is possible—the time was so close together that I am not sure that I talked with G-2 immediately before or immediately after.

Senator LUCAS. In that reply message of yours you stated "Alerted to sabotage; liaison with the Navy." How did you alert your command to sabotage within that short space of time?

General SHORT. We had the standing operating procedure that laid down definitely what every unit would do, and we issued the order as an oral order, and it went out over the telephone in a very few minutes; it was not take over 10 minutes at the outset to put it into effect, because everybody knew what was required. We had that standing operating procedure. You did not have to tell anybody what his business [8253] was.

Senator LUCAS. Well, your standing operating procedure at that particular time was with respect to sabotage, was it not?

General SHORT. No; it was with respect to the three alerts. All we had to do, when the phone message went out, was to go into alert No. 1.

Senator LUCAS. And what alert were you operating under previous to the time you received the message?

General SHORT. We were not operating under an alert, but we had out a very considerable number of guards over vital installations. We were not fully under alert No. 1; we were, you might say, half way, because there were certain installations that were so important that they had been really guarded for months.

Senator LUCAS. Then you took sole responsibility for alerting your command to sabotage immediately after receiving this message of November 27?

General SHORT. That is correct. I sent for two officers who would be most intimately concerned, General Martin and General Burgin, and I conferred with them some time within the next hour or hour and a half.

Senator LUCAS. And that is true notwithstanding the fact that there is not a single word in that message which talks about sabotage?

[8254] General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. It has always been just a little difficult for me to understand why your message was not a little more responsive to the message that was sent by General Marshall.

General SHORT. It is just an interpretation of what the message means to you. I think I was influenced almost wholly by the fact that no War Department message or estimate since June 17, 1940, had ever pointed to the probability of an air attack or a raid.

Senator LUCAS. That is probably true; but the record is rather complete here that everybody in Hawaii, both in the Army and Navy, were talking about the possibility of an air attack, that is from February on at least until October, and they were also having air drills. contemplating, I presume, an air attack, were they not?

General SHORT. We had lots of drills. We talked about the possibility.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

General SHORT. But everything that we got from the War Department in the nature of a probability indicating where the attack would come pointed toward the Philippines, Borneo, the Kra Peninsula.

down in that part of the world, and at Guam in one instance, and then in the next wire they took Guam [8255] out so as to give them sabotage orders. I think we should make a big distinction between the "possibility" orders and "probability" on account of the information we had from the War Department.

[8256] Senator LUCAS. I think that is a sound conclusion.

Now, following this message that you got from General Marshall, you also received a message from General Miles?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And that was wholly in regard to sabotage?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, and it was Miles' function if he had any information indicating anything beyond sabotage, an all-out attack, a landing attack, or air attack, that he should also have mentioned that.

Senator LUCAS. Who was your G-2 in Hawaii at that time?

General SHORT. Colonel Fielder, now General Fielder, who is still G-2 in the Hawaiian Department.

Senator LUCAS. What were his duties in Hawaii under your command there in the Hawaiian Department?

General SHORT. His duties were naturally to assemble and evaluate all possible enemy information, and the sources of enemy information were purely local. What he was able to get on his own pertained to subversive action. He was dependent on the War Department or the Navy Department for any other type of information. He had no agents outside of Honolulu.

Senator LUCAS. Did he have liaison with the Intelligence man in the Navy in Hawaii? [8257]

General SHORT. He had very close liaison with the man who had charge of the subversive action measures altogether. They had offices side by side in town; they had a teletype that connected the FBI and ONI and G-2, so they could talk back and forth.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand you to say to the committee, General, that all of the information that you received as to the situation existing between Japan and this country in the months preceding the attack came from Washington, D. C.?

General SHORT. Or some from the Navy Department. None on our own. I will amend that slightly. Our contact officer made it a habit to meet the boats from the Orient so he could get in touch with the people who had been living out in China or Japan who were coming through, and pick up anything he could.

Of course the value of that information varied with the individual he talked to. We were never sure how valuable it was, but we carried it on all the time, getting what we could out of these passengers going through.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand your only means of obtaining intelligence information was through the Army and Navy Intelligence Department here in Washington, D. C.?

[8258] General SHORT. No, we got some from the Navy in Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. In Hawaii?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I was going to ask you where Admiral Bloch figured in in that picture, as far as obtaining any intelligence was concerned?

General SHORT. Admiral Bloch had a service, a radio intercept serv-

ice on the location of ships, Japanese ships, and his office kept track of them pretty thoroughly, and on a good many occasions I have seen the map showing the various locations of the Japanese ships as they thought they had been.

I also talked with both Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel as to where the Japanese Fleet was.

Senator LUCAS. There was an interchange then of information with respect to the communications that were received?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I think it was more directly with me than it was with G-2. My liaison with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch was a little closer than his liaison with the man who handled that type of information.

Senator LUCAS. One of the reasons that I have asked these questions is because of what I find in exhibit 33.

[8259] In exhibit 33, on November 26, 1941, I note a memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.

The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12:45 a. m. this date.

In that memorandum they set forth at some length where they believe the Japanese Fleet might be on that particular day. I was just wondering whether you had ever seen that memorandum before it left Hawaii for the Naval Intelligence Department here.

General SHORT. I did not see the memorandum as such. I might have had the information from conversations with Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel, or I might have seen the same thing on the map in Admiral Bloch's headquarters.

Senator LUCAS. The only reason that I mention that is to me it is apparent that Admiral Bloch, or someone out at Hawaii had a considerable amount of information that they had obtained, and thought it valuable enough to send to Washington in order that they might have the advantage of making any evaluation of it that they saw fit.

General SHORT. Yes, sir, they had a regular intercept service. As I understand the thing, Washington took their [8260] estimates and the estimates of the intercept station at Manila. If there was no difference in the information, or if there was no difference of opinion, they accepted it, and if there was a difference of opinion they gave more credence to Manila, because it was closer and they thought it would be more accurate.

Senator LUCAS. Now in that memorandum to the Chief of Staff, which came from the Naval Intelligence of the 14th Naval District, you conclude by saying:

The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant 14th Naval District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia, while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and the Marshall Islands.

Is not that a strong indication that those in Hawaii at the time believed that Japan was going to move toward the Marshall Islands?

General SHORT. That would indicate that they thought some ships were going toward the Marshall Islands. Of course Palao is well down toward the Philippines.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I know.

General SHORT. The Marshalls would have been of decided interest. I don't remember having that piece of information, and I believe I

have seen since in docu- [8261] ments here that Manila disagreed, and within 12 hours they knew from the War Department that Manila had disagreed from that finding, and that may be one reason I never did know about it.

Senator LUCAS. That may be true. I am not certain about whether Manila disagreed with this finding. I am only pointing out the Marshall Islands, because under the Orange war plans, that was where the American fleet was going to strike also.

General SHORT. That was of very great interest.

Senator LUCAS. So if the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, on November 26, 1941, had any information that he believed that the Japanese Fleet, or a part of it might go into the Marshall Islands, you were getting pretty close to where America expected to start her offensive in the event of a declaration of war?

General SHORT. That is correct. It would have been of interest to me, and, as I say, it is possible I did not get it because of the disagreement between the two stations.

Senator LUCAS. I do not think that Admiral Kimmel was interrogated upon that message. I overlooked it. It seems to me it would be rather important as showing definite information on the 26th of November as to what Admiral Bloch [8262] at least, believed with respect to the offensive toward the Marshall Islands.

General SHORT. I believed, incidentally, that that would turn out to be, and it turned out to be false information.

Senator LUCAS. They did not come by way of the Marshalls, but they came north of the Marshalls?

General SHORT. They came way north of the Marshalls.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; that is true.

General SHORT. It could not have been the same force.

Senator LUCAS. I am only using it to point to the information which they believed at that time, that there was a possibility of some sort of a force coming in to the Marshalls which would bring them at least closer to Hawaii, and therefore it should have been, it seems to me, of tremendous significance to the folks in Hawaii with regard to the danger they were facing, whether it was right or wrong.

General SHORT. It would have been of very great interest to me, but I did not get it at the time.

Senator LUCAS. I have been just a little puzzled, General, with respect to your reply to this message of November 27, and the reply of General DeWitt, who was at that time, as I recall, commanding the command on the [8263] west coast.

The message that was sent by General Marshall to you and the message that was sent by General Marshall to General DeWitt on the west coast are almost identical are they not?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. I have been puzzled at your reply when I compare it with the reply of General DeWitt, and here is what he says:

Report following measures taken as per your radio November 27: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area, and Commandants Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Sixth Infantry battalions and necessary motor transportation

alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NTA to carry out his missions under Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and sub sector plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry [8264] out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnishing CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ November 25 which recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps take by me in preparation therefore. As air forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WPL five two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to direct operation of Air forces in defense of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

I presume that there are reasons for the difference in the answers that were made by yourself and the one who was in command of the west coast.

Can you tell why General DeWitt would take the position that he did in replying to the same kind of a message?

General SHORT. I can only make a guess at it. My [8265] guess would be that he did not having a standing operating procedure, and therefore it was necessary for him to go more into detail.

Our standing operating procedure showed that we had two battalions with full motor transportation ready to go any place on the islands.

We didn't mention that because that was part of the standing operating procedure. The reconnaissance apparently had no agreement with the Navy so he had to show the reconnaissance. The air force that he speaks about wanting placed under his command, I think was part of GHQ Air Force that operated directly under Washington, and he was asking to have it put under him for operation.

That is largely an estimate, but I think it is probably a fair one.

Senator LUCAS. His danger was not as much as yours, was it, General?

General SHORT. Well, he had the much longer front, and he had some very vital installations, like all of the factories at Los Angeles, and so it was difficult to say, because he had less, far less personnel to defend with than we had. Our area was a concentrated area where we could take up our positions in a relatively short time. His were hundreds of miles long, and he had a very limited force.

[8266] Senator LUCAS. Well, the thing that struck me as being rather strange was to find a reply of this kind to the same kind of a message and the reply of yours from Hawaii which always seemed to me to be the most dangerous spot perhaps of our outlying possessions or our coastal positions.

General SHORT. I believe it would indicate that our preparation for occupying our positions and everything of that kind were much more complete.

Senator LUCAS. It may be, but he went on an all-out alert; DeWitt went on the all-out alert?

General SHORT. No; I don't think so. He alerted certain infantry battalions. We had certain infantry battalions alerted. If you notice, on his seacoast guns, he alerted, I believe, one gun at the entrance of each harbor.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted.

General SHORT. He only had 1 battery alerted. Around San Francisco he probably had at least 12 and at Puget Sound he had a very considerable number. So you can see his was a partial alert. It was not a complete alert at all.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you about the civilian population in Hawaii. You alerted for sabotage. You were not there in 1940 when they had the previous alert?

[8267] General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did you learn about any uprisings or any undue sabotage being committed at that time by the people of Hawaii was the result of that alert?

General SHORT. No; you wouldn't get sabotage as a result of an alert. You might get it because you didn't go into an alert.

Senator LUCAS. He went on an all-out alert in 1940?

General SHORT. That is right, on a direct order from the War Department.

Senator LUCAS. I know.

General SHORT. Then he cut it back on July 16.

Senator LUCAS. What I am trying to find out is whether as a result of the alert the population of Hawaii was in any way disturbed.

General SHORT. If you will read the letters between General Marshall and General Herron there is one letter in there where General Herron says that a lot of people were considerably disturbed for the first few days and he says that even some of the younger officers sent their families to the hills.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the War Department in Washington and you fellows out in Hawaii were both wrong on that, too, weren't you, on the question of sabotage?

[8268] General SHORT. It is very difficult to say. We can't tell what would have happened if we hadn't held a tight rein over them. I think the feeling was, with everybody who had made a careful study, that if there had ever been any real success to the Japanese plans, that most anything might have happened.

Senator LUCAS. What do you call a success if December 7, 1941, wasn't a pretty fair test of success?

General SHORT. A landing on the island of Oahu. They immediately would have had perhaps an army of thousands, a fifth column of thousands, ready to support them.

Senator LUCAS. Were you alerted against sabotage because you feared a landing of the Japanese?

General SHORT. No, sir. We were alerted because we felt they might try to destroy all the vital installations; and, as a matter of fact, without an alert against sabotage, the way the gasoline and oil was placed along the waterfront in Honolulu a very small group of men could have destroyed the city of Honolulu; and the same thing with 4 million gallons of oil in Pearl Harbor. They could have done much more damage than was done because they could have destroyed all the oil. They could have destroyed the repair facilities. And probably the fire would have destroyed a good many of the ships in the harbor.

[8269] Senator LUCAS. I don't doubt but that is true, General Short, that you had every reason to take every precaution possible

against sabotage, but I come back to my original question, whether or not anybody from Japan really used the sabotage methods on December 7 or immediately thereafter insofar as you know?

General SHORT. Whether they used it?

Senator LUCAS. Whether they did carry out these acts of sabotage that you people in Hawaii and the people in Washington were constantly afraid of.

General SHORT. There was none, but whether there would have been if we had been lax I don't think anybody will ever know.

Senator LUCAS. Perhaps not. That is one of those things that will go unsolved.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I think it is in the record, but do you recall how many planes you lost that morning in the air raid that were on Hickam Field?

General SHORT. I think I have it here.

Senator LUCAS. It may not be material but I am leading up to another question.

General SHORT. It is in that exhibit No. 7 of the Roberts commission. I don't know whether I am going to find it right [8270] here or not. I have the statement of planes here as of December 7 and then as of December 20. I don't have the statement right here on that.

Senator LUCAS. You don't recall how many planes you lost at that particular time?

General SHORT. No, sir; I do not. This shows the different types. Some of them may have been repaired, don't you see, between December 7 and December 20 and be back in use.

Senator LUCAS. You may have received some more by that time.

General SHORT. Beg pardon?

Senator LUCAS. You may have received some more from the mainland.

General SHORT. We received 29 more B-17's and that was all.

Senator LUCAS. How many planes got in the air before the last attack was completed?

General SHORT. I think there were a total of 14.

Senator LUCAS. Did they shoot down any Jap planes?

General SHORT. They shot down 10 enemy planes.

Senator LUCAS. They shot down 10 enemy planes.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So it is a pretty safe assumption that if the planes had been warmed up and ready to go that, considering what you did with the 14 planes, that the damage would have been minimized considerably? [8271]

General SHORT. No question about that. I think our pilots showed that they were superior to the Japanese pilots in individual combat that day.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall seeing that two-man submarine?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you remember seeing the prisoner that they took?

General SHORT. I did not. I recall the incident but I didn't actually see him.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall now, from the conversations that you had with anyone there, as to just how far out that two-man submarine was before it started operating at sea?

General SHORT. Well, I can give you a rather interesting report of just what happened at the time of the capture. It was off a reef opposite Bellows Field and the commanding officer or G-2 of Bellows Field phoned me that it was there and that the Navy were getting ready to bomb it. I said if they wanted to destroy it, I didn't think it ought to be destroyed, but if the Navy wanted to destroy it we could bring up a piece of field artillery and do it very quickly, because it was on the reef. But before that message, apparently, could get to the Navy, they dropped a bomb, which fortunately [8272] missed it and picked it up and set it on the inside of the reef, and we sent a man out to put a rope around the conning-tower and towed it in. Some fellow from Texas, probably, lassoed it.

Senator LUCAS. Was there ever any conclusive evidence as to how and where that submarine took to sea, how far out it was and what brought it there?

General SHORT. I would hesitate to say. I am afraid my information would not be exact.

Senator LUCAS. Well, was it possible that a surface ship, a warship of some kind, belonging to the enemy, could have come within 200 miles and dropped it off, or do you think it came in by submarine?

General SHORT. I think the feeling was at the time that there was a mother ship that had brought them at least a considerable part of the way. I don't believe they were capable of going more than 150 to 200 miles under their own power.

Senator LUCAS. Now, what kind of a ship—that was the point I was making—what kind of a ship did you people conclude brought this midget submarine to 150 miles of the Hawaiian Islands?

General SHORT. Well, I am really a little uncertain on that. I think the Navy would be a much better source.

[8273] Senator LUCAS. Could a Jap submarine carry one of these small two-man submarines?

General SHORT. I think the largest type probably could but again I am not sure.

Senator LUCAS. There is more than a possibility that some large surface Japanese ship sailed within 150 or 200 miles of the Hawaiian coast that morning and dropped that submarine off?

General SHORT. I believe the feeling was that they must have been in the vicinity of Hawaiian waters, maybe for several days, and had not been picked up.

By the way, I have the report here, Senator, of the planes damaged.

Senator LUCAS. Please read that.

General SHORT. I will take up first what we had.

We had at the beginning of the attack: Planes in commission, 80. That is pursuit planes. Pursuit planes out of commission, 69. A total of 149. Of those 80 were damaged.

We had reconnaissance planes: In commission, 6. Out of commission, 7. Out of those 13, 6 were damaged. We had bombers: In commission, 39. That included the old B-18's. Bombers out of commission, 33. And 34 of those bombers were damaged.

Now, a considerable number of those planes we were able [8274] to repair locally. So in the report of December 20 we had almost as many planes in commission as we had the morning of the 7th, because our repair facilities were working 24 hours a day.

Senator LUCAS. Under the sabotage order these planes were lined up wing tip to wing tip?

General SHORT. Very close together on the landing mat.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you have given to the committee in your statement what you consider the term "appropriate defensive deployment" means.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In that statement you take almost direct issue with Admiral Kimmel.

General SHORT. I did not intend to give the impression that I was making an out and out statement of what a defensive deployment meant, but I couldn't conceive of any defense not including reconnaissance. I think that that, I said, must necessarily include reconnaissance. Isn't that the statement to which you refer?

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

General SHORT. I still cannot conceive of any defense that would not include reconnaissance.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel didn't so interpret the order.

[8275] General SHORT. I don't know what the technical term in the Navy would include. In the Army any defense in the world we would take up would include reconnaissance.

Senator LUCAS. I want to call your attention to the report of the Army board that made an investigation into this Pearl Harbor affair. I direct your attention to the last page. The board says:

Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, failed in his duties in the following particulars:

(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only.

You have gone into that thoroughly and have made your explanation.

General SHORT. I have.

Senator LUCAS. I presume you did the same thing before the Army board?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Notwithstanding its finding?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And I presume your evidence before the Army board was practically what is before this committee?

General SHORT. That is correct. I know some things [8276] now, like magic, which I had never heard of at the time I was before the Army board.

Senator LUCAS. They further state:

The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our Government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected.

Do you agree with that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; but that wouldn't necessarily mean an attack. I doubt very much if that board knew of the conclusions of General Grunnert and General Betts, which agreed 100 percent with

mine, and why they made them. They made them because they didn't have access to magic.

Senator LUCAS. Assuming, General Short, that you had never received any message from the War Department, either on November 27 from Marshall or on the 28th from Miles, or on the 29th from Arnold—

General SHORT. Or had any previous information?

Senator LUCAS. No. From the 27th on you only received three messages?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. But you saw some of the Navy messages?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Would your position have been any different [8277] on December 7 than it was previous to the message on November 27?

General SHORT. I think the three messages that followed up the 27th all pointing directly to sabotage did a great deal to confirm me in my opinion that I had done what the War Department wanted.

Senator LUCAS. I can well appreciate that.

General SHORT. I could have gone into any other alert in a few minutes if I had anything to indicate but what I got from the War Department pointed, all of it, 100 percent, very definitely to sabotage.

Senator LUCAS. That is, the second and third messages pointed definitely to sabotage.

General SHORT. Second and third and fourth.

Senator LUCAS. Which tended to confirm your message to General Marshall?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. That is the way you took it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The question I am asking you is this: Assuming you received no messages at all from the War Department your position on December 7, 1941, would have been no different than if there was an attack on November 24?

General SHORT. I would not have had the message of the 27th.

[8278] Senator LUCAS. That is right.

General SHORT. I hadn't been told to report any measures taken?

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

General SHORT. I would have been in the same position I was on November 24.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, these messages didn't enlighten you whatsoever as far as going on an all-out alert or going on the second alert which was near an all-out alert?

General SHORT. There was absolutely no additional enemy information. And there was one thing that cut down the probability. If you remember in the Navy message of the 24th they said: "Including action toward the Philippines and Guam." In the message of the 27th they told me to be prepared for sabotage at Guam.

In other words, it looked like they had eliminated even Guam, which was right alongside Japan, from possible attack.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; but the message of the 27th to you didn't have anything to do with sabotage.

General SHORT. No. That was the naval message.

Senator LUCAS. That is true, but you relied primarily upon General Marshall's message, more than any Navy message?

General SHORT. So far as information pointing to an attack I had to rely on the Navy messages because at no time [8279] after July 8 did I ever have an Army message that indicated any probable line of action by the Japanese.

Senator LUCAS. You did rely upon both messages, of course?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. But I recall in this testimony that you stated that the message of November 24, I think it was, that was sent to the Navy, which was the war warning message of the 27th—

General SHORT. The 27th was the war warning.

Senator LUCAS. In previous testimony you were not sure whether or not you ever saw that war warning message.

General SHORT. I think I said that I knew the substance of it. I was under the impression that Admiral Kimmel had just read it out loud at a conference. But in reading over the testimony, Captain Layton says that he personally brought it to me, and I have no doubt he did, and that he discussed it with me. I was perfectly aware of the contents. But I couldn't find in my headquarters, when I assembled the material for the Roberts commission, I couldn't find the message of either the 24th or the naval message of the 27th, and so I was doubtful whether I had been advised orally or whether I had received copies.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe that in the future, should [8280] something of this kind occur, that someone in Hawaii should assume all responsibility for the proper interpretation and analyzation of such a message as was sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel?

General SHORT. I would say, in view of all of the discussion and publicity were reference to Pearl Harbor, that anybody in command would take no chances whatever. To illustrate what I mean, in March of 1942 I visited a good-sized post in the interior of the country and found around the parade ground antiaircraft guns manned 24 hours of the day, when the possibility of an attack at that particular place was practically nil. But the commanding officer was taking no chances.

I believe that would be the condition that you will have for some years.

Senator LUCAS. You realize that Americans forget pretty fast?

General SHORT. Well, in a generation they might forget some. I don't believe they would forget much faster. The ones in the Army wouldn't forget.

Now, along that same line, this was hardly over until the War Department had called on the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth to prepare changes in their manual to provide for just that kind of a thing, and I would like to [8281] read what they inserted. This was inserted as an entirely new paragraph. It was not in the old manual. This is Field Manual 100-15, Field Regulations, Larger Units, June 29, 1942, paragraph 23:

In times of strained relations the War Department must exhaust every possible source of information to keep its commanders of field forces advised—

Not only keep itself but—

keep the commanders advised of air, military, and naval dispositions and movements of potential enemies and of the trend of diplomatic relations. Commanders of the field forces must keep themselves informed of the possibility of a surprise attack being made both from without and within previous to a declaration of war. During this period commanders must dispose of their forces so that a sudden attack will be defeated.

[8282] In other words, the War Department took very decisive action and prescribed very definitely for themselves that they would keep the commanders completely informed of the information and of the relations.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, that comes about through the Pearl Harbor disaster.

General SHORT. It comes about definitely through the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Senator LUCAS. What I am talking about is: Assuming that in 50 years a similar situation occurs, where there is no unity of command, it is still under a joint control system. You told the committee this morning that whether or not they had that complete unity of thought and action that was so necessary for the protection of the fleet and islands, that personalities were involved. That is, two men might get along all right, and two men who followed might not get along all right.

If you had one man in command, where you could place all of the responsibility over the Hawaiian Islands and the fleet, would that eliminate what I am talking about here, eliminate the possibility of any confusion or conflicting interests in the future which might be responsible for a similar disaster?

General SHORT. I believe it would be decidedly helpful. [8283] When you put it at 50 years, it is hard to say whether everybody would forget.

Senator LUCAS. Suit your own time on that. Most of us won't be around.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't mean that, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; I do. [Laughter.]

Senator LUCAS. One further question. There can't be any question but what under the evidence submitted before this committee they were as much confused in Washington in the Intelligence Branch of the service as they were in Hawaii with respect to what was going on between the two departments.

Do you agree that if you had one man in Washington responsible solely for all of the information, the evaluation of all of the intelligence, both from the Army and Navy, that that would be conducive to better administration, and possibly reduce the danger throughout?

General SHORT. I think it would tend to. At the same time, one department would have to analyze critically which I don't believe was done.

Senator LUCAS. At any rate if you had one man, you wouldn't have a general like General Miles coming before the committee and when you ask him about the important [8284] message that was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu carving the island into five districts, you wouldn't have him saying that that was a Navy responsibility, and not his, to properly interpret that?

General SHORT. He would know definitely it was his responsibility.

Senator LUCAS. That is where I think we are going to have to lodge some of these things, definite responsibility in someone so there can't be any buck-passing when a serious thing happens.

General SHORT. I agree fully that you should have a much more competent Intelligence service that is combined.

[8285] Senator LUCAS. Now this report further says, reading again from the Army board report:

This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.

I take it you do not agree with that, and you have covered that in your testimony.

General SHORT. I do not agree.

Senator LUCAS. Further:

(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the Fourteenth Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.

You could not agree with that in view of the position that you took with respect to the interpretation of these messages?

General SHORT. I believe that the War Department fully expected to declare when the situation had arrived to put the war plans into effect and that they would have expected us to get their permission before we thought of doing it.

[8286] Senator LUCAS. They further state:

(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

As I understand you took that for granted, that they were doing the job?

General SHORT. I knew that Admiral Kimmel was doing a great deal. I didn't know the exact details. But I considered that he was more capable of fitting the ships, surface ships and the submarines and the planes, into a complete picture than I was.

Senator LUCAS. Under a unity of command no board could have made that charge?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know why the air drills were stopped on November 12, 1941?

General SHORT. I am of the opinion that they probably were not all stopped. The ones that had to do with the B-17's I think were stopped because we needed all the time we had for training the crews.

Senator LUCAS. What was the nature of one of those air drills, what did you do?

General SHORT. They were of various natures. We would have a report, or the Navy would make an estimate, that possibly some Japanese ships were in a certain direction. [8287] A squadron or group would be given the mission of going out and finding this carrier. If they were successful then a bombing squadron would be sent out to bomb them.

Then you might, by the next phase, assume that the carrier got in without being picked up and the fighter planes were coming in. You would get that information just in time possibly to send up your own pursuit planes to try to intercept the enemy bombers and fighters before they reached the islands.

They varied.

Senator LUCAS. That was an actual drill?

General SHORT. Oh, yes. We had one a week on the average from about March on and I think probably about one a month where the B-17's were excluded because we didn't think we could spare the time.

Senator LUCAS. Why did you have those drills?

General SHORT. To try to get the Army-Navy Air Corps so they could work together.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have any potential enemy in mind?

General SHORT. We always, any time we maneuvered in Hawaii, the potential enemy was Japan. There wasn't any doubt in our minds about that. We didn't mention it but we thought—we thought of it as Orange—but it was Japan.

Senator LUCAS. That was the real reason for the air [8288] drills, was it not?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. There was no point in having any air drills over the islands unless it was for the defense of those islands and the defense of the fleet in case of an attack by the common enemy?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Those air drills were held, as I recall, from sometime in February up to November 12. I think it was probably about the first of March before we really got them under way.

Senator LUCAS. And all of a sudden they ceased.

General SHORT. I don't know definitely but I am inclined to think that they had one on the 29th of November that did not include the B-17's.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is difficult for me to understand why you had all of these air drills all summer long and yet when the tension became more strained and everybody in Hawaii knew, as well as here, that the conditions with Japan were deteriorating day by day, all of a sudden you quit the air drills and went to sabotage.

General SHORT. I can tell you why no air drill was scheduled for the morning of the 7th. They had a good many of these exercises on Sunday morning when the carriers would come in and the planes would be sent ashore on Ford Island. [8289] They would come in Saturday afternoon and then there would be an air drill scheduled for Sunday morning in which the Navy fighter planes would participate. On this particular Sunday morning the carriers were all out at sea. One was returning from Wake. One was going to Midway. One was on the west coast being overhauled. So there were no naval planes to participate. That I know was one reason why nothing was scheduled that Sunday morning.

Senator LUCAS. General Short, where were you on the morning of December 7 when the attack came?

General SHORT. I was in my quarters.

Senator LUCAS. How far were your quarters from the quarters of Admiral Kimmel?

General SHORT. I would say probably about a mile and a half, maybe just a little more than that.

Senator LUCAS. And you immediately, of course, took command and gave the orders to your men on the island there as soon as the first flight of planes came through?

General SHORT. The chief of staff came into my quarters somewhere around 8.03 and I gave him directions to immediately put No. 3 alert into effect. I went over to my headquarters. He was there by the time I got there and probably about 8:12, and he said that by 8:10 he had them all alerted. I remained there just long enough to [8290] make sure my G-3 section had reached the field command posts. I left Colonel Phillips in charge of the regular headquarters that had communication with Washington, and I went to the field command post where I could be in touch with all of them.

[8291] Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel told the committee that he was not only alerted to sabotage but a good many other things, as I recall, but was not clear whether he knew that you were alerted to sabotage only.

General SHORT. I believe that we have some of his testimony before this board that states that he did know.

Senator LUCAS. That he did know that you were alerted to sabotage?

Mr. KAUFMAN. He testified both ways.

General SHORT. On page 6985 of the transcript:

I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We considered, as we did frequently before and did later, the probabilities and possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was discussion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that fifty Army pursuit planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage among other things, although I do not now recall General Short specifically mentioning the details of his alert.

Senator LUCAS. Did you talk to Admiral Kimmel on December the 6th in the afternoon or the evening?

[8292] General SHORT. I did not.

Senator LUCAS. You did not expect on December the 6th any surprise attack on the following day?

General SHORT. No, sir; I did not.

Senator LUCAS. Was there anybody in Hawaii that you knew that expected a surprise attack?

General SHORT. If they did they never told me before or after. Ordinarily, afterward, there is someone who does expect it.

Senator LUCAS. Well, everybody in Washington and everybody in Hawaii sent messages from February on up to almost the day of the attack about the possibility of a surprise attack. They had air drills for it, they had the Martin-Bellinger report that detailed exactly how this thing might happen, which it did, and everybody was surprised when the attack came.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I think you must differentiate between possibilities and probability.

Senator LUCAS. I presume that is correct.

General SHORT. We had probabilities pointing to attacks at other places and nothing probable pointing to an attack on Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the truth of the matter is that everyone thought that this war was going to start over around [8293] the

Malayan States, down the China Sea, and everybody just went to sleep on watching Hawaii.

General SHORT. I think the universal opinion was that that is where the war was going to start.

Senator LUCAS. You stated in your statement before the committee that you alerted your command and your troops took the battle positions against what you thought was the possibility of a landing attack.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Was that a serious possibility?

General SHORT. Here was the way I felt about it: I felt that if that many carriers could elude the Navy and get in there as a complete surprise that there was an outside possibility that there would be a landing force attack here and that I would take no chances.

Senator LUCAS. Then if there was that possibility I would like to ask you this hypothetical question:

Assuming that the fleet had been withdrawn to the western coast and conditions at Pearl Harbor were the same other than that, do you believe that it would have been possible under those conditions or probable that the Japs could have made a landing with the striking air forces that they had and brought the planes down as they did?

General SHORT. It would have been thoroughly possible. [8294] If they had sent as large a force as they sent against the Philippines they could have made the landing. I doubt very much if they could have made the landing with a hundred thousand, but I believe they sent 224,000 against the Philippines and a force of that size, willing to take its losses, could undoubtedly have made the landing.

Senator LUCAS. And that would have been a possibility——

General SHORT. That would have been a possibility.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). If the fleet had not been in Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. I would have been much more worried if there had been no fleet in Hawaiian waters; I don't mean in Pearl Harbor but in the waters of Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. In the Hawaiian waters.

General SHORT. I wish to make the distinction.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; in the Hawaiian waters. If that should have happened, that possibility should have happened—and it was a possibility—and the Japs had taken the island of Oahu, it would have taken us a long time to have thrown them out of there, wouldn't it?

General SHORT. It would have been very serious.

Senator LUCAS. Very costly.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Referring again to the question of [8295] Admiral Kimmel's statement on sabotage I call your attention to page 6989 of the present transcript where this question was asked by Mr. Richardson, counsel for the committee:

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know, Admiral, what General Short's first alert was?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean No. 1 alert, as you call it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know he had but one kind of an alert.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What kind of alert did you think he had?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought he had an alert where he put his people on the alert.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know at the time you talked with General Short that his No. 1 alert was simply against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know he had a No. 1 alert. I think I have found out since, however, that this No. 1, 2, and 3 alert business was put into effect on the 5th of November of 1941. Prior to that they had an alert and a nonalert status.

So that seems to place his testimony just a little different.

[8296] General SHORT. That is a little contradiction from the other.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

General SHORT. I would like to say, however, that we had furnished Admiral Bloch's headquarters with 10 copies of our alert system, so someone in the staff should have known exactly what the different alerts meant.

Senator LUCAS. I want to ask one final question, General Short. Notwithstanding this far-reaching sea disaster and the damage that was done to the property on the island and the loss of life is it your contention now that with all the information available at that time you did all that any prudent commander could do to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack?

General SHORT. I believe I did all that a prudent commander could be expected to do; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe under all the circumstances you exercised that high degree of care and caution that was automatically imposed upon you when you took over the command of that base?

General SHORT. I believe the people in the—all the people in the Army there and the civilians know that I worked very seriously and very conscientiously constantly from the time I got there until the date of the attack to improve [8297] conditions to get ready for an attack.

Senator LUCAS. And you feel that you exercised that superior judgment necessary for one of your rank and position when you knew that war was on its way?

General SHORT. I believe I did.

Senator LUCAS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I shall be here when my turn comes and I only have one question. I do not want it answered now.

I will put the question in connection with this material which the counsel has now given me and which he has gone over with General Short. I can reoffer it again as an exhibit, although I won't press the offer at this time, but before General Short concludes his testimony I should like to have him make whatever comment he may think is warranted on certain of the items in here which indicate certain conflicts in his prior testimony and I will only read one sentence from the exhibit here that bears on it. It is not of a critical character.

The CHAIRMAN. Not of what?

Senator BREWSTER. This is not of a critical character but other portions of the exhibit are. [Reading:]

General Short's non-feasance or omission were based on an estimate of a situation which although proved faulty [8298] by subsequent events was, insofar as I am able to ascertain from the report of the Roberts Commission, made or concurred in by all of those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form an exact military opinion. That estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.

Now, whether you want to accept it now or whether you want other members of the committee to look it over before it is offered is immaterial to me.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has stated that other members would like to see them and look them over before it is made an exhibit and I see no delay in that procedure that would be disadvantageous.

Senator BREWSTER. That is quite all right.

The CHAIRMAN. And inasmuch as it is obvious that the committee will not conclude with General Short's testimony today that might go over until tomorrow.

Senator BREWSTER. I think he should certainly have a full opportunity to prepare any statement he desires on it and that is why I think it ought to be gone over.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the general is familiar with this, with the interrogatory of the Senator from Maine.

General SHORT. I am not familiar with the particular things he is bringing up there.

[8299] The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to have an opportunity to familiarize yourself with it before you answer it?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I am not asking for it now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, even the suggestion.

General SHORT. I think it would be an advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, all right. Well, we will determine that later. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. General Short, you were an infantry officer for some years, were you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever have any training or work with the Air Force at all prior to going to Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. Yes. In maneuvers we had Air Corps units attached.

Mr. MURPHY. Outside of maneuvers you never did deal directly with the Air as such, did you?

General SHORT. In the Command Staff School and in the Army War College we had a great deal of instruction.

Mr. MURPHY. How many years before Pearl Harbor were you at the Staff School and had any instruction about the Air?

General SHORT. I graduated from the Army War College in 1925.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you been there between 1925 and 1941?

General SHORT. No, sir.

[8300] Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel was a ship man primarily, wasn't he?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. He had not had anything to do particularly with the Air either then, so far as you know?

General SHORT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, both Admiral Kimmel and yourself, as I recollect it, say that you were largely influenced by the newspaper at Honolulu as to your estimate of the situation subsequent to November the 27th. Is that right in your case?

General SHORT. No, sir. I would say the only thing I remember getting from the newspaper that had a direct bearing on this message was the fact that the negotiations in Washington with the Japanese had been resumed. That is the only thing—

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to direct your attention to the headlines of the papers in Manila. I am now reading——

The CHAIRMAN. In Manila?

Mr. MURPHY. In Honolulu. I beg your pardon.

I am now reading from page 11 of the United States News which contains the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. The newspaper headlines in question, referring to the Honolulu Advertiser and the Honolulu Star Bulletin—the newspaper headlines in question read as follows:

[8301] U. S. Waits Japan Reply.

That was the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of November 29.

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend; Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle.

That was the Honolulu Advertiser of November 30, although it is recorded here as the 20th, which is a typographical error because the piece is already in the record. That is in the Honolulu Advertiser.

Hull, Kurusu in Critical Meeting Today.

That is the 1st of December in the Honolulu Advertiser.

U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows; Japanese Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension; War Fears Grow in Philippines.

That was the 1st of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S.; Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations.

That was December 2 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

Huge Pincher Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted.

That was the 3d of December in the Honolulu Advertiser.

Japan Spurns U. S. Program.

That was on the 4th of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today.

That is the 4th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

[8302] Singapore on War Footing; New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo; Civilians Urged to Leave Manila.

That is the 6th of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China; Japanese Navy Moving South; Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup.

That is the 6th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis.

That is the 7th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

Do you think there is anything in those headlines that would justify you in feeling that there was a lessening of the tension that existed?

General SHORT. Only one thing, the fact that the negotiations were expected to continue for 2 weeks.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, with about 14 you eliminate 13 and you stand on that 1 that says they might go 2 weeks?

General SHORT. But practically all of them pointed towards the South Pacific. In addition——

Mr. MURPHY. Let us stick to the papers, General. Out of the 14 the only one that impressed you was the one that they might go on for 2 weeks?

General SHORT. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Notwithstanding the fact that the subsequent [8303] one says that the zero hour may be on the 4th, or the Pacific zero hour is near; is that right?

General SHORT. I was willing to accept the information in the message of the 27th that hostilities might break out.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I understand you. You said that the November 27 message made you feel that war was imminent.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think then that Admiral Kimmel or yourself would be justified, in view of these headlines in December, that the newspaper headlines would make you feel there was a lessening in the tense situation that existed on the 27th of November?

General SHORT. The only thing there would be the statement of December 1 on account of the fact that the message had said there was a bare possibility that the Japanese Government would come back and would resume operations and it shows that they had resumed operations and then the message indicating that the negotiations would probably continue for 2 weeks might well have led us to believe that there was less likelihood of hostilities until the expiration of the 2 weeks.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, that was the only paper that influenced you, was it, that one about the 2 weeks?

[8304] General SHORT. That one and the one about the resumption of the negotiations.

Mr. MURPHY. And the others you dismissed?

General SHORT. No. I thought the others were in line with what—

Mr. MURPHY. With the 27th message?

General SHORT. With the information we had been given and also the direction of the attack was in line with the information we had been given.

Mr. MURPHY. General, you felt and apparently Admiral Kimmel felt that there was going to be an attack on the Philippines. You both agreed on that, didn't you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why, if there were going to be an attack on a United States possession and at the Philippines, wouldn't you feel that there was grave danger of some kind of an attack on Hawaii?

General SHORT. Frankly, I felt that there would certainly be internal disorders but that in all probability if the Japanese were going to make a real out and out attack on the Philippines, on the Philippine Islands, that they would employ practically all of their equipment and available means for that purpose to make it as strong as possible.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the thing that puzzles the writers and [8305] a lot of people in the country is if they were going to go all out on the Philippines why wouldn't any military man expect that there was danger of an attack from the fleet then on their flank and why wouldn't they seek to eliminate that possibility?

General SHORT. To make that attack they took six out of the eight airplane carriers they had. In other words, they took three-fourths of their air power that might have been used to support the Philippine attack and sent it to Hawaii. It weakened their attack in the Philippines very much and ordinarily when any country is making a very serious effort like that they try not to drive their forces.

Mr. MURPHY. Couldn't an attack on the Philippines, General, be made and wasn't it made by land-based bombers?

General SHORT. They could by a certain amount.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't they attack it? Isn't that what they used?

General SHORT. They did.

Mr. MURPHY. And didn't you know that, that they could?

General SHORT. Yes; but also we knew that the addition of the carrier planes would make that attack much heavier and much more serious.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, they did a pretty thorough job with land-based planes, didn't they?

[8306] General SHORT. They did, yes; but we have used both all through the war whenever we have made a serious attack.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I would like to review with you, General, if you will, exhibit 53.

General SHORT. 53?

Mr. MURPHY. I think it is important that somewhere in the record there should be a résumé of the correspondence between you and General Marshall. And before I go into that, General, on May 1, 1941, you had an all-out alert in Honolulu, did you not, where you had fortifications being built, you had everything out you could have in the way of equipment, didn't you, for the whole day?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have some plans for a maneuver on the 10th of December?

General SHORT. No, sir; we had no definite plans for a maneuver.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you discussed it?

General SHORT. We were counting on having a maneuver. There were two things that we were waiting for for a complete maneuver. We were building an underground interceptor-command post and we were completing our own field-command post. We were waiting until they were completed and got into communication so that our next maneuver would be controlled by the [8307] communications which we expected to have already to follow.

Mr. MURPHY. I will take that up with you later. Let me go to Marshall's correspondence with you. I refer first to the letter of February 7, 1941. At that time General Marshall gave you his impression and appraisal of Admiral Kimmel; that he was brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems and that he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business and that he felt that he was entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other fellow if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. You remember that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then you answered him, did you not, by saying that you had told Kimmel and Bloch that there would be no hair-splitting between you, on February 19?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, to come back to the letter of February 7, General Marshall told you that Hawaii was on a far better basis than any other command in the Army, did he not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. He told you at that time that at Cavite and Corregidor they had only two antiaircraft guns?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8308] Mr. MURPHY. He also told you, and I think this is significant:

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations at Hawaii.

That was your mission there; wasn't it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8309] Mr. MURPHY. Then he also told you about the Army and Navy feuds "which still persist in confusing issues of national defense," and "we must be completely impersonal in these matters"?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, in your letter of the 19th of February, you told him that you were taking up the question of dispersion of pursuit aviation upon the island of Oahu in order that you might be able to meet an attack from any direction; did you not?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Then on page 7 of your letter, you make reference, General, to a letter on maximum readiness of aircraft in the Hawaiian area. Do you have a copy of that letter? I am speaking now of page 7 of the exhibit, General.

General SHORT. What paragraph is that?

Mr. MURPHY. The third paragraph from the bottom of the page:

Letter HHD to Major Echelon Commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.

I would like to see a copy of that letter, if I may.

General SHORT. I have not a copy here. I will ask Colonel Duncombe if he can obtain a copy.

[8310] Mr. MURPHY. Will you make a notation of that, counsel, please? That is the third last paragraph on page 7.

On page 8 you spoke to General Marshall about the necessity of bomb-proofing the vital installations; did you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On March 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote you a letter in which he said:

I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority.

Do you recall that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On March 6, 1941, you wrote General Marshall:

One of the first projects which I investigated in this Department was the aircraft warning service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands.

Then again you said:

With the present international situation, it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all, the need for it is now here.

That was back in March; was it not?

[8311] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you also stated in the next paragraph that the equipment would arrive in June and the stations would be operating shortly thereafter, did you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You assured General Marshall that the personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within 30 days after the receipt of the equipment mentioned in your letter?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, on March 13, 1941, General Marshall wrote to you and said:

The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying.

On March 15, 1941, you received a letter from General Bryden, in the absence of General Marshall, saying:

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service station in the Hawaiian Department.

Then, the third paragraph:

I have given these matters my personal attention.

[8312] The last paragraph:

We are as anxious as you to work out a solution for these problems with the least practicable delay, and I know that I can count upon you for fullest cooperation.

General SHORT. May I interrupt you a moment?

Mr. MURPHY. All right, General.

General SHORT. That particular thing he is discussing is the question of getting the permission of the Park Service.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

General SHORT. That request was started in June 1940.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

General SHORT. And we did not get the authority until April 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. You had great difficulty in getting permission to have the fixed stations operate. The fixed stations were not operating, and therefore they could not help you on December 7?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Just put that one on one side, and let us go to the next one.

Now, on March 15, 1941, you stated to General Marshall:

On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss.

[8313] So apparently you meant to change that situation, did you not?

General SHORT. In case of an air attack; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. But you did not, did you?

General SHORT. We were not alerted against air attack. We were alerted against sabotage.

Mr. MURPHY. I see.

Now, then, on page 16, you said:

In general, we have no serious shortage in three-inch anti-aircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement—

did you not?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Then in the paragraph on the bottom of the page:

After the installation of our new detectors, we shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles.

What was the most dangerous direction you were speaking of there? It was from the north, wasn't it?

General SHORT. The north is what we ordinarily figured, although the Navy felt that there was quite a possibility of an attack coming in from the southwest, on account of the Mandated Islands.

[8314] Mr. MURPHY. As a matter of fact, an expert on Hawaii, and Admiral Kimmel on several occasions, and some other witnesses in these records, have said the most dangerous area was from the north. Are you familiar with that?

General SHORT. I am familiar with that particular thing. Also the Navy thought there was considerable danger from the southwest.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, throughout the testimony, for hundreds and hundreds of pages, the north was pointed to as the most dangerous place. Then, at a subsequent hearing, after the Roberts board had completed, there was a statement that the most dangerous place was from the north, and in this hearing there is a reference by Admiral Richardson to what he thought. The fact is you thought the north was the most dangerous section, did you not?

General SHORT. Not necessarily directly north, but northwest to north. That was the most probable.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you said there:

The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.

That is what you told General Marshall, is it not?

General SHORT. That would be true no matter what direction they came from.

[8315] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, that is what you told General Marshall, that pursuit aviation would have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, on the last page, page 17 of that letter, the letter of March 15, you told General Marshall:

I feel that the question of anti-aircraft defense against air attack is the most serious problem that we have to face—

did you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, on March 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote you, and at that time he said in the second to the last paragraph, he said:

I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your anti-aircraft garrison so as to provide full strength unit for the armament available within your department.

Then, again, in the last paragraph :

I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their executives, to the west coast defense exercise.

That was an air exercise, wasn't it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8316] Mr. MURPHY. On April 14, 1941, you wrote General Marshall, and in the second to the last paragraph on page 19, you said :

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreement made with them—

And one of them was the joint coastal frontier defense plan.

Then in paragraph 3, on page 20, or the one numbered 3, you state :
putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement.

The next paragraph :

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative, and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and the Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the Air Force and the anti-aircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details, the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command.

[8317] Then, in the last paragraph, you told General Marshall :

The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our air and anti-aircraft defense.

Now, I go over to the letter of May 5, that General Marshall wrote to you :

Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation.

And in the last paragraph—and this is significant—

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely well, and do not hesitate to write at any time.

Do you remember that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, on May 29, 1941, you wrote General Marshall, and you were describing the recent maneuvers. In paragraph 2, you said this :

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of engineer supplies for field fortifications and of engineer tools. During the air [8318] phase, our bombers acted under Navy Command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the Navy Patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and our own bombers, when they came in to attack ground defenses.

Upon receipt of the warning for this phase, our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase, and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and anti-aircraft, than we had during any previous exercise.

Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually issued before, and we got complete data in regard to the time and the transportation required to complete the issue.

If you had done just that after the war warning, it would have been a different result, would it not?

General SHORT. Not just that alone, no.

Mr. MURPHY. If you had done just what you did on May 29, issued live ammunition and had your planes ready, [8319] and have your pursuits ready?

General SHORT. We had live ammunition at all antiaircraft batteries but four, or immediately accessible to them.

Mr. MURPHY. You said you had that ready, and you also said you could go into alert 2 from alert 1 in 7 minutes, but the fact is, it took 5 to 6 hours for them to get to their guns, didn't it?

General SHORT. No, it did not. It took time to move the guns and troops to prescribed positions. There were some batteries that had to move probably 20 miles.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean to go from alert 1 to alert 2 you would make a phone call and say, "Go to alert 2"; is that it?

General SHORT. They were prepared for that anyway.

Mr. MURPHY. You would just give the order, but it might take six hours to get to where you could shoot?

General SHORT. For a few of the batteries that is true.

Mr. MURPHY. It took a few batteries some time to get into their positions?

General SHORT. They had to move their troops.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean your ammunition was at the crater?

General SHORT. The ammunition was at the crater for [8320] four batteries.

Mr. MURPHY. In the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft B, C, D, and F, just those four batteries?

General SHORT. Those four batteries. The others were placed close to the prescribed positions, within, I think 20 to 75 yards.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, when you had this maneuver on May 29, and when you had the alert on May 1 for 12 days—or would that be the same one, General?

General SHORT. The same one, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. At that time, did the public get hysterical?

General SHORT. I do not think you understood that ammunition business. What we were attempting there, was to find out, from a logistics point of view, how long it would take to move a day's fire. That ammunition was not issued out to the men. That ammunition was transported from the various places of storage to the troops.

The boxes were not opened. It was a question of transportation, as to how long it would take to load up the ammunition and to deliver it to the organization concerned. It was a logistics problem entirely, and it had never been tried out before in Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that on May 1, you say now [8321] that you did not take the ammunition out and did not use live ammunition?

General SHORT. We did not use any of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Did not fire any shots at all?

General SHORT. No, we fired none. It was a logistics proposition.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also say that the ammunition up in the crater only affected four antiaircraft batteries. Is that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct. Now, do not misunderstand me. There were lots of other ammunition in the crater. We had ammunition immediately accessible to the gun positions of all but those four batteries. There were many days of fire in the crater.

Mr. MURPHY. Did not you issue one full day's supply of ammunition to each gun in the maneuvers in May?

General SHORT. We delivered it to the batteries, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You had it right there ready for use?

General SHORT. It was not ready for use. It was a purely transportation proposition.

Mr. MURPHY. It was in the boxes and the boxes were not opened?

General SHORT. It was testing the time that it took [8322] to draw the ammunition at the storage, and to move it to the battery.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you said in the last paragraph of that letter, on page 36:

Some time later we expected to have a maneuver without any warning whatever to the troops. But will wait until after the organization of our air defense command.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that the one you were still waiting for in December?

General SHORT. That is the one we were waiting for.

Mr. MURPHY. On October 10, you said to Senator Lucas you had no word from Washington about the air subsequent to July, as I understood you, and here is a letter from General Marshall to you, dated October 10, which said:

The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention, and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units.

Then again, in the second paragraph:

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii.

General SHORT. That has no relation whatever to a probable attack.

[8323] Mr. MURPHY. Well, that was a discussion between you and General Marshall as to how much the air forces should be trained for using guns and the like; and in your letter you told him, did you not, that you had a surplus of some 3,000 men?

General SHORT. Right at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. That you had around 7,000-some-odd-hundred men, and if you used around 3,000 of them, that would take care of all of your needs for the airplanes, and you had 3,000 left over, and you wanted some to take care of themselves in the event there was an invasion; is that right?

General SHORT. That is correct, at that particular day.

Mr. MURPHY. But you were still talking about air, and the importance of air?

General SHORT. Yes, but nobody was pointing to the probability of an air attack today or tomorrow, next week or next month.

Mr. MURPHY. I expect you had those airplanes there to stop an air attack, did you not?

General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You had your air fields, your antiaircraft guns, your pursuit planes, and the only reason for them being there was to stop an air attack, was it not?

[8324] General SHORT. Yes, but that did not mean at all that an air attack was going to take place in the immediate future.

Mr. MURPHY. You were told that war was imminent?

General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You thought they should tell you where the stroke would come?

General SHORT. If they had the information, I thought so, and I still think so today, and I think they had it.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, on October 14, you wrote to General Marshall:

I have your letter of October 10 with reference to the use of men of the air force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative standing operating procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces.

[8325] So that there would not be any need of an all-out alert particularly unless the Air Force was destroyed?

General SHORT. That was my estimate of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. You say then near the end of the second to the last paragraph:

As regards their use as military police that was not correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

So that on October 14, at any rate, you were discussing the air forces as such with General Marshall?

General SHORT. We were always discussing air forces.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, General, I would like to ask you this: In the alert you put out what did you do about your fire control stations? Did you alert them?

General SHORT. The fire control for the coast artillery?

Mr. MURPHY. All of your fire-control stations under the command of the Army.

General SHORT. We did not do anything about the fire control stations because we were not on that kind of an alert.

[8326] Mr. MURPHY. Right. The fact is that a great amount of the damage was done to the hangars. I see here a picture of the hangar burning. What hangar would that be, General, do you remember?

General SHORT. I rather suspect it may have been the Hawaiian Air Depot. I am not sure.

Mr. MURPHY. I show you another picture of what appears to be another hangar, or it may be the same one. Will you examine this, if you please?

General SHORT. I would not know which particular hangar it was because they all look alike.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you pass these two to him, please?

(The photographs were handed to General Short.)

General SHORT. I would not be able to say what particular hangars those were.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that a great deal of damage occurred from fire there that day, did it not?

General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. If you had your fire-control stations alerted would that have cut down the damage?

General SHORT. When you are talking about fire control I assume you mean those stations for controlling the fire of the harbor defense guns. We had a fire department on every post.

[8327] Mr. MURPHY. I misunderstood you. I do not know anything about those things. I see Admiral Richardson laughing back there. However, I am only a layman and you are an expert.

What special provisions did you take to stop fire after November 27?

General SHORT. We always had provisions to stop fires.

Mr. MURPHY. What special provisions after November 27?

General SHORT. Our fire department was always fully alerted. We did not take any special provisions.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you say that the Navy had reconnaissance, General, and therefore the Navy had reconnaissance because of an expected air attack. Why did you have your pursuit planes on 4 hours' notice?

General SHORT. I did not say that the Navy had reconnaissance because of an expected air attack, because I do not think they did expect an air attack. They had reconnaissance to make sure that there were no Japanese vessels in the coastal zone.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that the understanding you gave to the Roberts board that I read yesterday, that the reconnaissance that was had was the kind of reconnaissance that was expected in the joint air mission? Is that what you referred to, the responsibility of reconnaissance in the event of an air [8328] attack?

General SHORT. That does not pertain only to air attack. That responsibility would be for any kind of reconnaissance.

Mr. MURPHY. You have said, General, you expected the Navy was carrying out their full duty in having reconnaissance and the Navy expected you to be doing your full duty on radar. Now if the Navy was having reconnaissance why did you have your pursuit planes on 4 hours' notice?

General SHORT. You are making statements that I have not made. I said I expected them to do their full duty as far as they were able to do it with the equipment they had.

Mr. MURPHY. I understood you to say, sir, you expected the Navy to do complete reconnaissance.

General SHORT. I did not say that.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me find your answer and let me give your exact words in the statement you gave before the Army Pearl Harbor board.

General SHORT. Will you please quote the page?

Mr. MURPHY. I will, General. I have it here.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say we have reached the hour of 4 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

[8329] The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to recess now or go into this?

Mr. MURPHY. No; I will go into it in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., January 24, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, January 25, 1946.)

[8330]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[8331] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this point?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, the other day a request was made for any further information that might be available regarding the message of December 7 to General Short signed by General Marshall.

We have received the following memorandum from Colonel Duncombe that I would like to read into the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of the War Department?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. MASTEN (reading):

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 24 January 1946.

Memorandum to Mr. Richardson:

The following inclosures relate to General Marshall's message to General Short, dated 7 December 1941:

(1) Copies of papers which show that, at the time of the Army Pearl Harbor board hearings, a search was made for General Marshall's handwritten draft of the message and that the draft was not found.

(2) A photostat of a copy of the encoded message sent from the War Department. On the photostat, to avoid disclosure of U. S. codes, the encoded text of the body of the message has been blocked out.

(3) A copy of Committee Exhibit 61, which is a photostat of General Gerow's memorandum to The Adjutant General concerning the message. This memorandum, as indicated by General Gerow's memorandum in Committee Exhibit 39, "was typed later during the day (7 December) and formally made of record."

(4) A photostat of a handwritten memorandum by General Adams, The Adjutant General, dated 29 January 1942.

(5) A photostat of the message as decoded in Hawaii.

/s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

5 Incls.

3092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

We suggest that the memorandum I have just read, together with enclosures 1, 2, 4, and 5, be spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Mr. MASTEN. I omit enclosure 3 since it is already Exhibit No. 61.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It may be so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[8333]

8 SEPTEMBER 1944.

Note for record:

1. On 8 September, Mr. Schneider, Secretary to Mr. Justice Roberts and Secretary to the Roberts Committee, informed General North that

a. he had no recollection of having seen General Marshall's handwritten draft of the 7 December 1941 message,

b. all documents received by the Committee from the War Department were returned to the Secretary of War by Colonel Brown who acted as liaison officer,

c. Mr. Schneider has no signature indicating receipt by an official of the War Department.

2. On 8 September 1944 Lt. Col. William M. Connor Jr., reports that General Weir of the Judge Advocate General's Office stated that he does not have the handwritten draft in his possession.

THOMAS NORTH,
Brigadier General, G. S. O.,
Chief, Current Group, OPD.

Col. Brown, who returned the papers to the War Department, and Col. Bratton, who carried the manuscript message in question to the Message Center, have both been questioned, and both disclaim any knowledge of what became of the [8334] manuscript draft.

C. G. J.

Priority

18 Sept 44
Washington, D. C.

Secret

A War 181916Z WTJ

War 32425 18th Desire to locate handwritten original of warning message dispatched on seven December nineteen forty one period This draft was used in testimony before Roberts commission and it would appear that it was submitted to that commission paren for Richardson for Colonel Charles W. West from North signed Marshall paren Colonel Lee How Brown comma USMC comma now believed station with HQ Fifth Marine Division or comma was law officer for the commission period Request you contact him to determine what disposition was made of this draft and radio your findings.

[Copy]

Secret

20 SEPTEMBER 1944.

GRUNERT

President, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Bldg #36, Presidio of San Francisco.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.

[8335] Rerad September Eighteenth from General North inquiry Colonel Brown Marine Corps reveals he does not recall what disposition was made handwritten original mentioned message period He suggested that Albert J. Schneider now secretary to Justice Roberts then clerk of commission may be able furnish information leading to discovery its whereabouts end

Lt. Gen. GEORGE GRUNERT,
U. S. Army,
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Official:

R. G. HURT,
Major AGD,
Aide-de-Camp.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

Received at DI 56 74/73 US Govt.

DI Washn, D. C., Dec. 7, 1941, at 1201 PM

CG

Hawaiian Dept, *Ft Shafter, T. H.*

529 Seventh.

(*)

MARSHALL

1217 PM

*Reporter's note: Context blocked out.

[8336]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, D. C.

Memorandum :

Checked on the history of this radio of Dec. 7, 1941 with Lt. Col. John R. Deane, G. S. C., who states that a pencil draft of it was taken directly to the Message Center by Col. Bratton for immediate dispatch which was done.

T. A. G. did not enter the picture at that time in any way except as custodian of the record message.

E. S. A.

1-29-42

File

[8337]

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

4758

Secret

1549WS Washington DC 74/73 RCA Etat 7 1218P

O G,

Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL

(Time and date stamp—Received at 3—7 Dec. 1941 Hq. Haw. Dept. AGO SRS)

(Decoded by Lt. J. H. BABCOCK, 251P Dec 7 1941.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th 70E."

[8338]

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Short, do you have anything further that you want to bring to the attention of the committee before your examination is resumed?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

First, I would like to have an opportunity for me and my counsel to look over this material that has now been introduced, because we have not seen it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have that right.

General SHORT. I have a statement here. I do not know whether I should read it now.

Senator Lucas asked me a question that I was unable to answer at the time. I have the answer out of the testimony of Admiral Inglis. I can read it now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would you permit a suggestion, General?

Since Senator Lucas asked you about that, don't you think it might be desirable to wait a little longer until he comes in? He is detained a few moments now.

General SHORT. I think it would be.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Since he is the man that wanted to know about it, I just offer that suggestion for your consideration.

General SHORT. All right, sir; we will put it to one side.

[8339] The VICE CHAIRMAN. With respect to the memorandum from Colonel Duncombe and the attached data which has been spread upon the record, I assume, General, you are familiar with General Marshall's testimony?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That he wrote out in his own handwriting that message of December 7, and you know about that?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel KARR. We have no objection to the introduction of that exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel states that he has no objection to that being put in the record, which has been done.

Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will continue his inquiry.

Mr. MURPHY. General Short, the reference I made yesterday afternoon and was about to read was from page 46 of volume entitled "Previous Testimony of General Short."

Colonel KARR. That is the Roberts Commission hearing?

Mr. MURPHY. The Roberts Commission hearing. And, apparently, a quotation from the prepared statement which you presented to the Roberts Commission. It reads as follows:

The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known by me.

General SHORT. About where is that on the page?

[8340] Mr. MURPHY. Page 46, General, six lines from the bottom.

General SHORT. Yes, sir, I have it.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known by me. If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign it to a certain sector, say, maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600 miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say, that was a matter that was not under my control.

My only reason for referring to that is that I get the impression from that that you thought the Navy were doing a pretty good job on reconnaissance.

General SHORT. On the critical areas. The best they could do with the material they had.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, my other question is, If you thought they were having reconnaissance in the critical areas, why did you have your pursuit planes on 4 hours' notice?

General SHORT. Because, on my information from Washington, I had nothing to indicate that we were going to have an air attack.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you think the reconnaissance was being made as a result of the message of November 27?

[8341] General SHORT. I thought the reconnaissance was being made on account of both that and the message of October 16. They were giving exactly the same instructions on October 16 as they were in the message of November 27.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it your impression that there was no change in the situation from November 27 on than that which existed from October 16?

General SHORT. As far as the deployment of the Navy, because both messages stated that the Navy would take a defensive deployment preparatory to carry out—

Mr. MURPHY. But you did say, General, many times in the record, that you felt after the 27th the Navy tightened up?

General SHORT. That is correct. They said they did.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. At any rate, you did not have your pursuit planes on other than a 4-hour preparatory state; isn't that right?

General SHORT. However, I may state that when the situation arose they were actually in the air in 55 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY. Some of them were.

General SHORT. All that were in condition to get in the air.

Mr. MURPHY. General, do you have any report made by you to Washington immediately after Pearl Harbor on that situation?

[8342] General SHORT. On the planes in the air?

Mr. MURPHY. On exactly what happened. We have a report before us, a letter, which Admiral Kimmel wrote to Washington, and which I am going to discuss with you. Do you have a report that you made as to what planes were ready, how your antiaircraft was situated, and so forth?

General SHORT. I think we made a written report. I haven't got it immediately available.

Mr. MURPHY. I think it is important that we have it. I will ask the Army liaison to produce a copy of it if they will.¹

General SHORT. May I say one word to Colonel Duncombe if he is here.

I think Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, can tell you definitely whether we did put in a written report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The question was about a written report made by General Short to the War Department following the attack on December 7, 1941.

General SHORT (addressing Colonel Duncombe). They want that and I think Colonel Phillips can tell you definitely whether it was put in and when.

Mr. MURPHY. Don't you know, General, whether you made a report to Washington or not?

General SHORT. I think I did. I was just referring to my chief of staff who would be responsible for assembling [8343] the details of the report. We made several reports by telephone. I think we put in a written report.

Here is a report put in by radiogram on December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. No, I want a report from the commanding general to Washington of the over-all picture.

General SHORT. This was a previous report on the over-all picture.

Mr. MURPHY. Signed by whom?

General SHORT. Signed by me.

¹ The document was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 164."

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

General SHORT. Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. MURPHY. No, I would like to examine it, if I may. It probably is quite lengthy.

Captain FORD. It is about seven lines.

Mr. MURPHY. Oh, then read it, General. I thought perhaps it was six or seven pages.

General SHORT. This was dated the 7th of December and was addressed to the Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.:

Japanese enemy dive bombers estimated number sixty attacked Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor at eight am Stop Extensive damage to at least three hangars Wheeler Field three hangars Hickam Field and to planes caught on the ground Stop Details not yet known Stop Raid lasted over [8344] one hour Stop Unconfirmed report that the ships in Pearl Harbor badly damaged Stop Marine air field EWA also badly damaged Stop Details later

Mr. MURPHY. It is the details that I am interested in.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have a report, if there is one, by you, giving your explanation as to what happened and your impression of why it happened.

General SHORT. I think Colonel Duncombe will be able to find that.

Mr. MURPHY. I have reference in that regard to a letter dated December 12—

General SHORT. There are other radiograms making additional reports. The photostats are very dim and very difficult to read.

Mr. MURPHY. I will ask the Army to get us the detailed report which the General made explaining what happened on December 7.

In that connection I refer to a letter dated December 12, 1941, sent by Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark in which he said the Army anti-aircraft guns were not manned. Did you know that Admiral Kimmel said that?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Was that a fair statement?

[8345] General SHORT. It was not. They were partly manned.

Mr. MURPHY. There was only a skeleton antisabotage crew, wasn't there?

General SHORT. That is correct; but they were able to fire, and brought down a considerable number of planes in that first raid.

Mr. MURPHY. You do not agree with that statement of the Admiral?

General SHORT. Not entirely. I don't know how he meant it. He may have meant that the full crews were not there. If that is what he meant that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. He also said:

Ships in harbor opened fire very promptly but the first attack was practically unopposed.

Do you agree?

General SHORT. We knocked down a number of planes in the first attack wave.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't agree then with the admiral's statement that the first wave was practically unopposed?

General SHORT. If he means the dive bombers that came in a distance above the water estimated to have been anywhere from 10 to 200 feet, the torpedo planes, that is probably correct, because nobody fired on them until they were close enough to identify.

[8346] Mr. MURPHY. Now, General—

General SHORT. I have, Mr. Murphy, a radio report here by General Martin, commanding the Air Corps, on the 7th, which was a little more detailed than the one I read.

Mr. MURPHY. I will ask counsel and the liaison officer if they will assemble a report, the reports from Hawaii from the Army on what happened on December 7.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

May I interject one other thing?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

General SHORT. Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, the chief of staff, says that a detailed report was made about the 10th or 11th in written form.

Mr. MURPHY. You say that Colonel Phillips made a detailed report?

General SHORT. I signed the report but he remembers more of the details.

Mr. MURPHY. But did Colonel Phillips know what went on between you and Admiral Kimmel?

General SHORT. I think he knew anything of importance.

Mr. MURPHY. He testified that he didn't, didn't he?

General SHORT. No, no; I wouldn't say that. I would like to have you read that testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let's get down to that exactly. The [8347] fact is that one Phil Hayes—was he a general or colonel?

General SHORT. He was a colonel.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Phil Hayes was your chief of staff up to November 1 of 1941; isn't that correct?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And every time you had a meeting with the Navy you took your chief of staff with you?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Then on November 6 you got Colonel Phillips as your chief of staff and you never brought him to the Navy meetings with you; isn't that correct?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to make an explanation on that?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, why you wouldn't have your chief of staff in your conferences with the other branch.

General SHORT. Colonel Hayes had been there for 3 or 4 years. He knew all the Navy people and had been present at all these conferences. I took him because I thought he had considerable background of what had gone on before. At the same time that Colonel Hayes had been attending conferences with me Major Fleming had been carrying on a great deal of the liaison work with the Navy and I thought he had more of a background than my new chief of staff.

For that reason, the fact that he was an unusually keen [8348] able officer, with a remarkable memory, I thought he would know a great deal about the things that Colonel Hayes had participated in.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, Major Fleming, who was in daily contact with the District Engineer in Honolulu and in contact with the civilian engineer and in contact with the engineer at San Francisco and was one of your—

General SHORT. May I add, his contact with the engineer in San Francisco was through the District Engineer in Honolulu.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, he was one of your engineers, in contact daily with the civilian authorities in Honolulu, and with the District Engineer, and when you were discussing matters subsequent to November 27 instead of having your own chief of staff with you took one of the members of G-4, your engineer, with you?

General SHORT. Because I thought he had more background. He had a background over a considerable period. He knew probably most everything that Colonel Hayes had known for the last year.

Mr. MURPHY. How was your chief of staff ever to learn or even know or ever to understand if you were taking the engineer to conferences instead of your chief of staff?

General SHORT. I explained to the chief of staff anything of importance.

[8349] Mr. MURPHY. But the chief of staff never saw the messages of the Navy, did he?

General SHORT. Yes, I am sure that the important ones were delivered to him; copies of the important ones he did see.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he at any time engage in conversation with you had Admiral Kimmel in conversation?

General SHORT. After November 27, in those few conferences he was not present.

Mr. MURPHY. He was not present at any conference after the warning. Was he ever present at any conference between you and the Navy from the time he became your chief of staff on November 27?

General SHORT. He was not present at formal conferences. He was present at a considerable number of informal conferences with Admiral Kimmel and I talked.

Mr. MURPHY. And the chief of staff, who was never present at a formal conference between you and the Navy, was the only person talked to before you decided on alert No. 1?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; because I considered him the best informed man on the staff.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you considered him the best informed man, but yet you never took him to the conferences.

General SHORT. May I put in here, that when you consider [8350] a chief of staff you must not consider him on only one point. I would like to compare slightly Colonel Hayes and Colonel Phillips.

Colonel Hayes was an excellent administrative man. He had dealings with the Navy over considerable periods of time. Colonel Phillips was a far more competent man on field work and training. A far more competent man.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't it so—excuse me, go ahead.

General SHORT. This November 27, if anything was going to come of it, it was going to come of it as field work.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the trouble. It was going to come of it as field work.

General SHORT. If anything came he was the more competent.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you were field-work conscious weren't you?

General SHORT. I am talking fighting.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you talking about the air, though? I mean about the infantry.

General SHORT. He knew more than any staff officer I had about fighting, the combined army.

Mr. MURPHY. How could he when he is presiding as chief of staff over a staff conference of your organization intelligently discuss with your staff what was going on if he wasn't in conferences where the two services got together?

[8351] General SHORT. I think I had better explain how those conferences were conducted.

Mr. MURPHY. I wish you would, and will you—

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think the witness had completed his answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him finish his question first.

Mr. MURPHY. I wish you would discuss that. General, I don't want to interrupt. But in that connection I wish you would tell us what staff conference, if any, was had by the Army between November 27 and the date of the attack.

[8352] General SHORT. The conferences were habitually held on Saturday morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there one held on December the 6th?

General SHORT. There was.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now go ahead.

General SHORT. And the chief of staff conducted these conferences but he did not do all the talking. Each staff officer, the head of each section was called upon in turn. If he had anything of interest or importance he discussed it. If the Chief of Staff had anything to add to it, or if some other section of the general staff was interested in the thing and had some additional information it was brought in.

Mr. MURPHY. You say there was a conference—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete our answer, General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there was a staff conference on December 6, 1941?

General SHORT. There was.

Mr. MURPHY. And who were present at it, General?

General SHORT. I think—I was not present at it but I am sure that all of the general staff and probably the [8353] special staff were present at it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you were not present, at any rate, to give them the benefit of what you knew about what the Navy knew, isn't that right?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. And there was no one else in your organization who discussed anything from a staff standpoint with Admiral Kimmel, was there?

General SHORT. I am sure that Phillips knew anything of importance that I knew.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, you said there was no one—

General SHORT. He was present.

Mr. MURPHY. You said before he was not.

General SHORT. Oh, yes. He conducted the conference.

Mr. MURPHY. Oh, no; I beg your pardon, we are misunderstanding each other. Phillips, your chief of staff, was not at the formal conferences with the Navy?

General SHORT. No, sir; he was not.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. Now, then, he is the one presiding over the staff conference and yet he had not been present at the conferences with the other service, isn't that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct.

[8354] Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

General SHORT. That is correct, but he knew what had taken place.

Mr. MURPHY. He knew only what you told him, isn't that right?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. And he never saw the reports as such or what went on or did not have the benefit of looking over these people as they discussed things and sizing them up. He took what you told him about what went on; isn't that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, do you know whether the man from the engineers was requested by the staff conference to give his impressions as to what went on at the conference?

General SHORT. I don't know whether he gave his impression or not. He was there and if he thought there was anything that needed to be added I am sure that he would have added it.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield right on that point for one question?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; surely.

Senator LUCAS. General Short, did Colonel Phillips know about the war-warning message that came from the Navy?

General SHORT. Oh, I am sure he did because that mes- [8355] sage—it happens that that particular message was not delivered to me personally, I think, but delivered to the G-3 section and unquestionably he brought it to me from the G-3 section.

Senator LUCAS. It is your opinion that he saw that message?

General SHORT. I am confident that he knew exactly what was in the message.

Mr. MURPHY. I thought, General, that Layton testified—oh, no, that was the 24th, I beg your pardon—no; I thought it was Layton who testified that he delivered that war-warning message to you personally.

General SHORT. I may be confused but I think the message of the 24th was delivered to me personally but that the message of the 27th was delivered to Colonel or Major Donnegan in charge of the G-3 section. It might have been the other way around, but I do not think so.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I wish you would turn to page 534 of the Army Pearl Harbor board hearings. I would like to read question 838:

General GRUNERT. One question, here. Somewhere in my notes, here, I have something to the effect that your Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, stated that he was not informed as to what took place at your confer- [8356] ences with the Admiral. Did you keep him informed, or did you discuss with him what happened?

General SHORT. Anything of any importance, I am sure I discussed with him. We were on a very friendly personal basis—

you are meaning there that you were on a very friendly basis with your own chief of staff?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. [Reading:]

—and I am sure that if I picked up any piece of information that I thought was of any importance—and I know that I talked to him about certain task forces, because when it came to sending an officer along, why, he would be the one that would get out the order.

Now, that was a very accurate statement as far as what Phillips knew as to what the Navy was doing?

General SHORT. That is a correct statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you told him whatever you thought was of importance?

General SHORT. That is a correct statement.

Mr. MURPHY. And you then attended meetings with the Navy on November the 27th and December the 1st and December the 2d and December the 3d, and then a meeting between Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeiffer on December the 4th where there [8357] were many Navy men present, at least at some of the meetings and not your own chief of staff; isn't that right?

General SHORT. I don't know who was present between Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeiffer. On December 2 there was nobody but Admiral Kimmel and me. On December 3 in all probability Admiral Bloch was there; I don't remember definitely and I do not know what additional naval officers were there. I think in all probability that Major Fleming was with me, although General Martin may have been.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I would like to ask you to turn to page 522 of the same record, question 790:

General GRUNERT. The notes on the testimony before the Roberts Commission indicates that General Wilson, commanding the 24th Division, was never called in conference or consulted regarding the warning message of November 27th.

Was that a correct statement?

General SHORT. I sent a staff officer the afternoon I received the message to General Wilson to explain exactly what was in the message. I did not scatter copies around on account of limiting the strictly secret information as I had been directed.

General Wilson had the north sector, which was much less populated than the south sector and where we feared much [8358] less subversive measures or sabotage. There were practically no changes made in the alert, in the sabotage alert as prescribed in our standing operating procedure in General Wilson's sector.

On the other hand, in General Murray's sector, the south sector, as a result of inspections by General Murray and by Colonel Fielder we very largely revamped the guard system in that sector, which was the more dangerous of the two sectors.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, General, General Wilson said he was never consulted about the war warning, and that is a correct statement.

General SHORT. But he does not say that he did not have the message, intelligence on the message of November 27. A staff officer was personally sent to him to explain.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you know that.

General SHORT. I do know it; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Who did explain it to him?

General SHORT. I do not know the name of the staff officer. I directed that the staff officers be sent and I know they were sent.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let me read you a little bit more.

General SHORT. Did he say he got it from the Division Officer?

[8359] General GRUNERT. He said he was never consulted.

General SHORT. He had the north sector where the antisabotage work was not nearly as serious. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, I may not have had any with Wilson.

General GRUNERT. Wilson thought the Navy had an inshore and offshore patrol. Why was he not instructed and informed?

General SHORT. His job was quite different from that of the other divisions. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, and I had Murray personally inspect every post and he came back to me with recommendations and made a lot of changes—

General GRUNERT (interposing). That was in connection with your alert 1?

General SHORT. Yes.

General GRUNERT. But in connection with the possibility of his giving advice as to any other alert, he, Wilson, did not have any information?

General SHORT. I did not have any conference with him as to whether he wanted to advise me as to something different.

Now, at any rate, General, Wilson was not at that meeting on Saturday morning, December 6, was he?

[8360] General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, let us come to Colonel Fielder, at the bottom of page 522, question 795. Colonel Fielder, he was your G-2, wasn't he?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Colonel Fielder says he discussed the possibility of an attack with the Commanding General in a purely academic way. I do not quite understand how there is anything academic about discussing the possibility of an attack.

General SHORT. I do not. We discussed the possibility, probably because he was G-2 and was supposed to have some information.

Do you know whether or not G-2—what he meant by "a purely academic way?"

General SHORT. I do not know why he used that terminology, but he had more information on sabotage than anybody in the department. He had a very thorough understanding of it.

Mr. MURPHY. About sabotage?

General SHORT. And any internal disorders and was supposed to know more about what the Japanese population in Hawaii were doing and thinking than anybody in the department.

Mr. MURPHY. That was covered very well by everybody, but what about the air warning and the messages of the Navy? [8361] Why didn't he see that or why was he left out of that conference with the Navy?

General SHORT. Because we had no message of an air warning.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the Navy had McMorris there, didn't they, their war plans man? He was their war plans man, wasn't he, McMorris?

General SHORT. He was the war plans man.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Why didn't you have your war plans man there if you were going to have a conference?

General SHORT. It was entirely up to me whom to bring. McMorris I do not think was—I am not sure but I do not think he was in on the conference all the time. He was immediately available where Admiral

Kimmel could call him in. That was true of all of Admiral Kimmel's staff. I took with me to that conference General Martin, who was the head of my air force, and Colonel Mollison, who was his chief of staff. This was an air conference. They were the two best men, the two best informed men in the department on the situation. It was perfectly logical to take them.

Mr. MURPHY. General, you say it was an air conference but it had nothing to do with the message of November the 27th, did it?

General SHORT. Not directly because we had not received [8362] the message.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right; you did not get that message until some time around 2 o'clock in the afternoon and this meeting in the morning for about 3 hours was about something else entirely, wasn't it?

General SHORT. But it necessarily covered all the elements of danger because the conference was about the reinforcement of Midway and Wake by Army planes, but we had discussed the danger connected with the reinforcement and the danger connected with lessening the air equipment at Oahu.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever at any time between November the 27th and December the 7th have your staff and the naval staff together to discuss the war warning?

General SHORT. There never was any time that I know of, and I have not heard of any time in the past, where the complete Army and Navy staff were assembled. If any previous commander ever did so I never heard of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, your key officers, did you assemble them, I mean your G-3 and your G-2?

General SHORT. We did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 525, question 803. Do you have that General, at the bottom of the page?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8363] General GRUNERT. "Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, informed the staff at a meeting on December 6 that the Japs were burning papers on December 5. Says it meant that war was imminent, to him." Did he so inform his Chief of Staff or his Commanding General? If so, what conclusions were reached with regard to it?

General SHORT. I am sure he didn't inform me.

Mr. MURPHY. As a matter of fact, General, you did not see him about that until the next day, did you?

General SHORT. Well, I think that I did not but both my G-2, Colonel Fielder, and my chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, stated in their testimony before the Roberts commission that they did inform me that they were burning papers. Colonel Fielder also stated to the Roberts commission that he attached no importance to it because we did the same every day and he thought it was a routine burning of papers.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is, General, that you did testify here and again in these hearings that you did not know about that until the next day.

General SHORT. All right, will you give me the quotations?

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, you say that you did not testify on several occasions—

General SHORT. I am asking you to give me the quotations [8364] where I did testify.

Mr. MURPHY. I will.

Mr. KEEFE. Why not do it now? You said you were going to do it half a dozen times and you haven't done it. I would like to get it while the General is being interrogated on the subject.

Mr. MURPHY. Be calm; I have the references here and I have a thousand pages here. I promise you I will.

General SHORT. I would like to have the references so that I can judge which one it was.

Mr. MURPHY. I cannot turn to it right now, but I will later.

Now, your assistant G-2 said he thought that the burning of papers meant that war was imminent. You were not at the staff conference. Did anybody tell you; did your assistant G-2 tell you on December the 6th that he thought war was imminent and about that being discussed at the conference?

General SHORT. Not the assistant G-2; he did not tell me that. G-2 says he told me that they had been burning papers and he apparently—he had heard the talk and the report of the assistant G-2. He apparently did not consider it a matter of importance, and I wish to invite your attention to one thing further.

Bicknell said he got this information on the 5th. [8365] If he had considered it so terrifically important he would not wait till the morning of the 6th to report it.

Mr. MURPHY. All I know, General, is that here is one of your staff saying under oath that he thought that war was imminent and that he discussed it at a staff meeting and you do not go to the staff meeting and apparently nobody tells you that in that staff meeting there was a feeling that war was imminent on the part of at least one person there, isn't that right?

General SHORT. And he also stated that he received the information on December 5 and apparently he did not tell Colonel Fielder and he did not tell me, which would not indicate that he attached such great importance to see that we got it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate he was right, wasn't he?

General SHORT. He was right in that respect. He was a much less experienced man than the G-2.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, may I ask counsel, do you have handy exhibit 37; the basic exhibit?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to exhibit No. 37—the last paper. I think I can make it clear to the general; it is just a one-sentence dispatch.

General, on December 6, 1941, there was sent from [8366] COM Fourteen, "ACTION: OpNav," Information for the Navy:

Belleve local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

Did you have any information from the Navy that they had sent word to Washington that the Japs at Honolulu were destroying their systems?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, did you have any information from the Navy that on December the 6th a message was sent to Admiral Kimmel:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and con-

Confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means of communication to support our current operations and special Intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Did the Navy tell you about that?

General SHORT. They did not.

Mr. MURPHY. You were not in any conference on any day from the third on, were you, with the Navy?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Did you know from the Navy that [8367] they had a dispatch on the 4th of December about destroying confidential publications and other matters at Guam?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know from the Navy that on the 4th of December—I beg your pardon. On the 4th of December—rather, the 3d of December that there was a message sent to them—and this is important in view of your testimony, General:

Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo One December ordered London Hong Kong Singapore and Manila to destroy Machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy X All but one copy of other systems X and all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied.

The Navy did not tell you about that either, did they?

General SHORT. They did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know from the Navy that on the 3d of December they had a message:

Highly reliable information has been received that categorical and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to [8368] burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Did you get that either, General?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, General, as I read your testimony in the other hearings you testified that if you had received the one p. m. message that there were two matters in the message, one the ultimatum, the date, the 1 o'clock hour, and the other about the destruction of the codes and you said that that would have much more importance to you than the 1 o'clock business, is that right?

General SHORT. Will you restate that, because I do not believe you made your meaning clear.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Will you read the question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. MURPHY. Do you understand that?

General SHORT. The 1 o'clock business included both; that is the reason I did not understand your question.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate did you attach great importance to the information about the destruction of the codes or to the fact that there was a 1 o'clock hour set?

General SHORT. It would have been a combination of both.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you testify before the Navy—excuse me, I don't mean to interrupt.

[8369] General SHORT. I think you are misquoting me again.

Mr. MURPHY. Again I am misquoting you?

General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, then, General, I guess I had better quote you exactly so that I won't be accused of that after this hearing.

General SHORT. All right, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to be eminently fair with you, but I want the facts. When did I misquote you before, General?

General SHORT. When you have read from the—I cannot say exactly when but a number of times you have made a statement that I think did not coincide exactly with my testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. You think I misquoted you?

General SHORT. I don't mean intentional at all, but when we quote without reading it is pretty hard to state definitely what has been said.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will quote you exactly, General. I now refer to page 256 of your testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry.

General SHORT. 256?

Mr. MURPHY. 256, General; question 179.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Question mark. Period.

General, would you have made a very quick re- [8370] estimate of the situation and have ordered such an alert had you had that scrambled telephone conversation with General Marshall?

A. I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the code machine would have been very significant, the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant to me. I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter.

General, would that be misquoting you by what I said about that message?

General SHORT. You may have drawn the wrong inference from my answer.

Mr. MURPHY. What did you mean by that?

General SHORT. I meant by that just the delivery of the ultimatum, because at previous times they had stated that the negotiations were practically terminated. I was not talking about the 1 p. m. I was talking about the ultimatum.

Mr. MURPHY. General, you say you were not talking about [8371] the 1 o'clock message?

General SHORT. Not the hour. In my statement there I was comparing the importance in my own mind of the statement that the code machines were ordered destroyed and the statement that the ultimatum—that an ultimatum was to be delivered, not the hour of the ultimatum but that an ultimatum was to be delivered; that is what I had in mind.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, General, you were saying that the code-machine business was very significant to you; isn't that right?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. And the fact is that the Navy on the 3d and the 6th had several messages about code destruction and then this from your own Honolulu to Washington on the 6th sent a message to Washington; isn't that so?

General SHORT. Let me get your last statement.

Mr. MURPHY. On the 6th they sent a message to Washington about the destruction of the system?

General SHORT. Who did?

Mr. MURPHY. The Navy.

General SHORT. I believe that that is correct, but I knew nothing about any one of them.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let me quote it correctly so that we won't have any charges against me that I am misquoting. [8372] I do not want to misquote you.

General SHORT. Yes, sir; I have the message that they sent on the 6th.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will read it exactly:

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

Do you see that, General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And the fact is that you time and again in this hearing have stated that Admiral Kimmel gave you everything of importance; isn't that right?

General SHORT. No, sir; I said he gave—I was pretty sure that he gave me everything that he considered of importance to me that I should know.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you considered these messages important?

General SHORT. Very important; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And the fact is that they were very important, as you have testified.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you and Admiral Kimmel had no conference about the air messages and you say you had no conference with him after the 3d?

[8373] General SHORT. The message on the third came in after the conference.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you had no conference?

General SHORT. We had no conference and I did not get the message.

Mr. MURPHY. And it was your understanding that Admiral Kimmel was not to give it to you unless Washington told him to give it to you, is that right?

General SHORT. I think his practice was definitely to transmit messages, as I said, only when he received instructions from Washington to do so. He might mention the thing to me informally, but he did not transmit the message to me.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know, General, that Admiral Kimmel was getting a lot of information over the months from Manila?

General SHORT. I think that I knew that he was getting something on location of Japanese intercepts, perhaps, but I did not know of anything else that I remember.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you know that he got a message from Manila about the winds code?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. He did not pass that on to you either, did he?

General SHORT. No, sir; I never heard of the winds [8374] code for many months afterward.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let me quote exactly. Did you know that there had been sent on the 28th of November from "CINCAF, ACTION OPNAV, INFO: COM SIXTEEN CINCPAC COM FOURTEEN", a message on the winds code which I believe is already in the record?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know that there was a message on the of December from "COM SIXTEEN, ACTION: CINCAF, INF CINCPAC, OPNAV, COM FOURTEEN, 011422", as follows:

J-V-J press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated quote "listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven the tomorrow morning, since there may be important news" unquote XX Suggest frequencies seven three two seven X Nine four three zero X And one two seven five X Times Tokyo LCT.

Did the Navy ever tell you about that message?

General SHORT. They did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know that Admiral Kimmel subsequent the 27th of November instituted a 24-hour war plan?

General SHORT. I don't know what you mean by a "24-hour war plan."

[8375] Mr. MURPHY. Well, let me quote exactly. I am referring to exhibit 118 in this record:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 1200, 30 November, 1941

Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next Twelve Hours.

And then subsequently a revision of that on December 5, 1941. I know you that the Navy had taken those steps?

General SHORT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Don't you think if you had had conferences with the Navy where these problems were discussed from November 27 that you most certainly would have been told about a 24-hour plan that the Navy had?

General SHORT. That was a later date, I believe, than any of the conferences.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, one was the 30th of November.

General SHORT. The 30th of November.

Mr. MURPHY. That is when it was constituted and you had a conference on the first, on the second, on the third and Major Fleming with Colonel Pfeiffer on the fourth.

General SHORT. That is correct, but I was not told about that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, don't you think you should have been?

[8376] General SHORT. I have not read the thing. I could not make a statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I ask you to look it over now, if you will, General, please. It has been an exhibit for some days [handing document to the witness].

Have you examined it, General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you any word of that plan?

General SHORT. I had not.

Mr. MURPHY. General, a while ago—oh, I don't want to go off the subject yet. Don't you think you should have been told about the fact that they after the 27th had a 24-hour plan and that on the very of December they had a revision of it?

General SHORT. I think if you read it carefully that they had the things in there: First, the details of what he was doing to carry out his instructions for a defensive deployment and the next the naval

tails of what he expected to do in case that he put war plans—was directed to put War Plans 46 into effect.

I do not believe that he would have thought it necessary to tell me what he expected to do on details of that kind. He possibly would have—he probably would have told me if he had ever—when he put the thing into effect. You see, among [8377] other things they are to include the bringing back from the west coast another carrier and he undoubtedly did not think that that was a matter—he had not ordered it back, he just contemplated doing it if the war came on. I can see why he did not tell me.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that he did have 3 or 4 days ahead—may I have it so that I will quote it exactly, please?

General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. He did have a plan called, "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next 24-hours."

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And do you or do you not think you should have been told about the creation of that plan on the 30th of November 1941 and the revision on December 5, 1941?

General SHORT. Looking it over it is practically all details of ship movements, and so forth and I can readily understand why he did not think it directly concerned me.

Mr. MURPHY. General, war within 24 hours would very much concern you, wouldn't it, as the General in Hawaii?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; but the location of a particular ship might not concern me.

Mr. MURPHY. General Marshall did tell you your mission [8378] was to protect the base and the naval communications and your first concern was to protect the fleet, didn't he?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And wouldn't you be concerned then if there were going to be war involving the fleet within 24 hours?

General SHORT. If there was going to be?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

General SHORT. Definitely; but I would not necessarily be concerned whether cruiser A was here and B over here, or vice versa.

Mr. MURPHY. Would you be concerned whether the fleet was in or out of the harbor?

General SHORT. Very decidedly.

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't the 24-hour plan affect that very decidedly?

General SHORT. I do not believe as I looked over that paper that there is any provision for the fleet coming in from outside the harbor except to come in long enough to refuel and go out. That provision was there.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, General, I wish you would come back to page 525 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. General Martin was your air officer; isn't that right? [8379]

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will you turn to question 807?

General GRUNERT. And General Martin did not seem to know that the interceptor command was not activated until December 17.

General SHORT. Well, the fact was it was actually operating, and there was such a technical difference there that apparently Bergin and Martin, neither one realized it hadn't gone out as an order. It was actually operating dally.

Was there some confusion in Martin's and Bergin's minds about the status of the air warning service?

General SHORT. I think it was more likely confusion in reference to terms used because I think they both knew that it was actually in operation. The printed order or typed order putting it into operation did not go out until the 17th.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, prior to December the 17th the air warning service was under the control of the Signal Corps and had not yet been turned over to the Air Corps, isn't that right?

General SHORT. That is not correct.

Mr. MURPHY. It is not correct?

General SHORT. No, sir. They were operating on a basis [8380] of cooperation. The control officer in every case was an Air officer. We had not put the whole thing directly under the Air people. The Signal Corps were responsible for the training of the operators and for the training of the men at the information center, but whenever they operated they had an Air officer in control, the control officer was always an Air officer.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the Signal Corps—under the order of the 17th it went under the Air Corps, did it not?

General SHORT. Even for training, yes, and they were not under it for training previous to that time.

[8381] Mr. MURPHY. But after the 17th it would be under the exclusive control of General Davidson?

General SHORT. For training and everything else.

Mr. MURPHY. For training and everything else?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then before the 17th, the Signal Corps was doing the training?

General SHORT. They were responsible for the training when they operated as part of an interceptor command. The Air control officer actually controlled the whole operation.

Mr. MURPHY. Then on page 1103—

General SHORT. 1163?

Mr. MURPHY. No, you do not have this, General. I am now referring to Transcript of Proceedings Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pages 973 to 1105, in which I find the following—I do not think there is another copy of this available, General. Will you come up and check me as I am reading it, so I will have it correctly?

Lt. Col. KARR. Just go ahead and read it.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General RUSSELL. You were not to go into action as a pursuit officer until these other people who evaluated the information, had evaluated it, and told you that [8382] hostile aircraft was enroute to the Island? That is the situation, isn't it?

Colonel TYLER. That is right, sir.

General RUSSELL. I think it was not your job to evaluate this information?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir; it was not.

Do you know whether or not that is true?

General SHORT. I will tell you how the thing functioned.

We had an officer from the pursuit squadron right there in the information center. If he looked on the board when this report came in, he should have known exactly where our own planes were, and when a plane was reported at a certain place, and he knew that that was our own plane, then he would not alert pursuit planes.

You see, there was no way at that time for the men operating the oscilloscope saying "This is an enemy plane," or "This is a friendly plane." All he could say is "There is a plane at such and such a place," and it was up to the officer representing the pursuit people to try to determine whether there was any possibility of a friendly plane there before we opened fire, or before we sent someone out to shoot it down.

Mr. MURPHY. General, on the floor of Congress, time [8383] after time after time, there have been castigations at this gentleman. I do not know who he is, except his name is Tyler.

As I understand it from reading this record, he was there and his duty was to order these pursuit planes where to go, after he had been told by somebody else that there was a problem that called for that being done.

Is that your understanding?

General SHORT. If the interceptor command had been operating at 7:20, which it was not, before he had the bomber squadron at Wheeler Field, there would have been a check-up by the pursuit officer to be sure we would not go up and knock down our own planes.

There was nobody at the station at 7:20, as I understand, but a man named McDonald, who was a telephone operator, and Lieutenant Tyler, because the station as such had been closed about 7 o'clock.

[8384] Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, wasn't it his job to direct the planes from the ground after someone said there was a reason for them to leave the ground?

General SHORT. Under the circumstances, I will tell you what I think he should have done. He should have called the Pursuit Command at Wheeler Field and they would have made the check then whether they had planes in that vicinity, before they sent anyone up to fire upon them.

Mr. MURPHY. As a matter of fact, would not they then have to call you, or somebody else, to reverse alert 1 and put into some other order so that they could take them off the ground?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Who had the authority to alter alert 1?

General SHORT. There was a provision in the standing operating procedure that in case of a surprise attack the alert would go automatically into effect. They would notify me after they would put it into effect.

Mr. MURPHY. What was he then? A lieutenant? Could a lieutenant do anything about that?

General SHORT. I beg pardon?

Mr. MURPHY. I say he was only a lieutenant. It was Lieutenant Tyler, wasn't it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8385] Mr. MURPHY. He says at page 1101:

General Russell and you knew the only thing you had to do was to get in touch with the people who could put those planes up, isn't that true?

Colonel TYLER. That is not exactly true, sir, because we had nothing on the alert. We had no planes.

Would he be in error in that respect?

General SHORT. He would be in error. I have checked that statement of his with General Davidson, who was the pursuit commander at Wheeler Field, and he said there would have been no question, that if he had received a message from Tyler to alert the command he would have turned out everything. He would have immediately checked afterward to find out whether there was justification for it, but the first thing he would have done was to alert the command.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, the second lieutenant would identify the planes as being enemy planes?

General SHORT. He would not, because he did not have the information there. The station was closed. In normal times there would be a pursuit officer there whose business would be to identify them.

May I call your attention to paragraph 13? I think that will answer you. The last two lines, or part of the last three lines.

[8386] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

—will be initiated by Department Order except in the case of a surprise hostile attack.

General SHORT. In case of a surprise hostile attack it went into effect automatically; it did not have to be put into effect by the Department.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, if this lieutenant knew there were any planes—

General SHORT (interposing). He could put it into effect by simply calling the Pursuit Command, and they would start operations and then notify me. The first thing they would have done would be to start operations.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to page 517, General, of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Question 764:

General FRANK. It strikes me that right within the Army itself you had a situation between the Air Force and the Signal Corps where this A. W. S. was operating on a cooperative basis rather than on a positive command basis.

General SHORT. Because it had not reached a state of training where we thought it could work to the best advantage.

General FRANK. But if the vast proportion of the people concerned with its operation were Air Force people—

General SHORT (interposing). Not the technical operation. The operation of the communications and the radar [8387] system is definitely for the Signal Corps.

That is a correct statement?

General SHORT. That is absolutely correct. There probably may have been 10 times as many men of the Signal Corps working as of the Air Corps.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, General, we have a letter placed in the record from Admiral Kimmel ordering the Navy not to bunch the planes but to disperse them, and then, as I remember it, the testimony was that the ones that were dispersed and anchored in the bay were destroyed and the ones that were together were not destroyed.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, your planes were bunched, based upon a survey of General Burwell, isn't that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct. It was a very extensive survey.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to page 526—by the way,

I will get through in 10 minutes—page 526, question 808:

General GRUNNERT. General Rudolph, the Commanding General of the bombers, stated that had he had any intimation of preceding trouble his planes would not have been bunched or concentrated but would have been ready for the air. Then, in parenthesis, "especially on a Sunday morning" parenthesis.

[8388] Was he not informed by the Commanding General, or the Commanding General of the Air Forces, of the warnings of the immediate past?

General SHORT. I went over the thing very fully with General Martin, talked over with him at as great length as anybody. I would imagine that he talked with his subordinate commanders.

Would that be a proper subject for discussion at that meeting on Saturday morning?

General SHORT. No, sir; I mean General Rudolph was not present at that meeting.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, General Martin, if General Rudolph was telling the truth, should have passed on the message to him, is that right?

General SHORT. He should have passed on the message to him. I do not know whether he did or not. I would like to read General Martin's report, what he says about that in his report to the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. I wish you would.

General SHORT. I would also say, in view of General Burwell's extensive study—in the first place, General Rudolph could not have dispersed those B-17's because you did not dare take them off the runways, the ground was so soft that you would have never gotten them into the air if [8389] you had.

I would like to read this:

8 DECEMBER 1941.

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,

Washington, D. C.:

More specific information on questions asked by General Arnold: Command alerted prevention sabotage required concentration rather than dispersion Stop All planes now dispersed comma pursuit in bunkers Stop Bombers cannot be bunkered on account of soft ground off runways Stop Local joint agreement places responsibility for search on Navy who may call on Army for help when thought necessary Stop Planes in ferry flight all land Oahu two landed small fields and were badly damaged comma one destroyed by gunfire and one badly damaged Stop Attack so perfectly executed surprise attack in strict accord with our prescribed tactics Stop Dive bomber was highly accurate Stop Every effort made with the bombers left to locate carriers without success Stop Casualties dead six officers two hundred seven enlisted men comma wounded some seriously three hundred and sixty-seven enlisted men Stop Morale high.

MARTIN.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, General, will you kindly go to page 524 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, question 800:

General GRUNNERT. You had a conference once a week. [8390] What did you confer on if it were not what the condition of things was and what should or should not be done, and so forth? I do not know whether this is the truth, but that is what is in the record, and we will question about it.

General SHORT. Undoubtedly that is correct. Burgin was not in on the weekly conferences. I did confer with the staff.

General GRUNNERT. Then the weekly conference was a staff conference and not a conference with subordinate commanders?

General SHORT. No. We had a conference with subordinate commanders on irregular occasions, whenever there was something we thought we should take up with them.

Do you know whether there was a staff conference with the subordinate commanders between November 27 and December 7?

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General SHORT. I had a conference with General Martin and General Burgin within an hour or an hour and a half after the receipt of the November 27 message. I had probably at least four or five conferences with General Murray, who was commanding the division in the south sector. I do not believe I had a conference with General Wilson in the north sector, because there was nothing in particular that I felt I needed to confer with him about.

Mr. MURPHY. General, if you had had all of the radar that you had ordered present, would you have had any different [8391] schedule on Sunday morning, December 7, in view of the situation as it then confronted you?

General SHORT. In view of the parts situation and in view of the fact that we had to train men, I doubt if I would.

I would like to read you, in that connection, a reference to this spare parts. This is a memorandum made out on yesterday.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Washington, 24 January 1946.

Memorandum:

I have examined the budget estimate for the FY's 1941 and 1942 and, in addition, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the first appropriated funds for the maintenance and operation of Radar sets SCR 270 were in the Third Supplemental Estimate, Fiscal Year 1942, page 35, submitted 13 November 1941, which was approved by the Congress on 17 December 1941. The original planning for these funds was made 10 October 1941 (preliminary estimate, F. Y. 1942).

These appropriated funds were for the operation of this type of set for a period of two hours per day, five days a week, and 50 weeks a year to provide training of [8392] personnel in the operation of this equipment.

That was signed by K. C. Lawton, colonel, Signal Corps.

That shows what the War Department planned their estimate of funds on, and that was 2 hours operation a day 5 days a week.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, General, I would like to ask you, if you will—

General SHORT (interposing). In connection with that, there is a statement here from Major Berquist, now Colonel Berquist, who was our chief control officer and who was one of the two officers who had some training prior to the return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell. This is from volume 10, pages 1197 and 1198 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. This is a paraphrase and not a direct quotation:

The design of the gasoline engines was defective and we had very serious trouble. We had very serious trouble with electric power failures.

He also said in connection with this number of hours, on page 1197, and again I paraphrase:

Colonel Berquist pointed out that some of the enlisted men had been ruining their eyes because we had to keep them on the radar work too long.

Now he was the man who was actively in charge of the operation of the radar and interceptor command, the man that [8393] we thought had the most knowledge.

Mr. MURPHY. Berquist?

General SHORT. Berquist.

Mr. MURPHY. Now in that connection I direct your attention to page 1088 of the hearing before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. You do not have that.

General GRUNNET. But if somebody came down there and said "we have got to get this thing going, anything is liable to pop any minute" you might have shortened up the time?

This is General Grunnert questioning Commander Taylor.

General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading) :

Commander TAYLOR. I think both Berquist and Taylor had that attitude, but unfortunately we could not get that much information out of the people we dealt with.

General GRUNNERT. Could not Berquist or Powell, or you, as far as the Navy was concerned, have had access to the Chief of Staff and said, "The most important thing is lacking. We have got to get it in"?

Commander TAYLOR. We saw the Chief of Staff, but we found that somebody else was always responsible.

General GRUNNERT. So they were not sufficiently impressed to make this their business or push it in comparison with all the other things they had to do?

[8394] Commander TAYLOR. No, sir; they lacked the power packs to get it going.

General GRUNNERT. General Short expressed himself as most concerned about getting this in. It seems to me if you had approached him he would have been able to do something about it. Do you know whether or not permanent radar equipment had been on the island awaiting construction projects such as roads, cables, and so forth?

Commander TAYLOR. It could be, sir; but not according to the Signal Corps. My information is from the Signal Corps Officers on the station.

Do you know whether or not that is a correct statement?

General SHORT. Commander Taylor was a naval officer and probably did not know as much about the details of what was required and what had not been received as Colonel Powell would have known. There was one thing that we had definitely not received. I think it was sent from the States about December 10 or 12. That was the plans for the erection of the radar towers. The engineer could not go ahead and erect those towers until he got the plans of the footings that had been provided for in the specifications in the States, and those were not received until after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand he is talking here, General, about the air warning service that was operating.

[8395] General SHORT. As far as that is concerned, as I pointed out yesterday, on the station at Haleakula, in the park, the negotiations with the park people lasted from June 1940 to April 1941, and I personally had a conference with the head of the park system before we got that straightened out. So we were not asleep at the switch.

Mr. MURPHY. I am thoroughly familiar with that. You made every effort, and you had your difficulties, but, as I understand it, Commander Taylor is talking about the mobile sets. He may be talking about the permanent sets, but I am not sure.

General SHORT. I am talking about the permanent sets.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. He says this:

General GRUNNERT. There was one remark that set me back when I saw it in your testimony. You said you never saw Short. Was he not the commanding general and was he not around there?

Commander TAYLOR. I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff.

General SHORT. May I state there that Commander Taylor being a naval officer, a junior naval officer, may not have felt that he could come to me, but I am sure Colonel Powell, my signal officer, told him he could come to me any time, and he was the man who was responsible, although Taylor was helping him out.

[8396] Mr. MURPHY. Now I want to conclude, General, by asking you to go to the supplemental part of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing.

General SHORT. We have it here. Is it part of the Roberts commission?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Now, the bottom of page 1619, the fifth paragraph up, beginning, "Now, General."

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, have you in mind the contents of General Marshall's message of the morning of December 7? You have in mind its content, have you?

General SHORT. You mean the one——

The CHAIRMAN. That never reached you.

General SHORT. That didn't come until 2:58; yes, sir. I know exactly what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. If that message had reached you, let us say, three hours before the attack, would that have changed your dispositions?

General SHORT. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either—to at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone against a complete attack, because it looked so significant.

[8397] The CHAIRMAN. Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would have stirred you up?

General SHORT. The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing; that they are going into an entirely new phase, and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of 3 or 4 days. That would have been extremely significant to me, the code machine, much more significant than just the ultimatum.

That was what I was referring to a while ago.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, if the Navy had given you that information on any of those days about the codes, you probably would have gone into a more serious alert; is that right?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. It would have been very significant. I would like to call your attention to the fact that when I made this statement about the ultimatum that I had no conception of what that ultimatum consisted of as magic as shown us. Here I found out how serious it was. At that time I had no idea what it was.

Mr. MURPHY. But, General, all we are interested in [8398] is what you knew on December 7. Not hindsight.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. That is the reason for my making the statement. I did not know the seriousness of what the War Department had received.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you will recall that I said I would show you in the transcript where you said you hadn't seen the information until the next day.

Will you come to the next question?

General McCox. Didn't you have on the night of the 6th a bit of information from your intelligence officer that they were burning the consular records?

General SHORT. No, sir, I did not know anything about that until probably the afternoon of the 7th, that they had. I think that he did get some information that they had burned something.

General McCox. It was not given to you?

General SHORT. It was not given to me.

Isn't that what I said before?

General SHORT. As I have explained, I may have, in the first part, thought that he meant the information given me the following day about burning codes, and at that time I did not remember, as I have stated, about the burning of papers, but after reading the testimony of Colonel Fielder and Colonel Phillips, I am sure the report was made to me [8399] of the burning of the papers on Saturday morning of the 6th.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you did say at page 1620:

As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had really burned anything until the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th; they interrupted the burning. I wasn't cognizant of the fact that they had burned the previous day.

You did say that?

General SHORT. I believed that at the time. When I later saw the chief of staff, I knew that my memory was at fault. I am perfectly willing to accept your statement.

Mr. MURPHY. General McCoy did say:

And you would consider that a serious slip on the part of your intelligence officer, then?

General SHORT. Well, that is a little questionable, General, because we burn every day. Any secret stuff that we are destroying, we burn to be sure that there is no chance of helping somebody break the code, and I wouldn't have been surprised if the Japanese consul's office was burning every day. It wouldn't have surprised me at all to learn that they habitually burned everything in their waste-baskets every day. I don't know that I would have gotten terribly excited about just the burning [8400] of the stuff in the waste baskets. I would expect it.

General McCoy. But the fact is that that did not come to you.

General SHORT. That did not come to me, no, sir. I learned the next day that when they arrested the consul and the assistant consul, they interrupted the burning of a file.

Now, General, I am asking you this question simply because it was passed on to me. Did somebody from the FBI call you on the night of December 6 and ask to see you before you went to a social affair at Schofield Barracks?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you talk to anybody in the FBI that night?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you on the night of the 6th tell anybody that they were "too security minded" anybody in the FBI?

General SHORT. No, sir; I talked to no one. I did talk to Colonel Bicknell, who had information from the FBI.

Mr. MURPHY. That was to Bicknell and Fielder at your house?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8401] Mr. MURPHY. You were at a social affair at Schofield Barracks, some kind of a relief proposition, on the night of the 6th?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. And the Air Corps had a party that evening but not in this building?

General SHORT. On an entirely different post.

Mr. MURPHY. At a different post?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I come to page 1622, the third paragraph:

General McCoy. And, as I remember it, you had in mind, however, not any fear of an attack at that time, and that you were trying to get warning of that, but that you were trying to get the personnel accustomed to the worst time, the most dangerous time?

General SHORT. Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more about the training, rather than expecting something to happen at that time.

That would be about the radar?

General SHORT. About all material.

Mr. MURPHY. About everything.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

[8402] Now, then, General, I come down to page 1622, the bottom of the page. The other day I made some statement about the training being on a volunteer basis, and at that time you felt that wasn't correct. I believe you said yesterday that it was on a more or less volunteer basis?

General SHORT. It was, as far as Sunday was concerned.

Mr. MURPHY. That is what I meant.

General SHORT. And over hours. They were working more than the prescribed hours.

Mr. MURPHY. I think this will answer it squarely. I direct your attention to the question at the bottom of the page.

Admiral STANDLEY. In one of the affidavits made by your officers, the affidavit of Grover C. White, the Second Lieutenant, Signal Corps, he says, "On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have the stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only, December 7, 1941."

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. "This was agreed to by the Control Officer." Have you any information as to why that request was made that way on that Saturday?

General SHORT. I haven't any information except I had ordered these stations to work only from four until [8403] seven, and then they were supposed to carry on routine training for the rest of the day. In agreement, they had met together and decided that if they carried on until 11 o'clock in the morning, a body, they would get more out of it than they would if they went on the afternoon after 7 o'clock, and they had agreed among themselves that they would call the training three teams at a time until 11 o'clock and from there on they would be on their own and making repairs, and things of that kind. Since I had not ordered that, and they were doing it by agreement, they apparently thought that they could eliminate it on Sunday, by agreement. That's the way I can account for it.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they were not going to do the training after 7 o'clock on Sunday?

General SHORT. On Sunday. They had agreed that just on Sunday at the place of working right straight through, they would stop at 7 o'clock on Sunday.

Admiral STANDLEY. We have a great many coincidences in this incident on the 7th.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And this is one of them. I was trying to see if there was any reason why that request was made on that Saturday, not to work after 7 o'clock in the [8404] morning on Sunday.

General SHORT. I think it was only because it was Sunday, and they were working every day practically from 4 o'clock in the morning until four o'clock in the afternoon, making a good long training day, and then they decided that on Sunday they would chop off Sunday hours, the only way I can figure it. The working 12 hours a day the other days.

Then, the next question:

Admiral STANDLEY. General, under the date of 5 November, 1941, you have a Standing Operating Procedure. That was signed by Adjutant General (Robert H. Dunlop, and you stated that copies of this were furnished the Navy.

In that connection, General, the Army have testified that they did not get a copy of your standing operating procedure of November until sometime in early 1942.

Do you know whether or not that is correct?

General SHORT. I have no way of knowing. The Army regulations at that time had a prescribed distribution of every order that we issued, every paper of any kind the Adjutant General was supposed to mail to Washington without letter of transmittal, these various things, to meet the Army regulations. The only record that was made of the [8405] mailing of these things was when the document was secret and this was not a secret document. I have talked with General Dunlop, who is here in town, and was Adjutant General, and he says the fact that it was distributed by the Adjutant General to all of the units in the department would make him sure that he must have sent it to Washington, but there would be no record of that, because it wasn't secret.

Now I have a copy of the Army regulations in effect at that time, and it mentions only corps areas, but the department that worked on the same basis as corps areas, applied it to them, and we habitually mailed these prescribed copies of whatever we got out.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think it particularly material anyhow. I was just going into it to clear up the record.

General SHORT. I would be glad to put this in the record as an exhibit.

Mr. MURPHY. What I say is this: Alert No. 1 could not be confusing because you didn't say that; you said sabotage.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is the Army, and I am just trying to clear the record, said they didn't get it until 1942, but I don't think it would make any difference one [8406] way or the other, whether they had it or not.

General SHORT. Hawaii cannot prove whether they did or not, because there are no records.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, as to the AWS, I agree the record says it is by cooperation, but I refer you to page 1628, and I was only quoting you when I made the statement I did:

General SHORT. I hadn't definitely—we hadn't given it a definite organization. It was working, but we waited to bring out the orders until General Davidson got back from the mainland, so we would not have to revise that. We were working informally.

Admiral STANDLEY. But it was still working under the Signal Corps at that time?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

That is what I had reference to.

General SHORT. My answer there was not—as far as aircraft warning service, not the interceptor command, but specifically the aircraft warning service, that was entirely a Signal function, and I may have made the answer on that account.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, I was quoting a pretty good witness.

General SHORT. The combined thing was a combination [8407] worked by cooperation.

Mr. MURPHY. Then I want to come to page 1633, the third last paragraph from the bottom of the page:

General SHORT. Frankly, I do not know how much search the Navy made, as that whole business of search was tied in between the ships and the planes, and it was their responsibility, and I do not know when their task forces—as I say, they have two task forces out at the time. I don't know what instructions their

task forces had as to search. I assume that whenever their task force went out, if it located Japanese ships, it would report them.

Admiral STANDLEY. But as for the search from Oahu itself, which in wartime was to be an all-around search, did you know that that was not being carried out daily?

General SHORT. I didn't know just what the Navy were doing, frankly. I knew they had task forces out and I assumed any searching they did was tied in with the task forces.

You made that statement?

General SHORT. May I say Admiral Standley's statement where he says that they were supposed to make a complete all-around search from Oahu would never be correct, because they would use the perimeter from Wake to Johnston-Wake to [8408] Midway so as to get the most economical use of their planes.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the war plan called for a 360-degree search, but they couldn't do it?

General SHORT. No, sir. If the Navy had been gone, and the Army had had to do this, if we hadn't occupied the outlying islands, we would have had to do it from Oahu.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, page 1634:

Admiral REEVES. It seems to me, General, that the reconnaissance search and the radar search are absolutely parallel in locating possible ships at sea. One was a longer range affair than the other, but otherwise there was no difference whatever.

General SHORT. Oh, there should be—they would be tied in.

Admiral REEVES. It seems to me that prior to any hostile or air—or declaration of war, that neither of these procedures was being operated regularly day after day.

General SHORT. They were being operated as a training matter, Admiral, rather than as a real intelligence service just combing the ocean.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

[8409] General SHORT. Now, I say I do not know just exactly what the Naval instructions were, but I know that was true from our point of view, that we were operating as a training proposition.

Admiral REEVES. Your failure to operate the radar after 7 a. m., was that in any way dependent on the fact that you thought the Navy reconnaissance planes were operating?

General SHORT. It frankly was that we didn't think—from all the information that we had, we did not think the situation demanded it.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General SHORT. We would have been working 24 hours a day, if we had had anything to indicate that the situation demanded it.

Now, again at page 1636, at the bottom of the page, referring to the carriers, General, five paragraphs up from the bottom:

General McCoy. Did any information come to you that day from your own sources of information or from the Navy that indicated the carriers were to the north of Oahu?

General SHORT. The only thing that indicated that to me was the fact that they picked up this group of planes at 7:20 132 miles 8 degrees east of north. That [8410] would indicate one carrier was in there, was in that direction.

I will ask that that be stricken. That is not the part I wanted.

Go to the bottom of page 1638, General, the third last paragraph:

General SHORT. I think the system is all right. I think that we made a very serious mistake when we didn't go to an alert against an all-out attack. I think that our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not.

General McCoy. Do you think there would have been any change in your attitude, possibly, or a more complete meeting of the situation, if there had been unity of command?

General SHORT. I don't believe it would have had any particular effect without the commander in that instance had decided that there was the danger of an air

attack. You could have had the same degree of alertness under unity of command that you had under cooperation.

Did you make that statement, General?

General SHORT. I believe that is a perfectly correct statement, that we made our estimate of the situation based on the information we had from Washington, that one man [8411] would have made the same estimate if he had been in full command, if he had the same information, because Admiral Kimmel and I absolutely independently arrived at the same conclusion.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, General, will you go to page 1639, again, at the bottom of the page. You are referring there to the conferences you had about Wake and Midway.

* * * —in the whole discussion the fear was submarines, because Wake is close to some of the Japanese bases, and not a question of air, although they would be close enough that land-based planes could have operated against them when they were executing the relief of Wake. I don't think that that was given very serious consideration, but there was a lot of discussion at that time, owing to, the fact that we were going so far out to make this relief, going practically into the Mandate Islands.

That was a discussion, was it not, about Wake and Midway, General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that a fair statement?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. But I think that that statement may not be absolutely correct, inasmuch as I remember that the Navy was not willing to send the carriers closer than 200 miles to Wake, and I think for both reasons [8412] and we even went to the point where Admiral Halsey took a carrier, we had never flown P-40 planes off a carrier, and he took his carrier out and two planes and made the experiment to determine that afternoon whether we could do it, and we succeeded in doing it. That was before the decision had been definitely made not to replace them.

Mr. MURPHY. General, it is getting close to the adjourning hour, and I want to say that I am sorry that I have to ask you some questions here where we talk about radar going 132 miles, when we have passed from that time to reaching the moon by radar.

General SHORT. I hope I did not give you the idea that I thought you were purposely misquoting, but it is hard to quote from memory.

Mr. MURPHY. No. Life is too short for me to misquote anybody.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are not quite through?

Mr. MURPHY. I will want about 5 minutes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, General Short wants to present some material that you inquired about.

General SHORT. On page 8272 of the record, Senator Lucas asked me how the midget submarines got in the vicinity of Hawaiian waters, and Admiral Inglis in his [8413] statement in exhibit 8, page 16, makes an explanation of why he thought they got there, and I would like to read that.

Senator LUCAS. Let me say, General, I had forgotten the testimony that the Admiral had placed before the committee, but since I have to read his testimony. I thank the General for calling my attention to it again.

General SHORT. It is just eight or ten lines, if you wish me to read it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you want it read, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. That is perfectly all right.

General SHORT [reading]:

Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, five midget submarines launched from specifically fitted fleet submarines as a "special attack force to conduct an offensive attack against American ships within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the American Fleet through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air strike. Available data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor. It inflicted no damage on American units, and none of the five rejoined the Japanese force."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, general?

General SHORT. That is all.

[8414] The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will stand adjourned until 1 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 1 o'clock p. m., of the same day.)

[8415]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

Mr. CLARK. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

Mr. MURPHY. General Short, I direct your attention to page 10 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, the fourth last paragraph from the bottom of the page:

General McCoy. If you had been furnished with all of the things that you needed, necessary, would that have made any difference in this particular action?

General SHORT. I do not believe it would.

Was that a correct answer?

General SHORT. What I intended to imply by that, that in the absence of information from the War Department we would not have been in a proper alert and that we would not have been much more effective.

Mr. MURPHY. Even though you had all the planes, all the resources and all the things you required?

General SHORT. It would have made some difference in the anti-aircraft fire; that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. In the anti-aircraft fire you still would not have had men at the guns?

General SHORT. Only the skeleton crews.

Mr. MURPHY. Just to guard the guns from the islanders?

[8416] General SHORT. And they could fire them.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, continuing:

Admiral STANDLEY. Right there: In case the patrol planes that were needed to make the effective off-shore patrol were here in sufficient numbers, do you still think that no change would have been made in the plans?

General SHORT. None whatever, because you couldn't tell when some of them might have been ordered away. If they had been left they just simply would not have called upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in most of our exercises the assumption was that they had enough to make the patrol, so they made the patrols and called upon us to execute the bombing mission, because they considered that our B-17's were more effective as bombers than their own planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but in this estimate they stated definitely that there were not sufficient forces to make a continuous air patrol as required in war.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't be—

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, if you had had that force here do you think under the circumstances you would have been making that patrol every morning? Not you, I mean, but the Navy?

General SHORT. But the Navy.

[8417] Admiral STANDLEY. The combined effort; yes.

General SHORT. Well, I think that would be a fair question to ask the Navy. I don't hardly think under the conditions that they would; I think that they would have been doing it as an exercise now and then in connection with us. I do not believe that they would have been doing it habitually if they had had them, but I don't know. It would be a fair question to ask them.

Were those questions asked you, and did you make those answers before the Roberts board?

General SHORT. I think that is perfectly O. K.; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, General, one more question near the bottom of the page:

Admiral REEVES. Before you go to that, General, let me ask General Short this:

On the other hand, if you had had material and fully equipped radar stations, would you have been operating them throughout the day or would you have operated them as you did on the morning of the 7th?

General SHORT. I probably would have operated them just as I did.

Is that a correct question and a correct answer, as reported there?

General SHORT. That is assuming that I had just the [8418] same information from Washington that I did have.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to this question by the Chairman of the Roberts Board, at page 630 of Admiral Kimmel's previous testimony. Do you have that?

General SHORT. Page 630?

Mr. MURPHY. Page 630.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The very top of the page:

The CHAIRMAN (Justice Roberts). In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it was not going to get any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Do you think Admiral Kimmel was justified in making that statement?

General SHORT. I do not know that he intended to answer that we knew we would not get any, but with all the reconnaissance that I know he had out I could not count on getting them, put it that way.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to page 109 of the Roberts board hearing of the Army, General, and I will only ask a few more questions.

General SHORT. Yes.

[8419] Mr. MURPHY. Page 109. I see, down about 12 lines:

Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly ever step out of his house without hearing planes * * *

Do you see that?

General SHORT. Page 109?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

General SHORT. Yes, sir; I have it.

Mr. MURPHY (reading) :

Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly ever step out of his house without hearing planes, * * *

You made that statement, did you not, before the board?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I go to page 127, General, the middle of the page:

General SHORT. Yes, habitually there were planes in the air from 4 o'clock on. There were planes in the air almost all the time except from about 11 o'clock at night until 4 o'clock in the morning. As I said before, you couldn't step out of your house and look in the air without seeing planes.

Then at the bottom of the page General McCoy said:

Well, they were apparently not up on that Sunday morning.

[8/20] General SHORT. That Sunday morning they were not up, most unusual. Each Sunday morning you are likely to—

General McCoy. How do you explain that?

General SHORT. I wouldn't be able to explain it without asking General Davidson just why; but if they had been up and training they wouldn't have had ammunition, for normally in the training they did not carry ammunition.

In that connection, General, I direct your attention—

Will you give me the number of this exhibit, Kimmel exhibit 5 to report of action, dated December 19, 1941.

Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit No. 120.

Mr. MURPHY. Exhibit No. 120. Do you have that?

Lieutenant KARR. We don't have it.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read it to the general. There is what is called the Kimmel exhibit 5 to report of action, and it is dated December 19, 1941, and on page 2, under paragraph 4, it says:

All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.

I was wondering why the Navy planes would have machine guns and ammunition and not the Army?

General SHORT. Our planes were grouped for sabotage alert. If you put machine-gun ammunition in the planes and a grenade was exploded you would probably set off the [8/21] ammunition and start a lot more trouble. We deliberately kept out ammunition when we grouped them for sabotage.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I ask you, General, if you would outline where you were on the 6th of December. That question has been asked of each of the important witnesses so far.

General SHORT. I was, as I remember, in my office until probably sometime around 5 o'clock, or a little after. I then went to my quarters. Around about 6:30 Colonel Bicknell arrived with the so-called Mori message. Colonel Bicknell and General Fielder and I discussed that for some time.

Mr. KEEFE. What message was that?

General SHORT. The Dr. Mori message.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General SHORT. We discussed that for some time.

Mr. KEEFE. The poinsettia message.

Mr. MURPHY. The Hibiscus and poinsettia.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General SHORT. Yes. After that discussion we, my wife and I, drove with Colonel and Mrs. Fielder to Schofield Barracks where

we attended a dinner for some type of local relief. I left the club sometime between 10 and 10:15, arrived at home at about 10:45, and retired.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, General, you were speaking about so [8422] many planes in the air on other mornings. There is testimony of Private Elliott that on other mornings besides this Sunday morning they would have about 25 different targets on the radar station.

General SHORT. That confirms my statement, because they would pick up everything.

Mr. MURPHY. Other mornings but not this particular morning.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral Kimmel received from Washington a several page report of a message or memorandum by General Short and Admiral Stark to the President outlining the Pacific situation rather in detail. Did he ever give you the benefit of showing you that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You mean General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Mr. MURPHY. Strike the question.

Admiral Kimmel received from Admiral Stark a copy of a memorandum to the President from Admiral Stark and General Marshall outlining the Pacific situation in quite some detail. Did he let you see that?

General SHORT. No, sir; he did not.

[8423] Mr. MURPHY. Did he ever tell you that he received it?

General SHORT. I don't think so.

Mr. MURPHY. When you talked to Secretary Knox on his arrival at Pearl Harbor, there was some conversation between you in which he asked you if you had received a message and, as I recall it, he said something about it being sent from Washington at midnight. Will you tell us about that?

General SHORT. My feeling is that he must have been confused in the time or some way we didn't arrive at an understanding because the only message that I got and he could have been referring to was the one sent by General Marshall about noon on the 7th.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I do find in exhibit 123 on the sixth page, something that I think should be shown in the record, and I will read it to you, General.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Of course, Admiral Kimmel had before him the whole Pacific area. You had before you the defense of Pearl Harbor. So that his problem was a broader problem than yours, ordinarily?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. I read this paragraph:

[8424] The conditions likely to exist on Oahu, in the event of war are definitely different from those prevailing in Europe, and which dictated the establishment of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great Britain. Sustained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army and the Fleet are considerably different—the operation of one being defensive and local, while the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Strategic, rather than tactical cooperation, is indicated, and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is of less importance.

That, General, was a statement by Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations on November 3, 1941.

Now, there was a letter written by Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark on June 4, 1941, General, where he said this:

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air-raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held.

Then there was the "Memorandum for General Marshall."

Enclosed is the arrangement of Kimmel and General Short with regard to joint air operations. You will recall [8425] our talking about it, and it looks to me extremely good.

Signed by "Stark."

Would there be a possibility that if General Marshall read your reply to his telegram that he might have understood liaison with the Navy to mean just that?

General SHORT. Undoubtedly he would have taken that whole thing as referring to that annex No. 7. I don't think there is any question but what that would have been the feeling.

Mr. MURPHY. I will ask you this question: As I understand it, there was provision at Hawaii for a joint committee of which your chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, was head, and that committee never met from November 27 until after December 7, and as I understand it, your reason for their not meeting was they would only meet in the case of an over-all change and there was nothing here to indicate the need of any such meeting?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. You also had 100 artillery lookouts that were not utilized because you didn't consider the situation called for it?

General SHORT. They would only be used if we expected a surface attack.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also had sound detectors that [8426] were not manned and that was to give some indication of something coming toward the island?

General SHORT. They were good for only about 4 miles.

Mr. MURPHY. They were not manned because of the situation?

General SHORT. Because we were not in this type of alert.

Mr. MURPHY. You also had civilian squadrons or lookouts, and they were not used because of the situation?

General SHORT. Civilian aircraft squadrons?

Mr. MURPHY. No.

General SHORT. I don't believe we had any.

Mr. MURPHY. There was no provision for civilian aircraft squadrons or lock-outs?

General SHORT. There was one poor lone civilian flyer that practically flew into the Japanese and got fired at when he didn't know anything was on.

Mr. MURPHY. Your harbor-control post was working 8 hours a day before December 7, and 24 hours after?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. One other question, General. The martial law, how long had you made provision for that?

General SHORT. That probably had been in every war plan for the last 20 years.

[8427] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, when you took over immediately after the raid, was it your intention at that time that martial law would be continued indefinitely, or only for the immediate emergency?

General SHORT. I would say as long as it was necessary. Once put into effect it could only be called off upon the order of the President.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. In the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor board, at page 49, there is the following colloquy between General Grunert and General Marshall to which I invite your attention:

General GRUNERT. Just to have it in the record for our future consideration, I want to put a query to be answered or not, as you see fit, or whether or not the question is such as to really demand an answer. That is this: Here, the same message, or three messages go to at least four prominent commanders, or three of them, overseas—Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and one, on a presumably exposed West Coast. Three of them apparently interpret those messages in one way, and the fourth one does not. So the three of them report all or the measures they have taken, or show by their reports that they con- [8428] sidered this as quite a critical and dangerous situation; so they take greater measures than the fourth does.

Now, is there anything in the case of that fourth which happens to be Hawaiian Department—are there any peculiar circumstances there that it should be interpreted in a different way for that command than it was in Panama, the Philippines, or on the West Coast?

Now, this is what I would like your consideration of:

General MARSHALL. All I can say to that is this—and my answer does not explain the contrast between the very, very urgent attitude of the Naval and Army Commanders in Hawaii in the spring and early summer with relation to air and anti-aircraft and radar requirements. All I can say is that Hawaii had always 130,000 Japanese in a very congested district there, and no commander could ever forget that, and the others did not have them. That did not exist in Panama. You had Panamanians over the border, but certainly you had no feeling of fears regarding them. In the Philippines you had no Japanese population, certainly of any moment. It actually developed later there was a Fifth Column, very well organized, out there; but you had always present in your mind in Hawaii the large Japanese population of unpredictable activities.

Now, I think that covers the answer to the question [8429] General Grunert asked as to why there was a different interpretation on the messages, if that was a fair statement of their purport.

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and I would like to add also that the very difference in the answers from the various departments should have caused the people in the War Plans Division who read my answer to look at it critically, and know what it said. It was sufficiently different that it should have called their attention to it, in place of their saying they never realized what it said.

Senator BREWSTER. It was true in the Philippines they did have these intercepts?

General SHORT. They had a great deal more information.

Senator BREWSTER. So that was another reason.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. But reverting to the point you make, which I think is referred to here, reading from page 52:

General FRANK. Now, General Marshall, a reading of the Roberts commission testimony leads one to the conclusion that there was a general feeling in both the Army and the Navy and in Hawaii that there would not be an air attack. In other words, there was a state of mind of security against an air attack. Do you believe such a state of mind [830] existed?

General MARSHALL. I was unaware of it. The previous communication had had, notably those of the spring and up to June, 1941, related very specific to the urgency of measures protective against an air attack.

General SHORT. General Marshall specifically made the state himself, and I quoted it in my statement that he did not expect surprise attack in Hawaii.

Senator BREWSTER. Where was that? You mean before this mittee?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. It is in my statement. He made the statement before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and I quoted it here is quoted in my statement. I haven't found it yet, but he said expected an attack toward Siam, he expected an attack in Indochina, he expected an attack in the Philippines, and possibly Borneo, but is as far as he knew, nobody expected an attack in Hawaii. So he is in the same position.

I have it right here. Do you wish me to read it?

Senator BREWSTER. I think it should go in here.

General Short (reading):

We anticipated beyond a doubt a Japanese movement in Indochina and Gulf of Siam and against the Malay Peninsula. We also anticipated an attack on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii, the reason being that we thought the addition of more military planes at the defenses would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for Japanese to attempt such an attack.

Now, that is Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, volume 1, page 1.

Senator BREWSTER. I will see if that is in the one I have here.

I have that here before me, and this part which I have been reading is subsequent thereto.

So that it would appear that although I presume there may have been intermittent appearances, that before that very board subsequently General Marshall denied his knowledge of the existence of a state of mind as to security from air attack, which he apparently had earlier testified he understood existed.

General SHORT. Definitely. I would like to add, in respect to your previous question, if I may, that there was a very considerable difference in the message that I received and the message that was received in the Philippines, which would account for that, because the message in the Philippines didn't have the "don'ts," my message

Don't alarm the public, don't do anything to disclose your intent, limit dissemination of this information to the minimum essential officers.

Those words did not appear in the message to the Philippines. Senator BREWSTER. Well, I think the point is proper, but recurring to this matter of General Marshall, if my interpretation of his language is correct then it would indicate that General Marshall occasionally nods. I speak of that because I think they criticized you somewhat because of giving different impressions to the state of mind that existed at various times.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And this would apparently indicate a somewhat different impression as to the fear of an air attack in General Marshall's own mind at various times.

General SHORT. I think also the aide memoir that he gave to the President on May the 3rd, 1941, with reference to Hawaii when

said in points of view or in sequence that the thing that would probably occur first would be sabotage and that it might be necessary to establish strict military control for several months in Hawaii before we had difficulty in the Far East.

Senator BREWSTER. Going further, General Frank on page 52 further asked General Marshall:

General FRANK. At that time, December 1941, what in your opinion was the general feeling in military and naval circles relative to the effectiveness of the air attack with bombs and torpedos?

[8434] General Marshall said:

As I recall, we considered it as very effective, in view of what had occurred in the European theater.

Were you given to understand that that was the military opinion at that time?

General SHORT. I believe in general I was. I think, however, that the Navy had a slightly different idea in regard to torpedoes; that they thought if the water was shallow enough that the torpedo attack would not be effective.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is what Admiral Kimmel has testified.

General SHORT. I think that was his opinion. I had no decided opinion because I did not know enough about the action of torpedoes.

Senator BREWSTER. This is the next question:

General FRANK. Was any consideration ever given—
this is on page 52 and 3—

Was any consideration ever given in the War Department to the possibility of a feeling of apathy that might ensue as a result of "crying wolf; wolf; too often"?

General Marshall answered:

Very much so.

Do I understand that that is your position, General?

General SHORT. I knew that for a year there had been some status of alarm and I suppose in the long run that that [8435] would make everybody slightly less alert or less likely to believe in any warning that came.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, going on with General Frank's question on page 53 of this same report:

With respect to the messages on sabotage sent to General Short from Washington, do not the provisions of his war plan and his standing operating procedure provide for full defense against sabotage?

General Marshall said:

I think it does.

General FRANK. Were not the provisions of these plans known in the War Department?

General MARSHALL. They must have been.

General FRANK. Then why was sabotage specifically singled out?

General MARSHALL. By whom?

General FRANK. By messages that were sent to him. Between November 16 and 28 there were six messages sent to him, four of them told him to be careful not to disturb the Japanese, and three of them cautioned him about sabotage.

General MARSHALL. Two of those on sabotage that are related to air were just coincidences, and those not to disturb the Japanese related to air, and the extreme anxiety not to have anything happen which would [8436] provoke a break, which would enable the Japanese to say that we were taking action, to

give them an excuse for action; and that was to enable Mr. Hull to stall this thing off as long as possible. All measures against sabotage are very difficult of set-up, because they indicate their purpose so plainly when you have to deploy your people around the key points and have them stay there in tents or otherwise, so they always provoke a difficult situation, and one that we were fearful would give the Japanese some handle to place the accusation against us that we were taking action of a hostile character directed towards them. That is as nearly as I can recall the reason for the three messages that you refer to, I think, though I have to look at the messages to familiarize myself with what they say. I don't recall them.

General SHORT. In that connection, I would like to say that when I arrived there, there were a considerable number of men on guard over vital installations to prevent sabotage, there had been for a year or so. So far as the guard for sabotage purposes, the community had become so accustomed to them that it did not alarm them in any way.

From July the 8th, or July the 25th, when we got the sanction message, we had had about a half alert against sabotage [8437] constantly because the community was extremely uneasy at that time; it affected their pocketbooks, it closed up businesses operated by Japanese, so that they were at that time accustomed to having our guard over vital installations.

Senator BREWSTER. Then the next question:

General FRANK. In accordance with that, you feel that it was a responsibility for the War Department to caution about sabotage?

General MARSHALL. In relation to what I have just said. We were trying to be very certain that we did not take measures which the Japanese could put their fingers on and say that we were doing something that was hostile; and most of your sabotage defense has to be right out in the open, a great portion of it. Now, in that respect we were doing something. We had to talk about it, too, because that was related to the meetings with Mr. Hull, where we were trying to do anything possible that could be done to stall off a break in the Pacific.

That is the whole of the quotation. Was this attitude of General Marshall, to which he here refers, as to the very great concern in Washington against anything of a provocative character communicated to you?

General SHORT. I definitely got that idea that their chief purpose, the chief aim was to avoid war if possible [8438] and by all means to avoid an international incident that might lead to war or might give the Japanese the chance to use it as propaganda that we provoked war, but at no time did I get the other idea presented that a guard over a vital installation was something that the population would not understand and would think was provocative.

Senator BREWSTER. And the thought was that there must, so far as practicable, be nothing done which the Japanese could by any strained construction interpret as a hostile act directed against them?

General SHORT. Very definitely.

Senator BREWSTER. Or an indication that you expected an attack from them?

General SHORT. Very definitely.

Senator BREWSTER. That seems to run through the thread of General Marshall's testimony and the thing which I thought was important was to know as to whether or not that attitude which he expresses here was communicated to you. I gather it was.

General SHORT. The November 27 message meant to me beyond everything else that what they were interested in was the avoidance

of war and the avoidance of giving Japan any excuse to start a war or to use propaganda that we had provoked a war.

[8439] Senator BREWSTER. Now, in connection with the material which I presented yesterday, as I have examined it—I do not know whether other members of the committee have had the opportunity as yet—it appears that it consists almost exclusively of excerpts from the testimony before the Roberts commission and I have come to the conclusion that in justice to all concerned, if the testimony before the Roberts commission is ultimately to be made a part of our record as an exhibit, it would be more fair to handle it in that way.

Has there been any conclusion reached on that matter of the Roberts evidence as yet?

The CHAIRMAN. There has not been any consultation among the committee on it at all since you brought it up the other day.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire with regard to that? I would like to suggest in answer to that, Mr. Chairman, that the testimony of General Short before the Roberts commission, to which frequent references have been made, be made an exhibit in this proceeding the same as we did with the Navy testimony of Admiral Kimmel.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sees no objection to that.

Senator BREWSTER. May we hear from counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I suggest this, Mr. Chairman, that until you determine the question of all of the testimony [8440] I see no point in picking out a particular bit of testimony and making it an exhibit, if all of that testimony is ultimately to be in your record here.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to inquire of the members of the committee if they have had an opportunity to examine the document Senator Brewster referred to, I think, day before yesterday, copies of which were supposed to be distributed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, they are available. We have had it mimeographed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes; but it has not been distributed.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, as I have looked it over it does consist almost entirely of quotations from the Roberts committee testimony and I think rather than taking excerpts it would be fairer all around if either the Short testimony or all of it—I would favor having all the Roberts testimony as an exhibit in connection with our case in order to comprehend the evidence of the whole situation.

Mr. MURPHY. The only trouble, Mr. Chairman, is that what I have asked for is a compilation of General Short's testimony on three different occasions for the convenience of those who were sufficiently interested to read and study it. The suggestion of counsel would have people going through three separate records to find what General Short said or did [8441] not say.

General SHORT. You mean this volume here, Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. I mean that very volume, General, which contains your testimony on all three occasions and I think in fairness to you and to the others who are interested they ought to be able to find it as the committee had it and make use of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Wasn't that done with Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. MURPHY. That was done with Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if we put this testimony in, which I think should be, that it should be sorted by counsel so that the testimony of the witness will always appear at one place in the record instead of going back days and looking for it, just as we would do later with this, but I believe that the time will come, and I favor that, that all of the testimony be put in.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I assume the Senator means that with respect to the several records that a compilation job be done.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that the testimony of a witness in all proceedings be put together with appropriate notations as to which proceeding the particular testimony comes from.

[8442] Senator FERGUSON. That is right; and that it be marked as an exhibit so that we can have it.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is done, of course, it would comprise all the testimony in all the proceedings and it would be marked as an appropriate exhibit and, therefore, would include Admiral Kimmel's previous testimony as well as General Short's.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And, therefore, would obviate the necessity of making them separate exhibits now.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the point I made a moment ago.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to the chair that that is a logical way to handle it. It all goes in anyway, but it goes in together under an exhibit and with the connotation in the record of each one of these testimonies as they have come all put together so that the members of the committee could refer to them conveniently. That would be a better way to handle it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I concur in Senator Ferguson's views there, I think that would be helpful to us and to others who examine the record, but on this question Mr. Murphy raises we have accorded Admiral Kimmel the privilege of having his testimony in other hearings included as [8443] an exhibit. I think General Short should be entitled to that same privilege.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, couldn't we do it this way? Of course, we will be glad to accord to General Short the same privilege accorded to Admiral Kimmel, but if the committee should have it all published, that would obviate the necessity of having these two particular testimonies as exhibit something and then put it in again as exhibit something else.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So that with the understanding that if the committee should order it all done and made an exhibit, then it shall not be filed as an exhibit separately from that collection of testimony which has been put in.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I had in mind, to do it all at the same time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it would result, Mr. Chairman, that the exhibit of Admiral Kimmel would be stricken out for practical purposes and all put in at once.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same could apply to General Short.

Mr. MURPHY. I want the record to show that it be stricken out only on the condition that it comes in in some other exhibit.

Senator BREWSTER. I don't understand that. He refers to [8444] a record. Is this to be an exhibit or a record?

The CHAIRMAN. An exhibit. The record you referred to is to be an exhibit.

If there is any reason—let us get it clear—the committee should not orders all this testimony presented as an exhibit together, with the understanding that counsel will arrange it so that each witness' testimony will appear consecutively or appear at one place, to which it can be referred, in the event we do that then the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and also of General Short will not be filed as separate exhibits.

If we should not do that, then both of them go in as an appropriate exhibit now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Can't we decide that now?

The CHAIRMAN. Why can't we now act on that? Without objection, then, the Chair will order that all this previous testimony be so arranged by counsel as to appear appropriately as we have discussed it and that that include the testimony of Admiral Kimmel referred to and made an exhibit the other day, as well as the testimony of General Short, and it will all be made an exhibit and include all of that instead of having it separate.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, with the understanding, then, that that includes all witnesses called by the committee or not called, who testified in these previous hearings. [8445]

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think so. That includes, of course, the testimony also upon which we agreed the other day.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it includes all of the hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. All of the hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right; all except the Clausen because that was nothing but affidavits.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to say something about the Clausen report later.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that covers this question that I raised, because I think it is better to have the whole thing in than to have just the excerpts.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. So that will dispose of my request, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, one other matter that I would like to inquire of you about, General, and that is the matter of the circumstances of your retirement.

General SHORT. I would like, in order to be very exact, to read a page that states the circumstances very succinctly:

[8446] When I read the findings of the Roberts Commission on the morning of January 25th, 1942 I was completely dumbfounded. To be accused of dereliction of duty after almost forty years of loyal and competent service was beyond my comprehension. I immediately called General Marshall on the telephone. He was an old and trusted friend of thirty-nine years standing. He said he had been in New York and had not seen the report until that minute. I asked him what I should do, having the country and the war in mind, should I retire? He replied, "Stand pat but if it becomes necessary I will use this conversation as authority."

I told him I would place myself entirely in his hands, having faith in his judgment and loyalty. After I hung up I decided it wasn't quite fair to him to have to use the conversation as authority, so I wrote out a formal application which I inclosed in a personal letter to him. I asked the War Department for a copy of this letter but they have not been able to locate it.

I have a copy that I had written of the letter to him and I should like to read that.

Senator LUCAS. Do we have a copy of this?

Senator FERGUSON. It was just handed to you.

General SHORT. It is this letter, the mimeograph.

Senator BREWSTER. That does not appear to have a date, [8447]
General.

General SHORT. I beg your pardon?

Senator BREWSTER. It does not appear to have a date on it, General.

General SHORT. That was dated January 25. That was made from a copy that I had made in my own handwriting at that day and it was sent from 610 Northwest Fifteenth Street, Oklahoma City, Okla. That does not appear on here.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing I would like to inquire about. The preliminary statement, General Short, that you read previous to the statement you are about to read, is that your own or is that some other statement?

General SHORT. That is mine and was not mimeographed but I wrote it in order to be sure and say exactly what I meant.

Senator LUCAS. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not included in this?

General SHORT. That is not included in this.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. This is the letter that I wrote to General Marshall on January 25.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment that I may understand that correctly. Do I understand that what you stated first from that statement was a telephone conversation with General Marshall?

[8448] General SHORT. That is correct, about 1 p. m. on January 25.

Senator BREWSTER. From Oklahoma City?

General SHORT. From Oklahoma City.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you call him or did he call you?

General SHORT. I called him.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you for the explanation.

General SHORT (reading):

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I appreciate very much your advice not to submit my request for retirement at the present time. Naturally, under existing conditions, I very much prefer to remain on the active list and take whatever assignment you think it necessary to give me. However, I am inclosing application so that you may use it should you consider it desirable to submit it at any time in the future.

Since you asked me to call your attention to anything I consider important, I want to call your attention to the fact that the report of the Board did not mention the fact that 12 B-17's arrived from the mainland in the midst of the attack without ammunition, with guns cosmolined, and with skeleton crews, resulting in the destruction of four of these planes. You will find this set forth fully in my statement accompanying the Board report. From [8449] my point of view this is a strong argument that the War Department agreed with me that sabotage was the most dangerous thing to the Hawaiian Department and for that reason did not direct me to take action against an air

attack although it had known since November 28th of the precautions taken by me.

In Section IX of the Report of the Board a statement is made that the CINCUS received three messages from the Navy Department on December 3, 4, 6 with reference to the destruction of Japanese codes. However, these messages were not shown to me.

I should appreciate very greatly anything you may be able to do in my case.

Sincerely,

WALTER C. SHORT.

I considered my dealing with General Marshall a purely personal matter between two old friends.

I did not receive a reply to this letter. I have seen General Marshall only one time prior to his appearance before this committee. In June 1942 I went to West Point to witness the graduation of my son and attended a garden party given by the superintendent of the academy. At this party General Marshall came across the lawn to speak to Mrs. Short and me. He spent about 5 minutes with us. He did not mention [8450] Pearl Harbor but talked of our early service together.

In this connection there are certain paragraphs in volume 23 of the transcript of this committee, page 4049, which I would like to read. [Reading:]

Senator FERGUSON. What did the Secretary of War's order that you spoke about do?

General MARSHALL. The Secretary of War's order that I spoke about brought General Short back from Hawaii, relieved him from all responsibility of command in Hawaii, directed him to report to some point in the United States, we will have to look at the order to see just what it was. Thereafter the question was whether he would be given another assignment, or, as actually developed, his retirement, which I believe was at his request; I do not recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted on that, as to whether or not he would be given another assignment?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman?

General MARSHALL. I presume so.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. KEEFE. Yesterday when I examined General Marshall I requested counsel to present the order with reference to General Short and I wonder whether that is [8451] here today, whether we have received it.

Mr. MITCHELL. It has not been handed to us yet by the War Department.

General MARSHALL. The procedure in General Short's case was handled by the Secretary of War.

Now, the enclosure in my personal letter to General Marshall was as follows:

610 N. W. 15th St.,
Oklahoma City, Okla., Jan. 25, 1942.

Subject: Retirement

To: Adjutant General, U. S. Army.

1. I hereby submit my request for retirement after more than thirty-nine years service, effective upon a date to be determined by the War Department.

2. If practicable, I request that the effective date be such as to permit me to take advantage of all accrued leave of absence (approximately four months). However, if this request for leave should militate against granting of retirement, I wish the request for leave to be disregarded.

(Sgd) WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. A.

Now, this letter that I have just read was enclosed with [8452] my personal letter to General Marshall to be used by him if he considered necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, so that the record might be clear, has our counsel requested this previous letter and has the War Department reported that it cannot be found, the one in the enclosure that includes the one of January 25? I just want to know whether that is a missing paper from the files of the War Department, whether we have made a sufficient search to ascertain that fact.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I do not think we have ever requested that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. What are the facts?

Mr. KAUFMAN. The fact is, from Colonel Duncombe, that when it was ascertained that General Short had a copy of that letter no search was made then for the original letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, could we now have a search made and ascertain the facts as to why that letter was not with the letter that was enclosed in the same envelope? As I understand General Short's testimony, they were enclosed in the same envelope.

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And he made an inquiry and could not locate in the War Department this top letter that he has just been reading.

[8453] General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. May we have General Short's statement?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might ask General Short whether the fact, as you stated, that it was a personal letter to General Marshall and not an official letter would have any bearing upon whether it would be part of the files of the War Department.

General SHORT. It was a purely personal letter and he could retain it or file it as he saw fit.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I make this inquiry, as to whether or not we are not getting, this committee is not getting personal letters between our respective officers and are only getting those letters that the officers consider are official letters or communications?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, the Chair does not know how many personal letters pass between officers in Washington and elsewhere and therefore cannot answer that question. I don't know whether anybody can or not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me ask General Short.

Is the letter that you have read here addressed to General Marshall, and you supplied the date January 25, 1942, is this a correct copy of the letter you sent to General Marshall?

[8454] General SHORT. That is a correct copy. The copy was made in my own handwriting. I did not have a typewriter and carbon paper when I wrote it, and I made a copy in my own handwriting and this is a correct copy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So the committee now has before it, supplied by you, the letter that is being discussed here?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you write that letter to General Marshall in your own handwriting?

General SHORT. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you mark it "Personal"?

General SHORT. I did.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I should like to make this observation on this point. I do not think there has been any question but what every department downtown has furnished us letters from their files of a personal nature if the letters were in the files. Obviously many personal letters went from one individual to another that never found its way into the State, War, or Navy files. Certainly there would be no way that counsel or the liaison man of the Navy or the Army could find out all of the personal letters that went from one individual to another.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, this is what I have in mind: When the official letter dated January 25, "Subject: [8455] Retirement" appears before us, it is in a way a conditional, or at least there was another condition attached to it, because there was a letter and a telephone conversation that preceded it and it does not exactly speak the facts alone and, therefore, without the others we do not have all of the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, I do not suppose that you or any other officer who wrote a personal letter to one of your superiors always expected that that personal letter should become a part of the official files of the Department. It was discretionary, I presume, with the recipient of the letter.

General SHORT. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. As to whether he should regard it as purely personal and if you marked it as "Personal" he probably would not put it in the files.

General SHORT. I regarded it as personal myself and apparently he did, too.

The CHAIRMAN. And no implication is to be drawn from the fact that General Marshall did not make it a part of the official files of the War Department of any sort that would be derogatory to the effort to keep the record. Your official letter was the one addressed to the Adjutant General, isn't that true?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and I have a photostat copy of [8456] it there.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is a part of the files in the War Department.

General SHORT. Now, may I explain that this letter and all of the following letters were taken from my 201 file in the War Department. That was a personal file of the officer concerned. My counsel, Colonel Karr, had the copies prepared and compared them and all the remaining letters that I will read came out of my personal file. I did not see them till yesterday but—

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, all this correspondence except that personal letter to General Marshall is part of the file and was taken from the file?

General SHORT. That was part of my personal 201 file.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the letter to General Marshall was taken from your individual file and is here?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, might I make a suggestion?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So far as I know—and I am supported in that by my associates—there never has been, so far as we know, any attempt on the part of any government agency to pick out what may be called official letters from [8457] personal letters. We have been given all the correspondence, so far as we know, that are in the files that were examined.

Exhibit 53 now in the record contains the personal letters between Short and Marshall, 106 between Kimmel and Stark, and we know of no personal letters that are not there and I would like to inquire from General Short whether he knows of any additional personal letters that are germane here that are not included in the exhibit 53?

General SHORT. I believe the exhibit marked "Letters from General Marshall to General Short" contains all of our personal correspondence.

Senator FERGUSON. The other way, from Short to Marshall, does it contain all?

General SHORT. Both ways, I think, during the period that I was in Honolulu.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I very much appreciate this assistance in my examination. I hope it does not indicate any inconsiderateness if I may now ask a question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Short is not through.

Senator BREWSTER. I am all through with it. I said I appreciate the help of the committee in the examination. It was a cooperative proceeding.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thought you were fixing to ask another question.

[8458] Senator BREWSTER. I am when I get a chance.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He is not through reading yet.

Senator BREWSTER. As everybody else has taken the privilege of interrupting him I would like to exercise that privilege likewise. I have a question which I think is really germane.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Senator BREWSTER. The point that I wanted to clarify, and my question contains no implication as to whether or not this letter should have been in the file. I just want to establish the point, which I think you said you had asked the War Department, as to whether they had a copy of this personal letter and what was the reply that you received from them?

General SHORT. I had asked Colonel Duncombe and up to the present he has not located it.

Senator BREWSTER. And when did you make that request?

General SHORT. Do you remember, Captain Ford?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, recently I mean?

General SHORT. Probably in the last week or 10 days.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, that is all right, that clears that up. I think now you may resume.

General SHORT. All right, sir. The next is a memorandum.
[Reading:]

[8459]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, January 26, 1942.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject: Retirement of General Short.

As I told you this morning, General Short telephoned me at 1 p. m. yesterday (Sunday), to say that he was ready to submit his application for retirement if that was desired. I told him to take no action at the present time, that we had not yet had an opportunity to read the proceedings, let alone arrive at any conclusions.

I am now of the opinion that we should accept General Short's application for retirement today and to do this quietly without any publicity at the moment.

Admiral Stark has requested me to advise him if we do this, as he proposes to communicate this fact to Admiral Kimmel in the hope that Kimmel will likewise apply for retirement.

I have talked briefly with the Judge Advocate General, who sees no objections to the foregoing procedure. He is looking over the proceedings of the Roberts' Board and preparing to advise us as to the matter [8460] of a Court of Inquiry or Court-martial. Quite informally he stated that his idea in the matter, without careful consideration, was identical with ours, that the Roberts' Board was on a plane above that of a Court of Inquiry and, therefore, rendered the latter unnecessary and to be refused if requested, and that a court-martial would not be in the public interest at this time.

(S) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

This next is a memorandum. [Reading:]

JANUARY 28, 1942.

Memorandum for The Adjutant General.

Attached is a written application for retirement from Major General Walter C. Short.

Please hold this without action awaiting instructions from the Secretary of War.

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, General, could General Marshall have received your letter on the 26th when he sent this memorandum to the Secretary of War?

General SHORT. He undoubtedly had received it on the 28th.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General SHORT. I don't remember whether I sent the letter [8461] airmail. I probably did. It might have been possible for him to receive it on the morning of the 26th.

Senator BREWSTER. But the memorandum of the 26th does, at any rate, indicate a radically different position than he had taken the day before?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and it also by implication indicates that he had not received my written application, if you read it carefully.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. But whether or not he had then had an opportunity to read the proceedings and to arrive at any conclusion, that he was on the 26th of the opinion that the application should be accepted.

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and the day before he had told me to stand pat.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Now, did he call you at any time again regarding this?

General SHORT. He did not and he did not answer the letter. Here is another memorandum—

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Senator BREWSTER. Well, now, in the 28th memorandum, evidently then a written application was in and he turned it over to the Adjutant General with instructions to await action from the Secretary of War?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

[Hand-written note:]

[8462] To G-1

Check on opinion of JA to Sec War.

Senator BREWSTER. Isn't that, "See what must be done"?

General SHORT. It should be: "See what must be done. (Sgd. GCM." [Reading:]

FEBRUARY 13, 1942.

Memorandum to the Chief of Staff:

I took up with Knox after Cabinet meeting today the retirement of Kimmel and Short. He assured me that Kimmel would get no leave with full pay. I told Marshall of the opinion of the Attorney General indicating that notice to the effect that the time must not be considered a condonation of offenses, if any, on the part of the War Department or a bar to a future court martial. The language of the President roughly, as given me by Knox, was as follows: "provided it is agreed by you that this is no bar to be used legally or otherwise to subsequent court martial proceedings".

Knox told me that the Navy thought that it was only fair that Kimmel and Short should have the right to ask for a court martial if they desired it.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

[8463]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington.

Memorandum for the President:

I took up with Secretary Knox, after Cabinet meeting yesterday, the retirement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. It is my suggestion that the requests for retirement of General Short and Admiral Kimmel should be now accepted.

In order that the acceptance of these requests for retirement may not be considered as a condonation of the offenses, it is recommended that the following language be used in the acceptance of such requests:

"Is accepted, effective -----, without prejudice to future action in the interest of the Government."

Secretary Knox concurs in this recommendation.

Secretary of War.

It does not show "signed Henry L. Stimson."

[Handwritten notes:]

Secretary of War's proposed wording
without condonation of any offense or prejudice
to future action on behalf of the Gov't
without condonation of any offense or prejudice
to any future disciplinary action.

[8464] This approved as safe by Atty. Genl. by telephone Feb. 16.

It has a notation that—

Green copy never on file.

FEBRUARY 14, 1942.

Memorandum for the Attorney General:

1. At the Cabinet meeting yesterday, the question of the acceptance of requests for retirement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was discussed. Several suggestions have been made as to the language that should be used in the action on the requests. In order that the acceptance of these requests for retirement may not be considered as a condonation of the offenses, the following language has been recommended:

a. The language of the President, roughly, as given to Secretary Stimson by Secretary Knox:

"Provided it is agreed by you that this is no bar to be used legally or otherwise to subsequent court martial proceedings."

b. The staff of the War Department, believing that the language suggested above might provoke the officers concerned to request court martials at once, and believing such action to be inadvisable at this time, submitted the following language, in which The Judge Advocate General concurred:

[8465] "Is accepted, effective -----, without prejudice to future action in the interest of the Government."

c. The Secretary of War proposes the following wording:

"without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future action on behalf of the Government."

The President has requested that you express your judgment as to which of the suggestions offered is preferable, and whether or not the preferable wording serves the legal purpose for which intended.

2. The Secretary of War has directed me to request that before reaching a final decision with respect to the President's request, that you read the complete file relating to proposals attached, and also the two opinions of The Judge Advocate General of the Army, one to the Secretary of War dated January 31, 1942, and the other to the Chief of Staff dated January 27, 1942, and the informal memorandum from the Secretary of War to The Judge Advocate General appended to these opinions.

3. In view of the fact that the President desires to reach a decision in regard to this matter on Monday morning, the Secretary of War has directed me to request that you [8466] make available to him your decision before the end of this week end. In view of the urgency of this matter, Colonel Walsh is delivering these papers to you, and is available for what assistance he may be to you in this matter.

For the Secretary of War:

J. H. HILLDRING,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

And a memorandum to the Secretary of War. At the top it says:

If the Secretary returns to Washington tonight—Sunday—have this at his house then.

G. C. M.

[Note attached:] Clause agreed upon by Sec. War, Sec. Navy and the Attorney General:

"without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any further disciplinary action"

To Secretary of War:

For Monday a. m. decision

Opinion of Attorney General re Short and Kimmel.

G. M. C.

[8467]

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., February 14, 1942.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

I have given consideration to the suggestions contained in your memorandum of today concerning language to be used in connection with the acceptance of the requests for retirement which have been made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In this connection I have read the opinions and other documents which accompanied the memorandum.

It seems to me that the objection which may be raised as to suggestion a (using the words "subsequent court martial proceedings") may be found with respect to the words in suggestion c "without condonation of any offense". It has been felt that the reference to court martial would indicate to the officers concerned that such action was definitely planned for a future date, and would move one or both of them to insist that such proceedings be had immediately. Similarly the reference to an offense may suggest to these officers that we felt that an offense had been committed, and thus might lead them to an insistence that the question of whether or not they were guilty of an offense be immediately determined by appropriate proceedings.

Suggestion b, while somewhat more remotely susceptible to the same difficulty, leaves the matter open for further action on the part of the government

without stating that a particular course is planned or that any special interpretation has been placed upon the acts committed. I believe it would be preferable to use the language contained in recommendation *b* which, I understand, to be that of the Judge Advocate General and the War Department staff.

(Sgd) FRANCIS BIDDLE,
Attorney General.

That completes the correspondence.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, now, that opinion of the Attorney General seems to recommend *b*, while the notation on the prior page recommends *c*. Do you know whether there is any reconciliation of those two statements?

General SHORT. You mean General Marshall's memorandum to the Secretary?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. It says:

The clause agreed upon by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and Attorney General—

which is clause *c*, while the opinion of the Attorney General recommends clause *b*.

General SHORT. Maybe this order directing the retirement would explain that fully:

FEBRUARY 17, 1942.

Subject: Retirement.

Major General WALTER C. SHORT (O-1621), U. S. Army,
610 N. W. 13th Street, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma:

By direction of the President, Major General Walter C. Short (O-1621), United States Army, upon his own application, is retired from active service to take effect February 28, 1942, under the provisions of Section 1243, Revised Statutes, after more than 39 years' service and without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action. He is relieved from his present status of awaiting orders at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and at the proper time will proceed to his home. The travel directed is necessary in the military service. FD-1401 F 1-06 15-06 A 0410-2

By order of the Secretary—Major General—Adjutant General,

and the name has not been copied here, so I do not know what particular adjutant general signed it.

Senator BREWSTER. Was the matter taken up by anyone, either the Chief of the General Staff, or any other one, before this action?

General SHORT. About the same time that that letter was written it was transmitted to me in Oklahoma City by an officer sent by plane by the Chief of Staff, who delivered it to me.

Senator BREWSTER. There was no further discussion [8470] regarding any construction to be placed on this language, or the phraseology which was used?

General SHORT. No, sir; because I would have welcomed a court martial in open court, although I did not want any more star-chamber proceedings that had everything secret and off the record, as had been the case in the Roberts report.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is all that I have.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield for just a moment?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Is the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army to the Secretary of War on January 31, 1942, available for the committee?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir; that is available. The entire file has been duplicated, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What do you mean by the "entire file," if I may ask?

Mr. KAUFMAN. The entire file that leads up to the Advocate General's opinion.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand that this is not all of the file, that General Short has read, but only a part of it? Are there more documents and correspondence that is involved in this question?

[8471] Mr. KAUFMAN. There are more documents involved in this question; yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That is in the letter, the reference to the opinion of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, dated January 31, 1942, and the other to the Chief of Staff dated January 27, 1942, and the informal memorandum of the Secretary of War, they are all appended to these opinions. Those are these two documents here [indicating].

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. We have photostats of them but did not have time to reproduce them. We will be very glad to present them with all the documents that have gone in.

Senator LUCAS. My inquiry was whether or not this is all the information we are going to get on this question or whether there is additional information that throws more light on this subject.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson has the files.

Senator FERGUSON. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. This is the file of which I was speaking [indicating]. These are items 1 and 2. The one to which I have particular reference is the one here [indicating]. That is the larger document that deals with the brief and résumé of the records in the Roberts Commission on General [8472] Short's case. That is the one to which I had reference and it simply summarizes many points of evidence in the Roberts record.

These others are references to the opinions of the Judge Advocate General, of which I quoted two sentences yesterday.

[8473] Senator LUCAS. In view of the fact that General Marshall's name has been used in these letters that have been read by General Short, I am wondering whether or not there is any more information in connection with this problem that is now before us, where General Marshall is involved anywhere.

General SHORT. Senator Lucas, I have two additional ones that we got later. We did not have time to duplicate them. I am not sure whether General Marshall's name appears on them or not. I will be glad to read them.

Senator BREWSTER. You referred to the memorandum of January 27, which was a memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Is that the one you refer to?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. By Maj. Gen. Myron C. Cramer, the Judge Advocate General?

Senator LUCAS. That is the one I referred to in the beginning, yes; because I thought that was important. I should like to see what the Judge Advocate General said on that occasion. Then I followed it

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with asking for any additional information that is in the file deals with General Marshall on this subject.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The rest of the file is right in front of Senator Brewster.

[8474] Senator LUCAS. I should like to have counsel, if he examines that file overnight and see if there is anything pertinent that ought to go in this record following what the general stated.

Senator BREWSTER. They are the ones that presented it to me they have examined it, so they are familiar with what it contains. I had discussed this with them before I took the course I did.

General SHORT. May I make a statement to you, Senator Lucas? Senator LUCAS. Certainly, General.

General SHORT. These two documents here [indicating] were furnished us by the War Department, by Colonel Duncombe. The fact that I read they did not furnish us, but we went to my 201 file and dug them out, but these were furnished by Colonel Duncombe.

Senator LUCAS. I shall conclude by requesting counsel to make a further study of that file with a view of determining whether or not they believe this is pertinent and material, to place the additional information before the committee.

General SHORT. I believe, Senator, that this memorandum, sent particularly by the Judge Advocate General [8475] would be of interest, and I would like to have the counsel read it, if there is no objection.

Senator BREWSTER. Would it be possible to have it placed in the record?

Senator LUCAS. I would just as soon have it spread on the record. The CHAIRMAN. It may be spread on the record without reservation. (The matter referred to follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Memorandum

To THE J. A. G.

Will you kindly give me your opinion on a further question—in addition to those embodied in this opinion—viz:

If Genl. Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a court martial for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be valid? Could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found advisable?

H. I.

[8476]

WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

Washington

To SECRETARY OF WAR:

Judge Advocate General's recommendations reference Major General Walter Short.

G. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington, January 27, 1942.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

Subject: Course of action with respect to General Walter Campbell Short.

1. Pursuant to your instructions I submit the following comments with respect to possible courses of action against the above-named officer on account of the derelictions disclosed in the report of the President's Commission to investigate the Japanese attack on Hawaii on December 7, 1941. These comments are based solely upon the text of the report of the Commission. I have not seen or examined the 1887 typewritten pages of testimony taken [8477] by the Commission nor the 3000 printed pages of records and documents examined by it.

2. General Short may be tried by a general court-martial or he may be summarily discharged from the Army by the President pursuant to the provisions of Article of War 118.

3. With reference to trial by general court-martial, it is assumed that the evidence taken by the Commission sustains its findings of fact and conclusions and would warrant such procedure should it be deemed advisable. However, it is impossible to predict with certainty the result of any trial or the sentence which the court might impose. In this case should a court acquit or impose a sentence less than dismissal I can see no advantage resulting from such a trial. It will be noted that the offenses charged against General Short are offenses of omission or nonfeasance which require a much stronger showing to justify a trial than those involving misfeasance or malfeasance. General Short's nonfeasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which, although proved faulty by subsequent events, was, insofar as I am able to ascertain from the report of the Commission, made or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that [8478] an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.

4. There are, in my opinion, serious questions of policy which should be considered in connection with a possible trial of this officer by general court-martial.

a. If a court should find him guilty and sentence him to anything less than dismissal, the Army would be accused of white-washing General Short. This accusation would be much more strongly made should the trial result in his acquittal.

b. Such trial would have to be in open court, otherwise the War Department would be subject to criticism of whitewashing General Short if acquitted, or of persecuting him if convicted.

c. The ramifications of this case are such that in a trial by court-martial it would be necessary to introduce in evidence numerous secret plans, orders and other papers which do not appear in the Commission's report. Both the prosecution and the defense would need these documents in order properly to present their cases. It certainly would be against the public interest to disclose some, at least, of these various war plans and documents. Such being the case, it would be impossible to prevent the publication of these plans and documents except by closing the court during those sessions in which these secret papers were read and [8479] discussed. The result of a trial by a court partly in open session and partly in secret session might be that the War Department would be subject to the same charges of whitewashing or persecution as referred to in the subparagraph b above.

d. A general court-martial would require the time and energy of a considerable period of a large number of generals and other officers of high rank as members of the court-martial, and for personnel of the prosecution and defense. It would consume much time and effort of the numerous officers of the Army and Navy whose services would be required in order properly to present the case for trial, or whose attendance would be required as witnesses. The ramifications of such a trial would be so great and it would require the time of so many officers from the lowest to the highest rank that it would interfere seriously in the main job now before the War Department, namely the prosecution of the war.

e. The career of General Short as an active Army officer is finished and closed. Because of the lack of confidence which the public now has in him, which lack of confidence would no doubt be shared by his future subordinates, it is unthinkable that any command should again be entrusted to him. General Short knows this. That in itself is a very severe punishment. Furthermore, General [8480] Short has been relieved of his command which reduces him from a lieutenant general to a major general. The addition to that punishment of any punishment other than dismissal, such as a reprimand, loss of files, forfeiture of pay or suspension from a command, would be inappropriate.

5. For the President to discharge General Short summarily under the provisions of Article of War 118 would tend even more strongly than a dismissal by a sentence of a general court-martial to enable him afterward to claim persecution. Revised Statutes, section 1244, provides that when an officer is 62 years old he may be retired from active service at the discretion of the President. General Short will be 62 years old on March 30, 1942. However, it is unnecessary to discuss this source of action for the reason that you have informed me that General Short has offered to apply for retirement at any time you may desire to accept it. He may lawfully be retired upon such application.

6. General Short entered the Army as a second lieutenant of Infantry on February 2, 1901, and had, up to December 7, 1941, nearly 41 years of honorable and most creditable service. He reached the next to the highest rank that an Army officer can reach, namely that of a lieutenant general.

7. I realize that the question of what ought to be [8481] done in this matter has been the subject of heated discussions in the press and elsewhere and whatever may be done will probably subject the War Department to criticism. However, in view of all the considerations hereinabove discussed, I respectfully suggest the advisability and the desirability of accepting the application of General Short for retirement. However, in this connection I would further suggest that it would be both politic and just to coordinate the action taken by the War Department with that taken by the Navy Department in the case of Admiral Kimmel.

/s/ MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

[8482]

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington, January 31, 1942.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.

Subject: Course of action with respect to Major General Walter Campbell Short.

1. After considering my memorandum for the Chief of Staff of January 27, 1942, on the above subject, you have asked me a further question, as follows:

"If General Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted, with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a future court martial for the alleged offenses *in re* Pearl Harbor, would that be valid—Could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found advisable?"

2. A retired officer is as a matter of law still an officer of the Army and still subject to court-martial as much as though he were still on the active list (A. W. 2a; Nat'l Defense Act, sec. 2; 10 U. S. C. 4). Neither does his retirement amount to a break in the continuity of his service which would prevent his trial after retirement for [8483] an offense committed before retirement (Dig. Op. JAG 1912, p. 992, par. I G 2b). The real question involved is whether the retirement of an officer on his own application constitutes a condonation of his offense, barring trial for it.

3. There are opinions of this office to the effect that under certain circumstances release from arrest or confinement or promotion may constitute such a condonation. I find no precedent holding either way with respect to retirement. Retirement after thirty years' service upon the officer's own application under section 1243, Revised Statutes (10 U. S. C. 943; Mil. Laws, sec. 326), is "in the discretion of the President." The foregoing is one of the two statutes under which General Short may be retired at once on his own application. If he be retired under the statutes, there may be some plausibility in a contention that the President's exercise of discretion in terminating the officer's active service on his own applica-

tion constitutes a bargain between him and the officer to the effect that he will not further be prosecuted for known offenses occurring prior to retirement. There is no statutory or judicial authority for such a view, and I regard it as unsound as a strict matter of law. Therefore I answer your inquiry by saying that as a matter of law [8484] the retirement of General Short under the above statute upon his own application in the discretion of the President does *not* involve the passing of judgment by the President upon the officer's past services or a condonation by him of prior offenses which would prevent subsequent trial by court-martial.

4. Nevertheless, as a matter of fairness rather than law, there is force in the supposed contention above stated. General Short has volunteered to submit an application for retirement. He may reasonably suppose that a request to him from an official source, in answer to his voluntary suggestion, to submit his application for retirement, involves a tacit agreement that the issue of his official conduct of the defense of Hawaii prior to and on December 7 will be closed by his retirement, and that no charges will be preferred against him growing out of such conduct.

5. Another statute under which General Short might be retired immediately upon his own application, is the second proviso of section 3 of the act of June 13, 1940 (54 Stat. 380), reading:

*"Provided further, That any officer on the active list of the Regular Army or Philippine Scouts who serve in any capacity as a member of the military or naval forces of the United States prior to [8485] November 12, 1918, shall upon his own application be retired with annual pay equal to 75 per centum of his active-duty annual pay at the time of his retirement unless entitled to retired pay of a higher grade as hereinafter provided, except that officers with less than twenty years' service and officers who are under investigation or who are awaiting trial by courts martial or the result of such trial, or whose cases are pending before courts of inquiry shall be retired only when the application for retirement in each case has been approved by the Secretary of War: * * **

It is manifest that War Department approval of an application of General Short for retirement under the above statute, would amount in effect to a finding that he is not under investigation or awaiting trial by court martial and would thus tend even more strongly to support a contention that any offenses chargeable against him were condoned by the action.

6. If General Short should be retired on his own application under the above circumstances and if afterward he should be brought to trial for his conduct of the defense of Hawaii, it may be anticipated that charges of bad faith would be made against the War Department by him [8486] or by others in his behalf. I think it is most desirable that no opportunity be afforded for such accusations. I assume that General Short's offer of retirement as made was not subject to any conditions. Therefore, I suggest that before his offer be accepted he be given to understand, preferably in writing for the purpose of the record, that such retirement will not constitute a condonation of his offenses, if any, on the part of the War Department, or be considered a bar to any future trial by general court martial in case such trial should be deemed advisable.

7. Should General Short refuse to submit his application for voluntary retirement with such a condition attached, the President may, without any application by General Short, retire him upon his reaching the age of 62 years on March 30, 1942, pursuant to the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 1244 (10 U. S. C. 944; Mil. Laws, sec. 323), and may make announcement to that effect at the present time.

/s/ MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

1. Incl.
Let. to C. of S.
1/27/42.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?
Senator LUCAS. Yes.

[8487] Mr. MURPHY. General, will you state now as to whether or not you feel it would be in the interest of national defense and national security to have had a court martial of either you or Admiral Kimmel during the war, and in view of the fact it would show the

situation at Hawaii, as well as other things, and require the presence of admirals in Admiral Kimmel's case, of admirals who were scattered over the seven seas, and in your case, generals and other officers who were scattered over the different parts of the world?

General SHORT. I will say that there may have been some justification in that point of view, but I do not think there was any justification in concealing the many things that were concealed; that the public had a right to know that, and that certainly I had the right to consider that the public should know it.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you feel that there should have been a more fair statement by the War Department, but you do not feel that there should have been a complete, [8488] open court martial exposing the matter on the record, is that right?

General SHORT. There might possibly have been some question about magic.

The CHAIRMAN. General, in that connection, is it not ordinarily the practice—whether it is the wisest or best practice, it has nearly always been the practice of the War Department and Navy Department, in making investigations of any sort under a board of inquiry, to make them secret? They do not usually do that out in the open, like we are holding this hearing, do they?

General SHORT. I will say this: Through the press propaganda, or otherwise, the public had been so acquainted with this case that any court of inquiry, or any courts martial was practically a trial before the American public, and I do not think there would have been any justification for any more secret, top secret, or off-the-record testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have not answered my question. I asked you whether it was not the practice, over the years, in both the Navy and War Department, to hold secret investigations?

General SHORT. That has been done frequently. Now I will say also usually it is not a matter of the same public interest.

[8489] The CHAIRMAN. No; and we were not previously engaged in an inquiry where the revelation of military secrets might have been as universal as in this case.

General SHORT. But even granting that, I do not believe there ever was any possible justification for off-the-record testimony that nobody could examine in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the interest, or the welfare, or the result that might follow to any individual officer in the case of yourself and Admiral Kimmel could compare to the public interest that might be served or affected to a disadvantage by the revelation of things that would have come out in a public courts martial in both cases?

General SHORT. The top secret evidence was kept secret until after the war was over, and then has been made available. The off-record testimony was not recorded, and I do not know to this day, and the public does not know to this day, and I do not think the committee knows to this day what that off-the-record testimony consisted of, and yet there was a final decision arrived at on the basis of that testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter about which I think the committee need not spend any more time.

Congressman GEARHART.

[8490] Senator BREWSTER. Just a minute. I would like to pursue that.

So it is your impression, General, that the public impressions which were formed as the result of releases here in Washington and the action taken convicted you before the American public on what you term off-the-record testimony?

General SHORT. It is.

Senator BREWSTER. Without an opportunity for you to have a hearing of any proper kind?

General SHORT. That is correct. It might be of interest if I could read the waiver that I signed to the Secretary of War in regard to the courts martial.

First, I received a letter from the Secretary of War—

The CHAIRMAN. General, before you do that, may I ask you this question, to clear it up.

In the newspapers from time to time it has been stated, and elsewhere, maybe on the floor of Congress, that in either the Navy or the War Department a demand could be made for a courts martial, and it was stated that was not true of both Departments. Is it not true that you had the right to demand a courts martial, and Admiral Kimmel had a right to demand it in the Navy?

General SHORT. I think either one of us could demand it, but whether it was granted in either Department depended [8491] on the Department.

Now there was a difference. I think you may possibly be confusing the court of inquiry in the Navy with the Army board. Under the regulations in the Navy, with the court of inquiry, the accused officer is permitted to hear all of the evidence given, to have an attorney, and is accorded the privilege of cross-examination.

When Admiral Kimmel appeared before the Navy board he sat in, he heard all of the testimony, he had the privilege of cross-examination so if things were not brought out he could bring them out.

Before the Army board I was not permitted to hear the other witnesses. I was not given the privilege of cross-examination, and neither was I permitted to be represented by an attorney during that period. That was the difference in the two Departments.

I believe, as far as a courts martial is concerned, that both Departments had the legal right to refuse us a courts martial, if they saw fit to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. I got the impression that one Department was compelled by law to grant a courts martial if the person involved requested or demanded it.

General SHORT. That is true of a court of inquiry. I think the point of view expressed by the Judge Advocate [8492] General and Chief of Staff was that the action of the Roberts report was on a plane above a court of inquiry and therefore denied us the right to demand a court of inquiry. That is plainly said in one of these memoranda.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Do I understand, General, that before the Army Pearl Harbor board you were not afforded the right of counsel?

General SHORT. I had the right of counsel only when I was testifying. My counsel could not sit in when the others were testifying, and neither he nor I heard the other witnesses, nor had any privilege of cross-examination.

Mr. MURPHY. But you did have Brig. Gen. Thomas Green as counsel?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and he was present during the time I was testifying only.

Mr. MURPHY. You were furnished a copy of the testimony over the protest of the board, weren't you, by the Secretary?

General SHORT. I was furnished with a copy of the testimony, except for the top secret and off-the-record testimony, so what I got did not explain the situation at all.

The CHAIRMAN. The off-the-record testimony was, in the [8493] main, testimony that might involve some result or effect upon the military operations during the war, was it not?

General SHORT. There is no way for me to know what was involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, there was no record made of the off-the-record testimony.

General SHORT. There was no record made and there was nothing to indicate the nature of it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

[8494] General SHORT. This is the letter I received from the Secretary of War—

Senator BREWSTER. General Short, do I understand that before the Army board there was off-the-record testimony?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And there is no record as far as you know of that?

General SHORT. I am sure there is no record of it.

Senator BREWSTER. That appears at various points in the testimony?

General SHORT. It just shows the testimony was taken of a certain witness off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been told or have you gotten information to the effect that it related largely if not altogether to magic?

General SHORT. I have had no word of what it consisted of. It was just the blank page.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield?

My recollection is that in the report of the Army board right at the beginning of the session there is a notation that General Marshall testified off the record, with the time the off-the-record discussion started, and [8495] when his testimony was again placed on the record. It is about an hour and 20 minutes, as I recall, that he testified off the record. No one knows what that testimony was, of course.

Senator BREWSTER. Except the men who listened to it.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; except the men who listened to it.

Senator BREWSTER. And were affected, apparently, by it.

The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't say that without knowing what it was.

General SHORT. Shall I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

General SHORT (reading) :

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 18 September 1943.

Major General WALTER C. SHORT,
United States Army, Retired.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: In connection with your possible trial by general court-martial, the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by Article of War 39 will, unless action is taken to prevent it, bar your trial by general court-martial 7 December 1943. The tolling of the statute of limitations would be stopped by either a present waiver by you or [8496] your arraignment before a general court martial, which, probably, would adjourn the case until later.

So long as the war continues it will be impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the Board on account of their war duties. In this situation it has occurred to me that the practical thing to do is to postpone any possible trial until later and that you may desire for this purpose to execute a waiver of the statute of limitations. In the event that you see fit to do this, I give you my personal assurance that any trial determined upon will be held at the earliest practicable date.

If you should agree with the foregoing your prompt return of the enclosed form of waiver, duly executed by you, is requested.

Sincerely,

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON.

1. Incl.
Waiver.

This is the waiver that I signed:

WAIVER

SEPTEMBER 20, 1943.

I, Walter C. Short, Major General, United States Army, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and [8497] a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit my attorney or other person on my behalf to plead the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

Senator FERGUSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to inquire, General, whether or not you ever saw the Roberts report and when. I mean the testimony before the Roberts Commission.

General SHORT. I saw it in August 1944. Now, it is possible that my attorney had it the last part of July. I made a request for it in July and I saw it when I came on to Washington for the Army board.

Senator FERGUSON. July of what year?

General SHORT. 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. When these letters were written, which you have read here today, this report had not been [8498] furnished to you?

General SHORT. It had not.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean, the testimony.

General SHORT. No, sir. Here is the letter I wrote requesting the Roberts report. July 4, 1944—

Senator FERGUSON. That brings up this question: At the time you were relieved from command and later retired you didn't have the Roberts report and know what the testimony was?

General SHORT. I had no idea what the testimony was. I had simply the printed document that appeared in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. Later you demanded it in writing and you are going to read us that latter?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When you called General Marshall and wrote him your personal letter enclosing your letter to the Adjutant General, the Roberts report hadn't been made at that time?

General SHORT. It was published in the Sunday morning paper of January 25.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were not in Washington at that time?

General SHORT. I was in Oklahoma City.

[8499] The CHAIRMAN. You phoned him on seeing the publication of the Roberts report?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So the action on your part upon seeing in the newspapers an account of that report was purely voluntary?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I was talking about the record upon which that report was made. I am talking about the testimony.

General SHORT. I understood perfectly.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood it, too.

Let me ask in that connection, in your letter waiving any right to plead the statute of limitations, you said you made that waiver on condition that it was a public court martial. Did you mean to intimate that if it was not to be a public court martial that you would insist on the statute of limitations?

General SHORT. Very definitely. I would raise the point. If they tried to try me in a closed court I would plead the statute of limitation. If it were in open court I would comply with my waiver.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the implication I got from your letter, your waiver was based on the understanding that you had an open court martial.

[8500] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In order to have an open court hearing you would insist, during the war on a public disclosure of the war plans we had drawn for the prosecution of the war?

General SHORT. If they insisted on court martialing me during the war I wanted the public to know exactly what I was being tried upon.

Mr. MURPHY. You wanted a public disclosure of all of our war plans for winning the war?

General SHORT. That would have been up to the War Department. If they thought the court martial was important enough they would have to agree to it.

Mr. MURPHY. In this hearing we have had the war plan in the Atlantic, we have had the war plan in the Pacific, we have had the hemispheric defense plan, and according to your theory there should have been a complete spreading on the record and in the newspapers and over the radio all of our war plans in the war in which we were then engaged?

General SHORT. That was a decision for the War Department. If the War Department decided my trial was so important that it was worth putting that in the papers that was their decision, not mine.

[8501] The CHAIRMAN. Was anybody in the War Department insisting upon a court martial of you?

General SHORT. I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, as a result of the board of inquiry, the War Department recommended that no action be taken.

General SHORT. That is correct. I just wanted to be sure when I signed the waiver that I would never be subject to a star chamber proceeding.

Senator BREWSTER. It should be clear in the record also that your waiver gave the War Department 6 months after the conclusion of the war to determine, so that there would be no necessity of the exposure of plans even if they did determine you should be court martialed.

General SHORT. Not without they deciding it was so important they wanted to do it this minute and they would gamble everything else.

Senator BREWSTER. If they decided to wait, the stipulation was that it should be after the war, and an open trial?

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. So there was no necessity on the part of the War Department to expose their plans in the face of the enemy.

[8502] General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted to read something, General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. My letter doesn't appear here but the memorandum of the Secretary of War in answer to it does appear, which is the important thing.

This is dated July 4, 1944:

Memorandum for the President:

Major General Walter C. Short has requested that he be furnished a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission. A copy of General Short's letter is attached.

But it is not attached.

I am informed that the Navy Department, presumably with your approval, has furnished Admiral Kimmel with a photostatic copy of the report. I believe that General Short is also entitled to a copy, in order to prepare his own defense, and request your approval of his request.

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Acting Secretary of War.

OK FDR

That is in the President's handwriting.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

[8503] Senator FERGUSON. What are you reading from?

General SHORT. From a memorandum for the President.

Senator FERGUSON. What file?

General SHORT. In my own 201 file.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the number of your file in the War Department?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That is what you call the personal file of every officer; it is a 201 file.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 201 is the personnel number.

General SHORT. It is all my file; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask you, General, whether or not on page 541 of the Army Pearl Harbor board hearing there will be found the following:

General SHORT. I thank the Board for its very courteous treatment.

General SHORT. The Army board.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the Chair would like to get to a little left of center and reach Congressman Gearhart for [8504] interrogation.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield for just one question?

Mr. GEARHART. I will gladly yield to the distinguished Senator.

General SHORT. May I, Mr. Chairman—may I introduce one more letter, that bears on this same question of testimony, before we go ahead?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the witness.

General SHORT (reading):

Confidential.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 20, 1944.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: I have your letter of October 18, 1944, requesting that your counsel be authorized to inform you of the information he obtains from an examination of the records made available to him in response to your letter of September 29, 1944.

Much of this information is classified and involves highly important material affecting military security. It must not be transmitted in writing, or by a third party, or by telephone or telegraph.

[8505] Should you feel that your interest justifies your personally meeting with your counsel, he may orally communicate the information to you upon your written undertaking to me that you will not disclose any of this classified information to any person except with the prior approval of the Secretary of War.

Sincerely yours,

(S) HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

Naturally, I refused to sign any such written undertaking, because it would bar me from using it before this committee or any place without the personal approval of the Secretary of War. So I had never seen any of this material until more recently.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time this committee hadn't been created.

General SHORT. It wouldn't have made any difference. He didn't limit this. I couldn't use it for any purpose without his personal approval.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't there a letter at page 4450 of the Army Pearl Harbor board in which General Ulio said that you are "to be furnished with a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Army Pearl Harbor board less exhibits and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the [8506] remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken as approved by order of the Secretary of War"?

General SHORT. But that did not approve the top secret and the top secret was never furnished me. I had never seen any of the top secret until probably a day or two before this board convened on November 15, when they had released it for printing. And the first time I ever saw the magic was when it was passed out here; this printed information.

Mr. MURPHY. At the time you were demanding the top secret information, the war was in progress, was it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Congressman Gearhart.

Senator LUCAS. I won't ask my question. I will wait.

Mr. GEARHART. We will not detain you for long, General.

General, I understood that when you asked to have an attorney appear with you on the Roberts hearings, that you were denied the right to have an attorney, but were allowed to have a person in the room with you to assist you with your documents; is that correct?

General SHORT. That is not correct. I did not make a request for an attorney. I took them at their word that this was not a trial in any sense. I didn't know they were [8507] going to arrive at a finding that practically amounted to a finding of court martial. I felt that I was absolutely not guilty in any sense, and I could handle my own case, and I went before the Roberts commission with no one assisting me in even handling documents.

Mr. GEARHART. Didn't General Green accompany you in the hearing room?

General SHORT. He did not.

Mr. GEARHART. You were alone?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You handled your own papers?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, what was your reference to him a moment ago?

General SHORT. General Green was my counsel before the Army Pearl Harbor board, not before the Roberts Commission.

Mr. GEARHART. Later on?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did he appear in the room as your attorney at that time, or did they object to him appearing as your attorney?

General SHORT. He appeared as my attorney, but when he read one document and made one slight comment on it, [8508] they did object to his comment. He could read the papers for me, to save me the trouble of reading them, but he could not comment.

I haven't that reference immediately at hand, but that actually happened.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, his function as an attorney was limited by the court of inquiry—rather the Army board?

General SHORT. Chiefly to advising me.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I just want to ask one or two questions about the radar.

On the day in question, December 7, 1941, the radar was on from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. How were those hours fixed?

General SHORT. I issued a general order at the time that we got the message of November 27 to my chief of staff and he transmitted the verbal order. I am not sure whether he transmitted it orally, or whether he put out a written order, but my order was an oral order to the chief of staff.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, was the radar on the same time schedule on week days as on Sundays?

General SHORT. The schedule for routine training was from 7 until 11 on week-days and from 12 to 4 for [8509] routine training

and maintenance. They could do in the afternoon all of the maintenance they required, and the man who was responsible for the training could vary the thing and do whatever he thought was most needed.

Now, on Sunday there was no required training. There were a good many Sundays they trained voluntarily. Saturday afternoon there was no required training, but again because it was new, they did voluntarily quite a good deal of maintenance work.

Mr. GEARHART. Lieutenant Lockhart gave some testimony in Washington on the 30th day of October of 1944 at the Pentagon Building where he was examined by a Mr. Fraser. He testified, in substance:

Answer. That is right. There were approximately six men per unit. We had six in ours. We operated from 7 to 9 o'clock.

Question. Nobody operated at nighttime so far as you know?

Answer. If there was any alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or something like that kind, there was a night operation.

Question. From 7 to 5 except for lunch periods, you were on daily?

Answer. Yes, sir, during the week.

[8510] Question. Sunday was a day off normally?

Answer. We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday.

General SHORT. This statement might have applied before November 27. It would not be correct for the period after November 27. And you notice he shows specifically that they did operate from 4 to 7 on Sunday, and that was required for every day.

Mr. GEARHART. From the 28th of November on?

General SHORT. From November 27 on.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that matter was never touched on further, so the record is silent except for what I have read to you on that point.

Now, was there any change in your verbal orders to stay on from 4 to 7 after you gave those orders?

General SHORT. No, sir. There was a considerable number of changes in the way they actually worked for training and routine, because they were interested in doing all they could possibly do, and they tried it out, worked until 6 o'clock, from 4 o'clock in the morning until 6 in the afternoon. They decided very soon that they couldn't work the men that hard, and when they were working beyond the hours, that was something they could agree to, and they [8511] made quite a number of changes before it settled down to 7 to 11 and 12 to 4.

Mr. GEARHART. How many of those radars did you have?

General SHORT. We had six.

Mr. GEARHART. Where were they placed? One was at the very north of the island?

General SHORT. I think I can give you the locations of most of them.

The Opana station, which was 2 or 3 miles southwest of Kahuku. There was one station then almost directly north of Kawailoa. That was several miles to the west of the Opana station. There was one station at Koko Head, which was a short distance to the south of Diamond Head, which I think is familiar to most of you. There was one station above Fort Shafter, a very short distance on a high point.

There was one station near Hawaii Island on the west side of the island. I believe that covers them all.

Mr. GEARHART. The arrangement of those stations was so that you could cover the sea in every direction?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. They were placed to get the best coverage possible with that number. Of course, there probably would have been some movement of them as soon as we got our fixed stations into place. We probably would [8512] have moved some of them then.

Mr. GEARHART. I notice from the testimony that appeared in the statement that I have just read from that the range of these portable radar stations was 132 miles.

General SHORT. We thought the range was 75 to 100 miles. That was the normal range. That was what the people on the mainland thought. Apparently, our atmospheric conditions were more favorable, and we actually got 132 miles on the morning of December 7. I understand that the expert radar people that came out from the mainland later were appalled to think we could get any such distance.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I heard some talk about two of the fixed stations already being in place on December 7. That was news to me. Is that correct?

General SHORT. That is not correct. I think on one station all of the construction work was about 97 percent completed. That was over on Haleakala. I am quite sure that the blueprints for the installation of the radar antenna hadn't been received so they couldn't complete that part of the work.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the one that was 97 percent complete, was it usable at all?

[8513] General SHORT. No, sir; because they couldn't set up the antenna, because they didn't have the approved plan for putting in the foundations and setting up the antenna.

Mr. GEARHART. What was to be the range of these permanent fixed stations?

General SHORT. It was a little uncertain. We thought with these greater elevations that we would get between 150 and 200 miles.

Now, we had one at 10,000 feet. As a matter of fact, I believe that they did later get almost the 200 miles from Haleakala, but for some reason the expert radar people from Washington recommended that it be discontinued on account of dead space. There apparently was certain dead space. However, that was after my time, and I have no personal knowledge of that.

Mr. GEARHART. When was the material for the construction of the fixed radar stations in Hawaii?

General SHORT. Most of the material was in Hawaii previous to December 7, and we were actually robbing those units for spare parts to keep the others in operation?

Mr. GEARHART. To keep the portables in operation?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. But the original contract for the [8514] construction of the fixed radars was for their completion at a time prior to December 7, was it not?

General SHORT. I would hardly put it as a contract. I would say the estimate of the time that they would be completed was put—we were told that we would have the parts by June 30. I mean all of the sets. We didn't get them. And we hoped to have all of the construction work done before they arrived.

However, there were a number of things that held that up, and they were not there.

[8515] Mr. GEARHART. One of those things was the old question of priority?

General SHORT. Priorities and the difficulty of getting permission from, taking 10 months to get permission from the Department of Interior for the park system. Also the difficulty of getting construction materials. There were all kinds of difficulties.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, the question of priority was determined in Washington, was it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The priorities which determined when you were going to get material for the construction of your fixed radars was determined in Washington, you had nothing to do with that?

General SHORT. No, sir. I did all I could do. We were working under the same priority as military construction in the States, which was A-1C. When I heard from the Division Engineer in San Francisco, about June 10, that he did not believe we would get our material by June 30, I sent a wire to the Adjutant General on the 10th of June and requested that the priority be attached to A-1A, which was the priority the Navy had for the outlying bases. They came back and they said they would advance it to A-1B, and that the chief engineer would take care of the [8516] rest of it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, did they?

General SHORT. They got there considerably later than June 30. They got there, most of them, in August.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the construction work began?

General SHORT. The construction work had been going on where it could before they were received. You see, we had to build roads up steep mountains to get up there and that had been going on for some time before the sets were received.

Mr. GEARHART. If you had been able to get a first priority for the material and had been able to get promptly your permit to build this fixed station in the national park from the Department of Interior, you would have had your 200-mile radius radar on December 7, would you not?

General SHORT. We probably would have had. Now, there was an additional difficulty that I have not mentioned. Procuring first-class expert workmen had become a terrific problem in Hawaii. They had taken everybody locally. The Navy got started about a year before the Army on construction. They were constructing bases on Johnston Island, Palmyra, and one or two other places. They had combed the local market. And apparently the market for labor in the States was a good deal in the same situation. [8517] They put in a request to the engineer in San Francisco for 300 workmen and when they got there they would not be 300 of the type that was expected but probably the best that could be had because good labor was scarce all over. It was an added difficulty.

Mr. GEARHART. But with these interferences and delays incident to priorities and permits to occupy the national-park area, you got one of those permanent fixed stations 93 percent—

General SHORT. 97 percent.

Mr. GEARHART. 97 percent completed?

General SHORT. That is my memory, but I think that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, on the 28th day of November you alerted against sabotage?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. How long did you remain alerted against sabotage?

General SHORT. We remained alerted against sabotage until the time the attack struck and by 8:10 that morning I had ordered the No. 3 alert, which was the alert against an all-out attack.

Mr. GEARHART. There was no suspension of the alert against sabotage between the day you ordered it and the day [8518] of the attack?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, before you adjourn—

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn, but before we do so, inasmuch as Mr. Tyler's name has been mentioned here, Lieutenant Tyler, who I believe you say is now a colonel?

General SHORT. I believe he is a lieutenant colonel. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. The newspapers carried several stories to the effect of drawing some implication out of the promotion of Lieutenant Tyler to a lieutenant colonelcy and keeping of Sergeant Lockhart in the ranks where he was at the time, the inference being that Lieutenant Tyler, who ignored this warning, that Lieutenant Tyler was promoted, whereas Lockhart was not.

Do you know anything about that?

[8519] General SHORT. Lockhart was a private.

The CHAIRMAN. A private?

General SHORT. He was a private and he was promoted from a private. I think he became a lieutenant; so they were both promoted.

The CHAIRMAN. They were both promoted. So there was no justification in drawing a comparison as to what happened to the two of them?

General SHORT. I don't think so. And, incidentally, I will say I had nothing to do with the promotion of either one of them.

Mr. GEARHART. In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, I think Lockhart was given a decoration at the end for his alertness.

General SHORT. I believe he was.

Senator FERGUSON. In March of 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been bandied about in public publications and I am glad to get it straightened out.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, the understanding was that everything that was in this file about General Marshall had been offered.

I have here a letter dated June 12, 1942, and then under it a memorandum of July 21, 1943:

Took up this matter with General Marshall.

That is in regard to this court martial.

[8520] Took up this matter with General Marshall. He told me that he would have to wait for Secretary Stimson's return for it was a matter for his decision.

Now, Senator Ferguson was the one who requested this file.

Senator FERGUSON. Senator Brewster.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator Brewster, and I do not want to offer something that was brought to him as an exhibit, but I do want the record to show that if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer of this file

in the morning I will ask unanimous consent to have it go in the record because I think it ought to be straightened out on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is the time to take action on it.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask one question of General Short on this point before we suspend. You don't object if I ask another question, General Short?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I was somewhat intrigued with the condition that you placed in the waiver with respect to court martial. I was just wondering what the custom is in the Army with respect to having courts martial in open before the public.

General SHORT. The normal court martial is open but I think there are some cases on record where the order for the court martial has been—where they have directed sessions in [8521] closed quarters.

Senator LUCAS. If I understand you correctly, then, either in time of war or in time of peace the ordinary court martial is open to the public?

General SHORT. Wide open.

Senator LUCAS. I was not sure on that. I was under the impression it was just the other way.

General SHORT. No, sir; but I think—my attorney says by act of Congress that it must be open.

Senator LUCAS. It must be. Being a member of Congress I should know that and I plead guilty. One other question.

The CHAIRMAN. Guilty of what?

Senator LUCAS. Of not knowing or anything that the committee wants to find me guilty of, that is all right.

One other question—well, I will not ask you that. I will just withhold it. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., January 25, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Saturday, January 26, 1946.)

[8522]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, JANUARY 26, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[8523] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (Retired)—Resumed

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything at this time to present before examination of the witness is resumed?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Short, do you have anything you want to present to the committee before your examination is resumed?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. General Short, you brought in the other day a telegram dated December 5, 1941, to the Panama Department. Had you seen the reply to the message of the 27th by General Andrews—it is in exhibit 32.

General SHORT. I have it here. It is dated November 29, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, it would appear that that was mailed air mail and there was a telegram sent prior to that indicating he would send the report by air mail.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8524] Senator FERGUSON. He says:

Reurad four six one November twenty seven signed Marshall report requested being forwarded air mail. CDC six eight seven.

Signed "Andrews."

Then we have the memorandum showing in detail just exactly what he was doing.

Now, apparently that was received prior to the 5th. And then General Miles sends this wire:

U. S.-Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Did you take that wire as a modification of the message of the 27th so that they really didn't want Andrews to be alerted to the full extent that he had notified them?

General SHORT. No, sir, I took it that he was given to understand that he could expect additional and probably last-minute information as to exactly what was taking place diplomatically.

Senator FERGUSON. And that Miles' construction of the message of the 27th was that diplomatic relations weren't as bad as the message of the 27th indicated or that severance of diplomatic relations being imminent that they would be notified of that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8525] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I note on this telegram this language "send number five twelve"—that is apparently the number of the telegram—"twelve seven." In other words, it was drawn up on the 5th. Severance of diplomatic relations was not imminent at this time and it wasn't sent until the 7th. Sent on the very day—even after we had the 14-part message?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that as far as General Miles was concerned he didn't even consider that the 1 o'clock and the 14-part message indicated that a severance of diplomatic relations was imminent.

General SHORT. Is it possible that he failed to mark the message "urgent" or "priority" and that it was held here in Washington for 2 days?

Senator FERGUSON. That was going to be my next question. This message is not marked "priority," the same as General Marshall's message to you of the 7th, it wasn't marked priority.

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it didn't receive the same attention that a priority message would receive. Now, was it the understanding as far as you were concerned that when messages were not marked "priority" that they were not [8526] considered important messages?

General SHORT. If the lines were not loaded, they would be sent through, but if the lines were loaded all of the priority or urgent messages would be sent ahead of those not so marked.

Senator FERGUSON. And if at the other end there was any translating or interpreting of codes the ones that were marked "priority" would all go through first and these nonpriority messages would be taken up after those?

General SHORT. That is correct.

[8527] Senator FERGUSON. Is that the system?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you account for this message to Panama that while it was drawn on the 5th, they did not get it until the 7th because it was not marked "Priority" and it is not marked "Priority." I have gone over it carefully. It is a photostatic copy and I cannot find where it was sent "Priority."

Do you want to look at it and see whether or not you can find anything on it indicating "Priority"? [Handing document to witness.]

General SHORT. I see nothing to indicate either "Priority" or "Urgent."

Senator FERGUSON. I have before me—and I received it from your counsel when going over the papers that were put in yesterday morning on the question of priority of the message of General Marshall to you.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that it was not a priority message. I think it is clear now from what was put in yesterday that it was not a priority message but I think this should be in to make the record complete. Do you have a copy of it before you?

General SHORT. I think so.

[8528] Senator FERGUSON. Would you read it into the record?

General SHORT. You mean the message itself or the—

Senator FERGUSON. No.

General SHORT. The inquiry?

Senator FERGUSON. The inquiry.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was told you or what was told one of your officials when they made an inquiry.

General SHORT (reading):

Paragraph 3 WAR L 54 1 extra urgent

WASHINGTON, D. C., 219 p. m., December 9, 1941.

C G

Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine.

Senator FERGUSON. That "529" was the Marshall message of the 7th?

General SHORT. Yes, sir [reading]:

Repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff office received.

COLTON, *Acting.*

Now, there is a pencilled note on that:

529 delivered to C/s 300 pm 7 Dec—received for by Capt. Trueman delivered by Mr. Hough.

[8529] And then out to one side there is a notation that apparently places it at "2:58 p. m., Colonel Dundoy."

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what that "2:58 p. m." is?

General SHORT. I beg your pardon?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what that "2:58 p. m." is?

General SHORT. I beg your pardon?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what this "2:58 p. m." is?

General SHORT. I think what that means is that that was delivered to Colonel Dunlop, the adjutant general, at 2:58 p. m. and he turned it over to my aide, Captain Trueman, at 3 o'clock, 2 minutes later, because it would take about that length of time to walk from his office to mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have this memo before you?

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask someone there to get this information for you so that you could wire it back to the War Department?

General SHORT. I probably did not personally but unquestionably a member of my staff did.

Senator FERGUSON. And this is a memorandum?

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read that into the record?

General SHORT (reading):

Radio War Department 529 Received. Filed at Washington, D. C. 12:18 PM Washington time (or 6:48 A. Haw. time) (as RCA 1549 WS),

I think it is.

[8530] Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 A. M. Delivered to Signal Office at 11:45 A. M. Not marked priority. Other priority messages handled first. Delivered to decoding officer 2:40 P. M. Decoded and delivered to Col. Dunlop 2:50 P. M. Delivered to Capt. Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD at 3:00 P. M.

And then this was the message, using that information, that was sent to the War Department:

Re your five four nine. Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning of seventh received Signal Office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning (this time approximate but within five minutes) seventh Stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh (Received by Chief of Staff Hq Haw Dept three o'clock afternoon seventh All Hawaiian).

SHORT.

That "All Hawaiian" indicates all Hawaiian time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, all of the other messages that you read, the foundation for the message that you sent, "Not marked priority, other priority messages handled first," do you know what they were?

General SHORT. No, sir; I do not. There may have been a considerable number.

[8531] Senator FERGUSON. Would counsel look in and see whether they can find out what messages were sent in there that same day?

Mr. MASTEN. I did not hear that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. On the same day there is a memorandum here on the 7th that this message was not marked priority, "other priority messages handled first." Would you try and ascertain what those other priority messages were on the 7th going into Hawaii that were translated first?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Then I take these messages to indicate this, that on the 9th of December, that is the Tuesday following the disaster, the War Department here undertook to investigate at least to the extent of ascertaining when you had received their message of the 7th. Is that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know anything about the General Bundy mission that was coming out to Hawaii to investigate as to the disaster?

General SHORT. Not for 2 or 3 years afterward, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was there any mission that came out for the War Department other than the Roberts commission?

¹See Hearings, Part 11 pp. 5296-5297.

General SHORT. No, sir. Secretary Knox came out ahead [8532] of the Roberts commission.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that he went more into the details of the Navy than he did of the War Department.

General SHORT. He went completely through my field headquarters and spent, I would say, probably 2 hours, in which we had officers detailed from every section to explain everything that had happened. He got a very complete picture not only of our headquarters but how we were functioning and exactly what happened, and at the end of the time he was so impressed with our headquarters that he directed the Navy to make arrangements to move over into an underground headquarters right alongside of us.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did he indicate in any way that he was not satisfied with what you had done?

General SHORT. He did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I may be repeating on this; I do not want to repeat but I want to try and find out whether or not you were present when Colonel Knox, Secretary of the Navy, said something to Admiral Kimmel about a message being sent on the 6th, the afternoon or the evening of the 6th?

General SHORT. I do not remember it. I talked with Colonel Knox at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters soon after he arrived, but I do not remember the conversation. It may have taken place.

[8533] Senator FERGUSON. Well, did he mention in any way to you a message being sent on the 6th, a warning message?

General SHORT. I do not remember that. I think that in some way that we must have misunderstood each other as to the time, because I explained to him about the Chief of Staff's message on the 7th and it was the only message I received, and I think that there must have been a misunderstanding somewhere between us.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the message of the 27th, were you familiar with exhibit 45? I wish you would look at exhibit 45. Does counsel have exhibit 45 there?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Pass it to General Short, please.

Mr. MASTEN. All right [handing document to witness].

Senator FERGUSON. That is an explanation or partial explanation as to the message of the 27th [reading]:

The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 A. M.—

This is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed.

Now, you will note there that there was nothing said about Hawaii. It is only what had been sent to General MacArthur and what was proposed.

[8534] I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines.

And you will note there that nothing is said about the President wanting a message sent to you. Then going on and reading:

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Now, when did you first learn about that exhibit?

General SHORT. I think that I learned the substance of that exhibit when I read the testimony of Secretary Stimson and General Gerow before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in 1944. I do not know whether I had actually seen the memorandum but I did learn the substance.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I would like to go to several answers in the top secret. Admiral Ingersoll on page 423 of the Hart record. Now, you were asked and others were asked about that preparatory deployment. Here is question No. 38:

Admiral, do you recall what the CNO meant by its [8535] directive to make a preparatory deployment as contained in this dispatch of October the 16th?

That is the first they used that "preparatory deployment", in that message also. Now, here is what he answers:

I think the preparatory deployment that would not constitute provocative action or disclose strategic intentions against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the Southern Philippines rather than any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here in connection with this dispatch and others which followed that they were released by me. In all cases such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In many cases I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Department and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character. The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft was presented and corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not to bother him further [8536] I released these dispatches in the form which he had approved.

Now, on page 426, questions Nos. 49 and 50. Let me read both of them.

Question: In drafting the dispatch of the 27th of November was consideration given to the thought that mention of western Pacific objectives only might tend to reduce the vigilance of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area?

Answer: I am sure that the drafting of the dispatch was not meant to give such an impression. The impression it was intended to give was that the events were moving in such a fashion in the Far East that the United States would become involved in war in a few days and consequently that the United States forces elsewhere in the Pacific and also in the Atlantic would find themselves at war with the Axis when the clash actually took place in the Asiatic waters.

Question No. 50: What action on the part of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet was expected incident to the directive concerning a deployment as given in the dispatch of the 27th of November?

Again—

This is his answer—

Again this dispatch is dispatched both to the Commander in Chief of [8537] the Asiatic Fleet and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observations, the establishment of a patrol and the reinforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered that an early dispatch in October had warned both Commanders in Chief against taking action which would provoke war.

Now, did you ever hear of that testimony or that interpretation of this word "deployment" in these messages?

General SHORT. I know at the time that it did not strike me that it was intended to be only the Asiatic Fleet. I do not believe I have had access to the Hart report; at least I do not remember those particular passages. I would like to ask my counsel if we have ever had a copy of the Hart report?

Captain FORD. No; we have not.

General SHORT. We have never had a copy of the Hart report.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you have never seen the Hart report?

General SHORT. That is correct.

[8538] Senator FERGUSON. Even to the time you are testifying here?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is this the kind of difficulty we find in messages that are given to two or more outposts where certain words are intended for one outpost and not for another?

General SHORT. Unquestionably in this case it was of great difficulty because it never occurred to me when I read those two messages that they applied just to the Asiatic Fleet. I think they directly applied to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. But the man who drafted the messages or sent them out gives this interpretation, that they were intended more for the Asiatic Fleet because they had certain missions which were outlined in the war plans. Now, were you familiar with the War Plan No. WPL 46?

General SHORT. I knew in general terms what it provided for. It was an offensive into the mandated islands.

[8539] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, General, in this message it said that you were not to commit an overt act against Japan.

General SHORT. What is that?

Senator FERGUSON. You were not to commit the first overt act against Japan.

I want to ask you how, as the head of the Army in Hawaii, it was possible for you to commit an overt act of war against Japan?

General SHORT. Only by sending out my long-range bombers, which would have been acting under the orders of the Navy, not under my own orders.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand there was only one way in which you could have committed an overt act against Japan, and that would have been to send out the long-range bomber and that bomber had done something in relation to a ship or submarine, or something of Japan?

General SHORT. I might add, something that I might have done to a Japanese national that the Japanese might have construed it that way. They were apparently looking for excuses. For instance, if I had arrested one of the consular agents that we knew the names of, they might have considered that an overt act. It would have been possible for me to do that.

[8540] Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, the Navy did not get this message and they were in a position to commit many overt acts?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for that?

General SHORT. I cannot account for it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that the arrest by the military police of one of the consular agents would have been an overt act in war?

General SHORT. I do not, but I do not know what the Japs might have tried to make it appear, or how they might have tried to make it appear.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how did you read the overt act part of your message? What did it mean to you?

General SHORT. It meant to me simply that the War Department was extremely anxious to avoid war, and they did not want any international incident to happen in Hawaii that might provoke war or might give the Japanese an opportunity to claim that we had started the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let us look at it this way. We had put the fleet in Hawaii in order that we might show Japan our strength, and we were backing up our diplomacy by the fleet being out there.

Now, why would the exhibition of a strong army in [8541] Hawaii have a greater tendency to prevent war than by showing we were weak and afraid and we were not doing anything?

General SHORT. It would look like it would be a similar action that they were using to impress Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. With the Navy?

General SHORT. A strong army would have been the same means of impressing the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. But in one case, we put the Navy in there as a symbol of strength, and in the other case, in your case, we tried to conceal the fact that you had a strong army and you were ready for anything that might happen.

General SHORT. That would be true.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would it have been possible, in your opinion as an expert—laying aside this question of the first overt act as far as the Army was concerned, that if we had a full mobilization of the Army—some 40,000 was it in Hawaii?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. If we had shown a full mobilization of that army, if we had shown that we were on the alert for everything that might come that we would have never had an attack at Pearl Harbor?

[8542] General SHORT. I think it quite probable that if that had been reported to the Japanese, they would have turned back the attacking force.

Senator FERGUSON. That would have meant that we would have had no attack at Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. These two phrases, one, don't commit the first overt act, and the other one, don't do anything—what is the language in the message of the 27th?

General SHORT. Alarm the public or disclose intent.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you had not had those, and you were fully alerted, where the soldiers were wearing regalia, full arms, your machine guns were manned, your radar was working 24 hours a day, then you would come to the conclusion, would you not that in your opinion as an Army General, they would have turned back?

General SHORT. There would have been a very excellent chance that they would have turned back. That would have been the tendency, because they would have felt, or they would be sure that they would take heavy losses. Surprise was the only opportunity that they had to succeed.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in your prepared statement, you use this language, on page 60, paragraph 98:

I do not feel that I have been treated fairly, or [8543] with justice by the War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for the disaster.

Now, you are covering very broad ground when you use the word "War Department." I wish you would be specific and tell me whom you had in mind was the War Department?

General SHORT. I had in mind the General Staff in particular, because they were primarily responsible for the policies pursued by the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. And the General Staff was headed by whom?

General SHORT. General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. And who else would be in there? I would like for you to be specific instead of covering the whole ground.

General SHORT. General Gerow as head of the War Plans Division had the direct responsibility for keeping me informed. General Miles, the head of G-2, had a very direct responsibility.

[8544] Senator FERGUSON. What about the Secretary of War? Is he included in the words there "War Department"?

General SHORT. As far as technical things went, I would not have expected him to be as fully aware of the significance of technical things. I would expect him to be fully aware of any policy.

Senator FERGUSON. So as far as the policy was concerned, he would be included in that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now when you use the word "scapegoat", will you give us the meaning that you want to convey to us in that word?

General SHORT. It seems to me that may be a slang expression, but it is a word in very common usage, and I meant just exactly what the common usage meant, that it was someone that they saddled the blame on to get it off of themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, they were in this position, in your opinion, and that is what you wanted to convey, that someone had to take some blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor, that certain people in Washington that you had named in your opinion were to blame, that they shifted that blame over to you as the commanding general at Hawaii and therefore made you, in the common language, a [8545] scapegoat?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you want to convey to this committee?

General SHORT. That is exactly what I want to convey.

Senator FERGUSON. Now yesterday you read to us some letters about your retirement, and you read part of General Marshall's testimony where I had examined him. What is it that you wanted to convey by the reading of General Marshall's testimony? Were

you of the opinion that it was in conflict with what you were about to read from the messages?

General SHORT. I thought his testimony conveyed the idea that the matter of my retirement had been handled entirely by the Secretary of War and that he had had nothing to do with it, in fact he was not cognizant of what was being done, and the correspondence I had did not agree with that.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you were of the opinion that his testimony was not in line with what the letters showed that you were about to put in? Is that what you wanted to convey to the committee?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consider, in a way, that your retirement request was a conditional one, that is that [8546] you would be consulted later by General Marshall before it would be turned in?

General SHORT. When I sent that to General Marshall I had very great confidence in both his judgment and his loyalty to me. I felt that he would use it only if his best judgment indicated that he should use it, but I did expect—not necessarily before he used it if there was not time, but he would communicate with me before he used it, or he would communicate with me immediately afterward and explain why it was necessary to use it. I had given him full authority to use it.

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate, from the fact that you had talked to him at 1 o'clock on the 25th, that is Sunday, when the Roberts report came out, and it was used on the 26th, that he would not have had time to read all of the testimony in the Roberts report to find out the facts, would he?

General SHORT. He would have had time, of course, to read all of the findings published in the newspaper, but he would not have had time to read all of the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. When you use a report, as a rule, you want to know on what facts it is based, do you not?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. When those facts are in existence?

[8547] General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted by Justice Roberts as to whether or not you had magic? You know what I mean by "magic," the intercepted codes, either the codes themselves or the means of getting the codes?

General SHORT. You mean the intercepts?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General SHORT. I do not think that at any place any inquiry was made of me as to whether I had received them. I am rather sure no inquiry was made. I think they understood that I had not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least you were not asked the specific questions as to whether or not you had or did not have magic?

General SHORT. I am sure that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the Roberts report is based upon the fact that you and Admiral Kimmel did have magic and had the means of getting the magic?

General SHORT. I have seen no testimony from the War Department that indicated that they were told that I did have magic. I

believe that there has been testimony here that the Roberts Board was informed by someone in the Navy Department——

Senator FERGUSON. By Turner and Stark?

[8548] General SHORT. Yes, sir; that Admiral Kimmel did have magic.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would have meant if Kimmel had it you would have it?

General SHORT. If he had been told to give it to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. General, do have a clipping as to what appeared in the press about your retirement?

General SHORT. I do. I have one here that I do not know whether it actually appeared, but I have a statement by the Secretary of War that was mimeographed, and it is presumed that it appeared in the press. My memory is not definite now to say whether it actually appeared.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, where did you get the copy?

General SHORT. Colonel Dumcombe gave it to me this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. At least it was in the War Department?

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You received it when?

General SHORT. This morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was in the War Department file?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

[8549]

WAR DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

Press Branch

Tel.—Re 6700 Brs. 3425 and 3438

FEBRUARY 28, 1942.

Immediate release

RETIREMENT OF GENERAL SHORT APPROVED

The Secretary of War announced today the acceptance, effective February 28, 1942, of the application for retirement of Major General Walter C. Short "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."

The Secretary of War announced at the same time that, based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts Commission, he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court-martial of General Short, alleging dereliction of duty. The Secretary of War made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.

[End]

Distribution: A, D, M, N.

1:00 P. M.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand then from that that [8550] the Secretary of War indicated that upon the basis of the Roberts report you would be court-martialed at some time?

General SHORT. He at least stated that he had directed this to be drawn.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. That would be the same as if you would be court-martialed?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you ever do anything in any way to prevent that court-martial, the charges being filed?

General SHORT. I did not. In fact, I signed a waiver that I would agree to a court-martial within 6 months after the termination of hostilities.

[8551] Senator FERGUSON. Now, who came to you about that waiver?

General SHORT. General Woodruff, retired, was sent from the War Department to Dallas, to see me.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the conversation about the waiver? About when was it?

General SHORT. I have forgotten the date. I believe it was sometime before December 7, 1943, because they wanted the waiver before the time was up. Perhaps along in September or October of 1943.

He explained to me that Admiral Kimmel had signed such a waiver and gave me the letter of the Secretary of War requesting me to sign the waiver, and also a copy of the correspondence that Admiral Kimmel had had with the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, they had used your request for retirement in getting Admiral Kimmel's request for retirement.

Now, do I understand that they used what Admiral Kimmel had done to waive the statute of limitations when they came to you?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they explain that Admiral Kimmel had waived the statute of limitations?

[8552] General SHORT. They furnished me with a copy of his letter and a copy of the waiver signed by him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you to sign such a waiver?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; by the Secretary of War in a written letter delivered by General Woodruff.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you happen to have that written letter?

General SHORT. I have it. I think we have it here probably. The waiver and letter were both read into the record yesterday, on page 8495. Do you wish to have it?

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; just let it go.

General SHORT. The date of that letter was the 18th of September 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether or not any department of the Government ever made any request of Congress to pass a statute extending the statute of limitations?

General SHORT. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were requested by the Secretary of War to sign a waiver of the statute of limitations, and you did so?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you ever made any direct request for a courts martial trial? [8553]

General SHORT. I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have done nothing, as I understand it, to prevent such a trial?

General SHORT. I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. You are prepared, then, to defend any trial that the Government may start? Is that the way it stands?

General SHORT. That is the way it stands.

Senator FERGUSON. A trial that the Government may start?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you consider that this is a fair hearing for you?

General SHORT. I consider that this hearing has been extremely fair, very thorough, and that I have been accorded very great courtesy by the chairman and by every member of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to go to another subject.

On October 17, 1941, George W. Bicknell, lieutenant colonel, G. S. C., assistant A. C. of S., G-2, contact officer—he was in your department?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8554] Senator FERGUSON. He was what?

General SHORT. He was one of my intelligence officers. He was the assistant to the G-2, Colonel Fielder.

Senator FERGUSON. Now were you familiar with what he drew up? It is here in evidence as exhibit 139, dated the 17th of October 1941. Will you look at that and tell us when you first saw that?

General SHORT. I probably saw that the day it was prepared, or maybe the day after it was prepared.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I will take you to paragraph 3, on page 3, and ask you to read that. It is headed "Attack on British Possession in the Far East."

General SHORT. You want me to read from there on?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I want you to read from there on to the bottom of the page.

General SHORT (reading):

3. Attack British Possessions in the Far East.
4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.
5. Attack simultaneously—

Senator FERGUSON. No, no, I guess you did not understand my question. I mean on page 3, the paragraph numbered 3, "Attack on British Possessions in the Far East." Then I would like to have you read from there down to the bottom [8555] of the page.

General SHORT. I was on page 2. I am sorry.

Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler—it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possessions, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to fight the United States within a relatively short time.

You want me to read on from there?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General SHORT (reading):

While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our Naval [8556] program is completed.

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block. Hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever

point might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, General, prior to that, what was your information in relation to any agreement we may have had, whether legally binding or not, with the British and Dutch?

General SHORT. I had no information whatever about an agreement between the British and Dutch.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any information about any understanding that we had with them?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You notice that your G-2 officer uses this language:

it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British, and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possessions, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not [8557] yet fully prepared to support such action.

Now, he uses the language "no known binding agreement." What do you understand by "binding agreement"? Do you mean by treaty?

General SHORT. To be binding, it should be approved by the Congress, as I understand it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what he was talking about there? He was telling you that we had no treaty, we had no agreement that was approved by Congress?

General SHORT. It is difficult to say. He might have meant simply any agreement that had been made and approved by the President, and not made public, something that the President expected to set forth in the Senate. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your understanding about that part of it that "the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action"?

General SHORT. I felt at that time that the American public would not have been willing to have an agreement ratified that we would go to war to defend the Netherlands East Indies or Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you familiar at that time with the message from Tokyo to Berlin, where we openly intercepted—I will not put it that way. We can [8558] only locate, in the War Department, two parts of three parts of a message sent from Tokyo to Berlin on this question.

General SHORT. I was not familiar with it.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no knowledge as to that?

General SHORT. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that we had met with the British and Dutch and had talked over this question?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no knowledge at all on that?

General SHORT. No knowledge whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that this plan, which we now have in evidence, this WPL-46, talked about certain agreements? Whether or not they were binding agreements is another question; but at least talked about it.

General SHORT. I knew when we received Rainbow 5 at the same time that it was drawn up with the idea apparently that when it went into effect we would be allied with Britain and the Dutch, but I had had no basis for the writing of that plan.

[8559] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that we had received word from the British on the morning of the 6th, sent to the State Department, that the Japanese ships were going into the Kra Peninsula?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that have meant anything to you, what you knew about our understanding?

General SHORT. It meant certainly war against the British.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever tried to find out personally what it would mean if Japan and Britain would go to war with no attack on America?

General SHORT. No, sir; I have not asked the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You heard Admiral Kimmel testify here, did you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have read his testimony?

General SHORT. I did not hear him; I read his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. You read his testimony?

General SHORT. I read his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, prior to the time that you read his testimony, that there was certain correspondence by Admiral Kimmel on this question of attack on the British [8560] and Dutch alone?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. The exhibit that I have just referred to, the WPL-46, is exhibit No. 129, so that the record will show it.

Now have you gone over this war plan?

General SHORT. I think I had gone over it some time ago. Not the WPL-46, but the Rainbow 5, which would have the same provisions, probably, in regard to fighting with the Allies.

Senator FERGUSON. That is true. This is the "Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5."

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. ORIGIN, BASIS, AND SCOPE OF THIS PLAN

This Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, was prepared under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

It is based upon the report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.

The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited distribution to holders of this plan.

Now, you did not know anything about these negotiations?

[8561] General SHORT. I knew nothing about the negotiations, but I think I had a copy of the plan, about what you have read there, a short time before the attack. That was a modification of our existing war plans, and I think we received that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when Singapore was alerted?

General SHORT. I do not exactly. I think probably a short time before December 7, maybe a week or 10 days before, but it would be just guess work.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Dutch, on December 1, sent this dispatch by the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon, to Mr. Hornbeck—

The Netherlands Minister informed me by telephone this morning that the Governor of the Netherlands East Indies had ordered a comprehensive mobilization of his armed forces?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now under the knowledge that you had would that have meant anything to you?

General SHORT. With the information that I had had from the War Department always pointing to an attack to the Southwest Pacific, and including the Netherlands East Indies, I would have thought that was what was going to take place.

[8562] Senator FERGUSON. Would that have meant anything to you?

General SHORT. It would have meant that they considered war very imminent out there naturally.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it have meant that war was imminent on the Hawaiian Islands?

General SHORT. Not necessarily, because there had never been an estimate since June 17, 1940, of an attack on Hawaii. It would have meant possible hostilities on Hawaii, but not necessarily an attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the President had delivered to Japan, on August 17, a message in relation to the entire Pacific?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have the copy or copies of information from any diplomatic notes between Japan and the United States?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, if they had brought to your attention the alerting of Singapore, the fact that the Singapore troops were alerted, what would that have meant to you?

General SHORT. With the information I had from the War Department it was just a confirmation that the Japanese action was going to come in that part of the world and not [8563] in Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. So it meant just the opposite to you than an alert in Hawaii? It indicated to you that there was going to be war many thousands of miles way from you with another country?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what the information meant to you?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I am not clear on the radar. I would like to get some information about it.

There isn't any doubt that the radar machine will catch a plane going out as well as coming in?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And there isn't any doubt that early on that morning, about 7 o'clock, our radar machine saw planes 132 miles. I believe it was, 130 or 132 miles, coming in from the north, and that

those very planes bombed American fortifications and sunk our ships? Is there any doubt about that?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And as shown by the map, that same radar machine, or other radar machines saw the planes going out in the same direction, is there any doubt about that? This [8564] map shows them coming in from the north one hundred and thirty-some miles, and we had contact with them going out, one hundred and thirty-some miles out even further north. At 7:02 we catch them first going out.

General SHORT. Major Berquist, who was the chief control officer, stated that there was so much confusion—I suppose he meant because they were going in every direction—that he was not able to draw any logical conclusion from what he had.

Senator FERGUSON. There wasn't any confusion about the fact that they were coming in at that distance?

General SHORT. Absolutely, because that is a definite direction.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that the ships in these task forces were notified to go south and look for them, when our only information was that they came from the north, and they even had the degree, or the line on which they had come, and we saw them coming in at 132 miles and we saw some of them, at least, going out the same way, so why did we go to the south to look for them?

General SHORT. Lieutenant Tyler states he did not make a report on that until some days later, when he reported to General Davidson the coming in. I personally did not hear that day that the Opana Station had picked them up. [8565] It seems when Major Tindall came back, when they re-manned the station about 8:30, that they took off all of the old information on the board in the information center. So apparently Lieutenant Tyler was not experienced enough to have this mean anything, and it not having been reported to Major Tindall when the station opened he did not know it, and the result was that it was not reported.

Senator FERGUSON. But, as I understand it, it was brought out definitely yesterday that Lieutenant Tyler has been promoted at least twice.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8566] Senator FERGUSON. There was no disciplinary action against him for not reporting this matter?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And that may have meant the difference between bombing and not bombing this Jap Fleet?

General SHORT. I think unquestionably if the Navy had had that information, they would have tried to locate the carriers.

Now, there is one other thing I did not mention. I believe that they picked up radio information, an intercept that indicated a Japanese ship sending radio messages from the southwest. Now, that may have been a small ship that was sent out there purposely by the Japanese, and I think that that influenced the Navy to send to the southwest first.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not as definite information, was it?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As that the ships had come in from the north and had gone out to the north?

General SHORT. No, sir; but they did not have that and I did not have it.

Senator FERGUSON. I take it from your testimony, you knew nothing about them coming in from the north on the day [8567] of the 7th?

General SHORT. Beg pardon?

Senator FERGUSON. On the day of the 7th you had no knowledge of these planes coming in from the north?

General SHORT. That is correct. I did know that our flying fortresses from California came in from the north. I knew that definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand now that you had no information on the 7th about the radar chart showing planes coming in from the north?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Anyone could see these planes coming in at various times from the north, could they not?

General SHORT. They came in from every direction, Senator. They had different tasks assigned them. Some came in from the east of the island to actually make the attack, and others came in from the west, so apparently they had diverted from their original direction so as to approach certain targets in certain ways.

Senator FERGUSON. I would assume that after they got near the island they would take a position so they could approach a target from a certain direction.

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But prior to that did not everything [8568] indicate that they were coming from the north?

General SHORT. All we had was what Lieutenant Tyler knew. If he had reported, it would have been a definite indication, but we did not have it at that time.

[8569] Senator FERGUSON. General, how can you account for the fact that there was no disciplinary action against an Army officer for not reporting a thing like that that was so vital to America's defense?

General SHORT. There was no device at that time by which he could differentiate between friend and foe.

Senator FERGUSON. But it turned out in a few minutes that everyone on the island knew that these ships were foe.

General SHORT. But coming in about 3° difference in direction, and 5 minutes difference in time. He just made a false assumption that the ships picked up were the American planes.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any evidence in the record that Tyler knew that the B-17's were coming in, other than that the music played all night on the Hawaiian radio, and therefore he assumed that our planes must be coming in on that beam.

General SHORT. You see, they had no beam at that time, and I think it was common knowledge with the air people that that music was used as a beam to guide our planes in.

Senator FERGUSON. Were our planes all equipped with radio?

[8570] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why couldn't our radio stations contact the planes and ask them whether they were enemy or friend?

General SHORT. If the report had been made by Lieutenant Tyler, it could have been done.

Senator FERGUSON. I come back—

General SHORT. Even if they had gotten the report, they might have been misled because they were so close to the same position at the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. Couldn't we have asked the B-17's "Are you friend or foe?" Didn't we have any codes at that time?

General SHORT. We could have asked them; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we ask them?

General SHORT. We did not.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for that? I realize you personally were not in charge of it, but I am trying to find out why there wasn't some discipline as far as men down in the ranks were concerned in relation to these fatal errors. I consider that you considered them fatal.

General SHORT. Apparently Lieutenant Tyler felt so sure they were friendly planes, that he made no inquiry.

[8571] Senator FERGUSON. But within a few minutes after he gets this message, raining down on the American possessions and our men were bombs from an enemy. How could this same man then keep the conclusion in his mind that they were friends?

General SHORT. I don't think he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why couldn't he at that moment, at the dropping of the first bomb, even, if necessary, by foot, give the alarm and tell where these planes were coming from so that we could go out and get the carriers, so at least they would never do it again?

General SHORT. He did alert the command, but he gave nobody the information he had as to what direction they were coming.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, he alerted the command, enemy planes came in, and he never even told them what direction the planes were coming from?

General SHORT. Apparently not.

Senator FERGUSON. And that man was promoted?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anybody ask him from what direction they were coming? Didn't somebody think to ask him? I realize you were taken away from there about the 16th.

[8572] General SHORT. What I did as soon as I heard it was this—it was too late to accomplish anything, but as soon as I heard of the incident, I sent an officer to take affidavits of Lieutenant Tyler and Lieutenant White, and I believe they got one from the operator, Private McDonald.

Senator FERGUSON. General, did you know that we even went out and bombed one of Admiral Newton's ships, one of the ships of his fleet?

General SHORT. I didn't know that we ever actually bombed one. I knew at one time that we had mistaken information, but fortunately our pilots recognized the ship as an American ship and did not bomb it. I never heard that we actually bombed a ship.

Senator FERGUSON. If you will bear with me a moment—

Mr. MURPHY. You will find something on it, Senator, in the naval narrative. I don't have the page, but it is in the naval narrative.

Mr. Masten, do you have volume 2 of the navy narrative here?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Here it is. It was the *Portland*.

None, except we carried on air patrol looking for any enemy forces in our area. We fueled cruisers and [8573] destroyers from a tanker, and we had several scares due to erroneous reports of enemy forces which turned out to be false.

The *Portland* was bombed by one of our own planes from Pearl Harbor, but, fortunately, the bombs hit well astern. This plane reported the *Portland* as an enemy carrier and the *Porter*, who was guarding her while she recovered one of her planes was reported as an accompanying cruiser.

Did you ever hear about that?

General SHORT. I don't remember. If I did, I have forgotten about it.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, this fleet of ours went south to look for this task force instead of north, with a good prospect of finding it to the north, as I understand the testimony, and that we bombed our own ship, the *Portland*.

General SHORT. The search was in control of the Navy. They gave our people the information on which they wanted the search. I think we made one search that was not directed by the Navy. There were persistent reports that there were Japanese planes off Pearl Harbor, 25 or 50 miles to the southwest off Barber's Point, and I believe that General Martin went out on his own and investigated that when he [8574] had no mission from the Navy, and found it was false.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I realize that we were at peace for something like 25 years, and that we had put our heads in the corner and didn't look for any war. That is, some people did, but I wonder whether the Army and the Navy were doing the same thing. Here it was said that our people weren't ready to enter into an understanding that in case there was an attack down there we would go to bat. But we weren't consulted on the question of the shooting orders in the Atlantic, as I recall. Congress didn't say anything about that.

Now, were the Army and the Navy, and I use this expression because it is one that is well-known, were they asleep at the switch up to December 7?

General SHORT. I think we had worked very seriously in Hawaii to make preparations against any type of attack, but all of the information that we had from Washington indicated to us not an attack on Hawaii, but toward the Philippines and South Pacific, and definitely gave us the opinion that hostile action in Hawaii would be in the nature of sabotage and internal disorder, and that was what we were immediately alerted for, that is what we immediately expected.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Army and the Navy ever come [8575] to use "possible" and "probable" as they are commonly understood? This word "possible" is so weak that if you tell a man a thing is possible you can hardly blame him for not paying attention to it.

General SHORT. I think the message of July 8, when they were pointing out action of the Japanese against Russia, was a rather definite prediction, and was the only prediction that the War Department ever made direct to me.

Some of the naval messages pointed directly toward the Philippines and toward the Kra Peninsula. No message of the Army after July 8 ever pointed anywhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, I know that you had your own forces and your own job out there, but did you know about where Newton's course was? Newton's force was about 300-odd miles from Midway when he learned of the attack. You know where Midway is as you see it on that map [indicating]?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About 300 miles. He said that he thought he would receive orders to intercept the enemy, who, he felt must be to the northwest, northward of Oahu. Therefore he signaled the *Lexington* that the flight to Midway was canceled, because presumably Midway had also [8576] been attacked.

Now, if he had received the message to go north, wouldn't there be good prospects, where you see this red line, this lower red line on that chart, to have intercepted that force?

General SHORT. He might have intercepted it after they had lost their planes and were withdrawing. He would have had to go east, I think, to intercept it beforehand.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, the *Lexington* had a full deployment of airplanes on her. Notwithstanding those that they had taken to Midway or were taking to Midway.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So they would have had the capacity with planes at least to attempt to do something to the Jap fleet, which it turned out nothing was ever done to, it was never intercepted, never seen, and it gave the Japs a great stimulant, I would assume, to know that they had made an attack and were not intercepted by the American forces. Wouldn't that indicate to the Japanese that we were asleep at the switch?

General SHORT. It would indicate that they had succeeded in putting over a complete surprise on us.

[8577] Senator FERGUSON. Now, coming back to this "asleep at the switch," do you think that we were, as a War Department and a Navy Department, our Intelligence, and the whole thing, really asleep at the switch as to war coming to America on the 7th?

General SHORT. I think that our Intelligence definitely failed to draw the conclusions that should have been drawn from the intercepts and that they failed to transmit anything to us that would be helpful.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it true in the Army that we treated Intelligence somewhat, to use the old saying, as a stepchild, that that is about the way we treated Intelligence?

General SHORT. I had not been in Washington on duty with the General Staff since 1924. It would be hard for me to say what the attitude toward Intelligence was in 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the reputation of the Intelligence Branch in the Army? Did good officers try to avoid it?

General SHORT. I don't believe they did. When I was in the War Department General Staff from 1921 to 1924, that was soon after the First World War, Gen. Stuart Heintzleman, whom the Army considered one of the really top-notch men in the Army, was placed in charge of the Military Intelligence Division.

[8578] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you said yesterday that it took almost a year to get permission from the Interior Department

to put up radar equipment, permanent radar equipment in the Hawaiian Islands.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that we really had an alert Army when it took a year to place radar in position, which was one of the new things to protect Hawaii, would you say that if it took a year that we were really alert and going as an army?

General SHORT. I don't believe you could place that on G-2 because I wrote to the Chief of Staff personally about that and had a reply signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, as to the reasons why they did not feel they could do it. I don't believe it stopped at G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. But the Commander in Chief of the United States Army, the President of the United States, was at least over both those branches?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for it taking almost a year to get the right to put up permanent equipment, and we didn't even have it up on the 7th of December, when we had a war message, a warning in June, on June 17, 1940. How do you account for the fact that we, having that [8579] kind of a warning that we were going to have an attack on Hawaii, either ships or planes, and radar would catch both, that it took a year after that to get the right to build radar equipment on those islands?

General SHORT. I would say that the Department of Interior at least did not have any proper appreciation of the international situation.

Senator FERGUSON. But who was over the Department of the Interior? Wasn't the President of the United States?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was the Commander in Chief of our Army?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand you said yesterday we had fine radar equipment in New York City?

General SHORT. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Where else—on the west coast?

General SHORT. The west coast, Seattle and San Francisco. I sent these officers to attend an exercise meeting conducted at Seattle. When they finished there they went to New York City to look over the establishment. They reported to me that those establishments were all set up.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether or not they were working 24 hours a day?

[8580] General SHORT. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 6th and the 7th?

General SHORT. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel if he will ascertain from those radar stations what they were doing and whether or not those radar station were alerted on the 6th and the 7th.¹

General, as an Army officer, would you consider that our possessions, the Hawaiian Islands, were in more danger than New York City on the 7th?

¹ See memorandum dated February 21, 1946, and attachments, from War Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5302 et seq.

General SHORT. Very much so.

Senator FERGUSON. From what you know now?

General SHORT. Very much more.

Senator FERGUSON. From what you know now?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you consider also that it was in more danger than Seattle or San Francisco?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. From what you know now?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, coming back, and I know this is a hypothetical matter because we didn't get those radars established, but if those radars had been established under priority—and I understand the priority was solely [8581] in Washington—is that correct?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It wasn't in your hands?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to get high priority, the best priority to get the equipment in?

General SHORT. On June 10 I radioed the War Department and asked that the priority be advanced to A-1A, which was the highest priority.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a believer in radar?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you feel that it was good equipment and new equipment such as would help the Army of the United States?

General SHORT. I stated in the telegram that it was probably the most important thing that we were trying to do at that time. I think I can find that and read it if you wish.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will also find it, once or twice, in your correspondence with General Marshall, that very same statement.

General SHORT. I was looking for the definite wire. I know I covered it in the wire to General Marshall.

I have the telegram:

[8582] To the Adjutant General,
Washington. D. C.

Division engineer, San Francisco, has informed me that the priority covering contract W-four one four Engr. seven eight four with Interstate Equipment Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J., is now dash one dash G Stop This contract is the one for furnishing all materials for cableway to Kaala Aircraft Warning Station Stop Motors and all electrical equipment and subcontract to General Electric Stop Division engineer states that with this priority there is strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contractor will be delayed about fifteen weeks Stop This Kaala station is the most important in aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project in this department Stop Strongly recommend that the War Department give all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to dash one dash B

I thought I requested that it be A-1A. This copy states 1-B.

[8583] Senator FERGUSON. On March 6 you wrote to General Marshall:

Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a Board of Officers in this Department who made

several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized, and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion.

Signed "Walter C. Short."

What were you talking about there when you said "I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once." This was back in March.

General SHORT. Because we had to get the design of the buildings going into the national parks approved by the Department of Interior.

From an architectural standpoint, it had to fit in with their ideas of the scenery.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, we were talking [8584] about beauty rather than efficiency, as far as war was concerned?

General SHORT. It might appear that way.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how does it appear to you?

General SHORT. It appears to me that the Department of Interior considered their routine requirements of more importance than preparations for war.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what was more important to the United States when we knew war was coming, to get prepared, or to determine upon the beauty of the structure that was to prepare us?

General SHORT. Unquestionably it was important, and I think I made my letter to the Chief of Staff about as strong as I could afford to make it.

[8585] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you say "afford." There are certain things you do not say——

General SHORT. To a superior officer. I told him I thought it was time to stop quibbling.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, there are certain things that in the Army you do not say to your superior; is that it?

General SHORT. You say it in a tactful way.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. You stop just a little short, or you say it in a tactful way. That is what you tried to do here?

General SHORT. That is what I tried to do.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the same rule applies to Cabinet officers?

General SHORT. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't been a Cabinet officer?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am sure it does not apply to Members of the House or the Senate.

Well, now, General Short, the Intelligence Department of the Army was to be used for two purposes if I am right, and if I am wrong you correct me: One was to determine when war might come. The other one was to determine where war might come. Is that correct?

[8586] General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is really the duty of an Intelligence Department?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I might add another thing, and also the strength that the prospective enemy might have to pursue this.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And do you consider them of equal importance?

General SHORT. I would say you might say they were of equal importance because one without the other does not give you the information.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in your opinion did these messages that reached you—and you have listed five, I think there were five—tell you when war was coming?

General SHORT. They indicated in that message of the 27th that war should be coming reasonably soon, although it left a possible chance of avoiding it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did they tell you when war was coming?

General SHORT. I mean when, not where.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they tell you where war was coming?

General SHORT. At no time after July the 8th did a War Department message directed to me ever point in any [8587] direction.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that the message of June 17, 1940, the alert, told General Herron where war was coming?

General SHORT. It told him definitely that they were afraid of a trans-Pacific raid on the Island of Oahu.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was definite information?

General SHORT. Absolutely.

Senator FERGUSON. Not the date but definite information as to where?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any such warning?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you kept advised as to what we were doing as far as our Army was concerned in the proposed attack on the Azores, the sending of the Army up to Iceland and whether or not we had contemplated a force going into Ireland?

General SHORT. General Marshall in one of his personal letters to me indicated confidentially that there was a possibility of attack on the Azores. That was some months before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you put that letter in here?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8588] Senator FERGUSON. It is in?

Mr. MURPHY. It is in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It is in the record?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that we have then before us all the so-called personal mail between you and General Marshall?

General SHORT. I believe that you have everything.

Senator FERGUSON. There has been no determination that the thing was personal or departmental. You have put them all in.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

General SHORT. The War Department selected it. I do not have any other letters.

Mr. MURPHY. When I say it is in the record I mean it is in the exhibit which has been offered.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I understand.

Well, now, did you know of any investigations, outside of the Roberts investigation, made by the War Department up until the Army board was created under the statute of Congress?

General SHORT. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have information on the Bundy investigation, where they were lost in the plane?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. And afterward you were not informed [8589] of any investigation. Did you know that the President had asked or requested that a compilation, at least, of messages, and so forth, be prepared and it was sent to General Marshall and that he made certain alterations in it?

General SHORT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what preparation was made by the Army by investigation that they might court martial you?

General SHORT. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. You were never advised of any of those investigations?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you knew about the statute that was passed asking that there be an investigation?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And such action taken as was required?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever know about the Clausen investigation?

General SHORT. I think there was something in the newspapers indicating that it was taking place but I was never advised by the War Department that it was being made.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Clausen ever come to you and try to get an affidavit?

[8590] General SHORT. He did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know now why the Clausen investigation was undertaken?

General SHORT. I think that there is an explanation of that. You have to read between the lines.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you read between the lines for us and give us that explanation? What are you looking for?

General SHORT. It is Exhibit 63. I am looking for the recommendation. Here it is.

This is a memorandum from the Judge Advocate General, General Cramer, dated November 25, 1944, for the Secretary of War. "Subject: Army Pearl Harbor board."

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read what you have in mind? Read the lines and read between them.

General SHORT. On page 48, the first paragraph. [Reading:]

Unexplored Leads:

In the course of my examination of the report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further [8591] explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

Now, I would like to state there—

Senator FERGUSON. Now you are going to read between the lines?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General SHORT. General Marshall testified before this committee that in all his service he had never heard of a reviewing officer, if he were dissatisfied with the findings of a court martial or a board, taking such action; that the normal action was to refer the proceedings back to the board and direct that additional evidence be taken if that were desired, or direct that a review of their findings be made by the board, and they would then be returned to the reviewing officer with a further explanation.

In this case the Judge Advocate General goes out of his way to state he does not want it referred back to the board but suggests an officer who has been on duty with the board.

Now, there were only three officers who could have met that qualification.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were they?

[8592] General SHORT. They were Colonel Toulmin, who was the executive of the board, Colonel West, who was the recorder of the board and Lieutenant Colonel Clausen, who was a Major at the time, who was assistant recorder of the board. Unquestionably General Cramer had in his mind the recommending of Colonel Clausen at the time that he made that recommendation, which would have taken the further investigation out of the hands of the Army board and placed it in the hands of a selected individual.

Senator FERGUSON. He placed it in the hands of a Major, who was an assistant?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, assistant recorder, who was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel since.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in your experience in the Army did you ever know of that?

General SHORT. I have never known of it. I have seen cases repeatedly where the reviewing officer might return the proceedings to the board and direct that additional evidence be taken and return it to the board, stating that he did not agree with their findings and asking them to review their findings, but I have never heard of a case of this kind.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, before a real review of these findings was made they sent Major Clausen out?

[8593] General SHORT. I think the review had been made but it was not what they wanted.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh. Now, that is what you are reading between the lines, that when they read this report they were not satisfied and they used the words "certain personnel" in there?

General SHORT. And they apparently did not believe there they could get what they wanted out of the Army board, so reading between the lines—

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask at this point in the record that the complete file of the Adjutant General, in view of what is now going on here, be placed in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand that there is a transcript or mimeograph, a complete mimeograph of that prepared, which we have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have it?

General SHORT. I will look at it.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand the file is in Senator Brewster's hands and it has been prepared for the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, that is the one.

[8594] Mr. MURPHY. I mean the Judge Advocate General's, that is the one I am talking about.

Lieutenant Colonel KERR. This is a different one.

Mr. MURPHY. It is the one in which the charges in this case are contained.

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. That may be. I have looked at the file that you have reference to and this is not the complete file.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I ask that we have the complete file then of everything. And in that connection, Senator, may I also request—I understand that the Army has made available all the papers concerning General Marshall in this transaction and I ask that they be made available and spread on the record and I also ask that Secretary Stimson's diary insofar as it pertains in any way to the retirement of General Short, that that also be brought in here and spread on the record.

I ask that everything the Army has in regard to this question of General Short's retirement and the preparation of charges be brought in here and placed in the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Spread on the record or as an exhibit?

Mr. MURPHY. As an exhibit.¹

Senator FERGUSON. I not only approve of what the Congressman is saying, but I would like to say I have been endeavoring here for weeks to get all of the evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. I agree the Senator has and I am not trying [8595] to steal a march or anything like that. I want to be cooperative.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I will say this: I not only want Mr. Stimson's diary as it relates to this particular question, but I want it as it relates to the whole Far East. I think that we will find in that diary an explanation of many things that we have been searching for here days and days and weeks and that we have hundreds, if not thousands, of pages in this record that could have been boiled down to a few lines out of the Secretary of War's diary. I think that we ought to get it immediately.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield for just 1 minute?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I also again call the attention of the committee to the exhibit which has just been offered, which should be made available to all of us.

Senator FERGUSON. May I look at it to see what you are putting in?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection Mr. Murphy's request is granted, but do you want it as an exhibit or spread on the transcript?

Mr. MURPHY. I think an exhibit is enough.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the next exhibit number?

Mr. KAUFMAN. 140.

[8596] The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 140. That is this document here?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you furnish the reporter a copy of it?

¹ See Exhibit 170 in Exhibits, Part 19, and Exhibit 140 in Exhibits, Part 18.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

(The document above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 140.")

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to call the attention of the committee to the fact that yesterday there were certain letters read into the record and, as I recall it, it was a series of letters in connection with the general's retirement.

There were present here some photostatic copies and I, at least, listening to them intently, thought they did not get into the record but I would like everybody to know that they are in the record and there is among them a notation in the handwriting of General Marshall, where he turns over to the Secretary of War the Judge Advocate General's recommendations in reference to—I don't know what these words are—"retirement of General Walter C. Short", and the initials of General Marshall.

And then there is a letter dated the 27th of January 1942 from the Judge Advocate General to General Marshall explaining the problem before him and there is a letter of [8597] January the 31st from the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, in which he encloses the letter which he had sent to General Marshall and I suggest a reading of those letters in connection with the evidence that went in yesterday.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It probably would be appropriate to say that with reference to the Stimson diary, that diary was referred to by the Secretary of War in a hearing before the Army board.

An effort was made by Mr. Mitchell before the hearing commenced with reference to this diary and he ran into a situation of illness on the part of Mr. Stimson under which his doctor refused even to permit the question of the diary to be referred to him.

Our information as to Secretary Stimson's present physical condition is not very accurate. I will be very glad to contact him again and ascertain, first, whether he can present himself as a witness with his diary; or, second, whether he would be willing to submit his diary to the committee. When I get that information I will report it to the chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, we will let it rest on that [8598] for the present.

Mr. MURPHY. I will say, Senator, in connection with this business of the Judge Advocate General, in all fairness to General Short, that it is in effect a complaint, with General Short not, in fact, being given a chance to answer it. I do not want to have any one-sided partisan proposition, but in view of his referring to what the Judge Advocate General had in mind and why he did certain things I think we ought to have everything.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest then that—this volume is rather large, I haven't seen a copy of it yet; it has been here among my papers and it is quite large and I assume that General Short will want some time to go over it. I would like to question him on it. I wonder whether or not after I am through with these other matters that I have and counsel and all the rest of the members ask their questions, if we can bring him back and I can ques-

tion him Monday morning, which will give him plenty of time to go over this and also give me plenty of time to go over it.

General SHORT. Senator, I would like to make a statement right now. I have been over it.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, you have been over it?

General SHORT. And I have a statement, since Mr. Murphy says I should be given an opportunity, that I would like to [8599] make.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask you now to make it if you desire to.

General SHORT. This relates to Exhibit 140.

Regarding the memorandum of specifications drawn up against me by Colonel Munson, I want to point out that the Judge Advocate General reviewed all the evidence of the Roberts commission, of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and of the Clausen affidavits, and came to the conclusion that he could not prove any offense.

The Judge Advocate General's letter dated January 27, 1942, reads in part as follows:

General Short's non-feasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which although proved faulty by subsequent events was insofar as I am able to ascertain from the report of the commission made or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.

In the Judge Advocate General's opinion dated 25 November 1944, page 50, the last paragraph, General Cramer said:

I suggest, therefore, that a public statement be made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceed- [8600] ings and pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could later be re-examined in the light of such additional evidence.

I have looked over the specifications that were drawn up by Colonel Munson and shown in this Exhibit and I will say very definitely that if these charges had been preferred and I had been arraigned my plea in every case would have been "Not guilty."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement on that, General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 12 o'clock. We will recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[8601]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Senator Ferguson will resume his examination of General Short.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (Retired)—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. General, there has been offered and received in evidence this paper—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator, I think it is Exhibit 140.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 140.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In that exhibit there is a memorandum for Mr. Bundy, November 27, 1944, subject: "Secretary's Press Release of 28 February 1942 re General Short."

Then it says:

1. Attached hereto are two copies of the Secretary's press release of 28 February 1942.

And then:

2. Pursuant to his direction the Judge Advocate General's office on 4 March undertook preparation of charges against General Short, utilizing all available data including the Roberts Report and transcript. This work was completed 20 April 1942 and resulted in preparation of charges alleging violation of the 96th Article of War, with 11 specifications [8602] as follows:

Before I go to those specifications, the end of that letter says:

3. The above charges were merely tentative and possible charges and were never approved by The Judge Advocate General or transmitted to the Secretary of War. Of course, they were never made public.

It is signed "William J. Hughes, Jr., Colonel, JAGD."

Now, I would like to ask you about those specific charges. They are in the record and I would like to have your opinion on them.

1. Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.

You made the statement that you plead not guilty to all of them, but I think that we should have an explanation on the record of these charges and what your answers to them are rather than the conclusion of "not guilty."

General SHORT. Do you wish me to indicate my answer on each one?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Give us what you consider is your complete answer on it.

General SHORT. Not guilty.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is there anything you want to say more than that on number 1?

[8603] General SHORT. On the inshore aerial patrol?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General SHORT. I did have an adequate patrol. The air people were satisfied and had full control. If the purpose was antisubmarine defense and it was not designed for air defense.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you using all the equipment that you had?

General SHORT. We had one observation squadron, six planes, in commission, and we were operating them several hours a day. I couldn't say exactly what the hours were.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you using them as much as possible?

General SHORT. I would say we were using them all we should use them. In addition to that there was a lot of observation that accomplished the same thing because our pursuit training was all over Oahu, pretty much around the perimeter, and they were all given to understand that they should learn to observe for submarines.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is that all you want to say on number 1?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Number 2.

Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense.

[8604] General SHORT. Not guilty. We would have had an adequate anti-aircraft defense if the War Department had given us the

equipment, and had given us the information which indicated imminent attack. Or, if they had replied to my report and indicated any desired modification.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you using all the antiaircraft guns and facilities that were provided from Washington for you?

General SHORT. We were not alerted for an antiaircraft defense because we had not received any information indicating a probable air attack.

Senator FERGUSON. The next:

Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.

General SHORT. Not guilty. We were training personnel as fast as we could to operate an effective interceptor command, and it was set up and operating as effectively as it could.

Senator FERGUSON. No. 4:

Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.

General SHORT. Not guilty. We were training our personnel as fast as we could to set up an effective aircraft-warning service. It was in operation.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, No. 5:

Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate [8605] warnings to interested agencies.

General SHORT. Not guilty. We were restricted by direct order from Marshall, from transmitting the November 27 warning to any other than the minimum essential officers.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would exclude giving it to what was called interested agencies; is that your opinion?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. If I had set up an aircraft-warning service and gotten it to everybody we would have had to give it to all the enlisted men.

Senator FERGUSON. No. 6:

Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy.

General SHORT. Not guilty. We had full, complete plans for defense by cooperation with the Navy, which had been approved by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. And in your opinion was that being carried out; was it being carried out?

General SHORT. It would have been carried out 100 percent if they would have given us the information they had.

Senator FERGUSON. No. 7:

Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case of sudden attack.

General SHORT. Not guilty. I could not tell "subordinates" [8606] to expect a sudden attack which neither I nor the War Department nor anyone else expected. Our information regarding impending hostile action was, by direction of the chief of staff, limited to the minimum essential officers. Our standard operating procedure of 5 November 1941 prescribed fully the duties of all personnel in event of any sudden attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I understand from some evidence that the people in Honolulu were given no information as to what to do in case of an air raid. Can you explain why that was true?

General SHORT. The civilians?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the civilian population was not instructed.

General SHORT. We had had a number of alerts and blackouts. We had had definite training of the surgical teams and of the first-aid people and of the ambulance corps. They had turned out and set up these several times. And I think that the civilian agencies that had to act not only knew but they performed their duties extremely well on December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that your claim is that you had given intimation previously to civilian agencies what to do in case of raids?

[8607] General SHORT. The ones who had positive things to do.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you had called in the civilian authorities and explained to them that you anticipated an attack as of after November 27, would you have been violating the instructions given to you in the message of the 27th?

General SHORT. I certainly would, because in all probability a considerable part of the population would have moved to the hills, notifying every Jap agent that we expected an attack practically immediately.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, from what you know now, didn't the Japanese agents know all about the defense and all about the various activities there?

General SHORT. They knew quite largely, probably most all about it, but they would have known definitely then that we were expecting an attack. I doubt if they knew that because we didn't know it ourselves.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you had been alerted as they were in 1940 would you then have alerted the civilian population?

General SHORT. I think that we would have encouraged them, except the ones in the very congested areas, to remain definitely where they were. We had plans completely drawn for the evacuation of certain areas where they thought there [8608] was danger of bombing or sabotage of the gasoline supply and we had asked for money to build those evacuation camps and we had not succeeded in getting it. The Delegate, Sam King, and the Governor, had also made strenuous efforts to get that money.

Senator FERGUSON. Had the responsible authorities in Washington been notified of the M-day plan that you had under the legislature of Hawaii?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; they knew that that legislation was being passed, I am sure, because we had made requests for these funds and when we didn't get it through the War Department then the Governor and the Delegate had tried through their channels.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, had you any notice to put that into effect, to declare M-day?

General SHORT. We had not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that have helped the situation?

General SHORT. We had things worked out so that the Governor was able to put that in effect in a very few hours. He put it into effect sometime before 7 o'clock in the afternoon of December 7 so that it turned out the home guard.

Senator FERGUSON. How many civilians were killed in the attack?

[8609] General SHORT. I couldn't answer that question. Not a great many. There were a few.

Senator FERGUSON. Our casualty lists, I understand, only include the Army and Navy, the military casualties. Can you give us an idea?

General SHORT. We lost in the Army 9 officers and 223 men. My guess would be that there were perhaps 10 civilians killed, but that might be off.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that has ever been listed authoritatively?

General SHORT. I think it has. And one rather unusual part of it is that I think a very considerable proportion of them were Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. Number 8:

Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

General SHORT. Not guilty. I took every measure I thought necessary to protect the fleet and naval base against sabotage. I so reported to the War Department. Marshall testified that I was reasonable in assuming that I was doing exactly what he wanted, because otherwise he would have notified me that he wanted more measures taken.

Senator FERGUSON. Number 9:

Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation [8610] of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.

General SHORT. Not guilty. I was never warned of any imminent danger of an air attack. The planes were therefore grouped for more adequate protection against hostile action in the form of sabotage.

[8611] Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, when you wrote on the 28th, or sent a message back that you were alerted for sabotage, that would indicate, would it, that the planes were grouped?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. That was laid down in our standard operating procedure.

Senator FERGUSON. No. 10:

Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.

General SHORT. Not guilty. My aircraft were not in a state of readiness for a surprise attack, but were protected against sabotage as directed by the War Department in the sabotage-alert messages of 27th, of 28th November 1941, and as reported to the War Department by me.

If they had been equipped with ammunition, grouped as they were, and a sabotage attack had been made, there would have been much more damage by exploding ammunition.

We never permitted, when alerted for sabotage, we never permitted them to be armed or to have ammunition in the planes.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the sabotage alert was one that wouldn't permit ammunition to be in the planes when they were grouped for sabotage?

[8612] General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. No. 11:

Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations.

General SHORT. We made a quite elaborate plan for evacuating the families of civilians on the military reservation. We asked the

War Department for money to establish a camp some 4 miles east of Schofield. I wrote a personal letter to the Chief of Staff and told him that we were asking for the money to establish these camps on the basis of recreation camps and the different units, different families would be assigned to different locations, but our real purpose was to get ready for a possible attack and this would give us a chance to acquaint everybody with the details without advertising what we were doing.

He answered my letter and stated that guns were needed worse for other purposes.

[8613] Senator FERGUSON. I notice that you left out the words "not guilty" to this last one. Is there any reason?

General SHORT. No, sir. I plead not guilty.

Now, I might say when we failed to get our concentration camp plans approved, get the money, we then made an alternate plan for taking care of the women and children in school buildings that we thought would be out of the range of an attack.

We had blankets placed in those school buildings, we had all arrangements set up for the establishment of cafeterias and they were moved in there on the afternoon of the 7th and everybody was taken care of.

Senator FERGUSON. In this evidence that was put in this morning, this exhibit, Myron C. Cramer, major general, judge advocate general, gives a report. I wish you would look on page 50 of that report; I don't know what page it is in the record.

General SHORT. I think it is the paragraph I read into the record this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, it is in Exhibit 63 that I had in mind.

General SHORT. Exhibit 63, top secret, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; top secret.

Now, I notice at the bottom of page 49 this remark by the [8614] Judge Advocate General:

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the court would adjudge.

Why would the Judge Advocate be concerned in advance and before he had filed the charges as to what the court would give as a penalty?

General SHORT. It would look like that he was thinking of the possible effect on public opinion. If I were tried and found not guilty, or given a very mild sentence, that the public would tend to feel that there had been no justification, that is the only conclusion I can draw.

Senator FERGUSON. And then he goes on:

As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the action taken.

Now, was he talking about your reply to General Marshall's message?

General SHORT. He undoubtedly was, in spite of his statement about it being ambiguous and incomplete.

[8615] Senator FERGUSON. Now, in your opinion was it an ambiguous message that you had taken an alert against sabotage?

General SHORT. I don't see how it could have been briefer or more concise or clearer.

Senator FERGUSON. The next sentence:

My experience with courts martial leads me to the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf. Roberts Report, Conclusion 18, p. 21.)

General SHORT. I do not have a copy of the Roberts report here.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you see that he gets a copy?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes. [Handing document to witness.]

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you this question in relation to that: Couldn't that have been cured by trying all that were guilty of contributory causes?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the War Department has ever considered the question of trying all that were guilty of contributory causes or causes of the disaster at Pear Harbor?

General SHORT. I am quite sure they have never made a [8616] public statement to that effect. I do not know whether any consideration has been given to it or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you have before you the Roberts report, do you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to look at those conclusions 18 on page 21 and see what he was talking about?

General SHORT. I have looked at it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to make any answer in relation to them?

General SHORT. I would say in regard to 18 that it was a complete surprise, because we had not been furnished the information that was definitely available in Washington and that should have been furnished to us.

In regard to 19, the things that he mentioned are largely beyond our control:

Disregard of international law by the Japanese.

There was nothing that we could do about that.

The restrictions they prepared on counter-espionage.

That was a question of our own laws. The Hawaiian Department could do nothing about that.

Emphasis in the warning messages of the probability of aggressive action in the Far East and on anti-sabotage measures.

That was wholly on the shoulders of the War Department. That could not apply to the Hawaiian Department.

[8617] Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

That was entirely a War Department failure.

Information received by the interested parties prior to the attack of warning message of December 7th.

That was entirely the failure of the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. The War Department is defined there as you defined it this morning?

General SHORT. I beg your pardon?

Senator FERGUSON. Is it defined as you defined it this morning?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything more that you want to add?

General SHORT. I would like to call attention to the fact that he admits in paragraph 20 that when the attack came that the command did act efficiently. He said that they were present and that certain things had not interfered in any way with their efficiency and that subordinate commanders executed their orders without question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness.

I would like to say there that I have never at any time tried to pass the buck to any single subordinate. My decision [8618] was made on the information that the War Department had furnished me and I had no desire and absolutely never took any steps to pass the buck to some individual man below me.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there such a thing as a joint trial in courts martial, where men can be tried jointly?

General SHORT. There is, yes, sir. It is rather unusual but it is possible. I think I am correct in that, am I not?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then reading on:

There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130.) I am therefore forced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in his conviction there is considerable likelihood the court would adjudge a sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand.

Would that lead us to believe, then, that he was of the opinion that he was concerned with the sentence and they were concerned with that alone?

General SHORT. I would say they were very greatly concerned with the effect on public opinion and that they wanted [8619] to be very careful and not try me on something where they would fail and the effect would bounce back on them.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, coming to the Clausen report. When did you see the Clausen affidavits?

General SHORT. About 2 or 3 days before this committee convened we got a copy of them.

Senator FERGUSON. In the first part of the Clausen report, the 23d of November 1944—have you got the Clausen report before you?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. No, sir; we do not have that here.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the letter by the Secretary of War to Major Clausen and on the next page is this memorandum:

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen: Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigations.

You had those before you this morning, did you not?

General SHORT. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. The unexplored leads.

General SHORT. I do not believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in evidence those two papers, the letter of the 23d creating the Clausen power and unexplored leads.

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, why the public are not entitled to the whole thing? I move that we put it all in, the whole volume.

[8620] The CHAIRMAN. Make them an exhibit or consider it as being spread on the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to spread those pages at least on the record because I have questioned General Short and he gave some answers in relation to these unexplored leads and that is what I desire to have in the record at the present time.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean you object, Senator, to the whole thing going in?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I think we should wait. The only thing is I think we should wait until Clausen came to get the other papers in, to know how the other papers were obtained before they go in.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I propose later on to ask that they all go in. I would like to have it all go in now. I will ask that again.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the chair does not want to exclude anything that ought to go in here, but if it is all going in when Clausen comes in I do not see any need of putting it all in here.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no objection to those two going in but I move that they all go in so that we will have everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Let them go in.

[8621] Senator FERGUSON. I will read them in, General, so that you will have them before you.

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON (reading). "November 23, 1944." Now, that date is after the board had rendered its opinion?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But the board, all the members were living and in good health so that they could have carried on, couldn't they?

General SHORT. So far as I know they were.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:
Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation.

In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and information in your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and the persons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they [8622] may have knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries.

In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether secret or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary notwithstanding.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

Now, the next page is:

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD:
Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.

1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might

advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.

2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, [8623] the following matters can be investigated:

a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the order.

b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor.

c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington.

d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part of the fleet to remain in harbor.

e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired back for its meaning.

f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other Navy Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished copies thereof.

g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were believed required by the situation.

h. Whether the War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department.

[8624] i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of February 1941.

j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their training and the possibility of continuing training under Alert 2 or 3.

k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britain and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised of this agreement or discovered its existence.

l. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan. (Rep. 41)

3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain:

a. The exact date and time of first translation.

b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some of the most vital messages.

c. Who got each message, when and in what form.

d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy.

e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept.

4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored:

[8625] a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it.

b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army (Tr., Safford C. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the translation was received.

c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

Did you ever hear about that one before?

General SHORT. I learned that in respect to the report, as I say, 2 or 3 days before the committee met. I had never heard about it before that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether or not Miles did know about that Anglo-Dutch-U. S. joint action agreement, in which case they would have known that the War with Britain message would necessarily have involved the United States in war?

[8626] General SHORT. I don't remember whether that question was specifically asked him or what his answer was.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy.

e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort of the implementation intercept?

f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating "Winds" message?

g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board failed to examine?

[8627] Did you know that the Army board had failed to examine certain intercept messages?

General SHORT. I did not know what they had examined. I was never permitted to see or know anything about magic.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "winds" message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities.

General SHORT. I never heard of the winds code until I read the Roberts report here sometime in August 1944. That was the first time I knew there was such a thing.

Senator FERGUSON. You never knew then that Rochefort, admiral or commander, whatever he was—it was Commander Rochefort—had known that there was intercepted a winds or implementing message?

General SHORT. No, sir; I had never heard of it.

Senator FERGUSON. So then you were not waiting, as a matter of fact, on an implementing winds message in order that you may be given advance notice of hostilities?

General SHORT. I was not.

[8628] Senator FERGUSON. This is signed Myron C. Cramer, major general, United States, Judge Advocate General.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. As you remember, we were first going to put in the first 18 pages, and I then stated in the record it was unfair to have the 18 in without the explanatory part but to have incorporated in the judge advocate general's opinion the report of Major Clausen.

There is also in the record the cross-examination from the Clausen report of General Gerow. I do not see how you can intelligently understand a report if you have only three parts of it in and not the whole.

I request, in view of the matters that have been read, that the entire report go in as an exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I am putting in here just what the judge advocate general was asking Clausen to look into. I haven't time this afternoon to examine him on the whole matter here that is contained in this volume.

I want to ask you, General Short, if you read this paper that I read and that I have before me, these affidavits of Clausen, or in the Clausen report?

General SHORT. I have read the complete report.

[8629] Senator FERGUSON. You have read the complete report?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The papers have never had the Clausen report. I think they are entitled to them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, then—

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). Just hold it, Mr. Chairman. I have at least on one or two other occasions registered objection to the introduction of the so-called Clausen statement at this time, until after we have had an opportunity to go into that situation in connection with the examination of Colonel Bratton and others who expect to be witnesses.

When the full facts with reference to it are developed it can then be disclosed as to whether it is material and pertinent to this inquiry. I do not care to be a party to consenting to the introduction in evidence of matter which may or may not be pertinent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman of Wisconsin object to the request of the gentleman of Pennsylvania?

Mr. MURPHY. May I say on this point, the Navy had a special examination after the naval court of inquiry concluded, by Admiral Hart, and they had a subsequent examination by Admiral Hewitt, and in each of those cases it was conducted by an individual going about the world to [8630] take testimony. The Clausen examination, as I understand it, covered 57,000 miles to the war fronts of the world.

I am simply making my request so that everything about Pearl Harbor shall be known, for whatever it is worth. Maybe it will not be worth much in the view of individual members, but so that all the facts will be before the papers of the country I think it should be made an exhibit.

Mr. KEEFE. In view of that statement, it is perfectly obvious why the statement is made; I do not want any misinterpretation of the purpose of my objection.

There is quite a difference between the Hewitt report and the Hart report and the manner in which the two were prepared, quite a difference between the questions and answers of witnesses recorded under oath than the mere statement that is made in the taking of affidavits.

Now I have some knowledge as to the manner and method in which affidavits are obtained, and so far as I am concerned, it will all be brought out at the proper time. I do not think they should be introduced in evidence at this time but should await the time when the individuals become witnesses on the stand and it gives us an opportunity to examine those witnesses in reference to how those affidavits were obtained.

Mr. MURPHY. According to the papers the gentleman said [8631] he wants to conclude by February 15, and I want to be sure the Clausen report is in by then, and I think this is as good a time as any.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit me to remind the gentleman from Wisconsin, as I recall the only witness who has appeared before the committee so far and who had appeared before the Army board of inquiry and later gave an affidavit to Major Clausen was General Gerow.

Mr. KEEFE. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Gerow was questioned by members of the committee about his affidavit that he gave to Major Clausen.

Mr. KEEFE. I certainly would not have any objection to having General Gerow's affidavit, which he gave to Clausen, introduced in evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. It is already in evidence.

Mr. KEEFE. It is already in evidence. Now all I ask is that the same situation with respect to the affidavit, perhaps, of Colonel Bratton and others be indulged in. I have no objection to the public and the world knowing just exactly what is in every one of those affidavits, but I would like to introduce them at a time when I have the right to cross-examine the witness who gave those affidavits.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, Major [8632] Clausen, I believe, questioned 135 witnesses. I do not believe we are going to have them all here. Ordinarily, if you put any part of an instrument in you ought to put all of it in, for whatever it is worth.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The objection has been heard. That settles the matter for the present.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, in view of what has been said I think it should be made clear that we do not take the affidavits of 135 witnesses. If Colonel Clausen appears here and we can examine him about it, we can review that whole question at that time. In the meantime it is a little premature.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand, sir, we have already agreed to take the statements of the staffs at Hawaii.

Senator BREWSTER. As the gentleman well knows, those who are in the category of these witnesses we agreed to let go in evidence.

Mr. KEEFE. That matter has heretofore been determined by this committee, as the Chairman will know, when we agreed to put in sworn testimony in the place of calling certain witnesses, and the Clausen matter was specifically eliminated by unanimous action of the committee at that time.

[8633] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is true, of course. It was determined by the committee in executive session that the Clausen material would not be included with this other material, but it does not follow that any member of the committee is deprived of the right to ask unanimous consent to include it at any time he may desire.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask it particularly in view of the fact that those members of the armed forces of the United States were fighting in the battlefronts of the world, and swore before God under oath that what they said was true, and it was presented to us by an officer of the United States Army.

Senator BREWSTER. You produce the officer, and we will listen to him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar, General, with the planes that were passing through Hawaii to other fronts for other places in the Pacific?

General SHORT. To the Philippines in particular?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were these planes up until the 7th [8634] the same as those that came in then? They were not armed?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No ammunition in them?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You were to arm them there and then send them on?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Had that ever been done before?

General SHORT. All the planes that had gone to the Philippines came in in that condition up to December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Came in that condition?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So there was no alteration at that time?

General SHORT. You mean the ones coming in on the 7th?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General SHORT. No, sir; that had been the normal procedure.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your force being reinforced or were these planes, from a certain day, all going through to the Philippines?

General SHORT. We had actually lost planes. We had 21 B-17's at one time, and 9 of those were sent to the [8635] Philippines and we were down to 12, and had to rob 6 of those of parts to keep the others going through.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that impress you with the fact that there was more thought of an attack in the Philippines than there was in your territory?

General SHORT. No question about it. They were ferrying in the last few months everything to the Philippines they could.

Senator FERGUSON. Can we get what planes went through Hawaii from, say, July, or something like that, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will try.

Senator FERGUSON. Try and get that, and what planes stopped and how they completed their journey.

General SHORT. May I interject there, also, there were other types of planes that were not flown through, that were shipped through on transports.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew about that?

General SHORT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been reinforced in such a way by shipping planes in after, say, September?

General SHORT. I think we got most of our planes before July 1. I could not state definitely, but I think we did.

[8636] Senator FERGUSON. After that, had you requested any more planes for your defense?

General SHORT. We had in August put in that study showing that we should have a total of 180 B-17's.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever received any word of any kind that after the 27th of November the Secretary of State had made a statement to the Secretary of War that the matter, in effect—I do not undertake to quote him in exact words—was then being turned over to the Army and Navy?

General SHORT. I had not.

Senator FERGUSON. You indicated yesterday that you were of the opinion that General Marshall had never seen the message of the 27th as it was sent, prior to the time it was sent to you.

General SHORT. Yes, sir; I believe that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And where do you get that knowledge?

General SHORT. Because General Marshall was not in Washington. He was, according to his testimony, and that of others, in the Carolinas for maneuvers. He stated, as I remember in his testimony that when he returned to his office on the 28th, he thought he found his message on his desk.

Senator FERGUSON. And he saw it afterward? [8637] He saw it after the maneuvers?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to add anything to or subtract anything from any of your answers that I may have asked you questions on?

General SHORT. I might bring out the fact that in addition to planes, a few days before December 7, I had a wire from the War Department asking me if I would be willing to ship forty-eight 75-millimeter guns and 120 30-caliber machine guns to the Philippines, and that they would replace them very soon. I agreed to that.

The transport was held at the time long enough to get them aboard, and they were shipped to the Philippines. That, of course, was another indication that they had a knowledge of the situation in the Philippines much more than we had.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish I did. I don't understand before that that we knew our attitude toward the case of a war with Japan, we could not hope to hold the Philippines?

General SHORT. I think that for years it had always been considered that we probably would lose the Philippines and have to retake them. I think in playing our war games at the War College, that had been the usual assumption.

[8638] Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel wherein he quoted the President as saying that it would be very embarrassing to us if the Philippines were attacked?

General SHORT. I am not. I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, as a military man, how it could have been embarrassing, using that word; is that the word you use in military circles, or is that a diplomatic word?

General SHORT. I think it would always be embarrassing from a military point of view, to lose anything of that kind, but it was something we had expected would happen.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. And if an attack came, it would come against the Philippines?

General SHORT. It would come against the Philippines and we probably would not be able to hold them. We did not have enough out there.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Had you ever asked the question as to what our policy was in case of an attack on the Philippines?

General SHORT. No, sir. I thought I knew, because I had seen the war plans when I was here in Washington.

[8639] I had played war games, commanded one side of the war game in actual maneuvering at the War College. I think I at that time knew it very thoroughly.

Senator FERGUSON. What was our policy in case of an attack? Would we go into action, into war?

General SHORT. We would hold them as long as we could and then expect to take them back.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it mean a general war? Was that our policy?

General SHORT. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. So then in your opinion, it meant war if they attacked the Philippines, and the British and Dutch?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just as much as if they attacked Hawaii or the Marshalls, or Guam, or any other possessions?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Or even our Coast?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I just want to say that if you made an error when you said that was quoting the President in an embarrassing situation.

[8640] Senator FERGUSON. I understand that exact language. I am not sure that they were not in evidence. I am not sure that they were not in evidence. Can I get the last letter in the Clark-Kimmel letters?

Mr. MURPHY. I think he quotes the President in some matters, but I do not think that was the quotation.

Senator FERGUSON. Under no circumstances do I want to allow even a thought that I am misquoting.

Were you here the day that the MacArthur affidavit was read into evidence?

General SHORT. I am sorry. I did not get the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you here on the day that the Clausen-MacArthur letter was read in evidence?

General SHORT. I think I was. At least I have read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the substance of it, as I recall it, was that General MacArthur claimed that he had enough information and was not embarrassed by any lack of information. Did you know at that time that he had magic?

General SHORT. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that if he had sufficient information then you had sufficient information, would it not?

General SHORT. If you read that alone, you could readily [8641] draw that inference, if you did not know anything about the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you know about magic, do you think that changes the situation?

General SHORT. There were two things that would give him much more information. One was magic and the other, which I did not know about, the message from the President to Commissioner Sayre, that Commissioner Sayre, General MacArthur, and Admiral Hart

were to get together at a conference. There was a considerable amount of information there.

Senator FERGUSON. And the fact that he had magic and access to that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that there will be no doubt about my quotation, I am going to ask to strike my previous question. I will quote directly from the letter.

This is the letter of the 25th of November 1941, in exhibit 106.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Whom is the letter from?

Senator FERGUSON. The original letter is signed "Betty."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From whom to whom?

Senator FERGUSON. From Admiral Stark to Admiral [8642] Kimmel.

Now, I will read the postscript:

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles, an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

[8643] I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I know I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to do or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything."

It is initialed "H. R. S."

Have you seen that? It was written on November 25, and he indicates that he is holding it up because of a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull and then he adds this postscript.

General SHORT. I have never seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Before December 7?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When is about the first that you heard of it?

General SHORT. I heard it discussed here.

Senator FERGUSON. In one of our joint committee hearings?

General SHORT. Yes; the first I ever heard of it.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did not know what they were talking about in there, about it being embarrassing if an attack was made on the Philippines?

General SHORT. I did not know specifically what was intended.

[8644] Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, before Congressman Keefe proceeds, there is a matter that I would like to bring to the attention of the committee that just came to my attention in connection with the introduction of this record called the brief and résumé of records of the Roberts commission. I brought this originally to the attention of the committee and asked its consideration, and it was deferred. Copies were made available for examination.

Subsequently I stated that an examination of this indicated to me clearly it was excerpts from a much longer report of the Roberts com-

mission and I asked that a complete record be put in this record and be made an exhibit, in justice to all concerned, and that was agreed to.

Subsequent thereto, there were certain letters that were discussed in connection with this, which went into the record yesterday. Last night, just before adjournment, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy, stated:

I do not want to offer something that was brought to him as an exhibit, but I do want the record to show that if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer of this file in the morning I will ask unanimous consent to have it go into the record because I think it ought to be straightened [8645] out on the record.

That being brought to my attention I came here this morning and spoke to the chairman, Mr. Cooper, in charge, and I told him I had to go to a meeting of conferees on the Ship Sales Act, and if it were to be offered I wanted to be heard. He suggested I talk to Mr. Murphy, which I did. I asked Mr. Murphy if he wanted to put this in and he said no, that he had no intention at this time to put it in. I went back to Mr. Cooper and told him the matter was adjusted. I find subsequently in the morning Mr. Murphy did offer it. I am ready to consider the further factors which led Mr. Murphy to change his mind in the course of the morning.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to speak for myself.

Senator BREWSTER. I certainly shall be happy to hear you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I talked to the Senator from Maine this morning and told him it was my understanding that exhibits 1 and 2 attached to the file he had were not in evidence. I was informed by counsel that they were, the counsel for General Short. Thereafter, after the Senator from Maine—

Senator BREWSTER. Just a moment. You said that was all our conversation?

[8646] Mr. MURPHY. I told you I did not intend to put the file in right then.

Now, with the understanding that the general was not going to be a witness after today, the general then made a statement to the effect, as I recollect it, that the Judge Advocate General did not want anyone on the Army board, but rather, one individual to go out to make a survey of certain additional facts.

Then there is one other thing. Yesterday the gentleman said, as I remember it, that there were certain parts of that record in this exhibit.

Senator BREWSTER. The Roberts commission.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. In this exhibit there is a letter which states that they are referring only to things on the record. When the gentleman saw fit to refer to The Adjutant General of the United States Army, and apparently to the Secretary of War, with the inference, as I got it, that there was some impropriety in sending out Major Clausen to make this survey, I then asked that not only this exhibit but all of the files of the War Department, including these and everything else, go into the record, so we would have the entire picture.

I also stated on the record that this, in effect, was a complaint that it was a one-sided ex parte proceeding. I [8647] used that word before the noon hour, an ex parte proceeding. I said in fairness to the general, he ought to be able to give his answer here.

Whereupon the general said, "I have a paper prepared here. I have examined the exhibit." He then read his answer.

I do think, inasmuch as the gentleman from Maine has brought it up, that he should be the one to offer it. Apparently he thought it was significant, because he brought it up twice. I certainly do not want to offend the general's feelings, but I am interested in the whole truth. My only purpose in introducing it is if there was any wrong committed by The Adjutant General, or anyone else on the staff, as to the procedure, we ought to know it. That is the only reason why it should be in this record.

Senator BREWSTER. I appreciate the gentleman's statement that he wants the whole truth, and so do I want the whole truth, but having examined this document I have found it does not even purport to be anything but a very partial summary of certain portions of the evidence. I asked for the entire evidence before the Roberts commission to be put in as an exhibit, so that we would have the whole truth, and that was agreed to.

I do not think we need to, or want, perhaps, to take the time of the committee at this time. In the light of the [8648] circumstances as stated by Mr. Murphy and myself, I would ask that the decision of the committee be reconsidered and that we have an opportunity over the week end to consider the situation, with a view to whether or not this should be incorporated in the record as an exhibit.

I think there were some serious questions about this which I should like to consider and perhaps discuss with Mr. Murphy and the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to say that inasmuch as the good faith of The Adjutant General of the United States Army appears to be challenged, or the Judge Advocate General, I think this committee and everybody should want to know the whole story, and for that reason I think it should remain in the record.

Senator BREWSTER. I simply ask the matter be reconsidered.

The CHAIRMAN. That matter can be pending and the committee can consider it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As the record stands now, it is in the record. The Senator is asking to reconsider it and the question of reconsideration is carried over.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the record as an exhibit, not as a part of the transcript, I understand, so the question of reconsidering that, as to whether it should be filed as an exhibit, will be pending.

[8649] Mr. MURPHY. May I just say, Mr. Chairman, that there are additional papers, and, as I understand it, counsel have a great volume of them, and I hope there will be a study made over the week-end. There is particularly one paper that is a memorandum dated February 17, 1942, which refers to the original retirement paper, or proposed retirement paper of the general, and it refers to a memorandum from General Marshall, and I would like to see that memorandum.

I have asked to have it here.

Senator BREWSTER. I think we should have all the records bearing on this which were asked for some days ago by me. It was as the result of that that these various records were produced.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to give the Senator full credit for it.

Senator BREWSTER. I want to say that I cannot conceive that similar records to this do not exist in the Kimmel case in the Navy Department, and I should like to have the matter thoroughly explored in order that entire justice may be done to all concerned, if it is finally decided that particularly documents of this character are to be included in this record as exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. All those matters can be straightened out by the committee. The Chair would like to see if we cannot finish with General Short today. We cannot do it [8650] if we argue back and forth on these matters, which I think can be disposed of in the committee itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. I do not want the record to show that I feel that I was in a position to really examine General Short on this because we dropped the subject and I did not cover it as carefully as I would want to. I did the best I could.

The CHAIRMAN. You made a pretty good stab at it.

Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You are welcome.

Mr. KEEFE. It is always a great pleasure to find myself at the end of this whip cracking and get thrown off into the last minute of the last hour of Saturday afternoon with witnesses, so that I am under the urge, of necessity, of not consuming any time in trying to complete with the witnesses.

I assure you, General Short, that I shall not utilize any of these bulky minutes in my examination. I will try to get through by 4 o'clock.

Now, General, I sat here during your entire examination and listened as attentively as I knew how to this mass of detail that has been submitted to this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you permit me to say that counsel [8651] wishes to have a brief executive session at the conclusion of today's session, so the members who are here will remain.

I beg your pardon for interrupting.

Mr. KEEFE. I wonder if I have arrived at a wrong conclusion, or whether I am correct when I assume that the evidence up to date, and the cross-examination of yourself, has tended to meet the issues with respect to your conduct as the commander at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, when in the public's mind for a long time after December 7, it was apparent that you and Admiral Kimmel were charged with the failure of your responsibilities as commanders at Pearl Harbor.

You specifically had training to alert your command to meet this air attack, with all that is involved in that matter of alerting your command.

In other words, the statement has repeatedly been made that had Kimmel and Short been on the alert they would have been able to meet this Jap attack and either repel it or to have minimized the results of that attack, and therefore Pearl Harbor was the result of the failure to be on a suitable and proper alert.

You felt the impact of that sentiment in the last 4 years, did you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8652] Mr. KEEFE. I understand your position to be, General Short, that as commander at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941, and subsequent to your appointment to that important position you did everything within your power to provide the physical things necessary to provide for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And it is your contention that as to many items of physical property, such as guns, installations, radar equipment, air strips, buildings, and so on, you did not get but a small part of the material that you had requested prior to December 7, 1941.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall has testified, as I recall, that in his opinion the material which you did have at Pearl Harbor on December 7, if alerted and effectively used, would have given a good account of itself and perhaps enabled you to repel the attack, or to severely minimize the damage that was caused. Do you agree with that?

General SHORT. I could have given a better account of myself, but to see how inadequate it was we need to only compare two items. The best anti-aircraft defense against low-flying planes, which did the most damage there, is the .50-caliber machine gun. We had 109. Our program at [8653] that time called for 345, but by December 1, 1942, they had actually increased the number of .50 caliber machine guns on Hawaii to 793, showing how much more the War Department thought was necessary, and keep in mind that that date is after the Japanese had been seriously defeated at Midway.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General, I do not want to indulge in the realm of hindsight or speculation. I know how easy it is to judge when you have the benefit of hindsight and I do not feel I should call upon you to indulge in a matter of speculation. The fact of the matter is, is it not, that except for the possibility of getting a few more guns into action and possibly minimizing, to a small extent, the damage that was done, regardless of what you had out there on December 7, this attack would have come in by surprise, isn't that true?

[8654] General SHORT. With the information.

Mr. KEEFE. With the information that you had?

General SHORT. The information we had from Washington, it was bound to be a surprise.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, then, I think it is quite clear from this evidence, and anybody can correct me if they think I am in error, but as I recall the evidence up to date, every witness that has testified concluded that there was no probability of an attack by air on Hawaii, except, as I recall, the testimony of Admiral Turner. He is the only witness that testified to the probability, in his opinion, that an attack by air would be made upon Pearl Harbor.

General SHORT. Except that General Miles said that the attack was so obvious that they couldn't take the trouble to mention it.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

General SHORT. So obvious that they didn't mention it in any of his estimates.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, General Miles said that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well. But it impresses me that everybody that had access to the diplomatic changes and all of the information with

respect to the Japanese inten- [8655] tions concluded that the attack, if it came at all, would be in the far west Pacific.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what you thought?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what Stark thought?

General SHORT. I think so.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what General Marshall thought.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Everybody that I know of that had access to anything thought that is where the attack would come.

Now, as evidence of that, you have brought before the committee a long series of situations. Admiral Kimmel has done likewise. That is, that that was the intention.

You have pointed out the fact that B-17's were sent out there unarmed, with their guns cosmolined, that they arrived at the very time that the attack was going on, as evidence that the Air Corps or nobody else would have sent those B-17's into that fray unarmed had they expected an attack.

You have indicated that they were ordering you to ship your supplies to the Philippines, material that you had on hand. That is correct, is it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8656] Mr. KEEFE. As indicating that that is where the attack would take place?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Some place in the record there is evidence of a plan by which the Army was to garrison our outlying islands. Do you remember that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You would garrison the islands of Samoa, Canton, Christmas, Palmyra, and Johnston; is that right?

General SHORT. I think that Palmyra and Johnston were not specifically mentioned. They stated that we would at some future time take over the outlying islands and we would garrison Christmas and Canton at once.

Mr. KEEFE. And when was that supposed to take place?

General SHORT. The message was received, I believe, November 29.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the idea was, after the war warning message of the 27th, plans were invoked by which you were to deplete your garrison at Honolulu and to send Army replacements to garrison Canton, Samoa, Christmas; is that right?

General SHORT. I am doubtful whether Samoa was included, but Christmas and Canton definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. Canton and Christmas.

[8657] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And they proposed to replace the troops thus removed from Oahu with fresh troops to be brought from the mainland?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is correct?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. You took all of those things into consideration, along with a lot of other facts that I will not burden the record with at this time, that indicated to you that if there was any

intent on the part of the Japs to attack Hawaii, that that information would be available to Washington, and would be forwarded to you?

Mr. KEEFE. And you got no information that would indicate a specific attack on Hawaii?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, it appears in accordance with the record that is before the committee that this November 27 warning message, page 7 of exhibit 32, was received in the Hawaii signal center at 6:46 p. m. Washington time, 1:16 Hawaiian time, having been dispatched from Washington to Hawaii at 6 o'clock p. m., Washington time on the 27th day of November, and that you replied as shown by your message on page 12 of exhibit 32, which was encoded in Hawaii at 11:10 p. m. Washington time, or 5:40 p. m. Hawaii [8658] time, and it was received in the War Department code room at Washington at 5:57 a. m. on the 28th of November, or 12:27 a. m. the 28 of November, Hawaiian time.

Now, there we had the war warning message to General Short and General Short's reply to General Marshall in which you stated that you were alerted against sabotage, and had liaison with the Navy.

Now, after that message of Marshall's you received a message from G-2, that has been referred to, sent to you by General Miles, a short message, on November 27, which reads:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may ensue stop Subversive activities may be expected stop Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only.

Signed Miles.

That message went from G-2 in Washington to G-2 Hawaii?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And advises the G-2 in Hawaii to inform you and your chief of staff only, and refers to nothing but sabotage?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You saw that message, did you?

[8659] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then on the 28th day of November you received a message signed "Adams." Who was Adams?

General SHORT. He was the adjutant general.

Mr. KEEFE. He had authority to send you messages?

General SHORT. His message meant that it was authorized by the Chief of Staff.

Mr. KEEFE. He would not send you a message unless it was authorized by the Chief of Staff, would he?

General SHORT. I am sure he wouldn't.

Mr. KEEFE. He had the authority to give you a command?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And in this message which he sent you on the 28th day of November he states:

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined [8660] to those essential to security comma avoiding unneces-

sary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat nor affect your possibility under existing instructions.

Now, when you received that telegram on the 28th after Washington had receive your message in which you stated that you were alerted against sabotage, did that tend to influence you in your thinking that the alert which you had was the proper alert, the alert that Washington wanted?

General SHORT. It did. I thought it was an answer to my radiogram and wanted to emphasize the question of legality.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, there was also sent to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, on the 28th a message signed "Carl Robinson, adjutant general." Did you receive that one?

General SHORT. Robinson?

Mr. KEEFE. That is what it looks like to me.

General SHORT. What page is that?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't know—

Mr. MURPHY. He is reading from different exhibits.

Mr. KEEFE. Here it is. This one here. Wouldn't you [8661] say that is "Robinson"?

Senator FERGUSON. I have one by Sullivan. Is this the one you want?

Senator LUCAS. "Williams" isn't it?

Mr. MURPHY. The record shows that somebody thought it was Wall, somebody thought it was Sullivan, and now you say it is Robinson.

Mr. KEEFE. Here is the photostatic copy.

Mr. MURPHY. I have seen it. I can't make it out.

Mr. KEEFE. Robinson, R-o-b-i-n-s-o-n, as plain as anything.

General SHORT. It is the Arnold message you are reading, from the Chief of Air Corps?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; that is the one.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, is it Robinson, Arnold, Williams, or Sullivan?

Mr. KEEFE. This is signed Carl Robinson, adjutant general. My eyes aren't too good, but I can certainly see that.

That came out to you on the 28th of November, did it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that reads:

[8662] Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force Period That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired Colon Against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department Paren See paragraph three MID SR three zero dash four five Paren—

Whatever that means. That is what you were worried about, Mr. Chariman, the other day.

The CHAIRMAN. I am still worrying about it.

Mr. KEEFE. So am I.

Then it says:

The present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once Period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following Colon Protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda Comma Protection of all activities against espionage Comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment Comma property and establishments Period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures

Period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essentially to secure Period Para It is also desired [8663] that on or before December five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions Period
(Signed) ARNOLD.

[8664] Now, you got that on the 28th of November?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Another message which refers specifically and only to sabotage and espionage; that is true?

General SHORT. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. The message speaks for itself.

Now, you replied to those two messages, the one from the adjutant general and the one from the air, the Arnold message, you replied separately, did you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you replied at considerable length?

General SHORT. Very great detail.

Mr. KEEFE. And those replies, your reply was addressed to the Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And in this reply, which I shall not attempt to read, I take it this message is in the record and I won't burden the record with reading it again, you give them a full and complete description of everything you have done?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General—

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that?

Mr. KEEFE. The date is the 29th of November 1941.

[8665] Perhaps I had better read it into the record right at this spot:

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid sc thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop Pursuant to the authority stated the governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures [8666] in the territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirteenth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters

Signed, "Short."

Did you consider that there was full and complete and ample notice to the War Department at Washington as to what you were doing out there in Hawaii?

General SHORT. It seems to me I thought it was very definitely a full explanation.

Mr. KEEFE. So if your message of the 27th in response to the Marshall message in which you used the language "alerted against sabotage—liaison with the Navy," might be contended [8667] by some people to be too short and too brief and not full enough, this message which went to the Adjutant General is full and complete as stating everything that you were doing?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then also on the next day, November 30, 1941, originating at Fort Shafter at 12:57 a. m., the message being dated November 29, you replied to the message from General Marshall?

General SHORT. That was on December 4. On page 19. I think the one you have is a Panama message.

Mr. KEEFE. No. Did you send a reply to the message from Arnold?

General SHORT. General Martin sent the reply after my O. K., and it is shown on page No. 19, 19 and 20, sent over both General Martin's name and mine.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh yes. That is pages 19 and 20 of Exhibit 32.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That gives a full and complete response to the wire received by you from General Arnold?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And this was prepared by General Martin of the Air Corps in Hawaii but bears your signature?

[8668] General SHORT. Yes, sir; and bears his also.

Mr. KEEFE. So that there again was a full and complete statement to Washington addressed to the Chief of the Air Corps setting forth completely just what you were doing out there at Hawaii?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I understand that from the time you sent your reply on the 27th of November right down to December 7, the time of the attack, you never received a single word from Washington that would indicate that these replies which you gave to these messages, and which are now in the record, did not indicate that you were carrying out the instructions from Washington?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you assumed during all this period, having replied to the Marshall message, having replied at great length to the Adjutant General's message, having replied at great length to the message sent you by the Chief of the Air Corps, you felt full assurance that had any other alert been expected by Washington they certainly had all the information as to what you were doing and would have given you the order; is that your position?

General SHORT. I did; I felt that.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact, your war plans, [8669] you were familiar with Rainbow 5, were you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And WPL-46?

General SHORT. Less familiar with it than Rainbow 5 but familiar with it.

Mr. KEEFE. It is a fact, is it not, General Short, that the war plans, the joint war plans of the Army and the Navy for war in the Pacific with Orange, which was Japan, contemplated an offensive war in the event of outbreak of hostilities?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And that commencement of hostilities was to be announced by radiogram to all theaters announcing in plain English just what ways to put that plan into effect—M-day?

General SHORT. M-day, that is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Then everybody knew, all over the Pacific, just exactly what to do; isn't that true?

General SHORT. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. In accordance with the plans already worked out?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That contemplated, so far as the fleet was concerned at Pearl Harbor, an offensive action against the [8670] Marshalls and the Carolines, did it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, according to the recorded plan which is here in evidence, that fleet was supposed to go on the offensive immediately?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That meant air cover, did it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when Pearl Harbor happened the plans had to be completely revised and instead of an offensive war it became a defensive war; isn't that true?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Did any of the war plans, so far as you know, contemplate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, I assume, General Short, that you were training personnel out there at Honolulu all the while you were there in various games of one kind or another designed to protect that island?

General SHORT. That is correct.

[8671] Mr. KEEFE. You knew that Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu was a vital thing in our war games and plans as far as the Pacific area was concerned?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, radar has been mentioned here repeatedly. You were pretty young and pretty new in the radar field at the time of the 7th of December, weren't you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The fact of the matter is you only had about two people out there that knew much of anything about it, isn't that true?

General SHORT. We had had two and three more arrived and became available the day before the attack.

Mr. KEEFE. In fact, you had sent a couple of men to the mainland to sort of get some instructions a short time before December 7, hadn't you?

General SHORT. That is right. They had just gotten back.

Mr. KEEFE. They had gone there with the full knowledge of Washington and practically on instructions from Washington to get some knowledge about this radar business?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And what you were trying to do was to train as many men as you could in the use of such facilities as you had?

[8672] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Isn't that true?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the utilization of the radar then, as I understand it, in view of the attitude that no one expected any attack out there at Pearl Harbor, was more largely based upon the desire for training than it was the expectation that they would intercept Jap planes coming into an attack that nobody expected would ever occur out there, am I correct in that assumption?

General SHORT. You are correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Kimmel has testified that he was compelled to indulge in large-scale training activities because his fleet was being depleted constantly of trained personnel for transfers to other theaters. Did you know that that was taking place?

General SHORT. I think I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you transfer any troops from your command in the fall of 1941 to other theaters?

General SHORT. Trained crews for the B-17's.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, you were training those crews out there, were you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You couldn't ship B-17's out to the Philip- [8673]
pines without trained operating and ground crews, could you?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were busy training those crews as fast as the B-17's would come in, to take them on and ferry them out to the Philippines?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is where the emphasis was being placed, to get those bombers out to the Philippines?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, General Short, how in the world could you have put your command on a No. 3 alert without disclosing your intent?

General SHORT. It was impossible.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I agree with you.

The military installations on Oahu, which is a very small island, some of them are right next door to the biggest hotel there, isn't that true?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Right near the public parks?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if you went on an all-out alert it would mean more than just having a few people running around with steel helmets and a little field equipment, would it not?

General SHORT. It would.

[8674] Mr. KEEFE. It would mean putting up barbed wire entanglements, it would mean stretching signal wires around and putting up emergency signal equipment, would it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It would mean the complete control of the life of that island so far as black-outs and all that sort of thing was concerned.

General SHORT. I could not have exercised complete control over the civil population until martial law was put into effect, but it would have been control so far as the Governor could have complied with my wishes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I am wondering if I am correct in my thinking that here is some 135,000 Japanese with a tremendous number of loyal Japanese but an unknown number of disloyal Japanese. You had that problem before you constantly, did you not?

General SHORT. We did.

Mr. KEEFE. And you could not tell what would happen in the event of a rupture of diplomatic relations between this country and Japan so far as that overwhelming Japanese population out there was concerned?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, that was well known to the War Department at all times here and everybody connected with it, wasn't it? [8675]

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So this question of sabotage and espionage became a highly important thing so far as Oahu was concerned?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when they sent you this message that said you should take a reconnaissance and such other defensive measures as you deem necessary, you explained the failure of reconnaissance by reason of the fact that you had a written contract with the Navy which was approved by the War and Navy Departments, and you say that General Marshall thoroughly understood that, in your opinion?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that whoever wrote that message in his absence apparently had overlooked the fact that that was a Navy responsibility, is that your answer?

General SHORT. That is my answer.

Mr. KEEFE. And that when it says "other defensive measures," measures against sabotage and espionage would be those other defensive measures, would they not?

General SHORT. To me they appeared the most important.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you had a chief of staff. Was it Colonel Phillips?

[8676] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he a colonel or a major?

General SHORT. He was a colonel.

Mr. KEEFE. You requested that he be assigned to you as your chief of staff, did you not?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. You made that request of General Marshall when you were appointed?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did he get out there?

General SHORT. About March 1.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was the chief of staff prior to the time that Colonel Phillips arrived?

General SHORT. Col. Philip Hayes.

Mr. KEEFE. When did Colonel Hayes retire as chief of staff?

General SHORT. I believe it was effective November 5, but I think he had been on leave of absence for a few days before that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I do not quite understand that, General. You say that Colonel Phillips was sent out there to be your chief of staff in March, but Colonel Hayes continued out there until about the 5th of November.

General SHORT. I was understood that Phillips was to [8677] become chief of staff upon the expiration of the tour of Colonel Hayes and the time, the interim was used to put Colonel Phillips through all the sections of the general staff to familiarize him with conditions.

Mr. KEEFE. So that he would have full knowledge when he actually assumed the responsibilities of chief of staff?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that he actually did not perform as chief of staff until some time, you think, in—

General SHORT. The last part of October, the last few days of October.

Mr. KEEFE. When the commission came through ordering Hayes back?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He was an experienced man, was he not?

General SHORT. He was an unusually experienced man on field work and training.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he talk Chinese?

General SHORT. I think so. He has been since that time the senior liaison officer with the Sixth Chinese Army, with 300 officers under him, one down to each battalion and I believe that the rating of that Sixth Army, from talking with American officers, was extremely high, perhaps the best of the Chinese armies.

[8678] Mr. KEEFE. Well, your chief of staff continued on after this debacle at Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; he continued. The War Department had ordered Colonel Collins over there to become chief of staff and General Emmons asked him to stay as deputy chief of staff. He remained on for almost a year and at his own request was relieved as he desired to get more active service.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in this line of command you had a staff?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Kimmel had a staff?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You each had your chief of staff?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had your chiefs of various departments of your layout out there?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now in the line of command it was the responsibility of the commanding general to issue an order to his chief of staff and

it went on from him down through to the various other elements that would be affected by that order?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that correct?

[8679] General SHORT. That is the normal way.

Mr. KEEFE. That is a normal method of doing business, is it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And in connection with your determinations, they were your determinations and your orders when issued, but on vital matters were they the result of the combined action of your staff?

General SHORT. I could go to them for advice but the responsibility was definitely mine no matter under what circumstances I made the decision. I could not pass the responsibility to them because they participated.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, I understand that thoroughly, but the point is you are the president of this corporation out there and you have got a board of directors as your staff and you sit in staff meetings and talk these things over, isn't that true?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And you as the president have to make the ultimate decision.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever have a situation where you and your staff disagreed on anything of great importance?

General SHORT. I don't think we did.

[8680] Mr. KEEFE. Did you have a telephone out there that you could call Washington?

General SHORT. I had what we called a scrambler phone and General Marshall had one in his office.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever use it?

General SHORT. I did.

Mr. KEEFE. How long did it take to get a message through normally from Honolulu to Washington here using that scrambler telephone business?

General SHORT. The times I used it I would say 10 or 15 minutes. On the morning of the attack, along about 8:15 I directed Colonel Phillips to call General Marshall because I was going to my field command post and I believe that he got the connection at 8:22. I think it took 7 minutes.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, do I understand that that morning right while the attack was going on Colonel Phillips called General Marshall on the scrambler telephone and got a connection in about 7 minutes?

General SHORT. And told him if he would listen he could hear the bombs. The attack was still going on.

Mr. KEEFE. I might also say in that connection that I was advised by Mr. Hoover when Mr. Gearhart and I talked with him that Mr. Shivers, his agent out there, called him when he was up in New York and got a direct telephone connection [8681] in just a few minutes right while the attack was going on and he heard the bombs dropping over the telephone.

Well, if you could get the telephone message while this attack was going on in just a few minutes there wouldn't be any reason why the

line was not clear so a message could come from the other way, from Washington to Honolulu, is there?

General SHORT. There wouldn't appear to be.

Mr. KEEFE. Now I would like to get some idea about the use of this other means of communication out there. Wasn't there radio communication?

General SHORT. The Army had a 10-kilowatt station and the Navy had a 25-kilowatt station; the FBI had a station, I think it was quite a good deal more powerful than the Army. I am not sure whether it was 25 or what. And there was also a commercial radiogram and commercial cable.

Mr. KEEFE. These radiograms back and forth, did you use the Army set-up frequently?

General SHORT. I think they always used it when it was not overloaded and when the atmospheric conditions were such that the 10-watt system would go through.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, do you know whether any investigation has ever been made to see what the atmospheric conditions were that morning as to whether or not they could use this radio as a means of communication?

[8682] General SHORT. I have heard—I did not know it at the time—I have heard since that they did have some trouble getting through with that 10-kilowatt system that morning.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, do you know about the Navy or the FBI?

General SHORT. I am sure that they could have gotten through.

Mr. KEEFE. I recall the testimony here that at the time they were considering the question of sending this message on the morning of December 7 in General Marshall's office, I think I recall that somebody suggested that Admiral Stark offered the use of the Navy radio.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was not used. Well, now, supposing you had been called on the telephone, or supposing a telephone call had been put in here that morning by somebody when the Japanese fourteenth part message and the short message of instruction was received, decoded and translated and in clean form some time between 7 and 8 o'clock that morning, would you have been aroused from your slumbers that morning or somebody out there to answer a telephone if one had come through?

General SHORT. We had an officer on the general staff on duty all night along right by the phone and there would have been no difficulty in getting anyone. He could have [8683] gotten me within a minute or two.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the story has gone around the country that you were all drunk out there that night; that you were drunk and that Kimmel was drunk and everybody else was drunk and that everybody was asleep out there at Pearl Harbor sleeping off a jag. That is the way it has been told out around the country. Now, is there any truth in that, General Short?

General SHORT. There is absolutely no truth in it. If I may add one thing—

Mr. KEEFE. Go ahead.

General SHORT. To show that the War Department, if they were not conscious at that time that more than one means of communication

could be used, they became fully conscious at the time they issued the order to relieve me. I got that order three different ways within 30 to 40 minutes. I received a radiogram first. Ten or fifteen minutes later General Emmons got off a plane with a printed order. Fifteen or twenty minutes later the secretary of the general staff called Colonel Philips to ask if I had received the order.

Mr. KEEFE. So you got it in—

General SHORT. In three different ways.

Mr. KEEFE (continuing). In three different ways?

[8684] General SHORT. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. To make sure that you got it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, General Short, to be perfectly frank and candid, you have told us where you were that night?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were not expecting an attack at all?

General SHORT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had your various members of your establishment at their respective duties that night the same as they had been?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, and my chief of staff at midnight, owing to the fact that we were expecting the B-17's in from Hamilton Field, went over to headquarters and checked up to find out whether any additional information had been received in regard to them. I know my chief of staff was at our headquarters as late as midnight the night before.

Mr. KEEFE. You had no notice whatsoever of this intercept of the first thirteen parts of the fourteen part message and no knowledge whatsoever until after the attack of the receipts of the short message or anything else?

General SHORT. Seven hours after the attack.

Mr. KEEFE. As evidence of the fact, if I understand your statement correctly, General Short, when the attack did take [8685] place and your all-out alert was ordered the men did do a remarkably splendid job of defense?

General SHORT. They did it with great rapidity and precision. Every man knew exactly his job and it went into effect extremely rapidly.

Mr. KEEFE. It was too late.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I was a little intrigued by the questions that were asked this morning by Senator Ferguson with respect to the difficulties which were encountered out there due to not only duplication of or, rather, separation of command but also the intervention of a third governmental unit in the picture, namely, the Interior Department, which had to be dealt with in the matter of securing permission to erect military installations out there and I think you testified that it took nearly a year to get permission to erect some installations for radar equipment on Government-owned land, part of the parks system, under the supervision of the Interior Department.

General SHORT. About 10 months.

Mr. KEEFE. About 10 months. In the face of possibilities of an attack in Hawaii?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General Short, there has been a tremendous amount of information given to the American people with [8686] respect to a Colonel Clausen and a Hans Wilhelm Rohl, who were in charge of Army construction out there in Hawaii. Now, I do not want to go into that because that would take all next week.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You mean Colonel Wyman.

Mr. KEEFE. Wyman, that is right. I don't mean Clausen. I mean Colonel Wyman.

And the inference has been that due to certain failures of the Army engineers in making installations out there at Pearl Harbor the installations were delayed and, thus, as a result Pearl Harbor happened and all the damage was done.

Now I would like to ask you the flat, plain, square question: If you had had all the installations that were contemplated and that you had asked for and the operators of those installations were not alerted to use them, the best that you could have hoped for was to have minimized this attack rather than to have stopped it or prevented the damage which did actually occur; isn't that right?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, it doesn't make any difference how many guns you have if there is nobody to use them and if there is no ammunition in them; isn't that right?

General SHORT. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. It doesn't make any difference how many radar [8687] stations you have if there is nobody to use them or know how to use them, isn't that right?

General SHORT. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. So that all this question about the failure of installation or failure of installations, while it may be a very important subject for some further investigation, so far as its effect upon whether or not it contributed to bring about Pearl Harbor do you see any connection?

General SHORT. If we had had the information, if we had picked it up at 200 miles instead of 132 it would not have been time enough to do any more than disperse the planes. What we needed was information from Washington giving us time to go into an alert.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you could have done a pretty good job with the stuff you had out there if you had been on the alert and had been expecting an attack.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had some bombers and you had some planes that could have been in the air and the few that did get into the air did a pretty good job, didn't they?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And these slow torpedo planes that came in there and did most of the damage to the battleships in the harbor were pretty easy targets for your fast fighters, were [8688] they not?

General SHORT. If you knew where they were coming from they would have been very easy.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, all during this war the element of surprise has been a thing that has been involved in almost everything that has been done on both sides out there in the Pacific, isn't that true?

General SHORT. All over the world. It is always the most important element.

Mr. KEEFE. It is always the attempt on the part of a commander to involve his adversary in surprise, isn't that true?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And as far as an air attack itself is concerned our experience has been that regardless of the fact whether an attack is known or not a lot of these planes—some of them, at least, get through and cause damage, isn't that true?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That was true at Okinawa, is it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when we think of the exploits at Midway and the magnificent job that our Navy did in sinking the Jap Navy, it was possible because of intelligence, was it not and [8969] the fact that our Navy was informed and had the facts and knew what to do?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And when they shot down this Admiral Yamamoto that was possible because they got an intercept which put them on notice and gave them some information?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. I refer to those two incidents because it correctly illustrates the idea that intelligence is necessary and fundamental, is it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when Intelligence fails you are liable to have serious results?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, your position in this case is that Intelligence, so far as Washington was concerned, failed?

General SHORT. A hundred percent.

Mr. KEEFE. And thus Pearl Harbor occurred. Is that your defense?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel for General Short wish to ask any questions?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

[8690] The CHAIRMAN. Counsel for the committee?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. There are several questions I would like to ask.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask a couple, too.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, counsel, give me the ship movements exhibit, the intercepts on the ship movements. It is on page 22. On page 22 of that exhibit there is an intercept; I want to ask you about that. It is in Exhibit 2.

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. I am sorry. We do not have that.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 2, page 22. It has been referred to at times as the "light in the window" message. Are you familiar with that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It may have been a Paul Revere, it has been suggested here, but nobody was riding?

Are you familiar with that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if it appears in the testimony and from the evidence that that was translated in the rough by 1 o'clock on Saturday, the 6th, and that information had come to you, would that have made any difference to you? It is dated the third, from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo.

[8591] General SHORT. Unquestionably that would have given us some very definite information if we had had the message and knew how to read it.

Senator FERGUSON. What I mean is if you could have had that information it would have indicated an attack on Hawaii, would it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt about that.

General SHORT. It shows a definite desire for detailed information of just exactly what our fleet is doing and is preparing to do.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is another message on page 27. It is dated the 6th, from Honolulu to Tokyo, on page 27. That is the one that says:

No barrage balloons.

And then it says at the end:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage by a surprise attack against these places.

If that had been decoded and sent to you, or the information from it, would that have meant anything to you?

General SHORT. That would practically have meant a surprise attack was in store for us or was a certainty.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any doubt whatever that such [8692] a message, while not decoded, as shown by the instrument itself at the bottom, because it shows that it was decoded December 8 but it was sent on the 6th and therefore was intercepted on the 6th—if that information had come to you that would have, uncontradicted, have indicated a surprise attack on Oahu?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And would that alone have alerted you?

General SHORT. Very decidedly.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there was one other thing that I wanted to inquire about. Did you know about the General Carter Clarke report or investigation?

General SHORT. I never heard of it till some time after this committee met. I have since then read it. I think it probably was a month after this committee started meeting before I knew of the existence of this report.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for that investigation by Carter Clarke after Clausen got through and we find a new investigation by Carter Clarke, Gen. Carter Clarke?

General SHORT. It is pretty difficult to say just what they were attempting to do. They were apparently wanting to find out exactly what every man holding an important position in G-2 would say about their so-called top secret material, magic and about their estimates, and so forth, and it was a [8693] very difficult report to get a hold of.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you know whether or not it indicated in any way that there had been an investigation by G-2 for the President and that there had been some changes made in it by General Marshall?

General SHORT. Somewhere—I have forgotten whether it was in that report or not, but somewhere I have run across something of that kind.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't it fair to say that after reading it that there is a man named Friedman and several other witnesses and a General Spaulding and others who had some kind of a rumor going about that Marshall was supposed to have destroyed papers, and that was unequivocally, absolutely and positively contradicted?

Senator FERGUSON. But there is also more in it. I think at some time Carter Clarke or General Clarke should appear and give us the reason for it, if there was a reason, but I am just asking you, General, what you know about it.

General SHORT. I know nothing except what the report states.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

[8694] Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask just one question, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. Stories have gone about, been bandied about that you had your planes lined up on the apron wing-tip to wing-tip without any gasoline in them. without any ammunition, making a perfect target and a perfect set-up for the Japs to come in to spray with incendiary bullets that demolished the whole works at one time, and that set-up there was likened to the story of the ships in the harbor like a lot of sitting ducks for the Japs to come in and shoot up.

That is the story.

Now, I would like to know whether or not under your provisions against sabotage, there were specific provisions made and orders given as to how the airplanes were to be fixed?

General SHORT. That is correct. General Burwell—Colonel Burwell then—

Mr. KEEFE. Colonel who?

General SHORT. Burwell.

Mr. KEEFE. Who is he?

General SHORT. He was a colonel in the Air Corps detached to make a study in connection with sabotage. He [8695] made a very extensive study and was absolutely insistent that the way to protect them was to place them close together where they could be guarded absolutely safely leaving the ammunition out of them, so if one was hit the ammunition would not explode.

I am quite sure that the gasoline was not removed. It was an element of danger to have gasoline in them, but the gasoline was in them, so the planes could be moved.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, then, the placing of the planes wing-tip to wing-tip on the aprons of the bunkers was in accordance with the practice that had been developed by the Air Corps representative out there, this Colonel Burwell?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. In his report?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And that was considered after a long investigation and study to be the most effective manner of protecting those planes against the possibility incident to sabotage?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And you referred to the fact that some of the Navy planes, I believe over at Kaneohe were not so placed, [8696] and that they were the ones that really got damaged.

General SHORT. It just happened that the planes that were dispersed in the water were sunk, and a considerable number on the apron were saved.

Mr. KEEFE. Those that were anchored were all shot and sunk?

General SHORT. They were all sunk.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. General Short, the only difference there, so far as you are concerned, as to guarding the planes against sabotage, would have been whether you used a couple of hundred men if they were concentrated or 400 or 500 to guard them, if they were dispersed?

General SHORT. That is not correct. The bunkers for the planes at Wheeler Field, a very large percentage of them, were right along the highway where a man could have driven a truck along the highway and simply hurled a grenade into each bunker.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. I desire to ask a question or two.

Following the thought that has just been discussed, I should like to ask you this question, General Short:

[8697] Your planes were lined up, most of them wing-tip to wing-tip under the sabotage-alert order, under which you were operating; is that correct?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, I do not think the record is clear as to what position the Navy planes were in that were on the ground at that time.

General SHORT. At Kaneohe Bay the seaplanes were well dispersed, but they had on the apron a bunch of planes, or a group of planes that were bunched.

Now, I do not know the exact arrangement of their planes at Ford Island. I do happen to know it at Kaneohe Bay, but I do not know at Ford Island.

Senator LUCAS. The record discloses that the Navy lost 102 planes and the Army lost 96 planes, and I have been at a loss to understand why the Navy lost more planes than the Army unless the Navy was also alerted to sabotage.

General SHORT. Their planes were dispersed. There is probably one reason. A plane that was anchored in the bay at Kaneohe was hit, sunk, and was a complete loss. Where they were hit on the runways, on the aprons, the men got in and pulled them out, even while the attack was going on, and a great many were saved that way.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know whether or not any of [8698] the Navy planes were lined up wing-tip to wing-tip similar to the planes that you had?

General SHORT. I think that was true of Kaneohe Bay, and as to the other places, I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. You made no inquiry about that afterwards?

General SHORT. If I had known, I have forgotten it. I do not know now.

Senator LUCAS. I do not believe Admiral Kimmel was interrogated along that line. It does seem to me in view of his testimony, that that is somewhat important.

One other question. It is not clear in this record whether or not Admiral Kimmel knew that you were operating on the sabotage alert. What would you say about that?

General SHORT. I believe you will find in his testimony one place that he does make the statement that he did understand that I was on the sabotage alert, and I think he said some other things.

Mr. KEEFE. That is in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUCAS. I was under the impression that he said in one place that he did not know that he was on the sabotage alert, and in another part of the testimony that he thought he was on the sabotage alert.

General SHORT. I believe he made slight variations in [8699] his testimony. I would say that the Navy, the Navy staff, the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District definitely should have known, on account of their liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, who knew exactly what was going on.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, if Admiral Kimmel didn't know you were on the sabotage alert, it was no fault of yours, because you gave that information definitely to his liaison man?

[8700] General SHORT. Yes, sir; I have the quotation here. Page 6985 of the transcript, Witness Kimmel:

I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We considered, as we did frequently before and did later, the probabilities and possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was discussion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that 50 Army pursuit planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage, among other things, although I do not now recall General Short specifically mentioning the details of his alert.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the morning you received the message from General Marshall and you alerted your command for sabotage, a short while thereafter, as I understand you did not directly tell Admiral Kimmel?

General SHORT. I sent a copy of the message to him.

Senator LUCAS. You sent a copy of the message that you had alerted for sabotage through your Navy liaison man?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; I sent a copy of my message from the Chief of Staff.

Senator LUCAS. One other question. On yesterday [8701] there was considerable controversy here between yourself and the committee with respect to court martials and Army and Navy inquiries and Army and Navy boards.

In order to clear up a cloud in my mind as to how they operate, I want to ask you whether or not there is any difference in the way an Army board operates and the way a Navy board operates insofar as it being a public affair?

General SHORT. The Navy board in this particular case was a court of inquiry. Now, I do not know under their regulations whether they can have a board that would operate just as the Army board did. They were both closed sessions—secret—but in the Navy court of inquiry the accused, so to speak, had the right to be present all the way through, hear all the witnesses and have counsel with him, and had the right of cross-examination.

Before the Army board I was not permitted to hear the evidence given by the other witnesses or to have counsel, except when I was personally giving my testimony.

Senator LUCAS. The point I raise is whether or not there is a difference between the regulations of the Army and the Navy in an investigation of a question of this character.

General SHORT. I would rather an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department answer that. [8702]

Senator LUCAS. My conclusion upon it is that if the Navy has one set of regulations on an important matter of this kind, which permits an accused to come before that Board of inquiry with counsel and have the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the Army has a different system, which denies that very thing, it certainly is a question for consideration by the Congress, because I cannot see why you should be denied the right and Admiral Kimmel have the right. That is the point I make.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. It actually worked out that way. I don't know all the details of the law.

Senator LUCAS. Now, General Short, the Congressman from Wisconsin and the Senator from Michigan have raised some questions about stories that have originated from time to time about what happened at Pearl Harbor, about the laxity here and the laxity there. I want to state that those are not the only stories that have originated about Pearl Harbor from time to time.

It has been alleged and reported by certain individuals as well as a segment of the press that members of this committee have sought to suppress certain evidence and in so doing have attempted to whitewash the real reason for this investigation. In answer specifically to a question [8703] submitted by Senator Ferguson you stated that this committee had given you every consideration and, as I understand it, you are perfectly satisfied with the fair and impartial treatment that you have received at the hands of this committee; is that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct, absolutely.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of any evidence that has been covered up, that has been suppressed, by any member of this committee, or by counsel for the committee, that would have in any wise affected your interest, or any other individual who is interested in this hearing?

General SHORT. I do not.

Senator LUCAS. There have been a lot of investigations. I suppose you hope this is the last one?

General SHORT. As far as I am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask this one question, General. I am not thoroughly familiar now with what your answer

was as to whether between the 3d of December and the 7th of December 1941 you had any conferences with Admiral Kimmel.

General SHORT. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the way I remembered it.

[8704] General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this has nothing to do with what actually happened at Pearl Harbor, but the matter of your retirement and the communications between General Marshall and you. I am in doubt there, too.

I want to see if I can clear up something because it may affect your personal relations with General Marshall.

You had been relieved of your command at Pearl Harbor prior to the Roberts report?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had returned to this country and were in Oklahoma City?

General SHORT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You saw in the morning paper accounts of the Roberts report and then you called General Marshall over the telephone?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he tell you in that conversation that he had read the report?

General SHORT. He told me he had not read it.

The CHAIRMAN. You, seeing the report in the newspapers, probably thought over in your mind whether your continued active status in the Army would be embarrassing to the War Department and therefore you called up to inquire [8705] whether they desired you to ask for retirement; did that happen?

General SHORT. I thought both the country and my personal interest required a rather careful consideration, I had great confidence in General Marshall's judgment and his loyalty as an old friend, and that was the reason I called him and put the thing entirely in his own hands.

The CHAIRMAN. You told him in your conversation with him that you were going to write him and you would enclose a letter to the Adjutant General requesting retirement?

General SHORT. I do not believe that I told him in that conversation. I think probably after I hung up I decided it was fair to him to send it to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Throughout the conversation between General Marshall and you then he did not know and was not told that you were going to actually send your request for retirement to the Adjutant General?

General SHORT. He told me that he would take that conversation as an application for retirement if they got to the point where it looked like it was the thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. And after you hung up you decided to put it in writing and make it formal?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and I sent it to him personally.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, is there any other statement not [8706] brought out by any questions by counsel or members of the committee that you wish to make with reference to any further pertinent facts in regard to the Pearl Harbor attack?

General SHORT. I would like to make a very brief statement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. As a matter of the interests of the country and as a loyal soldier, I maintained a steadfast silence for 4 years and I bore the load of public censure during this time and I would have continued to bear it so long as I thought the question of national security was involved. However, the war is now ended and I have been very appreciative of the opportunity that has been given me here to make a full and frank statement of my point of view.

I want to thank all the members of the committee for the attitude that they have taken and I want to assure them that I have tried to give them fully and frankly all the information that I have on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might state that regardless of any conclusions that may be reached by the committee when the evidence is all in, in any report that it makes to the Congress, the Chair feels that one of the outstanding benefits of this hearing has been that the evidence has been brought [8707] forth in public and everybody has been given an opportunity to give to the committee and to the country whatever information they had. In all likelihood, regardless of what report the committee makes, the country will very probably have made up its own mind, and maybe before we do.

But there has been that benefit that has accrued by reason of this public hearing.

The committee thanks you, General, for your courtesy and patience, in cooperating with us in attempting to bring out all the evidence. I hope you will soon completely recover your health.

General SHORT. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. You are excused.

(Witness excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will now go into executive session and the spectators will retire as promptly as possible.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the committee recessed and went into executive session.)

[8708]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, JANUARY 28, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

President: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[8709] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

I might state that Senator Barkley had to go to the White House this morning to attend the usual Monday morning conference. He will be in a little later. We will proceed.

Does counsel have anything before the next witness is called?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The counsel will then call the next witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to you for examination, Captain Zacharias.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you please come forward, Captain Zacharias. Will you please be sworn.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES NAVY¹

(Captain Zacharias was duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, how old are you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am 56 years old.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I have completed over 37 years in the naval service.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you a graduate of Annapolis?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was.

[8710] Mr. RICHARDSON. What class?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Class of 1912.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, will you detail to the committee in a general way, what your Naval experience has been since?

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5511 et seq., for corrections in his testimony submitted by Capt. Zacharias.

Captain ZACHARIAS. As I have said, I have completed over 37 years in the naval service. I served in or operated with all types of ships. I served aboard ship in all departments as head of the department.

I commanded destroyers, a heavy cruiser, and a battleship.

All of my shore duty with the exception of 1 year as instructor at the Naval Academy, and 1 year taking the senior course at the Naval War College, all of my work has been in intelligence on shore duty. That included 3½ years in Japan studying the language and the people; one tour in crypt-analytic work; two tours of about 2½ years each as head of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence; one tour of about 2½ years as District Intelligence Officer of the Eleventh Naval District with headquarters at San Diego, Calif.; and between my two war cruises, I have served 1 year as Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. That gives a total of about 12 years actually in intelligence work on shore.

[8711] At sea, my spare time was devoted to study and matters relating to intelligence, and while at sea I actually participated in certain counter-espionage activities, and this gave me a direct and indirect connection with intelligence over a period of 25 years.

During the war, I had the good fortune to command two capital ships.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which war?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The recent war. One of those was the heavy cruiser *Salt Lake City*, and the other was the battleship *New Mexico*. Both of these ships participated in many of the operations successfully in the Pacific and both of them are still afloat.

My most recent duty was that of conducting a psychological warfare campaign against the Japanese high command, which had for its objective the unconditional surrender of the Japanese without the necessity of a forced invasion of the Japanese main islands.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, just before you go into that, did this intelligence work of yours, Captain, and your life in Japan, give you a Japanese acquaintance?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It gave me an opportunity to make a very wide acquaintance in Japan, and I was fortunate in knowing intimately, many of the Japanese who in the last [8712] war became the Japanese high command.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you learn the language?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you speak it fluently?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I speak it very fluently.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it was that fact, plus your Intelligence experience that brought the assignment to you that you were about to relate when I interrupted you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

[8713] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now will you proceed.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think that just about concluded my work, except I was about to say that this objective, which was the unconditional surrender of Japan without the necessity of a forced invasion of the Japanese main islands, there was an indication of completion of that on the 25th of July, 1945, in a broadcast by an official spokesman of the Japanese Government direct to me, and, as we know, the situation eventuated on the 15th of August 1945.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now did your experience with the Navy take you into Hawaiian waters?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It did quite often.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And were you familiar with Hawaii and the general conditions and set-up in Hawaii?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With the character of the people there and the Japanese element involved in the population?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was, both the second generation Japanese, that is Americans of Japanese extraction, and also the first generation of Japanese who were enemy aliens after the war began.

Mr. RICHARDSON. During 1941 were you in service in the Pacific?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was in command of the heavy cruiser [8714] *Salt Lake City*.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And was that a part of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you were stationed, a portion of the time at least, at Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you acquainted with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And with his Chief of Staff, Admiral Smith?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It was brought to the attention of the committee, Captain, that a conversation occurred between you and Admiral Kimmel during 1941 in which it is reported reference was made to the probability, possibility, likelihood of a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now I would like to ask you whether any such conversation occurred, where it occurred, when it occurred, and who was present.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think it will add something to the conversation by indicating the reasons for the conversation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there such a conversation?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was such a conversation.

[8715] Mr. RICHARDSON. When did it take place about?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It took place between March 26 and March 31, 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where was it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. In the office of the commander in chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. At Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was present at the conversation?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff, then Capt. W. W. Smith, now Vice Admiral Smith.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were old acquaintances of yours?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I had known them both previously.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now if you will proceed.

Captain ZACHARIAS. As I indicated, it will have some bearing to tell the reasons why I went over to see Admiral Kimmel on this occasion. On the 8th of February 1941, I had a long conversation with Admiral Nomura in San Francisco. He was then enroute to Washington, D. C., as Ambassador.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From Japan?

Captain ZACHARIAS. From Japan.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was he one of the ambassadors who thereafter conducted, in part, the negotiations that took place with Secretary Hull?

[8716] Captain ZACHARIAS. He was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Proceed.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I had indicated previously to Admiral Richardson that I proposed to have such a conversation with Admiral Nomura when he came through San Francisco, and Admiral Richardson expressed a desire to have a copy of the report which he knew I would submit after such a conversation, and for that reason, after Admiral Richardson was relieved on the first of February 1941 by Admiral Kimmel, I sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 11th of February 1941, in a letter to Admiral Kimmel, a copy of the report on this conference with Admiral Nomura that I had sent to Admiral Stark.

When I arrived in Pearl Harbor with my ship after an overhaul period on the west coast I took the first opportunity to see Admiral Kimmel, and it occurred between the dates that I gave.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, why did you want to see Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I wanted to see Admiral Kimmel to find out if he had received the report, or whether or not this report of the conversation with Admiral Nomura had come to his attention. In addition to that I wanted to tell Admiral Kimmel of an incident which occurred on the [8717] 16th of October 1940, which had a bearing on future events as I saw them approaching.

Incidentally, I think what I am about to relate was referred to as having caused Admiral Richardson to take his fleet out on a wild goose chase. I would like to clarify that point now by saying that this incident had no effect, as far as I could see, on influencing Admiral Richardson in any decision that he was to make as a result of it, which you will see from the incident itself.

On October 16, 1940, as district intelligence officer at San Diego, I received a report from an intelligence reserve officer at the border, Tia Juana, or at San Jacinto opposite Tia Juana in Mexico, that he had something of the most vital importance and if I could not come down myself he requested that I send one of my best investigators. I could not go myself at that time, therefore I did select my most competent investigator to go down and find out what this was.

When he arrived this reserve officer related to him information that had just come from an informant in Mexico which stated that a certain Japanese—who, incidentally, was on our No. 1 suspect list—had stated that on the following day, the 17th of October 1940, the Japanese were going to bomb four battleships. He had all the details, that it would be done by a force of 12 planes divided into [8718] four groups, one of whom in each group was to be a suicide plane and dive down the stack of each ship, and the other two would drop their bombs and get away, if possible.

When this report came to me I took it in to the commandant of the district, and simultaneously I learned that Admiral Richardson had arrived on the west coast, at San Pedro, with three battleships and a heavy cruiser, indicating the four ships in this picture.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where is San Pedro?

Captain ZACHARIAS. San Pedro is the seaport of Los Angeles.

We notified Admiral Richardson that there was something of importance and requested that he remain on board while I come up by plane, which I did. I went aboard, related the story to Admiral Richardson, and he said, "Are there any planes in this vicinity which might carry out such an attack?" I informed him that we could not assure him that there were not planes in Mexico, and further that there had been surreptitious activities along the coast by the Japanese vessels that we knew of, but we were not certain that there were not planes in Mexico with which the Japanese could carry out such an attack.

Admiral Richardson considered that and then said, "We cannot ignore this." And I said, "Admiral, I think you are [8719] quite right." He said, "I will alert my antiaircraft batteries, and when you return to San Diego you get in touch with Captain McCain," who was then the commanding officer at the naval air station at San Diego—"and tell him to be on the alert." I did that. I understand that the following morning Admiral Richardson sailed from San Pedro for San Francisco, where he was going anyhow, and possibly left a little before the time of his scheduled departure.

I told Admiral Kimmel that full situation.

[8720] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you see Admiral Kimmel then at the place you mentioned earlier in your testimony?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did. As indicated, Admiral Kimmel then called in Captain Smith, and I proceeded to relate the circumstances of my interview with Admiral Nomura. He informed me he had received a copy of my report sent to Admiral Stark, and then I proceeded to tell him of this incident on the 16th of October 1940. From that he went into a discussion of the general Japanese situation, the possibilities of what might occur in the future, Japanese attitudes, and the prospects of this situation being liquidated.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by that, "liquidated"?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The situation which then existed between Japan and the United States, for which Admiral Nomura had come over to this country to handle if possible.

Mr. RICHARDSON. By the word "liquidated" you mean settled?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Settled; right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

Captain ZACHARIAS. In the course of our discussions, Admiral Kimmel asked me if the situation became extreme what I thought would occur. And this point is very important, because I think of a misunderstanding that has been created [8721] by something which has been said here about the date December 7 having been the date which I predicted.

First I would like to say that Decemer 7 is a synonym for Pearl Harbor particularly in the memorandum which I later submitted to Admiral Draemel for Admiral Nimitz.

This conversation with Admiral Kimmel was 9 months before Pearl Harbor, and I don't think there is any profession which would attempt to predict 9 months ahead the exact day that something would occur. I told Admiral Kimmel in this conversation that if the situation became such that Japan decided that they must go to war with us, that it would begin with an air attack on our fleet on a week-end and probably a Sunday morning; that attack would be for the purpose of disabling four battleships.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why did you mention four battleships rather than three or five or seven?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Four battleships was a number that I had determined in my own mind as the number that the Japanese felt they would have to reduce our fleet in order to prevent effective interference with any southern movement that they might want to make after declaring war with us. I will go into more detail on that later.

Admiral Kimmel then asked me how I thought they would [8722] effect such an attack. I said there are two methods, the least likely of which would be to bring in seaplanes, surreptitiously aboard merchant vessels, and land them in the lea of some of our islands that were sparsely populated and then on a selected day, weather permitting, they could make such an attack.

He asked how that could be prevented. I said that could be prevented effectively by declaring a defensive sea area around the Hawaiian Islands, in which case you notify all nations of the world and require all merchant vessels coming into that area to proceed through a specified point at which place we could conduct inspections. That would preclude any surreptitious entrance and prevent such a contingency of an attack by that method.

However, I emphasized that the most probable method of attack would be by aircraft carriers supported by appropriate ships; that such an attack would come in undoubtedly from the northern because that was the prevailing winds in the Hawaiian Islands; they would come in and launch their attack downwind, because of their concern over the possible loss of a single capital ship and for that reason after launching their planes, the ships and the force which brought the planes to launch them would retreat as quickly as possible directly upwind in order to escape any damage [8723] which they felt might come.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there discussion as to where this supposed expedition would start from?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was not. I would like to indicate at this point that although this conversation was 9 months prior to the actual attack on Pearl Harbor, it lasted for about an hour and a half, and concerned something in which the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet would be vitally interested. However, I realize that Admiral Kimmel was a very busy man, that I was only one of hundreds to whom he talked, and it was quite possible that he could not remember the details of my conversation.

However, his chief of staff, then Captain Smith, was present throughout the entire conversation, and I am sure that he remembers the details of that conversation, because he has discussed those details subsequent to the event, and for a considerable period after Pearl Harbor occurred.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why did you think the attack would come on Sunday morning?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think it has been clearly indicated that the Japanese knew of our every movement in and out of Pearl Harbor, the situation existing in Hawaii prior to the attack on December 7. They well knew that on Sunday [8724] morning everyone took advantage of the lack of drills to be excused from reporting in on Sunday morning. We call it being excused from Sunday morning quarters.

So that they would not have to report on that day. That applies to officers and men, and particularly to those who have families in Hawaii, in Honolulu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well—

Captain ZACHARIAS. I might add there that Sunday morning is a time when everyone is enjoying their leisure and it is significant that 8 o'clock in the morning, which was approximately the time of the attack, at 8 o'clock. That is the time when the watches change, when men are relieving others who have been on watch, and there is a certain amount of confusion existing at that time in the turn-overs which take place.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You spoke of Japanese knowledge in Hawaii. Was it a matter, Captain, of common knowledge in the Navy that there was present in Hawaii a large number of Japanese agents?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It was. In my conversations, and I must say that I kept in constant touch with not only the fleet intelligence officer, but also with the district intelligence officers, because I had a hand in setting up that organization beginning with my arrival there November [8725] 13, 1940. Therefore, I had a direct interest in that organization and what they were accomplishing. It was believed that there existed in Hawaii at least a thousand enemy agents.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, do you know of anywhere that you have served, where the operations of a military force of either the Army or the Navy was subject to as concentrated an espionage as our establishment in Hawaii?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I do not, and there is no other place comparable except in Panama where there was an unusually large group of Japanese barber shops before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in this conversation, Captain, that you had with Admiral Kimmel, were the details of the reasons why you thought there would be an attack discussed between you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Only in a general way, but I think the reasons why I thought there would be an attack on the fleet if the situation became such that war between Japan and the United States was imminent, I think that those reasons have a great bearing on everything that is before this committee.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion on the part of Admiral Kimmel in agreement with or opposition to your [8726] views?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. After outlining to him the probabilities and the methods by which the Japanese would make their attacks, in the second instance that of an attack by aircraft carriers, Admiral Kimmel asked me how I thought it could be prevented, and I stated that the only possible way of doing it would be to have a daily patrol out to cover the approach of the Japanese, and this patrol must go out at least 500 miles.

To that Admiral Kimmel replied, "Well, we have neither the personnel nor the matériel with which to carry out such a patrol," and I replied to him, "Well, Admiral, you better get them because that is what is coming."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you, as a naval man know of any other way in which such an attack could be effectively guarded against than through distant patrol and discovery of the attacking planes either in carriers, or in the air, and an attack on those planes by fighter planes?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Only by learning of the approach of such a force and intercepting it with the fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where were you at the time of the attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was in command of the *Salt Lake City* which was then 200 miles west of Oahu returning to [8727] Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now—go ahead.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was with Admiral Halsey's force which had been to Wake Island to deliver the planes to the marines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Between the time of this conversation with Admiral Kimmel, and the attack, were there any other discussions between you and any of the staff officers, or task commanders with respect to the probability of an attack on Hawaii from the air?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I want to know whether it was a matter of general conversation, or simply a vague possibility?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was. As I indicated while on sea duty, I devoted myself to reading and study of intelligence matters. For that reason I frequented the fleet intelligence office. The fleet intelligence officer, then Commander Layton, I knew well, and I had recommended him to Admiral Richardson for that job which he did in an excellent manner.

[8728] In my visits to the fleet intelligence office and the public relations office I was enabled to keep track on the situation as it was developing and there came a period when I was somewhat concerned over the prospects. That is what prompted me to say at one time to a group of the staff assembled, I can't recall just who was present at the time—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where was it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. In the office of the commander in chief Pacific Fleet, the flag office.

I was prompted to say, as recorded in this memorandum which has been presented to the committee, that "I think it is time to stop these surprise inspections and get ready for a surprise attack." These surprise inspections were methods by which the matériel conditions of the ships were ascertained without giving previous notice of visits by either division commanders or others.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any rejoinder to that remark on your part from those present?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was not. In the course of those conversations I asked the fleet intelligence officer if he had presented to the war plans officer of the commander in chief a certain extract from a Japanese book which considered the pros and cons of success of an attack on Pearl [8729] Harbor. That is included in one of the papers that were presented to the committee by the Navy Department and I would like to refer to that later on. It is page 47 of the papers.

Senator LUCAS. What is the date of that conversation, sir?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That was in October 1941. I will bring that in when I discuss the reasons for my belief that an attack on Pearl Harbor would occur.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Between the time you had your first talk with Admiral Kimmel and the time you had this talk in the fall of 1941

was the subject of a possible air attack on Pearl Harbor a matter of common or unusual discussion among the Navy people that you met in Hawaii?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Because of my——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it or not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was general discussion of what would occur if we went to war with Japan.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any general feeling that an attack, an air attack, surprise air attack was possible or probable or likely or improbable?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was not much expression of opinion. It was rather an acceptance of my opinion because of my background knowledge and any discussion was for the purpose of ascertaining what I thought in the premises, and [8730] I cannot recall any objections to them or any attempt to belittle the possibilities.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion at any time prior to the attack between you and the other commanders of the task forces about the probability of an attack by air on Hawaii in the case of hostilities?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was not. I was a little reluctant to impose my views here and there. I think most of the officers present knew of my background and if the task force commanders wanted any opinion from me they could ask for it.

I discussed with Admiral Spruance, who was my division commander when I was in command of the *Salt Lake City*, the possibilities of the success of Admiral Nomura in preventing hostilities developing between Japan and the United States.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you believe he would be successful?

Senator BREWSTER. I don't believe he had finished his answer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Pardon me. Proceed.

Captain ZACHARIAS. In these conversations with Admiral Spruance there was nothing very definite. There was nothing definite regarding what would happen if we went to war. It was more with regard to the possible success of preventing war. Outside of that I did not talk to any task force commanders.

[8731] I might say that I did at one time, or on several occasions, endeavor to engage in conversation the war plans officer of the commander in chief regarding the situation. On three separate occasions I endeavored to do so, but he was always preoccupied and I was never able to do so. It seemed rather strange to me at the time that he did not want to discuss it, so much so that I went to the fleet intelligence officer and questioned him about the attitude of this individual.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask at this point: Who was the war plans officer, by name?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That was then Capt. C. H. McMorris, United States Navy, now Vice Admiral McMorris.

As a result of what I took to be in the colloquial a "brush-off," I never discussed the situation with him although he was the war plans officer for the commander in chief.

The next time I discussed this with someone whom I considered of importance was with Mr. Munson. I had——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute. He was a civilian?

Captain ZACHARIAS. He was a civilian, and who had come to Hawaii with a letter signed by Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations,

which he showed to me, Munson showed to me, stating that he was there to investigate certain matters and everything was to be opened up to him.

[8732] Munson told me that he had been advised to get in touch with me because of my background knowledge of the Japanese. I had several conferences with him during the period of October 20 to 26, 1941, and during those conversations I related to him every aspect of a possible attack. He was principally interested in whether or not there would be an armed uprising in Hawaii or on the west coast in case of a war between Japan and the United States.

After relating to him everything that I had told to Admiral Kimmel I told him that he could forget about an armed uprising or sabotage of any kind, that was categorical, because it would begin with an air attack on our fleet, and for that reason it would have to be conducted with the greatest secrecy and therefore no Japanese, regardless of their position in the United States or in Hawaii, would be aware of the fact that such an attack was coming.

That being so, and knowing the great preparations that you have to make in an armed uprising or for the commission of sabotage, those contingencies were an impossibility, and I told him that I was convinced that hostilities would begin with an air attack on the fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, during the period immediately before the attack, do you know what distant reconnaissance was being carried on of your own knowledge?

[8733] Captain ZACHARIAS. I do not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were with Halsey's task force?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your task force was ready for battle from the time you started up to the time of the attack, was it not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. You mean from the date we left Pearl Harbor on the 28th of November 1941?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Captain ZACHARIAS. We received no direct orders from Admiral Halsey, but the fleet went out ostensibly on routine training on that morning. About noon we changed course to the westward and headed for Wake Island. That was not the direction of the operating area and we knew that we were going on a different mission.

As I recall, Admiral Halsey did not send out any specific orders to the ships of his course, at least to the cruisers, because there was no necessity. He had full knowledge undoubtedly of what might be impending and I assume that he was in a position to make any dispositions necessary to meet any threat that we might encounter en route or returning from Wake Island. I knew that something unusual was occurring but was not quite certain. We did learn en route [8734] that, through signal, that we were going to Wake Island to deliver planes to the Marines which the *Enterprise* had on board, that we would launch them about 100 miles east of Wake Island and then return to Pearl Harbor. We were originally scheduled to arrive back in Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December 1941, but we were delayed by fueling and weather, and, now I know because of certain orders, which did not speed us up, and we felt that was where our luck began because we were just 200 miles to the westward instead of being inside on December 7.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you regard that as good luck or bad luck?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I regard that as good luck because as a commanding officer of a ship I prefer to take my chances in the open sea rather than in an enclosed harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, can you give us a little more information on certain orders that you later discovered had been transmitted, who transmitted them and what they were, generally?

Captain ZACHARIAS. What orders?

Mr. RICHARDSON. You just said that you learned afterward of certain orders which delayed you. I am wondering what those orders were.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Oh, that is only hearsay and what [8735] I have heard of the testimony before this committee.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see. When knowledge of the attack came to you in fact the direction in which you were directed to search was to the south, was it not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did that surprise you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It did. I might qualify that by saying that in the numerous reports that we were receiving subsequent to the attack it was indicated that there was a Japanese force down to the southward, but still I could not reconcile them being there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Captain ZACHARIAS. If I may, I indicated that I felt it important to present the reasons why I thought an attack on Pearl Harbor or the fleet would occur.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Very well. Let me ask you preparatory to that, Captain, did you consider that the tension of the situation with the probability of war with Japan constantly increased during 1941?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And was there any time that it was as tense as it was during the week before the attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I had, the week before the attack, [8736] having sailed on the 28th of November, which seems to have been the really turning point in the situation, I received very little news en route to Wake Island except through radio press, which indicated that there had been some difficulty in the progress of the negotiations taking place in Washington.

However, I had become somewhat concerned over certain events which had transpired in the interim or during 1941, such as the embargo and other things which were matters of policy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, as the tenseness grew in your mind and with your experience did the danger of an air attack become greater and greater, as the tenseness continued?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, because I was always convinced that if the situation ever became such that hostilities between Japan and the United States were imminent that the Japanese would begin their campaign with an air attack on our fleet wherever it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What I am suggesting is that the condition of affairs, the information you had, growing tenseness of the situation, constantly made that danger greater?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It did not make the danger of an air attack any greater. It made the danger of hostilities become more imminent.

[8737] Mr. RICHARDSON. As hostilities became more imminent the danger of an air attack increased?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. No further questions.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Now may I go ahead with the reasons why I thought that there would be an air attack?

Senator LUCAS. Will you move closer to the microphone, please.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

There were four very good reasons why I felt that in case of hostilities between the United States and Japan it would begin with an air attack on our fleet.

First of all, the Japanese could be counted upon not to commit the grave strategical blunder of making a movement to the southward without disabling a part of our fleet and that is in spite of the fact that we had in Pearl Harbor at the time a force considerably inferior to the Japanese Fleet, namely, about 180 ships in the Japanese Fleet to 102 of ours.

That was because the Japanese well knew if they made a movement to the southward that before we would be able to assemble an expeditionary force with which to take the offensive against them we would be able to bring around from the Atlantic coast the rest of our fleet which would have [8738] then made us superior to the Japanese, even if that fleet had to go around the Horn.

[8739] The Japanese are great students. They know everything that has been written about the fundamentals of warfare. They know all of the lessons of history, and they could be counted upon to utilize everything that has been written about it.

They realized the value of surprise as one of the fundamental principles of warfare. They used it at Port Arthur with tremendous success. Therefore, it could be certain that they would use it again at Pearl Harbor if they could do it with fair safety.

I have already indicated that the Japanese weighed in their minds the probability of success of such an attack on Pearl Harbor. They have written several books and those books, I might say, are always released under the auspices of the military in Japan, because of the complete government control and censorship.

In those books they have discussed the probability of success in war with the United States. In this particular book, which is entitled "When Japan Fights," written ostensibly by a civilian named Hirata, he discussed the pros and cons, and I think it might be well to read that. It is very short, and is included at page 47, I think, of the papers which were given to the committee.

He says:

[8740] The American Commander-in-Chief has been occupied by various secret plans, but the three points about which he is the most concerned are:

(1) Will a Japanese fast striking force made up of cruisers and aircraft carriers come on a scouting or striking mission?

(2) Will Japanese submarines hover near the islands to attack or harass the Fleet?

(3) Will a Japanese expeditionary force be sent overseas?

The first of these is the most fearsome. Suppose Japan were to form a fast striking force composed of such speedy battleships (whose speed America cannot match) as the *Haruna*, *Kongo*, and *Kirishima*, the aircraft carriers *Akagi* and *Ryujo* and the *Nachi* class of heavy cruisers? This would be a fast-stepping force that would be truly matchless and invincible.

Were they opposed to even the large guns of American battleships, they could utilize their superior speeds, thus leaving their slow adversaries behind. If opposed to a cruiser force, they could close in with telling blows, crush the opposition. Truly this would be a peerless force; able to close to battle, or open out, if outgunned. If this fast striking force should meet misfortune, losing one [8741] or two fast battleships or aircraft carriers, they would surely be a severe blow to Japan, and we would have to grit our teeth, smothering our rage until the day of a decisive main engagement to obtain our revenge.

Maybe such a bold venture would be too great a risk, who can say? On the other hand, warfare is a risk, and he who hesitates, or fears the risks of bold venture, cannot wage war.

Moreover, an attack off Hawaii would be the first battle of the Pacific war, and if in the very first engagement one can wrest the courage away from the enemy by one's own daring, it would put him in a funk or give him the jitters.

[8742] Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that book at all widely read among naval men?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It was read by our officers who knew the Japanese language. In fact, this translation was made in the fleet intelligence office at Hawaii and, as I have indicated, a copy of this extract was given to the war plans officer about October 1941. That was the third indication.

The fourth indication that they would attack, open the war by an attack on our fleet was somewhat strengthened by this incident which occurred in Mexico on October 16, 1940.

We had always known through discussions of the 5-5-3 ratio that Japan was anxious to have the number of capital ships reduced because they felt that with a 5-5-3 ratio it was possible for us to arrive in the theater of operations in Asia with more than parity. That is what crystallized in my mind the fact that they would make an attack on our fleet for the purpose of betting 4 battleships. Four battleships out of our number, which were then 15, excluding the 2 new ones which we had not yet commissioned, would have reduced us to 11. One battleship they knew was always in the navy yard under overhaul, bringing us down to 10. Under the treaty they were allowed 9 battleships, but, as expected, they had rearmed the *Hiei*, which brought them up to 10, or what they considered a parity with us.

[8743] As we know, the intensity of their attack was directed toward the battleships and I think my impressions were confirmed. Those were the four reasons why I felt certain that hostilities with Japan would begin with an air attack on our fleet.

Now, I would like to jump back to my conversation with Admiral Kimmel, to say that in the precautions that I felt we should take I indicated that there would be earliest indications of hostilities and unmistakable signs of hostilities.

Among the earliest indications I told him would be the withdrawal of their merchant ships to Japan. We had long realized that and had kept a complete track of the location of every Japanese merchant vessel throughout the world. I started that system myself in 1935 in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The other early indication would be preparations or, rather, deceptive measures in which they would engage, some of which developed. The unmistakable signs, as I pointed out to Admiral Kimmel, would be the appearance of submarines in the Hawaiian area, in which case he could well realized that the Japanese were then ready to strike.

In my conversations with Mr. Munson there was one additional

indication which I gave to him and that was that we already had two Japanese envoys in Washington, Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu; that when the third envoy arrived they could [8744] definitely look for things to break one way or the other.

I learned over the radio on the 3d of December that the Japanese Ambassador to Peru, Mr. Sakamoto, had arrived in Washington and that made me feel that the situation was coming to a head.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not have the privilege of hearing your testimony up to now because I was unavoidably absent and I may ask a question or two that has already been covered.

You just spoke of the Peruvian Japanese Minister arriving in Washington on the 3d of December.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you at that time?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was in command of the *Salt Lake City*. We were then en route to Pearl Harbor from Wake Island.

The CHAIRMAN. From Wake?

Saptain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you arrive at Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. On the morning of—at noon on the 8th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. On the 8th. After the attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You got this information about the Peruvian Minister or Ambassador on the 3d by radio you say?

[8745] Captain ZACHARIAS. By radio; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had a radio receiving set on board the ship?

Captain ZACHARIAS. We had many sets; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you got it through a radio?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the officers in charge of the Pearl Harbor installations in the fleet and particularly Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch or General Short, had that information about the Peruvian Minister coming here on the third?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It is possible they had the information regarding his arrival but I had not indicated to them that that would have any bearing on the subsequent events because I did not know in my conversations with Admiral Kimmel that there would be even a second ambassador arriving.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know what his reaction to that would have been if he had known it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you stationed at Pearl Harbor or in the Hawaiian Islands when you had this conversation in March with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was in command of the heavy cruiser *Salt Lake City* and I have already indicated in my testimony [8746] why I sought this conference with Admiral Kimmel and that was to discuss, to make certain he had received the report of my conference with Admiral Nomura which I had given in detail to Admiral Stark in a letter to Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you have already stated it. What was Admiral Kimmel's reaction to that prediction?

Captain ZACHARIAS. What he stated? I did state, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. State it again, please.

Captain ZACHARIAS. He said to me, "Well, we have neither the personnel nor the matériel with which to carry out this patrol." I had indicated to him that the only way to prevent this air attack which would come down wind from the northward because that was the prevailing wind in Hawaii, was to have out patrols at least 500 miles then, and he stated that he had neither the personnel nor matériel with which to carry out such patrols and I said to him, "Well, Admiral, you better get them because that is what is coming."

The CHAIRMAN. You formed your conclusion as to what was coming from your general knowledge of the situation, together with your experience, your long experience in the Intelligence Division?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not have the benefit of any magic or intercepted messages at the time you formed your conclusion [8747] and at the time you transmitted your conclusion to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; I did not. I did have some knowledge of certain messages which dealt with the Far Eastern situation in general but I would not say that I had access to any which really bore upon the events which followed.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you read those intercepted messages as they have been filed with the committee?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you read the messages about which Admiral Kimmel and General Short have testified as being messages to which they were entitled and which might have changed their course of action if they had had them?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Those which were not decoded, I think, until after Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. No, some of them were decoded.

Senator BREWSTER. But not communicated.

The CHAIRMAN. But not communicated. They were decoded but not communicated to them.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; I now recall them.

The CHAIRMAN. As an Intelligence Officer I would like to ask your opinion as to whether those messages if transmitted would have given any additional information as to the immediate likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

[8748] Captain ZACHARIAS. I can state the effect that they would have had on me but I cannot state what effect they would have had on Admiral Kimmel or General Short.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I realize that but just for my own—not curiosity exactly—but for my own information, I would like to get an opinion as to what reaction they would have had on you.

Captain ZACHARIAS. What opinion I would have had?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Why, I can state positively if I had had access to those messages it would have further confirmed my opinion as to what took place.

The CHAIRMAN. Those messages, outside of the one carving up the Pearl Harbor region or area into five different sections for the ships to be parked—that is not the naval word.

Mr. MURPHY. Docked.

The CHAIRMAN. Docked or berthed pertain to the——

Captain ZACHARIAS. The five different what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. One of those messages was an intercept of a message between the Hawaiian Islands and Tokyo indicating the dividing up of the harbor into five sections and the berthing of the ships there, which might have indicated they had some particular interest in that in Pearl Harbor, but outside of that, as I recall, the other messages were dealing with [8749] the general situation between Japan and the United States and the growing tensivity of it. Would those messages outside of that one, would those messages have indicated any additional likelihood of an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, I think I can say categorically that those messages would have had a very distinct effect on my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this book from which you have quoted here, you say that the part you read was translated and distributed among the naval officers?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I do not know the distribution but this copy was given to me by the fleet intelligence officer because it was translated in that office and I picked it up in the course of my conversations with them and my interest in the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in October?

Captain ZACHARIAS. About October.

The CHAIRMAN. 1941?

Captain ZACHARIAS. 1941, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is all I will ask at the moment. I am at a disadvantage because I did not hear the rest of the testimony. Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That fleet intelligence officer you referred to, Captain, was the fleet intelligence officer of the [8750] Pacific Fleet under the command of Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ZACHARIAS. He was the first fleet intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet and later, as the name was changed—first he was fleet intelligence officer of the United States Fleet and when it was changed later to the Pacific Fleet he became fleet intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet. He had been there for quite a considerable time before Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, at the time you received this copy that you have read to the committee he was then Admiral Kimmel's intelligence officer?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you allow me to ask one question that I have overlooked?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What, from your experience, your long experience in the Intelligence Division of the Navy, what is the practice of naval officers in the Navy Department in transmitting diplomatic messages to naval officers in the field or in the waters where they are in command?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think the general policy is to give such messages only to those who need to know their existence.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a general policy that from such [8751] messages as are received initially anywhere an estimate of the situation is drawn and that is transmitted to the commanding officers both in the Navy and War Departments, is it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not get that.

The CHAIRMAN. Instead of sending each individual diplomatic message that is picked up in general for any reason or from any source to the commanding officers in the field or in the waters in which the Navy may be operating, is it the practice to send them an estimate, a general estimate of the situation drawn from those messages that are received in the Department as a whole?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Either or both of those methods are employed.

The CHAIRMAN. Either or both?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, would you give us a little more information as to why you considered the arrival of the third Japanese envoy so important?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The reasons as to why I felt that the arrival of a third envoy in Washington would precipitate a decision, that came through experience in intelligence work and our observation of the many Japanese missions which came over to this country on inspection trips or purchasing mis- [8762] sions.

We noticed that almost invariably when they went to a certain industrial activity they were interested in one particular thing in that plant. Depending on its importance, a second mission would come and go to that same plant and showed an interest only in that particular piece of machinery or whatever it was. They would be followed by a third group, who would go through the same procedure and after the visit of the third group all interest in that plant and that particular item would disappear.

In my mind I formulated the opinion that the Japanese would not accept the view of a single individual; that two individuals usually resulted in a controversy. Therefore, it was necessary to have the opinion of a third one before they would reach their decision. That is typical and in line with everything Japanese.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is part of their way of operating, to do everything three times before they reach a decision?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir, and that is possibly the reason why even in their most important operations they have in the past taken away the initiative from the commander in chief and required him to get his detailed instructions from Tokyo before he would make any move.

I feel that that every condition was responsible for in [8763] some degree our success at Midway. Ordinarily when a force is coming in to make a surprise attack, as they were doing again at Midway, a commander in chief would know that he had been discovered when they spotted a patrol plane of ours 2 days before and would then retire to a sector and come in at a later date. The commander in chief was not empowered to make any such decision and by the time, I assume, that he was able to contact Tokyo and get permission to change his plan it was too late.

I give that as an indication that decisions by the Japanese are never confined to a single individual or even two.

The CHAIRMAN. And you cite that instance as something that actually happened that contributed to our success in the Battle of Midway?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; that was known; that information had been furnished to Mr. Munson and, as I indicated in the memorandum, I talked with a third party, went over the details of this thing completely the night before I sailed for Wake Island. The night before was November 27, 1941; and that was with Mr. Lorrin Thurston, the head of the Honolulu Advertiser and the head of Station KGU in Honolulu, who was a Military Intelligence Reserve officer, a captain.

THE VICE CHAIRMAN. He was a captain in the United States [8754] Army?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, Military Intelligence Reserve and, as I indicated in that memorandum, he expressed surprise that he had not been informed as to what to send out over his radio when the air attack came.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, I want to try to understand you a little more clearly, Captain, about this—what was his name, Thurston?

Captain ZACHARIAS. L-o-r-r-i-n T-h-u-r-s-t-o-n; Lorrin Thurston.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, was he at that time a captain in the United States Army?

Captain ZACHARIAS. He was a captain in the Military Intelligence Reserve of the United States Army, not on active duty.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Not on active duty?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, was that a civilian radio station that he had or was it a military radio station?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That was one of the two civilian radio stations on the Island of Oahu.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And just what was it you told him?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I related to him the entire probability of events as I have already testified and that is [8755] what caused him to say to me with an expression of surprise, "Why, I am here and a Reserve intelligence officer in G-2 and I have not been given any indication of what I should send out over the radio in the event of an air attack."

I said to him, "Well," I said, "if you say, 'We are having a sporadic air attack; there is no reason for alarm. Everyone should keep indoors because if you go on the streets you will interfere with the military going to their posts. Just stay at home and keep calm.'"

And I might say that on the morning of December 7 when the communications officer brought me the word around 8 o'clock that Oahu had been attacked, I turned on my radio and almost those exact words were going out over KGU.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, I cannot say that I understand this. I am sure it is my fault but I am sorry. I still do not quite understand just the status of that officer. You say he was not on active duty?

Captain ZACHARIAS. He was not on active duty.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you say he was working with the Army intelligence office. Now, what does that mean?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not say he was working with the intelligence office. I said that he was an intelligence officer in the Military Reserve not on active duty but I happened to know that he was consulted from time to time by the [8756] Army because he was a very prominent citizen in Hawaii by reason of those two positions

he occupied, but I inject that only to indicate that up to the very last moment these ideas that I had were being passed along as freely as possible.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the reason I got the impression that he was connected with the Army intelligence office there in Hawaii was your statement that you said he was surprised that he had not been told about that because he was connected with the Army intelligence office.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, if I conveyed the impression that that was being critical of the Army for not advising him I ask to correct that because it was not. That was only incidental and the surprise was on his part.

[8757] There were no implications in that. I only brought that in to further substantiate the fact that I was carrying all these things along in my own mind.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you told us about your conversation with Admiral Kimmel in which you gave him the information that you here related, and then you state that you conveyed substantially the same opinion, or expressed the same views to Captain Layton.

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; I did not say that I had expressed those same views to Captain Layton. Undoubtedly in our many conversations, possibilities and probabilities were discussed, but I did not say that I had given Layton specifically an outline of what I had expected. I assume that he would arrive at similar conclusions because of his experience in intelligence, and knowledge of the Japanese. He was also a Japanese language officer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had served with him, and it was on your recommendation that he was appointed in the positions he was then holding?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, who else, if anybody, besides Admiral Kimmel, did you tell substantially this same thing to?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think those were all. As I said [8758] before, I was on duty there in the Hawaiian area. I already expressed myself to Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff. I felt if there was anything further that they wanted from me, they knew where I was, and they could get it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were not at that time in the intelligence service of the Navy?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was not, except indirectly, because I had been admonished by a former director of naval intelligence when I completed a certain tour of duty in naval intelligence, when he said to me "Although you are now leaving this office to go to sea, you must consider yourself as continuing your active intelligence work. I hope you will feel that way and continue to do so, because of your background and the value that it will have to the Navy, and generally in the future."

In other words, he gave me a commission to continue intelligence work even while I was afloat, and I proceeded to do so, even to the extent of engaging in certain counter-espionage activities, while I was aboard ship.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated you had directly, or in an indirect way, about 25 years' experience in naval intelligence work?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

[8759] THE VICE CHAIRMAN. Then the greater part of your 37 years' service in the Navy has been devoted to that line of work?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir; although the portions afloat, as I have indicated, were during my spare time, because all Japanese language officers well realized that in order to have the possibility of promotion by selection in addition to their specialty, they had to be good naval officers.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, one other inquiry, if I may, please, Captain.

This information that you say you conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, was that based upon your general knowledge of the Japanese, and the relations existing between Japan and the United States, or was any part of that directly the result of your conversation with Admiral Nomura?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think I can say categorically that it was principally my background experience, and not the result of the conversation with Admiral Nomura. I had hoped that he might be able to arrive at a successful solution to the situation between Japan and the United States. I might say after my conversation with him, I was not too hopeful, but I felt—I knew that—I will stick to my original expression, I felt that he was quite anxious [8760] to prevent a war between Japan and the United States, because he had always said to me that if Japan and the United States went to war, it would mean the finish of the Japanese Empire and a great loss to the United States. He reiterated that in my conversation with him in San Francisco on February 8, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you sought this conference with Admiral Nomura in San Francisco, then, did you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, and when I had previously notified the commander in chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Richardson, that I proposed to do so, he liked the idea and asked me to send him a copy of the report of that conversation immediately after it was completed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you were then serving as naval intelligence officer at San Francisco?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir, I was then in command of the heavy cruiser, *Salt Lake City*, which had recently come into Mare Island to be overhauled, and an implementation of her armament.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Had you been ordered, directed, or had a suggestion come to you that you have such a conversation with Admiral Nomura?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Only through the attitude of Admiral Richardson when I indicated to him that I had known [8761] Admiral Nomura intimately in Japan, and on subsequent occasions of his visit to the United States, that I had found him the one Japanese who was willing and never embarrassed by discussing situations, and I felt if anybody could get from him an expression of opinion as to the real mission for which he was sent over, that I could do it. I felt there was only one other person in the United States with whom he would talk as frankly, and that was Admiral W. V. Pratt, retired.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You had known Admiral Nomura in Japan?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long were you stationed in Japan, Captain?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The first time about 3 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were you naval attaché at our Embassy there?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was an attaché at the Embassy for the purpose of learning the language and studying the people. It was during that period that I first met Admiral Nomura. He was then director of naval intelligence in Japan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All told, how much time have you spent in Japan?

[8762] Captain ZACHARIAS. About 4 years. I went back to the Asiatic Fleet in 1926 for a specific purpose, and on my way back from the Asiatic Fleet I was in Japan for a period of something over 6 months, to refresh my knowledge of both the language, the people, and the situation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, after your conversation with Admiral Richardson, in which he indicated at least to you that he thought it might be well for you to talk to Admiral Nomura, you then did have the conversation with him?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you reported by way of a memorandum on that conversation to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I wrote a personal and very lengthy letter to Admiral Stark, a copy of which you have in the papers that were furnished by the Navy Department to the committee, and I received a reply from Admiral Stark, a copy of which also has been furnished to you, in which he indicated that my letter to him was very interesting and illuminating, and he had sent the original over to the President and had made copies for the Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of State.

[8763] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you state that copies were sent to Admiral Kimmel and in your conversation with him he told you he had received it.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now what was the occasion for your writing the memorandum to the other Admiral; Admiral Draemel?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That memorandum, as you recall, was written on March 17, 1942. The specific purpose of that memorandum was to advise Admiral Nimitz, then commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, of the situation existing in Hawaii as I saw it, and to indicate to him that if certain steps were not taken to change the situation existing there that he could expect something even more disastrous than what took place at Pearl Harbor.

As you know, that situation eventuated less than 3 months later and precipitated the battle of Midway. At that time, as you know, the Japanese were approaching Hawaii with an overpowering force for the purpose of capturing Hawaii after Midway.

I must say that I felt that we were very fortunate in the conclusion of that campaign. I know that Admiral Nimitz felt that way after the battle of Midway had finished.

Now, as I say, this memorandum was prepared for Vice Admiral Nimitz of the situation then existing. I was very [8764] much concerned in what had not been done regarding Japanese agents in Hawaii subsequent to Pearl Harbor, the inspections of various localities and everything else as is outlined in this memorandum.

I was still the commanding officer of a ship and it took a good deal of deliberation on my part to decide to go over to the commander in chief and present my views to him. However, because of my background in intelligence and knowing that I was the senior, the one officer in the United States Navy who had such a background of knowledge regarding the Japanese, and in intelligence work, I felt it my duty to advise him of the situation as I saw it, and I proceeded to have a conversation with Admiral Draemel, his chief of staff, to see what he might suggest.

After going over all these details with him, which included a complete analysis of the situation prior to Pearl Harbor, and that was given to Admiral Draemel for the sole purpose of letting him know my background and to let him know, or, rather, to convince him that I knew what I was talking about, that was the sole purpose of giving him this pre-Pearl Harbor background.

After my conversation, and the relation of it was given to him, he said, "Well, now, I agree with you practically 99 percent and I wish you would write that out for me in the [8765] form of a memorandum so I can give it to Admiral Nimitz to read, and then if he wants to discuss it with you further he can do so."

I told him I would be very glad to do that. I returned to my ship and wrote out the memorandum as exactly as possible as our conversation had taken place and gave it to him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then on March 17, 1942, when you wrote this memorandum to Admiral Nimitz, you were then in the Pacific Fleet?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir. I was a subordinate.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And in command of the cruiser *Salt Lake City*?

Captain ZACHARIAS. In command of the cruiser *Salt Lake City*.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated, Captain, that you were graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From what State were you appointed?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Florida.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you have been in the Navy continuously since then?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all. Thank you.

[8766] The CHAIRMAN. Senator George had to leave to go to the floor. Congressman Clark is not here. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, you told the committee a few moments ago that in October 1941, you attempted, on three different occasions, to discuss the Japanese situation from the standpoint of a surprise attack with Captain Layton. Is that right?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir. This was with Captain McMorris—and it was not to discuss the possibilities of an air attack, it was to discuss the current situation of our relations with Japan.

Senator LUCAS. Well, why did you want to see Captain McMorris at that time?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Because he was the war plans officer and I knew that he would be drawing up any procedures for eventualities.

Senator LUCAS. What did you have in mind discussing with Captain McMorris?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I would have discussed with him the probabilities.

Senator LUCAS. Of an air attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Of what might eventuate. I think I would have related to him then everything I had told Admiral [8767] Kimmel, because it was just at that same period that I had the conversations with Mr. Munson.

Senator LUCAS. Why were you so free with Munson with respect to the possibility of an air attack and yet you did not pass it on in October 1941 to the proper authorities in Hawaii?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I had already passed it along to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; you had done that back in March 1941.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Did it ever occur to you, as the tense situation developed between this country and Japan, to again repeat that to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I have already indicated that Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff knew that I was a commanding officer in his fleet, and I felt that if he wanted any further information from me he knew where he could find me. I did not again go over to bring myself to his attention, because I long since learned that when you are persistent in these things you arouse certain feelings which nullify the effect which you desire to produce.

Senator LUCAS. Did you feel that they considered you a sort of a nuisance for interfering with their own decisions [8768] when you made suggestions of this kind?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; there was no indication of that. Why Captain McMorris did not want to discuss it I do not know, but it so impressed me after the third attempt that I went in to Commander Layton and said, "What is the matter with Captain McMorris? I tried to engage him in a conversation about this situation but he does not feel like talking about it." And the intelligence officer indicated to me he did not know any reason why he should not want to discuss it.

Senator LUCAS. You were a very good friend of Captain Layton?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I understand you recommended him.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did.

Senator LUCAS. Was it Layton you recommended for the position he held in the fleet at that time?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct. I might add that I was also a good friend of Captain McMorris and he is a classmate of mine.

Senator LUCAS. Now did you discuss with Layton at any time in October 1941 the possibilities of an air attack and give to him the substance of the conversation that you gave to Munson?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No; only I think I discussed with him [8769] the fact that Munson had sought me out, and what I had gone over with him I cannot recall.

Senator LUCAS. Why did you consider Munson more important than Layton?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Because Munson had come out with a letter signed "H. R. Stark," to open up everything to him. That letter

was to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. So I tried to get from Munson some indication as to whom he was representing, but he consistently declined to tell me, in a very friendly manner, so I did not pursue it further, but I reached my own conclusions.

Senator LUCAS. Did Munson talk to Captain Layton while he was there?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you confer with Layton after Munson left and discuss with him the conversation that you might have had?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Now, only incidentally, possibly. In one of my visits to the fleet intelligence officer I said I had some conversations with Munson and had given him my idea of what would occur.

Senator LUCAS. As I recall, Admiral Kimmel does not remember the conversation you had with him in March 1941.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I have indicated that I was possibly one [8770] of hundreds with whom he talked, and although the subject of our conversation was one which I felt, and still feel, was most vital to his position as commander in chief of the fleet, I have said that I can realize that he might not remember the details of that conversation.

Senator LUCAS. Have you talked to Captain Smith, the other officer who was present at the time you engaged Admiral Kimmel in a conversation about this important matter?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Not about the matters I discussed there. I probably have spoken to him in greetings.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood the Senator to state Admiral Kimmel testified he did not have the conversation with him.

Senator LUCAS. If I said that I am wrong. Admiral Kimmel did not recall the substance of the conversation that he had with you, Captain?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will permit, I interrogated Admiral Kimmel about that. He stated that he did have a conversation with Captain Zacharias in March of 1941. Then I read to him this statement from your memorandum and asked him whether Captain Zacharias told him there would be an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and he answered that he [8771] did not believe that.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; I think that is right.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think I can clarify that.

Senator LUCAS. Clarify it, if you will, sir.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. The question asked of Admiral Kimmel was whether this was going to take place, or whether I had told him that this would take place on December 7, and he said I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I will read the quotation, if the Senator will indulge me a moment.

Senator LUCAS. I yield for that purpose.

[8772] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I first asked Admiral Kimmel:

Now, you were asked some questions about some conversations between you and Captain Zacharias.

Senator BREWSTER. What page is that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Page 7133 of our transcript.

Admiral Kimmel answered: "Yes, sir."

Then I asked:

He was an officer under your command at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Then I asked:

And you stated that you did have a conversation with him in March of 1941, and you did not recall that he said anything to you about expecting an air attack on Pearl Harbor, is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I made such a statement as that.

Then I asked:

Did you have any conversation with him at any other time other than March 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not that I now recall.

Then I asked:

You had no other conversation with him at all, that you remember?

[8773] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I cannot recall every conversation I had with every officer in Pearl Harbor, but so far as I know, Captain Zacharias never expressed any idea that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent at any time to me. He may have expressed such sentiments, I do not know.

Then I said:

Now, then, Admiral, you say that when you received the message of November 24, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations—

then I inquired about the message of November 24.

Then shortly after that we recessed for noon.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In the meantime I had looked at these papers that had been filed before we resumed the afternoon session, or that you had filed with the Navy Department. There was only one copy, and I had not read it up to that time, but during the noon recess I looked through it. Then, when we resumed the hearing after noon, I questioned Admiral Kimmel further on that point, as appears on page 7140 of our transcript.

Senator BREWSTER. Would not you take page 7137, where you started your question on that? That is where you began in the afternoon about the conversation.

[8774] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was during the morning. I had not thought that was important, but this should precede what I read.

Senator BREWSTER. That was the afternoon session, page 7137, when we resumed the inquiry, and introduced the exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; I see now. Page 7137.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think I know the point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anyhow, on page 7137 I asked Admiral Kimmel this question:

Admiral Kimmel, this morning I asked you a few questions about your conversation with Captain Zacharias. At that time I did not have before me the photostatic copies of certain documents that have been presented here to the committee with respect to Captain Zacharias, and at the conclusion of the morning's session, counsel handed me this copy which is the only one before the committee. It is headed "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up To It." And quite a number of items are listed on the front page, but I will pass on down to an item appearing about the middle of this page, which I will read to you:

"March, 1941: Conversation with Admiral Kimmel CINOPAC—

that was you—

"and his Chief of Staff, Captain," it [8775] looks like "W. W. Smith, U. S. N."

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Then I continued reading:

"Regarding Nomura, notifying of surprise attack on our Fleet by Japanese in case hostilities eventuate. Details of this conversation are covered in a personal and confidential memo to Chief of Staff, to CINCPAC, Rear Admiral Milo Draemel, U. S. N., for presentation to CINCPAC (Admiral Nimitz) and dated March 17, 1942, copy attached."

Then I turn over to this copy to which he refers in that note. I will not take time to read all of it, but in the fourth paragraph of this headed "Personal and Confidential Memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942" I read you as follows:

"Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them of the exact event to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battleships, and they got five."

Do you recall any such statement as that, or any information of that nature given you by Captain Zacharias?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is very little I can add to my previous testimony on that subject. In the past [8776] few days I heard of this memorandum, and I had read that memorandum before I testified before this committee and if you want me to clarify any of my previous statements, I will be pleased to do so, but I am willing to let it stand as it is.

Then I asked:

Well, in questions asked you by counsel and those which I asked you, you stated that you did not remember——

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Then I asked:

Any conversation with Captain Zacharias along this line.

Admiral KIMMEL. I remembered a conversation with Captain Zacharias.

Then I asked:

But I have now tried to refresh your memory.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Then I state:

If it is worth anything in that respect.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Then I state:

By reading you what appears in this memorandum prepared by him, which has been presented to this committee for whatever it may be worth.

[8777] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Then I asked:

And I am now asking you whether he said to you what he states there, or anything like that.

Admiral KIMMEL. He did not, and furthermore, I would have paid very little attention to any man who told me in March of 1941 that an attack was going to occur on the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

I think that covers the pertinent point. I assume you are familiar with it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is time to adjourn.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I can reply very quickly to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you will. We will have to recess in a moment.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Included in that memorandum was the date December 7. I have already indicated that December 7 is synonymous with Pearl Harbor. When you realize that this memorandum was prepared after Pearl Harbor, it was referring back to an event for the benefit of Admiral Draemel and Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral Kimmel is quite correct in saying that in March 1941, I did not predict something was going to happen on December 7. And he is also correct in saying that I did not indicate that there was any imminence of Japanese hostilities. Everything I said to him [8778] was contingent upon the development of a situation which made hostilities between Japan and the United States imminent. I did not predict when that would occur, but I indicated to him clearly as to what would happen if that situation evolved.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 2:00 o'clock, and the Chair understands that Justice Roberts will be here.

You may come back here also, Captain.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I will be here, sir.¹

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the committee recessed to 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[8779]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Justice Roberts, will you be sworn?

(Justice Roberts was sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have before me, Mr. Chairman, some correspondence which it might be well to have extended in the record in connection with the testimony of the Justice.

The first is a letter of December 16, 1941, to the President from the Secretary of War in connection with the individuals who were selected to form the Commission of which the Justice was the chairman.

That is followed by a letter of January 27, 1942, being a letter to Justice Roberts from the Secretary of War with reference to the report which had been prior thereto filed.

The third is a letter under date of January 31, 1942, from the Justice to the Secretary of War in acknowledgment of the letters.

I think probably it would be sufficient if the letters were extended in the record by the stenographer without reading them.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of counsel showing them to me and I think that they are of sufficient consequence to have them read.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, well, they ought to be spread on the [8780] record at this point before Justice Roberts testifies.

Senator BREWSTER. I think they should be read so the committee will be familiar with them.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, counsel may read them.

Mr. MURPHY. I have a suggestion to make. They were read about two weeks ago at the time Senator Ferguson asked a question about them. I think these were among those read.

Senator BREWSTER. These were not read.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not understand that they were read.

Mr. MURPHY. Oh, I see, these letters were not read.

¹ Captain Zacharias' testimony is resumed on p. 3303, infra.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection the counsel will read the letters into the record at this point in sequence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. (reading):

Personal and Confidential

DECEMBER 16, 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: KNOX tells me that you would like our suggestions as to the investigating board this morning—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask counsel this question: Prior to that letter is there any official document appointing the Commission by the President which might well go in ahead of these letters?

[8781] Mr. RICHARDSON. This would come ahead of that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. RICHARDSON (reading):

Knox tells me that you would like our suggestions as to the investigating board this morning.

1. My suggestion for the civilian head is Justice Roberts. No less a man in my opinion should be asked and Roberts, by his action in investigating and prosecuting the Teapot Dome scandal and in deciding the Black Tom case more recently, has an outstanding reputation among our people for getting down to the bottom of a factual situation. I think his appointment would command the confidence of the whole country. I believe Knox agrees with me.

2. For the War Department representatives I suggest Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired, and Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney of the Air Corps.

a. McCoy you know personally. He has the most outstanding record of any man in the Army for such an appointment, requiring as it does breadth of view, superlative character, and wide similar experience. As a member of the Lytton Commission which investigated the [8782] Japanese in Manchuria, he won a very high reputation among all nations involved for his balance and tact. It was due to him more than any other member that the report of that Commission was unanimous.

b. McNarney I recommend as the best air man we have for that purpose. I think there must be an air man on the board because the duties and alleged derelictions were in air protection. The fight was an air fight. We have no retired officers of the Air Corps fit for this assignment, but McNarney has a reputation which commands the respect of everybody. As you know, he was Chief of Staff for Chaney in London, was on the recent Staff conferences with the British, went to Moscow, and is familiar with British technique in respect to air defense. Marshall and I think he is the most competent man we have at the present time on air and ground joint requirements.

Marshall and I united on all the foregoing suggestions after very careful consideration by each of us.

Most confidentially we are sending to Hawaii two men to relieve Short and Martin, the present Army Commander and Air Commander. Lieutenant General Emmons, our present Air Combat Commander, will relieve Short. Brigadier General Tinker will relieve Martin. They are starting at once and I think nothing should be said about [8783] it until they arrive to take command. As you know, we have had a sad and serious blow in this matter. Major General Dargue and Colonel Bundy, who have been missing since the storm of last Friday night, were on their way out to Hawaii. They were two of the best men we had and we had expected to use Dargue to relieve one of the men out there.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

This is addressed to:

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

My opinion is that the housecleaning which I describe in the last paragraph should be synchronized with a similar housecleaning in the Navy Command, and all announced at the same time.

This was followed by a letter of January 27, 1942, from the Secretary of War to Justice Roberts. [Reading:]

My dear Justice Roberts:

This is just a hasty line to tell you what an admirable job I think that you and your colleagues have done in your difficult task of drawing the report on the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

[8784] I think it is a masterpiece of candid and accurate statement based upon most careful study and analysis of a difficult factual situation. One of the best features of it has been your treatment of certain underlying elements which could not be fully embodied in the report without giving assistance to the enemy.

Your full opinion on some of these latter points seems to me so important that I hope it will be given to the President and others of us who are concerned in the defense of the country, in a manner which can be used without going to the enemy. These are the type of things that I intended to suggest to you in my preliminary talk with you before you left for Pearl Harbor.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,

And addressed to: "Honorable Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Washington, D. C."

That is followed by a letter of January 31, 1942, from Justice Roberts to the Secretary of War. [Reading:]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am greatly indebted to you for your letter of January 27 with respect to the Pearl Harbor report. It was good of you to take the time from your manifold [8785] duties to write me about it.

Yours sincerely,

OWEN J. ROBERTS.

Addressed to "Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C."

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, does the record show the date of the first two letters?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It does? All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed with the examination of Justice Roberts.

[8786] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I wish those would remain or be gotten back.

The REPORTER. They will be back in a half-hour.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Richardson.

TESTIMONY OF HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (RETIRED)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Justice, you were the Chairman of what is known as the Roberts Commission in connection with the investigation of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was that Commission sworn in?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I should think the 18th or 19th of December. I can give you the exact date from the minutes. We swore the recorder and then he swore the members of the Commission.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How soon after that before the Commission began to function?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Immediately. The very morning that it was organized.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you give us a running résumé of the time the Commission did function here and then later upon your arrival at Hawaii?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. We called in the higher command of the Army and Navy and ask them to produce the war plans, maps, orders, and

every document that could have a bearing on the situation at Pearl Harbor. We examined those and had [8787] the officers explain them and their bearing to us.

I might say at that time we had not decided how we would take testimony, and we had no stenographer. We had a secretary who was a stenographer who made notes on the topics on which these people spoke, and we each made notes for ourselves of things which we thought important and that we desired to investigate.

General Marshall and Admiral Stark were present and gave us an outline of the whole transaction from their points of view. We asked whether we should retain certain code telegrams, and what not, and they told us that copies of them would be found at Pearl Harbor, and we decided not to take those into our possession at that time but to get them when we had stenographic service at Pearl Harbor.

As the result of the conference and testimony of these gentlemen, who were not under oath but were upon honor to give us all they had, we then formed a plan of going to Pearl Harbor where copies of practically every document they produced would be found and we could proceed more formally with the stenographer.

We made arrangements immediately for stenographic service by stenographers known in Washington, and known to me personally to be reputable, because we did not know what kind of stenographic service we could depend on in Pearl [8788] Harbor, and we took those gentlemen with us. I think they arrived on Oahu on the 22d—I may be wrong about the date—about 6 o'clock in the morning, and we started our session at 9:30 on that morning at Fort Shafter with a stenographer present, and we called for our first witness, after we called for the production of a lot of documents, General Short.

Mr. RICHARDSON. From that time on, when the Commission functioned, it was by question and answer to witnesses who had first been duly sworn?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes. I might say that Congress passed an act giving us the right to subpoena witnesses and swear them, and that was at our request.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was any witness proposed who was not given an opportunity to be heard?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Certainly not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How were your proceedings conducted with respect to their being open or otherwise?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. They were closed. Every witness was asked to observe secrecy, that is to say, not to disclose what went on in the room.

Of course the reason for that was what this committee now knows, that there were questions of broken codes. We were informed that the Army and Navy were getting invaluable [8789] information every day; that the Japanese did not realize that their codes were broken, and indeed the Navy was rather chary about even telling us about the thing for fear there might be some leak from our commission.

Of course if we held open hearings there was a chance we might do a great damage to our forces, our military program.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you complete your duties there, approximately?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I have got it all in the minutes, and you have the minutes, I think, so when I speak I do not speak against the minutes. It was around the 18th of January, I suppose.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you returned to Washington?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes; we came to San Francisco, and in order not to lose any time we came back by Pullman from San Francisco, and we had a drawing room in which we could discuss the facts, and as to facts which were of record and as to which there was no doubt we could start to prepare findings, which we did on the train.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Approximately how long after you returned were your findings completed?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Again I do not speak by the record. It is all here. You can get it day by day. But I should [8790] think something over a week.

The CHAIRMAN. The report shows that they held meetings on the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And the report is dated the 23d of January.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then upon your return to Washington you took no more testimony?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes; we did. We took some testimony on some matters that were still doubtful in our minds, and we did not attempt to make findings on those particular points until we had taken testimony from General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and several others.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I note, Mr. Justice, in the report that your commission eventually made, there are 19 in number of what are referred to as the findings of fact.

I also note in the minutes of your commission, under date of January 21, 1942, the following language:

At 3:00 o'clock p. m. the Secretary of the Navy, having been shown certain proposed findings of fact, stated that he suggested no changes for the safeguarding of the national interest in any of the statements except one, in Finding No. 20. This was then differently phrased. At [8791] 4:30 p. m. Brigadier General Gerow, designated by the Chief of Staff, after examining the same findings for the same purpose stated to the recorder that he found no changes to suggest, and the recorder so informed the Commission.

I would be obliged if you would give us some explanation with respect to the elimination of what must have been originally finding No. 20 in connection with your report.

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. There wasn't any elimination. When we started to make findings, every member of the commission was drawing findings to represent his view of certain facts. Then we took the different drafts of the members and compared them, and corrected them, and agreed on a statement.

In order to have that done accurately, I asked the Commissioners in making findings, to make a short finding for each specific fact. When we had finally agreed on the findings there were over 70 of them, numbered from 1 to 70. They were agreed upon. Those were the ones that were shown to the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War.

[8792] When we came to draft our report for submission to the President, every one of the Commission but myself said that it was a disjointed sort of thing, because it had 70 short paragraphs in it, cut apart, and they said it would be a great deal better to put the findings in longer paragraphs together.

We did that, and we finally condensed those 70 paragraphs into 19, without changing a word in them. If you will look at the findings, you will see that No. 1 consists of two paragraphs. Those were originally numbered separately.

The next one consists of two paragraphs which were originally numbered separately. The third one does not. The fourth consists of three paragraphs that had separate numbers, and so on.

We took the findings that dealt with a particular situation and put them under one caption with paragraphs instead of having them numbered straight through.

As to finding No. 20, I think I know what it was. It is at the bottom of page 6 of the printed report. That finding is now in a paragraph starting "November 24, 1941." It dealt with a message from the Navy. In making up a statement on these messages we garbled them. We were told if we had translated them accurately, that either the Germans or the Japanese, who had taken off the code messages, might [8793] take the translation and break our code, and we should paraphrase them, and Secretary Knox thought our paraphrase perhaps was not plain enough to deceive the Japanese, and he suggested a slight change in verbiage, and we made it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, as a matter of fact, Mr. Justice, nothing in your findings was deleted, or eliminated because of the objection of anyone outside of the Commission?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Certainly not, except, as I say, Secretary Knox called attention to one finding, and said that might give some information, that we ought to phrase it somewhat differently, and we did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But the factual result of the rephrasing was the same as the original phrasing?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Absolutely.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now was your commission unanimous in approving each of the findings which you reported?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Certainly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And was your commission unanimous in the report which you filed on those findings?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. It was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when that report was made, how was it signed?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Signed by all the commission [8794] in duplicate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And each commissioner had a signed copy of the report?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. No, sir. When we decided to make this change in the findings of fact, to put them in long paragraphs, that was pretty late. I think it might have been Thursday afternoon or Friday morning, and our secretary told us that he could get the report finished quicker, if he did not have to make seven copies, with six carbons, so he made the first and two carbons; that made it less difficult to put into the machine for each page, and we signed two duplicates. This is one, the ribbon copy, and one carbon.

I kept this one copy [indicating] as my copy, the third carbon. If you will look at the minutes, you will see the commissioner instructing the secretary to make one copy from this for each of the

other commissioners, that is to make four from this. So far as I know, the four were made, and so far as I know, each commissioner has a copy. I do not believe there was any shuffling around. I think that is the copy that the minutes said I was to have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that copy was an exact copy of the report as signed?

[8795] Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Absolutely. It is a carbon copy of the ribbon copy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, following the signing of your report, did you have some conference with the President with reference to that report?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Yes. I covered that in my letter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you mind going over it again, so your testimony can be complete here on that point?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. I do not know whether I can state what is in the letter with accuracy or not. I think I can.

That report was finished around 2:30 on Friday afternoon, December 23. In the presence of the commissioners, I called the White House, got Miss Tully on the phone, told her the report would be ready late that afternoon, was practically ready, and would be ready within an hour or so, and I should like to know whether the President wished it sent by the recorder under cover or whether he wished the commission to wait on him in a body and present it, or whether he wanted myself, as the chairman, to present it.

Miss Tully told me that the President was in a Cabinet meeting and could not reach him, but when he came out she would communicate with me.

The commission waited until Miss Tully came back and [8796] said the President had come out of the Cabinet meeting, that he was very tired, and he did not want the report presented that afternoon; that he wanted it presented by me as chairman of the commission in person, and he would see me for that purpose at 11 o'clock the next morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What date or what month was the 24th?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. January 24, Saturday.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Your earlier remark was December 23. That should have been January?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Should have been January; certainly.

So I called at the White House on the morning of January 24 at 11 o'clock, saw the President in his study on the second floor. He was at his desk. I handed him an envelope containing these two duplicate reports. He opened it, and then started to read it.

I sat there and he read it line by line, and so far as I could make out he read every word of it, carried his finger on the pages.

I was there over 2 hours.

When he concluded reading it, he turned to me and said, "Is there anything in this report that might give our enemies information they ought not to have?" Or words to that effect. I said "No, sir; I cleared that with the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, [8797] because we didn't want to put anything in here that might endanger the national defense."

Then he said, "I do not see why I should not give this report to the public in full."

I said, "It would be a great satisfaction to the commission if you did that, sir," or "it would please the commission if you did that," or words to that effect.

He rang the bell, and Mr. McIntyre came in. He threw this whole thing across the table, as I remember it, both copies, and envelope, and said, "Mac, give that to the Sunday papers in full," and Mr. McIntyre said, "Well I will have to put it in the mimeographing room, in the press room."

You see, it was then 1 o'clock and he took it and started to go away, and then he turned around and said, "Don't you want to say something about the work of the commission, Mr. President?"

The President said, "Oh, yes," and then he said something about he was greatly indebted to the commission for their prompt report, something of that kind, and Mr. McIntyre turned and went away. I have never seen the report from that day to this.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You have had a copy, this carbon copy?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. That has been in my files.

[8798] Mr. RICHARDSON. That has also been compared, has it, with this Senate Document No. 159?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that also is a correct copy of the report?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Well, I found one typographical error in the Senate Report, in finding 15, where it should read "distant air raid reconnaissance," it reads "distinct air raid reconnaissance." There can be no mistake as to what is meant, because the word "distant" appears twice again in the same paragraph. That is at the top of page 12. That is evidently a printer's error. That is the only thing I can find.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not care to inquire of the Justice.

Congressman Cooper.

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. I would like to say this: When we made these findings into larger paragraphs, we made two or three changes. You will note up at the top of page 8, at the end of the paragraph there, "Referred to in the next succeeding paragraph."

Well, as that paragraph had been put into a finding we had to change the words "next succeeding finding" to [8799] "paragraph," because they were all separate.

The same thing occurs in one or two other places wherever we speak of the "next succeeding paragraph." That originally read "finding", but when we put them in one finding, we changed it.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask just one question.

I gather from your statement there was never any finding 20 that was in any way eliminated, but you consolidated some seventy-odd findings into 19 findings; is that correct?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. At no time during your consideration was there any finding No. 20 that was subsequently eliminated?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. No, sir. There is one other thing.

At the very last moment, and after we had heard from the Secretaries of War and Navy, we made a slight change in finding 16, what is now the fourth paragraph of that finding.

In reading over the thing when it was finally in type, there was a word or two in there which I thought indicated that the Navy might

have broken the Japanese Navy code after December 7, and I eliminated, with the consent of the other two commissioners, two or three words, that I thought might indicate that the Navy had broken the Japanese code. [8800] That was the Japanese naval code, and not this other code that has been talked about.

The CHAIRMAN. That elimination was made with the approval of all of the commissioners?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, the whole report was a tentative draft which was subsequently reduced in form to the 19 findings which appear here in this official document?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is correct.

[8801] The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Justice, there never was any intention of conducting any kind of court proceeding or trial, or anything of that kind?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were just making an investigation, were you?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Yes, sir. This seemed to me a preliminary investigation, like a grand jury investigation, and I did not think, for our report, that was to be taken as precluding every one of the men mentioned in it from a defense before his peers.

In other words, you could not conduct a proceeding without cross-examination and without publicity and call it a trial. It was not a trial.

[8802] The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was just an investigation?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. It was an investigation and it was the formation of a judgment to be handed to the President. We didn't know whether the President would publish it or what he would do with it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark is not here. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Justice, after the President gave the two copies to Secretary McIntyre with instructions to give it to the press, do you recall seeing that report in the press the following Sunday?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. At that time I was on the Supreme Court and the following Monday mimeographed copies of this press release were sent up to the press room of the Supreme Court and Mr. Potter brought me up one. I didn't compare it line for line with our report but I had the report fully in mind. I read it through and it was obviously complete.

Senator LUCAS. After you read the report through you saw no changes or there was nothing in the report that called to your attention any changes from what you had [8803] presented to the President on the Saturday before?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. That is correct, sir. I also saw the full report published in the New York Times on Sunday and read it with some care to see if it was complete and to my eye it was complete. There again I did not compare it line for line with my typewritten copy. Of course, with this [indicating printed copy] I took the trouble to compare it paragraph by paragraph—not line by line—and it was complete.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Justice, when Admiral Kimmel was testifying before us he made some reference to the type of stenographic work done at Pearl Harbor. As I read the record that has been given to us there was first several pages reporting the questions and answers as between the Commission and the witness. Thereafter there were corrections suggested and as we have been given it they are interlined following each particular page that would be corrected.

Then after that was done, as I understand it, Admiral Kimmel presented his version of the testimony. I mean, something that was prepared by him and which he wanted the commission to substitute for that which the stenographer had actually reported. As I understand it, then the commission [8804] said "No, but we will take it as reported to us and the corrections as supplied by you, we will also take what you consider the correct version, and include both in our record, and we will have before us what we actually got from the stenographer, the corrections that were suggested, plus the completed copy."

At any time was there ever any intention on the part of the commission to be unfair to Admiral Kimmel and not reflect entirely what occurred during the course of the entire investigation?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. No, Mr. Murphy.

Let me say that Admiral Kimmel was in a state, to my mind, of shock after this situation. He was dreadfully down, at which I was not at all surprised. These stenographers that I have spoken of served first to my knowledge in the *Teapot Dome* case. They are official court stenographers in Washington of the highest type. There was no criticism of their work in any respect.

Now, the transcript of Admiral Kimmel's testimony to our knowledge was a correct transcript of what he said. Then he came back and said that wasn't what he said and he wanted to substitute various things—and you have got his proposed substitutions. The commission considered that matter and they said "The stenographic transcript to our mind [8805] is correct as to what you said, Admiral, and we can't let you interlard things that you did not say."

So we didn't allow him to do that. Then he went off with one of his assistants and prepared a draft of what he said he really meant by his testimony or had really intended to say and we said—he wanted what he had said deleted from the record and this thing substituted—and we said "We can't do that, Admiral Kimmel, but in fairness to you we will include in the transcript this new paper that you have drawn up which you say is really what you want to say on the subject."

So we put them all in the record so there would be no question of unfairness to him.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Justice, do you have any recollection of any paper ever having been given to your commission which was in effect an intercept of the so-called winds code?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I believe the Army Pearl Harbor Board makes reference to the fact that such a paper was presented to your commission and lost.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Was not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever have any such paper?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. It was not. When Senator Ferguson wrote me some time ago and asked me what I knew about the [8806] winds message I sent him a letter about a winds message that I did know about and when I read the testimony before this Commission I found that I was talking about something entirely different. There was a commercial message over the radio from Tokyo on the 5th or 6th of December by a merchant in Honolulu to a merchant in Tokyo.

Mr. MURPHY. Would that be the Mori message?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I think so. It talked about the poinsettias being in bloom and the winds blowing from the east, and so forth. I thought that was the thing referred to. But I know of no other.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate that was the only so-called winds message that you had any knowledge of during the course of your entire proceeding?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is true.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. On page 9 of the report, the Senate document, there is a statement:

Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

That relates to the warning message of the morning of [8807] December 7.

That would require some qualification under the evidence we have received. How fully was that explored by you?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. As fully as we knew how, and that was our judgment after hearing all the story. You may have evidence that we didn't have.

Senator BREWSTER. What was your understanding as to how that message was sent?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. I haven't seen the testimony, since it was sealed, but I will give you my recollection of it after 4 years.

General Marshall told us before we went to Pearl Harbor the circumstances of that. When he had gotten to his office on the morning of December 7 and learned of this decode of the Japanese message he thought he ought to send one more urgent message to Pearl Harbor, and he told Admiral Stark he would like him to join it, and Admiral Stark in effect said, "Well, I have sent so many warning messages to them that I think it will only confuse them to send another; I think they have all the warning they need, and I won't join."

Marshall sat down and, to hurry, he scribbled off the message in lead pencil. Then Stark reconsidered, phoned him, and said, "You may join me in that message," which Marshall [8808] did. He then sent for his communications officer. It may have been Colonel French. He said, "How quickly can you get that to Pearl Harbor?" The man said, "In about a half an hour." I think he had warned French beforehand that he wanted to get a message through, and French had tried to open communications on the Army radio to Pearl Harbor but they couldn't get them. This communications officer explained to us in his testimony their practice in that case, where they couldn't raise the station on the radio, was to open the Western Union wire. He said the Army had a standing arrangement that when they wanted a wire open they could get it opened immediately and have it

held open. He called the Western Union and asked them to open a wire to San Francisco. That was done. The message was coded and sent. That then required the Western Union in San Francisco to carry the message across the street to the cable office to be resent.

Mr. RICHARDSON. RCA, I think.

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. RCA, whatever it was. The cable office. I guess there is no cable to Hawaii. But to a communications company that would send it to Hawaii.

Now, we asked General Marshall whether he couldn't have used the telephone. He had, as we understood it, what might be called a private telephone from his office to [8809] General Short's office. General Marshall said that first of all the man having told him that he could get the message there in about a half an hour it didn't occur to him to use it but in any event he would have been hesitant to use that telephone while it had a scrambler on it. He knew that our enemy, and I don't know whether it was Germany or Japan, had been able to take off some messages from those scrambler telephones. They weren't very safe.

I think that is the whole of it.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I think my question had reference to the—

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Oh, let me add one thing more.

If the teletype in Pearl Harbor had been working Sunday morning that message would have been delivered within 2 or 3 minutes of its receipt. It was not the practice to run the teletype Sunday morning and the teletype was not running this Sunday morning. When the RCA operator found he couldn't get to General Short on the teletype he gave a little boy the message to take on a bicycle. The boy started out and went some distance when the first bomb dropped and then he went into the bushes and stayed there until about 2 o'clock when he delivered the message.

The CHAIRMAN. Can't blame him for that.

Senator BREWSTER. The qualification which I had in mind, [8810] which I gather is now indicated by your testimony, is that every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time consistent with security. That qualification I take it is implied in connection with the scrambler telephone.

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. As we have had testimony that within the next hour after the attack they reached Washington on the phone in 7 minutes; so that apparently there was very ready communication by the scrambler telephone between Washington and—between Hawaii and the east coast of the United States. There was the question of security raised which, of course, was a factor to be taken into account.

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Yes. Those are all the facts I know on which we formed our judgment. It may have been quite a wrong one.

Senator BREWSTER. So you would agree that that qualification would be necessary to make your statement in the report strictly accurate?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. No; I don't think so. The way I got it was that General Marshall thought that it would go through in code in about a half hour.

Senator BREWSTER. Did he tell you how long it took on the scrambler telephone?

[8811] Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, but I supposed only a minute or two.

Senator BREWSTER. So that the statement:

Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, * * *

without a qualification would not be correct?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is probably true.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, another statement, on page 18:

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initiation of a state of readiness for defense.

On this question of lack of information, were you informed in your hearings in Washington that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had the same information which was available in the War and Navy Departments here in Washington?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I don't think so.

Senator BREWSTER. In particular relation to the magic messages?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I don't think so. I think we set forth in our report what information we thought they were given by these warning messages. They were in doubt about the disposition of the Japanese fleet. The monitoring, the Navy monitoring system in Pearl Harbor, had been keeping [8812] very careful tabs on radio messages from the Japanese fleet. They had gotten a lot of indication that there was a tremendous fleet going down the Kra Peninsula. They had also noted that there was complete silence by the carriers.

Now, they assumed that the carriers being silent they were in port, because when they were in port they used a low frequency radio that couldn't be heard over the ocean. Of course, the carriers were coming across under silence from the northeast but the Navy Department seemed to think the carriers were in port. I presume Admiral Kimmel was told that from time to time by the monitors.

The reason for our statement there was that after the warnings that any lack of information ought to have made the commanders even more alert because they had warnings that war was liable to break out and go in any direction any moment.

Senator BREWSTER. That, of course, would be a matter of opinion.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is a matter of our conclusion and our findings and I do not assume you are examining the Roberts Commission to find its faults.

Senator BREWSTER. Not at all. I was examining the Roberts commission to find out what—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. What it had before it.

[8813] Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

I call attention again to:

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent.

It is my understanding that you were given more or less information about the magic, but all reference to that was very properly eliminated from both your investigation and your report?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Certainly.

Senator BREWSTER. This is now all a matter of public knowledge. The point which I think is of importance to determine is whether or not when you were given the information regarding the magic you were given any information as to whether or not Kimmel and Short had been given any report regarding that or its contents.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. The commission's information was, I think, quite to the contrary. In other words, that no commander anywhere was told anything about that. Perhaps a half a dozen people in Washington were all the people that knew anything about it.

Senator BREWSTER. That was explained, so far as you recall now, to you fully at that time?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. We knew the commanders weren't given what was taken off the breaking of the code; yes, indeed.

[8814] Senator BREWSTER. Was there evidence before you as to the responsibility of General Marshall and General Gerow in checking on General Short's report, which you quote:

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. And you understood that that was their responsibility, to check on that?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I understood, yes, and you will notice that in our report we say one of the subsidiary causes of the disaster was the failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-sabotage messages instituted by the commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

Senator BREWSTER. Did the matter of the winds message come before you?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I don't know anything about this winds message except the winds message that I wrote Senator Ferguson about, that commercial message a day or two before the attack.

Senator BREWSTER. So, so far as you now recall, there was no mention about either the original or implementing winds message, as it is called?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I have no recollection of any such thing. And I think you will search the testimony in [8815] vain for any reference to it.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, we understood there were important gaps in that as the result of representations as to security.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Oh, No. The stenographic testimony is complete. There is nothing eliminated from the stenographic testimony. Oh, now and again General McNarney would want to know where General X or General Y was, and would say off the record "By the way, where is General X or Y." There were questions of that type, but there was nothing suppressed from the testimony whatever. All that about the magic, and all that, was given us in confidence at the War Department when we were taking the statements and not put on the typewritten record, not having a stenographer present.

Senator BREWSTER. That is what I am addressing myself to. I supposed that was material which was not a formal part of the record?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. For reasons which you have indicated.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I have already questioned the Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart. Pardon me.

[8816] Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Justice, how much time intervened after the attack before the Roberts commission had its first meeting?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. The attack was on December 7. We had our—I was called to the White House and told that the President desired me to act as chairman of the commission on the 16th or 17th, 16th, I think. Admiral Standley was on his way to Washington. General McNarney had come in by air that morning. There was an informal meeting of four of us with the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy on the morning I would say of the 17th and we formally organized on the morning of the 18th. That would have been 11 days after the attack.

Mr. GEARHART. Then on the 16th day, were Admiral Stark and General Marshall present?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. The White House sent me a request to call there in the afternoon by 5 o'clock. I called at the White House and went to the President's Executive Office. Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of Navy Knox, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, Admiral Stark and General Marshall, at least, were there when the President asked me to assume this duty. I think there were no others present. I told him I could not assume the duty without the consent of the Chief Justice and he asked me to get that consent and phone [8817] him and I did that evening.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you take any testimony in the United States, that is, in the States here?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. I would say so, Mr. Gearhart. I would say that all these statements and all this documentary proof that was produced from the Navy and the Army—I imagine you have had it all before you, war plans, subwar plans, copies of messages, orders, letters, all of that was in a sense testimony, and General Marshall told us what its bearing was and which hitched to which.

Admiral Turner was there to explain the war plans. General Gerow was there to explain the war plans. I would call that all testimony. It was not taken formally.

Mr. GEARHART. It was not stenographically reported?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Not at that time. We had no stenographers at that time and we had been warned that nobody outside of the Commission was to be there because the Army and Navy were so worried about anybody getting this story about the broken code, which, of course, they had to tell us, to tell us why they got frightened on December 7.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark and General Marshall both told you about the 1 o'clock directive message?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Which do you mean, the 1 o'clock? The one that was sent off at noon on December 7?

[8818] Mr. GEARHART. That contained a reference to it. I am referring to the Japanese intercepted message directing that the reply to Secretary Hull's message be delivered at 1 o'clock on Sunday, the 7th of December 1941.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes, they told us about that. That was the secret thing that they didn't want disclosed anywhere.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. You see, we had to cover that up in our report. I saw where we said something about it was "believed", "that it was believed that relations would be broken off", or something of that kind. "Believed", by Secretary Hull.

The CHAIRMAN. You said in effect that information was received "from various sources"?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Something of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Without identifying it.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did General Marshall and Admiral Stark tell you when they first received that information?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes. It was on the morning of December 7. General Marshall was out horseback riding. I think he got it about, I won't be certain, 10:30. Something like that—10 or 10:30. He came right to the War [8819] Department. I don't remember when Admiral Stark said he got it but it was that morning, maybe 9 o'clock or 9:30. I won't be certain.

Mr. GEARHART. Did either of them tell when it was received and when it was decoded?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, sir. I got the impression that it was received on the morning of December 7 sometime. Now, they weren't definite about when the State Department or the Navy Department got it and they were very chary about telling us which agency was taking this stuff off. I never got it clear whether it was the Navy that broke that thing or the Army or the Department of State or whose agency was doing it. I know that they got the final word sometime on the morning of December 7 and from whom they got it I don't know.

Mr. GEARHART. Did they, or either one of them, tell you about the 14-part message which the 1 o'clock directive referred to?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Not in that way. They said they didn't know the final news until that morning. They didn't tell us that the 14 parts came one day and one part the next day or overnight, but that the final directive, whatever it was, came that morning. And I believe that is right. I don't know.

[8820] Mr. GEARHART. I think that is right. Was anything said by either of them about the 13 parts that came the afternoon before?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No. It was spoken of as their getting the knowledge that the thing was going to break that morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Did they or either one of them tell you where they were on Saturday night preceding?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, sir, I don't think we asked them.

Mr. GEARHART. You didn't ask them that question?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I don't think so.

Mr. GEARHART. Did they volunteer any information as to where they might have been?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, sir, I think not.

Mr. GEARHART. Did they tell you where they were the previous Saturday during the daytime?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, I think not. I don't think we asked them.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Justice, were you interviewed by Colonel Clausen? The reason I ask is that someone advised him, as shown in the record at page 8625:

[8821] The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I am sure I don't know what he is talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. This was sometime in 1944. He is talking about the winds message.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No; I never heard of it.

Senator FERGUSON. At another place in the record, page 134 of Safford's testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board——

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Whose testimony?

Senator FERGUSON. Safford, Captain Safford. Do you recall him?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all important messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission; and Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to see that we strained out the unimportant ones; and that "winds" translation, the "winds execute," was included [8822] in those. I do not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it may even be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we have never seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. It couldn't be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. We did not take any of these original messages. Not one. They were looked at. The Navy and the Army said they would rather keep them in their secret files. They were available. We made memorandums of them. When we got to Pearl Harbor we took the same course. If there was any message that was shown to us we made a memorandum as to what it was and gave it back to the custodian. We did not have the original, the file originals of anything of this kind in our custody at any time.

Senator FERGUSON. When you made a copy of a message, at the end, when you got through, what happened to your papers?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. It was returned to the man who produced it for us.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the copies. When you finally completed and had your testimony and your notes.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. We destroyed them. When we took [8823] a copy of a message, if the message said, "This is a war warning," we would make a copy, in conjunction with the Navy or the Army, "This is to be considered a war warning," so as to stick in a couple of words so that if we ever published it the Japs couldn't translate from the English back to the code. We would make our transcript of the purport of the message and return the message to the man who produced it.

That is true of the messages that were produced for us in Pearl Harbor. We didn't take them out of the Army Pearl Harbor files. They ought to be there today.

Senator FERGUSON. In volume 3 of the testimony before your commission, referring to page 290, this is a photostatic copy, you are examining Colonel Fielder. He was——

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. He was on General Short's staff.

Senator FERGUSON. As an intelligence officer?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the chairman and this is your language:

The CHAIRMAN. It has been reported to me that about 10 days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained [8824] three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

I wish you would look at that.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. You don't need to show it to me.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you talking about?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I was talking about some information that had been given to me somewhere around Pearl Harbor. People were coming to me all the time telling me that there was such and such a rumor. You see I say "It has been reported to me."

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't this describe the winds code message?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Very likely it would; very likely so.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do you know of anyone in Hawaii that knew about this code coming in here and that we translated and got it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I couldn't know. I got numerous letters and telephone messages from people who thought they had information and I gathered reports from all around. And [8825] you will see that I say in this report that the commission has had all sorts of rumors and tried to run them down. And that is no doubt some report that came to me out in Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Justice, this last part—

and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here—

you were in Hawaii then?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. As an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes; that is what I say.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that indicate that the winds execute message had been received and that you had some information on that point?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Surely. Somebody had told me that or I wouldn't have asked the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 319—

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Don't you think we ought to have the answer of Colonel Fielder?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Colonel Fielder said:

I have no knowledge of that whatever.

[8826] The CHAIRMAN. You know nothing about it?

Colonel FIELDER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no communication from the War Department as of December 5th forwarding to you the meaning of the three code words which would be the signal for the attack?

I was coming back to that.

Now, that would indicate that there were three code words showing there was going to be an attack as far as the United States was concerned, at least someone told you about it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And then Colonel Fielder says:

No, sir, it never came to my attention.

The CHAIRMAN. After the Japanese Consul had burned his papers, the code message here was discovered?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, the code book was.

They are talking about a different thing.

Now, I refer to exhibit 32 and on December 5, 1941, there was a message sent by General Miles:

Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2,
Hawaiian Department, Honolulu Territory, Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcast from Tokyo with reference weather.

[8827] signed "Miles".

Did you have that message before you, do you recall?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that they were talking there about the original code message?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the original winds message.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, sir; I don't know it now.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going on:

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to something else which you may or may not know anything about. I refer to the fact that some ten days before December it is supposed that a Japanese code message was intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, having broken that down, one of the military establishment in Washington caught over the radio the three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you", to the Islands.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any such story?

Colonel BICKNELL. I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.

[8828] The CHAIRMAN. Never heard of it?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no other questions. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I was talking about the same rumors that had come to me from somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. As you were there with Bicknell?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you follow that up? I have looked over the testimony and I haven't been able to find it but I want to know now, from your recollection, do you know whether you ever tried to follow that up here in Washington after you failed on Bicknell and Fielder?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes, sir. We asked for all the messages there were about any broken codes and we were told we had had all they had except this magic thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that you did not get the magic?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No; we were never shown one of the magic messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Not one?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Not one.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever shown the substance of the magic messages?

[8829] Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that when you made this report you never had any information out of the magic messages?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there were such messages?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, I knew that the Army or Navy or State Department had been cracking a super code of the Japanese for weeks or months and that they had been taking off all kinds of information. We asked the War Department and the Navy Department to tell us what they got from that and they told us. They did not show us the messages, any of them, and I didn't ask them to.

Senator FERGUSON. That being true how was this finding possible, on page 19:

The Secretary of State—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Now, Senator, is this an investigation of the Roberts commission or an investigation of what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to get the facts.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. When you ask "How is this finding possible?" I don't find you criticizing me a bit.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not criticizing. I want to know on the facts you had before you—

[8830] Mr. Justice ROBERTS. How we could make a certain finding.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I think that is criticism.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that is criticism?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Go ahead. I will be glad to answer your question.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

Now, I merely mean if you didn't have any of these messages, for instance, the message setting the dead line as the 25th, which he had, another dead line of the 29th, the pilot message, the 1 o'clock message, the 13-part message up until midnight or 9 o'clock, and the 14th part and 1 o'clock message on Sunday morning, how could the commission make a finding, if they didn't have the facts?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Let him answer the question first.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I spent an entire day in Secretary Hull's office. Secretary Hull showed me, as a Commissioner sent over by the

commission, because we wanted [8831] to do him the courtesy of sending someone there to take his evidence instead of dragging him over to the Navy Department, Secretary Hull showed me his personal memorandum where he had noted that on a certain day he had told the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy this, that and the other thing, and where he got that information I didn't ask him, but I was perfectly convinced, and our commission was convinced from my report to them of the testimony he brought to me, that Secretary Hull had been warning the War and Navy Departments day by day and day by day that something might happen this day or that day, that the situation was degenerating, and so on.

[8832] Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, Justice, that part of the testimony is not in the testimony furnished to us, is it?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Certainly not. They had a stack of memoranda of the State Department that high, or Secretary Hull's personal memoranda and in order to recap it I asked him to write the letter which is in our record.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have the message of the 16th and the 17th—no, it was in Exhibits 16 and 17 here and I will describe it because you wouldn't know those exhibit numbers, about the two deadlines. Did you ever know there was a dead line set?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. I won't say that I knew there was a dead line set in so many words. What our commission was interested in was this, if General Marshall and Admiral Stark had not been given sufficient warnings the Secretary of State would have been at fault. We did not want to pass on the policy that the Secretary of State had or was pursuing, it was not within our function at all. We were to look into any military defaults.

Now, all we had to satisfy ourselves was that General Marshall and Admiral Stark had had ample warning and they told us so themselves. They said that they had had ample warning.

[8833] Mr. MURPHY. That is all the report says, by the way, the Army and Navy Departments—

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator does not yield.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand you did not go into any question of policy of the Secretary of State or the President of the United States?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Certainly not. It was not within our commission. Here is the commission.

Senator FERGUSON. Your commission was limited solely to the Army?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. And the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. And the Navy?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then we come to the next finding in your conclusions:

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

Now, without having the intercepted magic messages, did you make this finding? I will put it that way.

[8834] Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Why, certainly. The Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark told us and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy told us that every time Hull gave them a warning they would go and repeat it to the Chief of Staff and to the Admiral. I did not need to look at any messages to find out whether Marshall and Stark had been sufficiently warned. That is all I was interested in.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Justice, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the President, and the Secretary of State were each being furnished this magic. Did you not know that they were all being furnished the magic?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I did not know it and I would not have been interested in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, as to whether or not—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Now, let's go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have something to say?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Let's investigate the Roberts commission. I would not have been interested in it, Senator. I wanted to know whether the military men were put on full warning and put on their toes by the men who did have the information. I got a unanimous statement that they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, Justice, if your commission [8835] was not furnished all the data that we had here in Washington how could you make a finding on whether or not they were on their toes out in Hawaii and knew all the facts?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. We had the messages that were sent to them.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that there was more information that could have been sent to them?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I suppose there never was a situation where there was not more information that could be sent to somebody.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I show you Exhibit 2 and show you a message on page—

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at this moment.

(Continuing.) Page 14 and ask you whether or not that message was ever furnished to you? [Handing document to witness.]

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I think we saw that message; I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 18 of your report you say this: [Reading:]

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initiation of [8836] a state of readiness for defense.

Now, have you ever gone over all of the intercepted messages, diplomatic and otherwise, like the one I just showed you, to determine whether or not that was a fact or not, or did you find this upon what you had before you and that did not include the magic?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. It certainly did not include the magic. The magic was not shown to us. I would not have bothered to read it if it had been shown to us. All I wanted to know was whether the commanders had been advised of the criticalness of this situation. I found from the messages sent them—I say “I found”—the commission found that they had had ample warning and that they had orders from headquarters. Now, they could have been sent more, of course. They could have been sent a message every 2 hours.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, wait. If there was a message coming in every 2 hours and that information would have given them more warning wouldn't there then have been neglect on those here who did not send it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Now, do you want me to make your report?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, I have made my conclusions. My commissioners joined me in making the conclusions. If you [8837] reach a different conclusion, certainly that is your privilege but don't ask me to check your conclusions.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 2 I see this:

The oral evidence received amounts to 1,887 typewritten pages, and the records and documents examined exceed 3,000 printed pages in number.

Now, the photostatic copy of the transcript has only 1862 pages, 25 less, and there is—would you look at the page?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I do not need to, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you answer it if you do not need to look at it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes; I can answer it. I do not know why the discrepancy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether there is any evidence that we do not have?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I know there is none you do not have.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know what evidence we have as far as the Roberts report is concerned?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, I thought you meant whether there was any evidence before us that you do not have. We turned over everything that was before us that was in the shape of evidence.

[8838] Senator FERGUSON. And to whom did you turn it over?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, our minutes show it; you have the minutes before you. Documents received from the Army were returned to the Army. Documents received from the Navy were returned to the Navy. Documents received neither from the Army nor the Navy were sealed in a Navy bundle, the testimony was sealed in a bundle, a copy of our minutes were sealed in a bundle and one bundle delivered to the Army and one bundle delivered to the Navy and in each one of them we had a list of the documents delivered to the Army and to the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. No copy of the findings and the exhibits was furnished to the White House?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the day that you spent some 2 hours with the President the day you made your report did you have a discussion of the facts?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There was no discussion of the facts?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, it depends on what you mean by a "discussion of the facts."

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you try and give us what took place there and that will answer the question.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, I think it a highly improper thing but if you ask it I suppose I am bound to answer it.

[8839] The President, as I said, read this report with his fingers on the lines, and I remember when he came to a statement—

Senator FERGUSON. Justice, I only want in relation to Pearl Harbor. I do not want anything else.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Certainly. I think it is improper; the report speaks for itself.

The President, I remember, when he saw our report said that the attack had done great damage and caused a great loss of life. He said, "Did you report on the nature of the damage?" I said, "No, Mr. President, I thought the administration would give that out when it thought the country was prepared for it. It is not really our province." He said, "I think you are right." And I remember when he got to something about what happened at Pearl Harbor he said, "Frank Knox told me that." Knox had been over there before us and had come back. And several times he would say "Frank Knox reported on that." Two or three times he would shake his head and say, "Tsk, Tsk," something of that sort.

I remember when he got to the finding about the FBI establishing an office in Pearl Harbor he said, "I ordered the FBI to establish an office there." He said, "I thought they could do the civilian espionage better than the Army or the Navy."

And then he turned to me and he said, "Was there any [8840] evidence that the Army and the Navy and the FBI did not cooperate fully?" I said, "We could find none, Mr. President." And I think there was some report went to Washington on it and he said something about, "I understand the airways there are going to be usable very soon in there," and I said, "I heard the Army and Navy men discussing it with some of the witnesses but it didn't interest me, it had nothing to do with our inquiry."

I remember that—of course, it has been 4 years ago and it was a sort of a running commentary. I think he asked me what reason these officers out there seemed to have for thinking that there never would be an air attack on Oahu? And I told him that as nearly as I could gather it was because they thought that the Japanese would never risk three or four carriers in such an attack, it was too big a risk. And he said something about our lack of carriers, that our carrier force, he hoped, would be very much augmented and very fast and I think he said that he was thinking about converting other types of vessels into carriers, merchant vessels into small carriers.

Well, there was that sort of comment; it was a comment and a question here and there.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything said about the [8841] safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, whether that question had been raised before?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. No. Our report referred to that and he did not say anything about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Justice, what was wrong with the question I asked you, to tell me what the President had said?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, now Senator, I am not going to indicate whether Senator Ferguson is wrong. We have been inquiring about how wrong Roberts is. Don't let us get clear off that line.

Senator FERGUSON. I was wondering why we shouldn't have the facts as a committee.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, I am not going to argue it with you, Senator. I said I was going to try to answer your questions.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, there is in your letter—rather, in the letter from Mr. Stimson I read this language:

Your full opinion on some of these latter points seem to me so important that I hope it will be given to the President and others, possibly, who are concerned with the defense of the country in a manner which we can use without getting to the enemy.

What did he have in mind, do you know?

[8842] Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, I think I know. I told you that on the morning after I was notified of my appointment and the others were we met informally in the Secretary of War's office at his request. Secretary Knox was there and Mr. Stimson very characteristically said that the Army and Navy wanted to cooperate fully with us and furnish us every facility they could and he added that he felt really that it was not a question of Army versus the Navy or Navy versus the Army and he turned to Knox and said, "How about that, Frank?" And Secretary Knox said, "That is absolutely right; it is not a question of Army against the Navy or the Navy against the Army. Let them find the full facts."

And Stimson said, "I have asked you to stop in here because there is another thing in my mind." He said, "While I understand it has nothing to do with your functions as an investigative body, some of these men are competent military and naval men. It has just occurred to me that as a result of your investigation you may think of something that is for the betterment of the service, some lines that we can take in the future and make some recommendations," and we listened to him and we went out.

You see, he wrote in that sense to me afterward. I thought it was not my province to make recommendations to the [8843] Army and Navy and you will see by my reply I acknowledge his letter and say nothing about making any recommendations.

Whether Admiral Standley or Admiral Reeves saw something about a better type of airplane and mentioned it to the Secretary afterward or better antiaircraft or better organization, I do not know, but I did not think I would volunteer any military advice to the Secretary of War and I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had not given him any opinion, so that he wanted you to elaborate on the report?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Certainly not. I gave him what is in our report and I have never given him anything else.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have information in Hawaii that there had been wire tapping?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. It depends on when you mean.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at any time.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. We were so informed and the testimony was that the military services, intelligence services, including the FBI, had been instructed by the Attorney General that it was unlawful to tap commercial messages, private messages. We were informed that that view was changed just before Pearl Harbor, I cannot say how many days, and that arrangements had been made with one or two of the commercial radio companies for taps. As a result of those taps they got this poinsettia called message that I told you about, where a [8844] Honolulu merchant talked to a Tokyo merchant for something like \$50 about winds and poinsettias and so on.

They took that tap to General Short and he said, "Well, what does it mean?" They said, "We don't know." He said "I don't know what I can do about it." They took it to Admiral Kimmel and the same thing took place.

I think they also—that is the only commercial message that I remember that they got as a result of those 2 or 3 days of taps. They did take off a message that I am not sure whether it was a commercial message or not, in code which contained signals that if a fire was burning on a mountain on Maui on a certain night that would mean something and if a light was shown in a certain house on a certain night—on the night of December 6, that would mean something. Now—

Senator FERGUSON. Just on that, if I may.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. And in addition—let me finish.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. The Navy Intelligence Service could not make that message out. They never got it broken until, I think, December 8 or 9; they finally broke it.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean at Hawaii they had not broken it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is right.

[8845] Senator FERGUSON. We have some testimony here before us that it was broken in the rough and on Commander Kramer's desk by 1 or 2 o'clock on Saturday. Did you go into the question of the attack on the Kra Peninsula; what it meant?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, we went into the fact that the navy intelligence was indicating a tremendous fleet going down the Kra Peninsula and that the likelihood was that an attack would come there very likely.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go into the question as to whether or not we had any obligations if there was an attack upon the Kra Peninsula and not upon America, as to what our obligations would be?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. You would have considered that part of the policy which you were not to go into?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Why, certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So that was not covered.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I just want to ask one or two questions to see if I can understand the testimony of Justice Roberts.

The scope of your inquiry or, rather, the inquiry made by [8846] the Roberts Commission, was limited to the Army and Navy and specifically limited to the facts surrounding Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Quite so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, do I correctly understand your testimony that in connection with the determination of what you conceived to be the issue submitted to the commission you were not shown by either the Army or the Navy the magic messages?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is correct; we were not shown one of them.

Mr. KEEFE. You were shown the messages that were sent from Washington to Kimmel and Short?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. And the reply that Short and Kimmel gave to Washington?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. So that the determination of the Roberts Commission was based upon that type of message and that type of intelligence and in no way considered the magic which was in the possession of the officers here in Washington.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, we considered it in this sense, that evidently the magic had given information to all in the high command here that something was going to break very soon. Now they had a duty as soon as they got that information. That duty was that they sufficiently advise the commanders at [8847] the front that that was the situation and put them on warning.

Mr. KEEFE. So that as far as you and your commission were concerned you had general knowledge that they must have received information from some source—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Oh, certainly.

Mr. KEEFE (continuing). Which prompted them to send the messages.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. They told us they had this magic that gave that distinct information.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, before—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, is it desired that my copy of the report go in? There still seems to be some suspicion that the President did not get all we had, or expressions of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, regardless of any suspicion or lack of suspicion, in order that the record may be complete the Chair thinks that such copy should be printed at this time as a part of your testimony.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. And that it may be returned to me, if the stenographer will mark it as my property. This is the only copy I have.

[8848] The CHAIRMAN. We will undertake to do that.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Thank you, sir.

(The report referred to follows:)

[8849]

JANUARY 23, 1942.

The PRESIDENT,

The White House.

SIR: The undersigned were appointed by Executive Order of December 18, 1941, which defined our duties as a commission thus:

"to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. "The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor."

The Congress speedily supplemented the Executive Order by granting the Commission power to summon witnesses and examine them under oath.

The Commission held three meetings in Washington December 18, 19 and 20, and on the latter day proceeded to Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, where the Commission arrived [8850] December 22 and held meetings December 22, 23, 24, and 26 at the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, Fort

Shafter, and December 27, 29, 30, and 31, 1941, and January 2, and 3, 1942 at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, and January 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu. January 10 the Commission left Honolulu for Washington, D. C., held meetings January 12, 13, and 14, arrived at Washington January 15th, and held further meetings January 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.

The Commission examined 127 witnesses and received a large number of documents. All members of the military and naval establishments, and civil officers and citizens who were thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the inquiry were summoned and examined under oath. All persons in the Island of Oahu, who believed they had knowledge of such facts, were publicly requested to appear, and a number responded to the invitation, and gave evidence.

Various rumors and hearsay statements have been communicated to the Commission. The Commission has sought to find and examine witnesses who might be expected to have knowledge respecting them. We believe that our findings of fact sufficiently dispose of most of them.

The evidence touches subjects which in the national interest should remain secret. We have, therefore, refrained [8851] from quotation of testimony or documentary proof. Our findings, however, have been made with the purpose fully and accurately to reflect the testimony, which as respects matters of fact is substantially without contradiction.

It is true, as we have found, that due to the enormous demand on the nation's capacity to produce munitions and war supplies, there was a deficiency in the provision of matériel for the Hawaiian area. This was but natural, in the circumstances, and was well known to the government departments and local commanders. We have made no detailed findings on the subject, since as will appear from our report, we find that this deficiency did not affect the critical fact of failure to take appropriate measures with the means available.

At our hearings reference was made to what has long been a matter of common knowledge—that there are, and have been, diverse views of national policy respecting the basing of the entire United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, T. H. We feel that the national policy in this matter is one that has been settled by those responsible for such decisions and that it is not within our province—that of finding the facts respecting the attack of December 7, and the responsibility for the resulting damage to the United States,—to discuss any such topic.

Regrettable loss of life and extensive damage [8852] resulted from the air raid. The nature of that damage and the details of the measures taken to repair it have no direct bearing on the execution of the mandate appointing this Commission, and the subject is dealt with in our report only to the extent that it bears on questions of responsibility for the disaster.

The evidence taken covered a wide scope. The Commission intentionally invited such latitude of testimony and inquiry in the belief that thereby incidental light might be thrown upon the main issues involved. As an example, the Commission heard evidence to show what had been done at Pearl Harbor and on the Island of Oahu by naval and military commands subsequent to December 7, 1941, in the view that this might throw some light upon the matters submitted for our consideration. Again, the Commission heard much testimony as to the population of Hawaii, its composition, and the attitude and disposition of the persons composing it, in the belief that the facts disclosed might aid in appraising the results of investigative, counter-espionage, and anti-sabotage work done antecedent to the attack of December 7, 1941.

The Commission visited the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor and air fields of the military and naval establishments, as well as the Army posts and forts and certain of the coast fortifications on the Island of Oahu.

[8853] The minutes of each meeting of the Commission are of record. The statements of witnesses received in the meetings previous to that of December 22 have been recorded in summaries. All testimony received at the meeting of December 22 and the subsequent meetings was stenographically reported and transcribed.

The oral evidence received amounts to 1887 typewritten pages, and the records and documents examined exceed 3000 printed pages in number.

Appended hereto is a map of the Island of Oahu showing the location of the principal naval and military establishments.

All the testimony and evidence received have been considered, and as the result of its deliberations, the Commission submits the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

About 7:55 A. M. Honolulu time (1.25 P. M. E. S. T.) on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Japanese forces attacked Army and Navy installations and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii.

Although the United States and Japan were at peace on that morning, Japan planned to announce to the Secretary of State of the United States at 1.00 P. M. of that day E. S. T. (7.30 A. M. Honolulu time) the severance of diplomatic relations and simultaneously to attack the [8854] Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor. The military preparations for this breach of international faith and honor were put in train and the forces for its consummation had been dispatched weeks prior to any intimation of the planned severance of relations.

II

The Territory of Hawaii comprises the group of islands known as "The Hawaiian Islands." This group consists of the larger islands—Hawaii, Maui, Molokai, Oahu, and Kauai—a number of smaller islands. They extend from Hawaii in the south some three hundred miles in a northwesterly direction, including Kauai in the north. For purposes of certain developments and protection, the Islands of Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Christmas, and Canton, had been placed under the responsible naval and military heads in the Hawaiian area.

The importance of the Territory of Hawaii from a national defense standpoint is the fact that Pearl Harbor, the main outlying naval base in the Pacific, is located in the Island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian group. For this reason all measures for the protection and defense of the Territory have centered in and around Oahu, the other islands being garrisoned by minor forces only. A main outlying naval base, such as Pearl Harbor, is intended for the use of the fleet for taking on fuel and supplies, [8855] for recreation and rest of the fleet personnel, and for the repair and refitting of ships.

III

It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to affairs in the Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other Governments. It was realized by the State, War and Navy Departments of the United States that unless these policies were reconciled war in the Pacific was inevitable.

IV

Plans and preparations against the contingency of war was the joint responsibility of the military and naval authorities, and within the limits of funds and authorizations provided by the Congress were being ceaselessly carried out.

Under these plans the general function of the Army is to conduct military operations in direct defense of United States territory. The general function of the Navy is to conduct naval operations to gain and maintain control of vital sea areas, thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers.

Specific plans for the protection of the Hawaiian area against every contingency had been prepared. There included Joint Army and Navy War Plans and War Department and Navy Department plans subsidiary thereto which [8856] establish the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, assign tasks and forces to both Army and Navy for its joint defense, and prescribe that the system of coordination between the responsible Army and Navy commanders shall be by mutual cooperation.

V

The responsibility for the joint defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier rested upon the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant 14th Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet, in addition, was assigned the task of protecting the territory within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions within that frontier, and the further task of covering the operations of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier forces. The Commanding General, Hawaiian De-

partment, could properly deal respecting defense measures and dispositions with either the commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet from February 1, 1941 to December 17, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. The Commandant, 14th Naval District from April 11, 1940 to date is Rear Admiral Claude E. Bloch. The [8857] Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, from February 7, 1941 to December 17, 1941, was Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

A local joint defense plan entitled "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier", was prepared by General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, the latter acting under the direction of Admiral Kimmel. Each commander adopted a standing operating procedure, or standing orders, to carry out his obligation under the joint agreement. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was intended to become operative under order of the War and Navy Departments or as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emergency, a threat of hostile action, or the occurrence of war.

VI

The means available to the Army, for the fulfillment of this mission, consist of coast defense and antiaircraft artillery, mobile ground forces, the Hawaiian Air Force, and an aircraft warning service. The supporting elements of the Navy consist of local naval defense forces comprising light surface craft and shore-based aircraft not assigned to the fleet. The fleet as such was not charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor, except that certain aircraft attached to the fleet, when present, and the antiaircraft weapons of such units of the fleet as were in [8858] port, were available.

It was recognized that, prior to furnishing the full war strength garrison, insufficient forces were available to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time. The responsible commanders made numerous recommendations to the War and Navy Departments for additional forces, equipment, and funds which they deemed necessary to insure the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under any eventuality. The national situation permitted only a partial filling of these requirements. However, presupposing timely dispositions by the Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii, the forces available to them were adequate to frustrate a surprise air attack or greatly to mitigate its effectiveness.

VII

In a letter of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised the Secretary of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of the Pacific fleet while in Pearl Harbor. The writer stated: "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor." The writer stated that the "inherent possibilities of a major disaster" warranted further speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of [8859] the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned.

The letter proceeded: "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack (2) air torpedo plane attack (3) sabotage (4) submarine attack (5) mining (6) bombardment by gun fire." It stated the defenses against all but the first two were then satisfactory, described the probable character of an air attack and urged consideration by the Army of dispositions to discover and meet such attack and provision of additional equipment therefor. It concluded with recommendations for the revision of joint defense plans with special emphasis on the coordination of Army and Navy operations against surprise aircraft raids. It also urged the conduct of joint exercises to train the forces to meet such raids.

The Secretary of War replied February 7, 1941, giving the present and prospective status of the Hawaiian Department in respect to airplanes and antiaircraft artillery, and stating with respect to the other proposals of the Secretary of the Navy that a copy of the letter was being forwarded to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, with direction to him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making the suggested measures effective.

[8860] Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters at about the time they assumed the commands which they held December 7, 1941. Rear Admiral Bloch also received copies.

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and plans subsidiary thereto envisaged the possibility of an air attack and estimated that, if made, it would most likely occur at dawn. An agreement between the Hawaiian Air Force and the Commander, Navy Patrol Wing Two, established the responsibilities for the joint use and operation of the available air forces of the Army and Navy. The Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, and standing orders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and the 14th Naval District also prescribed measures for protection against air attack. Frequent joint drills and exercises were conducted during the year 1941 to insure such measures would be effective.

VIII

For months prior to December 7, 1941, the Secretary of State was repeatedly in contact with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, not only in Cabinet meetings, but in meetings of the War Council; and on the occasions of those contacts and in conference with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy discussed negotiations with Japan and the growing tensility of the relations of the United States with Japan. At meetings [8861] of the War Council the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations were also present. The Secretary of State constantly kept the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy informed of the progress of the negotiations, and all three of these officials were cognizant of the growing threat of hostilities and of the military and naval needs and measures consequent thereupon. The Secretaries of War and Navy were in constant touch with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and imparted to them the information received from the Secretary of State and the results of their conferences with him. The latter officers in turn advised the responsible commanders in the field of the progress of events and of the growing threat of hostilities. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware that previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Axis methods indicated that hostile action might be expected prior to a declaration of war.

IX

October 16, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, were advised by the War and Navy Departments of the changes in the Japanese cabinet, of the probability of hostilities between Japan and Russia, and of the possibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States. [8862] Both commanders were warned to take precautions and to make preparatory dispositions which would not disclose their strategic intentions or constitute provocation as against Japan. Admiral Kimmel made certain dispositions of units of the fleet, and placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. At that time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in training operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly important to the training of the fleet personnel, and the Army was also conducting intensive training, particularly of its air arm. The responsible commanders testified that to undertake increased defense measures respecting Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian area would necessitate curtailment of training, if not its virtual suspension, and they thought the situation was not such as to require that.

November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility; that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations, the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of its army and naval forces, support this opinion. The communication enjoined secrecy to prevent complication of the tense existing situation. The message advised that the [8863] Chief of Staff of the Army requested that the local senior Army officers be advised that he concurred in the despatch. This message was seen by both the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had been continued through October and November, and were awaiting further developments. November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, that the negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended, with little likelihood of their resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible; that

in the event of hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that this nation should not commit the first overt act; that the Department Commander was not to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his defense. The message directed him, even prior to hostile action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was directed to restrict the information contained in the message to the minimum of essential officers, and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures taken. The purport of this message was communicated by the Department Commander to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

[8864] On the same day (November 27, 1941) The Chief of Military Intelligence sent a message to the Intelligence Officer on the Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to inform the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue; and that subversive activity might be expected.

On the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. It directed the execution of a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. It stated that Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage, and that a similar warning was being sent by the War Department. It ordered that the addressee inform naval district and army authorities. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet communicated the purpose of this message to the General commanding [8865] the Hawaiian Department of the Army.

At the time of our hearing General Short had no independent recollection of the last mentioned message, although he felt that it must have been shown to him.

November 27, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in response to the direction of the Chief of Staff that he report measures taken, informed the Chief of Staff that he had alerted his command against sabotage and that he was maintaining liaison with the Navy. No reply referring to this message was sent by the War Department; but General Short testified that he considered the Adjutant General's message referred to in the next succeeding paragraph a reply.

November 28, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, received from the Adjutant General of the Army a message stating that the critical situation required every precaution to be taken at once against subversive activities, within the scope of the Army's responsibility; that all necessary measures to be taken to protect military establishments, property and equipment against sabotage, against propaganda affecting Army personnel, and against all espionage. The message disclaimed ordering any illegal measures, and warned that protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, so as to avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm. The message stated that [8866] identic communications were being sent to all air stations, and on November 28 the Chief of the Army Air Forces sent such an identic message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

November 29, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, replied to the last mentioned message outlining at length and in detail the measures taken to prevent sabotage of military establishments and property and essential industrial and public utility installations. No reply was sent by the War Department to this message. General Short testified that he considered this series of messages a tacit agreement that the measures taken were all that were intended by the Department.

November 29, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, which was in substance a quotation of the Chief of Staff's despatch of November 27 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; and in addition directed the addressee to take no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act, and ordered certain action in case hostilities should occur.

November 30, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and also forwarded the message to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for his information, in which it was

stated the indications were that Japan was about to [8867] launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus, directing the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to do certain scouting, but to avoid the appearance of attacking. Admiral Kimmel testified that he had viewed this message as indicating that the Navy Department was not expecting a Japanese attack on Hawaii.

The Navy Department sent three messages to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet; the first of December 3, 1941, stated that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents; the second of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only); and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific Islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment.

The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of aid raids. On the [8868] contrary they only served to emphasize in their minds the danger from sabotage and surprise submarine attack. The necessity for taking a state of war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air raid attack was not considered.

[8869]

X

December 1, 1941, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin which, under the caption "Japanese Naval Situation", stated:

"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home [8870] waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers."

The naval intelligence service in Hawaii, due to lack of information indicating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, concluded they were in home ports.

XI

At about noon E. S. T. (6:30 A. M. Honolulu time) December 7, an additional warning message indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan, was despatched by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief of Naval Operations, for the information of responsible Army and Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

XII

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District, their senior subordinates, of their principal staff officers, considered the possibility of air raids. Without exception they believed that the chances of such a raid while the Pacific Fleet was based upon Pearl Harbor were practically nil. The attack of Sunday, December 7, 1941, was therefore a complete surprise to each of them.

[8871] While General Short and Admiral Kimmel conferred frequently with respect to joint Army-Navy plans and procedures, they did not, on or subsequent to November 27, 1941, hold any conference specifically directed to the meaning of the messages received from the War and Navy Departments or concerning action required to be taken pursuant to those messages.

For some time prior to November 27, 1941, the War Department and the Navy Department had under consideration the possibility of sending Army airplanes to Wake and Midway and withdrawing marine planes then on those islands: of relieving marines stationed there by the substitution of units of the Army. General Short, Admiral Kimmel, and Rear Admiral Bloch had been in conference concerning this proposal.

At the time of the receipt of the messages of November 27 by Admiral Kimmel and General Short, respectively, this proposal was a subject of discussion. General Short held discussions with Admiral Kimmel on November 27, December 1, 2, and 3, concerning this matter in an effort to compose certain differences of view. At one of these conferences Admiral Kimmel inquired of his War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris, who was present, concerning the probability of a surprise air attack on Oahu. According to General Short, Captain McMorris replied there was no probability of such an attack; and, according to Captain McMorris, his reply was that the Japanese would never so [8872] attack. According to the testimony Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not discuss means or measures for Hawaiian defense to be adopted in the light of the messages.

On and after November 27, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, independently took such action as each deemed appropriate to the existing situation. Neither informed the other specifically of the action he was taking, and neither inquired of the other whether or not any action had been taken, nor did they consult as to the appropriateness of the actions taken by them respectively.

After receipt of the messages of November 27 the following action was taken:

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered Alert No. 1 (see next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27, and it was maintained in effect until December 7. At the same time he ordered that the aircraft warning system operate daily from 4:00 A. M. to 7:00 A. M. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in his capacity as base defense officer, called a conference of all the destroyer commanders of the inshore patrol, advised them that something might happen, and that they should be on the alert. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet made certain dispositions of units of the Fleet for the purpose of strengthening his outposts to the south and west of the [8873] Hawaiian Islands, and also issued an order that any Japanese submarines found in the operating areas around the Island of Oahu should be attacked. This order went beyond the authority given him by the Navy Department.

In the Hawaiian Department's standing operating procedure governing the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, three states of readiness were prescribed, known as Alert No. 1, Alert No. 2, and Alert No. 3. Alert No. 1 was thus defined:

"This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, with no threat from without."

Alert No. 2 was thus defined:

"This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and air craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided."

Alert No. 3 was thus defined:

"This alert requires occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands."

[8874]

XIII

The responsibilities of the Army included the installation and operation of an aircraft warning system for the detection of water-borne and air-borne craft at a distance from the coast. Throughout the late spring and summer of 1941 the Army was engaged in the installation of permanent facilities for this purpose on the Hawaiian Islands. Permanent installations had not, on December 7, 1941, been completed. By November 27, 1941, certain mobile equipment had been installed at temporary locations, and was being operated intermittently throughout the day for the purpose of training personnel in its operation. On November 27, 1941, in connection with the order for Alert No. 1, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that this system be operated each day during the period from 4.00 A. M. until 7.00 A. M. It was intended that in the near future the Navy should have officer personnel in the information center, but up to December 7 such officers had not been designated. In accordance with the order in effect, the system closed at 7.00 A. M. Sunday, December 7. A non-commissioned officer who had been receiving training requested that he be allowed

to remain at one of the stations, and was granted leave so to do. At about 7.02 A. M. he discovered what he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east of north of Oahu, at a distance of about 130 miles. He reported this fact at 7.20 A. M. to a lieutenant of the Army who was at the central information center, having been detailed there to familiarize himself with the operation of the system. This inexperienced lieutenant, having information that certain United States planes might be in the vicinity at the time, assumed that the planes in question were friendly planes, and took no action with respect to them. The recording of the observation made indicated that these airplanes were tracked towards the Island and then lost.

On November 27, 1941, there was sufficient partially trained personnel available to operate the aircraft warning system throughout twenty-four hours of the day, as installed in its temporary locations. An arc of nearly 360 degrees around Oahu could have been covered.

Admiral Kimmel, on and prior to December 7, 1941, assumed that the aircraft warning system was being fully operated by the Army, but made no inquiry after reading any of the messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments as to what the fact was with respect to its operation.

XIV

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that, when it became effective, the Army should conduct an inshore airplane patrol, covering the circumference of the Island of Oahu to a distance of about twenty miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no inshore patrol was conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. Pilots were being trained on weekdays, and the training involved flying around the confines of Oahu from about eight o'clock in the morning throughout the day. On Sunday morning no inshore airplane patrol was conducted.

XV

Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, when the Plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distant air reconnaissance, radiating from Oahu to a distance of from seven to eight hundred miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The Fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the Island of Oahu, and in connection with such operations carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however, constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360 degrees, and rarely extended to a radius of seven hundred miles.

Means were available for distance reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack.

General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments [8877] he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted by the Navy.

XVI

There were, prior to December 7, 1941, Japanese spies on the Island of Oahu. Some were Japanese consular agents and others were persons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service. These spies collected, and through various channels transmitted, information to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval establishments and dispositions on the Island.

In Hawaii the local Army Intelligence Service has always devoted itself to matters pertaining to Army personnel and property; and the local Naval Intelligence Service to matters pertaining to Navy personnel and property. In addition, prior to the establishment of an office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii, Naval Intelligence investigated enemy activities amongst the civil population. When the Bureau's office was established it was agreed by the three governmental agencies that the Bureau should take over and become primarily responsible for investigation of matters connected with the civil population, and that the three services should cooperate with each other. Efforts were made by the Bureau to uncover espionage activities in Hawaii. The United States being at peace with Japan, restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining [8878] the content of messages transmitted by telephone or

radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu and Japan. The Bureau and the local intelligence staffs were unable, prior to December 7, to obtain and make available significant information respecting Japanese plans and fleet movements in the direction of Hawaii.

In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents acting under the Japanese Consul who was stationed in Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii. The Naval District Intelligence Office raised a question with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and with the Intelligence Officer of the Hawaiian Department of the Army, whether these agents should not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign principal as required by statutes of the United States. In conferences respecting this question the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until they had been given notice and an opportunity to register, asserting that their arrest would tend to thwart the efforts which the Army had made to create friendly sentiment towards the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and create unnecessary bad feeling. No action was taken against the agents.

It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage [8879] in Hawaii was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Japanese consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and other names many messages on commercial radio circuits. This activity greatly increased toward December 7, 1941. The contents of these messages, if it could have been learned, might have furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating agencies they were unable prior to December 7th to obtain and examine messages transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons acting for him.

It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had complete information. They evidently knew that no task force of the United States Navy was anywhere in the sector northeast, north, and northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. They evidently knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance was maintained in any sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6 no inshore airplane patrol was being maintained around the periphery of Oahu. They knew from maps which they had obtained, the exact location of vital air fields, hangars, and other structures. They also knew accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed. Their fliers had the most detailed maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or field. Each [8880] seems to have been given a specified mission.

XVII

The passes and liberty granted the personnel of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on Saturday, December 6th, were normal for a period when the forces were not upon a war footing, with the following exceptions: the normal Army guard had been increased by approximately 100 per cent; two battalions of infantry were held in reserve for anti-sabotage defense; anti-aircraft gun crews were maintained on ships in harbor for instant defense; all Navy personnel, with the exception of those authorized to be absent, were required to be in their quarters at midnight; all places of amusement in Honolulu and all entertainments at the Army posts were closed at midnight; all saloons and drinking places in Honolulu were closed at midnight.

On the night of December 6 numerous officers of the Army and Navy attended social functions at various points on the island of Oahu, principally the usual Saturday functions at the various posts and naval establishments. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, were both guests at dinners away from their posts of command on that evening, but returned to their quarters at an early hour. [8881] The percentages of strength in the Army present for duty on the Island of Oahu at 8.00 A. M. December 7, 1941, reported by all major echelons and posts, were: 24th Infantry Division, 90%; 25th Infantry Division, 85.6%; Coast Artillery Corps, 87.5%; Air Force, 88.9%; miscellaneous, including Department Headquarters, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Medical, 92%. Estimated general percentage 88.8%. Reports from large ships and destroyers that were in Pearl Harbor during the attack, show 60% of officers on board, and 96% of the men. Of seventy-five vessels of the Fleet, of all kinds, 49 commanding officers were aboard during the attack, and 22 were enroute to their ships, one was on another ship, and one was on authorized leave, which leaves two for whom we are unable to account.

Intoxicating liquor is sold on the Island of Oahu, and men on pass or on liberty have the opportunity to buy and consume it. Following the established procedure, at home and abroad, the Army exercises disciplinary control of men on pass through its military police, and the Navy of men on liberty by the use of shore patrols. These organizations take into custody any person showing evidence of intoxication. On the night of December 6-7, 1941, from 6.00 P. M. to 6.00 A. M., arrests of soldiers by the military police, for intoxication, were 38, and arrests of sailors by the Navy shore patrol, for intoxication, were 4. By [8882] comparison the arrests of civilians for drunkenness on that night were 39. Thorough inquiry disclosed there is no evidence of excessive drinking by any officer of either service on that night. The evidence shows that as respects the use of intoxicating liquor and intoxication, the conditions amongst the men of the Army and of the Navy on the night of December 6 compare closely with similar conditions for the several preceding months. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, the usual percentage of enlisted strength entitled to passes or liberty took advantage of such privilege to spend the afternoon or evening in the city of Honolulu. Application of this ratio to total numbers of all the services then on the Island of Oahu and in Pearl Harbor, amounting to about seventy-five thousand men, indicates that no less than eleven thousand soldiers, sailors and marines visited Honolulu that afternoon and evening.

In normal times more enlisted men of both services are absent from duty by permission on Saturday nights than on other nights; and on Saturday nights more officers are customarily absent than on week-day nights.

On the morning of Sunday, December 7, Army posts and Naval vessels and stations were adequately manned, for the readiness and alert then in effect, by men fit for duty.

XVIII

The attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, was a combined air raid and submarine attack on the Island of Oahu, a bombardment of Midway and a continuous air attack and bom- [8883] bardment on Wake Island.

Available information indicates that the force attacking Oahu consisted of either three or four Japanese carriers, with supporting surface craft and a few small submarines, and that this force had maintained radio silence during its approach, which, except for the submarines, was from the northward of Oahu.

In the attack on Oahu a suspicious object was sighted in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6.30 A. M., by the U. S. S. *Antares*. Between 6.33 and 6.45 this object, which was a small submarine, was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and the U. S. S. *Ward*. A report of this action by the *Ward* reached the Naval Base watch officer at 7.12 A. M., who notified his Chief of Staff. The ready destroyer was despatched to investigate, but no alert warnings were issued based upon this report. Another small submarine was fired upon, depth charged, rammed and sunk inside the harbor between 8.35 and 8.43 A. M. A third small submarine grounded in Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There is no evidence of any damage by torpedoes fired by these submarines.

Pearl Harbor was provided with an anti-torpedo net which would have prevented the entrance of torpedoes into the harbor, and would have revealed the entrance of a submarine. The procedure prior to December 7, 1941, was to keep the net closed during the hours of darkness, opening [8884] it only when necessary for a vessel to pass through. It was kept open during daylight hours, on the theory that, during daylight, the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels in the vicinity, would detect a submerged or partially submerged submarine. December 7 the net was opened at 4.58 A. M. for the entrance of two mine sweepers. It was kept open until 8.40 A. M., when it was closed by orders. The net was not damaged. The submarine was first sighted in the harbor at 7.45 A. M. The time of its entrance is not known, but probably it passed in about 7.00 A. M.

An estimated force of from 150 to 200 fighting, bombing and torpedo planes simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor and all air bases on Oahu at about 7.55 A. M. All attacking planes had withdrawn before 11.00 A. M. As a result of the attack serious loss of life was caused and serious damage was inflicted on ships in the harbor, and planes, hangars, and other facilities at Hickam Field, Ewa Field, Fort Island, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, and Kaneohe.

The major part of the damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from planes. The torpedoes were of an obsolete type, altered to increase

their explosive load, to decrease their radius, and fitted with side vanes to insure functioning in shallow water [8885] a weapon peculiarly adapted to an attack such as the one delivered upon ships in Pearl Harbor. Many of the bombs had extra heavy cases, and appeared to be modified armor-piercing shell.

December 7, 1941, at 9.30 P. M. Midway time (11.30 P. M. Honolulu time), a force believed to consist of two cruisers and two destroyers, approaching from the southward, opened fire and shelled Midway Island for about thirty minutes. About noon December 8, 1941 (2.50 P. M. December 7, Honolulu time), some twenty-seven land planes made a strafing and bombing attack on Wake Island. Some loss of life and damage to material resulted on each island. Attacks on Wake continued until its capture on December 22, 1941 (December 21, Honolulu time).

Immediately upon realizing that the Japanese were attacking, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered Alert No. 3. The alert was executed with reasonable promptness. At the same time the Commander in Chief placed the Fleet on a full war basis and issued a series of orders in an effort to intercept and destroy the attacking force.

Officers and enlisted men, in defending against the attack, demonstrated excellent training and high morale. Anti-aircraft weapons aboard ship, which were not already manned, and anti-aircraft weapons ashore, which were in [8886] position, were promptly manned. Junior officers and enlisted men on their own initiative procured from storage every possible automatic weapon. These weapons continued in action during and in spite of low level strafing and dive bombing which had been known to demoralize even seasoned troops. At least three fighter pilots, in total disregard of their own safety, attempted to take off in the face of greatly superior forces then attacking their airdrome, but lost their lives in the attempt. A few fighter planes parked on an outlying gunnery training field, which was not attacked, took the air. This combined anti-aircraft and fighter action resulted in the destruction of approximately thirty enemy aircraft; and a number of others were lost at sea because they were unable to rejoin their carriers.

XIX

The state of readiness prescribed for Army aircraft prior to the attack required them to be ready for flight only after four hours' notice. The type of alert in effect required all Army aircraft to be concentrated in order more effectively to guard against possible sabotage, instead of being dispersed in order to afford greater security against air attack, and greater facility in taking the air. This state of readiness, this concentration of airplanes, and the element of surprise, all [8887] contributed to the effectiveness of the Japanese attack, and resulted in such permanent or temporary disablement of airplanes that very few fighter planes were able to take the air during the course of the action. For the same reasons it was impossible to get airplanes into the air in time to trail the Japanese airplanes back to their carriers.

The aircraft warning system, which was remanned by about 8.30 A. M. December 7, 1941, failed during the balance of that day to furnish any reliable information of enemy aircraft returning to their carriers. Such information as it afforded indicated enemy forces to the southward and southwestward of Oahu. A report of an actual contact with an enemy carrier, which later proved to be erroneous, gave credence to numerous reports from other sources indicating enemy carriers might be to the southward and southwestward thus causing futile searches in those areas.

On December 7, naval Task Force 8 was about 200 miles west of Oahu proceeding towards Oahu. Another was about 700 miles west of Oahu. A third Task Force 11 was in the vicinity of Johnston Island, about 700 miles southwest of Oahu. These task forces were engaged in operations connected with strengthening the defenses of the outlying islands.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to the attack, the following searches of sea areas were being made. [8888] Six patrol planes were searching south and southeastwardly from Midway. Three patrol planes were in the air engaged in a joint exercise with submarines south of Oahu. Eighteen scouting planes from Task Force 8 had been despatched to scout in advance of the force which was on its way to Oahu. These scouted to the southwestward of Oahu. After the attack the following searches were made; The three planes in the air south of Oahu, according to their standing orders, searched to the northwest of Oahu a distance of about 375 miles. Nine planes were despatched by Task Force 8 and searched to the south and southwest of Oahu. Carrier

planes of Task Force 11 searched in an area about 500 miles southwestward of Oahu. About 11.27 A. M. two heavy Army bombers and four light bombers took off to attack a carrier reported about 25 miles off Barber's Point. After failure to make contact the two heavy bombers searched first to the southwestward and then in areas to the northwest of Oahu. The other four searched to the southwestward. At 11.50 A. M. six Navy VS planes searched southward of Oahu. Thereafter nine planes searched the sector southwest to northwest of Oahu. Two utility planes searched northward of Oahu to a distance of 300 miles; and nine planes which had arrived from carriers and refueled searched some two hundred miles to the northward. No contacts were made with the enemy aircraft or carriers, except that one Navy airplane was at [8889] tacked by a Japanese airplane some 300 miles north of Oahu. This incident was not reported until the next day.

SUMMARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS

Pearl Harbor is an important outlying naval base, and its security is vital to both offensive and defensive operations. It is the Army's function to insure the security of Pearl Harbor against hostile attack, and the Navy's function to support the Army indirectly by operations at sea and directly by making available therefor such instrumentalities of the Navy as are on the vessels of the fleet when in harbor and are located or based on shore either temporarily or permanently.

Effective utilization of the military power of the nation is essential to success in war and requires that the operations of the Army and the Navy be coordinated. Under the then existing plans the joint defense of the Hawaiian Frontier was to be coordinated by mutual cooperation between the commanders concerned. Plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier were prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Adherence to such a plan prepared in advance of hostilities does not suffice to relieve commanders of their responsibility to [8890] apply and adapt the plan to the situation as it develops.

Where as here the defense of an area is the joint responsibility of two commanders who are to coordinate their activities by mutual cooperation, the first duty of such commanders in the case of an emergency is conference and consultation with respect to the measures to be taken under the existing plans and the adaption of those plans in whole or in part to the situation.

At about the time that Admiral Kimmel and General Short assumed their respective commands, the War and Navy Departments were in correspondence with respect to adequate defense against air raids on Oahu and the naval base. The correspondence between the Departments exhibits a deep concern respecting the probability of this form of attack. These commanders were acquainted with this correspondence. Nevertheless, there has been amongst the responsible commanders and their subordinates, without exception, a conviction, which persisted up to December 7, 1941, that Japan had no intention of making any such raid. Consequently this form of attack was a complete surprise to all of the superior officers of Army and Navy stationed in the Hawaiian area. This conviction persisted notwithstanding messages containing warnings and orders, brought to the attention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the attack. As early as October 16 the commanders were warned of the [8891] possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States and were directed to take precautions and make preparatory dispositions in the light of this information. A significant warning message was communicated to both the local commanders on November 24th. On November 27 each responsible commander was warned that hostilities were momentarily possible. The warnings indicated war, and war only.

Both of these messages contained orders. The Commanding General was ordered to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet was ordered to execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. Other significant messages followed on succeeding days. These emphasized the impending danger and the need for war readiness.

In this situation, during a period of ten days preceding the Japanese attack, the responsible commanders held no conference directed to a discussion of the meaning of the warnings and orders sent them, and failed to collaborate and to

coordinate defensive measures which should be taken pursuant to the orders received. Dispositions as a result of the messages were independently made by each commander. Neither of them informed himself of the measures and dispositions taken by the other.

The dispositions so made were inadequate to meet a [8892] surprise air attack.

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initiation of a state of readiness for defense.

The personnel, matériel, and equipment were insufficient to place the forces on a war footing and maintain them on that footing for an extended period. These deficiencies did not preclude measures which would have to a great extent frustrated the attack or mitigated its severity.

A considerable number of the Army and Navy personnel were on pass or liberty December 6th, for the reason that the state of alert or of readiness demanded by the emergency had not been put into effect. With immaterial exceptions Army and Navy personnel had returned from leave and liberty hours before the attack ensued, fit for duty.

[8893] Both officers and men responded immediately in the emergency and exhibited initiative, efficiency and bravery in meeting the raid.

Based upon its findings of fact, the Commission reaches the following

CONCLUSIONS

1. Effective utilization of the military power of the nation is essential to success in war and requires: first, the coordination of the foreign and military policies of the nation; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the Army and Navy.

2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obligations by consulting and cooperating [8894] with each other, and with their superiors, respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier; and each knew of and concurred in the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible commanders with respect to such defense.

5. The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in the following words: "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."

6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in the following words: "This despatch is to be considered a war warning"; and "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned."

7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian Area, in fulfillment of their obligation so to do, prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the existing emergency would have been adequate.

8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.

9. These commanders failed to confer with respect [8895] to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.

10. The order for Alert No. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

11. The state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning of December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning message.

12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the Army should have been operating; the distant reconnaissance of the Navy, and the

inshore air patrol of the Army, should have been maintained; the anti-aircraft batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional anti-aircraft artillery located on vessels of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have been manned and supplied with ammunition; and a high state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

13. There was deficiencies in personnel, weapons, [8896] equipment and facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time, but these deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible commanders as to the state of readiness to be prescribed.

14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders in the field at about 7:00 A. M. Hawaiian time, December 7, 1941, was but an added precaution, in view of the warnings and orders previously issued. If the message had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have been too late to be of substantial use, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it.

15. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staff's message of that date, nor otherwise, had reported the measures taken by him, and the transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to take measures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply to his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had taken against sabotage only, and referring to nothing [8897] else, tended to lead General Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings and orders received by him.

16. The failure of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the meaning of the warnings received and the measures necessary to comply with the orders given them under date of November 27, 1941, resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost.

17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry [8898] out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

18. The Japanese attack was a complete surprise to the commanders, and they failed to make suitable dispositions to meet such an attack. Each failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. These errors of judgment were the effective causes for the success of the Japanese attack:

19. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:

Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and customs.

Restrictions which prevented effective counter-espionage.

Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive Japanese action in the Far East, and on anti-sabotage measures.

Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

[8899] Non-receipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941.

20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the officers and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient number and were in fit condition to perform any duty. Except for a negligible number, the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect their efficiency.

21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed.

Respectfully submitted.

[8900] The CHAIRMAN. I have a recollection that Admiral Kimmel was asked here by one of the members of the committee whether there were a couple of distinguished admirals who were members of the Commission of which you were chairman and his reply was "There were a couple of admirals."

I would like to ask if you are acquainted with the records of Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves, as to what positions they had held in the Navy?

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Well, Admiral Reeves was originally the assistant engineer on the *Oregon*. When Captain Clark was ordered to bring the *Oregon* around to fight in Cuba in the Spanish-American war Admiral Reeves was responsible largely for the physical condition of her machinery and so on. She came around, as you know, to Cuba and fought.

Admiral Reeves after the Spanish-American War determined that air was the great, coming thing in the Navy. He asked to be transferred from the engineering to the line. He was transferred to the line. He went to Florida and went into one of the Navy's flying schools and handled the sticks, although he was a middle-aged man.

He is the outstanding original airman in the Navy. He was promoted finally to Admiral of the Pacific Fleet and he was Admiral of the United States Fleet more years than any other man in your life or mine. He has been in command of the [8901] United States Fleet.

When the war broke out he was called back to take care of the Navy's end of the lend-lease with Britain and has held that responsible position up to recently at any rate; I do not know how long. He was an officer who wherever he appeared in Honolulu or anywhere else Navy men just flocked to him, as if to a father, and with respect to many of the witnesses who were admirals who came before us, Reeves would turn to me and say, "He is one of my boys."

Admiral Standley has had almost a parallel career. Admiral Standley has had very high commands in the Navy and was Chief of Naval Operations, as you know, sir, for a long time and a very outstanding Chief of Naval Operations, one of the keenest and ablest men I have ever known and one of the fairest.

[8899-A]



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The CHAIRMAN. I think it is valuable to have that testimony as to their record in view of the question asked by a member of the committee.

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. You are correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine would like to inquire.

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to take up one further matter, Justice, and I think you will understand that it is very rare for us to have an opportunity to examine a former Justice of the Supreme Court.

[8902] Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, I hope they are having as much fun as I am.

Senator BREWSTER. It is rarely we can suggest that a witness may be unduly sensitive, although without positive—

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Oh, no; I am just plain Mr. John Citizen now; you know that. I haven't the high exalted position that you hold now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you can be recalled to the service, but if we are retired, we cannot be.

Mr. JUSTICE ROBERTS. No, I cannot be. I have resigned, Senator. I am a pensioner, sir, on your good will only.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I am sure you will appreciate somewhat the difficulty of our situation and I do think that this should be clarified in the record, in justice to everyone concerned. I think probably it is susceptible of clarification, but on page 3173 of our record General Marshall, answering Senator Ferguson—Senator Ferguson, referring to the Roberts report, said:

Before that report was issued, there were certain things taken out of it?

General MARSHALL. Before that report was made public there were certain things withdrawn. * * *

Senator FERGUSON. We are clear on that, that certain parts were taken out before it was made public?

[8903] General MARSHALL. That is correct. I am quite certain, sir.

Then on page 3175 the question appears there, with the Chairman also participating as to clarification of this statement, and Senator Ferguson says:

May we have from the witness what his understanding was?

General MARSHALL. My understanding was, and I am speaking on hearsay because I had no control over the matter, that the complete report went to the President but that the portions that referred to magic were withdrawn from the portion of the report which was released to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. Have I misquoted you, General?

General MARSHALL. There has been so much conversation I am a little confused, but the complete report, as I understand it, and I am not an authority on that, went to the President, and the portions that were considered top secret, which were magic, were pulled out of that before a general release to the public. That is my understanding, but I am not the best authority on that. That is my understanding and it was on that that this part of the letter was based.

I quote all of this, Mr. Justice, in justice to Senator [8904] Ferguson who, I think, had reason to feel that the situation invited clarification and I assume that it is susceptible of clarification and I gather from what you have said that General Marshall was wrong in his understanding, but I do think we ought to have that as a matter of record.

[8905] Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Well, I have testified to the facts. Now if you want me to say, which I think is a very improper thing, that General Marshall was wrong, I will say General Marshall was

teetotally wrong. I have given you facts. The facts are all typed. they are not my word against General Marshall's word.

Sometime ago the President of the United States was asked why portions of the Roberts report were suppressed and he said, "For military reasons."

Senator BREWSTER. What President?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. President Truman. The papers from time to time said that portions of it were suppressed. I was not accused of suppressing it, so I did not jump to conclusions.

Senator BREWSTER. You made your first reputation as an investigator and prosecutor, Mr. Justice, and I cannot believe that in your broad experience you failed to call the attention of witnesses to contradictions of testimony in order to give them an opportunity to clarify it, if it was possible.

I do not think it is questioning the integrity of General Marshall or criticizing you when your attention is called to the testimony of General Marshall before this committee, and it was called to your attention for any [8906] comment you desired to make, and I do feel very confident, in examining your distinguished record both as investigator and justice of the highest court in this country for many years, that you have found that this could be duplicated many times.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. Thank you for those kind words.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to interrupt and raise the point of order, but Justice Roberts has taken care of it.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one remark.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas wishes to ask another question.

Senator LUCAS. I want to make one observation with respect to the winds message, the so-called pilot message and so-called execute message.

There has probably been more misinterpretation about that message than any other message in this hearing.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I haven't any information about it.

Senator LUCAS. On the question that the Senator from Michigan asked you, and also calling attention to a question that you asked a witness while you were in Hawaii, in order to make the record complete at this point I want to direct your attention and call the attention of the committee to [8907] the fact that on November 28 Admiral Hart sent to Admiral Kimmel for his information a copy of the pilot message that is known as the original winds message. the pilot message, and Admiral Kimmel had that message when you gentlemen were in Hawaii making this investigation.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I did not know it.

Senator LUCAS. So it is very reasonable to suppose that, as the result of those high in command in Hawaii having this original message, that some information leaked out and got to you along that line.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Justice, just this one question:

Regardless of General Marshall's answer to any questions based upon the assumption that something in the Roberts Report was suppressed or withheld and that it was done for military reasons, and regardless of the impression of the present President of the United States, who was not at that time familiar with your report or the

existence of it, that if anything was withheld it was for military reasons, the fact is that nothing was suppressed or withheld for military or other reasons, is it not?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. That is correct, sir. We tried not to disclose any military secrets in what we wrote, but what we wrote was published line for line.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I want the record also to [8908] show that General Marshall said he could only give hearsay. There had been a protest by certain members of this committee theretofore about hearsay evidence, but he was asked to pursue a line which necessarily would be hearsay. So it is not a question of contradiction necessarily, it is a question of one knowing the fact and the other giving hearsay evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions by the committee?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. By counsel?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Justice, the committee thanks you for your cooperation. It regrets the necessity of bringing you from what Horace in his "Odes" said is a Sabine farm.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I cannot get back in time to milk, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have a photograph of you in that operation.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. I think that is the most irrelevant of anything that the committee has asked me for [Laughter].

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(Justice Roberts was excused.)

Captain Zacharias, will you resume the witness stand.

[8909] **TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)**

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Senator George was unavoidably detained when he was reached this morning and he will inquire at this time, Captain.

Senator GEORGE. I think my very brief questioning should follow Senator Lucas since he had already commenced.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the questions of Senator George and answers of Captain Zacharias will appear in the record following the conclusion of Senator Lucas' inquiry.

Senator LUCAS. Developing the thought that was just placed before you by the distinguished Senator from Georgia, I again call your attention to page 7137 which carries a copy of the statement that you had given to the committee which you prepared sometime, as I recall, after the Pearl Harbor disaster.

At page 7138 you make this statement:

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of the hour and a half conversation with them of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen but also how and when.

Now reading that without any clarification, would not I be justified in concluding that you had predicted to Admiral Kimmel that this would happen on December 7?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; without knowing that I had given him this 9 months before, and I doubt that anyone would assume that I would make a prediction as to an [8912] exact date 9 months hence. I explained at the conclusion of this morning's testimony that the two words "7 December" were synonymous with Pearl Harbor and were injected in that sentence for the purpose of conveying to Admiral Draemel and Admiral Nimitz what I was talking about prior to a certain period.

Senator LUCAS. I accept your interpretation and clarification, but what I am asking you is, without any clarification and verification, would I have the right to reach the conclusion that you had given Admiral Kimmel definite information that this attack would happen on the date of December 7?

Captain ZACHARIAS. You would have to assume that I had some very occult powers.

Senator LUCAS. I am not assuming anything, whether you have occult powers or just ordinary powers; I am asking you whether that would not be a fair interpretation and whether that is the way he interpreted it on the following page, on page 7140, where he said:

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I am now asking you whether he said to you what he states there, or anything like that.

Admiral KIMMEL. He did not. And furthermore, I would have paid very little attention to any man who told me in March of 1941 that an attack was going to occur on [8913] the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; I would agree with him that such a statement was made.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, Admiral Kimmel, after reading your statement, took the position that you had told him that this would happen on December 7, 1941, and answered accordingly. You have clarified that and qualified it by your statement to the committee this morning.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, it is hard for me to say, with a careful reading of that sentence and having in mind that this was a statement prepared for Admiral Draemel subsequent to Pearl Harbor, that he could read any other meaning into it.

Senator LUCAS. I will read it again.

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them of the exact events to take place on 7 December not only as to what would happen but also how and when.

If I understood the construction of the English language—and I have been practicing law for a good many years—it seems to me—

Captain ZACHARIAS (interposing). The reference to December 7 was made over 3 months after the date, and as I [8914] said, it was synonymous with the words "Pearl Harbor." So I suppose it is possible that Admiral Kimmel would read something else into it. I will grant him that.

Senator LUCAS. I read something else into it too.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is all right, sir.

[8915] Senator LUCAS. I am just wondering if I am not fair in making that kind of interpretation by the way you have it stated here.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I do not think that would be a fair interpretation.

Senator LUCAS. I caution you if you have a case in court at any time you better not use that type of language. It may get you into trouble. Especially with a man like Justice Roberts.

The CHAIRMAN. Or Lawyer Lucas. [Laughter.]

Senator LUCAS. Now, one other question or two, sir: When you were out with Admiral Halsey, with his task force on the mission to Wake Island, which, I understand you to tell the committee went on a regular routine trip without being armed, or without knowing that war might be imminent at any time—

Captain ZACHARIAS (interposing). We were to leave that morning on a routine training schedule. Our task force was due to go out that day, which we did, but after we were outside the harbor, Admiral Halsey changed the course to the westward, and we proceeded toward Wake.

Subsequent to that time we were advised by signal that we were heading for Wake to deliver planes to the [8916] Marines at that place.

Senator LUCAS. What orders did you get from Admiral Halsey with respect to having your ship ready for anything that might happen?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No additional orders. We were in condition of readiness 3, which is half of the antiaircraft battery manned.

Senator LUCAS. Is that the way you sailed?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. To Wake and also upon your return?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator LUCAS. When did you finally change over to an all-out alert on that ship?

Captain ZACHARIAS. About 11 o'clock in the morning of December 7 a report was received that an enemy plane was sighted to the southward, and we went into condition 2, in which half of the main battery are manned in addition to the antiaircraft battery being manned.

Senator LUCAS. When did you first learn of the attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. About 8 o'clock when my communications officer came into my cabin and informed me that a message had been received that—

Oahu is being attacked. This is no drill.

[8917] Senator LUCAS. Then you went on the all-out alert?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir. We immediately received a signal from Admiral Halsey to change our disposition a slight degree. We reduced the distance of the cruisers from the carrier, which we were escorting, by one-half.

We closed into 1,000 yards from the carrier, whereas we were out a mile from the carrier before.

The destroyers which were screening us closed in proportionately.

Senator LUCAS. And you were due back in Pearl Harbor on the evening of December 5?

Captain ZACHARIAS. As far as the schedule provided.

Senator LUCAS. Why was it again that you did not get there then?

Captain ZACHARIAS. We were delayed by the fueling of the ships, the destroyers particularly, and also some little rough weather that we had coming back.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever have a conversation with Admiral Halsey with respect to the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Not during that trip, sir. There was nothing to justify me in doing that.

Senator LUCAS. At any time, did you ever talk to him about it?

[8918] Captain ZACHARIAS. During the trip?

Senator LUCAS. At any time previous to Pearl Harbor did you ever discuss with Admiral Halsey what you discussed with Captain Layton—or do you know about that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Only my conversation. No exact details.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all.

Senator GEORGE. Captain, this forenoon you detailed a statement that you made to Admiral Kimmel and the discussion that you had with Admiral Kimmel. I should like to ask whether or not your statements made to Admiral Kimmel regarding the air attack on Oahu, or the Hawaiian Islands, was based on any specific information that you had received or was it based upon your general knowledge and your general estimate of the situation?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It was based upon my general knowledge and general estimate of the situation.

Senator GEORGE. You received no specific information that there was to be at any particular time an overseas air attack on the Fleet at Oahu?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You never gave any information to General Short?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That, of course, was not your responsibility. But you did have this conversation with Admiral Kimmel.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. I also understood from your testimony that you did not indicate that an air attack would be made on any particular Sunday or week-end.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And whether it would be on December 1, December 7, December 21, or any other particular day?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Your statement was general, not based upon any specific information whatever but upon your general evaluation and general knowledge of the Japanese and their methods of warfare, and so forth?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir; and it was contingent upon a situation which might result in hostilities between the United States and Japan.

Senator GEORGE. Yes, I understand that. That is, if hostilities actually did become imminent, that is, immediate, why, this was your conclusion of what would happen, is that correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That is all the questions I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, as I understand it, your conversation with Admiral Kimmel was sometime toward the end of March of 1941, in which you outlined your idea as to the possible attack on Pearl Harbor, that is right, isn't it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you, prior to your conversation with Admiral Kimmel, been familiar with the message which had been sent to Hawaii from Washington about the possible attack on Pearl Harbor, the origin of that being from the Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Grew?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you now know, do you not, that there was such a message in the month of February?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I have heard that there was something.

[8919] Mr. MURPHY. Had you known at the time you talked to Admiral Kimmel about the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of War's answer, the Secretary of the Navy outlining pretty much in detail the dangers and Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you known that just about at the very same time as you were talking to Admiral Kimmel, that there was prepared, I believe on March 21, 1941, a plan which in effect, outlined the steps that you outlined to the Admiral?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not know that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. There has been a great deal of talk here about a bomb plot from the Japanese in the month of September and decoded in the month of October, but the Martin-Bellinger plan was practically a bomb plot of what would happen at Pearl Harbor; did you know about that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know that the Secretary of War had given a direction to the general at Pearl Harbor to be prepared to meet a situation such as a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, an air raid attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, so that there will be [8920] a complete account of the message sent by Captain Zacharias to Admiral Draemel, I ask that the letter of March 17, 1942, be spread on the record at this point in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

Personal and confidential
Memorandum for Admiral Draemel

MARCH 17, 1942.

In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the following memo is submitted—

My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because of what I consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such a situation, I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break through preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would believe it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter other than assuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our fleet, which

is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude that it makes no difference who does a job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly.

Any criticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster such as that of 7 December.

[8921] Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them, of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battleships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusion and advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an attack. From time to time, in contact with the Staff, I would voice possibilities and only two months before the attack amazed at unrealistic attitude I said, "When are we going to stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack." About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opnav to "open everything to him," sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "You now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other." This envoy arrived [8922] in Washington about 2 December 1941.

On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorrin Thurston, Head of the Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I related the impending possibilities as above and he said, "Here I am a G-2 Officer and I haven't even been advised what to send out over the radio in case of an attack." I advised him precisely to say, "We are having a sporadic air attack, everyone should keep calm and remain indoors. Do not go on the streets, as it will prevent the military from getting to their stations. There is nothing to worry about." On 28 November I sailed with Task Force 8 for Wake Island. Upon receipt of CincPac's despatch on 7 December, "The Islands are being attacked this is no drill," I turned on my radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At least someone believed it. This was probably made certain by the press announcement about 3 December that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third envoy. Seeing this, Mrs. Thurston reminded her husband; and they were alerted.

On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu—one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmel as a positive indication of intention to attack—I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation. All was garbled conversation but the intensity of the [8923] acknowledgments (typically Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a single word which would justify me in requesting ComTask-For 8 to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper warnings would be coming from Washington.

I have made it a point when afloat to give my advice to Intelligence activities both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in". I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally two years ago Commander Dyer advised me that Cincus was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I recommended Lieutenant Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job in an office where there should have been 20 officers instead of two. Early in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to creek up. But I hesitate, wondering why should I have to advise Cincus on the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition.

[8924] One of the contributing factors to 7 December was the reluctance of Admiral Kimmel to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant to carry out directives or someone else would be obtained to do the job. The possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to the Department when a former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition.

A typical indication was one incident which I observed closely. When I arrived in Honolulu in November 1940 to take command of the Salt Lake City I was asked to assist in a survey of the District Intelligence Office which was initiated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations had been blocked and that the office was of little value.

This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th as quickly as possible.

The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we enjoyed in the 11th and indicating the complete lack here he approved all steps to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning, and training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline faults in the District, the report or digest was brought to the attention of Admiral Bloch. This survey was made by an officer who was working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the [8925] District. At the sight of this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch gave vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities suffered for quite a time.

The skepticism of the Commandant regarding necessity for security was also typical from a remark once made during security efforts, "Bring me a Japanese spy. I've never seen one and would like to see one". His yard was full of them.

On 16 September, 1941, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I stated, "It is gratifying to see that there is a possibility of resolving the Japanese situation, but we must not relax until they have given concrete demonstrations of sincerity".

All of the foregoing is simply to indicate the possibility of qualified personnel accurately estimating the situation, and the distressing fact that nothing was done about it.

I am now concerned because of another situation which is growing in seriousness and proportions. Rumors are increasing and I find not only the morale of civilians falling lower and lower but also that of Naval Officers. This is a typical fifth column technique and it must be stopped. It not only softens up our own people but it is throwing the second generation Japanese into the laps of enemy agents, many of whom are still *not in custody*. I used to be most optimistic about the Japanese never returning here for another raid, but that persistence of the present situation, which they will learn about soon enough, will be an invitation to them to return. [8926] This situation can be corrected somewhat by strong "offensive" pronouncements but not by "defensive" ones, and by punitive action against rumor mongers. I found one woman frantically engaging passage because an Army man told her how terrible the gas attack would be when it came. Someone is spreading a rumor that there is to be a Japanese Fleet attack on April 14th. I am now trying to trace the source of some rumors. Rumors are sometimes started to enhance the position of an individual or organization.

Apparently, on the West Coast they are undecided how to handle the Japanese situation. Here, where it is much more difficult, I find that little or nothing is being done. Make no mistake about it, the proper handling of this situation requires two qualifications: first, highly professional Intelligence activities, and second, a thorough knowledge of the Japanese people. The Army in Hawaii has no one qualified to handle either. I know what they have and what they are capable of doing. It makes no difference who does the job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly. But I venture to make the flat statement that little or no results have been received on cases turned over to them by the 14th Naval District. I find that the numerous Japanese amateur operators have only been admonished by letter only not to operate. Adequate searches have not been made. Known suspects have not been taken into custody. Strategic locations are still endangered by the [8927] presence of enemy aliens. The problem can be solved in forty-five days by qualified personnel and Intelligent Action.

In my long interview with General Emmons, I was impressed with his incompetence. He appeared to have no thoughts of his own. He gave as the reason for continuing the Japanese newspapers that they were necessary for the morale of the enemy aliens. At the same time, the Army has assembled all the second generation Japanese into one battalion of the Territorial Guard and have disbanded it. The selectees have been disarmed and put into labor battalions. This action will have the effect of sending these boys slinking home and into the laps of enemy agents. It is most serious. There are sensible solutions to all these problems which certain of us have worked out, but it is inadvisable to let incompetent hands take on pre-prejudiced solutions.

After my interview with General Emmons, I searched for the reasons for what seemed like an undue influence upon him. Yesterday I think I discovered the answer. I was told that one of his principal advisors on Island and Japanese matters is General Wells, a highly paid official, of one of the large local industries whose objectives are still "maintenance of the status quo".

At the present time the Army is endeavoring to take over control of the Intelligence Organization in Hawaii. Under those conditions the Commander-in-Chief would be *tying his own hands* [8928] *voluntarily*. Their past and present training and performances in no way qualifies them for the work. I know their capabilities and what they have because it was I who for many years, tried to have them implemented on the West Coast, but the War Department invariably replied, "No action will be taken until M day". As a result they "had not a single trained Intelligence man with which to start an organization". The quotations are from General Miles, the head of G-2.

The Naval Intelligence Organization of the 14th District has been built up and trained through the intensive effort of two excellent officers with years of experience behind them. Through their knowledge, excellent personnel have been enrolled and trained and I am safe in saying that in spite of obstructions which should have been help, this organization is so far superior to the Army and F. B. I. for Intelligence work that there is no comparison.

CONCLUSION

Hawaii, as a defense outpost of the United States, is of value solely as a *safe* base for the Fleet. The protection of it provides the only excuse for the existence of the Army. An offensive attitude is a requisite to that defense. This offensive attitude does not exist. Under the present state of administration, the influences at work, and the degenerating morale, I cannot escape the feeling that unless firm action is taken we are approaching a situation which might result in some- [8929] thing worse than that of 7 December. (It has always been my considered opinion for a long time that because of the racial situation the Hawaiian Islands will eventually require a military government. Its purposes dictate that it should be a Naval military government, therefore now is the time to start it.)

RECOMMENDATION

That the Commander-in-Chief, as Military Commander, exercise his function as Military Governor and take command of all activities that the administration of martial law be delegated to a Deputy, as at present, if such administration has been satisfactory, and that the Intelligence Organization be centered under the Commander-in-Chief, in order to insure the security of the Fleet and the Fleet Base.

That power of arrest be extended to special agents of the Naval Intelligence Organization. (The most vitally interested agency but the only government agency not having the power.)

That the security of the Naval District and the Navy Yard be incorporated under a competent head (The present security officer, Victor Houston, was recently removed from the Police Commission and it is inconceivable that he should be in a position to hamper Naval security).

E. M. ZACHARIAS.

[8930] Mr. MURPHY. Now, Captain, I would like to take you to the memorandum which you sent to Admiral Stark on February 9, 1941, in which you outlined your conversation with Ambassador Nomura.

Did you at any place in that letter to Admiral Stark, a copy of which was apparently sent to Admiral Kimmel, refer to the details which you have outlined as to Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That letter which you sent to Admiral Stark, and which Admiral Kimmel got a copy of, was, in effect your appraisal of the situation, of the relations between Japan and the United States, as the result of the Nomura talk; isn't that right?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I would say it was more in relation to the details of the conversation than the reactions of Admiral Nomura.

Senator BREWSTER. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, surely.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you contemplate putting this entire matter in? It seems to me it might be a valuable thing as an exhibit in the case, and I was going to suggest that at the proper time.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask that the letter of February 9, [8931] 1941, be spread in the record at this point, and that all of the letters be marked as an exhibit.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you have what I have here, labeled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It"? I think that should be in as an exhibit.

Mr. MASTEN. That will be Exhibit 141,

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 141, and the request of Mr. Murphy to spread the letter he described on the record will be granted without objection.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 141.")

(The letter referred to follows:)

U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY,
Mare Island, California, February 9, 1941.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: I think that you will be interested in a conversation that I had with Admiral Nomura yesterday. It lasted for more than an hour and we were alone the entire time in his room at the hotel. Having known him intimately and favorable over a long period we were in a position to speak frankly. I decided to arrange for such a conversation in order to determine if possible the purpose for which he was [8932] sent over here and to explore, if possible, the latitude which might be in his hands. As a result of the conversation I have formed the following impressions:

(1) That Japan regrets her partnership in the Axis and is greatly concerned over the China venture, therefore Admiral Nomura was sent here to determine the best bargain to be obtained. (A previous thought that he might be coming to "Rock us to sleep" while Japan proceeded to the Southward, has been eliminated definitely).

(2) He will try to prevent an embargo on oil and other essentials now being obtained here, and will request reconsideration on those now under embargo.

(3) Japan definitely has decided that they cannot "conquer" China or exert sufficient control while Chiang Kai-Shek maintains his present position and strength. They realize that their best way out is a peace. This will be attempted first by trying to dissuade us from further aid to China, thereby allowing the Wang Chin-wei group to gain control under Japanese direction. If this is impossible he will then explore the other possible means of bringing about peace in China.

(4) That hostilities between Japan and the U. S. can be avoided if he is given sufficient basis for an approach to the Leaders in Japan. (I indicated to him that an [8933] immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan would have to be forthcoming if our Government opened such an approach. When he asked "What for example," I replied, "If I were asked, I would say 'Immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China'". He made no comment on this.

In the course of the conversation he made the following positive statements:

(1) That his mission was to prevent a resort to force between Japan and the U. S. in settling present disagreements.

(2) That Japan has completely changed her views with regard to China, and that peace is essential to both countries.

(3) That if the U. S. is patient until Europe is settled then the Far Eastern situation will take care of itself. (This statement I took to be a feeler, therefore I resisted an impulse to ask him if impatience meant probability of force by us in the Far East.) My reply was optimism over British prospects which prompted the question from him "Do you think it will be a long war?" My answer was negative and reason given was the effect upon the German people when they finally hear of U. S. aid to Britain.

(4) That the signing of the Axis pact was done only after a sharp division of opinion and with only a slight [8934] balance of influence in its favor.

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Now, the mistake is realized but as it is a "Fait accompli" nothing can be done towards cancelling it. It must die a natural death. (The previous day a leading Japanese business representative in San Francisco referred to the signing of the pact by Japan as a grave mistake. When asked what could have brought this about he stated without hesitation and authoritatively that it was accomplished by bribery of officials with tremendous sums of money from Germany.)

DETAILS OF CONVERSATION

After the usual exchange of pleasantries I opened the conversation by indicating to the Admiral that I thought he had been given a most difficult task and asked him how he expected to handle it.

He said "My hope is to prevent a resort to force in settling the difficulties existing between our two countries. I replied, "Of course you know that at least 65 percent of the American people are reconciled to any action as far as the Far East is concerned, and you yourself have often said that such a conflict would be disastrous for Japan and entail great loss for the U. S.

"We have no desire to see Japan defeated and destroyed. We saved her in 1904, you will agree?" He answered in the affirmative, and I continued, "Well, we would like to [8935] save her again because the very same reasons exist today. The American people have long since learned that a strong Russia or a strong China means the end of Japan, in which case problems for us will come from other sources. I have always told the Japanese that we would go to war if our commerce was blocked off, because that has been the cause of every war in which we have engaged. Now see what has happened to all Foreign trade in Manchuria. What would happen in the rest of Asia?" At this he apologized for their extremists and I reminded him that they are the ones who bring on wars. I then said, "Admiral, one thing which the American people can't reconcile is why Japan, a country which has called continually for 'Equal Opportunity' could sign a pact with Germany which has done away with all opportunity and has the utmost contempt for all other nations?" He replied that there was a sharp division of opinion in Japan as to the advisability of signing the pact and that only a very slight balance of influence made it possible. Now, they realize the mistake but it is a "fait accompli" and it is practically impossible to cancel it. Therefore it will have to die a natural death.

[8936] "Admiral, I would like to know why you think you can pick a man like Wang Chin-wei, set him up and count upon him working for Japan?"

He replied that Wang was for peace in China and that this was very necessary now to combat the growing menace of Communism which has spread Russian influence as far South as Peking. "In this case", I said, "it seems to me that you want a man like Chiang Kai-shek to combat it, as he has done so successfully for over ten years. That is where you ought to make your agreement if you really want the peace of Asia, and here is where the U. S. might act as Mediator and again save Japan. With communications as now exist in China you will never be able to conquer or control it. Peace in China will bring prosperity to all three of our countries. Your objective of markets and raw materials will be realized. Our complementary trade will thrive again and there remains only the problem of taking care of Japan's expanding population. Let's explore the realms of possibility. Do you think that if Chiang Kai-shek should be willing to cede Manchuria to Japan in return for the protection it would afford Asia from the inroads of Communism, would you then be able to go to the Japanese people and say 'Japan has at last reached her original objective, we can now stop this war in China and settle down to prosperity', do you think it would be accepted?" This question was evidently unexpected for after much hesitation the Admiral laughing and then seriously said, "It would have to be handled [8937] very carefully, you know how excited the extremists become in such matters and the steps they take." I replied that I remember well the affair of resumption of normal affairs under the careful direction of Chiang Kai-shek and the long desired development would eventuate, China would disappear." The Admiral again indicated the difficulty of approach to such problems in Japan at this time, but I said that the more difficult they were the more important they became. And I added, "Of course, you understand that if Japan really wants the U. S. to assist in solving this serious situation without resort to force, which you say is your mission, then there would have to be an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan." I would say immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China. He made no comment on this and remained thoughtful for an appreciable interval.

[8938] During this conversation I made two references to my watch and the fact that he must have many callers, in order to give him the opportunity to indicate a desire to break off, but each time he stressed that he had no engagements and wanted to continue talking.

Other parts of the conversation were devoted to the general cause of ill feeling between the two countries which I indicated has been due solely to the villification of the U. S. by the controlled press of Japan. Starting with the unjustified raging over the Portsmouth Treaty after the U. S. had saved Japan from defeat, it continued with every incident. Typical was that after the immigration bill, a purely economic expedient occasioned by the failure of immigrant farmers to adhere to the existing standards thereby endangering the California farmers. Japan does not admit farmers.

I indicated that the Public is now well aware of the vast difference between the Monroe Doctrine and the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Also that the public does understand Japans needs and the difficult situations with which she has been confronted in the past, however they do not understand and will not tolerate either in Europe or Asia any impositions on our commerce which restricts their freedom to go where and when they will.

In conclusion I told the Admiral that he had been [8939] quoted in the Press as having accepted this mission on the conditions that while he was here the Japanese Government would not take any steps in the Far East which might embarrass him. He neither confirmed nor denied this. I then said that I hoped that it was true because it had put him in a very favorable light with the American public and they would wish him every success as I do.

Admiral Nomura is accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, as advisor. Wakasugi was formerly Consul-General at San Francisco, and was not looked upon as a good mixer. Having had some occasion to observe him in 1931 I was not impressed with his ability. For a diplomat he was unusually unapproachable, which gave the impression of assumed reticence to hide inferior qualities. It is believed that he will be only a general guide for Admiral Nomura, whose activities or conclusions will not be influenced by Mr. Wakasugi.

Admiral Nomura was very appreciative of the attentions which he received from Admiral Richardson while in Honolulu, and I am sure these will have a profound effect in Japan, in raising his prestige.

Admiral Richardson, who knew of my proposed conversation with Admiral Nomura, had expressed a desire to have any details I could give him on it. I am therefore sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Kimmel.

[8940] With kindest regards and best wishes, I am
Sincerely,

E. M. ZACHARIAS.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. N.,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, my understanding of the reason for you having been listed as a witness was that early in the executive session one of the members of the committee said you had given two talks at Annapolis relative to the Pearl Harbor situation.

Did you give talks at Annapolis to the student body?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I had given talks at Annapolis to the student body, but I do not recall that they referred specifically to the Pearl Harbor situation.

[8941] Mr. MURPHY. You do not recall any such talks there?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I always talked about Japan and the possibilities of war, but I do not believe I referred to what might occur specifically at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Now you gave testimony this morning to the effect that, in your judgment, the north of the island was the most dangerous. Were atmospheric conditions any different on the north of the island usually than they were on the other parts of the island of Oahu? Was it clearer there ordinarily?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There is quite frequently a difference in the atmospheric conditions to the northward from those to the southward because of the configuration of the land areas.

Mr. MURPHY. You also said something about the north being a more dangerous area for an attack because of the wind conditions. What degree of the arc would you say, or what degree of area, would be covered by that particular wind condition?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The prevailing winds in the Hawaiian area are from the northward, because of the trade winds. The trade winds are from the northeastward, but in the Hawaiian area they are—I do not know just what the prevalence is, but they are from the northern sector.

[8942] Mr. MURPHY. Now is it your judgment—while I agree that this was marked as an exhibit—is it your judgment that all of this material is pertinent to this inquiry? They are your notes, are they not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. Of course there are letters there which bring out what I felt were organizational deficiencies regarding the improper indoctrination in the Navy and the naval officers regarding security.

Mr. MURPHY. You have seen fit to criticize the conduct of officers even after Pearl Harbor. Was that part of your function? You remember that, don't you? You made some very caustic remarks and uncomplimentary remarks about General Emmons.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, you will note these reports were marked "personal and confidential," made up for a superior officer of the Navy, for his use, on which to base an estimate of the situation. As an Intelligence officer and as an officer of 37 years in the Navy I felt that I had reached the stage where I could present facts to a superior officer without mincing any words.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you think it was part of the Navy function to be criticizing Army generals? That is what I am wondering about.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That report was not for the purpose [8943] of criticizing Army generals but was for the purpose of emphasizing to the commander in chief what I considered the danger in allowing Japanese newspapers, under the control of alien enemies, to be republished in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the report was written for the admiral in charge after there was unity of command and after the Army, in effect, was under the command of the Navy; is that right?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, I understood by the joint agreement of the Army and Navy that the senior officer present in an outlying station, such as Pearl Harbor, the senior officer was, in fact, in a position to exercise unity of command.

Mr. MURPHY. I think there is considerable disagreement about that. The fact is, however, after December 7 there was unity of command and it was in charge of a Navy man and your letter was written while the Navy was, in effect, in command and the Army under the Navy command; is that right? Do you understand me?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I would like to have that again.

Mr. MURPHY. Read it please, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

[8944] Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct. I would like to add that the report that I made up after my conference with General Emmons regarding allowing these Japanese newspapers to resume publication, I went to see him upon the direction of Admiral

Nimitz and the report was made out in an official manner for Admiral Nimitz. I took along with me, now that you have mentioned the criticism, I took along with me the district Intelligence officer, Capt. I. H. Mayfield, now Rear Adm. I. H. Mayfield, who upon the termination of our conference with General Emmons, or my interconversation with General Emmons, as we left he turned to me and he said, "Now you see what we are up against."

A year later I was advised by an Army officer who was then the head of the Joint Intelligence activity that he had read this report that I had submitted to Admiral Nimitz and he wanted to say that he and Admiral Richardson agreed with everything I had to say in it and steps would be taken to remedy the situation immediately.

Mr. MURPHY. I have just one more question.

Captain, you have been asked about the particular alert condition of the ship you were on after it departed from Pearl Harbor immediately prior to December 7, 1941. There is an article—and I do not like to go to the Saturday Evening Post for my authority, but it has been mentioned here [8945] at different times—there is an article by Lt. J. Bryan 3d, USNR, of January 1, 1944, in which he said that on November 28, 1 day out at sea, battle order No. 1 was put into effect and that that provided the following:

1. The *Enterprise* is now operating under war conditions.
2. At any time day or night we must be ready for instant action.
3. Hostile submarines may be encountered.

The writer says further:

Further he ordered all planes armed with torpedoes, bombs and ammunition and told the pilots "sink anything you sight."

Do you know of anything like that ever having existed?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No order of that nature was transmitted to us but it is quite possible that it was in effect on the *Enterprise* because of their duties of scouting and other matters.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

The Chair might say, in view of the fact the members of the House have some duties at the other end, we have decided not to go later than 4:15.

Senator BREWSTER. I don't think I will take more than [8946] 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator BREWSTER. I have asked that this entire record be placed in evidence as an exhibit because I think there is some very valuable material in there on Intelligence and it is to the broader questions that I shall address myself.

With regard to the December 7 date concerning which you were examined by Mr. Lucas, I think it may be pertinent to call attention to what appears in the subsequent portion of the same paragraph where the statement is made:

About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from OPNAV to "open everything to him", sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a

weekend, and probably Sunday morning, with all reasons therefor, and I then stated, "you now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other."

So that in the same paragraph to which Admiral Kimmel's attention had been called in reference to the letter it did appear that while [8947] on March 17 you apparently had predicted December 7, if it is read very literally in October when Mr. Munson arrived you did not defend the date but indicated you were referring to the attack and the time?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. So it lends some confirmation to the interpretation which you placed on the communication, you gather?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It does, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, on the broader question of the intelligence, Admiral Stark in his testimony, on page 6280 said, in response to a question about intelligence, and, as I understand, there were three officers in charge of intelligence in the year preceding Pearl Harbor; is that correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral Kirk, Admiral Anderson, and Admiral Wilkinson, three in the year preceding?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral Stark in response to a question about the officer desiring to go to sea and be taken out of Intelligence said:

Generally speaking that is true in the Navy. An officer in wartime, or if the occasion demanded, I think at [8984] any time might sacrifice his career, * * *

Now, in a letter which you have written I find that same language, that you indicated in one of your exhibits your readiness to sacrifice your career for Intelligence. What does that mean?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was asked one day by Admiral Anderson, when he was Director of Naval Intelligence, whether I would sacrifice my career for Intelligence. I was rather puzzled at the question and I said to him:

Admiral, I think that the situation is such that if some of us don't think about sacrificing our careers there aren't going to be any to sacrifice.

I later in my letter to Admiral Stark reiterated to him that, something along that same line that I had told to Admiral Anderson. That was for the purpose of emphasizing that regardless of the prejudice against ourselves which we wrought by engaging in too much intelligence work, because we thought it was vitally necessary for the security of the Nation, I was ready to accept that if necessary.

Senator BREWSTER. As it would mean that your promotion might be seriously affected by failure to have the well-rounded activities of the Navy?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That would be correct; but I felt that I did have a well-rounded activity throughout the Navy [8949] as my record at sea will show.

Senator BREWSTER. One other thing and I am through.

In your letter of November 16, 1941, you emphasize this in your communication to Admiral Stark:

Of course I look forward to the day when I will be in the position to continue to work out the many ideas which I know to be vital to our intelligence organization. As you know, the Commander in Chief has expressed himself as to

the lack of sufficient and thoroughly effective Intelligence organization. In the past it has been a difficult "selling" job, but I hope eventually to make our people, particularly the higher ranks, realize the important elements. Last June, while in Washington, Admiral Anderson asked me one day if I would be willing to sacrifice my career for Intelligence—

Was he then in charge of intelligence?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes; I am quite sure.

Senator BREWSTER (reading):

"asked me one day if I would be willing to sacrifice my career for Intelligence." I replied, "Admiral, the time has come when if we don't think about sacrificing our careers, there won't be any to sacrifice." Of course, I am delighted with my ship and will soon have in half of my two years in grade, but if and when the situation demands my [8950] statement above still stands.

In other words, is it your impression that the important of competently directed intelligence had not been sufficiently appreciated in what you term the higher ranks of the Navy prior to Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. If I may say so, I think that is one of the greatest contributing factors for Pearl Harbor.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may interject there, what you mean is that the average naval officer making a choice between gluing himself to a desk or a station for intelligence work or going to sea in command of a vessel would choose the sea and that in order to have a properly directed intelligence service men must give up the chances of promotion that would be involved in command at sea and remain, if necessary, glued to their desks in the intelligence service?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is one phase of it, sir, but what I was driving at in the two letters which I wrote on January 27, 1942, which are included in there, one regarding the lack of security indoctrination in the Navy and the other the faulty selection of officers for intelligence duty, those were based upon a belief on my part that the officers of the Navy were not sufficiently cognizant of the [8951] scope and importance of intelligence as such and I urged that training facilities be installed to remedy that situation.

I felt that once a general knowledge on the part of all officers of the Navy became a fact, a general knowledge regarding the scope and importance of intelligence, that the future would be safeguarded against such a thing as occurred at Pearl Harbor.

I would like to invite attention to one page in one of those letters, I think it is page 40 in the documents listed, which outlines my opinion of what constituted a good intelligence officer.

[8952] Among the things which are given there in addition to the qualifications, I say that an officer must not only be able to receive the information and evaluate it properly, he must have the courage to present it to his superior officer, and that is where in the past that has been one of the greatest drawbacks and that is the reason I said that this situation was one of the greatest contributing factors to Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood Admiral Stark to say—and I won't say that I am correct about it and I hope you can tell me—I understood Admiral Stark to say that as a matter of law by act of Congress naval officers had to have a certain amount of sea duty.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think it is custom rather than law.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the custom is then that they have to have a certain amount of sea duty.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; in order to be eligible to have a good chance of selection and be promoted.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that does have some bearing on promotions?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It does; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that, he thought, affects an officer's career.

[8953] Captain ZACHARIAS. It affects those who might otherwise choose intelligence as a field.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, are there any intelligence officers at sea?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Each ship has an intelligence officer designated as such but—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what I thought.

Captain ZACHARIAS (continuing). Very few have any intelligence background or experience.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I thought they had intelligence officers at sea.

Captain ZACHARIAS. They now have people with experience because during the 1 year which I had as Deputy Director of Navy Intelligence between my two war cruises I installed an entirely new system of training which gave basic and advanced intelligence training and provided for the fleet the officers which they now have to interpret what we call operational intelligence.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, these officers who have intelligence duties at sea, does that count in their favor the same as if they were serving intelligence work on shore?

Captain ZACHARIAS. In the past that duty at sea has been a collateral duty. They had regular ship's duties in addition to having intelligence duties.

[8964] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, does the fact that they do intelligence work at sea militate against their interest?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; it does not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. As I recall, Captain, there are some special duty stations in the Navy where the officers are never changed; am I correct about that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct; yes sir. They all have the status of engineering duty only, although they might not be in engineering.

Senator LUCAS. Their promotion is not affected as a result of being placed in that special-duty work?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The general feeling has been that an officer in specialist duty is prejudiced to some extent.

Senator LUCAS. But there are some spots where they make no change. Once they get a good man in that place they keep him there.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. There were a few instances of that kind, as I recall, testified to before the Naval Affairs Committee some time ago and I would like to ask you whether or not in view of what has happened here in the development of a lack of proper intelligence, perhaps, or

lack of proper evaluation, whether or not if you found the right type of a man that really could do the job it wouldn't be more advantageous to the national defense to keep that man in Intelligence rather than move him out every year and a half or two years all over the globe?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think that goes without saying, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You would advocate that, wouldn't you—

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). As one who has had a lot of experience in that kind of work?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir, that is quite true. Of course, then—

Senator LUCAS. In other words, take a fellow like Edgar Hoover here, who is the head of crime detection in this country and of intelligence. We don't take him out every so often and put a new man in because he has done and is doing a whale of a job, and it seems to me that in Army and Navy as a result of this Pearl Harbor investigation we must have something on the same order and it does seem to me that that has to come about.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am now convinced that we will have to come to something of that nature, and this lack of the knowledge and scope of the work of intelligence ordinarily has tended to create another organization unit. I think it [8956] has brought out in these hearings that the war plans officers have taken over the functions of evaluation, which are primarily the functions of the Chiefs of Intelligence, and I feel certain that if the Chiefs of Intelligence had been allowed to retain that function and had the responsibility, that a great many things which did occur would not occur and I certainly advocate that for the future.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to just say that I did not go into detail in this exhibit just introduced, which gives Captain Zacharias' views at considerable length, on account of the time element. I think they are highly important. I do want to read this additional sentence that I found there in the letter of the 27th of January:

The orthodox and conservative type of naval officer is designed by training and indoctrination not to be an intelligence officer.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think that is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is a considered conclusion. I might say in conclusion, Captain, that in November 1940 when you were going to Pearl Harbor, if you need additional corroboration as to your concern, you stated it very fully to me in the course of a trip out there, as to your very great anxiety over the Pearl Harbor situation, to which you then pointed.

[8957] Were you then a captain?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was then a captain. I was en route to take command of the *Salt Lake City*.

Senator BREWSTER. And you have not been promoted since that time?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the committee will suspend until 10 o'clock tomorrow, when the captain will resume.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., January 28, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, January 29, 1946.)

[8958]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION,
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[8959] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Captain ZACHARIAS.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have one item that we would like to take up first.

The CHAIRMAN. The counsel has something to take up before you resume, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, some time ago we compiled a group of documents which relate to certain transfers of information and inquiry between the United States and other Governments. The file I hold in my hand contains the photostats of those documents.

There has been suggestion from individual members of the committee that they would like to have us advise the State Department that these various documents should be called to the attention of the foreign governments, and their permission obtained, as is required, for the publication of these documents.

We brought the matter, you recall, to the attention of the committee at one time, suggesting that we felt we should have the direction of the committee before we formally advise the State Department to formally request the foreign governments to release the documents.

[8960] Now, I say just for what it may be worth, which is probably nothing, as we go through these documents there are only one or two that we can, by any particular stretch of the imagination, feel are germane.

I have this suggestion:

If the committee is amenable to a direction to us to secure the consent of the foreign governments to the publication of all of these documents, that then some method be devised whereby any indi-

vidual committee members who are interested might examine this group and delete from the number of documents those that are not relevant to this proceeding, so that the number that we have to ask the foreign governments to O. K. and free, can be reduced as much as possible.

But I would like now to have the committee give us some direction as to what is to be done with reference to communicating with the State Department to get the release of these documents.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me inquire there, Mr. Richardson. You have examined all of these documents?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it is your opinion that only a few of them could, by any stretch of the imagination, be relevant or material to this inquiry?

[8961] Mr. RICHARDSON. That was my feeling, as I read them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It would look to me like the committee would want very carefully to consider that before we go to all the trouble of having the State Department get the clearances of the foreign governments on something that may not be even material or relevant to this inquiry.

I would think that the members who have indicated an interest in this material, would assist the committee to the extent of examining these things carefully, and conferring with you and seeing if they can reach a decision to comply with the suggestion that you here made.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no need of any further conference with us. I am perfectly willing to turn this file over to any committeeman who wants to examine it, and then it is up to the committee to tell us which ones ought to be taken out.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My point in that suggestion is that a member interested may take this whole file and examine it carefully himself, and then confer with you as to your opinion as to which of those documents might be material, and you can point out to the member your reason for thinking that others are not. In other words, try to get together with the committee member and if the committee member feels that he still wants to urge that all of it be brought in here, why, then the matter can be submitted to the committee again for action on it.

[8962] Senator LUCAS. May I inquire just that this is?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Senator, it is a series of documents that have to do with the troubled relations existing between the United States and Japan and England and China.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I might say personally what I am afraid of is that we are getting such a mass of material in here, much of it that is so remotely, if at all, related to the subject under consideration, we are going to get our record so terribly large that it will be difficult for people interested in the matter to find the things that are really material and important.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Suppose, Mr. Chairman, that I turn this over to Senator Ferguson, who I think is more familiar with them than anyone else.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I will say that I have gone over this and I have marked certain ones that I think are material. I wanted them released prior to a witness we had last week leaving the stand, but I will go over them again.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sure we will all appreciate that.

Senator FERGUSON. There were, I think, three places that I marked for counsel that I was greatly interested in, but the witness has gone from the stand and I couldn't use [8963] it for cross-examination.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then we may depend upon having further information from Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now I think Mr. Masten has a document he wants to offer in evidence.

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Masten may proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have distributed to the committee this morning a folder of documents, mimeographed copies of documents, which is entitled "Material Relating to 'Winds' Code."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is this document here?

Mr. MASTEN. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MASTEN. If you will look at the first two pages you will find a table of contents of the documents that are included in this compilation. Many of the documents included have been previously introduced, either in the transcript or as exhibits, but it was thought for the convenience of the committee it would be well to bring them all together in one place.

If I may take a minute I would like to run down the [8964] index to show you just how it was compiled.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. MASTEN. Section No. 1, entitled "Data received concerning establishment and nature of winds code," lists dispatches, all of which, except item d, have been previously placed in the record or made an exhibit.

Under Section 2, "Dispatches and data relating to monitoring for Winds 'Execute,'" there are listed three dispatches, all of which are either exhibits or have been read into the record previously.

Section 3, entitled "Certification of Secretary FCC, dated 8/18/44, with attachments as follows," is not now in the record and is new material.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All four of those messages?

Mr. MASTEN. All four of those items under No. 3.

The same is true of all of the items of Section 4 entitled "Material relating to weather Winds 'Execute' message sent or received." Items a and b under that number include all of the communications which have been received from General MacArthur in this connection.

Items c, d, and e include communications from the State Department to the British, the Australians, and the Dutch regarding the monitoring for the Winds "Execute" message that was carried on by those respective governments.

[8965] Items c, d, and e may have to be supplemented by further reports from the State Department, but we have given you here everything that we have received to date in that connection.

Section 5, entitled "List of messages appearing in Committee Exhibit 1 dealing with instructions to Japanese representatives to de-

stroy codes, sent through ordinary channels of communications," is simply a list that was compiled on the basis of the material in Exhibit 1, and I think is self-explanatory.

Section 6 consists of new material which has to do with the question of file number JD-1 7001 in the Navy Department, and I think will be found self-explanatory upon examination.

In this latter connection, I would like to read into the record a memorandum dated January 26, 1946, from Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe, the Army liaison officer, which is as follows:

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Pursuant to the request of former counsel to the committee, a comparison was made of the intercepted messages in the Army Signal Intelligence Service file which had been translated on 2, 3, and 4 December 1941 and those in the Navy file translated on the same dates. The purpose of the comparison was to ascertain whether the Army file contained [8966] a message not in the Navy file. The comparison, which was jointly made by the Army and the Navy, showed that each message in the Army file was also in the Navy file.

The results of the comparison were reported orally to the former counsel to the committee at the time the comparison was completed.

As you will see that memorandum also has to do with the question of file number 7001.

Now, there may be additional material later in connection with the winds matter, in fact, there are some dispatches referred to in the statement by Captain Safford which has been circulated to the committee which the Navy Department is now endeavoring to find and deliver to us, and we will make them available to you just as soon as they are received.

We would like to offer this compilation as Exhibit No. 142.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit No. 142.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142.")

Mr. MASTEN. We would also like to offer two additional documents from the Federal Communications Commission file, the first of which is the page dated at the top December 5, 1941, and is a memorandum to Mr. Sterling. We [8967] would like to offer that as Exhibit 142-A.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Exhibit 142-A?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes; in other words, we would like to have Exhibit 142 as the basic exhibit for all this new material.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142-A.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is next?

Mr. MASTEN. That is all we have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All this is one exhibit, then?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes; Mr. Richardson suggests that we mention at this time that the material included in Exhibit 142, item 3, and this additional material which we have now marked as Exhibit 142-A, is only a part of the total material we have received from the FCC but is the part that we felt was most relevant, and if any of the other material becomes relevant we will add it to the exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All of this material in Exhibit 142-A relates to the FCC?

Mr. MASTEN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel, have you got in this new data you gave us this [8968] Tokyo to Washington serial 8430, November 27, 1941?

Mr. MASTEN. If that is one of the dispatches referred to in Captain Safford's statement as not being in the record, it is not yet included in this as we have not yet received it from the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not yet got that from the Navy Department.

Mr. MASTEN. They are working on it, but it has not yet been received.

Senator FERGUSON. Another one is OPNAV 282301. That is not in either?

Mr. MASTEN. That is not in this compilation.

Senator FERGUSON. Then on page 16 of the Safford statement, 1, 2, 3, 4 OPNAV messages are marked priority, two of them referred to priority, you don't have those in the memorandum?

Mr. MASTEN. If those are dispatches referred to as not having been introduced, then they are not in this compilation but all of them are being sought by the Navy and we will let you have them as soon as we get them.

Senator FERGUSON. But you haven't them now?

Mr. MASTEN. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

[8969] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain Zacharias, do you have anything you want to present to the committee before your examination is resumed?

[8970] Captain ZACHARIAS. I think I would like to clarify one of my statements yesterday regarding the word "when" about which I was questioned by Senator Lucas.

I couldn't quite make his point and since thinking it over, I feel that he wanted an explanation of what I meant by "when."

If so, the word "when" applied to two things; one a Sunday morning, and the other a time when submarines were discovered in the Hawaiian area. That would cover the meaning of the word "when" in my statement that I advised Admiral Kimmel as to where, how, and when such an attack would take place.

Senator LUCAS. That still does not satisfy the Senator from Illinois.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further, Captain?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Nothing further.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe it is Mr. Gearhart's time to inquire. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Captain.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, as I understand your testimony, the substance of your conversation with Admiral Kimmel and the purpose of your going to his office or headquarters to discuss anything with him, was to point out that in your opinion, as an experienced Intelligence officer, and also [8971] as an experienced line officer in the Navy, that the Japanese, if they chose to attack us, would commence hostilities by an attack upon our fleet; is that not correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir. Of course, that discussion evolved from my discussions with Admiral Kimmel regarding the report that I had sent in to Admiral Stark regarding my conversations with Admiral Nomura and then the discussion of the incident of October 16, 1940, which I described in detail yesterday.

From there we went into a discussion of the general situation which might arise, and the things that would be inherent in it.

Mr. GEARHART. After you pointed out to him that in your opinion, they would commence hostilities by an attack upon our fleet, the next topic of conversation naturally was, "Well, assuming that to be true, what should we do about it," and you suggested that we install or inaugurate patrols?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Which caused the admiral to say that he didn't have the equipment or the men to maintain extended patrols for any length of time?

Captain ZACHARIAS. He didn't qualify it. He said:

[8972] Well, we have neither the personnel nor the matériel with which to make such a patrol.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the maintenance of a patrol which is adequate as a defense against surprise attack, you could expect a tremendous attrition upon the planes that are used, could you not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The patrol planes?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, you could. However, it is to be expected that an alert patrol would be able to get in a report by radio before it is shot down.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I don't mean attrition by warfare especially, but attrition from the mechanical standpoint.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. A certain number of planes will always have to be under repair, a certain amount of parts will become worn, and have to be replaced, so unless you have a large number of planes, as a reservoir, any patrol undertaken with 50 or 60 planes available would necessarily be a limited operation, limited as to time, would it not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir, but although limited in forces available for that work, they nevertheless could be used and restricted to the most probable area [8973] or sector.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, was there a most probable area?

Captain ZACHARIAS. In my opinion, as I stated, I expected, fully expected, that an air attack would be launched down-wind, and as the prevailing wind in Hawaii is from the northward sector, it would come from that direction.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you knew that if any Japanese fleet should sail into that area, that it would have to travel several thousand miles, didn't you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You also knew that the Japanese were already installed in the Marshall Islands, and in other Pacific islands, from which they could make a quicker movement toward the Hawaiian Islands?

Captain ZACHARIAS. But they would suspect that that would be the locality in which we would be most interested.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, it being more probable that they would come from the Marshalls or from some other islands in that area, therefore they would reduce, by coming from that area, the element of surprise?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And if they came from the north, the element of surprise would be emphasized rather than detracted from?

[8974] Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, it wasn't the unexpected area in my mind.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, you selected that point as a probable initiation of attack because it was the improbable one?

Captain ZACHARIAS. From the standpoint of what the Japanese would estimate us to do.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, you were trying to think as a Jap would think.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, Admiral Kimmel explained to you that he only had a limited number of planes available for this purpose of reconnaissance, and you urged him to do everything he could to get the Washington authorities to supply him with more planes, didn't you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. He didn't explain that he had a limited number. He said "We have neither the material nor the personnel with which to carry out such a patrol," and as I indicated, I replied, "Well, Admiral, I feel you better get them because that is what is coming."

Mr. GEARHART. You knew that both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were asking for more and more planes at all times?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not, sir.

[8975] Mr. GEARHART. You didn't know that Harry Hopkins was sending them across the Atlantic rather than sending them to the Pacific?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I object to that statement.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the Senator from Illinois has a perfect right to object, but I would like to know.

Senator LUCAS. What is the basis for the assumption, and why bring Harry Hopkins into this program at this late date?

[8976] Mr. GEARHART. Why, certainly the Senator from Illinois is not so uninformed as not to know that Harry Hopkins was doing the allocating of those materials at that time.

Senator LUCAS. Well, is there any proof in this record to that effect?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; there is in this record as well as in the record of the American people.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I challenge the statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart will proceed in order.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, do I understand then that the ruling of the Chair was that the Congressman was not in order?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I ruled that the gentleman from California may proceed in order, which is a proper parliamentary expression to use.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And is used all the time in the Senate and in the House.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; that was a very adroit one because nobody knows when they hear that ruling whether the objection is sustained or is not sustained. However, we will proceed in order.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California will proceed in order.

[8977] Mr. GEARHART. You were informed that there was a munitions assignment board, weren't you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; I was aware of that.

Mr. GEARHART. And you were also aware of the fact that Harry Hopkins was a member of that board, weren't you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I do not recall that I did, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, he was, and if there is any doubt in the mind of the Senator from Illinois now, it is now in evidence by my assertion.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, that makes it so.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I am giving the Senator from Illinois an opportunity now to say it is not true if it is not true, and I will accept his word for it.

Senator LUCAS. I am not going to argue with the Congressman. He has testified all the way through in these hearings.

Mr. GEARHART. You knew that under lend-lease we were supplying the British and other people who were fighting Hitlerism with planes?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I knew we were furnishing a great many supplies and including planes, too.

Mr. GEARHART. And you naturally knew as an American citizen that which the Senator from Illinois pretends is not in evidence, that some agency of the Government had to allocate [8978] to the different theaters of operations and to the different countries that were involved all the munitions that we produced of various kinds, including airplanes, didn't you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That was a matter of policy to which I gave no question at all.

Mr. GEARHART. Then as a naval expert, one who has had a great deal of experience in intelligence work, which involves a further study of the question of what is an appropriate supply, do you think that the number of planes that Admiral Kimmel had and General Short had was a sufficient amount to defend that island in the likelihood of an attack from the Japanese?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have stated that the number of planes was insufficient. I prefer to take their opinion on that point.

Mr. GEARHART. Because they were closer to the problem.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, when did you first reduce to writing the substance of your conversation with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The first time was when I presented the memorandum to Admiral Draemel on March the 17, 1942, just about a year after I had the conversation with Admiral Kimmel.

[8979] Mr. GEARHART. Was there anything in that conversation that you had with Admiral Kimmel which marked it in your memory so that you can say now that your memorandum prepared a year later was accurate in every detail?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I would like to say that this whole question was something that was uppermost in my mind. There were no important duties to becloud it in any way. It was something that had been of interest to me for the past 20 years. Therefore, there is every reason

why I should have remembered every detail of that conversation with Admiral Kimmel and I might say, on the other hand, that he had many other matters which were his concern, and I grant the possibility for that reason for his not having remembered the details of that conversation.

However, I do want to emphasize that this whole question was one to which I was giving full attention all my spare time in contacts with the fleet intelligence office at Pearl Harbor and the district intelligence office in the city of Honolulu.

Mr. GEARHART. To whom did you say you prepared that memorandum? For whom did you prepare it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It was prepared as a result of a conversation which I had with Admiral Draemel, then the chief of staff to Admiral Nimitz, and it was made up upon his recommendation when he said:

I agree with ninety-nine per cent of [8980] what you have said and I wish you would write this up for me as a memorandum so I can present it to Admiral Nimitz and let him go over it at his leisure.

That was the sole purpose of the preparation of that memorandum, and I would like to emphasize at this time that there was no inclination on my part to air my views regarding this previous conversation that I had had with Admiral Kimmel in March of 1941.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you take any steps after your conversation with Admiral Kimmel, when he told you he did not have sufficient equipment to undertake a patrol of the type that you recommended, did you take any steps to communicate your views to Washington authorities?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Not regarding the lack of planes. I think I furnished a copy of that memorandum to Admiral King.

Mr. GEARHART. After the conversation, a year after the conversation with Admiral Kimmel.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, at the time you talked with Admiral Kimmel and at the time he told you he could not undertake such a reconnaissance, you did not carry your ideas to any other source, but remained silent on the subject for a year?

Captain ZACHARIAS. In replying to that, sir, I would like to emphasize that I was a commanding officer of a ship of the [8981] Pacific Fleet, which were my primary duties and having once given Admiral Kimmel my views as a student of Japan I knew that—I felt that—he knew that I was in the vicinity, available at any time should he desire any further advice on the subject.

Mr. GEARHART. But if Admiral Kimmel told you he did not have sufficient equipment to undertake such a reconnaissance, you knew that equipment could be secured from higher authority. Did you thereafter take the matter up with any authority—

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART (continuing). By letter or by conversation?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; I did not. That was not a part of my function.

Mr. GEARHART. Was your original conversation with Admiral Kimmel a part of your function?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. As I stated yesterday, I was the senior officer on active duty who had studied the Japanese language

and Japan. I was the one who had interviewed Admiral Nomura and had made a semiofficial report to Admiral Stark, in which I knew Admiral Kimmel would be interested. I was the one who participated in that event of October 16, 1940, which I knew would be of interest to Admiral Kimmel. [8982] Therefore, it was from a sense of duty that I took it upon myself to go over and have a talk with him.

Mr. GEARHART. At that time you were the commander, were you not, of the U. S. S. *Salt Lake City*?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As such you were not detailed to intelligence work at that time, were you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Only insofar as I had been previously impertuned by a former Director of Naval Intelligence that because of my past experience and interest, although I was going to sea duty, it was hoped and desired that I would continue active as an Intelligence officer no matter where I was or what duty I was performing. I merely followed that recommendation.

Mr. GEARHART. At the time that you held this conversation with Admiral Nomura were you an Intelligence officer or were you just a naval officer, a friend of his?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was commanding officer of the *Salt Lake City* at that time in the San Francisco area. I had previously discussed the proposed visit of Admiral Nomura with Admiral Richardson and told him that I expected to talk to him because of my intimate acquaintance with Admiral Nomura, and Admiral Richardson expressed a desire for a copy of the report which I told him I would make out after the conversation [8983] and send in to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as an expert in naval strategy, and as an Intelligence officer and informed with respect to such things, you knew what the Japanese problem was in the event they undertook hostilities against the United States?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That problem was to immobilize our fleet until they could consolidate their conquests and install themselves into position, is that not correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir, and specifically, too, I felt that they had as their objective seriously disabling at least four battle-ships.

Mr. GEARHART. It would have been a rather dangerous operation for the Japanese to attempt conquests in the southwestern Pacific if the American fleet was on its flank and in fighting trim?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir. As I explained yesterday, that although we had in the Pacific 102 ships as against the Japanese 180, they would certainly feel that by the time we had assembled an expeditionary force with which to make an offensive movement across the Pacific we could have the rest of our fleet around in the Pacific even if it had to go around the Horn.

Mr. GEARHART. And even though the Japanese did have far [8984] more ships, numerically speaking, in the Pacific than we had, they had their responsibilities, other responsibilities than facing an American fleet alone, and would have further responsibilities in

the event they were to move through finally in the Pacific, is that not correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir; and I might add that in all our fleet problems at War College and the general consideration, it was taken for granted that in the event of hostilities between the United States and Japan they would most certainly capture Guam and attempt to capture the Philippines regardless of whatever else they did.

Mr. GEARHART. And whatever they did do, each operation required ships?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Therefore, they did not have 160 vessels of different kinds to direct against our approximately a hundred vessels of different kinds at Hawaii?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And assuming that we would immediately reinforce our fleet by transfers from the Atlantic—and they had to assume the worst, of course—it became apparent from their standpoint, did it not, that they had to immobilize a considerable number of our ships before they undertook any operations in the southwestern Pacific?

[8985] Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, and as I have indicated previously.

Mr. GEARHART. And when they undertook this attack upon Hawaii they undertook a very risky operation, did they not? As it turned out, it worked all right for them, but I mean as they contemplated it and looked forward to the operation.

Captain ZACHARIAS. All things being equal it may be considered a very dangerous operation, as was indicated by the extract that I read into the record yesterday, which is page 47 of the papers furnished to the committee, but we felt that they knew the exact situation existing in Hawaii and could to some extent discount the danger that they might encounter.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, as a matter of fact whether it was very, very dangerous, or whether it was less dangerous, or not dangerous at all, it was absolutely necessary for Japan to commence this war that way, as you pointed out.

Captain ZACHARIAS. In order to have a chance of victory, that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, the Hawaiian Islands are very small, and the harbors are very limited, and the fleet based on Hawaii was necessarily concentrated, with the ships very close together under all circumstances, is that not correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And the fleet at Hawaii proper would be a [8986] far better opportunity for immobilization by a successful attack than they would have been if the fleet had been scattered between San Francisco, Monterey Bay, Los Angeles Harbor, Long Beach and San Diego?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think the important point in their was that that gave the Japanese a better opportunity to destroy the aircraft which would be a menace to the force that was bringing the planes over and thereby reduce the danger to the Japanese force, than would have existed if they would have had to attack another area. As it turned out they did immobilize practically every aircraft in Hawaii.

Mr. GEARHART. And by knocking out our battleships they immobilized our fleet and compelled it to immediately drop its offensive plans as set forth in WPL-46 and the Rainbow, and go on a defensive operation, didn't they?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Of course, I felt immediately after Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had not destroyed any vessels which we would use in the operations that would be needed in the immediate future, such as the raids which we began. Those battleships, of course, would be vitally necessary at a later date, when we began the expeditionary forces.

Mr. GEARHART. That being true how do you account for the fact that the Japanese pilots went right after the battleships and their damage to the cruisers was slight in comparison?

[8987] Captain ZACHARIAS. Because the Japanese had in mind disabling all the battleships because they would represent the ultimate force that would be brought to bear against the Japanese in the Western Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. But they were not considering about ultimate forces as much as they were considering the immediate result, were they not? Is that not true?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The immediate result was to disable the battleships; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The immediate result they were after was to immobilize the American fleet for a considerable length of time.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. To give them time sufficiently long for them to consolidate their conquests in the Southwest Pacific.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, they immobilized our fleet, as they set out to, by immobilizing our battleships, didn't they?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was differentiating between the offensive and defensive actions on our part, but I agree to what you say, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, if their attack had been unsuccessful against Hawaii, the very temper of the American people, I think, would have been such as to require an immediate attempt by the American fleet to go to the relief of the Philippines; is that not correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And if we went to the relief of the Philippines it would have to be by an American armada undertaking the task, wouldn't it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That would have to include battleships, would it not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And therefore, by immobilizing our battleships, they immobilized the American fleet right then, not eventually; is that not correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. As far as early movements were concerned, that is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, by concentrating our fleet in this limited area around the Hawaiian Islands and in that one harbor that they have over there that is at all important, did we not offer the Japs a temptation to come there and with one fell swoop to immobilize our

whole fleet and accomplish something which would have been difficult to accomplish if the fleet had been scattered along the Pacific coast as advocated by others and naval strategists?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, that is a matter of policy, [8989] undoubtedly, based on information which was not at my disposal. I prefer not to comment on that.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I don't want you to take sides between one set of officers and another set of strategists, but, in passing on it, the Japs could not have hit the Pacific coast and knocked out and immobilized our full fleet if our fleet was scattered, with only four carriers, could they?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think the important consideration is this: If the fleet had been at some point on the west coast, the Japanese would not have been in a position to immobilize the aircraft at our disposal, which would have resulted in a very sizable aircraft force being sent out against the forces which had to come in to make this attack, and would have created a very dangerous situation for the Japanese fleet which had come over. In addition to that they would have had to travel 2,500 miles further than Hawaii, which would put them in a position strategically vulnerable because of the location of the air forces at Hawaii and Dutch Harbor to the northward.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, now, we have defined the problem that the Japanese had with our fleet based at Hawaii. Can you define the problem that would have been theirs if they were contemplating hostilities against the United States if our fleet were scattered between San Francisco and San Diego?

[8990] Captain ZACHARIAS. We did contemplate that in our fleet problem No. 14 in 1932, in which I participated as commanding officer of a destroyer and was required to make up an estimate of the situation and a decision. At that time I arrived at the conclusion that the Japanese would begin hostilities with an air attack on our fleet wherever it was and also disable by an air attack, if possible, the facilities at Hawaii on their way home.

At that time, 1932, we did not have dispersed along the west coast or in close proximity the air bases which we had in 1941 and which I have indicated would have created a much more dangerous situation for the Japanese at that time than it would have in 1932. However, I give you that to indicate that we have thought in terms of this air attack for a long time.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if our fleet was scattered along the Pacific coast the air defense problem would be reduced to one-half, in that they would only have to patrol 180°, whereas around the islands they have to patrol 360°, is that not correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir, provided we did not take into consideration a favorable sector from which they might approach.

Mr. GEARHART. And in the event that they set upon the [8991] idea of immobilizing our fleet scattered as I described along the Pacific coast, they would have to send at least four naval contingents to cover each one of the ports where the American fleet might be at that moment in harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And, furthermore, is it not a fact that we had permanent installations of radar along the Pacific coast?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I do not recall the state of the radar installations at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, there is one other thing that I would like to conclude by asking you about: In the course of your remarks you used the phrase "surprise inspections."

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I think you were discussing some operation that was being used frequently in the Hawaiian area, were you not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Those surprise inspections were inspections made by division commanders of ships, or higher authority, by sudden visits to the ships they wished to inspect, with an announcement only late the night before that they were coming the following morning. This, of course, was for the purpose of keeping up matériel conditions of the ships. What prompted my remark this afternoon when I was visiting [8992] with some of the staff at fleet headquarters, was the changing situation which made me feel that a little more attention should be directed toward the surprise attacks rather than these matériel conditions at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you were coming into Hawaii on December 7, weren't you, as commander of the U. S. S. *Salt Lake City*?

Captain ZACHARIAS. We were originally scheduled to return on the 5th of December, but that was on the regular training schedule which we were to take up when we left port, but which was changed when we found that we were going to Wake Island, so our delay was due principally to the necessities of refueling on that trip, a little bad weather that we encountered, and the duty that we were performing, so that we did not arrive until the morning of the 8th of December.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, naturally as a naval officer you were tremendously interested in what had transpired at Pearl Harbor on the 7?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Everybody was talking about that and nothing else. Did you make a visit to Pearl Harbor on the 8th?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You saw the results of their attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir.

[8993] Mr. GEARHART. I wonder if you heard discussed at that time anything about inspections having been ordered or having been in process on any of the ships that were in the harbor at the time of the attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. What did you learn as to what was the fact with respect to inspections of various kinds that were being engaged in at the time of the attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, this is only hearsay and I have no basis for expressing it other than that there was much discussion about one or more ships being opened for a surprise inspection on Monday morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Monday morning? You mean after the attack they were still opened?

Captain ZACHARIAS. They were opened on Saturday or Sunday—on Saturday, or before the attack on Sunday morning, so that they

would be ready for the inspecting party when they arrived on Monday morning. As I say, I have no knowledge of the facts regarding this.

Mr. GEARHART. When you use the phrase, "opened for inspection" are you referring to the voids of the larger ships?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Battleships have voids?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

[8994] Mr. GEARHART. Cruisers have voids?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Some; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. But destroyers do not, is that correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. And when the voids are opened the battle efficiency of a battleship and a cruiser is reduced somewhat, is it not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Those voids are for the purpose of giving additional stability to the ship. Therefore, when water is allowed to enter them the stability of the ship is greatly reduced and enhances the chances of capsizing.

Mr. GEARHART. But if water enters into any one void and is properly sealed, the water is confined to that particular void, is that not true?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And the ship therefore will not sink as a result of having been pierced by a torpedo in a single or one or two voids?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, did you hear in the discussion that the voids on some of the battleships were opened for inspection at the time the torpedo attack occurred?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Those were the rumors.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Well, wasn't it a well-substantiated [8995] rumor in view of what happened to the *Oklahoma*?

Captain ZACHARIAS. So it would appear, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. In fact, it capsized because of the torpedoes and the letting of water in unequally in the ship, is that correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I don't know about the *Oklahoma*, but I think it has been brought out that the Bureau of Ships made a study of the situation pertaining to those ships and found that only one ship was affected by that condition. I cannot remark on the correctness of that statement.

Mr. GEARHART. The report was a little bit unsatisfactory to me when it said that the fighting efficiency of one ship was reduced because of the condition of the inspection. I do not know how to interpret that, and the ship they referred to was the *California*.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. But the fighting efficiency of one ship can be improved by having its voids open when a battle is on?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I had a letter from one of the Annapolis students who heard you speak down in Annapolis and ever since you said something about that yesterday I have been trying to find that letter and I haven't been able to find it, but it compels me to ask you were your addresses that you delivered [8996] down there at that time written? Were they prepared addresses in writing?

Captain ZACHARIAS. They were delivered from notes, and after the question yesterday I found my notes last night and discovered that the statement was with regard to the importance of Intelligence, if

I may refer to the notes, which I have. This was a lecture delivered to the midshipmen on the 20th of November 1942 in which I stated, in the course of emphasizing the importance of Intelligence, that—

Full appreciation of Intelligence would have prevented the surprise at Pearl Harbor. Intelligence knew what would happen, where and when, and more will be heard later about the failure to grasp the basic psychology of the Japanese which was largely responsible for the success of the Japanese attack.

I think that is the substance of the point in question.

Mr. GEARHART. I believe that is all. Thank you very much, Captain.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire, Captain.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I said Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire now.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

[8997] Senator FERGUSON. Captain Zacharias, were you familiar with our policy as far as our diplomatic relations with Japan were concerned?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you one of the men who saw the intercepts of the Japanese code as far as it related to our international or our relations with Japan?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I had seen many of them at times previously but none at the time near the Pearl Harbor attack.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you leave the Intelligence Branch here in Washington?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I left Washington the last time in 1936, when I went to 2 years sea duty. My next Intelligence duty was as district Intelligence officer in San Diego from June 1938 until November 1940. During that period I made one trip back to Washington on duty for a period of about 3 or 4 weeks to discuss the situation and details with Admiral Anderson, then the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if I understood you correctly then, you knew that we were intercepting Jap diplomatic messages?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew that how early, what year?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, of course, I indicated that I [8998] was engaged in cryptanalytic work, particularly of the Japanese, as far back as 1924.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you familiar with the actual messages at any time? Did you know that we had received a dead-line message on the 29th?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; I did not have knowledge of those.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have any knowledge of that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have the so-called ship movements knowledge that is in Exhibit 2? I want to show you several messages.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, they had continually been interested in movements of ships, all of our ships.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you will look on page 12, the one I think that was referred to yesterday. Now, that is dated September 24, 1941, and according to our information on the bottom of it it was

translated on October the 9th. Are you familiar with that message?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I had not seen it before; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that indicate that Japan was plotting our harbor for an air attack?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think that would have reinforced my views regarding the preparation.

[8999] Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that the thing that such a message would indicate? Isn't that the only thing that such a message could indicate?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that it would not be translated from September 24 to October the 9th when our diplomatic intercepts were being decoded the day, many times, that they were received? In fact, I know of no case when they were not translated the same day.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think that is one—I look upon that as one of the organizational deficiencies.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you about the organizational deficiencies. Will you explain that to us?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. What you mean by the "organizational deficiencies"?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield on one thing that is in the record? You said the diplomatic messages were translated on the same day. That is not quite so. In fact, the winds code was not translated for a period of about 2 weeks after, the original winds code itself.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask the witness whether or not the winds code was considered diplomatic. It was not in purple code, as I understand it.

[9000] Mr. MURPHY. It is in the intercepts, in the diplomatic intercepts. It is in Exhibit 1, it is in that book there on page 154. You will find a period of 10 days.

Senator FERGUSON. It tells exactly when they were received here and many of them were translated on the same day. It was one known as the code J-19, not the purple code.

Were you familiar with the difference between J-19 and purple?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. I think that at this time there was a limited number of personnel available to do such work as you have here, and the allocation of it was a result of an agreement between the Army and the Navy, and the delay which is indicated here is undoubtedly due to one or two things: Either insufficient personnel with which to cover all of the traffic or improper selectivity.

[9001] Senator FERGUSON. Now, in that same Exhibit will you look at page 22?

Captain ZACHARIAS (after reading document). Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. If that had been decoded and on the desk of one of the naval officers by noon, or by 2 o'clock Saturday, the 6th, would that message have been significant as to an attack on Pearl Harbor? Particularly page 23?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Only as something leading up to it. It does indicate a little further concentration of espionage activities, but there is nothing there beyond what we already knew, that they were trying to keep in the closest possible touch with our ship movements.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not that also indicate that they were following up the message that you saw on page 12?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. It is an intensification of the espionage activities which would have had a significance.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that was received by our communications on the 3d of December 1941.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, look at page 27, the one on the 6th from Honolulu to Tokyo, where they talk about, in [9002] the first sentence:

Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment.

Then the last sentence:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

What does that indicate?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That would have been extremely significant that an attack was in preparation.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that was in our possession, as shown by the message itself on the 6th.

Now, I want to ask you, how the selectivity of these messages could have been exercised, so we could have pulled out a message like that, and have seen that they intended to attack Pearl Harbor, and even do it by a surprise attack. What method is there in the Department for selecting such a message to get a translation of it quickly, particularly since on the morning of the 6th we had a pilot message that we were going to get an answer to our declaration of the 26th, and it would be in 14 parts, and there would be a time of delivery? Are you familiar with those messages?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Not the contents of the messages, but in general.

[9003] Senator FERGUSON. Now, that being true, and expecting on Saturday that there was, as they had expressed before, "something automatically would take place," wouldn't it be significant that on the day we were anticipating an answer that we were not decoding immediately all messages sent on that day, because that could be a fatal day? Do you see what I have in mind?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; that is correct, but it is possible that there were personnel limitations there. That point, I think, can be better covered by the officers actually engaged at the time in this work.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would there be anything unusual on that kind of a day to work all personnel around the clock?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Considering the situation existing at the time, I would say that that is correct, sir.

[9004] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not we were alerted here in Washington on that day?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that the message on page 27 is a very significant message that they would attack Pearl Harbor. I wish you would look at the whole message.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Give us your opinion on it.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That would lead to the conclusion that there had been previous discussions by the Japanese of the feasibility of an air attack and that this did presage something.

Senator FERGUSON. Now were you familiar with the fact that Japan was about to attack the Kra Peninsula on Sunday or Saturday?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was not aware of that.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not aware of that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that fact have been significant, that on Saturday we had received the message from the British Admiralty, through Winant who was our Ambassador there, to the Secretary of State, which went to our Navy, and to others, that some sixty-odd ships were moving on the Kra Peninsula about 14 hours away?

[9005] Captain ZACHARIAS. That would depend upon other information available at the time. The Kra Peninsula, while being a direct menace to Singapore, I cannot say at this time and would not have been able to say whether or not that in itself would involve Japan in a war with the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any knowledge as to what was the arrangement between the United States and Britain and the Netherlands in relation to an attack on one being considered an attack on all?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no such knowledge?

Captain ZACHARIAS. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. It would have depended upon that situation, would it, as to what appraisal or evaluation you would have given the movement on the British possessions?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you anticipate that if they attacked one that they would attack both, or did you have no facts upon which you could base that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I had no facts, but I always felt that the Japanese, being the opportunists that they were, and the fact that they had always made their advance prepared to retreat a little to placate anyone who might dislike it. [9006] I could only speculate as to the probable effect that that would have on my opinion at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Japanese maps showed that there were supposed to be carriers where some of our battleships were, and that that may have made a difference on the concentration on the battleships? You indicated before that you thought they were equally alert to getting our aircraft as they were to getting the battleships.

Captain ZACHARIAS. The aircraft on shore, I meant. I did not mean the naval aircraft.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not mean the naval aircraft?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir. That was the aircraft on shore, because they would be the only one available to go out against the Japanese forces, or to intercept the attacking planes. It would be impossible to launch the aircraft from the carriers in the harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. That is true.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the carriers themselves?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, they would look upon the carriers as probably just as important as the battleships. But knowing that they were cognizant of the movements of our ships I think they well knew that no carriers were in [9007] there on the morning of December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know anything in relation to a down-wind sector? Does that mean anything to you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was that sector?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I do not know about a message——

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). Not a message but a certain territory around Hawaii.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, the down-wind sector, of course, is a small sector on either side of the direction of the wind. That is the sector within which we might expect an attack to come, because of the necessity of the attacking forces to have the best chance of getting away.

It was felt that they would launch their planes from up-wind in that comparatively small sector in order to let them come in with a greater speed, and when the forces retreated up-wind, that is away from Hawaii, it would slow down any planes, it would slow down to the greatest extent any planes that might come out to attack those forces.

Therefore it could be expected that an attack would be launched from this down-wind sector, so-called, in order to get the best results in the shortest possible time, and to give the greatest protection to the attacking forces.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you had a conversation with [9008] Admiral Nomura before he came over here, in fact before he arrived here in Washington.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything in that conversation that indicated to you that war was imminent?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was not, sir. I was convinced that he would do his utmost to prevent it.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time you trusted him?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; because of his statement in 1921, and which he reiterated at that time on February 8, 1941, that he felt that if Japan and the United States went to war it would mean the finish of the Japanese Empire and a great loss to the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say anything on the day that you talked to him in 1941 about that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; he did. I asked him if he still felt that way and he said he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there was nothing in that conversation that was significant, as far as Pearl Harbor was concerned, or an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; there was not.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact I take it, from your statement there, that it would be all negative, that it would indicate that war would not be imminent?

[9009] Captain ZACHARIAS. That he would do his best to prevent it.

Senator FERGUSON. And in your opinion was he a strong man in government in Japan, that his views would mean a lot on the question of war?

Captain ZACHARIAS. He was. He was a very unusual Japanese in many ways, and I might say that he was the only Japanese extant who had expressed himself regarding the potential power of the United States, because that was something they never wanted to hear, or disliked to hear.

It so happens that when other Japanese, who had been over here in official capacities, ventured the opinion that the war potential of the United States might make it impossible for them to win a war against the United States, it always brought them into disfavor.

Admiral Nomura was the only one who seemed to be able to keep his position even after stating such things.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that bring you to the conclusion that it would have been a good thing for us to be bold with our forces on Hawaii, that we should have indicated that we anticipated an attack, that we were alerted to full strength both in Washington and in Hawaii, rather than to say that we were to do nothing that would arouse the population?

[9010] Captain ZACHARIAS. Well, that was a matter of policy which was probably based on more information that I had available.

Senator FERGUSON. But with what you knew, what would your answer be?

Captain ZACHARIAS. My knowledge of the Japanese makes me feel that they respond better to certain things than they do to others, and one of them would be a situation that would not invite an attack by them. That was why I was concerned about the situation in March 1942 which caused me to prepare, or to initiate the conversation with Admiral Draemel and prepare the memorandum for Admiral Nimitz, because of the local situation and the defensive attitude that we were taking at that time which, to my mind, invited the Japanese to come back. That, of course, eventuated in less than 3 months when the battle of Midway took place.

The attitude to which I refer was expressed in the press in such terms as "We can defend the Islands." Anyone knowing the Japanese would realize that that would immediately create in their minds a doubt on our part as to whether or not we could defend them. I would have preferred to say "We wish the Japanese would come back. We will hit them with everything we have." That would have had an entirely different effect upon them than a pronouncement that [9011] we can defend the Hawaiian Islands.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your ship, the *Salt Lake City*, alerted fully to war on the 6th, your particular ship? In other words, you were the captain of that ship.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you alerted to war?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I was alert myself on December 5, when I received a report that a submarine had been sighted in the Hawaiian area. As you recall, that was one of the contingencies, the unmistakable signs that I indicated to Admiral Kimmel, that the Japanese would be ready to strike. Therefore—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). As I understand it, you were alert because you knew there was a sub around, not that somebody alerted you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead. You started to say "therefore."

Captain ZACHARIAS. That evening, from 6 o'clock to midnight—this was the 5th of December, Friday night—I sat at my radio listening to the short wave transmissions from Japan, hoping to pick up something which would give me further indications of what they intended, but all I could hear was scrambled conversation. We were then en route to [9012] Pearl Harbor. I did nothing, other than the condition of readiness 3 in which we were placed at the time, to alert the ship any further.

Of course, under way the captain is in his emergency cabin all the time, which is really a part of the navigating bridge, where the officer on deck can have him on the bridge within 2 seconds.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was no specific alert given to your ship?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There was not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we have evidence before us that Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, War Department, G-2, from July 1941 up to the time of the Japanese attack, had not personally received the intercepts of the Jap codes either in Exhibit 2 or Exhibit 1, or the others. Could you explain what the set-up would be that would keep him from having that information? You were familiar with the set-up here, were you not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. I did not know about that specific instance, but it might be an indication of one of the organizational deficiencies which I had in mind and which had been considered over a great number of years and on which effort had been made to bring about a change. That is the allocation of the cryptographic work to a [9013] purely technical bureau such as the Office of Naval Communications and Signal Intelligence Service of the Army. Those are purely technical organizations which have the facilities and personnel for picking messages out of the air. After that their function would seem to cease, and therefore, the decrypting, translating, evaluating, and dissemination, of information in such dispatches is a purely Intelligence function.

For that reason I had made consistent efforts over many years to have that function placed directly under the Office of Naval Intelligence, but without results.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, why would they place evaluation under Communications rather than under Intelligence?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is one of the things that I could never understand, because Intelligence is the receptacle of all information and would be the only organization in either the Army or Navy where all information was available, and particularly background information such as on the Japanese. That appears to have contributed largely to some of the things that took place, because the evaluations were made by certain war-plans officers without a background knowledge of Japan and the Japanese, and they could not possibly have at their disposal all the information available.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how often they would [9014] change the heads of Intelligence in the Navy?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is another organizational deficiency that I would like to defer. I might say that in the past 5 years we have had seven Directors of Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. If you knew that, how is it possible for the Director to get the background information and really intelligently operate as an Intelligence officer?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It is not possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Before December 7, 1941, we had a change, as I remember here in the evidence, in March, and one on October 15, which was the day before the change in the Jap Cabinet.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That was when Admiral Kirk was relieved by Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator FERGUSON. Kirk took the place of Anderson and Anderson had been relieved by an acting man, so we really had three in that year.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How would it be possible, from your experience in Intelligence, for an officer as Director of Naval Intelligence to get the background and to be able to intelligently evaluate intelligence under those circumstances and under those changes?

[9015] Captain ZACHARIAS. As I said before, it is not possible. That is one of the points that I would like to emphasize, regarding the training of officers for Intelligence work. There has been a general misconception that because an officer is intelligent he is a good Intelligence officer. That is not correct. As indicated by Senator Brewster yesterday in reading from one of the papers, I wish to emphasize that naval officers are trained fundamentally not to be Intelligence officers, because of the qualifications that are attached thereto. That does not detract one bit from the capabilities of these officers as naval officers, but it is a misconception to believe that because an officer is intelligent he will make a good Intelligence officer.

[9016] Senator FERGUSON. Why shouldn't a man, if he makes a good Intelligence officer, receive his promotions and receive high rank? Why do we treat Intelligence, which is, as I understand, to tell you the strength of the enemy, when you may go to war, or when you may not, and where you may go to war—aren't those all very, very important questions?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir. It is actually a specialty of the same comparable importance as the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Senator FERGUSON. But what have been the conditions in our Navy?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I might say that there has been entire disregard of the fundamental requirement for Intelligence, but that is not a reflection on those who made the decisions, because they were not in a position to judge properly.

If you will examine that letter of mine written on January 27, 1942, which is a part of the exhibit which I sent into the Chief of Naval Operations, via the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet at that time, I have indicated clearly why we must have better selectivity and training for officers doing Intelligence work, and unless we do that I think we will never change the situation with [9017] which we have been confronted in the past.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned yesterday, in relation to, let's call it the boldness of an officer, or the capacity of an officer to evaluate something for a superior officer, that some men just do not have the capacity to evaluate and actually tell the superior officer the meaning of what he has.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir, and that is what I tried to do for Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Nimitz.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that, prior to the 7th, have been one of the cases that we didn't really get out of what we intercepted and what we had the real significance, and permitted an attack without our knowledge that it was coming?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is quite true, sir. The improper selection of officers for Intelligence duty is one, I look upon it as one, organization deficiency. The allocation of evaluation functions to the communications officer and Signal Intelligence Service is the other, and a third one—well, I won't bring that in at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it have anything to do with this?

Captain ZACHARIAS. We have mentioned it already. The War Plans officers undertaking the functions of evaluation [9018] and dissemination instead of the Chiefs of Intelligence taking over.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that brings me to this point, that sometime during 1941, it was decided that certain people would get the information, that is, it would be given to the War Plans, it would be given to the Chief of Naval Operations, it would be given to the Secretary of the Navy, it would be given to the President of the United States, it would be given to the Secretary of State, in the raw, you might call it, so that evaluations would not go to them from the men who had been trained and who had the history of the situation.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not that fact alone place the responsibility for the evaluation of our intelligence in those who got it in the raw, and who did not take the evaluation of those who had the history and who were trained to give evaluation?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I would say that it would tend to take away the functions of the Chiefs of Intelligence who should have been the sole, should have had the sole, responsibility for the evaluation and presentation to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, and at Pearl Harbor, the fleet Intelligence officer instead of [9019] the War Plans officer.

I would like to point specifically to that because, as has been reported, it was the War Plans officer on the staff of the commander in chief who stated in a conference between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, when asked whether there was any probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, he stated there was none.

Now, he was an officer, an excellent officer, but he did not have any background knowledge of Japan or the Japanese, or their psychology. In other words, he did not have full information at his disposal on which to make such a decision, and unconsciously that would be bound to effect the decision of the commander in chief, and I feel that he is entitled to better information and advice than he received there, all of which was inadvertent and due solely to the organizational deficiency, and I feel confident that if the fleet intelligence officer had had the sole responsibility for stating his evaluation to the commander in chief

and had been allowed to do so, we would have had an entirely different picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you stated this morning that the attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a hazardous attack. Of course, all attacks in war are hazardous, isn't that true?

[9020] Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; and they discuss that fully in this extract from the book that I read yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. Now if the Japanese knew that we were fully alerted—and as I understand it their intelligence was rather superior on Hawaii, they had intelligence officers all over the island?

Captain ZACHARIAS. They knew everything that was going on.

Senator FERGUSON. They knew everything that was going on. Therefore we should have assumed that they knew everything that was going on, isn't that correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if they knew everything that was going on, the next thing they would have to find out would be whether we knew that they knew what was going on; isn't that correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. If we did know what was going on and were fully alerted, it would be an extraordinarily hazardous thing, would it not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. If they knew that we just passed it over and didn't do anything, for instance, stopped our radar at 7 in the morning, and had our ships coming in [9021] from the coast unarmed, at the same time that we were not alerted, they had these messages, as I have shown you, what hazard were they taking?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I would say they were confident that they were taking none, and that they knew every detail of information as to the operation of the radars, the times at which they were under operation, and other things that were of importance to them.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion, how could the fact that on the morning of the 7th we fully alerted Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, to a full alert for an attack, how could that have in any way been a detriment to the United States? That would be 4 or 5 hours before they left their ships.

Suppose they found out we were then fully alerted, wouldn't that be a great benefit to the United States, that they would get that knowledge?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It would have, sir. It might have served the purpose of preventing—of calling off the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. If they knew we were fully alerted?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I showed you the ad in a newspaper this morning.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

[9022] Senator FERGUSON. You obtained from your file another ad in a newspaper. I want to show you these ads.

First, I want to show you the cloud above, with the white spot on it, and the bottom part of the "J" in "Jashion," and some of the words. Have you got an extra copy of that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I have a small one.

Senator FERGUSON. What does the botton of that "J" indicate in the Japanese or Chinese characters?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The bottom part would be the numeral 1.

Senator FERGUSON. Not 7?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir. The botton part is simply that straight line.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't mean the bottom; I mean the entire—will you take this interpretation. This is an advertisement published by the Honolulu Star Bulletin, December 3, 1941. That is before the Pearl Harbor attack.

Take the other sheet that I hand you. The reason I ask you is that you are familiar with the language, and we have indications here from some of these messages that they were using the want ads and other ads to get certain signals or certain information.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; but I don't think I [9023] would attach much importance to it.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, look down over the sheet that has been interpreted there, and see whether or not there is any truth—or whether they are false—those interpretations.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I checked on——

Senator FERGUSON. You must have checked on that ad.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir. In Hawaii, this was brought to my attention, and we checked first to see if these were the names of silks, and I was told that there was a silk for each one of these names. That led to the——

Senator FERGUSON. Take the "Yippee."

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. In consideration of those——

Senator FERGUSON. What kind of silk is that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. In consideration of those various unusual silks, it led to the investigation of who had inserted the ad in the paper, particularly because in another paper, in the Honolulu Star Bulletin on six different days, November 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26, there appeared in the personal column, a phrase, "Yippee," which also appears in this silk ad, "Please call me on phone, urgent."

[9024] On checking with the newspaper office, it was found that this ad was registered in the name of a man named Tmayer, giving a certain address.

Further investigation disclosed that no such person was at the address given, or in any directory in Hawaii. But the Intelligence officer was unable to run down anything further regarding these advertisements, but it did leave the impression that it was very suspicious, particularly because the ad was made up in Hawaiian Importing Co., which was a Japanese house, and turned over to the newspaper for publication.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether there was a silk known as Tip-Hi? That is the second one.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Only through inquiries that there was such a silk. I don't know now whether that is true.

Senator FERGUSON. What does the word "Juno" mean; what is the interpretation of that? What is the interpretation given on the ad I gave you? Will you look and see on the one I gave you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Juno means Sunday in Japanese. That is not correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not correct?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the word for Sunday?

[9025] Captain ZACHARIAS. Nichiyobi.

Senator LUCAS. What is Monday in Japanese?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Monday?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Getsuyobi.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I am asking you about these ads, you thought they were significant and had looked them up and our Intelligence officers had looked them up; isn't that true?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find that their intelligence was such that they were using certain ads to convey certain messages?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It was my impression that they were, particularly in Japanese newspapers. The reason for insertion in the English-language newspapers was in order to reach agents who were not Japanese and who we knew were operating in Hawaii at the time. That is, Germans and Italians.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, they were reaching them by ads in American newspapers, and this could have been one of those ads?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought at one time that it was [9026] such an ad?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get anything from it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the interpretations put on the one which I gave you, give you any more knowledge on it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir. These have been analyzed very thoroughly, and the conclusion was that there was nothing we could understand from them. That still did not remove the possibility of their being an instrument for conveying information.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, unless you had the code words, you couldn't determine that they were significant?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Now, in order that there might not be any doubt about this translation "Juno" meaning Sunday, the word "Nichiyobi" is composed of two characters, "Nichi," meaning Sunday, and "yobi"—"day." Likewise Monday is composed of "Getsu," which is Monday, and "yobi," which is "day."

Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest that somebody reading this record is going to have to read all this to get down to [9027] what they are looking for.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this part of the Intelligence system that you were looking at—were any of our other officers looking at these ads?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; very much so. I was in frequent consultation with the officer in charge of investigation in the Fourteenth Naval District located in Honolulu.

Senator FERGUSON. That was now Commander W. B. Stevenson. Had you any other advertisements that you looked over?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir. These are the only ones.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is one more question. Why did you get a certificate from Munson that you had made a statement to him in October—it is the last page of your sheet. That was in July of 1942. There is a certificate, as I read it, that you did tell Munson this story about, this item about an attack on Sunday morning, and he was making an investigation for someone here in Washington and had credentials to see everything and hear everything?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you get the certificate?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That was done upon the advice of my wife, who, through womanly instinct, felt that at some [9028] future date the subject might come up for discussion and there might be some short memories.

Senator FERGUSON. Is your wife an Intelligence officer, also?

Captain ZACHARIAS. She is my adviser on strategy.

Senator LUCAS. I don't know why you would need that. Your memory is not short.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 12 o'clock. We will recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[9029]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will now inquire, Captain.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Zacharias, did you ever at any time tell Admiral Kimmel that a Jap air attack would be made on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, 1941?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In your conversations with Admiral Kimmel did you state anything more than your opinion based upon your study and your experience in Intelligence?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That in the event of a breakdown of diplomatic relations Japan would attack the fleet wherever it might be and, in your opinion, the attack would come from the north and would take place probably on a Sunday morning?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that all that you ever told Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is the substance of it, with the addition of the earliest indications and the unmistakable signs.

[9030] Mr. KEEFE. Of the submarines?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Of the submarine appearing in the operating area.

Mr. KEEFE. Now you had a discussion with Mr. Munson?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. A civilian?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In October 1941?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. You understood Mr. Munson had been sent to Hawaii to make an investigation of conditions there by someone in authority at Washington?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you learn under what authority he was acting?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I endeavored to ascertain that but he consistently refused to disclose it, other than to produce the letter signed by Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations to open up everything to him.

Mr. KEEFE. Because of the letter which he carried representing his credentials, signed by Admiral Stark, you advised him of whatever information you had in the interviews which he had with you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

[9031] Mr. KEEFE. When you had this conversation with Mr. Munson did you relate to him the same information that you had given to Admiral Kimmel back in March of 1941?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir, and in addition I indicated to him the circumstance about the arrival of the third envoy in Washington, as to what would take place, and I learned over the radio while at sea that the Ambassador to Peru, the Japanese Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington on the 2d of December, 1941.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you prophesy or predict or state to Mr. Munson that, in your opinion, the Japs would attack on Sunday, December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you tell him any more than you had previously told Admiral Kimmel, with the addition of the information to which you have just alluded?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir; I did. He was interested in the question of whether or not there would be an armed uprising in Hawaii or on the west coast in the event of hostilities. As I have previously testified, I told him that because of my belief that the hostilities would commence by an air attack on the fleet, because of the necessity of secrecy on the part of the Japanese, they would not have been able to disseminate the necessary information on which [9032] to base an uprising or extensive sabotage, and therefore he could forget about those two items.

Mr. KEEFE. I have read the report which appears in the record of these proceedings, of January 17, in which is set out the report of Mr. Munson, and the reason for asking you these questions is because I do not find in his report any reference or suggestion of a proposed air attack upon Pearl Harbor.

You have read that report, haven't you?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I have seen his report, but I do not know why he did not include it.

Mr. KEEFE. The fact is, as far as my question is concerned, he did not include it, did he, in his report?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir. However, he did authenticate, in July 1942, for me the fact that I had given him those details.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now you graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did they have an organization at the Academy at that time known as the Green Bowlers?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did not know of any such organization and heard of it only recently.

[9033] Mr. KEEFE. How did you happen to hear of it recently?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It came up in a discussion of a group of naval officers, and later I saw an account of it in a recent publication of the Army and Navy Bulletin in which the editorial of that paper concluded that it was an organization of not much importance or influence.

Mr. KEEFE. How long have you been a captain in the United States Navy?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Since July 1939.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you been up for promotion since then?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Not under a regular selection board of the Navy. I might add that these selection boards as such were discontinued during wartime.

Mr. KEEFE. The thought just occurred to me, in all frankness, Captain Zacharias, that here is a graduate of the Naval Academy of the class of 1912; he has been a captain since 1939, who has rendered distinguished service both in the line and in Intelligence, and he is still a captain when others have been carried on to considerably higher rank; is there any reason for that, that you know of, or are conscious of, today?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I appreciate the thought, and I might add that that never has been a consideration with me and will so remain. Why I was not promoted is something [9034] within the knowledge of the former Chief of the Bureau of Personnel and the former Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. KEEFE. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask two questions?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. May I ask a question first?

Mr. MURPHY. Surely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't any other officers, Captain, have anything to do with promotions besides the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Chief of Naval Operations?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am not entirely familiar with the methods by which promotions were made during wartime. It was something different from the process of selection for promotion as established by the Congress.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do not the commanding officers under whom officers serve have some power of recommending, and so on?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. They make out periodic reports of fitness of the officers concerned. My reports for service at sea have been uniformly excellent, as can be noted in the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One reason that prompted me to ask that question—I recall Admiral Richardson testified here that he included Admiral Kimmel on his list for Commander of [9035] the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Stark stated that he had included Admiral Kimmel on his for that. And that carried a promotion. So I was just wonder-

ing whether commanding officers did make recommendations that had something to do with the question of promotions.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I think that he was referring to his position as a member of the selection board which passed upon the record of all officers coming up for consideration for promotion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, I don't know about the Navy, and you do; but I got the impression that Admiral Richardson had submitted a list of names for the position of commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Kimmel was included on that list; and Admiral Stark—I got the impression with regard to him, that he had a list that he had made up which included Admiral Kimmel for the position of commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. I think that was probably a special list of those eligible for commander in chief and not in the general run of selection for promotion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I had also understood that in the Army probably a list of names was submitted for special assignment which carried with it a promotion and the appointing authority selected one of those names on that [9036] list.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is quite true.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So I had assumed that commanding officers had some function to perform in the preparation of those lists and had something to do with the question of promotion. I am just asking for information.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. The only part the commanding officer plays is to submit the periodic reports of fitness which go into the record of that officer and are kept in the Bureau of Personnel, which are later considered by the board when they meet regularly for considerations of that kind.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, in fairness to you as a witness before us here, I will ask you: Do you want to give the committee any further information with respect to the question asked you by Mr. Keefe about your promotion?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Why, no, sir. I would not inject that into the question at all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire.

Mr. MURPHY. I have two questions, Captain.

You testified this morning, Captain, that you talked at Annapolis to the student body on the question of intelligence, and I assume from your past experience plus the fact that [9037] you were selected to address the student body that you can answer this question quite satisfactorily: What is the significance of the destruction of codes by an expected enemy at a time when international relations are tense between our Nation and the supposed enemy?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It means that that nation intends to resort to hostilities in the country in which the codes are destroyed.

[9038] Mr. MURPHY. Do you know of any teaching anywhere in the Naval Academy, or anywhere in the United States Navy, that would justify an admiral in charge of the fleet in saying that the destruction of codes was a matter of little importance, or not of vital importance? Do you know of any books, any pamphlet, or any ad-

dress anywhere in your lifetime where you ever heard that until this case?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There is nothing of that nature on which he could base it, unless he had information that was specially available to him.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, all of the textbooks and the authorities are to the effect, are they not, that the destruction of codes by an expected enemy at a time when relations are tense is a very good indication of the probability of war?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain, what is your present assignment with the Navy?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am still attached to the office of the Secretary of the Navy, the administrative office of [9039] the Navy Department, where I was attached at the time I was engaged in the project of conducting a psychological warfare campaign against the Japanese high command. That has not been changed as yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that considered an assignment in the Intelligence Branch?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It is not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a special branch in that section of the Navy office?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir. It is more in the light of ability, being attached to the administrative office, and that assignment was simply to facilitate the handling of my records while I was on this other special duty.

I might add that the last word I had from the Secretary was to wait further word from him.

Senator FERGUSON. On your new assignment, if there is to be one?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I don't know as there is a new assignment yet in prospect, but I am waiting, and covering the situations and occasionally making out estimates and memorandums for him.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you want to add to or subtract anything from your testimony, or do you want to change it in any way?

[9040] Captain ZACHARIAS. Nothing whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything that you think of that you could tell this committee that would help us in the solution of the problem now before us as to how this surprise attack could have taken place in Pearl Harbor in December, on December 7, 1941?

Captain ZACHARIAS. There is nothing that I can add to what I termed as organizational deficiencies, which had some effect and which I feel should be remedied in the future in order to add better security to the Nation.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you an opinion on the unification of the Intelligence in all the services?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I have long advocated a joint intelligence agency for the purpose of handling all intelligence.

I made a plan, made up a plan, in 1942 which contemplated such an organization and would have incorporated in time of war all intelligence agencies under a joint committee, and directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In peacetime such an organization would have to be a little differently constituted, but there should be something, in my opinion, to coordinate all of the efforts, eliminate duplication, and assure us that all information is available to those who might require it.

[9041] Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it important that in peacetime the Navy has all of the intelligence the Army has and that the Army all that the Navy has, and the Marines, including all of the services, so that evaluation will include the evaluation of all pertinent facts?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you get that under a system such as we had in the two services prior to the 7th of December 1941?

Captain ZACHARIAS. The likelihood is that some information would not reach those who should be using it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wasn't it true that Mr. Munson represented some other agency outside of the Army and Navy when he came out working on intelligence?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I don't know, sir. I was never able to establish the source of his representation.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you have in the last sheet of your report—do you have it before you there?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The word that he was—well, did you say “possibly” or “presumably”?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I presumed that he was a representative of the President. I did not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you presume it? Was there [9042] any facts?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir. His refusal to tell me, and his—quite properly so—and his coming out as a civilian with a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to have things opened up to him. That did not bear—have any bearing on the information that I gave to him or the expression of my opinion to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever talked to him as to why he left out of his report to the Secretary of State the facts of what you told him about the attack on Sunday?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir; I have not. At the time I saw him in 1942 I had not seen his report, and I haven't seen him since then, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have no knowledge on it?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, one other question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, do you know of any rule in the Intelligence field or any authority or any reason after an admiral of the fleet gets a war warning, and thereafter from December 3 on, gets several messages in regard to code destruction, do you know of any reason for his not making that information available to the Commanding General [9043] at Hawaii?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am not in a position to answer that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, are there any rules that prohibit the handing over of code-destruction messages to your counterpart in the other service, when you are expecting a war?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am not aware of any.

Mr. MURPHY. All right; that is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will inquire.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, following out the inquiry of Congressman Murphy briefly, you regard information with reference to code burning as being of the first importance?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Of the highest importance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you would regard it as the duty of any competent Intelligence service to place that information in the hands of people in the field from whom action was expected?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you would expect those people in the field to extend that information to all persons with whom they were associated, who could be helpful in defending the interests of the United States?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I would sir.

[9044] Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

(No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you have already been asked, Captain, if you have any further information or knowledge you desire to give to the committee.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I have nothing else.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On behalf of the committee, I thank you for your appearance, the information you have given to the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful in bringing to the attention of the committee all information you have on the question here under consideration.

You may now be excused, sir.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to present to the committee Admiral Smith.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Smith will please come forward.

Admiral, will you please be sworn?

[9045] **TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM WARD SMITH,
UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral Smith, what is your full name?

Admiral SMITH. William Ward Smith.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been connected with the Navy?

Admiral SMITH. It would be 41 years next June.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are a graduate of Annapolis?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; class of 1909.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you still in active service?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

[9046] Mr. RICHARDSON. You are the Admiral Smith who was chief of staff for Admiral Kimmel for the Pacific Fleet in the summer and fall and winter of 1941?

Admiral SMITH. I am.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are the Admiral Smith referred to here in the testimony of the previous witness, Captain Zacharias?

Admiral SMITH. I am.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you present at any conversation between Captain Zacharias and Admiral Kimmel during 1941?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And was the time and place of that conversation that which was named by Captain Zacharias?

Admiral SMITH. The exact date I do not know but it was after Admiral Kimmel transferred his headquarters from the *Pennsylvania* to shore; I should say approximately April 1, possibly at the time given by the last witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long had you known Captain Zacharias?

Admiral SMITH. I knew him slightly at the Naval Academy. I was a first classman when he was a plebe. I have seen him from time to time since but have never served in the same organization with him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Your relations with him have always been [9047] friendly?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And how long had you known Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral SMITH. I first served with Admiral Kimmel in the summer of 1939 and from then on until after Pearl Harbor. I had known him, had met him on one or two occasions previously, but had never been with him, never had served with him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, will you advise the committee of what your recollection is of this conversation at which you were present and referred to by Captain Zacharias as having taken place in Honolulu on or about April 1, 1941?

Admiral SMITH. I remember the meeting very well, but Captain Zacharias is in error when he says that Kimmel sent for me. Zacharias came to my office and I took him down to the War Plans office where I knew Kimmel to be at the time. So far as I recollect, no one else was present. Kimmel was studying war plans.

I introduced Captain Zacharias and had the impression at that time that they had never met before. The meeting, to my recollection, did not last an hour and a half but I believe more likely 15 minutes, and during this meeting Admiral Kimmel did most of the talking.

After the first few minutes of the conversation, which [9048] concerned the Jap situation as it existed at the time, Admiral Kimmel questioned Zacharias on the characteristics of some of the Japanese leaders, naval leaders. He had already had from Admiral Hart very good reports of these leaders and Admiral Hart's information turned out to be correct.

Admiral Kimmel then asked about the efficiency of operations of the Japanese Fleet, and, as I recall, Captain Zacharias could give him no information on that. We already knew that he probably could not, since none of our Intelligence officers or students, language students, had ever been able to get about in Japan to see the things they would have to see to learn something of the operations efficiency and gunnery of the Japanese Fleet.

The conversation was brief and, as I recall it, when Zacharias left, Admiral Kimmel was disappointed and said to the effect that he had gained no new information.

Now, to cover this meeting more thoroughly, I would like to refer to a few items mentioned by Captain Zacharias.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Before you do that might I ask you, Admiral, to state how the meeting came about?

Admiral SMITH. Captain Zacharias came to my office and asked to see Admiral Kimmel and tell him that he had had a great deal of Intelligence duty and I believe he just came from Naval Intelligence and had brought the *Salt Lake City* and had [9049] just joined up, as I remember.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

Admiral SMITH. I listened to that testimony, I might say, with astonishment. It struck me as the testimony of clairvoyance operating in reverse. I am absolutely positive that at this meeting there was never mentioned the question of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, a submarine attack, or the question of seaplanes arriving in merchant ships and taking off from the nearby islands.

There are two statements in this testimony, one where Zacharias is alleged to have told Kimmel that an air attack was certain and Kimmel replied, "How can I prevent this?"

Now, those words do not sound like Kimmel to me as I know him. This was a subordinate officer just joining up and I believe that Kimmel knew very little about him.

The next statement, that when he informed Admiral Kimmel about an air attack—about a reconnaissance to 500 miles—and when Kimmel replied that he had neither men nor materials to carry out such reconnaissance and that Captain Zacharias states that he replied, "You had better get them, Admiral, for that is what is coming."

Had any officer of any rank ever made a statement like that to Kimmel it would have been so impressed upon my memory that I would never have forgotten it, and I do not recollect [9050] that statement.

Now, Captain Zacharias states also that Captain Smith has since discussed—since Pearl Harbor has discussed this meeting, this air attack with others on several occasions. I would like to know with whom I held these discussions and where. I am certain that the matter passes out of my mind.

Never since that meeting was Captain Zacharias in my office, I never saw him with Admiral Kimmel, he was never at a meeting of the staff though he probably did have meetings with the fleet Intelligence officer, Captain Layton. I have never heard his name mentioned in staff meetings.

Now, as for this Sunday business, that was not questioned. A Sunday attack had been discussed as far back as 1935 when I was fleet operations officer to Admiral Reeves and the fleet was in San Pedro. Admiral Reeves feared a Sunday attack, but we were lying in an open harbor with no protection whatever. Officers and men had their families there, so that on Sunday morning probably half of the officers and half of the men would be on shore. There was no protection against submarines.

At Pearl Harbor it was different, after we left Lahaina Roads. Very few had their families in Honolulu. There was a net at the gate; there was no danger from torpedo attacks from submarines.

[9051] As for the attitude of McMorris—that he was preoccupied. I can believe that he was often preoccupied. It may be that this reflects the fact that Kimmel had more confidence in his own Intelligence officer, Captain Layton, than he had in Captain Zacharias or in anyone else, and I think this is confirmed by the fact that after Admiral Nimitz took over the fleet he kept Captain Layton on as his fleet Intelligence officer throughout the war.

As for Mr. Munson, I never heard of him until a few days ago. I doubt that he represented the Chief of Naval Operations because it was customary and a matter of courtesy when a special agent was arriving at Pearl Harbor for the Chief of Naval Operations to notify the commander in chief in advance of his coming. No such notice was received to the best of my knowledge and I did not know that Mr. Munson had ever been in the Pearl Harbor area.

As for the statement to Mr. Munson that he can forget sabotage and consider only an air attack, I do not see how sabotage could be overlooked. We all knew that the islands had many Japanese spies in them, some as consular agents and some as priests. I know the Army was afraid of sabotage. I talked to many civilians who spent their lives in the Islands and it was their opinion that the most dangerous Jap was the one born in Honolulu and taken at a very early age to Japan, [9052] educated there and brought back to the islands in early manhood. They said that that type of Jap could never be converted to the American system.

If I may touch upon a few other statements it may clear up questions in the minds of the committee.

Halsey was not delayed in his return to Pearl Harbor. There was no haste in his return to Pearl Harbor. It was natural for him to return at an economic speed so as not to consume too much fuel. He had to fuel his destroyers from his heavy ships regardless of weather conditions and there was no need for him to be back in Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December, no necessity for his arriving at that time. The balance of his force, including his three battleships, did return on the 5th of December as they were scheduled.

As for the reason for the search to the south: It is true that the weather in the north after you get a few hundred miles north of Midway is likely to be very thick. I had 6 months in the Aleutians and believe I understand that weather; it also may be very rough, but the Japanese Fleet had to fuel en route and fueling in the water is not always easy, but it must be remembered that two carriers had been reported in the Marshalls, not very far away. That was an Intelligence report.

Our best Intelligence, except for the absence of radio interception, was that the Japanese main carrier strength was [9053] in Empire waters.

On the morning of the attack and shortly after the attack a report was received by radio that a Jap carrier had been sighted to the south. This later proved incorrect. It was the cruiser *Minneapolis* operating under Admiral Brown. Shortly after that report was received and while we were still uncertain, the fleet Intelligence officer ran over to the plotting board with radio bearings and stated, "Here they are" and he cut them into the southward. Present at the plotting board were Admiral Kimmel, Captain McMorris, the war plans officer, Captain

Delaney, the operations officer, and myself. For that reason the search was ordered to the south.

The fleet Intelligence officer's explanation of that later is, as we knew at the time, radio bearings from a single station were then and may still be subject to only one error, that is an error of 180 degrees. That was Layton's explanation the last time I talked to him and shortly after Pearl Harbor.

The statement is made that the Japs knew all the fundamentals of naval warfare. I think this war has proved that they did not.

As for Mr. Thurston and the station KGU: It is true that KGU did send out this warning to keep the streets clear, to permit freedom for the military, to keep cool, summoning [9054] the Red Cross, and so on, but when the attack struck, the telephone system of Honolulu was blocked because the Honolulu Advertiser had not been delivered that morning and everyone was calling for his paper. The radio was carrying on as usual with morning music. I left the house and was informed later by my wife that the music was interrupted and KGU announced "Pearl Harbor under attack," then went on with the music for something like one hour before it gave the instructions what to do. Where it got those instructions I do not know.

As for the appointment of Captain Layton, I do not know anything of that except that when Admiral Reeves had the fleet in 1935 and 1936 and Admiral J. O. Richardson was his chief of staff, Layton was on the *Pennsylvania*, was known to be a Japanese language student, was the officer usually sent to board an incoming Japanese naval vessel. He had the high respect of Admiral Richardson.

About surprise inspections: Surprise inspections were never held on Mondays. Surprise inspections referred to the captain's inspection on Saturday morning, which was always held, unless the ship were fueling or taking on board ammunition; it was held from 9:30 until 11:30 in the morning. All that it involved was the inspection of the crew and of the living quarters and of a few other compartments. It did not involve the inspection of double bottoms.

[9055] The system was that a division commander just before morning quarters at 9:30 would send a signal to a ship stating "You will receive a surprise inspection this morning," and then accompanied by the captain of another ship of the division and of an inspection crew of many officers the admiral would go to that ship under inspection and while he inspected the crew and the living quarters the younger officers would go to the engine room and to various parts of the machinery spaces and storerooms.

The inspection was brief. A very brief report was put in on it. The captains liked this inspection because it gave them an opportunity to exchange ideas with other ships and they would come back and make improvements in their own and, consequently, get less reprimand perhaps from the admiral on his next inspection.

A question has been asked this morning whether carrier planes could take off from the carriers while in Pearl Harbor. Planes were never on the carrier decks in Pearl Harbor. They were flown off, sometimes as much as 200 miles, but always before entry and were dispersed into air fields at Ewa and other places where they could continue their training in case the carrier were to remain for a long time.

When the carrier sortied from Pearl Harbor the planes joined her at sea. This practice had been going on long [9056] before Pearl Harbor.

The *Utah* may have been mistaken by the Japanese for a carrier. Her deck was flat and covered by 12 by 12 lumber because she was used for bombing purposes, bombing from the air. To them from the mountains she may have appeared to be a carrier. She was occupying the berth of the *Enterprise* and I believe that she received the torpedoes intended for the *Enterprise*.

The question was asked this morning whether a ship had been alerted at sea. Ships at sea were always alerted and the moment the *Salt Lake City* sortied from Pearl Harbor she was automatically alerted by Admiral Kimmel's order 2 CL-41, which is an exhibit before this committee. She then went to condition 3, and I would like to explain that condition 3 is ample on a ship at sea. It is quite different from a shore establishment.

At condition 3 the aircraft battery of the ship is manned, ammunition is at the guns, lookouts are stationed. There is an air patrol of some kind in the air from the ship's own planes if from no other source, so that a surface enemy could be sighted when many miles out of range. It is only a very few minutes to go from condition 3 to a full alert manning all guns. It is obviously unnecessary to man turret guns when there is no possible enemy within range.

In confirmation of what Captain Zacharias has said, he [9057] never arrived before a board of nine admirals in accordance with the old, regular Navy selection system. The last officer selected by that system was the top man in 1911, so that his failure of promotion cannot be blamed upon the Navy promotion system, as it exists except in time of war.

The fleet Intelligence officer did evaluate all of the information he had and bring it to the commander in chief every day, and when other task force commanders or type commanders were in port and came to the admiral's morning conferences the fleet intelligence officer invariably, on a chart which covered one whole wall of the room, explained the information received by Intelligence and his evaluation of where the enemy was and what he was doing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Having been unavoidably absent during the Admiral's testimony I am not advised of his testimony. Therefore, I cannot at this time make any inquiries and therefore I will not do so at the moment. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I have no questions on the points covered by Admiral Smith. If there are any questions asked on any other matters, I may have a few questions later.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark?

[9058] Mr. CLARK. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He just stepped out.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. The Admiral's testimony was very clear. I do not have any questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Kimmel when he was on the stand related a conversation that he had with Secretary Knox in relation to a message being sent on the 6th. Were you present at that conference or conversation?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain that?

Admiral SMITH. I remember that, I believe, word for word because it impressed me so at the time.

Admiral Kimmel, General Short, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Pye had been in conference all morning and I had been invited to join up at 12 o'clock and be there for lunch. I joined them in a small room. Present, in addition to those mentioned, were the Secretary of the Navy and his aide, Captain Beattie.

[9059] Secretary Knox made a statement—I don't know what had been discussed before my arrival—but Secretary Knox made a statement:

I don't believe anyone in the War Department or in the Navy Department expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor, not even Kelly Turner.

He then said:

But did you not receive on the Saturday preceding Pearl Harbor a warning message that we had learned surreptitiously that Kurusu and Nomura had been directed by their home government to deliver their final message to Mr. Hull at one o'clock on Sunday, December 7th?

Everyone in the room said "No."

Whereupon Secretary Knox stated:

That is strange. I know that such a message was sent to Hart and I thought it was sent to you.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say when it was sent, Saturday or Sunday?

Admiral SMITH. I understood him to say Saturday, the night before.

Senator FERGUSON. The night before.

Admiral SMITH. But I checked it later on with Admiral Hart and found he had never received it either.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see all the messages that came to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether they were considered [9060] and did you pass judgment on the war warning message?

Admiral SMITH. I was at the conference when it was discussed; yes, sir. I saw all of his messages, I saw every letter that he wrote or received to or from Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us the impression that the war warning message had on you, what it meant to you as a war warning?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you do that?

Admiral SMITH. We had had many warnings but this warning as analyzed, if written in letter form by the War College System and the system in use in the fleet, would have been in two paragraphs.

Paragraph 1, Information:

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Paragraph 2: Which is always the action paragraph:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform [9061] District and Army authorities.

That meant to me, since all previous warnings had been to the effect that the attack was bound to the southward, toward the Kra Peninsula and a previous message about an attack, an aggressive attack in any direction, including the Philippines, in my mind confined the possible attack to that area and this message warned us to take a defensive deployment so that we could carry out our tasks in the war plan, the first of which would have been a raid on the Marshalls. It did not convey to me that we were likely to be attacked.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there an opinion of the group that were studying this message expressed at that time?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what that opinion was?

Admiral SMITH. There was general discussion. Always in a case of that kind Admiral Pye, if in port, and always Admiral Bloch as previous commander in chief, with the members of the staff who were concerned, and they reached the same agreement that I have told you of, and there was no opposition that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the staff have daily staff conferences?

Admiral SMITH. Not every day; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they have them prior to the 7th?

[9062] Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And if so, what date?

Admiral SMITH. They had them practically every morning; Admiral Kimmel had certain members of his staff, not the entire staff, in his office. It is my recollection there was a staff meeting on the morning of the 27th before this message was received.

The message was received some time in the afternoon and Admiral Bloch was sent for and did not come. I believe it was the only conference he missed. He had been to the hospital to see his wife. He was represented by Captain Earle. I believe Admiral Halsey was there but am not certain. The message was sent by courier, by Captain Layton to General Short and on the following morning, to the best of my recollection, there was a full conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short and the principal members of their staffs and that this conference lasted all morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the message that went to General Short in relation to that on the 27th?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. That was brought over by Captain Earle.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that change your opinion in any way as to your opinion on this?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

[9063] Senator FERGUSON. Did you have the same opinion about that instrument?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the relationship good between the officers and Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. Very good; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were the relations between your organization, the Navy, and the Army? Was it good or was it not co-operative?

Admiral SMITH. It was good and Admiral Kimmel and General Short were together very frequently. Sometimes Admiral Kimmel would go over to see him. There was liaison between the fleet gunnery officer and the Army, the fleet aviation officer and the Army Air Force. The two staffs did not get together very frequently except in the presence of the commanding general and Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. Were these liaison officers competent to do the job between the two, to have coordination between the two services?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. I believe every member of Admiral Kimmel's staff has since been promoted. They had to be competent to serve with him.

Senator FERGUSON. And I take it that included your own promotion?

[9064] Admiral SMITH. Well, I hope so. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I mean you were on his staff.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were speaking of those on his staff. You have been promoted after that?

Admiral SMITH. I had been promoted before that. I had been selected by the Navy Board of Selection in September 1941, some time after I became Chief of Staff, but I had not yet made my number when Pearl Harbor struck, and when I was promoted it was dated back to November 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the one promotion, that is the only one you have had since Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. Well, I have been made Vice Admiral since. That was March 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. So there were really two promotions after Pearl Harbor as far as you are concerned?

Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you familiar with the demands for more material and more men by Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there such demands?

Admiral SMITH. There were very many of them. In fact, we sometimes thought he was sending in too many. He was demanding radar, all kinds of late materials, more planes, anti- [9065] aircraft guns, more men, and stability of officers.

Of course, we realized that men trained in the fleet had to be sent to new construction and his principal demand was that they send men out for training to overcomplement ships so that taking expe-

rienced men out and sending them home to new construction would not handicap the efficiency of the ship. In the last message I remember he asked for something like 20,000 men, I think it was, or perhaps 19,000, 9,000 to fill up the fleet and 10,000 additional for training. He did not get them.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor were you in on the conversations in relation to taking ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic?

Admiral SMITH. Moving ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, that movement was made after I was Chief of Staff. There was no conference on the subject. We simply received orders to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there some ships returned after Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. After Pearl Harbor I believe everything we sent was returned with the exception of two light cruisers, the *Brooklyn* and the *Philadelphia*. The carrier *Yorktown*—in fact two cruisers of that type, the three battleships *New Mexico*, *Idaho*, and *Mississippi* and the destroyers were promptly [9066] returned to the Pacific after Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Smith, do you know of anything that you could give this committee to help us in deciding the question before it as to how this surprise attack could happen at Pearl Harbor and we not be prepared for it?

Admiral SMITH. I might say for one thing, not as an explanation of Pearl Harbor but in the interests of the future. I believe there was entirely too much secrecy in all branches of the Government connected with national defense. I see no use in breaking a cipher unless you use its contents.

I can think of one incident to explain what I mean by "too much secrecy."

Senator FERGUSON. Will you do that?

Admiral SMITH. In about May 1941, while we were at sea in exercises, the commander in chief was in my cabin when we received from the Chief of Naval Operations a dispatch directing us to send two divisions of cruisers and two squadrons of destroyers to Samoa to stand by for distant reconnaissance and to occupy the torpedoes of these destroyers with the mark VI exploder. The commander in chief was not informed where these ships were going and did not know until they received their direct orders from Washington after their arrival in Samoa.

[9067] The commander in chief asked if I knew the meaning of the term "Mark VI exploder" because he did not, and I told him that I had a suspicion that it was an exploder for the magnetic head of a torpedo. I gave as my reason for this the fact that 15 years previously I had been in charge of torpedo manufacture at Newport and we then had an order for a new type of torpedo to use a magnetic head. The torpedo was very successful. The magnetic exploder which had been tested proved an absolute failure.

Captain Hart, now Senator and Admiral Hart, was the inspector in charge at Newport. He promptly called in the engineers of the Westinghouse Co. to design a magnetic head that would work, and their engineers were there frequently and would return to their laboratories, all at no expense to the Government, to attempt to develop this device.

I left Newport in 1929 and was never able to learn whether that torpedo head had proved successful.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were captain at that time?

Admiral SMITH. I was a commander when I had the torpedo desk, the torpedo I manufactured. In 1939 I asked an officer who was in a position to know what results had been obtained and he said that the head was successful but was so secret that it could not even be talked about.

[9068] Admiral Kimmel then sent for the fleet gunnery officer, Captain Kitts.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand this was an order from Washington that you received?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were trying to interpret it?

Admiral SMITH. We were trying to fulfill the contract for 250 torpedoes equipped with that head, and I dare say many contracts followed.

On the receipt of this message on the *Pennsylvania*, Admiral Kimmel sent for the fleet gunnery officer and asked if he knew the meaning of the words "Mark VI exploder." Captain Kitts had spent most of his career in gunnery. He is now Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. He admitted to me that he had never heard of a magnetically exploded head.

Admiral Draemel, then in command of the destroyers of the Pacific Fleet, was sent for, and he stated that he had never heard of such a device. The exploders we found on our return to port were in the storehouse on the submarine base, and certain submarine officers had been given instruction on how to use them. There was a test stand of some sort to indicate whether they were active or inactive, and all were tested out before being issued.

[9069] Now, shortly before Pearl Harbor, a squadron of submarines was moved from Pearl to Cavite and these were equipped with this new magnetic device. I am informed that early in the war the heart of many a submarine captain was broken when he fired these torpedoes and they passed under the ships without exploding, when they were designed to explode under the ship and blow her belly through the smokestack. They all ran deeper than they were supposed to run.

Now, in my opinion, had we not been so secret about that device and had taken some of them out and tested them, we would, of course, have had a much more effective weapon.

I believe that this matter of secrecy has some bearing also on Pearl Harbor. All of these magic messages—none of which I ever heard of until I arrived here before this committee and listened to the testimony—these messages should certainly have been sent to the commander in the field, and to permit him and his staff to evaluate the information they received. I think it is admitted that all the naval brains are not concentrated in Washington.

[9070] Admiral Kimmel had a staff and many good advisers in the Pacific Fleet. He had no chance to evaluate this information which I learned was available in Washington.

I believe there was a state of mind in Washington that the war is in the Atlantic. In fact, one letter received after Pearl Harbor but

written before, stated something to the effect, "I know you need more men, and would be glad to give them to you, but they are not available; and remember the war is in the Pacific and we here in the Atlantic think that you are sitting pretty."

The CHAIRMAN. You do not quite mean that. You mean the war is in the Atlantic, don't you?

Admiral SMITH. "The war is in the Atlantic, and you in the Pacific are sitting pretty," yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you since then read over the diplomatic messages in exhibit 1, and the messages in exhibit 2, the so-called ship-movement messages?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I have heard them read before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is what you are now referring to?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; particularly the bomb plot message of October 10, and the two deadline messages of November 25 and November 29, and the 1 o'clock message.

[9071] Senator FERGUSON. And the 13-part message, or whatever it is.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, do you have a judgment that if you had seen those messages, you would have had a different idea about what was going to happen at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. The dead-line messages would have indicated war, but not necessarily Pearl Harbor. The message dividing Pearl Harbor into five sectors, and demanding information even to the detail of reporting at least twice per week, when two large ships were tied up abreast, would certainly have indicated to us that Pearl Harbor was a dangerous place for our fleet to remain. I believe had that message been received, the fleet would have spent most of its time at sea, with small detachments in port.

The message about the delivery at 1 o'clock, meaning, 7:30 at Pearl Harbor, and about midnight in the Philippines would have been a matter for grave discussion. I cannot say now that we would have known that to mean an air attack on Pearl Harbor, but I think it very likely that someone in the conference would have advanced that idea, and the matter could have been discussed and evaluated, and I think most certainly any land radar would have been [9072] manned at that time, and I believe that planes would have been ready for take-off, or might have been in the air rather than grouped.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I have just one question, Admiral. In all the discussions relative to the construction or interpretation of these messages which were received by the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the staff of Admiral Kimmel was advised, and discussed what the meaning of those messages was?

Admiral SMITH. Invariably; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And any determination which was made by the commander in chief, while that determination was his fundamental responsibility, necessarily arose as the result of those discussions had with his staff members?

Admiral SMITH. Always, and at the end of the conference, the war plans officer, or the operations officer would be directed to draw up the paper or plan, and that paper or plan, when drawn up, would be brought to me, slight changes might be made in discussion among the war plans officer, the operations officer, and me, and then the paper would be taken in to Admiral Kimmel for signature.

To my knowledge, he never issued any plan entirely on his own. The staff was always in on the discussion.

[9073] Mr. KEEFE. Well, of course, the reason for my asking that question is perfectly obvious I think. The responsibility for Pearl Harbor has heretofore been placed largely upon General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and no responsibility in any of these findings that I have read has been placed upon the distinguished members of the staff of Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral SMITH. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, while it is true that the determination of war plans for any orders to be issued, was the function and responsibility of the commander in chief, whatever he did resulted from the joint conference with his staff officers?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; that is true.

Mr. KEEFE. That also is true of the Army, in its operations there, is it not?

Admiral SMITH. I would expect it to be so; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask a question or two, prompted by Admiral Smith's comments here.

I do not know just what prompted your comment upon Captain Zacharias' failure to be promoted. Evidently that was prompted by a question that was asked before I came in.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

[9074] The CHAIRMAN. You said that he had no complaint at his failure to be promoted according to the rules that prevail in time of peace.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I gather from that there may have been a different situation in time of war. My impression is that both in the Navy and Army, nearly everybody has been promoted on account of the war, because of their services. Lieutenants in the Army, second lieutenants, have become majors, and lieutenant colonels, and some of them colonels, and men low down in rank in the Navy have become vice admirals, and so on.

I do not know that there is any reason for that, and I do not know as it is pertinent to what had happened at Pearl Harbor, but I am wondering whether, in view of that general course during the war of promoting the men in the Army and Navy time and time again, that Captain Zacharias' precocity, or disposition to give to his superior officers, or even go over the heads of some superiors to give his opinions to others, had anything to do with his failure to be promoted during the war.

Do you know anything about that?

Admiral SMITH. I do not. I would have to see his record. I know he is very smart and he is a very brilliant [9075] Japanese student, and has been studying naval intelligence during most of his

career. I know that he has had the necessary sea duty for promotion, but I have never served with him at sea and don't know what his record in that respect is.

If I might say so, in the peacetime system, the board looking over the officers for promotion has available their entire record, the entire possible for them to see the written record. The time of officers re-Naval Academy. Under the wartime system of promotion—and I do not know what it is—these records cannot be available because the opinions are asked of officers at sea in both oceans and it is not possible for them to see the written record. The time of officers required to look over the many records would take too many officers away from their jobs. It is true that promotion in wartime has been very rapid in both the Army and Navy, but there has been a great deal of selectivity in the Navy from captain to flag rank. There are many good officers who have not been promoted to flag rank.

[9076] The CHAIRMAN. I make no point of it, I do not know anything about it, but in view of the fact that this man graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912, has given 37 years in the Navy and he was a captain, I believe, at the time he says that he gave this information or his views back in 1941—he was made a captain in 1939—that he is still a captain when practically everybody else who has been in the Navy that long has been promoted, and I am just wondering whether something failed to click there, whether it is his fault or the fault of those who are responsible for promotion? I still insist that it has nothing to do with what happened prior to Pearl Harbor, but inasmuch as you mentioned it a while ago, evidently in response to a question that I did not hear, I am wondering whether there is some sort of penalty that has been assessed because he took it upon himself to communicate his views to some of his superiors?

Admiral SMITH. That conversation referred to the last few questions asked of Captain Zacharias when some of the members of the committee asked for his opinion why he had not been promoted and he stated that he had not come before a Regular Navy selection board. I merely confirm that. I am not qualified to express an opinion on why he was not promoted.

[9077] The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. Were you present during the entire conference between Captain Zacharias and Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I was.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that Admiral Kimmel stated that that conversation lasted an hour and a half and that Captain Zacharias also stated it lasted an hour and a half, whereas you say it only lasted about 15 minutes.

Admiral SMITH. I am positive of that.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you reconcile that?

Admiral SMITH. I did not know that Admiral Kimmel did state an hour and a half.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is he said he thought he recalled it lasted about that long. It may have just seemed that long to him, but my recollection is he said that he recalled it lasted about that long, and I understand Captain Zacharias fixed the same length of time. That is a pretty wide difference as to the length of the conversation.

It may not be material, but I am wondering whether you were there all the time?

Admiral SMITH. There were so many administrative details to my job that I never spent an hour and a half out of that office without growling, unless in one of Admiral [9078] Kimmel's conferences, and I do recall that I stayed through this conference because I remained and talked to him afterward.

The CHAIRMAN. After Captain Zacharias left?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, one other question. It has been testified here by Admiral Stark and Admirals Wilkinson and Turner, and also the Chief of Staff of the Army and his assistants, in regard to these magic messages, that one of the reasons why they did not transmit them to Hawaii was their fear that the Japanese might discover that they were being intercepted, and in the interest of safety they did not transmit them.

Your position is, as I understand it, and that of Admiral Kimmel, that they should have been sent regardless of that; that that risk should have been taken and they should have been transmitted to Hawaii.

Now if that had been done, or if in a similar circumstance, an evaluation made in Washington through messages received by the high-ranking officers in the Army and Navy had fixed an evaluation on this situation and that had gone out, as it is claimed in this case they did send out their evaluation of the situation based upon these messages, if the messages actually had gone and Admiral Kimmel and General [9079] Short had assessed a different evaluation on them so that there would have been a conflict between Washington and the field, which evaluation would have taken precedence?

Admiral SMITH. The one in the field.

The CHAIRMAN. The one in the field?

Admiral SMITH. Yes; because the field commander was carrying the responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that precedence go to the extent of the action in the field countermanning the directions of the high-ranking officers in the War and Navy Departments?

Admiral SMITH. Throughout the war the evaluations were made and the operations executed by orders in the field, and I never heard of any conflict with Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. I am wondering if there had been a conflict based upon the same information, whose orders and directions would have been entitled to precedence or priority in controlling what happened in the field. I can understand that where an officer is in the field he has a wide discretion to exercise his own judgment under circumstances that may arise, but where in the office of the Chief of Staff, or the Chief of Naval Operations, based upon information received, an evaluation is made and that is sent out in the field with instructions as to what to do, that same information had been sent in the field and the commanding officer [9080] there had reached a different conclusion to what ought to be done, without any further communication between Washington and the field, which would have taken precedence? Which would have been carried out?

Admiral SMITH. Well, Senator, I do not know in what legal posi-

tion that commander in chief would have found himself, but I do know that every commander in chief with whom I have served would take action on his own evaluation if he thought he was in danger, just as a ship's captain will drop out of formation if he thinks the formation is in danger; he is then on his own, and I have never heard of anyone being hanged for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Being what?

Admiral SMITH. Being hanged for it, or punished for it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about being hanged; I am trying to determine, from the information available at both ends of the line, whose commands, whose directives were to be obeyed in the event there is a different assessment or evaluation. I believe there is nothing that succeeds like success, and even if the commander in the field violated instructions from Washington and gets away with it and succeeds in it nobody raises any question, but suppose he acts on his own judgment and violates the direction [9081] from Washington and it turns out to be bad judgment, then what would happen? It might be an academic question, but it is entirely possible that that might arise, and it might have arisen here.

Admiral SMITH. I do not know that that is laid down. Of course, the general plan is issued from headquarters in the Navy Department and the details of carrying it out are the responsibility of the officer in the field. That is one reason I believe that our fleet has been so successful.

If an operation is planned and something comes up that the enemy changes his plan, the task-force commander at sea is entirely free to depart from the plan laid down for him and to get the enemy where he can find him.

[9082] The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I agree, but even in that case I suppose it would be the duty of the commanding officer in the field to advise the Department in Washington what it was doing.

Admiral SMITH. Immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question or two?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, how many meetings did the staff officers of General Short and the staff officers of Admiral Kimmel have from February on? I am talking about the combination of the two, joint meetings.

Admiral SMITH. I should say an average of once in 2 weeks.

Senator LUCAS. There wasn't any specific time.

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. For these meetings?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir. They would be called, but the meetings between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were much more frequent than that.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that.

Now you said in your testimony, in answer to questions by Senator Ferguson, that you had certain joint-staff [9083] meetings from time to time, as I recall.

Admiral SMITH. Not regular meetings; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Not regular meetings?

Admiral SMITH., Not regular.

Senator LUCAS. This message of November 27, which was the war-warning message, as I understand it, didn't mean very much to you as Chief of Admiral Kimmel's staff?

Admiral SMITH. Frankly, not much more than the others had, no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What would it indicate to a reasonably prudent commander when it starts out by saying "This is a war-warning message"?

Admiral SMITH. Well, I have heard others testify here that they never heard the expression used before in an official message. It is quite true. But when you look back through the messages that preceded it, they were war warnings also.

Senator LUCAS. I have read all of these messages, and I heard Admiral Kimmel's testimony along that line and I heard him quote from different messages, but there isn't a single one of those messages that Admiral Kimmel quoted which directly states in such terms, it seems to me, as given to the command at that time.

It starts out by saying "This is a war-warning message."

[9084] Now, I don't know what construction you, as chief of staff, would place upon those words.

Admiral SMITH. Then it told us what to do.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Admiral SMITH. We were already prepared to do that.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral SMITH. But we couldn't go ahead with it. Had we received a message "Mobilize," or "Execute WPL-46," that would have meant something. WPL-46 would have meant war.

"Mobilize" wouldn't have meant war.

Senator LUCAS. That message caused you to have a meeting of two staffs, the following morning, did it not?

Admiral SMITH. Yes. We had a meeting not only on that but at the same conference discussed the replacement or reinforcement of the marines on the outlying islands by Army troops. That is one reason the conference was so large, that we had the head of the Army Air Force there, because planes were also considered.

Senator LUCAS. That was discussed at the same conference?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was one of the reasons for calling [9085] it?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. I believe that same matter had been discussed on the 27th.

Senator LUCAS. It has been disclosed, Admiral, that the Navy lost 105 planes in the raid and the Army I think lost something like 95. Can you tell the committee, how those planes, the naval planes were dispersed at the time?

Admiral SMITH. I cannot in detail, but I believe that that may be explained by the fact that Ford Island has such a limited field, it is impossible to put large numbers of planes on it without having them very, very closely bunched. There is no place to disperse them.

I believe that is one reason. And of course the Japs concentrated on Ford Island.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I understand Admiral Bellinger will be here, and he can tell us about that.

Admiral SMITH. It may be possible also that the Navy had more planes than the Army.

Senator LUCAS. One other question before you retire, sir.

Did you know that General Short was alerted to sabotage?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir. I knew he was alerted.

Senator LUCAS. Why didn't you know that, as chief of staff?

[9086] Admiral SMITH. I have inquired since I have been here. I find there was an order issued called Operation Procedure, or something of that sort, and it was issued only very shortly before Pearl Harbor, I believe it was in the month of November, possibly on the 5th, in which the Army prescribed these three types of alerts. That letter went to Admiral Bloch because in the defense of the island Admiral Bloch was the naval base defense officer and his control post and his patrols had to work with the Army.

I have checked up with several members of the staff now on duty in this vicinity and none of them recall having seen that letter or that procedure. I doubt if it ever reached the commander in chief's office.

Senator LUCAS. Well, would that be of some interest to you had you known that General Short was alerted only to sabotage in view of the fact that it was General Short's duty to protect the fleet while it was in the harbor?

Admiral SMITH. It might have; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. It might not have?

Admiral SMITH. Of course, I did know that what the Army seemed to fear most was sabotage.

Senator LUCAS. Was that what the Navy feared, also?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir. The Navy was—Admiral [9087] Kimmel was offensive-minded, and he was thinking of what he could do in attacking when the time came. The Navy did not fear sabotage because the saboteurs could not get near the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know why it was, if the Navy didn't fear sabotage, that General Short's No. 1 order was sabotage?

Admiral SMITH. Well, his problem was much different.

Senator LUCAS. His problem was different, but his main problem, as I understand it was the defense of the fleet when it was in harbor. That was his main duty, was it not?

Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand, you say that the question of sabotage was not important from the standpoint of the fleet, even while it was in the harbor?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; it was not.

Senator LUCAS. Then it is still difficult for me to understand why the Navy didn't know exactly what General Short was doing with respect to sabotage, or with respect to his alerts, in view of the fact that General Short's great responsibility was to protect that fleet while it was in the harbor.

Admiral SMITH. I saw the Army go on the alert on the late afternoon of the 27th, the streets were full of them, [9088] going in all directions, manning the bridges, public utilities, but I did not know how far their alert went.

Senator LUCAS. And you never inquired, as chief of Admiral Kimmel's staff?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; I did not.

Senator LUCAS. Did you assume that General Short's movement of troops at that time was in response to the message of the 27th he had received?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. I returned the next morning and reported to Admiral Kimmel that the Army was on the alert?

Senator LUCAS. Did you see the message that General Short received, that was sent by General Marshall on November 27?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have a chance to analyze that?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, I did.

Senator LUCAS. Was there anything in that message which would have caused you as chief of staff to have gone on a sabotage alert and that alone?

Admiral SMITH. I don't recall the wording of that message, but I do recall that he was cautioned not to disclose intent and not to alarm the civilian population.

[9089] Senator LUCAS. That is right. That is one of the many things that was in there.

Also, to take a defensive deployment. That was Kimmel, as I recall it.

Admiral SMITH. That was the Navy message.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Well, the morning that you saw the troops of General Short moving around in the streets, did you report that to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator LUCAS. What did you tell him?

Admiral SMITH. I said the Army went on the alert last night, I saw them do it.

Senator LUCAS. You believed as a result of what you saw that they were really on an all-out alert?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I thought they only had one kind.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, how many times have you testified before today about Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. I testified before the Hart Board, [9090] the Naval Court of Inquiry, and the Hewitt Board. I was not called before the Roberts Commission.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you the Admiral Smith who described Admiral Kimmel saying that the situation in the outlying islands would be a certain way over his dead body?

Admiral SMITH. That wasn't exactly as it happened.

[9091] Mr. MURPHY. Will counsel produce that testimony.

Where was that expression used, "over his dead body"?

Admiral SMITH. That was in a conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Mr. MURPHY. Where did you give the testimony?

Admiral SMITH. In Admiral Kimmel's office.

Mr. MURPHY. Before what board and in what inquiry?

Admiral SMITH. I think it is in the Hart inquiry. I remember the testimony. I can give it to you.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have it exactly so there will be no mistake and no misquoting.

Does counsel have it? Do you know where it is, Mr. Masten?

Admiral, while I am looking for that, you say the Navy didn't fear sabotage?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; not so far as the fleet was concerned.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't it a fact that you were on a sabotage warning at Hawaii on an order issued on it for two solid year before Pearl Harbor and the reason you didn't go on sabotage was that you were sabotage-minded for two solid years and were guarding against it? Is that a fact or not?

Admiral SMITH. What would sabotage be, a ship in the fleet? It would be something from the inside, would [9092] it not? We have always been alerted against that.

Mr. MURPHY. I am saying that there is testimony in one of these hearings that the reason why you didn't go on a special sabotage alert is that you were alerted to it for two solid years. Is that not a fact?

Admiral SMITH. I should say for more than two solid years if you have in mind the kind of alert, sabotage alert, that I mean. We had had cases in the past where a ship prepared to leave a navy yard would find emery in her bearings or when a ship was overhauled. We were always alerted against sabotage.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it or is it not a fact that there had been sabotage precautions taken for two solid years by the Navy at Pearl Harbor before December 1941?

Admiral SMITH. I don't doubt it.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't that the reason why you didn't have to take any special precautions, you already were taking them?

Admiral SMITH. No; that is not. I hope the ships are still alerted against sabotage.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me take the next proposition. You said you saw the Army guarding the public utilities; that was your testimony?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

[9093] Mr. MURPHY. Didn't you know that the Army had been guarding public utilities for 2 months before, that they were guarding the public utilities ever since the freezing of the assets?

Admiral SMITH. It was not in evidence to the man in the street.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Admiral SMITH. It was not in evidence to the man on the street.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, you were the chief of staff, do you now know whether or not the Army at Pearl Harbor was guarding the public utilities ever since the freezing of the assets?

Admiral SMITH. I do not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have any conference at all with the chief of staff of the Army from the day of his appointment until after the attack, and if so, when?

Admiral SMITH. I had several conferences with his predecessor, Colonel Hayes.

Mr. MURPHY. No. I am talking about Colonel Phillips. From the day of his appointment to the day of the attack, did you have a single conference with Colonel Phillips?

Admiral SMITH. No, not in person; no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. May I inquire while you are looking [9094] through your papers?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I was interested in the statement you made about what you thought would be of value for future consideration.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you stated you thought that there had been too much secrecy.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In the Navy.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you wouldn't apply that to these intercepted Japanese messages, would you?

Admiral SMITH. Oh, no; but I have never heard that the Japanese, or that any other nation, ever broke our most secret codes. To my mind there was no danger in transmitting those messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor over our system.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You think there was no danger at all involved?

Admiral SMITH. Absolutely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In transmitting those highly secret Japanese messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. I am positive there was no danger. Our [9095] own most secret messages were sent by the same system.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was it known at that time that there was no danger in transmitting these highly secret Japanese messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. Well, it was believed, certainly—I was once a cryptanalyst, in my early career, and the character of our secret devices is such that it was certainly my opinion, and I believe the opinion of all other naval officers, that our system was safe. If not safe, then it was unsafe to send our own messages back and forth between Washington and Pearl Harbor, messages which had to be sent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can understand that, Admiral, but the fact is that Japan did not know that we had broken her code, did not know that we were intercepting, decoding, and translating these highly important messages; that is a fact, isn't it?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, wasn't it highly important that every effort be made to continue the situation that prevented Japan from knowing that?

Admiral SMITH. Most important; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And every precaution should be taken?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

[9096] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And in the opinion of those in charge of this highly important work that there was some element of danger involved, that certainly was an important aspect of it, wasn't it?

Admiral SMITH. The only expression I have heard of danger of imparting leakage is over the scrambler telephone. I agree with that. But there was no danger of leakage in passing on the secret Japanese messages unless a leak was expected in the headquarters of Admiral Kimmel, and I am certain there was no more danger of a leak there than there was in the Navy Department in Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the fact that we had broken the Japanese code and the fact that they had not broken our code always involved some element of danger that they might break our code, didn't it?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was something that should have been carefully guarded at all times, wasn't it?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; but we had messages in the air every day. They had plenty of material of our own upon which to practice. Passing on these magic messages in our code would only have added to the quantity of material. I don't see that it would have increased the danger.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, if we had transmitted every one [9097] of these Japanese messages that we intercepted it would certainly have increased the possibility of Japan finding out that we had broken their code, wouldn't it?

Admiral SMITH. Not unless they knew that we were passing those messages out; but that same message when placed into a naval cipher is so disguised that there is nothing that a cryptanalyst could use to recognize the Japanese message as a Japanese message, after placed in the American cipher.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it was highly important?

Admiral SMITH. It was highly important; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To our success in the war and the security of our armed forces that Japan not find out that we had broken their code?

Admiral SMITH. Most important; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And every precaution should have been used to try to prevent them from finding that out?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It would naturally follow if they had ever found that out they would have changed their code?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it might have been very disastrous to us, mightn't it?

Admiral SMITH. It would have been disastrous to us [9098] possibly and certainly would have been advantageous to the Japanese because had they known we were breaking their code the great ambush at Midway might not have taken place.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the question I was going to ask you next. Isn't it true that some of our greatest successes in battle during this last war were due to the fact that we were breaking their code and had the information?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, I assume, Admiral, that you would not take the position that your general statement as to too much secrecy in the Navy would apply to a matter of this type?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, did I understand you to say that there was a discussion at a meeting between the Army and the Navy staff about the possibility of an air raid after the receipt of this war warning?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. It was never even discussed, was it, the possibility of an air raid, at that conference?

Admiral SMITH. I do not recollect it having been discussed; no.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me refer you to your testimony in the [9099] Hart investigation on page 50, question 130:

Q. Were any decisions arrived at as to coordinated action to be taken with respect to the security or defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of this warning?

A. I think the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except the danger of sabotage by the large Japanese population in the islands. That's to the best of my recollection.

Question 131:

Q. Did the question of possible attack arise?

A. No.

Does that refresh your recollection?

Admiral SMITH. I think that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you now think there was a discussion about sabotage at that meeting on the 28th? Who would be talking about sabotage at the time you were discussing sending planes to Wake and Midway?

Admiral SMITH. If the question of sabotage was discussed it was raised by the Army.

[9100] Mr. MURPHY. My question is, Was it?

Admiral SMITH. I do not recollect.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, when Admiral Kimmel was on the stand he said that he got these code-destruction messages and he said he didn't show them to the Army nor did he order them to be shown. Did you, as chief of staff, order them to be shown, or did you, as chief of staff, show them to the Army?

Admiral SMITH. It was my impression then, and is now, that the Army had the same information.

Mr. MURPHY. But the Army, according to General Short, if they had had it even on December 7, it would have been of great significance to them, highly important and he never received them. Why didn't you, as chief of staff confer with somebody, your counterpart in the Army, to find out if the people who were to protect your ships knew those things and why they didn't?

Admiral SMITH. I was under the impression that they got news.

Mr. MURPHY. Don't you think that as chief of staff your interest in the security of the fleet should have been such that you would make inquiry instead of resting on an assumption?

Admiral SMITH. I probably should have. There are many [9101] things for a chief of staff to do.

We have an Intelligence officer and a district Intelligence officer. They are in close liaison with the Army.

Mr. MURPHY. The responsibility of the Army was to protect the fleet in order for it to carry out the offense and if the fleet wasn't protected, you had no fleet, and here is a code-destruction message—and, by the way, what significance did the destruction of the codes have to you as a naval officer of vast experience?

Admiral SMITH. These were diplomatic codes in various parts of the world, not in all. To my recollection, the code-destruction message did not include Honolulu. But if the situation had been reversed, if we feared that Japan intended to attack us, we might very well have told our diplomatic officials in Japan, or Japanese-occupied territory, to destroy their codes.

Mr. MURPHY. But, Admiral, the Navy at Honolulu sent a code-destruction message to Washington. What significance did that have

to you? The Navy, the U. S. Navy at Honolulu, sent a message to Washington that the Japanese at Honolulu were destroying their machines, their systems.

By the way, let me quote that exactly.

Do you have exhibit No. 37, Counsel, please?

(Counsel hands document to Mr. Murphy.)

[9102] Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, on the 6th of December, there is a message from COMFOURTEEN to OPNAV:

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

The "eighteen double five of third" was another message.

There is the U. S. Navy informing Washington about the destruction of systems at Honolulu. Wouldn't that be highly significant to you?

Admiral SMITH. There is a very good point to be raised. That is the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, the naval base defense officer.

If the fleet is in port, it helps him support the Army. If the fleet has one ship in port, that one ship helps him.

If the fleet is not in port, he does it himself. But that is his duty, to keep the Army informed. He is working for and with the Army in this respect. That is not the function of the commander in chief.

Mr. MURPHY. I will come to that.

First of all, what conferences did you have with the chief of staff of Admiral Bloch in this critical period?

Admiral SMITH. I had none.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you say it was Admiral Bloch's [9103] responsibility to protect the fleet.

Isn't it a fact that all Admiral Bloch had was four old destroyers, one or two small ships, and nothing else?

Admiral SMITH. Quite true, but this message refers to something else. This refers to his Intelligence. He had plenty of that.

Mr. MURPHY. But if there was a conference between the chiefs of staff, don't you think that you would call on your Intelligence to give each of the chiefs of staff a report on Intelligence, and then have the combined judgment of the three chiefs of staff as to how best to meet the danger?

Admiral SMITH. No; I would say that was rather a matter between the two Intelligence officers.

[9104] Mr. MURPHY. But if the Intelligence officer does not do his work, who is over the Intelligence officer and who is responsible for him? Isn't it the chief of staff?

Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me come, if you will, to page 48 of this report. I see question 114:

Q. Did these discussions include coordinated efforts to resist any attempt by the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?

A. Frankly, I do not believe that the Commanding General or Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel expected an attack upon Pearl Harbor, except by submarine.

But the question is, Admiral, did the discussions include a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. I do not recollect that.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. I will now take you to page 42 of the Hart inquiry, question 67:

Was it your belief that the Army and the Navy, operating through the local

defense forces, were capable of furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack?

A. We thought so at the time. I realize now we were not.

Did you so think, Admiral?

[9105] Admiral SMITH. I did. I also thought that Oahu could not be taken. I know now that it could have been.

Mr. MURPHY. Oahu?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You say it was taken?

Admiral SMITH. It could have been at the time, had the Japanese brought with them an amphibious force such as we now know in our own Navy, today.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in the Naval narrative there is a report and I hope counsel can locate it. I have it, but I cannot put my finger on it, where you spoke about Admiral Kimmel saying "Not over my dead body."

I refer you, however, in the Hart inquiry to page 40, question 57:

Was Admiral Kimmel familiar with the state of personnel and material readiness of the Army to carry out its commitments as to the defense of Pearl Harbor, just prior to the Japanese attack?

A. Yes. He had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the Marines off of the outlying islands, and all the Marine and Navy planes in the outlying islands, and replacing [9106] them with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke beforehand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports," or [9107] words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan as made and submitted but never carried out.

Now, then, in the naval narrative, Admiral, they quote you in different fashion. Are you aware of how they quote you about this "dead body" business?

Admiral SMITH. I have been told about that naval narrative. I don't know who prepared it but someone did it in great haste and I understand that it is full of errors.¹

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess at this time until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., January 29, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 30, 1946.)

Part 8—January 30 and 31 and February 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946—follows.

¹ Admiral Smith's testimony is resumed in Hearings, Part 8, p. 3521.

4 H.P. 31: P. 31 pt. 8

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
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RELATING THERETO

PART 8

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COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS ENCLOSED IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE

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[9108]¹

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

President: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[9109] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I believe the committee had not finished with Admiral Smith.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I was questioning Admiral Smith. It was the understanding that he would be here this morning at 10 o'clock. He is not here.

Yesterday the statement was made by Mr. Richardson of counsel that it would be desirable if possible to hold the testimony to 10 minutes, because of the urgency of finishing with the testimony of Captain or Admiral McCollum.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain McCollum.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain McCollum.

Now, then I have spent considerable time on the previous testimony of Admiral Smith, and I find, Mr. Chairman, that there is a vast amount of very important material in the previous testimony of Admiral Smith as to why they didn't use the Army planes, as to basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, as to the propriety of it, as to the efficiency of the fleet at the time of December 7, as well as one more important thing, that when Admiral Kimmel was on the stand I asked at that time if he consulted his air man, Admiral Bellinger, and he said "no," that he consulted Captain Davis.

[9110] Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Smith is here now.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to show by this witness on the stand that Captain Davis was never consulted either.

For those reasons, I cannot agree to restricting myself to 10 minutes, and if Captain McCollum—I ask that this testimony of Admiral Smith be put over until later.

I think the testimony too important not to be developed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may make this suggestion: There isn't the slightest necessity of the Congressman or any other

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

member of the committee curtailing his examination of Admiral Smith. My suggestion is that the Admiral be permitted to step aside, so that we can present the testimony of Captain McCollum and Admiral Bellinger, who are under very imperative orders, and when they are through, there is no reason why Admiral Smith can't be examined to the limit.

And I want to make this statement to the committee:

There has never been any idea in our minds that Admiral Smith might not be able to give material testimony. The point that we make, and which has been in my mind, is that he has testified two or three times. There will be in the record a very full statement. I have an apprehension that all of the testimony that will be brought from the Admiral [9111] here may be just cumulative to that testimony.

If, of course, there are new facts to be elicited, not only with Admiral Smith but with any other witness, there should be further examination.

But now I would ask the chairman to permit the admiral to pause in his testimony to get rid of these other two witnesses, and then take up the testimony. I have been advised, too, by Captain Zacharias that he desires to offer some further remarks in connection with the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Smith may step aside then, and these other witnesses will be called.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to call attention to an article that appears in this morning's Washington Post, with the headline, "Pearl Harbor Report to Hit Army, Navy—Congress to be told High Command, as well as Kimmel and Short, 'Muffed Ball.'"

The article goes on to say:

The joint congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor will report to Congress that the War and Navy Departments in Washington share the responsibility for the disaster with Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Major General Walter C. Short, 1941 Hawaiian Commanders, The Washington Post learned exclusively yesterday.

[9112] The Committee, which is now at work on its report to Congress has tentatively decided, a member disclosed that the High Command here, as well as Kimmel and Short "muffed the ball" and gave the Japs the chance to inflict this nation's greatest naval disaster.

And the article goes on further.

The Chair wishes to say that the committee has not met, nor discussed its report, even informally, or casually. It has been the Chair's understanding, and I think that of the committee, that the committee will not make up its mind on its report until the evidence is in, and it has met and gone over the situation, and agreed on its report.

There isn't any basis for any article in any newspaper that this committee is now writing its report, or that anybody on the committee knows what its report will be.

I think it is a distinct disservice to this committee to be predicting and prognosticating a report when the committee has not met or discussed its report.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to say as a member of the committee that I certainly have never heard of any member of the committee having an idea as to what the report should be, and that

I personally have not commented upon the evidence or made up my mind in any way in relation to what the report should be.

[9113] My sole purpose has been and will be during the hearings to get the facts and then I know the committee as a whole will consider those facts and make a report.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the member's comment. If there is any member of the committee that has any other view or objective, I don't know who it is, but I do feel the committee ought not in advance to be put in the position of having made up its mind, when we haven't even concluded the evidence, and when we will in all likelihood want to take a little time when we have concluded the evidence to consider it, and probably reread some of it in order to get the picture appropriately before the committee before we attempt to write a report.

I felt in justice to the committee that that comment ought to be made.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I want to thank the chairman for making that statement. I had intended to make a similar statement when the chairman very graciously called attention to the article which appeared in this morning's Washington Post.

I agree with the chairman that I think a disservice has been done the committee and the country by the speculation that is contained in this article, but perhaps it may [9114] have been prompted by the fact that it has been suggested that we have been indulging somewhat in clairvoyance in some of the evidence that has been given here. Maybe that is what tended to influence this particular writer. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that.

Mr. KEEFE. So far as I am concerned, I have never met with the committee to discuss that matter; I don't know of any committee meeting, and if there has been any such agreement by any group on the committee, I know nothing about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say there has been no meeting, so far as the Chair knows, of any group, and so far as the Chair's intention is concerned there would be no meeting called of the committee to consider the evidence and consider its report until all of the evidence is in; and while it may be that there has been some clairvoyance indulged in here, at least the Chair hopes it will not become contagious.

That is all.

Mr. KAUFMAN. May we then present Captain McCollum?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain McCollum.

[9115] The CHAIRMAN. Captain, will you be sworn?

Captain MCCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ARTHUR HOWARD MCCOLLUM, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain, where were you born?

Captain MCCOLLUM. I was born in Nagasaki, Japan.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And how long have you been in the Navy?

Captain McCOLLUM. I have been in the Navy for 28 years continuously.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us briefly your experience in the Navy?

Captain McCOLLUM. I was appointed to the Naval Academy in 1917 by the late Senator Bankhead, of Alabama. I was graduated in 1921, in June.

I served for 6 months on the battleship *Arkansas* and for 2 months on the destroyer *Argonne* en route to the Orient. I arrived in Japan, in Tokyo, in March of 1922 for the purpose of studying the Japanese language. I remained, I think it was, until 1925.

During that period, for 4 months I served with the destroyers of the Asiatic Fleet who were at that time serving in conjunction with Japanese destroyers assisting the Army planes flying around the world in 1924. Most of that service [9116] was in the Kurile Islands, where I spent nearly 6 weeks at that time.

I returned to the United States in June of 1925, went to submarine school, finished there and in June 1926 I was assigned to duty on board the U. S. S. *O-7*, a submarine operating out of the Canal Zone. I served in that submarine for 2½ years, the last of which I was in command of it. I shifted from the U. S. S. *O-7* to executive officer of a larger submarine, the *S-11*, returned to the United States in that ship in June of 1928 and was ordered to duty as assistant naval attaché at the American Embassy in Tokyo. I arrived in Tokyo in about October of 1928 and served on that up until June of 1930.

I returned then to the United States and served for 3 years on the battleship *West Virginia*. In 1933, I returned to the Navy Department as head of the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence. In February of 1935 I was detached from that duty and ordered to San Pedro, Calif., to set up a special Intelligence Office to work in conjunction with the staff of the commander in chief of the fleet, at that time, Admiral Reeves, to make an effort to stop the Japanese espionage attack on the vessels of our fleet.

I completed that duty in 1936 and was assigned as assistant operations officer and fleet intelligence officer on [9117] the staff of the commander in chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral A. J. Hepburn. I continued in that duty until about February 1, 1938. The last 7 months of that duty I was acting operations officer of the fleet, having no senior in that billing.

I spent then 2 months on temporary duty here in the Navy Department in connection with the installing of a new system for keeping check of the movements of vessels of the fleet; was assigned to the command of the destroyer *Jacob Jones*. In the course of that cruise I was detached from the command of the *Jacob Jones* in the latter part of September of 1939, returned to the United States, and was assigned to duty in the Division of Naval Intelligence, where I was detailed as officer in charge of the far eastern section.

I was relieved from that duty in October of 1942, was ordered as operations officer on the staff of the commander of the Southwest Pacific force, which was later called the Seventh Fleet, which was that part of the Navy serving under General MacArthur's orders, his over-all command. Upon arrival I was directed by the admiral to assume duty as intelligence officer of that fleet and served and developed an intelligence organization for him.

I served as intelligence officer of that fleet until about May 1 of 1945, when I returned to this country. I am now [9118] assigned as commanding officer of the heavy cruiser *Helena*.

Mr. KAUFMAN. During the months of October and November 1941 what was your assignment?

Captain McCOLLUM. I was head of the far eastern section of the Division of Naval Intelligence. I might add that from the 25th of August until about the 14th of October I was absent from the United States.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You returned here around the 14th of October 1941?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you continued as chief of the far eastern section until October of 1942?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And who was the counterpart of your particular position in the Army?

Captain McCOLLUM. Colonel Bratton.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, as part of your duties as chief of the far eastern section was it part of your duties to keep track of the fleet movements, of the Japanese fleet movements, and will you explain to the committee the manner in which that was done?

Captain McCOLLUM. It was. I had a special section in my office who were charged with that particular duty. We had a large chart spread on the wall with the ocean divided up into [9119] certain zones to which we had given names. All sorts of information concerning the movements of any Japanese man-of-war were entered on a card and that card index was kept together and daily or more often as necessary pins representing the various ships of the fleet were moved around on this chart, and for my own purposes there was a sheet summarizing the situation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did the time come in November 1941 when you determined that the Intelligence Office in Washington had lost track of part of the Japanese fleet?

Captain McCOLLUM. By the time you speak of, we were almost wholly dependent on one form of radio intelligence for information concerning the Japanese fleet which was not on the China coast. That form is known as traffic analysis, whereby inferences are drawn from such things as the volume of radio traffic and call signs and so on.

Those inferences were drawn and were made based largely on radio intelligence by that particular section of the Communications Intelligence organization. Their conclusions were then submitted to my office.

Radio intelligence, of course, has very definite limitations. If the man you are trying to find out about does not use the radio, radio falls down. After a fleet has been in port a certain length of time, in the absence of other informa- [9120] tion, that is, information other than radio intelligence, such as sight contact or some other report from an observer, unless the call signs of those ships are heard very definitely and plotted in by compass a doubt arises as to whether those ships are where radio intelligence thinks that they are. That situation existed, to my mind, from about the middle of November on.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And as a result of that doubt did you dispatch to the commander of the Asiatic Fleet a dispatch which is dated No-

vember 24, 1941, part of exhibit 37 [handing document to witness]?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, I drafted that dispatch and it was released by my chief, Admiral Wilkinson.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in reply to that dispatch did you get communications from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet which are referred to on page 7610 of the record before this committee, pages 7610 and 7611 [handing transcript to witness]?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. On or about December 1, 1941, did you cause to be prepared a memorandum showing the disposition or location of the Japanese fleet?

Captain McCOLLUM. May I just see it, sir? I think I know what you mean, Mr. Counsel, but I would just like to refresh my mind, sir. [9121] (The document referred to was handed to the witness.)

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; this is a routine report on this particular subject and under the office orders that existed at the time, while that is dated December 1, the information and the time, the dead line for preparing this report was about 2 days before that, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in that memorandum that you prepared you indicated that part of the Japanese fleet was in Japanese home waters?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is in Exhibit 85 before this committee.

On or about December 6 did you prepare another memorandum as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet [handing document to witness]?

Captain McCOLLUM. December 6?

Mr. KAUFMAN. December 1.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. This memorandum that you have shown me here on December 1 is a memorandum which I personally prepared covering the development of the entire situation, the general location on the idea of the Japanese fleet and it is only one part of it. This summarizes the situation and is an attempt to show what to my mind was the very critical situation that had been brought about step by [9122] step.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And was that communicated to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain McCOLLUM. So far as I know it was not, sir. This thing was actually drafted by me on the Friday and Saturday preceding.

If I remember correctly, December 1 was Monday. I polished it up in some aspects and took it to my chief, Admiral Wilkinson, early Monday morning in finished form. He read this document over, directed me to wait in his office and disappeared. He came back in about 10 minutes and said:

You be ready to go to the office of Admiral Stark with me between 11 and 11:30 this morning, and make a number of copies of this thing that you have given me.

I did that and at the time stated I appeared in Admiral Stark's office. Present in that office at the time were Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Turner, the Director of War Plans, of course my chief, Admiral Wilkinson, and one or two other flag officers—I believe Admirals Brainard and Noyes.

At the direction of Admiral Wilkinson copies of this memorandum were passed to each of the flag officers present. I then read the memorandum personally and engaged a discussion at that time and pointed out that in my opinion war or [9123] rupture of diplomatic relations was imminent, and I requested information as to whether or not the fleets in the Pacific had been adequately alerted.

I was given a categorical assurance by both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner that dispatches fully alerting the fleets and placing them on a war basis had been sent. I had seen no such dispatches at that time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Were you informed at that time of the war message sent by Admiral Stark to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet under date of November 27?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not except in the form of the assurance that adequate information in alerting the fleet had been sent.

Mr. KAUFMAN. In connection with the preparation of the memorandum to which you have just referred did you rely to any extent on the traffic analysis reports received by you from Admiral Kimmel?

Captain McCOLLUM. Oh, yes. I might point out that the best stations for traffic analysis were at Corregidor, the radio intelligence center there, and at Hawaii on Oahu. We were dependent on those places for our information here.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, Captain, we will go to another subject. You are familiar with the intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic code regarding the setting up of the so-called [9124] winds code?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir. I had first heard it called the winds code upon my return to Washington last May, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But you are familiar with the two intercepts that are part of Exhibit 1?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. On pages 154 and 155 of Exhibit 1.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; I am familiar with these.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And they are dated when, sir?

Captain McCOLLUM. The first one is dated from Tokyo to Washington November 19, 1941, translated apparently in the Navy Department on November 28, 1941. The second one is also dated Tokyo to Washington November 19, 1941, translated in the Navy Department on November 26, 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, after those two messages were called to your attention what did you do to insure receipt of any execute message in furtherance of that code?

Captain McCOLLUM. At my recommendation my chief, Admiral Wilkinson, went to the director of communications, Admiral Noyes, and asked him to set up everything he possibly could to intercept the execute of these dispatches, and it is my understanding that that was done. That would be done by that technical service.

[9125] Mr. KAUFMAN. And any reports with respect to the execute of the winds code would normally come to you?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir—should have.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you, up to November 7, get any information that an execute message of the winds code had come through?

Captain McCOLLUM. About the middle of the week I was told—I had heard that an execute which would have meant relations with

Russia in danger had been received. In checking back on the Japanese original, or in trying to run down the Japanese original of that particular dispatch, we checked it very carefully, and we came to the conclusion that it was not an execute whatsoever; that it was merely a part of an ordinary weather broadcast.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the only one that was called to your attention was that relations with Russia had been broken.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It did not relate to relations with the United States or with Britain?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it did not relate to war with either one?

Captain McCOLLUM. None of these related to war, sir; that is, being exact about it. The translations all used the euphemism of strained relations, or what have you, sir.

[9126] Mr. KAUFMAN. Would you explain the Japanese language relating to the setting up of those codes?

Captain McCOLLUM. I presume either one of them will do, will it, sir?

Mr. KAUFMAN. I think so.

Captain McCOLLUM. In the first one here the dispatch says:

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.

That means "east wind rain."

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.

That is "north wind cloudy."

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KASE HARE.

That means "west wind clear."

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. [9127] This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

I would like to point out that the value of this thing as a code is wholly dependent upon the use of particular and precise Japanese words, used in a precise position within a broadcast. Any departure from that order must necessarily cause the code to be in doubt.

For instance, one might say "east wind rain" in a number of different ways in Japanese. Here it is in the rather emphatic and brief form "Higashi No Kazeame." We might as well say "Kaze Higashi Ame," which means exactly the same thing in another form.

So I may point out the translation will not suffice. It must be the particular Japanese words used in a particular sequence in a dispatch. They deal with weather matters here and they could so easily be confused that the value of this thing as a code would be nil.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Exactitude is necessary?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And if other words were used meaning the same thing then you would not regard that as being an execute of the code?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; not in this type of thing.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I asked you just a few moments ago as to [9128] when your attention was called to a break in Russian relations. Do you recall when and where that information came to you?

Captain McCOLLUM. That came to me from Captain Kramer, who is, I think—I cannot be certain on this, but I heard later—excuse me, I am wandering. I heard later that Admiral Noyes, Director of Communications, set up a special system for warning me and the officers in the Naval Plans about the arrival of any of these winds messages, or winds information. That I did not know about at the time.

I heard one morning somewhere about the middle of the week of December 1 to 7 that such a dispatch had been received, and I sent for Kramer and we went over it in detail and came to the conclusion that it was not the real thing, and I am fairly certain that Colonel Bratton of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Service also worked on it with his experts and came to the same conclusion, and we continued to check back and forward with each other.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain McCollum, I direct your attention to a communication from the FCC, Federal Communications Commission, which is part of Exhibit 142, and ask you whether that is the information that you got to which you just referred?

Captain McCOLLUM. I cannot be certain that it was this [9129] particular one, but it was one of this same general connotation, because we went back, or tried to go back, to the original Japanese on this thing.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you look at the one on the next page and see whether that refreshes your recollection?

Captain McCOLLUM. I am sorry, Mr. Counsellor, I cannot identify any one of these as the exact one I saw. It might have been either one of them.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The two papers to which I just referred are items 3-B and 3-C of Exhibit 142.

Aside from the suggestion that there may have been an execute of that portion of the code as related to Russia, you had no other information?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not until after the war had started, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am talking about up to and including December 7.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After December 7, the day after Pearl Harbor, did a message come in in execution of the winds code?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; one that we thought was an execute, and that either came in late on the afternoon of the 7th or sometime on the 8th. The code, as translated, if you can use that term, would have indicated strained [9130] relations between England and Japan.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You refer now to item 3-B of Exhibit 142?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain Safford has testified that a winds execute message was received in the Navy Department on December 3 or 4. Did any such information come to you?

Captain McCOLLUM. I saw nothing of that sort, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain Safford testified in substance that, predicated on information that an execute message had been received, you prepared a dispatch to go to the various outposts. Did you prepare any such dispatch?

Captain McCOLLUM. I did prepare such dispatch, but it was not predicated on the winds execute, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What dispatch are you referring to now?

Captain McCOLLUM. After submitting my memorandum to Admiral Wilkinson and through him to the Chief of Naval Operations—

Mr. KAUFMAN. You are referring now to exhibit what? Exhibit 81?

Captain McCOLLUM. The December 1, 1941. [Continuing:] I was put in the rather difficult position of not personally knowing what had been sent out to the fleet. Possibly it was none of my business. As I pointed out to you, the basis of this memorandum—the information it [9131] was based on—was actually as of about the 28th of November. As time went on we had sent out dispatches to our naval attachés in Tokyo, Pieping, Bangkok, and Shanghai to destroy all of their codes, and to report by the use of a code word, and those codes were destroyed.

[9132] We were getting reports from our observers of the Japanese task force which was moving down the Kra Peninsula. Our planes were sighting forces moving; our submarines were trailing them. We had some little information in addition. I still did not know what had been sent to the fleet.

I drafted a rather brief dispatch, outlining the information pretty much as is in this memorandum, but greatly condensed. I went further and stated that we felt everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the United States. That dispatch was taken by me to my Chief, Captain Hurd, and together we went in to see Admiral Wilkinson. We did it in view of the fact that the function of evaluation of Intelligence, that is, the drawing of inferences therefrom, had been transferred over to be a function of the War Plans Division.

I was directed to take that dispatch and present it for the consideration of Admiral Turner, the Director of the War Plans Division, which I did.

Admiral Turner read the dispatch over. He then made a number of corrections in it, striking out all except the information parts of it, more or less, and then showed me for the first time the dispatch which he had sent on the 27th, which I believe is referred to as the "war warning" [9133] dispatch, and the one which was sent, I believe, on the 24th—wasn't it?

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is right.

Captain McCOLLUM (continuing). Which preceded that dispatch, and said did not I think that was enough. I said, "Well, good gosh, you put in the words 'war warning.' I do not know what could be plainer than that, but, nevertheless, I would like to see mine go too."

He said, "Well, if you want to send it, you either send it the way I corrected it, or take it back to Wilkinson and we will argue about it"—or words to that effect.

I cannot presume to remember precisely.

I took it back to Admiral Wilkinson and discussed it with him, and he said, "Leave it here with me for a while," and that is all.

Now, I would like it understood that merely because this was prepared on a dispatch blank in no sense means it was an official dispatch.

It was merely my recommendation to my seniors which they were privileged to throw in the wastebasket, I imagine. It was in no sense a part of the official file. It is nothing other than a recommendation for the dispatch officer. I have written dozens of dispatches for the admiral, and he could either throw them away, or use them. There was no record kept of that sort [9134] of thing.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That dispatch, or that memorandum that you prepared had no relation or no reference at all, to the winds execute message?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And if Captain Safford says that the dispatch or memorandum that you prepared had relation to the winds execute message, what is your version of it?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think Safford would be misinformed in that. He has judged my intentions in what motivated me, sir, and I believe I am a better judge of that than he is, although I do not impugn his motives whatsoever. He may sincerely believe that to be true, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain Safford testified at one place that the last paragraph of your memorandum or dispatch had particular reference to the winds execute message, and a suggestion by you that you wanted to avoid another Port Arthur.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; I could not have done anything like that, Mr. Counsellor, when I did not have the winds execute message.

Mr. KEEFE. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman? Am I correct in the understanding that this purported message [9135] drawn by Captain McCollum is not in evidence, and is not in existence?

Captain McCOLLUM. As I explained, sir, this sort of thing was merely my recommendation on a dispatch blank, drafted in dispatch form.

Mr. KEEFE. But it is not in existence?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, it is not in existence, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You are testifying from recollection?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As to what was written in it?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The document itself is not available?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And is not before the committee?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I just wanted to be sure of that.

Senator LUCAS. May I make an inquiry at this point?

As I understand you, sir, Admiral Wilkinson did not act on your recommendation.

Captain McCOLLUM. That, Senator, I do not know, sir. I do not know what further Admiral Wilkinson did with it. He may have gone up with it to higher authority, and it was turned down, or he may have decided not to go further with it, sir.

[9136] Senator LUCAS. As far as the evidence is concerned, there is no evidence in the record that any dispatch of this character was ever sent?

Captain McCOLLUM. There is no evidence that any dispatch of this character was ever sent.

Senator LUCAS. By the Chief of Naval Operations?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir; no dispatch was ever sent.

Mr. KEEFE. Does the evidence disclose the date of this alleged conversation, or the writing of this dispatch?

Captain McCOLLUM. These things are entirely memory on my part, sir. There is no record of this thing at all. As I explained to you, this was drawn up and written on the dispatch form. When the dispatch does not go, you wind it up, and throw it in the waste basket. That is what happened probably in this case.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall the date that this took place?

Captain McCOLLUM. It was either the 4th or 5th, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Of December?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be on a Saturday or a Friday?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. It was about that time.

[9137] The CHAIRMAN. The 7th was Sunday, the 6th was Saturday, and the 5th would be Friday.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And the 4th would be Thursday.

The CHAIRMAN. The 4th would be Thursday.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And so on, backward.

Senator FERGUSON. Let the record show that I asked the question thinking it might refresh his memory if he knew what day of the week it was.

I know just as well as the other members of the committee what day these dates fall on.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes that.

[9138] Mr. KAUFMAN. We will go now, Captain, to another item. I direct your attention to a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, which is part of Exhibit 2, and being on page 12 of Exhibit 2.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, I have seen this dispatch since coming to Washington this time, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you see it at or about the time it was translated on October 9?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; I was not in Washington at that time, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You arrived in Washington about the 16th?

Captain McCOLLUM. I arrived in Washington about the 11th, sir, but that was Friday and I had certain notes and reports that I made. I had been to Europe and I had to knock some of my notes in shape, and I called in at the office and then went home where I got my notes in shape, and actually went down to the office on Monday, sir, and it was probably 2 or 3 days after that before I got myself into the saddle again, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you recall whether that particular memorandum, or that particular dispatch, which has been referred to here as plotting a chart of Pearl Harbor, whether that came to your attention at any time after you came back and before December 7?

[9139] Captain McCOLLUM. Mr. Counselor, I cannot be certain. If it did not it should have been called to my attention as Chief of that Division, sir. I have heard it in the testimony before this committee, that I have read, sir, I have heard it referred to as the

bombing plan. All I can say about that, sir, is, if I saw it, it did not make much impression on my mind, nor did it make much impression on the minds of any of the considerable number of what were supposed to be quite capable officers who saw this dispatch at that time, sir.

The first time I ever heard it referred to as being any definite bombing arrangement was when I believe the former counsel advanced that hypothesis before this committee, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what interpretation, if you saw it, did you put on it, or what interpretation do you put on that chart now?

Captain McCOLLUM. The situation in regard to the Japanese obtaining intelligence in this country was this:

Back in 1935 the Japanese Navy was apparently not satisfied with the type of intelligence forwarded to them by their consular agents in this country and undertook the setting up, on the west coast of the United States, of an observation net of their own. We knew about it in [9140] 1935 and broke it up by 1936. We purposely let a certain portion of it run along so that we had an insight into the organization on this coast, on the west coast of the United States.

During all of this time it was my feeling then, and it is my feeling now, that the Japanese had been unable to put naval observers into the consulate general at Honolulu. In 1941 they had them at Seattle, San Francisco, the Los Angeles-San Diego area, and Panama. Panama was serviced from the Japanese naval attache's office in Peru. These officers, you will remember—we were able to run two of them out. One was arrested I think in Los Angeles in about June of 1941. Okada, lieutenant commander, and son of the former Premier of Japan, was chased out of the country about the same time. He had been operating in Seattle.

As we estimated it, the consul general at Honolulu was receiving, through the Foreign Office at the instance of the Japanese Naval Department, explicit directions of the type of intelligence that was needed, much more in detail than any of the other key consulates on the west coast, because he did not have the benefit of the services of a Japanese Naval Intelligence officer within his consulate.

Therefore this thing here, if I saw it, I am quite certain I would have felt it was just another move to get [9141] explicit information, to cut down the frequently voluble type of reports made by consular officials which the Jap Navy did not like.

More than that, sir, I cannot say.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You do not now regard it as a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not necessarily, sir, not unless I had known that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, and then I could say this certainly looks like it might be such a plan, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now we will go to the last item, Captain, and that is the 14-part message, part of which arrived on Saturday, December 6.

Were you on duty at that time?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When did you first receive the 13 parts of that message?

Captain McCOLLUM. I was receiving parts of that message as they came in. I was down in my office until late Saturday night, sir. They called me up at my home in the middle of the night and told me that the rest of it had come in, but they did not have the last part, there was one still to come. I inquired right away what steps had been taken to deliver it and to whom. I was informed it had been [9142] delivered by Captain Kramer to the Director of Naval Intelligence. Fortunately the naval aide for the President happened to be at his house, as was, I believe, the Director of Military Intelligence, General Miles, who had all seen it at that time, and that steps had been taken to deliver it to others of the high command in the Navy Department and presumably to the White House, because our channel there was with the aide to the President, Admiral Beardall.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What time, to your recollection, did this message begin to come in on Saturday?

Captain McCOLLUM. I cannot say, sir. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon was the first time that I heard about it, sir, that it was coming in. It might have come in before that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you stay on duty until that entire message had been received?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; my office was on a 24-hour basis by early November, sir. I had a total of six officers, including myself and including Kramer, who was excluded because of his special relationship there. Early in November, I take it, the three senior officers, that is, from experience, either myself, Captain Watts, or Colonel Boone were on duty in my office, together with adequate assistants such as we had on a 24-hour basis, sir. I took over the watch on Sunday morning sometime between 7:30 and 8, and about 9 [9143] o'clock I went home to get some sleep so I could be bright eyed the next morning, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What time did the 14th part of that message come in on Sunday morning?

Captain McCOLLUM. I received it I think about 9 o'clock, sir. My recollections, as to the exact time, I might add are not precise. I know I was on duty and relieved Watts in my office in the Navy Department on Sunday morning prior to 8 o'clock, probably about 7:45.

This was brought to me, I think, when I was in the outer office of Admiral Stark's office. That would be about 9 or 9:30, would be my guess, sir, on Sunday morning. Now I say again, sir, my time refers back to the time I came on duty, sir. I do not remember the times precisely.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was Admiral Stark there when this message was brought to you in his outer office?

Captain McCOLLUM. The sequence of events on Sunday morning was something like this, if you are interested—

Mr. KAUFMAN. I know the committee is very much interested in this particular phase of it.

Captain McCOLLUM. I went over the situation with Watts when I arrived and was trying to digest the 13 parts of this thing when I received word that Admiral Wilkinson, my chief, [9144] had arrived and desired to see me. I went up to Admiral Wilkinson's office and we entered into a discussion of the first 13 parts of this dispatch. I should say that would be 9 o'clock or maybe a little later.

While we were talking an orderly or someone came in and said Admiral Stark had come into his office, and Admiral Wilkinson said, "Well, come on, let's go and see the Chief." We went down the passageway and went into Admiral Stark's office. At that time there was no one in Admiral Stark's office except himself. None of his aides were present in the outer office. We went in and discussed this thing with Admiral Stark and then came on out. That was the 13 parts.

[9145] Shortly after that, the 14th part was delivered to me. I took it up with Admiral Wilkinson, and pointed out to him the difference in the tenor of the language of the 14th part from that of the other. We immediately took it to Admiral Stark and pointed out to him the virulence and tenor of the language of the 14th part of it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What time would you say it was that you and Admiral Stark discussed it?

Captain McCOLLUM. Certainly before 10 o'clock, sir, 9:30, or 10. I cannot be exact, Mr. Counselor. I am trying to do the best I can, sir, but I just did not have the time to check the time precisely, sir.

At that time, the suggestion was made that it looked right there that that was enough to indicate that we could expect war. That term was used. That was an inference. I mean there was nothing about war in this dispatch at all, and possibly was loose language, unquestionably was loose language, but we were all rather thinking in those terms.

The suggestion was then made that an additional warning be sent to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KEEFE. By whom? Who made the suggestion?

Captain McCOLLUM. Admiral Wilkinson, sir. Some little discussion went on, and, as far as I know nothing was done [9146] at that time.

About a half-hour later—I was still in Admiral Stark's office—when word was sent in that one of my officers wished to see me, and I stepped out, and Kramer was standing there with the time part of the dispatch; that is, an additional dispatch which directed the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington to deliver this note at 1 o'clock Washington time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was the 14th part of the message, was it not?

Captain McCOLLUM. I am not certain without referring to it. I thought it was a separate message, that was my impression, sir, and that the 14th part in it, the last thing, was rather a Philippic thing against the United States. It followed the usual procedure, and this procedure was used as an emphasis. There was nothing unusual about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You are either too close or too far from the microphone. Some of the members have difficulty hearing you. Will you raise your voice a little?

Captain McCOLLUM. Is this better, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. That is better.

Captain McCOLLUM. The time zone is set up as a routine procedure in my office, and in order to keep track of what [9147] time of day it was there, whether it was sunset or sunrise, or moonset, we had a standard procedure that when any dispatch of which time was an element came in, we immediately converted that time to not only our own time but usually set up Washington time, West Coast time, Hono-

lulu time, Manila time, and Tokyo time. That was all set forth, because the Japanese operate entirely on Tokyo time, that is, all of their time business in the Japanese Navy is run on Tokyo time.

So that a consideration of these times is necessary to get a view as to what is understandable in relation to sunrise and sunset, and other phenomena that have a rather important effect on naval operations.

Senator LUCAS. You mean the Navy was run on Tokyo time?

Captain McCOLLUM. The Japanese navy was run on Tokyo time; that is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I am sorry I interrupted you.

Captain McCOLLUM. Thank you sir.

As a result of that, Kramer had worked out these times and those times were shown just on a rough sheet of paper as they appeared to Admiral Stark. The suggestion was made at that time that this indicated that if anything was going to occur, it would probably start about that time.

[9148] As I remember it, Admiral Stark picked up the receiver of his telephone and attempted to contact someone over the telephone. It was my impression at the time that he had tried to get the Chief of Staff of the Army, and had been unsuccessful in getting through.

By this time, a good many of the senior officers of the Division of Operations had come in. They were in and out of Admiral Stark's office. Various times of the morning, Admiral Turner was there, Admiral Ingersoll was there, Admiral Brainard, I am certain Admiral Noyes was there, and of course, my chief, Admiral Wilkinson.

Later on, about 11 o'clock or maybe later in the morning, I was given to understand that it had been decided to send a warning to Pearl Harbor—I wish to stand corrected there, to the forces in Hawaii, including the fleet, and that the warning dispatch was to be handled by the Chief of Staff of the Army and it would be in a form which would be sent to General Short who would be instructed to transmit the substance of that dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of our fleet, Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. KAUFMAN. One further question, Captain.

An examination of Exhibits 1 and 2, and some of the other intercepts, indicates delays in transmission. Will you tell us whether anything was done about that?

[9149] Captain McCOLLUM. As to that part of it, there are officers of the technical service that are probably better qualified to answer that than I am. However, I would venture this general explanation:

These dispatches were intercepted at a great many intercept or pick-up stations located in various parts of the world.

One they were picked up, the pick-up station had no personnel qualified to either decode or translate any of this material. They only had operators who were skilled in taking the Japanese equivalent of our Morse code. Those dispatches, therefore, from any given pick-up station, when received, were sent to a center, depending on who was the control center—either Washington, Pearl Harbor, or Corregidor.

They might have sent it either by radio, teletype, or by mail.

Radio and teletype facilities were not always available.

When sent by mail to one of the decryption and translational centers, as soon as they arrived, there was an office procedure for taking through the dispatch, and an attempt was made to decrypt the code.

It is my understanding that priorities were first given on the basis of the code classification. In other [9150] words, the higher the code classification, probably the more important the information was.

There was also the precedence of the dispatch, that is the urgency with which it was sent. Those were obtained from the normal procedure signs at the head of the dispatch.

Then an attempt was made to decrypt them together, if we had the particular code table in which that code was sent.

We did not always have it. Sometimes these codes would be received and we did not have the method or means of decrypting them until sometime afterwards.

Once it was decrypted, or sufficiently decrypted to indicate some importance, it was handed to one of the translators who took a look at it to determine whether he thought it should be completely broken down for further decryption. That had to be done because of the limited number of people capable of translating the language, and to make the very best use of the people we had.

When we were working full blast, the way we were, oh, for the month immediately preceding the attack on our fleet, great effort was made to get the stuff out on these negotiations right away, just as quickly as we possibly could.

Now, that was dependent on the time of arrival at the [9151] decoding center, which was not of necessity directly related to the time of transmission from Tokyo, whether the code to decode it was available or not, and dependent upon the relative importance of it as determined prior to reading any of the contents.

[9152] Now, when you come then to a slack period, that is, when we weren't getting so many messages, they would go back and work on the old ones. The effort was to decode everything but to try to decode the most important ones first.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain, you said a moment ago that Pearl Harbor was a central point for decryption. What type messages were decrypted at Pearl Harbor, if you know?

Captain McCOLLUM. Going back somewhat here, sir, the Navy Communications Intelligence organization was set up first with headquarters in Washington. Then we put an organization out in the Asiatic sphere with headquarters in Cavite first, and later at Corregidor. We originally had pick-up stations in Peking, Shanghai, Guam, and I think at one time one almost in Japan, some years ago.

Until the early 30's very little had been done so far as Honolulu was concerned. We didn't have very many people. The first idea was that they would be a mobile movement, that would move with the commander in chief of the fleet. I had such a movement when I was Fleet Intelligence Officer. That was found unworkable. They couldn't get the sets. As a result of that, a route of entry was set up in Honolulu with the hope that that could be built [9153] up.

Until about early 1941, we had only, it is my understanding, a very rudimentary organization in Honolulu. At that time we were very fortunate in having become available the services of Captain Rochefort, who is the only officer in our Navy who is a top-flight cryptographer and radio man, and who also has a thorough knowledge of the Japanese language. He was obtained from the staff of

Vice Admiral Andrews, and put in charge at Honolulu with instructions to build up his organization as rapidly as he could.

He did not get very much help, I believe, from Washington. We didn't have the people, and he was in the process of building up that organization with the primary job of making an effort to break Japanese naval codes and ciphers when the war occurred.

It is my understanding that they did not have the complete codes to enable them to read the Japanese diplomatic messages, nor is it my understanding that they were expected to; that their principal effort was to be directed on an attack on Japanese naval codes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you know whether Admiral Turner thought that the organization in Hawaii could decode Japanese diplomatic codes?

[9154] Captain McCOLLUM. This is hearsay, Mr. Counsellor. I heard him say before this committee that he thought so, sir.

I wish to clarify one point. This organization at Honolulu, by dropping everything else that they were doing and using some of the standard books that they had, and by exercising cryptographic efforts, in other words, a direct attack with some of the very clever officers they then had out there, were able to read the gist of some of the low-grade stuff in the Japanese diplomatic ciphers.

In other words, it was a major cryptographic effort on each code; that was my understanding, but they couldn't read it right straight through.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, coming back to the meeting at Admiral Stark's office on Sunday morning after you had the 1 o'clock delivery date for the message, did any officer at that meeting suggest Pearl Harbor was a possible point of attack?

Captain McCOLLUM. Pearl Harbor as such was never mentioned. The feeling that I had, and I think the feeling that most officers there had, was that at or near the outbreak of war with Japan, we could expect a surprise attack on the fleet.

When I was acting fleet-operations officer of the fleet [9155] right in our standard fleet operating plans of war was the major assumption that upon the outbreak of war with Japan, or the near outbreak of war with Japan, we could expect a surprise attack, or an attempted surprise attack, on the fleet.

I recollect, by way of illustration, if I may, at Christmas, 1937, we went on an all-out alert on the battleships and fleet based on the west coast, and that went on for some time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. If it was the assumption of all of the officers there that there would be an attempted surprise attack on the fleet, did not that mean Pearl Harbor because the fleet was at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct; but if the fleet had not been at Pearl Harbor it would mean wherever the fleet was.

[9156] Mr. KAUFMAN. But it was never suggested that Pearl Harbor better go on an all-out alert immediately?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think the thinking was in terms of the fleet, Mr. Counselor, that the fleet should have been alerted all the way through.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did the officers there assume that Pearl Harbor was on an all-out alert, both Army and Navy?

Captain McCOLLUM. I had been given to understand that they had been thoroughly alerted, sir, and on their toes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. No further questions, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Just one or two questions, Captain.

Did you state what date it was in December that this message came through that seemed to refer to Russia but which you did not regard as an execute?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think, Senator, that it is right here, sir, if I may refer to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain McCOLLUM. One of them here is on the 5th of December and I think there is one preceding that. Here is one on the 4th of December, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If any execute message, in view of your position, which could have been regarded as an execute message, predicated upon this winds forecast, had come to the Navy Department, would you have seen it?

[9157] Captain McCOLLUM. I should have seen it; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any reason, if it did come, why you wouldn't have seen it?

Captain McCOLLUM. Oh, occasionally, I believe it has been testified here before, there was a special arrangement made here by the director of communications, Admiral Noyes, to get this information promptly higher up in the chain than I was, Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, and so on; under those conditions it would be possible that they would overlook me, but in the normal chain I should have seen that first, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If such a message or a similar message came through, in what office would a record of it be kept?

Captain McCOLLUM. That should be kept down in the communications intelligence office.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have come there first?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. They would have kept a record or a copy of it and sent it up to the next order?

Captain McCOLLUM. They would have gone through their office-filing procedure, Senator, on that, and Kramer or one of his assistants would have brought me that instantly.

The CHAIRMAN. When it got to you, would there be a record of it in your office?

[9158] Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You passed it on upstairs. You kept no record then?

Captain McCOLLUM. I took those messages in my office, Senator, and filed them in a file and kept them for a period of about 2 weeks, when they were then returned to the Communications Intelligence Section, where those messages were destroyed, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In case such a message went up to Admiral Wilkinson and thence up to Admiral Stark, so that all of them saw it, would there be any record in each of those offices that the message had been received?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. It was carried by an officer by hand to these people and every effort made to get a copy and return it to the communications intelligence center, who then kept the master file.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the only office in which there would be a written record of the receipt of this message would be in the office where it was received?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in charge of that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Captain Safford would be the head [9159] of that office.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the intercept that was received indicated that if certain things happened, if they got this weather forecast from Tokyo, east-wind rain, and so forth, it was based upon an assumption that an emergency came into being, and then then they spell out what the emergency is in their mind by saying "breaking off relations".

Captain McCOLLUM. That parenthesis is a translator's explanation, Senator. In other words, the translator has given you the exact Japanese translation and then he in parentheses gives you the full force and meaning of the Japanese, sir, which is not always possible in a direct translation.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, what is in the parentheses is his interpretation.

Captain McCOLLUM. Is the translator's interpretation and explanation of his use of the words.

The CHAIRMAN. And the other part is as to the breaking of communications. They are two separate things.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Diplomatic relations might be broken between the two Governments.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. But without any breaking of diplomatic [9160] relations, communications might be cut off?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Even private communications, telegraph or radio?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In case those things happened and they got this broadcast about the weather they would understand.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the basis upon which the execute message would be sent was never in existence. There was no diplomatic break of relations and no breaking of communications between Japan and the United States or between the communications systems, public or private, prior to the attack?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. So the basis upon which they were predicting that such an execute message might come through never transpired?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. If such a message had come through it would have been in a sense premature because conditions for forecasting it did not take place?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right; unless they wished to use this and forecast the action which they expected to [9161] occur some hours later, but as you pointed out, that did not occur.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, why was not priority given to the decoding, decrypting, and translating of these Japanese messages?

In other words, what I am trying to ascertain is this, I got the impression that these intercepted Japanese messages were handled more or less in a routine manner. I was wondering why the highest type of priority was not given for the immediate decoding, decrypting, and translating of these messages intercepted from Japanese sources.

Captain McCOLLUM. Oh, but they were, sir. If the impression was given that the thing was routine, that is a wrong impression, sir. Everyone was working tooth and nail to get these things out as quickly as they possibly could, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To the exclusion of others?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir. In other words, the people working on the Japanese, the major effort was put on the Japanese and all other things that had relations to it were dropped completely out of the picture. Every effort of that organization was bent on this thing, the decrypting of these dispatches.

[9162] The VICE CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that the evidence presented here during the appearance of General Miles, who was G-2 of the General Staff of the Army, as you know, it was called to his attention that all the way from two to twenty-odd days of time elapsed from the time the Japanese message was sent before it was decoded and translated.

Now, did anything of that kind happen with the Navy?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; I have tried to explain that, sir. In other words, if I may take a hypothetical case, assume that a Japanese diplomatic dispatch was picked up in one of the pick-up stations in Alaska. I, again, do not know the physical means they had but there were such stations that the only communication they had was by mail. Assume, again, that that was the only station that picked up that particular dispatch. That would come in to us here in Washington we will say by mail. As much as a week might elapse from the time it was actually received at the pick-up station until it was received in the decoding center in Washington. The minute that thing then came in it would be looked at to see if we had the code that would permit us to decode it, sir. If we had that code it would be decoded in part, handed to a translator, who would translate part of it to ascertain whether, as far as he had gone, whether it merited complete breakdown, particularly if there [9163] was more code work to be done on it.

Then if it didn't look important it would be set aside in favor of things that looked to be more important and pressing, sir.

Those things were done first. Then when you came to a slack time everything that you hadn't done before would be decoded. The set-up was to try to decode what appeared to be the most important things first and get them out just as quickly as we could, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, can you tell by review of these messages that have been presented here in evidence that the most important messages were handled more promptly than the less important messages?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You think that is the true situation?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think that is the true situation looking at it all over, sir. I think the most important ones went out first.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, you are an expert in this and I am not.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I am not an expert. As I said before, sir, I am not an expert in that field and I believe there will be an officer here, Captain Safford, and perhaps others, who are much better qualified to explain [9164] in detail on those points than I am, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, at least you have had much more experience with it than I have; that is a fair statement, isn't it?

Captain McCOLLUM. Thank you, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, there is a definite physical problem involved in this type of work.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. Not only that, I might add, Mr. Congressman, but there is a mental problem involved.

Senator LUCAS. A what?

Captain McCOLLUM. A mental problem. This type of work is one of the most trying mental exercises that you have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can appreciate that.

Captain McCOLLUM. We have had a number of our officers and a number of our civil people break down rather badly under continual punching on this sort of thing and it is a continual concern of officers who handle those people to keep them from coming to a mental breakdown on this type of work.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can readily appreciate that it is a difficult task. That would certainly be my idea about it.

I want to see if you can clear me up on this point. The records presented here, these exhibits of the messages, [9165] rather indicate that some relatively unimportant messages were decoded and translated more promptly than some other messages here which were much more important. Now, can you help me some on that?

Captain McCOLLUM. That may be because on the more important messages they weren't able to break them at the time they arrived. They might not have arrived until after the unimportant ones were here. On the more important messages we couldn't use all of our translators. We had to use only the few top-flight ones. We only had six or seven. We had increased our number 100 percent, sir, but it was still six or seven when we got through with that in 1941.

And, if I may be pardoned for going back to this, the so-called translator in this type of stuff almost has to be a cryptographer himself. You understand that these things come out in the form of syllables, and it is how you group your syllables that you make your words. There is no punctuation.

Now, without the Chinese ideograph to read from, it is most difficult to group these things together. That is, any two sounds grouped together to make a word may mean a variety of things. For instance, "Ba," may mean horses or fields, old women, or my hand, all depending on the ideographs with which it is written. On the so-called [9166] translator is forced the job of taking from unrelated syllables and grouping them into what looks to him to be intelligible words, substituting then such of the Chinese ideographs necessary to pin it down, and then going ahead with the translation, which is a much more difficult job than simple translation, sir.

For that reason all of the people, however qualified they might be in the Japanese language, had to have considerable experience in this particular field before they could be trusted to come through with a correct interpretation of the dispatch.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can understand those difficulties. Is it true that many words in the Japanese language can be given a variety of meanings, as you have indicated by this one word you have used here?

Captain McCOLLUM. It depends on the Chinese ideograph. The reason is this: The Japanese language is an uninflected language. It is straight out. They borrowed and applied to the Japanese the Chinese characters. The Chinese indicate a difference between the characters by a difference of inflection. Therefore the Chinese, when he talks, sounds like he is singing. The Japanese, not being able to sing, when he says "Ba," we will say, he doesn't know whether it is one of a half a dozen different things that he means. It [9167] is not uncommon to see two Japanese in discussion who get out of tune and one of them has to write the character down to show the other what he is talking about.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In ordinary conversation?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I might take a second to state that I had the experience one time when I was in school of meeting a Chinese student, and he said, "So many words in your language mean such a different thing." He said, "You talk about a horse running fast and then you talk about a man being tied hard and fast." He said, "One is going, and the other can't move at all. What do you mean?"

I can understand some of the difficulties. Let me ask, if I may—assume that one of our stations somewhere picked up a Japanese message. It is then rushed by the fastest available means of communication to a center where the decoding, decrypting, and translating is done. Is that correct?

[9168] Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then there is somebody there who has to make an appraisal on the value of the information contained in that message?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; that is correct, but that appraisal in the first instance is done without the benefit of reading any of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just by looking at it?

Captain McCOLLUM. By judging from the—as I say, I may be contradicted later on because I am not exact on this, but you have at least two methods of judgment of that. One is the urgency of the dispatch, in other words, whether it is priority, triple priority, or so on.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Japanese—do they use terms for that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not those terms, but I mean they use a similar system. They have to in practically all of these systems.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Captain McCOLLUM. Then by looking at it they could tell whether it was in one of the highest security codes or a code of less security or what kind of code, and the presumption was that the higher the security of the code the more important was the information contained in that, sir.

[9169] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then after that appraisal was made—

Captain McCOLLUM. Then, after that, you would look to see where it came from, whether it was the Embassy in Washington, the Foreign Office in Tokyo talking, or something that concerned us more directly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And after that appraisal was made, why, then—

Captain McCOLLUM. After that they would then see whether it was a code they could read themselves or whether some cryptographic work was required, how much of it we had, how much could be decrypted of that, if it could all be decrypted or not. It would be decrypted, or parts of it would be, and then handed to a translator if it looked urgent. All these factors were considered in there; and it was then sent to a man who then said—from virtually looking at the Japanese syllables—said: "I think that they ought to work full blast on this one or spend more time on that one and get it out."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then your explanation of the details of getting at these messages is to explain, apparently, the delay in the decoding, decrypting, and translating of some of them?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. We tried to run time after time what we called, technically, time studies in there; [9170] that is, to see how fast we could get them out.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As I recall, we also received information that one difficulty was the lack of trained, qualified personnel.

Captain McCOLLUM. Oh, yes, sir; that was all the way through. I might add on that, sir, that from 1907 until the outbreak of the war in 1941 the Navy had exposed to Japanese language instruction a total of about 50 officers. By 1941 about 43 of those were available, either active or retired. All but 8 of those people were on specialty jobs when the war commenced.

In October of 1941 the Navy started schools for the instruction of college men in the Japanese language, and those schools opened on October 1, 1941, I think, with about 40 selected students, one at Harvard and the other at the University of California out in Berkeley. They were subsequently combined at Boulder in Colorado, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Captain, to invite your attention to what I have been trying to inquire about, on page 245 of Exhibit 1, in the middle of the page, there appears a brief message there from Tokyo to Washington. It apparently was sent December 6, 1941, and is shown to have been translated the same day. That would not be a very important message, would it?

[9171] Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; but on this thing, this might have cleared right away as it came in. In other words, the code might have been immediately available. It was a simple matter to put it into Japanese, and it was simple, and it was translated almost by looking at it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you would not regard this as an important message, the opening words there, "There is really no need to tell you this?"

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; that is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But that was translated the same day it was sent.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, I invite your attention to page 29 of Exhibit 2. Do you have it there?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. A message from Honolulu to Tokyo sent December 6, 1941, not translated until the 8th, December 8, 1941. That was 2 days later. That would be——

Captain McCOLLUM. That is an important message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That would be an important message, wouldn't it?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is an important message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to get at is—two messages sent on December 6th, one of them of practically no [9172] importance translated that day; another message sent on December the 6th that was important, not translated for 2 days later.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; that is correct. As I have said before, sir, I cannot answer that directly because it would depend so much, sir, on where the pick-up station was located that got this thing and how fast they got it in to Washington, sir. There is nothing in this dispatch to indicate when it was received in the decryption centers here, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But it is an important message——

Captain McCOLLUM. It is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). Because they were inquiring about our air reconnaissance.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And things there in Hawaii.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain, did you state that the best decoding, decrypting, and translating officer in the United States Navy was at Pearl Harbor? You gave the name of some man.

Captain McCOLLUM. That was my impression, Mr. Cooper. I have known Rochefort a good many years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the name?

Captain McCOLLUM. Rochefort, sir; R-o-c-h-e-f-o-r-t.

[9173] The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was his rank?

Captain McCOLLUM. He was then a commander, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Commander Rochefort?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. As early as 1925, Mr. Cooper, he was looked on as being one of the outstanding cryptographers and radio officers in the service, and because of those special qualifications he was sent to Japan to acquire a knowledge of the Japanese language, which he did, and to my mind he is the only officer in the entire naval service that in this particular field is preeminent because of his training in both the language and the decryption, together with my evaluation of his ability. I rate him as one of the ablest officers in the service, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he was on duty there in Hawaii on December 7?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And had been for some time prior thereto?

Captain McCOLLUM. In May, I believe it was, of 1941 he took over that job.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He went to Hawaii in May 1941 and continued there until after December 7, 1941?

Captain McCOLLUM. And he stayed there until the Battle of Midway, sir.

[9174] Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield for a question on that point?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, I yield, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. What equipment did he have compared with what you had in the center here at Washington for decrypting, decoding, and translating?

Captain McCOLLUM. As I have indicated, Senator, he was in the process of getting things organized. His job was to make an attack on the naval codes. I am not informed as to the details of the equipment, sir. I believe that Captain Safford, who was the head of that section, can give you that information in detail, sir, and anything I might say might merely becloud the issue, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then this Commander Rochefort, you say, had been engaged in this type of work from 1925?

Captain McCOLLUM. It was my understanding, sir—well, Mr. Congressman, the first time I had ever heard of this sort of thing was in 1925, when I worked for a brief period here in the Navy Department, sir. At that time Safford was in that section, and I understood that he and Rochefort more or less alternated in that job. Safford, I believe, was a lieutenant then, and Rocheford was a lieutenant, junior grade; and when I [9175] was assistant naval attaché in Tokyo this fellow Rochefort was up there with a wife and a child, and I sent a dispatch to the Navy Department protesting the sending of a married naval officer out there because living conditions were most difficult; and our general rule was that an officer that studied Japanese was unmarried, largely because of the difficulty of supporting a family and keeping his wife and children happy while he buried himself in this language business; and I was told that they had special reasons for overlooking the normal incumbrance of a wife and a child—that this fellow was going to stay anyway; so it was only after I got back to Washington and talked to him about it later, in 1930, that I commenced to realize why they had sent this individual out there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was because of his ability in that field?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When was that that he arrived in Japan?

Captain McCOLLUM. That, I believe, was in 1929, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, did you state that these intercepted Japanese messages were sent to Pearl Harbor by the stations that picked up the message?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; they had a pick-up method. Whether Pearl Harbor merely passed them on to the decryption [9176] center here or not, I do not know, sir. I think each one of these centers—the idea was that each one of these centers controlled a certain pick-up station. Those pick-up stations flowed—the information went from the pick-up station to the center, and then anything that center could not do they sent on to another center that could handle it.

For instance, these diplomatic messages of the Pearl Harbor net—or the Hawaii net—might well be flown into the—might well have moved first into the center at Hawaii and then been transmitted by radio or cable direct to Washington, because they were not working on this particular type of stuff out there, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, Honolulu was a center—

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). For those intercepted Japanese messages to be sent to?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And they had the best man in the Navy in Hawaii at the time qualified to do this type of work?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; that is my opinion as to his ability, sir. Someone else might differ with me on that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You certainly ought to know more about that than I do.

Now, on that question, Captain, of this message that you [9177] referred to as the bomb plotting message, dividing up of Pearl Harbor into five sectors.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, did you ever in all of your wide experience in the Navy know of any request for such detailed information about the location of our fleet as was called for in that message?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. Might I elaborate on it a bit, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; I would be glad for you to.

Captain McCOLLUM. The anchorage there at Pearl Harbor is chopped up into a number of more or less independent locks there. When we moved the fleet in and out of that place where the ships were moored in there, whether they were pointing in or pointing out, whether they were double banked or whether they were in the east lock or west lock or wherever they might be, was indicative of the facility with which the ships could move out. The channel going in is fairly shallow and a ship the size of a battleship has to move at relatively reduced speeds.

I am speaking, if I may say so, from my experience as operations officer on Admiral Hepburn's flag when we moved the fleet in and out of that place two or three times.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you serve at one time as operations officer of the fleet? [9178]

Captain McCOLLUM. I was assistant operations officer of the fleet and acting operations officer of the United States Fleet for about 7 months, sir. I served as assistant operations officer for about 18 months.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. While the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, sir, we were not based there but we went there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You went there?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Captain McCOLLUM. So that those questions relating to how the ships were anchored and where they were anchored in there might be interpreted to indicate the facility with which that fleet was prepared to move.

To give a general statement of where the ships were, the stuff they are requiring here, would require a rather long-winded dispatch, where the same device, such as breaking it up into areas A, B, and C, such a simple device could be used. With this area discovered a rather simple and short dispatch would suffice to give the essential information as to the location of the fleet and also an

indication of their readiness for sortie. I would suggest that that is a reasonable, tenable [9179] hypothesis as to why they wished information, apparently, in this detail.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, one other question, if I may, please, Captain. Did you ever know of a fleet commander taking the position that all information received by the Navy Department in Washington should be sent to him for his evaluation?

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, sir, I have not served intimately with any large number of fleet commanders, but certainly neither the fleet commander, Admiral Hepburn, that I served with, nor the fleet commander, Admiral Kincaid, that I recently served with, took that attitude, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Hasn't it always been generally recognized that the Navy Department is supposed to make certain evaluations and give appropriate information and instructions to fleet commanders?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was the basis on which I understood that we were operating here in Washington, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, hasn't that been the traditional policy of the United States Navy?

Captain McCOLLUM. So far as I am aware; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you. Senator George, of Georgia, may inquire.

Senator GEORGE. I never heard the direct, Mr. Chairman, [9180] so I will pass. I did not hear his direct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark had to go to a meeting of the Rules Committee. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, is recognized at this time. It is now about 3 minutes to 12, Senator. Would you like to start after lunch?

Senator LUCAS. I will start after lunch.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As this point the committee will take a recess until 2 o'clock, please, Captain. Be back at that time.

(Whereupon, at 11:57 a. m., January 30, 1946, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[9181]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Come forward, please, Captain.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ARTHUR HOWARD McCOLLUM, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything at this time before examination is resumed?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, do you have anything you want to bring to the attention of the committee before your examination is resumed?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will now inquire.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, I am not sure just the route that one of these messages takes from the time it is intercepted until it finally gets into the high command. With the hope of avoiding repetition I

should like to have you take, for instance, the so-called pilot message—which, as I understand, you saw and were familiar with?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, where was that intercepted, if you remember?

[9182] Captain McCOLLUM. Senator, I do not know where it was intercepted, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I see. Where was it analyzed, decrypted, and decoded, or whatever term you use?

Captain McCOLLUM. My impression is that that was done here in Washington.

Senator LUCAS. Where is that station located?

Captain McCOLLUM. The center for doing that work was right in the Navy Department at that time.

Senator LUCAS. In the Navy Department?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Who would be in charge of that work in December 1941?

Captain McCOLLUM. Captain Safford was the officer in charge of that section, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Captain Safford was the officer in charge?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did he possess all of the necessary knowledge in order to properly decrypt, translate, decode these messages?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not in his person, but within his organization; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. He did not have that peculiar information within himself?

[9183] Captain McCOLLUM. He is one of the best cryptographers and experts on the radio aspects of this thing in the Navy. That is his reputation, sir. He is not a Japanese language man, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. So you would have to rely upon the Japanese language men for proper translation?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And when he would translate it he would then transmit it to—what is the name, Captain Safford?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. When translated that came directly to me, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Where did Captain Safford get in on it?

Captain McCOLLUM. Captain Safford was the administrative head and the director of the whole organization. Then that organization is broken down into certain parts, one of which you might call the translation-distribution center whose people were actually attached to my office but worked under Safford and were headed up by Kramer.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand Safford then saw all of the messages?

Captain McCOLLUM. Ordinarily he would see them all, either as a check-up or as they went through office procedure, but occasionally, if something hot came in Kramer could come directly with it to me or higher authority.

Senator LUCAS. After the Japanese language student [9184] translated the messages they were presumed to go to Captain Safford?

Captain McCOLLUM. I didn't quite understand.

Senator LUCAS. I say, after they were translated by the Japanese language student these messages were presumed at least to go to Safford?

Captain McCOLLUM. Captain Safford would see them sooner or later, but not necessarily immediately.

Senator LUCAS. You saw them all, is that correct?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was the idea; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that an answer to your question, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. He said that was the idea.

Captain McCOLLUM. If I haven't answered your question I will try to do so.

Senator LUCAS. I said, was it your duty as a result of the position you held at that time to examine each and every one of the messages that came from the language student?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. After you examined one of these messages what did you do with it?

Captain McCOLLUM. I then indicated the distribution within the Navy Department, sir, and made sure that my opposite numbers in the War Department had it, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was ordinarily a standard distribution?

[9185] Captain McCOLLUM. If that distribution within the Navy Department needed additional ones, I added that, for if the ones I considered important had not been so marked I added those marks to them.

Senator LUCAS. Who delivered the so-called pilot message, what did you do with it, if you remember?

Captain McCOLLUM. That pilot message was distributed on the standard distribution in the Navy Department.

Senator LUCAS. Who did that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Captain Kramer.

Senator LUCAS. Captain Kramer was the individual who was held responsible?

[9186] Captain McCOLLUM. He actually carried it around and delivered it to the various officers who should have received it, sir, including mine.

Senator LUCAS. That helps me just a little, Captain. One further question. You have repeatedly said that at no time did you ever see an implementing winds message after you had the original pilot message.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir. That is prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I want to examine you just briefly upon the so-called pilot message with which you are familiar.

I call your attention to that message which is No. 2353, and then I also direct your attention to the message sent from Tokyo to Washington on that same day, November 19, 1941, known as Circular No. 2354:

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts.

And at the bottom of that it says:

The above will be repeated five times and included at the beginning and end.

Will you explain that to me, what that means?

Captain McCOLLUM. This, I take it, sir, is an additional [9187] word code to the one we had before. As you notice, the word "HIGASHI" up there means "east" and this is an additional word code to be used in either the voice broadcasts or possibly in the news broadcasts sent out in Morse and would be repeated five times at the start of the message and five times at the end of the message, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you consider that this message identified as 2354 has anything to do with 2353?

Captain McCOLLUM. It is the same sort of thing, sir. It brings out the same—it is an attempt to convey the same information.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that was the way I construed it from my limited knowledge of the type of message that was sent. I admit that I have no particular powers of analyzation of a message of this kind but as a layman in reading these two messages I could not help but read one unless I read the other and then attempt to construe both of them as really one message. Am I correct about that?

Captain McCOLLUM. They are not one message.

Senator LUCAS. No; they are not one message.

Captain McCOLLUM. But they are attempting to convey the same information. The Japanese at that time were trying, as I remember—were most anxious to convey this information and they apparently rigged up an additional word—two [9188] additional word codes, that is, hidden word codes here to accomplish that purpose, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Counsel seems to think, after giving these two messages some study, that they set up both of these types of message, one to go to the general public and one to go more or less to the diplomatic representatives, but they both mean the same thing.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I was just wondering whether or not any message, any purported implementing message, was ever received, or it is contended was received, whereby they repeated the particular word five times including it at the beginning and the end? Have you ever heard that discussed?

Captain McCOLLUM. I never saw such an information message.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this: If an implementing message of any kind came from the result of the information contained in Circular 2353 or Circular 2354 wouldn't it be necessary in order that the people receiving it, the Japs receiving that message in this country, would thoroughly understand what it means, to have the names repeated five times and included at the beginning and end?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is, regardless of what message [9189] whether it was based upon 2353 or 2354?

Captain McCOLLUM. I believe, sir, that there are two separate systems; that it could be either this system, 2354, or the system set forth in 2353, sir, not to go in the one message.

Senator LUCAS. You were testifying this morning upon a question that I want to raise. Do you recall that the Navy Department here in Washington at one time did send to Admiral Kimmel some of these intercepts?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know why they discontinued that practice?

Captain McCOLLUM. I do not know that it was ever a practice. When the Japanese fleet would start an aggressive move, when the movement was actually going, there were times when we were unable to keep up with the evaluation process and at that time certain selected things were sent in a special code system breakable only by the Communication Intelligence organization attached to the staff of the admiral and was sent for that purpose and it is my recollection that that series of dispatches along, I believe, in July of 1941 will coincide, sir, very closely with Japanese movements into French Indochina.

Senator LUCAS. Well, as I understood from the previous [9190] testimony, there was a while there that they sent these intercepts direct to Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific.

Captain McCOLLUM. Not all of them by any means, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Who determined what should be sent at that particular time?

Captain McCOLLUM. We had that in my office, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did you get any orders from the higher command to cease and desist sending those messages to Kimmel?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; no such orders, except that there were constant reminders to reduce the sending of these verbatim translations of these dispatches to the ultimate degree, sir, and the matter of the security of the information that we were able to break these codes was continually and repeatedly stressed. Where it was possible to draw an evaluation from this material and to send the substance of that evaluation out in the form of orders to the fleet commander or as an evaluated Intelligence message it was so sent.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, returning to the exhibit that contains the message from Tokyo to Honolulu with respect to getting information and dividing the harbor up into five sectors. You are familiar with that message?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Whose definite responsibility was it to [9191] analyze and evaluate that particular message along with the rest that came in from time to time?

Captain McCOLLUM. That would have been the responsibility of the Intelligence Division and then to pass that information, together with their evaluation, to the Plans Division, who would direct any dissemination to any outfit other than the Plans Division of the Navy Department.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, in your Intelligence Division, who initiated the original analyzation of a message of that kind?

Captain McCOLLUM. My office.

Senator LUCAS. Your what?

Captain McCOLLUM. My office.

Senator LUCAS. Your office?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Your office was responsible for analyzing any message from time to time and then whatever evaluation you placed upon that message you sent it on to Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did Admiral Wilkinson have the experience and inside knowledge of the Intelligence work that you and your staff had?

Captain McCOLLUM. Admiral Wilkinson had not previously served in Intelligence, sir. He is by reputation one of our most brilliant officers. It is my opinion he has a magnificent mind. He accepted my recommendations almost in toto.

One of the reasons that Captain Kramer carried these messages around is that Captain Kramer had served in an analytical capacity in my office, was completely aware of all of the ramifications, and in addition to any written evaluation could in person add a verbal evaluation that might be necessary or send for me in case of necessity, sir.

Senator LUCAS. One other question, Captain. After the so-called pilot winds message was received did you continue to look thereafter for this implementing message that might come in?

Captain McCOLLUM. So far as I am aware, we were continuing to look for that after the bombs had started falling on the fleet, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did Captain Safford ever discuss this question with you at any time after the pilot message came in?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not that I remember, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, was there any particular reason why in view of your position that you held at that time that you should not have received this implementing winds message if such a one had come in?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

[9193] Senator LUCAS. Do you know of any other message of importance whereby you were passed up completely and the Communications officer sent it direct over your head to the higher command?

Captain McCOLLUM. There might have been one or two instances in which they did go directly over my head to the higher command, but in almost every instance I would know about it shortly thereafter, sir.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand, Captain Safford says that he took this message direct to you and handed it to you.

Captain McCOLLUM. I have no recollection of that, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, an important message of that kind certainly would have made an impression upon you?

Captain McCOLLUM. Very definitely, sir. We were all looking for it, Senator; everybody.

Senator LUCAS. You were all looking for it?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you would have remembered it, I take it, if such a message had been brought to you?

Captain McCOLLUM. I feel quite certain I would have, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have an opportunity to look at the message that was prepared by Admiral Turner and finally sent through by Admiral Stark, known as the war warning message? [9194]

Captain McCOLLUM. I first saw that message about the 4th or 5th of December, sir. I saw no messages prepared by Admiral Turner of that nature, either that one or any of the others that preceded it, before they were sent, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you are an officer with a wide range of experience in the Intelligence Department and as such you have had an opportunity from time to time to construe messages of all types and character, have you not?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You had an opportunity to analyze and construe the message that was sent by Admiral Stark on November the 27th to Admiral Kimmel, known as the war warning message?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; I have read it repeatedly lately.

Senator LUCAS. What would that message mean to you if you had been out in the Pacific and had received it?

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, sir, the outstanding part of that message is that it says, "This is a war warning." It does not come in the life of most naval officers to receive or see a message containing such words and my personal feeling is that a message containing the information, "This is a war warning", indicated clearly that the Department expected a war [9195] to break out there at any moment from then on, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, I would like to clear up on point in connection with some questions I asked you this morning, and some just now asked you by Senator Lucas.

With respect to the so-called bomb plot message, was that before you assumed your duties or after?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. I was on duty there, but I left Washington on the 25th of August and I returned to the Navy Department about—I got back to Washington on the 11th of October and I did not really commence to function in my office down here until about the 15th, sir. The 11th I believe was Friday and it was a week end and I had notes and so on to prepare, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, was that bomb plot message received during that interval when you were away?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. It has a note here. It says that it was translated on the 9th of October 1941, sir, so it must have been distributed about that time very closely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was before you resumed your work after you came back?

[9196] Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain McCollum, as I understand it you stated as an explanation of the bomb plot, so called, on page 12 of Exhibit No. 2, the fact that they had no naval men at the consulate in Honolulu and the fact that Pearl Harbor was an unusually complicated condition. Do you know whether or not those two factors were known to others in Naval Intelligence?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think that was the general feeling, sir, of the Intelligence officers who were working there.

Mr. MURPHY. And in your judgment would that have minimized the importance of that rather than have it as an outstanding message that would indicate an air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, as I understand it, you did testify as to page 154 in Exhibit 1. Will you hand that to the Captain, please? Page 154.

Captain McCOLLUM. I have it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, that message, if it were not sent by way of an implementing message to the winds code, if it were sent by the Japanese, what were the people to do who received it?

[9197] Captain McCOLLUM. It says in this message here, "When this is heard, please destroy all code papers," and so forth, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now, the fact is that the Navy did receive messages from Japan through the consulates telling them to destroy the codes?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And the very reason why the winds code, so-called, was set up was that if they did send an implementing message that way, to destroy the codes; isn't that right?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Actually there were messages sent spelling out exactly what to do to destroy the codes, isn't that right?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, after that message was received or, rather, intercepted in Washington, who was it who prepared the messages to CINCPAC by way of information and by way of authority as to code destruction at Guam and also informing CINCPAC that the codes were being destroyed at different points throughout the world by the Japanese?

I direct your attention to your testimony, Captain, along that line at page 21 of the Hewitt testimony. That reads as follows:

Subsequent to this the situation further deteriorated [9198] and I recommended to Admiral Wilkinson and we did send dispatches out to our naval attaches and various naval agencies throughout the Far East directing that they destroy all their codes and ciphers, and so on, and so forth, and to affirmatively report when these had been destroyed. That despatch was sent so that the fleet commanders on the chain going out and coming back would have the information that the order had been issued. Some time after the first, possibly around the fourth, I prepared this.

Now, was it you who prepared that message to the islands to take steps about destroying their particular codes, our own naval codes?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

[9199] Mr. MURPHY. What was it?

Captain McCOLLUM. That would be Captain Safford who prepared that sort of thing, and his division, sir, in our own islands. The instruction that actually had been given was this, sir: The naval attaches, the people whose codes could be seized by the Japanese, were our responsibility. The general destruction of codes in their outlying areas was the responsibility of the communications division. I conferred with Captain Safford, and in view of the fact that it involved codes I asked him to draw up the appropriate thing to send to the naval attaches, so there would be no misunderstanding about which ones they were to destroy.

Mr. MURPHY. Now why was it sent out?

Captain McCOLLUM. He drafted this despatch. I had expected that he would bring it to me. I wished to add something more to

it at the time. In his hurry he did not and got it released directly, which was quite all right with me. I had some discussion with Admiral Wilkinson as to whether we should send another one direct to these fellows to destroy other things in addition to codes.

Mr. MURPHY. What was the purpose of sending the message?

Captain McCOLLUM. The purpose of sending the message was to insure that none of our cryptographic systems should fall into the hands of the enemy should war ensue.

[9200] Mr. MURPHY. And at that time was the reason for sending it the fact that you thought war was imminent?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You have been in Naval Intelligence for a good many years. What is the significance in the Navy of a message stating that an expected enemy is destroying his codes, all the different systems?

Captain McCOLLUM. I would interpret that to mean that the enemy expects to be at war with us in the immediate future, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 359 of the Hart testimony Captain Safford testified:

Q. Was any of the foregoing information, under dates of November and December, 1941, disseminated by the main Washington unit direct to the corresponding unit in the 14th Naval District?

A. (Captain Safford.) No, sir. That was not permitted by a written order then in force.

Was there ever any such order by anybody prohibiting that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever hear of it?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. If there was such an order, don't you think [9201] it should have come to your attention?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 359, to Captain Safford's testimony. Do you have a copy of it available? If not, I will read it to you.

After speaking about the order in question Captain Safford said:

— but there was one exception. On the 3rd of December, I prepared OPNAV Secret Dispatch 031855, which was released by Captain Redman, the Assistant Director of Naval Communications.

Was that the one you spoke of, which he prepared without taking it up with you?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I will go on then—we will come back to that.

A similar dispatch was released by Admiral Wilkinson and filed at 031850. Admiral Wilkinson's message is referred to in the Roberts Report. Before drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked him "Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet", and McCollum replied, "We are doing everything we can to get the news out to the Fleet." McCollum emphasized both "we's". In sending this [9202] information, I was over-stepping the bounds as established by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released.

Do you recall such phone call from Captain Safford?

Captain McCOLLUM. I remember talking to Safford on this subject about that time, sir. The specific things that I said I do not

remember, sir. I drafted the dispatch which ONI sent out about the same time. That starts out, I think, "Categorical and specific instructions herein."

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you remember Safford did call you?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you agree with him, that it was your function and his function to send messages out to the fleet?

Captain McCOLLUM. I felt that messages should have gone to the fleet, sir. The effort was to get it out there. Now you will notice, sir, Safford's message here, or the one that you refer to, is sent in this system to his communication intelligence organizations out there. That would probably be in a code only very closely held by his immediate, you might say, subordinates.

Mr. MURPHY. He speaks in his testimony of sending a message to Hawaii, that only one man in Hawaii would understand [9203] what was in it. Why would it be sent that way? He says the only man at Hawaii who would understand it was Lieutenant Coleman. Do you have a copy of that message, do you know?

Captain McCOLLUM. I do not know, sir, unless he had some private arrangement of wording with Coleman, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring to the Navy liaison officer, to page 359, in which Captain Safford said, at page 360:

OPNAV 031855 was addressed to CINCAF and COMSIXTEEN for action but was routed to CINCPAC and COMFOURTEEN for information. It was written in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, on CINCPAC's staff, could have explained its significance.

I suppose the "late Lieutenant Coleman" means that he is dead, the man who could understand it. There is a message that only a dead man could understand at Hawaii. I wonder if we have somebody here with that message?

Captain McCOLLUM. Mr. Congressman, is that the dispatch which says:

Circular 244. From Tokyo. 1 December. Order London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy machine—

Is that what you are referring to?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know. All it says is "OPNAV 031855 was addressed to CINCAF", and so forth. He says it was in [9204] highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant Coleman, on CINCPAC's staff, could have explained its significance. Is there anything about that that everybody cannot understand?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not that I see, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know why only one person at Hawaii could explain that?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. There might be some minor details in there that might not be entirely clear.

Mr. MURPHY. He says it is highly technical language, that only one officer present at Pearl Harbor could have explained. Surely it was not in that highly technical language so that Admiral Kimmel would not get the significance of it. I mean he did not put much stock in the code-instruction messages.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. I think the entire effort was to try to see that he got the information.

Mr. MURPHY. I would think so.

Now, then, you did testify at page 30 of the Hewitt report as follows:

About the middle of the week 1-7 December, the Federal Communications Commission reported the occurrence of one of the words in a Japanese news broadcast from Tokyo which indicated war with Russia. In studying the message [9205] at the time, it did not appear that this was a bona fide warning in the terms as set forth. It did not appear in the proper sequence and proper number of times in the broadcast, as I remember it, and it was thought at the time that this was a bona fide weather report which happened to use the code word for Russia. I know of no message received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December which indicated that diplomatic relations with the United States would be ruptured.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made, either late afternoon of the 7th, Washington time, or sometime on the 8th, a dispatch was translated which indicated war with England. I think you have got some exhibits on that point there.

That testimony was accurate, was it?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; except for the word "war," sir. That was loose language, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. The language, so far as you understood, was "ruptured in relations," is that right?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now Captain Safford testified at page 362 of the Hart testimony:

The following officers knew by hearsay that the "winds message" has been intercepted but did not actually see it [9206] themselves—

and then he gives the following officers who had some recollection of the winds message, and among them he lists Captain McCollum.

So far as you know, is the one which is referred to in this testimony which I have just read the only winds intercept that you had heard of up to December 7, 1941?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, the particular message that you referred to on page 41, dated December 3, 1941, should have on the second line after "destroy" the word "purple," and on the fourth line after "destroy" the word "purple." That had been left out because at one time there was greater effort being made to protect this code than subsequently.

No other questions.

[9207] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster would be next. He is not here.

Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will now inquire, Captain.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that you testified just recently in your testimony that the message destroying the code meant war between the countries?

Captain McCOLLUM. That would be my interpretation, that it not necessarily meant war, but that they expected war to break out, and it was a step looking to safeguard their systems, to prevent them from being compromised in case war eventuated as expected.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, it did not mean to you immediate war?

Captain McCOLLUM. Pretty close to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, when you sent to our Embassy, military attaché and naval attaché in Tokyo, on the 5th, a message to destroy our codes and code machines, did it mean that we were going to war? You were familiar with the fact that a message was sent to Tokyo to destroy our codes, were you not?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. That message, I believe, [9208] was sent on the 4th.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; on the 4th.

Captain McCOLLUM. It was sent on the 4th with the idea that we felt war might break out any time, sir, and we did not want our codes and other papers compromised, and the safe thing to do in that dangerous situation was to destroy them.

If war did not develop, then we could always replace them, but the situation was so acute that we felt that they had to be destroyed at once.

Senator FERGUSON. So you anticipated war immediately?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, on the 27th of November anticipate war immediately, and if you did, why did you not send messages to destroy our codes on the 27th?

Captain McCOLLUM. It was merely a matter of how you judged it at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in the Intelligence Branch?

Captain McCOLLUM. I judged that it was time to send the message on the 4th, Senator, and that is all I can say now, sir.

Why I did not do it on the 27th or why I did not wait until the 5th, sir, I am sorry I cannot reconstruct, but on the 4th, I was convinced that the situation was so acute that [9209] we might have war at once.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was there a change sometime between the 27th of November and the 4th of December which brought you to the conclusion, as the head of the Intelligence Branch, that war was imminent on the 4th, and was not so imminent on the 27th?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; I think so, sir. We had watched the Japanese task force moving, and up until about the 4th their exact intentions were presumed. They became much clearer after the 4th.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there was in the War Department, as I understand, owing to the coordination between the War and Navy Departments, there was a message from General Short to the Commander in Chief, or to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, that he was only alerted to sabotage.

Now, that being true, and you being in charge of the Intelligence Branch, and having access to it all, don't you think that some other steps should have been taken on the 4th?

Captain McCOLLUM. I did not see the message from General Short, Senator. I am not sure that it was well known all around, sir—that is, to me, anyway.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact, if there was coordination between the two branches of [9210] Intelligence, that it did not reach you as to how they were alerted?

Captain McCOLLUM. I cannot account for it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you let me see, Counsel, the message that was sent on the 5th, and finally sent on the 7th to Panama?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield just to make a request?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. While Counsel are looking for the message from General Miles to Panama, I would like to have the Army produce another message sent from Miles to Honolulu, from G-2 in Washington to G-2 in Honolulu.

Senator LUCAS. What date?

Mr. MURPHY. It was sent subsequent to November 27, in which it speaks of being alerted against sabotage, and in addition to sabotage, it expected hostilities to ensue.¹

Senator FERGUSON. I will come back to that a little later, as soon as we get that message.

You testified before how many boards, or commissions?

Captain McCOLLUM. Only one before this one, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was before the Hewitt Board?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

[9211] Senator FERGUSON. They have found this Miles message now, so I will go back to that.

Did you know that a message, about on the 27th or a day later, similar to the one that was sent to General Short, to be distributed to Admiral Kimmel, had been sent to Panama?

Captain McCOLLUM. I do not remember precisely, Senator. I may have known it.

Senator FERGUSON. If war was much nearer, and I assume it was from your answers, on the 4th than it was on the 27th, how would you account for this message, being dated the 5th, not marked "priority" and on its face showing it was sent on the 7th to the Panama Canal Department, which states:

U. S.-Japanese relations strained stop Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

"Signed MILES."

Captain McCOLLUM. General Miles, as Director of Military Intelligence, was privileged to make his own evaluation, sir, and that presumably reflects his views.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know anything in the two Intelligence branches that would warrant such a change of heart, or change of message?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. I might add, Senator, that [9212] the head of the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelligence Service was Colonel Bratton at the time. I had known Colonel Bratton and worked with him since 1923.

There were not only the closest possible official relations between us, but we have also maintained exceedingly close personal relations.

Every effort was made by me to see that my views were explained in detail to Colonel Bratton, and I am satisfied that that was reciprocated in full, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in a different department than Captain Safford? He was in Communications, and you were in Intelligence?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He would get the winds message if it came prior to the time it would come to you?

¹ Included in Exhibit No. 32.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know of any slip-up, any failure to deliver to one and not to another in the Navy?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. Those things are human, sir. Slips are bound to occur. I have known of slips, sir. I do not recollect any important slips in this respect, on this particular magic stuff, sir. It was guarded very closely, with check-up systems all the way [9213] through, sir, both up and down.

Senator FERGUSON. How did they check whether a man got the message or not?

Captain McCOLLUM. It was delivered in person to that man, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But what if a man failed to make delivery, there was not any check-up, was there? What if Kramer happened to miss one, was there any way of checking it?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; not any mechanical way, or to say that Kramer had failed to show it to Admiral Stark or something like that.

Senator FERGUSON. Not failed, but just made a mistake?

Captain McCOLLUM. Had overlooked doing it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to know whether you can explain how Admiral Ingersoll could see the winds message, and he being in the Navy and on the list just the same as you, if he did see it. I am going to read you his testimony. This is question No. 69 before the Hart board.

[9214] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Which record, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. The Hart record. It is question No. 68:

Question. During November or December 1941, were you cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements by means of a partial weather report?

Answer. Yes, I do recall such a message.

Would you take that to be an answer that that was the original setting up of a code of east wind, west wind, and south wind?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now the next question, No. 69.

Question. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4th of December, the broadcast directive thus given indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?

Now that question would ask for an implementing message, would it not?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is the way it would appear, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way it would appear?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the answer is "yes."

[9215] To show that he had that in mind I would read question No. 70 and the answer:

Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the commander in chief, Pacific?

Answer. I do not know, except it was probably supposed that the intercept station in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regards to the destruction of the Japanese codes that had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent.

Those would be two logical answers, would they not?

Captain McCOLLUM. Those would be logical answers.

Senator FERGUSON. One was that we thought here in Washington that Hawaii knew about it because they had a code machine and they had the means of getting it, and the other was, as you have testified and indicated, as I understand it, in your testimony, that the destruction of the codes and code machines meant the same thing. Is that correct.

Captain McCOLLUM. Not from the Japanese point of view, sir, that is our order for code destruction. We would then draw the inference that the Japanese would start war, but the Japanese had not affirmatively used that code, sir.

[9216] Senator FERGUSON. And that gives the same date and it is indicated by some at least that the code was in.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any way of accounting for the fact that Ingersoll, who was Deputy to Admiral Stark, saw the code, the winds code, the implementing message and you do not recall seeing it, and you did not see it, you say?

Captain McCOLLUM. I am quite certain if there was such a message, sir, that I would have seen it. It is my suggestion at this time that Admiral Ingersoll might have been referring to the false message relating to Russia, which I believe he was called up in the middle of the night about, and in his testimony confused that with the one that was the real implementation, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But he said here it was the third or fourth, and he said the United States and Great Britain. When did the one with Russia come in?

Captain McCOLLUM. About the same time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that as important a thing as that was, that you could get confused on war with Russia instead of war with the United States?

Captain McCOLLUM. Knowing Admiral Ingersoll, sir, I believe he would have taken positive steps had it been the definite one that called for war with the United States, or [9217] called for rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States, sir. The very fact he did not do so would indicate that his testimony there is based on memory, which did not serve him too well, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now reading from the Navy testimony, so that we get all of this, on page 825, the fortieth question is—I better read the question before, question No. 39:

On or prior to the 7th of December did you receive any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the so-called winds message?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you state the circumstances?

A. I recall that sometime I did see the messages which were supposed to put the winds message translated on the 28th into effect. I do not recall whether I saw that prior to December 7 or afterward. If I saw that prior to December 7 I am quite sure that that would have been considered confirmation of the information which had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet on December 3 or 4 regarding the destruction of the codes at London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

Whether he saw it before or after, it would indicate [9218] that the message had come in, would it?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; not afterward, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Captain McCOLLUM. The message did come in afterward, sir. The war with England, or rupture of diplomatic relations with England, we received on the 8th, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. And with the United States?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But he was specific that he saw a message showing a break, the war break or diplomatic break between the United States and Japan, and Britain and Japan.

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, Senator, all I can say is I saw no such dispatch, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 204 of Exhibit 1 there is a message from Tokyo to Berlin, November 30, 1941, in three parts, that indicates part 1 of 3. It is:

Re my circular #2387.

Have you got that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to ask you whether you noticed, when you got that message, that you did not get part 2, whether you recall that. Have you read those?

Captain McCOLLUM. Those are the messages, Senator, starting towards the top of page 204 and running over to [9219] page 205, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, No. 985, and No. 985 at the bottom of the page.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; I saw those, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When those came through your hands did you notice that part 2 was not there?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not that a very significant thing?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; not necessarily, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not necessarily?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. Part 2 might have been received.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us read the last sentence of part 1 and the first sentence of part 3:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was talking to Von Ribbontrop and Hitler?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

[9220] Senator FERGUSON. Part 3, but missing part 2, reads:

If when you tell them this, the German and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July.

Does not that indicate that there is a missing part also?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; there is a missing part.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a missing number?

Captain McCOLLUM. There is a missing number here.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you get in touch with the British to see whether or not they got that No. 2?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. That exchange was run between the Communications and Intelligence Service, as to the check-up of these things, sir; not by me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you miss it at the time? Do you remember this?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, we frequently would pick up one part of a dispatch. In other words, this was one transmission and then the other part would be sent in another transmission, and not infrequently you would pick up one part sent as one transmission and not get the other part sent as another transmission, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We had the same kind of station in [9221] the Philippines that we had in Washington, to get the secret messages?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not precisely the same, sir, but they were merely technical differences. They were substantially the same, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you ever took it up, to try to find this second part?

Captain McCOLLUM. There was a regular exchange between all of the stations and Washington, and vice versa, sir. Everything that we got, they had a system of checking up on, to see whether they got it, and possibly they did have the fill-in, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we should find some message if we inquire from the Philippines about this second part, should we not?

Captain McCOLLUM. They can check through the numbers to see whether they have it or not; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The Army has No. 2, and we are going to get it.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Murphy—

Mr. MURPHY. The Army has been working on it. They reported it to us.

[9222] Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Murphy, Senator Ferguson asked for that second part, as I recall it, and we have delivered to him certificates by both the Army and Navy—I think I am correct—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. To the effect that they have no record in either department of this part 2 ever having been received.

Mr. MURPHY. That is before you had the material from Tokyo. They have the movies down there now, and they are transcribing those messages.

Mr. MASTEN. That may be, but the point is it had not been received prior to December 7, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. I know, but this business I am talking about will be available from the movies.

Mr. MASTEN. If it is in the reels. I think it would be well to read into the record at this point the two certificates that Mr. Ferguson has that were received from the Army and Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have that?

Mr. MASTEN. We will get them and give them to the reporter.

Senator FERGUSON. Put them in at this place.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted in the record at this point. Please supply them to the reporter.

[9223] (The matter referred to follows:)

JANUARY 7, 1946.

Memorandum for Senator Ferguson:

With reference to your request for additional information regarding the Japanese intercepts appearing on pages 195 and 204 of exhibit 1, I enclose copies of memoranda received from Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe and Lt. Comdr. Baecher in this connection.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Room 4D757, The Pentagon

28 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

1. SIS No. 25445 (p. 195 Exhibit 1) was intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, Washington, at 1149 GMT, 28 November 1941 (6:49 a. m., 28 November, Washington time). No information has been found in the records concerning the time the message was received by the Navy from Station S, or by Army SIS from the Navy.

2. A thorough search of the Signal Intelligence Service records discloses no evidence that Part 2 of Tokyo-to-Berlin [9224] message No. 985 (Parts 1 and 8 of which appear on p. 204 of Exhibit 1) was ever intercepted.

(Sgd) Harmon Duncombe,
BB

HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 5 January 1946.

1083A

R#94

Memorandum

To: Mr. William D. Mitchell

1. Mr. John Masten of your staff in a telephone conversation on 28 December 1945, requested that the Navy Department institute a search to ascertain whether there existed in the records of the Navy Department part 2 of the Japanese intercept, identified as Message 985 from Tokyo to Berlin and contained in Exhibit #1 at page 204.

2. You are informed that after an extensive search of pertinent files in the Navy Department and Archives, it has been determined that part 2 of Message 985 is not contained in the files and there is no evidence that part 2 [9225] of Message 985 was ever intercepted and decoded.

(Sgd) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lieut. Comdr. USNR.
JANUARY 22, 1946.

Memorandum for Senator Ferguson

With reference to your further request of January 8, 1946, regarding Part 2 of Message 985 appearing at page 204 of Exhibit 1, I enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum dated January 16, 1946, from Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe, together with a copy of the certificate enclosed therewith.

It is our understanding that all of the information regarding receipt of this message would be found in the Signal Intelligence Service records and that further inquiry of the radio stations would not throw any further light on the matter.

We have forwarded a copy of your request to the Navy Department and will advise you of their reply.

SETH W. RICHARDSON.

SWR:MBB
encs.

3424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[9226]

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Room 4D761, The Pentagon

16 JANUARY 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Pursuant to Senator Ferguson's request, there is inclosed a certificate relating to Tokyo-to-Berlin Message No. 985 (Parts 1 and 3 of which are printed at page 204 of Committee Exhibit No. 1).

HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

Incl.

16 JANUARY 1946.

I, Harold G. Hayes, Colonel, Signal Corps, hereby certify:

(1) That the Signal Intelligence Service records, which are now in my custody, disclose the following information on Parts 1 and 3 of Tokyo-to-Berlin message No. 985 (which are printed at Page 204 of Committee Exhibit 1):

Intercepted by Navy Radio:

	Part 1	Part 3
Coded text received by-----	10:06 A. M.	10.06 A. M.
Army SIS from Navy-----	1 Dec	1 Dec
[9227] Decoded by Army SIS-----	305 P. M.	3:59 P. M.
	1 Dec	1 Dec
Translated by Army SIS-----	1 Dec	1 Dec

(2) That a thorough search of the Signal Intelligence Service records discloses no evidence that Part 2 of the message was ever intercepted.

HAROLD G. HAYES,
Colonel, Signal Corps.

Senator FERGUSON. To complete the record on the question of Admiral Ingersoll on this subject, I would like to insert another question and another answer.

Would counsel have any objection to that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Question No. 41. I did not read far enough back. I want to put this in:

Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941, any action was taken in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, as the result of the information contained in this execution of the winds code, which you state you saw?

As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or before or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7.

[9228] If it was after December 7 there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

That would be speaking about the United States, would it not? Talking about our fleet?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is what he is talking about, I judge, sir.

[9229] Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you testified before the Hewitt Board—I want to go over some of your testimony there with relation to that. You were asked the question and made this answer—

Mr. MURPHY. What page?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not have it here. You will probably be able to find it. It is about in the center of his testimony:

That was the night of the 6th and 7th?

Yes, sir. By late Saturday night we had, if I remember correctly, 13 of the parts.

You are referring there to the 14-part message?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is the final Japanese note; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other occasions where you ever delivered any intercept to the White House at night?

Captain McCOLLUM. I did not make the deliveries, sir. Those deliveries were made by Captain Kramer, and I believe there were occasions when they were delivered to the naval aide to the President at night.

[9230] Senator FERGUSON. At night?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of those occasions? What they were?

Captain McCOLLUM. I do not specifically at this distance, sir, but it was common practice to make those deliveries at night, and report things to the people that had to know, including the Director of Intelligence, Chief of Operations, Director of War Plans, and the naval aide to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what the hours of the naval aide were at the White House?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Admiral Beardall, who was the regular naval aide, was at the White House on the night of the 6th?

Captain McCOLLUM. I understand he was at dinner with Admiral Wilkinson on that night.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, there would be an assistant, would there not, to the aide?

Captain McCOLLUM. It would be delivered at the homes of these people wherever they were in town.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the copy for the President was delivered to Admiral Beardall . [9231] at Admiral Wilkinson's home?

Captain McCOLLUM. It is my understanding that he saw it at Admiral Wilkinson's home on the night of the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand then that if the aide of the President read the message that that was all that was required? It didn't go to the President personally?

Captain McCOLLUM. That the aide would take it to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I wanted to know, whether or not you have any knowledge of whether the aide took the message to the President; that is, Admiral Beardall when he saw it at Admiral Wilkinson's home, whether he took it that night to the President?

Captain McCOLLUM. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. My understanding of the testimony is that it will clearly show that Captain Kramer delivered this message to the White House and left it with the under aide, if you may call him such, to Admiral Beardall, Admiral Beardall not being present, and when he got to Admiral Wilkinson's home he found Admiral Beardall there along with General Miles. It was actually delivered to the White House that night. [9232]

Captain McCOLLUM. Thank you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that the aide on duty that night will be able to explain that it was delivered that night. I think his name is Schultz.

Now, going on with your testimony:

They were transmitted, almost as soon as received, to the Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to people over here in the War Department.

Would you say that that was a correct statement?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time you went home on the evening of the 6th?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. Sometime between 9 and 10 o'clock, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the 13 parts were in when you went home?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not all of them?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many were in?

Captain McCOLLUM. I don't remember exactly how many. Probably six or seven.

[9233] Senator FERGUSON. Had you left any instructions?

Captain McCOLLUM. They called me when they were all in, and told me they had been delivered to the correct people. Both Kramer and Watts called me probably between 11 and 12 that night.

Senator FERGUSON. Between 11 and 12 you received the call showing they were all in and delivered?

Captain McCOLLUM. Thirteen parts, and they were looking for the 14th.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, on the day of the 6th, your office was fully alerted to the seriousness of this whole situation?

Captain McCOLLUM. We thought so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you know whether the Army was fully alerted to the seriousness of the situation?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was my impression, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next part of your testimony—have you found it?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I find it, but I find there are two errors in the rest of his sentence. He says the White House, but he also says it went to Admiral Stark, but it didn't, as I understand it. At the top of page 33.

[9234] Senator FERGUSON. Let me have it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If I may interject, I think you have to remember that this witness's testimony on delivery is purely hearsay.

Mr. MURPHY. Of course it is.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Of course he cannot be held accountable for whether it was delivered to Stark or not.

Senator FERGUSON. I read it just as it is.

Mr. MURPHY. You said it went to the White House but you didn't read the rest to show it went to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to the War Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I have the identical language.

Mr. MURPHY. You read the whole sentence? All right.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read it from the original.

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure. I don't want to say that you misread it.

Senator FERGUSON. We don't want to misquote the witness.

Captain McCOLLUM. That was the night of the 6th-7th yes, sir. By late Saturday night, we had, if I remember correctly, 13 of the parts. They were transmitted almost as soon as received, to the Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to the people over here in the War Department.

[9235] And your reason for making that answer, as I understand it, was you got a call from Kramer and Watts?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Between 11 and 12 o'clock that night, that they had done that very thing?

Captain McCOLLUM. That they had made the proper deliveries. They did not go into detail, and that is possibly wrong in detail as brought out later.

I have only reported that it had been delivered to the proper people.

Senator FERGUSON. Among the proper people, was the Secretary of State, the President, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the War Department?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. My only reason in raising it was that I didn't want to have the captain up here to be saying that he knew of his own knowledge that it went to Admiral Stark because all the testimony is that it didn't, as I understand it.

Captain McCOLLUM. As counsel said, what I am giving is hearsay, and it is based on reports. It is my impression at the time. It is undoubtedly wrong in minor detail.

[9236] Senator FERGUSON. But it was an official report from one of the men working with you or under you?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you explained what kind of hearsay it was?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Going on with your answer:

Early Sunday morning, when I arrived to take over the duty in my office, where we had a special watch set up since early November, the 14th part was coming in; and while Admiral Wilkinson and I were discussing the situation about nine o'clock Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30 with Admiral Stark—

You recall that testimony?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Captain McCOLLUM. The times may be off, Senator, as I explained before. In other words, my basis of judging time is the time that I arrived at the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was your best judgment when you gave this testimony?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON.

—the instruction which directed the delivery of the note to the Secretary of State, was brought in, shown [9237] to Admiral Stark, who immediately called the White House on the telephone, and the draft was taken over to the Secretary of State and to the White House.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that testimony?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now:

At the time, the possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all hands.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us who "all hands" were?

Captain McCOLLUM. Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and possibly Captain Schuirmann, who I think was in Admiral Stark's office at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next question is by Admiral Hewitt:

You are referring to the one p. m. delivery time?

And you answered:

Yes, sir. In other words, it was pointed out that one p. m. Washington time would mean about 8 o'clock in the morning Honolulu time.

Admiral HEWITT. 7:30.

Captain McCOLLUM. 7:30, yes, sir—

You remember that?

[9238] Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Going on with your answer after the words "7:30, yes, sir":

And very early in the morning out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places; and that we didn't know what this signified, but that if an attack were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time. We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the Ambassadors—

There is where you were referring to an intercepted note?

Captain McCOLLUM. No; still time of delivery, 1 o'clock.

[9239] Senator FERGUSON. But it had been in a message that we intercepted to the Jap Ambassadors?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Reading on:

we felt that there were important things which would move at that time, and that was pointed out not only to Admiral Stark, but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State.

Captain McCOLLUM. I will have to amend my former testimony on that latter point. I do not know of that of my own knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did somebody tell you?

Captain McCOLLUM. Kramer went over with instructions to point out the time business to the Secretary, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So officially Kramer was told?

Captain McCOLLUM. I told him.

Senator FERGUSON. Or ordered to tell and point this out to the Secretary of State?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reason you have put in "but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State"?

Captain McCOLLUM. I should not have said it in that categorical language because I do not know that of my own knowledge.

[9240] Senator FERGUSON. But you had every reason to believe that because you instructed Kramer to do it?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

I was present and assisted in pointing it out to Admiral Stark and it was taken over, with instructions to point that out, to the Secretary of State.

So you do explain it.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

I was not present at that. I do not know. I would add, however, that the Secretary of State was not available at the time that the Japanese Ambassadors desired to deliver their note, and it is my recollection in the discussion at the time with the Chief of Naval Operations—

That is Admiral Stark, is it not?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

and his admirals in there that that was a deliberate move on our part.

Captain McCOLLUM. That was my impression at that time, sir; it may have been wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. You had a discussion with Admiral Stark and his admirals that he had deliberately moved so that [9241] the Secretary of State would not be present at 1 o'clock for the delivery?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was the impression I was under, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. From the conversation that took place?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, to go on:

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember who it was delivered the message to the Secretary of State and the White House?

He is talking there about the fourteenth part, is he not, and the 1 o'clock message?

Captain McCOLLUM. I am not sure which.

Senator FERGUSON. I will go on:

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I do not, but it was probably Lieutenant Commander, now Captain, Kramer. I can't say that for sure because some of these things Admiral Turner himself would run over to see the Secretary, or Captain Schuirmann would run over. The normal routine would have been for Kramer to have delivered it.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would be talking about the fourteenth part and the 1 o'clock message?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall who was present when—

[9242] Captain McCOLLUM. Yes. May I elaborate a little?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Captain McCOLLUM. By mid-November the situation in the Far East had appeared so acute that in addition to the usual duty watches in the Division of Naval Intelligence, one of the three regular officers assigned to the Far East Section—that is, Commander Watts, Colonel Boone and myself—was constantly on duty in our offices, with adequate office help, on a 24-hour basis.

Do you recall that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is accurate?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I just have it in the back of my head that there is some testimony that for sometime before the 7th, there was a division between the Army and Navy where the Army was to cover the State Department and the Navy the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct, but it was changed. There was a change made.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean the Navy then covered both of them?

[9243] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. As I understand, that is correct. Isn't it, Captain?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. Normally the Navy covered the White House, and the War Department covered the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Captain McCOLLUM. This dispatch was considered so important that rather than wait for it to go to the War Department to be picked up by Colonel Bratton, and taken over to the State Department, we cut short and delivered direct telling Colonel Bratton what we had done.

Mr. MURPHY. That explains it.

Senator FERGUSON. So this was an unusual situation and you were making delivery to the State Department even though that was the Army's job?

Captain McCOLLUM. It was a situation that we believe required the quickest possible delivery and the quickest possible was for us to deliver rather than pass it on to the Army and then have them pass it further, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the danger wasn't in Washington. There wasn't danger in Washington because of which you were delivering this message out of the ordinary rules to the Secretary of State. The danger was on our fronts, was it not, and our outposts?

[9244] Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. You mean the danger of actual physical damage?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you say anything about getting it to them where the danger was?

Captain McCOLLUM. Senator, I have already said that that suggestion was definitely made, that a dispatch be sent to the fleet pointing out that something could be expected to happen at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. That was before it was sent to the State Department?

Captain McCOLLUM. About that same time, sir. We continued to discuss this thing. Whether it was before or immediately after, I can't say at this time, sir. But the situation was very definitely discussed and in my recollection Admiral Stark made an effort to get in touch with General Marshall by the telephone and couldn't.

Now, I can't say who he tried to get in touch with. That is my impression at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you finished?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Going on:

I arrived at the Navy Department about 7:30 or a quarter [9245] of 8, December 7—

What was your regular time to get there? Did you have a watch on certain hours?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. That was the normal time to shift the watch, quarter to 8. That left the other fellow time to get home for breakfast.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

—to take over the watch from Commander Watts. Shortly after my arrival in the Navy Department, Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Intelligence, arrived and sent for me and we had a discussion concerning the situation in the Far East.

Do you recall that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About how long had you been on your post that morning until Wilkinson called you, or came in—sent for you?

Captain McCOLLUM. It is hard to estimate the time, Senator, but I hadn't completed reading carefully the 13 parts of the dispatch note at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Hadn't you had the night before to read it?

Captain McCOLLUM. I had had part of it. Not all of it.

Senator FERGUSON. They didn't then deliver it to you [9246] the night before?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But they talked to you on the telephone?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

After 15 or 20 minutes of the discussion, we received word that Admiral Stark had arrived in the Navy Department and both Admiral Wilkinson and myself went down to talk to Admiral Stark.

Do you recall that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

At that time he was alone. While were in there discussing the situation with Admiral Stark, various officers of the Division of Operations came into the office. I believe Admiral Ingersoll was present, Admiral Brainard, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Turner, and possibly Captain Schuirman. There may have been others; I don't know. Certainly Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll were present. Whether they were present all the time, I do not know. There was considerable going in and out at that time.

Admiral Turner was head of the War Plans?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

[9247] Senator FERGUSON. Under the rule that had been laid down, he received the messages in the raw and did not get your interpretation of them?

Captain McCOLLUM. He got both. He received them in the raw, and I was careful to give him my interpretation of it. That was my duty.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you were doing there that morning on the 7th, giving these men your interpretation, as head of the Intelligence?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were carrying out your function at that time.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, continuing:

About 9 o'clock, or a little earlier, I received word from the outside room that one of my officers wished to see me urgently, and I stepped outside and received the last part of the message, concerning the final note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese Ambassadors.

That would be the fourteenth part that you received while you were discussing the 13 parts?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, that would seem to be so. I am not certain from what you have read, whether that is the fourteenth part, or whether I am referring now to the time [9248] there, sir.

Possibly reading further will clear that up.

Senator FERGUSON. I will go on.

Admiral HEWITT. The last part of the long message?

Captain McCOLLUM. The long message, and the dispatch directing its presentation on the Secretary of State at one o'clock, Washington time.

So there were both?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was my recollection at the time, sir. I had not had opportunity to read over very much. I would like to amend that to this degree:

I think that the times that I gave there are erroneous. They are probably off by as much as an hour there, sir. The fourteenth part came in separately and was brought up by Admiral Wilkinson and myself to Admiral Stark after we had talked to him about the 13 parts. While we were discussing the fourteenth part, and its language, then this word came in that an officer wanted to see me outside. It was Kramer with the time-delivery dispatch, which was separate from the other dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. But the fourteenth part was in English, this message all came in in English, didn't it?

Captain McCOLLUM. That I don't know. It may have; I don't know.

[9249] Senator FERGUSON. Didn't we have both the cipher and the code so that we could read this 14-part message?

Captain McCOLLUM. Apparently so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that made it quite easy to read, if we had both the cipher and the code?

Captain McCOLLUM. I don't know about that aspect. I would like to answer that question, but I am simply not technically qualified to answer it. I don't know those technical details.

Mr. MURPHY. Don't we have an exhibit showing exactly that? I mean showing what the times were, and when they got each one. Isn't it in evidence?

Senator FERGUSON. We have.

Mr. MURPHY. It might help in your examination.

Senator FERGUSON. I may not have read all of your answer. I will go back:

Captain McCOLLUM. The long message, and the dispatch directing its presentation on the Secretary of State at one o'clock Washington time. I held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance at the

time, and he it was who pointed out the time at Honolulu at 7:30 and in the Far East as dawn, and so on.

Admiral HEWITT. Before dawn. Wouldn't that be before dawn?

[9250] Captain McCOLLUM. Before dawn, yes, sir. That would be about 2 o'clock in the morning out there.

So, you corrected yourself there, did you not?

Captain McCOLLUM. You have to take those time zones and add them up. It is difficult to add under discussion, and I may be erroneous in the addition. But they can be added out.

Senator FERGUSON. I read on.

I took that in to Admiral Stark and pointed out the possible significance of the time in conjunction with the note, and it was also pointed out to other officers of the Division of Operations who were present at the time.

The Division of Operations was War Plans, was it not?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. The Division of Operations consisted of the staff, you might say, of the Chief of Naval Operations. War Plans was one of the divisions of Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were you talking about when you said the "officers of the Division of Operations"?

Captain McCOLLUM. I was talking about War Plans, Intelligence, Communications, Ship Movements, the Central Division, and so on, sir.

[9251] Senator FERGUSON. Then, going on:

Admiral Stark talked over the telephone, I think, with the Chief of Staff of the Army, who presently came over with Colonel Bratton.

Now, you testified there that General Marshall came over with Colonel Bratton. Is that correct?

Captain McCOLLUM. I testified to that effect, but I am in error on that, Senator. I did not have the privilege of reading over the testimony that I gave before Admiral Hewitt, and amend it at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, how could you be mistaken on such an important thing as the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, coming over with Bratton?

Captain McCOLLUM. He was over that afternoon, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't catch your answer.

Captain McCOLLUM. I say, the general was over in Admiral Stark's office that afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were talking about the morning.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir, and I was confused when I gave that testimony as to time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, you said:

I was not there the whole time, and later on I came in and by ten o'clock that morning we were given to [9252] understand that a warning message had been sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, via Army channels.

Captain McCOLLUM. As I told you, sir, the time is off. I believe that that message was sent out sometime between 11 and noon, sir.

The only basis on which I have discussed the time was the time I got there first in the morning. I was extremely busy, as I am sure you will understand, in moving in and out, and those statements I made at the time are probably not accurate.

[9253] Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you were an hour off, it would only be 11 o'clock. You said "by 10 o'clock."

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

In other words, the warning was to go to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with instructions to transmit it to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that the Navy did not consider this any more important than to send it to the Army and then have them look up the commander in chief in the Pacific and give him a copy of it? Is that how you treated it?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was not my decision, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose decision was that?

Captain McCOLLUM. That decision was made by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral Hewitt said:

Now, go back to the winds code message—

and then he changes the subject so we are no longer on that subject. Is that correct?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Will you yield, Senator, so that I may [9254] ask him a question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; certainly.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask you, Captain, when it was you gave the testimony that Senator Ferguson has been reading from?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was in May of this year, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Last year, you mean.

Captain McCOLLUM. Or last year; I beg your pardon. May of 1945, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Is that the first time you testified?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. I might add, by way of explanation, sir, that unfortunately every time they would get ready to hold one of these previous inquiries we would be in the midst of an operation against the Japs at the time, and my admiral asked that I not appear at that time, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you discuss this matter with anyone from December 7 on to the time that Admiral Hewitt took your testimony?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not in detail, Senator. I may have discussed it with various people shortly after that time here in Washington and around that I saw, but certainly not since October or November of 1942, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you were giving your best recollection at the time with respect to dates and times, and so forth and so on?

[9255] Captain McCOLLUM. That is right; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you state in your testimony or before that it was a fact that you had made an analysis of the situation in the Pacific and that you and Wilkinson—that is, Admiral Wilkinson—had a discussion with Admiral Stark and urged a warning be sent to the fleet? That was around about December the 1st.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the one you described this morning?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us what the nature of the warning is that you wanted sent about the 1st of December?

Captain McCOLLUM. The situation, Senator, was this—that this information, not only from this source but from all other information sources we had, was coming in, was being sent to the War Plans Division with evaluation as to the credibility of the information as it came in. I had several discussions with Admiral Turner, as we always did during the days going on, and by 1 December I had personally not seen anything going out to anybody warning people outside that there was danger.

[9256] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that we had sent a message or delivered a message to Japan from the Secretary of State on the 26th?

Captain McCOLLUM. Most of my information as to what we had delivered to the Japanese, sir, came from my reading of the intercepts of the outgoing Japanese dispatches.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that was a fact?

Captain McCOLLUM. I knew it from reading the break-down—I am not certain on that point, sir. I probably knew it from reading the decode of the outgoing dispatch here from the Japanese Ambassador.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, the State Department did not convey that to you?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not to me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were trying to evaluate what you had without knowing what the State Department was doing on December the 1st, when you had this conversation with Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at that time about the message of the dead line of the 25th and then being shifted to the 29th?

Captain McCOLLUM. Those were Japanese dispatches. Yes, sir; I saw that.

[9257] Senator FERGUSON. Were those significant to you?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It has been discussed here in other testimony about your drafting a long message. Was that the one of December the 1st?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. I drafted no message on December the 1st. There is a memorandum that I drafted here on December the 1st, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that the one that you discussed with Admiral Stark?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you draft a long—it is described as a long message?

Captain McCOLLUM. About the middle of the week of 1 to 7 December I drafted a dispatch which contained certain items of information, drawing deductions from it, which covered about, I should say, a half of a page of this size. That would be a normal dispatch blank.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you give us the—you said this morning that that is not existent; that it has been destroyed.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; that type of thing, Senator, would be purely indicative of my recommendations and to be submitted in

final form to my chiefs, who normally, if they [9258] did not elect to send it out, would destroy it, and there would be no record of it anywhere, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, that would require us to try to get from you as nearly as possible the contents of that instrument. Would you give it to us?

Captain McCOLLUM. It has been a long time ago, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that.

Captain McCOLLUM. I don't know that I can give it with any exactitude at all, sir. The message, I believe, Senator—all the major points contained in this memorandum of mine of the 1st of December were secured out of bits of what I considered to be significant information and drew from that the conclusion that the Japanese were definitely bent on war and that we could expect the opening of hostilities almost at any time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, hostilities against us?

Captain McCOLLUM. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Hostilities against America?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised when the Japanese attacked on Sunday morning at Hawaii?

Captain McCOLLUM. I was not surprised at the Japanese attack, sir. I was astonished at the success attained by that attack, sir.

[9259] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, there is a difference between that and the question I asked you. Were you surprised that we were attacked at Hawaii on Sunday morning?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not?

Captain McCOLLUM. I do not mean by that statement to imply that I had any knowledge that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor, and I wish to state categorically that there was no bit of intelligence that I had at my disposal that definitely to my mind indicated that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor, but I had—

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the—

The CHAIRMAN. Let him finish that answer.

Mr. MURPHY. This is important. He was right in the midst of a sentence.

Senator FERGUSON. I will let him complete it. Read the last part of it.

Mr. MURPHY. He said, "But I had"—and then you interrupted him.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read his answer so that he gets the exact point? I don't want to cut him off.

(Answer read.)

Captain McCOLLUM (continuing). For many years felt that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between the [9260] United States and Japan that the Japanese would make a very definite attempt to strike the fleet at or near the commencement time of those hostilities.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not any of the messages in Exhibit 2 give you information that they would strike, or intended to strike, at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not to my mind, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you knew that war was very imminent in the middle of the week. You expected an attack, and you were not surprised at the attack, and you thought that they would attack our fleet wherever it was.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why were you surprised that they attacked Pearl Harbor? Didn't you have information that they would attack Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. I did not know that the fleet was in Pearl Harbor exactly, sir. I knew that they were operating in that area, but I presumed that the attack would be made on the fleet wherever it was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that if you would have known that the fleet was in Pearl Harbor, at least six battleships, eight battleships and, outside of the task forces, were sitting like ducks in Pearl Harbor, you would have anticipated an attack upon that fleet in Pearl Harbor?

[9261] Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. If it had been in San Pedro I would have anticipated the attack there, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. So that it was because you did not know where the fleet was that you made this explanation?

Captain McCOLLUM. I do not quite follow you.

Senator FERGUSON. You made an explanation after your answer that you were not surprised. Then you made an explanation. Do you remember that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was because you did not know where the fleet was that you made that explanation?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. I meant to make the explanation to try to make it clear that at no time did I predict a definite Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, nor was there any intelligence at my disposal that I considered conclusively showed that the Japanese intended to attack Pearl Harbor. I felt that the fact that the Japanese intended to go to war carried with it the possibility of an attack on the fleet wherever it might be, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now of course, in Intelligence you do do not always deal upon absolute certainties, do you?

Captain McCOLLUM. As near as possible, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but you have to evaluate certain [9262] things to determine what you anticipate from the enemy?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is a matter of estimate, is it not?

Captain McCOLLUM. Judgment; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And that you talked to Admiral Stark and showed him the significance of the 9 o'clock message being 7:30 at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that you did then and there—

Captain McCOLLUM. That was not a significant time, Senator, at Pearl Harbor. I have explained that it was standard practice for use to check up times at the major points that we had throughout the Pacific so that we could get a clear view of what the daylight and dark status, and so on, was at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was your estimate that a message should go to the Admiral of the Fleet no matter where it was; that is what you were figuring on?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And to go immediately because you expected something to happen at 1 o'clock.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that message that you drew up, that [9263] you indicated was about a half a page—that is just for description—did it have any so-called orders in it?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or was it only information?

Captain McCOLLUM. It was information and conclusions drawn therefrom, sir. In other words, it was a broad-gaged estimate of the intent of the Japanese, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the substance of that estimate was that we were going to war with Japan?

Captain McCOLLUM. That Japan would strike.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; would strike. Now, you knew of the movement to the south, to the Kra Peninsula?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. I estimated on the 1st of December that they would strike the Kra Peninsula in force.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that mean anything to you in evaluating the evidence, that they would strike both America and the British at the same?

Captain McCOLLUM. I felt that they were definitely capable of it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was that your estimate, that if they struck the one they would strike the other?

Captain McCOLLUM. I cannot answer that precisely at this time, sir. I felt that if the Japanese were convinced that we would strike if they went down to the Kra Peninsula, then [9264] they would strike us at the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. You say if they were convinced that we would strike?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. In other words, if the Japanese high command became convinced that we would interpret their move against the Kra Peninsula as a warlike move against us and would go to war with them, then they would strike us.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you familiar then with the message of the 17th of August 1941? It is in that book, volume II here. I will show you the message.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to say to the committee that counsel has indicated that Captain McCollum is compelled to leave for his command tonight.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And, therefore, I hope the committee will be willing to sit a little longer so that we may conclude his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I will do everything I can. I will hurry right along.

I wish to show you now an exhibits in the case. It is the Foreign Relations, volume II. And will you state the page, Mr. Masten?

Mr. MASTEN. Page 556.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 556. Now, it is the last paragraph [9265] at the bottom of the page and runs over onto the top of the next page. I wish that you would read it.

Captain McCOLLUM (reading):

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know about that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Through reading the intercepts I may have, sir. I did not know about these notes as they were delivered, nor did I see any of the notes as they were delivered.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that be notice to the Japanese that we were interested in a matter as vital to our country as the question of going into the southwest?

Captain McCOLLUM. The impression was that we were going to safeguard the interests of the United States and the safety of our nationals. That is what it says here, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you know of the various messages [9266] from Great Britain, the message from Winant to the Secretary of State being, in effect, from Mr. Churchill to the Secretary of State, at 10:40 on the morning of the 6th?

Captain McCOLLUM. Saying what, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Saying that the ships were going into the Kra Peninsula and that they were 14 hours away.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; I saw that, but we already had it from our own source, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You already had it from your own source?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. That was merely passing on information along to us that we already had, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you have any knowledge about the question of what we would do in case they went into the southwest?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. That was a matter of Government policy. That was way over my head, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not get Government policy?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; not of that level, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I will ask you how you could evaluate Intelligence if you did not get all of the Government policy?

Captain McCOLLUM. All I can say to that, Senator, is that I did the best I could with what I had, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did the best you could with what [9267] you had. Now I will ask you about a meeting or a conference on the morning of the 6th; that is Saturday.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go into that with Miles, or was there a conference of Miles and Bratton and Wilkinson and McCollum and probably Heinmarsh?

Captain McCOLLUM. There may have been, Senator. We frequently saw each other either in one office or another. We ran backward and forward all the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you recall anything being considered Saturday morning, that being a very important day, was it not? It stood out to you?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not much more than the days preceding and immediately following, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you had the pilot message on the morning of Saturday morning which indicated that they were going to deliver a message in reply to the message of the 26th. You had the Tokyo to Berlin saying that war would come quicker than some people thought?

Captain McCOLLUM. Might I just offer one suggestion on the interpretation of that Tokyo to Berlin dispatch if I may, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir; that is what I would like to have you do.

[9268] Captain McCOLLUM. Berlin up until that time had been pressing the Japanese to go to war with the Russians, they had been doing everything they could to kick the Japanese into jumping on the backs of the Russians, and the first time I read that dispatch it impressed me as being a Japanese excuse to the Germans not to jump on the Russians.

Senator FERGUSON. But a message that they were going to jump both on the United States and Britain?

Captain McCOLLUM. They frequently at other times sent messages that they were going to do things in other areas and we were fairly certain that they were driving to the south then.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that the reason that you discounted that message that they were not going to jump on us, because they were only using it as an excuse?

Captain McCOLLUM. I discounted anything which showed that they were not going to jump on us. Everything I tried to say is that I felt that they were going to jump on us, that I was convinced that the situation between us and Japan was intensely acute. Had I not felt that way I certainly should not have put my office on a 24 hour basis early in November.

As a matter of fact, if the Senator will indulge me, my wife remonstrated with me as to how hard I was working my people at that time, sir. In other words, I felt that the situation between us and Japan was extremely explosive and would [9269] erupt at any time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, getting back to the morning of the 6th. I only raised that point to see whether or not you could recall a conference on that particular morning.

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes; I appreciate that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember such a conference that morning in relation to trying to get a message out to the so-called outposts?

Captain McCOLLUM. Senator, I am afraid I would be confusing if I said I did.

Senator FERGUSON. I certainly to do want you to do that.

Captain McCOLLUM. I cannot answer that directly. There may have been such a conference. It does not stand out in my memory at this time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were, as a Director of Intelligence, greatly concerned that there be sufficient messages go from time to time as the situation increased in danger to the front?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, yes, sir; very much so.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had taken it up with your superior officers, that is correct?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had considered it with your lower officers, is that correct?

[9270] Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was it unusual to send out information from the War Plans which you did not know about?

Captain McCOLLUM. That apparently was the practice, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know it until recently, is that it? You say it apparently was the practice.

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, you hear some of these things by rumors in a place like the Navy Department, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They do have rumors, then, in the Navy Department?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir. They are pretty human down there after all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Rochefort that you described this morning was a very efficient officer?

Captain McCOLLUM. In my opinion, he is one of the most efficient officers in the Navy, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted about a message to him from Miles about the wind code message?

Captain McCOLLUM. From General Miles to Commander Rochefort?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain McCOLLUM. I cannot conceive of a message of that sort being sent except through me or through Captain Safford.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, from their G-2 to get in touch [9271] with Rochefort?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir; I knew that their G-2 had been told to get in touch—I don't know whether the term "Rochefort" was mentioned or not, but that was the intention, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There was a rather iron-clad rule that you never got in touch with an Army man, a Navy man would never directly get in touch from your department with the Army?

Captain McCOLLUM. Oh, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well you said before it would be unusual to have one sent—

Captain McCOLLUM. No. What I said was, it would be unusual for General Miles to send a dispatch to Rochefort to get in touch with someone. That is what I understood you to say, Senator. In other words, he would have normally come to me and asked me to send a dispatch to Rochefort from the Navy here; merely a matter of technique, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted with about getting in touch with Rochefort in Hawaii in relation to the weather message, the wind core?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand then that they would get the interpretation of the message?

Captain McCOLLUM. I understood that G-2 was very anxious for their G-2 in Hawaii to have direct access with Commander [9272] Rochefort, who had the only agency capable of intercepting the winds message in Hawaii, sir. The Army, as I understand it, had no parallel set-up in Hawaii at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with plan WPL-46?

Captain McCOLLUM. In a general way, sir. I read it at the time. I haven't read it since, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that it considered or it required certain action upon the part of Admiral Kimmel to take action in the Marshalls and places such as that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could a war warning have meant that?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; not a war warning. The commander in chief of the fleet would not have been authorized to undertake hostilities on the basis of a war warning. What you are suggesting, as I understand it, sir, is that Admiral Kimmel would undertake immediately to start war. I did not so interpret that message of the 27th of November.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, there was a way to put the War Plan into effect, wasn't there?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, but when that War Plan went into effect, that was war, sir. The War Plan called for active operations, and when we got to operate under WPL-46 you can bet we started shooting, Senator.

[9273] Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you wanted to alert Admiral Kimmel to an air attack upon Hawaii, there would be very simple words that you could do that in, wouldn't there?

Captain McCOLLUM. Probably so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, only probably so?

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, sir, how would you suggest it?

Senator FERGUSON. If you wanted no misunderstanding, what words would you use as an Intelligence officer? That was your duty, was it not, to help to draw up these alerts?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not your duty?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. That duty was taken away from us in about February 1941, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In February of 1941 that duty was taken away from you?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was placed where?

Captain McCOLLUM. Placed in the Division of War Plans of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just clear up three matters briefly. It won't take long.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, there was a dead line of the 25th of [9274] November; you recall that?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On the day immediately preceding that there was a message sent by the Navy that hostilities may commence in any direction, is that right? Do you remember that?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is my understanding now, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the second dead line was the 29th of November and 2 days previously to that there was a war-warning message sent to Hawaii?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the other thing that you testified about was that the significance of the 1 p. m. message was pointed out to different people. As I understand it, you did not talk to anyone except to Turner, Ingersoll, and Admiral Stark, is that right?

Captain McCOLLUM. And Admiral Wilkinson, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And Admiral Wilkinson.

Captain McCOLLUM. And there may have been others. Admiral Ingersoll may have been there, there may have been others in Admiral Stark's office there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate you have definite knowledge of the facts as to what occurred there because you were present.

Captain McCOLLUM. I was there.

[9275] Mr. MURPHY. And you did point out the significance of the 1 o'clock p. m. to them, did you?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, what did you say the significance was?

Captain McCOLLUM. I felt that if the Japanese intended to have war with us they would strike at or near 1 o'clock Washington time, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you say you felt that they would commence at 1 o'clock at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt that they would commence hostilities against us at 1 o'clock?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you always felt that if the Japs were going to strike with her fleets the place to start was by attacking our fleet?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. The place they would start would be by attacking the fleet.

Captain McCOLLUM. They not only would do that, but that there was historical precedent, if the Japanese wished to start a war with us. Their war with China in 1895 was started that way; their war with Russia in 1907 was started that way; their war against Germany in Tsingtao in 1914 [9276] was started in that way.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the starting of their war with the Chinese and starting war with anyone else was by attacking their fleet?

Captain McCOLLUM. Attacking their fleet and timing a declaration of war on presentation of the final notes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

[9277] Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, the time has finally arrived, as usual, when my questions start at the end of the day's hearing.

Mr. MURPHY. I did not mean to take up any part of your time.

Mr. KEEFE. Nobody ever intends to mean anything, except it places me in an unfortunate position as to time, being compelled to forgo asking as many questions as I would like.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair indicated we would sit longer in order to conclude with Captain McCollum. We do not intend to shorten the examination of any member of the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. I have a desire, the same as everybody else, to get through here.

Captain, did you have any information, obtained as the result of your position, prior to the receipt of the 1 o'clock message on the morning of December 7, 1941, from which you concluded that the Japs would strike at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question before the witness leaves?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, through what instrumentalities did you receive your intelligence?

[9278] Captain McCOLLUM. The Communications Division of the Navy Department, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to have the different methods that were used.

Captain McCOLLUM. The different methods, sir?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Captain McCOLLUM. Some came in by mail. We got regular mail reports sent to us. Other things were sent by telegraph. Some came by Western Union. When people traveled over those countries they frequently came in to see me and talk about it. Business firms and other interested Americans here who had contacts out there would let us know any news they received through those contacts. Our press associations were most cooperative in giving us their sidelines, the benefit of their views. It was that sort of thing, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. All of that information was directed to your department?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir. It would come in to the Navy Department; it would be sent to the Intelligence Division, and there it was blocked out by the strategic sphere, sir, and if it concerned the Far East it came to my section, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did that include diplomatic messages or diplomatic intercepts that came from Japan?

[9279] Captain McCOLLUM. Intercepts, sir? You mean this magic business?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Captain McCOLLUM. That magic business was a special set-up in the Navy Department and that was received by that special organization and that product came to us as a source of intelligence, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You were the one who first saw all those diplomatic messages that came through magic?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So you had in your office all of the intelligence information that came from any source?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was the design; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is what the office was designed for?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you tell the committee that, with all of the information that you had, at no time did you ever receive any message that indicated that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7 with a surprise move?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir. That is my opinion, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to show——

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

[9280] Mr. KEEFE. May I check my notes just long enough, sir, to see whether I have another question?

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose no one has any objection to that. You have been very modest in your questions.

Mr. KEEFE. I want to clear up one thing in my mind, Captain.

I understood you to say in response to many questions that were asked in reference to it, that at sometime between the 1st and 7th of December, at a date which you did not definitely fix, you did consider it necessary to send some additional warning to the fleet and prepared a draft of the message which you thought ought to be sent; is that correct?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. I understood you to say that you took that message to your superior and discussed it and then went to Admiral Stark.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; Admiral Turner, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, at the time you drafted that message, am I correct in assuming that you had not had previous knowledge of the contents of the message sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 27th of November?

Captain McCOLLUM. I had no knowledge of that other than the statement made to me on the 1st by both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, that the fleet had received adequate and categorical warning, sir. [9281]

Mr. KEEFE. Now, on the day that you discussed the message that you proposed sending did you see this message, the so-called war-warning message?

Captain McCOLLUM. That message was then shown to me by Admiral Turner, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that the first time you had actually seen the contents of that message?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I understood you to say, when asked a question as an expert naval officer, that the language in that message of the 27th, which you saw for the first time when it was shown to you by Admiral Turner, containing the words "This is a war warning," would have been sufficient notice to you, as an officer with the fleet, to put you on notice that war was about to break out.

Captain McCOLLUM. That would have been my reaction, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if you read the entire message, and I assume you did, that day, was there anything in that message that would lead you, as an experienced naval officer, assuming you had received it, to assume that war was going to break out at Pearl Harbor or any other specific place?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think that a commander to whom such a message as that is addressed must assume that war is going to

[9282] break out over his forces and take the steps necessary to cover it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The contention has been made repeatedly and repeatedly here, by almost every officer that has testified, with the exception of Admiral Turner and I believe the testimony which you have given this afternoon, that everyone was surprised that this attack took place at Pearl Harbor; no one expected the attack to take place there. You have heard that testimony?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. I think I have elaborated on mine, sir. I had no intention to show myself as a clairvoyant at all. I was not surprised that war was started by an attack on the fleet. The fleet was at Pearl Harbor, and therefore the fact that the war was started by an attack on the fleet was not a surprise.

Mr. KEEFE. I think I understand you. That is all.

Captain McCOLLUM. In other words, I had no preknowledge, or made no preestimate, that the Japanese would attack at Pearl Harbor, sir.

[9283] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 22 of Exhibit 2, do you remember seeing that message on the 6th? As I understand it, the testimony shows that it was translated in the rough.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. I saw nothing of this sort until about the 11th or 12th, sir, that is, that I now recollect. I might have seen that before. A great many of these things were coming in, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not these fleet movements mean anything to you in the Intelligence Branch? Were not they considered the same as the diplomatic messages?

Captain McCOLLUM. Senator, this is translated on the 11th.

Senator FERGUSON. Mrs. Edgers testified before one of the boards that she made it in the rough.

Captain McCOLLUM. Let me make one explanation in regard to Mrs. Edgers: I was instrumental in employing Mrs. Edgers. She is an extremely able translator. She has a magnificent Japanese and a magnificent English education.

At the time of which you are now speaking, she was not a reliable translator. She was not able at that time to accurately transfer from the Japanese into English, and [9284] vice versa, sir. I had to check a number of her translations, sir. I just offer that by way of background, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Notwithstanding that, if it was translated in the rough, would it not be significant to show that on the 3d of December they were inquiring, particularly on the second page, about the lights?

Captain McCOLLUM. Senator, I did not see this, that I recollect, at the time you indicate, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you treat these messages in relation to ship movements on the same basis as you did the diplomatic, or did you translate the diplomatic prior to the ship movements?

Captain McCOLLUM. As the the priority, I tried to explain how that was done before, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to know which had priority between them.

Captain McCOLLUM. At this particular time, top priority, as I remember it, was given to trying to listen for the war-warning messages out of the code, and to be sure that we did not miss any part of the interchange of Japanese notes between this Government and the Government of Japan.

[9285] Senator FERGUSON. But you had two questions, didn't you? That was when war would start. These may indicate and did indicate where war would start. Was there any difference between the two?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; these merely indicated the setting up of a signal system out of Honolulu.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't that significant?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not necessarily, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, you didn't treat these on the same basis as you did the diplomatic messages?

Captain McCOLLUM. We treated them all alike.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you familiar with the other messages that came in, page 27—

Captain McCOLLUM. I must have been familiar with all. I said that I read them all or thought I was reading them all.

Senator FERGUSON. And page 29.

Captain McCOLLUM. I have.

Senator FERGUSON. Where it says:

It appears no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

And is from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6.

Captain McCOLLUM. What time was it translated?

Senator FERGUSON. Translated 12/8. What I am trying to get at is, if we were fully alerted, we had a pilot message, why we didn't put every effort on translating these messages that [9286] now appear so significant showing that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Captain McCOLLUM. I think the effort was there, but I believe at the time it was considered the first word would come through diplomatic interchange and the primary service of the Government was given to learning what the Japanese Ambassador was talking about and what instructions he was receiving.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that only relate to when the war would start? Where the war would start would be where our fleet was.

Captain McCOLLUM. Once we knew when the war would start and the fleet was told when it would start, we were under the impression they were able to handle the situation from there on, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. I wanted to ask who the next witness will be tomorrow.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral Bellinger.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, with all of the knowledge that you had as an Intelligence officer, and in view of the top position [9287] that you held in Intelligence at that time, do you know of anyone in your branch of the service or any other department of the Navy who

attempted to trick or maneuver the Japs into attacking the United States on December 7, 1941?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, was your immediate superior Admiral Turner?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; my immediate superior was Admiral Wilkinson.

The CHAIRMAN. So that this draft of the message that you suggested was sent or taken by you to Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain McCOLLUM. Senator, I carried it personally to Captain Hurd, who was my immediate chief. We walked in together with it to Admiral Wilkinson, and I carried it to Admiral Turner.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you know whether it ever got beyond him?

Captain McCOLLUM. I brought it back with me to Admiral Wilkinson after it had been amended and corrected.

The CHAIRMAN. And if that message had been sent under whose name would it have been sent?

Captain McCOLLUM. All messages from the Navy Department, Senator, go out from one major office. It would have gone out as by the Chief of Naval Operations.

[9288] The CHAIRMAN. In other words, Admiral Stark?

Captain McCOLLUM. It would have gone out under the blanket number. We don't use names, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether that contemplated message was ever taken to him?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether he passed upon it or not?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; I do not know that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Captain, the committee thanks you very much for your cooperation in trying to reveal the facts here. The Chair would like to ask you if there is any other information you have that is pertinent to this inquiry that has not been brought out by the questions asked?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir; I don't think so, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Captain McCOLLUM. I appreciate the indulgence of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. You are excused, Captain.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., January 30, 1946, a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 31, 1946.)

[9289]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[9290] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

The Chair understands counsel has some documents to file before proceeding with Admiral Bellinger.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have distributed to the committee a number of additional documents which we would like to add to the exhibits which have been previously introduced.

The first, which we would like to add to Exhibit 113 as Exhibit 113-C, is a document which on the cover bears the heading, "I. Revised employment schedule of Task Force Nine, for remainder of second quarter of fiscal year 1942." We would like to offer that as 113-C.

I call your attention to the fact that on page 4-J of that exhibit there is a letter signed by Admiral Bellinger, transmitting the proposed employment schedule to the commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel.

This exhibit shows on the two or three pages following 6-J, down at the bottom of the page, the proposed employment schedules of Patrol Wing 2 and the various other patrol squadrons of fleet aviation.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113-C.")

As Exhibit 115-A, we would like to offer the document entitled, "Communication Intelligence Summaries of 9 and 10 December 1941," showing assumed composition of Japanese striking force. [9291]

On the first page of that exhibit under the paragraph entitled, "First Fleet" you will see the expression in the ninth line, "Blue Pacific." We understand from the Navy that that is an area of the Pacific which was regarded as a United States area.

We have previously introduced Communication Intelligence Summaries through December 6th, and this adds to those exhibits the Intelligence Summaries for December 9 and 10. It is our understanding that no summaries were prepared for December 7 and 8.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115-A.")

Finally, as Exhibit 115-B, we would like to offer the document entitled, "Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41," which bears the date of November 27, 1941.

Reference was made to this at the time the other Intelligence Bulletins were introduced and it has only now been duplicated and we are making it available to the committee as promptly as possible.

In this connection I would say that the Navy has furnished us and we have examined Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 44-41, which is dated November 10, 1941, as well as Intelligence Bulletin No. 46-41, which is dated December the 6th, 1941. We had not had these duplicated as they [9292] do not appear to us to be relevant in this connection. If any of the committee members wish to examine them, we have them here.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115-B.")

The CHAIRMAN. These various documents will be filed under the numbers indicated.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, in connection with Admiral Bellinger's testimony, he has presented and we have distributed to the committee a short statement which he desires to make. Now, we just got it this morning and we have no desire to infringe on the committee's announcement that each member should be furnished these a day ahead.

Whether the committee accepts this statement and permits it to be read or not is immaterial to us. I have gone over it. I think it is pretty largely facts which are well grouped in the statement and I would recommend that you permit it to be read by him. It has only been placed before you this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to that?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. If not, it will be done.

Will you be sworn, Admiral?

[9293] **TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. PATRICK NEISON LYNCH BELLINGER, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, will you state your name, your age, and the length of time you have been in the Navy?

Admiral BELLINGER. Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger. Age 60. Date of birth, October the 8, 1885. I entered the Naval Academy in June 1903.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that there has been distributed to each member of the committee the detailed history of Admiral Bellinger and his service in the Navy I will not encumber the record with an examination of that from him on direct.

Admiral, have you prepared a statement which you would like to read to the committee?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you proceed and read that?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have been in some doubt about whether to prepare a statement for the committee in advance. I thought I might save the committee's time by simply presenting myself for question-

ing. However, I feel that my command relationship at Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack might be more readily grasped by the committee if I first describe it to you.

On December 6, 1941, and, for several months prior thereto, my duties were as follows:

[9294] (1) Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and commander, Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.

(2) Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2 with attending surface craft plus such other units as might be assigned by commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

(3) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, but did not include operational authority.

(4) Liaison with commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for aviation development within the district, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

(5) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In connection with these duties, I functioned under the following seniors:

(a) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as type commander for patrol wings, was based at San Diego.

(b) Commander Scouting Force, the force command of which Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part.

(c) Directly under commander in chief, Pacific Fleet in [9295] my capacity as commander, Task Force 9.

(d) Commanders of Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 for operation of patrol planes assigned those forces for specific operations.

(e) Under commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as commander, Naval Base Defense Force when I was performing duties as commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

Shortly after my taking command of Patrol Wing 2 on November 1, 1940, Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, arrived to take command of the Hawaiian Air Force. He and I almost at once arranged to conduct joint training operations for the purpose of preparing our personnel to work together and to utilize opportunities to prepare ourselves for war. This was an arrangement entirely between General Martin and myself, although the commander, Scouting Force, was informed by me of this arrangement. Whenever patrol planes were scheduled for wing tactics, the Army Air Command also took part if it was practical for them to do so. These arrangements were over and above the regularly scheduled joint Army and Navy tactical exercises. Upon completion of patrol wing and Army air groups joint exercises, I held a critique in the auditorium of the air station, Pearl Harbor, on that operation and I remember stating at the first critique, at which Army personnel were present, that the Army Air and Navy Air should [9296] learn to work so close together that it would be difficult to tell us apart, that in order to perfect our technique we must be able to criticize one another without fear of giving offense, that this was all necessary in the preparation for war. The relationship between the Hawaiian Air Force and the Navy patrol wings was very close and cooperative.

About March 1, 1941, the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, directed me to report to the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District in connection with the preparation of an air-defense plan in conjunction with the commanding general, Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported and proceeded with the assigned task, working directly with General Martin.

[9297] It was agreed by General Martin and myself that the first action to be taken was the preparation of an estimate of the situation, and from this estimate would be evolved a joint air-operation plan followed by detailed contributory plans, these latter to be prepared by General Martin for Army Air and by me for Navy Air.

This was done. The estimate of the situation was signed jointly by General Martin and myself. The detailed contributory plans were prepared and signed by General Martin for Army Air and by me for Navy Air.

The estimate and plans were officially forwarded through the respective echelons of command. The commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (commander, Naval Base Defense Force), was my immediate superior in connection with naval base defense, and to him were delivered the joint estimate of the situation and the plans for Naval Air.

Based upon this estimate and plans was the organization that was termed the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, became one of my duties.

The term "commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force" might be considered a misnomer, as it was not an actual command until the Naval Base Defense Force Organization was placed in a functioning status. It was even more of [9298] a misnomer as it implied authority over operating units to a degree which did not exist. My authority, even after the naval base defense plan took effect, extended only over the search and attack groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and was nonexistent concerning Army pursuit aviation and Navy fighter aviation which were to function under the Army Air Command.

The Naval Base Defense Air Force was a paper organization; it did not exist, in fact, as an entity unto itself. It was not an organization specifically manned and equipped to perform a definite job. It existed only when called into being by proper authority—and under the circumstances this necessarily required joint Army-Navy action—or it could be brought into being by an actual emergency that was apparent to those concerned. Its composition was variable, depending entirely upon the availability of aircraft and personnel that might happen to be on Oahu at the time it was called into being.

As commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, I did not have the authority to place that organization in a functioning status, except in the case of an actual emergency. After the start of the attack on December 7, 1941, the Naval Base Defense Air Force did assume a functioning status immediately without orders from higher authority.

[9299] A message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill" was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning and orders to planes in the air were sent and received by 0805.

The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft made "available" to it by

the various air commands of both Army and Navy. The determining factor in this technical availability was the daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air units. Aircraft reported available were classified as available in the prevailing category of readiness for the search and attack group (commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force) or for the air combat group (commander, Hawaiian Air Force), depending on their types.

The normal procedure for vitalizing the Naval Base Defense Air Force for drills was for the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to send a dispatch reading, "Drill, Danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists, Drill". This placed the Naval Base Defense Force in a functioning status. Upon receipt of this message I, as commander of the search and attack group, immediately sent a message to the air units assigned to this group, to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of [9300] readiness. My staff officers assumed the duties involved in the operational control of the search and attack group. Search operations were immediately ordered. Those patrol planes that were initially in the highest degree of readiness were assigned the northwest sector, which were considered the most vital.

This was because the prevailing winds were from the northeast, and enemy carriers could thus recover their planes while retiring from the Oahu area.

These were supplemented by other patrol planes as they were made ready for flight, covering other sections in accordance with their relative importance until 360° was covered or all available planes had been employed.

Available bombing planes of the Army comprising the attack group were placed in the highest degree of readiness and were maintained in a stand-by condition awaiting instructions to attack the enemy when located.

When Navy patrol planes were insufficient to search the necessary sectors and Army bomber planes were available for this purpose, the bombers were assigned sectors for search.

As I have said, Task Force Nine, which I commanded, normally included patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two with attending surface craft.

[9301] The primary missions of Task Force Nine, as stated in Pacific Fleet confidential letter 14CL-41 were:

(1) To organize, train and concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient long-range air scouting and air striking force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of fleet units and bases.

During the period immediately preceding the Japanese attack, the squadrons of Patrol Wings One and Two were carrying out those missions, operating on regular employment schedules approved by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

[9302] Both the Army and the Navy were in the process of receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18's were being replaced by the more modern B-17's and in Patrol Wings One and Two PBY-1's, 2's, and 3's were being replaced by PBY-5's.

There were 5 squadrons of patrol planes with operating complement of 12 planes each and 1 squadron with operating complement of 6 patrol planes based on Oahu and 1 squadron with 12 planes based on Midway. In addition, there were 3 spare patrol planes, making a total of 81 patrol planes in the Pacific Fleet within the Hawaiian area.

Of the Patrol planes, 27 were of the PBY-3 type, an older model, and 54 were of the PBY-5 type, the latest model. Twelve of the PBY-3 air planes had returned on December 5 after extended operations at Midway and Wake with inadequate facilities for normal upkeep and repair. Ten of them were due for overhaul. The 54 PBY-5 planes had recently arrived in Oahu from the Pacific coast for replacement of obsolescent planes in increments as follows: 18 planes on October 28, 1941; 12 planes on November 8, 1941; 24 planes on November 23, 1941. Attention is invited to the dates of their arrival. The PBY-5 planes were [9303] experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties of new planes and their maintenance was hampered by an almost complete absence of spare parts.

Of the 81 patrol planes listed above, 12 were conducting operations at Midway, 3 planes armed with gun and depth charges were engaged in the morning security patrol of fleet operating areas, 4 planes were conducting intertype tactics with submarines. Of the remaining 62 planes, 2 were on 15-minute notice, 8 were on 30-minute notice for operations, 9 were undergoing repairs, 43 were on 4-hour notice.

For a commander to be reasonably sure that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection, would have required an effective daily search through 360° to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 25-mile radius of visibility this would have required a daily 16½-hour flight of 50 PBY-5 planes. This, in turn, would have necessitated a force of not less than 150 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and ample well-trained personnel. We had 81 patrol planes in the whole Hawaiian area, including Midway.

The major effort of Patrol Wings One and Two during 1941 prior to December 7 was expansion training, operational training, security operations, development and equipping of [9304] air facilities—all in preparation for war. Aviation training facilities and output of trained personnel in the Navy at that time was considerably behind the contemplated increase in the number of squadrons. Particular stress was placed, therefore, on the need for expansion training. Each squadron was required not only to train additional combat crews for their own aircraft, but also to form nuclei for new squadrons being commissioned back on the mainland.

Despite this continuing emphasis on training, every effort was being made to increase the local readiness for war. Squadron and patrol plane commanders were indoctrinated with the necessity of keeping their planes so equipped and their crews so trained that at any time during a flight they could be converted from their peacetime objectives to combat missions.

It was a definite policy that all planes on all operations be equipped with full allowance of machine guns and ammunition. On special missions connected with the security, such as in searching operating areas, planes were also equipped with depth charges. This was justifi-

fied when planes in the air on December 7 were diverted immediately from their peacetime duties to war missions.

Vitalizing the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization would have necessitated a substantial cessation of [9305] training activities and a concentration on defense. The dispatching of planes on distant search operations would not have caused more work, it merely would have changed the type of employment of the patrol planes and of course would have caused a reduction in their training effort and thereby affected their readiness for war. As pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem of when to place the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan, and required specific information as to the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time limits.

In the absence of such information, the patrol planes available were carrying out their regularly assigned schedules when the Japanese struck.

I had no knowledge of any of the warning messages emanating from the Navy and War Departments during October, November, and December. I never knew of any warning dispatches until a few days after the attack—on the evening of about December 10, I think it was—when I was told by one of my officers that he had just heard that there had been a warning dispatch received in the district Naval Intelligence Office and that the local Intelligence officer of the naval air station knew about it. I immediately [9306] sent for the Intelligence officer and he confirmed this information. Several days after that, when I was working on some papers with Admiral Kimmel, I first saw one of the warning dispatches.

During October, November, and December my only information concerning our relation with Japan and the imminence of war came from the Honolulu newspapers. These newspapers described a tense situation, but this had not been the first time during the year that such situations were indicated between the United States and Japan. Also, there were Japanese envoys in Washington who, according to the papers, were endeavoring to bring about a peaceful settlement. The information available to me—limited and unofficial as it was—did not indicate that I should recommend to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, that distant patrol plane search for the security of Pearl Harbor be undertaken at that time.

[9307] Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, how many planes of all kinds did the Navy have at Oahu on December 6, approximately?

Admiral BELLINGER. In accordance with the plans and directives, each command—

Mr. RICHARDSON (interposing). Just give me the numbers of all the planes, without all this explanation.

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, I cannot do it. I have the number of planes that were reported to me as available for the Naval Base Advance Air Force.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, how many?

Admiral BELLINGER. The marines reported 18 scout bombers—3 ready in 2 hours, 15 ready in 4 hours.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Never mind the "readiness," just give me the number.

Admiral BELLINGER. Seven fighters. The Army reported 8 B-17, 21 B-18, 6 A-20, and I reported to the commander, Hawaiian Air Force, which was in accordance with our agreement, 7 fighters, which were the marines, and 9 scouts, which were also the marines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you give me the total number of planes available for long-distance reconnaissance on December 6, 1941, the gross number of the Navy?

Admiral BELLINGER. In accordance with my figures there were 48 patrol planes. There were no other planes that were [9308] considered available for long-distance search. The Army B-17's reported to be were for bombardment. They did not report any for long-distance search.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The marine planes were not suitable for long-distance search?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whatever B-17's the Army had were available, or were planes that could be used for long-distance search?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many Army B-17's were reported to you as being available on December 6?

Admiral BELLINGER. Eight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then that would make a total of planes that you had, and Army B-17's, of 54?

Admiral BELLINGER. Fifty-seven.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now where were those planes located, the 57?

Admiral BELLINGER. At Pearl Harbor, Kaneohe, and Army fields, I think Hickam.

[9309] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the fighter planes that would be available for use in event of an air attack were Army planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Army planes and such Navy fighter planes as were available to be assigned to the Army.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any fighter planes of the Navy that were in condition for use as fighters on December 6?

Admiral BELLINGER. Seven fighters were reported as available to the Army.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And how many Army fighters were reported as available?

Admiral BELLINGER. That I don't know. I was not in control of that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you have no information about it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You made no inquiry concerning it at the time?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not any specific inquiry. I was cognizant of about 140 being available.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was your understanding?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it was your understanding that they were all in shape to go up and fight on proper notice?

[9310] Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many were available to get up in the air and fight, do you know?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever make inquiry as to that?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So far as you are concerned, if an attack came you had no information as to how many fighters you would have to use in that attack from the Army?

Admiral BELLINGER. It was the Army's—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Leave the Army's job out. I am asking about your information as to what you knew. Did you know?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what is the length of a long-distance patrol suitable for guarding a post such as Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BELLINGER. Eight hundred miles is what we try to get. With some planes we could get only 700, even with what are considered long-range planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make any request at any time prior to the attack on December 7 for the use of the Army B-17's for distance patrol?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you yourself with the planes . [9311] available to you, were making no distance patrol prior to December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not for security purposes, no.

Mr. RICHARDSON. For any purpose?

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 7, 2, 3, 4, and 5, we had what we termed wing tactical exercise.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How far?

Admiral BELLINGER. Three hundred miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it wasn't a long-distance patrol?

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I asked whether you were conducting any long-distance patrol.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Before December 7. And the answer is no?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am forgetting one thing. The squadrons that went to Wake and Midway and that area covered an area in scouting en route.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was not undertaken for the purpose of furnishing a defense to Pearl Harbor, was it? Didn't you so testify?

Admiral BELLINGER. The only reason they were sent out in this spread-out fashion was to get information that was supposed to be vital.

[9312] Mr. RICHARDSON. The patrol that you are talking about—

Admiral BELLINGER. Negative or positive.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The patrol that you are talking about is the patrol that was carried on by the task forces as they proceeded on their mission?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. I am talking about the patrol plane squadrons.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where? Where based?

Admiral BELLINGER. Those that went from Pearl to Midway and from Midway to Pearl on the 5th of December, and from Midway to Wake.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you intend to testify, Admiral, that there was any 700-mile long distance patrol operating out of either Midway or Wake at any time?

Admiral BELLINGER. If a plane is out at sea——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you please answer my question?

Admiral BELLINGER. If you are speaking about solely for long distance patrol, that is one thing, but you have got to realize that if a plane goes on a passage from one place to another, and its job in that passage is to look and see and report, why, that is accomplishment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, you know just as well as I do, I think, that those task forces were going to Midway [9313] and Wake for purposes that were connected with Midway and Wake.

Admiral BELLINGER. Certainly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were not going for the purpose of conducting a distance patrol for the protection of Pearl Harbor, were they?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not in protection of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is what I am talking about now—the protection of Pearl Harbor. Was there any long-distance patrol on December 6 out of Pearl Harbor for the protection of Pearl Harbor that you know of?

Admiral BELLINGER. In spite of the fact that it may not have been specifically for the protection of Pearl Harbor, undoubtedly it furnished information which had a bearing on the protection of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As the fleet task forces proceeded to Midway and Wake, their planes would be out scouting their path?

Admiral BELLINGER. The carrier planes; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How far would they go from the ship on that scouting?

Admiral BELLINGER. About 200, 250 miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What additional scouting was being done by the task forces as they proceeded to Midway and [9314] Wake except that form of scouting?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not speaking——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you please answer my question, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't know what they did. I was at Pearl Harbor. They were out at sea.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many patrol planes were based on Midway on December 6? Do you know that?

Admiral BELLINGER. Twelve.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many at Wake?

Admiral BELLINGER. None.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, there wasn't any distance patrol out of Wake, was there?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not on December 6.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know anything about there being a distant patrol out of Midway on the 6th?

If you don't know, tell me. I am asking your understanding.

Admiral BELLINGER. I have got to refresh my memory and check definitely whether it was the 6th or the 7th. I think it was the 6th and the 7th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Keep in mind we are referring to what you have defined as the long-distance patrol being a 700-mile sweep with patrol planes, and I am asking whether there was any such patrol as that conducted from Midway.

[9315] Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; not 700 miles; no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the patrol planes that the Navy had at Oahu were necessary for the use of the fleet if the fleet should initiate an offensive operation out of the Pearl Harbor base, were they not.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. They were there primarily for the fleet use.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you are familiar with WPL-46?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you knew that in connection with that immediately upon a declaration of hostilities, it was planned that a raiding expedition would be conducted toward the Mandates?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If that raiding operation was to be conducted, it would be necessary for the fleet to have long-distance reconnaissance planes cooperating with them?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, upon such a raid as that where would those patrol planes be based?

Admiral BELLINGER. First at Wake supported by planes from Midway.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many squadrons of planes was Wake in a position to take care of on the week prior to December [9316] 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. Two squadrons could have operated from there for a short time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by a short time?

Admiral BELLINGER. About 2 weeks.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the length of time would be dictated by what?

Admiral BELLINGER. By lack of adequate facilities for maintenance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Fueling?

Admiral BELLINGER. Fueling could be done.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many planes are there in a squadron?

Admiral BELLINGER. Twelve.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the most that Wake could take care of would be 24 planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Practically, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. On a raiding expedition to the Mandates, Wake would be the suitable basing point for long distance reconnaissance planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. On account of its strategic location with reference to those mandated islands.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that would be the place where the long distance patrol planes would be based to aid that raiding expedition?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, that would leave you, subtracting 24 from 57, with 33 planes at Pearl Harbor suitable for long-distance patrol? You stated there were 57 in all. Deducing 24, that, under my arithmetic, would be 33, including the Army planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, all you had to do to get the Army planes was to ask for them, wasn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. I never found it exactly that way.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever ask for them and not get them?

Admiral BELLINGER. In connection with drills, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any doubt today, Admiral, that if you had asked for those 8 B-17's to use in long-distance reconnaissance out of Pearl Harbor you would have had any difficulty in getting them?

Admiral BELLINGER. If I asked for them entirely from information I had which was not concurred in by the Army, I would not have gotten them. It had to be a mutual approval and a recognition of a situation that demanded that sort of action.

[9318] Mr. RICHARDSON. In other words, if you concluded that you wanted to initiate a long-distance patrol out of Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 6, you would first have had to persuade the Army that you were exercising good judgment in planning that patrol, and if they agreed with you, then they would let you have the planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. If they had them, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, they did have them?

Admiral BELLINGER. They reported eight as available for this work.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had no doubt they were telling the truth?

Admiral BELLINGER. They said for bombardment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were suitable for long-distance patrol, weren't they? Why fence with this? Did you ask for those planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. There is no fencing. You have got to be clear. You have got to come out so that people know what you are talking about.

[9319] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ask for those planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. For any purpose?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You don't know whether you could have gotten them if you had asked for them?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. That is what I asked.

Admiral BELLINGER. But I doubt seriously. I know what they were doing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know they were doing anything with their long-distance B-17's?

Admiral BELLINGER. I know they were trying their best training pilots to fly the B-17 planes. Now, when you talk about long-distance reconnaissance, you have got to have qualified people to fly these planes, because they have got to come back to the island from the long-distance. You can't just say that because the plane is available that a crew can do it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you ever contended in any of your former testimony, Admiral, that there was not available pilots that could operate the B-17's in long-distance reconnaissance on December 6?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

[9320] Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you ever made such a contention?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; but that is speaking for the Army, and I don't want to speak for the Army, but you are asking me questions I have to answer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew on December 6 about the general task missions of the task forces that were operating to Johnston to Midway and Wake?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And as an experienced air officer familiar with long-distance reconnaissance, in your opinion the presence of those task forces in the area south of Midway, the Midway sector, and as far south as Johnston, was being adequately protected by those task missions?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not necessarily adequately, no.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you have told me they were running long-distance reconnaissance out of Midway and there were three task forces.

Admiral BELLINGER. I didn't say long-distance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Four hundred miles.

Admiral BELLINGER. Four hundred and fifty.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were sending out these task forces with their protecting planes a couple of hundred miles away from the course of the fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was on one day with reference [9321] to the transfer of those planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean? Didn't those planes scout the course of the fleet after it left Pearl Harbor until it got to Midway and Wake?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I think we are a little confused on this.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me go back. I am a little confused. What more could you have had in the southwest sector, what more could you have had by way of protective airplane search than was conducted by the three task fleets, by the planes they had on the carriers, and by the planes out of Midway? What more could you ask for?

Admiral BELLINGER. For instance, during the daylight you were covering a circular area of about 400 miles diameter with the carrier as the center. That is what you are covering. As the carrier moves the circular area moves with it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, anything that crosses that circular area would be pretty apt to be seen?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As you proceeded from Oahu to Midway the line of the fleet as it moved to Midway would cover a space 200 miles to the north of that line, wouldn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And 200 miles south?

[9322] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then as the task force moved between Oahu and Wake that would cover the area still further to the south?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As the task force moved from Oahu to Johnston that would cover the bottom of the arc?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I ask you again whether the entire area west from Oahu and south to Wake and Midway and south to Johnston wasn't being adequately searched in effect by the task forces that were moving there, the 4th, 5th and 6th?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is a question. You have got to consider the time that a certain area is searched. I have had a lot to do with searching operations and the only way you can search is by searching and you have got to make sure that the area is covered and covered in a timely way in accordance with the schedule to make sure that nothing gets through.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let's see——

Admiral BELLINGER. Now, I quite agree with you that that sounds very well but the question is the timing. For instance, a force moving and searching leaves something behind, something may come behind, something may go ahead [9323] of it before it gets there. It is covering only, say, a 400-mile circular area.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I can't see any reason why something couldn't come behind your planes if they came from Oahu.

Admiral BELLINGER. It could but the plane is coming back again.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Suppose it wasn't there when it came back then it would miss it?

Admiral BELLINGER. There is a possibility.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I grant you, Admiral, the possibility that a search may not be 100 percent successful, but I am asking you what more, if you wanted to make a search of the area between Oahu and Midway, Wake and Johnston, what more you could have done than was being done by the operations of the task forces and their planes and the scouting planes at Midway than was being done on the 5th and the 6th of December?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, planes flying long-distance reconnaissance from those islands, I would say an adequate number would have furnished a better search.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But from Oahu?

Admiral BELLINGER. From Oahu, from Midway, or from Wake.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How far is it from Oahu to Midway?

Admiral BELLINGER. About 1,200—well, 1,140 miles.

[9324] Mr. RICHARDSON. Then your long-distance patrols wouldn't get within 400 miles of Midway?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; but I was speaking about from Midway also.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I grant you if you had patrol planes flying out from Wake and from Midway and flying out from Johnston it would help.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you didn't have any patrol planes flying out from any of them, did you?

Admiral BELLINGER. On what date?

Mr. RICHARDSON. On the 5th or 6th.

Admiral BELLINGER. They were flying out from Midway on the 6th and I think on the 7th. I mean, I think on the 6th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There weren't any planes or any ships that you knew of in the north or northwest area from Oahu, were there?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that if you were then going to put on an additional search it would have occurred to you to make it in that sector, wouldn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Normally speaking, as far as our plans were concerned, the northwest sector was the first sector [9325] covered when planes were available.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And a northwest sector would be what we call——

Admiral BELLINGER. A north by west.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many degrees would that cover?

Admiral BELLINGER. Ninety.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many degrees will a patrol plane ordinarily in your charting cover?

Admiral BELLINGER. Eight degrees, 700 miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

You had left, according to my figures, in Oahu 33 patrol planes that could have been used with the Army planes for long-distance patrol.

Admiral BELLINGER. That 33—I presume that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Page 6.

Admiral BELLINGER. I have a statement written down here which was done by looking over figures and trying to get the best answer and it says this:

If no other operations had been scheduled for December 7, 1941 there could have been considered to be a total of 48 patrol planes that could have been made available for long-distance reconnaissance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What ones of those 48 planes were you using for any other mission on the 6th day of December?

[9326] Admiral BELLINGER. The exercises carried on in connection with the schedule were in progress.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you using long-distance patrols for those?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not long-distance patrols.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am talking about the 48 long-distance patrol planes. What other mission were they operating on on December 6?

Admiral BELLINGER. You are talking about planes——

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is exactly what I am talking about.

Admiral BELLINGER. It is a question of what the schedule was. I have it here somewhere if you would like me to read it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All I am trying to have you tell me is what possible use you were making of any of those 48 patrol planes on December 6.

Admiral BELLINGER. From a security point of view other than the search of the operating areas, I would say none.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The search of operating areas was simply the perimeter where you were accustomed to conduct maneuvers for the fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was very largely a training proposition?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

[9327] Mr. RICHARDSON. It wasn't a long-distance search?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; but it was not training.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it was an operation which you could have changed any time you wanted to, wasn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Couldn't you have initiated a long-distance patrol on December 6th of your own authority?

Admiral BELLINGER. By virtue of having command certainly I could have issued orders to planes, but I would have had to notify the Commander in Chief immediately and have gotten his concurrence. He must know what is available to him. A commander below him having forces such as that has no real authority to utilize his planes and so put them in condition where they are not available to him in accordance with his information.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make any effort to get his permission to fly any long-distance reconnaissance on December 5 or December 6?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest that the witness was sick in bed with the flu for 5 days before December 7 and had never heard of a war warning over a period of 2 months.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there ever any decision, Admiral, that you knew anything about, made by your superiors, that [9328] there would not be any long-distance reconnaissance patrol flown from Oahu?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How did it come about, if you know, that no long-distance patrol was initiated prior to the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. That, I think, is a question which higher authority in the fleet and the Navy Department will have to answer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am asking you whether any ever was given to you?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you today have no knowledge of your own why a long-distance reconnaissance wasn't flown out of Oahu on the 5th or 6th or the 7th of December, of your own knowledge?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, it is my understanding, Admiral, that in flying long-distance reconnaissance it isn't well to operate the same crew and the same ship oftener than once in 3 days; is that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct for the crew and practically correct for the ship. The ship, for instance, that is, the plane, might be used somewhat more than the crew.

[9329] Mr. RICHARDSON. But the plane and crew could be used once every 3 days?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if you had 33 long-distance patrol planes available on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of December, 11 of them could have been used for long-distance search?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if each plane covered 8 degrees that would be an 88 degree search, wouldn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It would be just as thorough for those 88 degrees as it would be if other planes were scouting the other part of the whole arc of 360 degrees?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is a question of mathematics.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, and a question of fact, too, isn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; it depends on which way the force is moving.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well—

Admiral BELLINGER. There is a sector in one case where there is question of passage through the area. But I grant you that that has very little to do with it and is a technicality.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the 11 planes that would have been sent out could have given a first-class proper military scout of the entire north-west sector out of Oahu; isn't that [9330] correct?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it could have been continued, an echelon of 11 planes, for several weeks, couldn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Now we are talking about something that is a variable quantity. I don't know anything I could have done to have gotten spare parts for these planes more than I did. The 54 planes which arrived on the date as you have noted in my statements had practically no spare parts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then am I to understand the reason you didn't want to use your planes at all was because they might wear out if you did use them?

Admiral BELLINGER. No; you asked me how many they could use.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many could they?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is a question—

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am asking for your judgment, Admiral.

Admiral BELLINGER. I would say that they probably could have kept up, with a slight reduction maybe in the 11 per day, or about 2 weeks and maybe longer. It is a question of spare parts to replace the parts that are vital in a plane to keep the plane in commission. If there are no spare parts the plane stays on the beach.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, we will never know because [9331] nothing was ever done about it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, for instance, after December 7 it became a major mission.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why? Why after December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. Because we were then very much on the defensive.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And on the alert?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, that depends on how you mean "alert." There was peace on December 6.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me ask you this question, Admiral, prompted by a question asked here, how were these Navy planes parked?

Senator FERGUSON. May I have the last part of the answer read.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. In other words, you had to see the planes come in over the mountains around Pearl Harbor before the idea of patrol planes and alert entered your mind?

Admiral BELLINGER. I suppose that is true with everybody in the United States.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Maybe.

Now, let me ask you this: How were these planes parked, these 48 planes that you refer to, just describe to us where they were and how they were parked and what was the nature [9332] of their moorings?

Admiral BELLINGER. On account of the size and type of planes—which was a flying boat weighing about, fully loaded, about 34,000 pounds—they were put on wheels, carts, run up ramps and put on the concrete parkways. They have to be on concrete parkways if they are put on the beach. It is the only practical way actually of operating patrol planes with any degree of efficiency or effectiveness from the beach. That was a question of dispersal and was a question with which I was very much concerned prior to Pearl Harbor, for some months prior. It was a question, how could we disperse planes properly. It was a question of trying to build up Hilo or another place. A question of building up Hilo Lagoon, which was just finished a few months, I think, ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why were you exercised?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was considerably exercised, from the time I got out there, with the situation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Admiral BELLINGER. Because I thought war was coming and we were not ready for it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was there in the way in which you had to park your planes that would exercise your interest? Were they parked too closely together?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were parked as far apart as [9333] they could be on the concrete. There were some in the water moored by these buoys in Kaneohe Bay, but we did not have them on those buoys that day because of the combination of work. You are losing time and losing effort when you do park them out in the water.

As a matter of fact, those that were moored out in the water at Kaneohe Bay were sunk and completely lost and those that were actually on the beach and were damaged, many of them were put back into commission.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is it a fact that the conditions were such in Pearl Harbor there that, in your opinion, your planes, when parked on the beach, were not sufficiently dispersed for safety?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, actually, in fact, no, they were not sufficiently dispersed for safety. It is a very difficult proposition to figure how far you have got to park them for safety, but we had worked it out from the point of view of the explosion of bombs in planes in case the bombs in the planes were exploded. Bombs were on the planes. And with the idea of the effect on other planes. The limitation of dispersion at a place like Pearl Harbor was the limitation of the concrete area on which to put the planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am confused. Is it your position [9334] that you had plenty of room at Pearl Harbor to disperse your planes or that you did not?

Admiral BELLINGER. We did not at any place.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. But you parked your planes as best you could with the room you had?

Admiral BELLINGER. With the type of planes we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, speaking generally, as a result of this raid you lost about half your planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not quite half.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you the figures?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think so.

On December 30 of the 81 planes we had, 44 were operating and 37 were not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. December 30?

Admiral BELLINGER. December 30.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Your idea is that the 37 that were not were those that were basically destroyed?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; although I think some later were gotten back in commission. I haven't the exact figures on that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did any Navy planes get in the air while the attack was on on that morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. Some patrol planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were saved?

Admiral BELLINGER. Those patrol planes went on search missions, that is the reason they took off. [9335]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did they search before or after the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. After.

Mr. RICHARDSON. During the attack how many of your planes got in the air?

Mr. MURPHY. I suggest we have the report of the Admiral dated December 17 in the record with these details in it. I think the witness might be presented with his own report of December 17.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead, Admiral, if you have the information.

Admiral BELLINGER. I have a rather elaborate answer to that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

According to my data the following operations took place on December 7, 1941:

At 0700—Patrol Plane 14 P-1 assisted in the sinking of a Japanese submarine off Pearl Harbor entrance.

At 0715—Message giving above information was coded and transmitted to Patrol Wing Two.

At 0735—This message was received, decoded and information received by Patrol Wing Two Staff Duty Officer.

[9336] At 0737—This message was relayed to Patrol Wing Two Operations Officer.

At 0740—This message was relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

At 0750—The patrol plane search plan assigning squadrons in accordance with their readiness was drafted.

At 0757—The first bomb dropped by Japanese aircraft was seen by the Operations Officer of Patrol Wing Two. It fell and exploded in the vicinity of the hangar utilized by Patrol Squadron 22.

At 0758—A message emanating from headquarters, Patrol Wing Two, was broadcast to all ships and units present, quote "Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill" unquote.

At 0800—Search plan was transmitted by radio and telephone. This was received and acted upon by some of the patrol planes in the air at 0805.

An accurate chronological account of events from then on during the attack was impracticable.

At one time during the first attack wave, both radio and telephone communications from headquarters of Patrol Wing Two were temporarily out of commission due to the attack; however, these were shortly put back in commission.

The three patrol planes, 14 P-1, 2 and 3, on early morning security search, were assigned search sector between [9337] north and northwest, and proceeded on search. After the first phase of the attack, Patrol Wing One reported two planes at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, available for immediate operation, and was directed to send these two planes on a northwesterly sector. Before these could be dispatched, another Japanese attack wave put them out of commission, at about the same time communications between Kaneohe and Pearl were knocked out.

Patrol Wing One, on own initiative, diverted the two planes then on northerly sector search, 14 P-1 and 3 to cover a westerly sector because of the loss of the two planes originally detailed, and in his effort to comply with instructions.

This diversion was not known to me until a few days after December 7 when checking the sectors covered by planes. This diversion removed two planes from a sector where the Japanese task force was later determined to be near.

[9338] The four patrol planes that were engaged in tactical exercises with submarines, 24 P-1, 2, 4, and 5, had difficulty in shifting their radio frequency, so that receipt of their originally planned assignment of sector was delayed. At this time, information was received that a chart taken from a Jap plane that had been destroyed indicated enemy rendezvous bearing 223 degrees and 90 miles from Pearl. These four planes were then assigned to cover sector 240 degrees to 280 degrees for at the time it was thought the enemy might retire westward.

Two patrol planes, 23 P-1 and 6, took off from Pearl and were assigned to a sector to the southwest.

One patrol plane, 23 P-4, taking off from Pearl, was assigned a sector to the westward.

The above ten patrol planes were all that could be put in search during the attack because of damage from the attack to the other planes, and to facilities.

The Army were directed to search to the northward, and they reported dispatching three groups:

One at 1115, consisting of 2 B-17's and four A-20A's.

One at 1255, consisting of 2 A-20A's.

One at 1330, consisting of 3 B-18's.

The 3-20's and B-18's were very limited in range.

Eight utility planes were dispatched on search as [9339] they were made ready later in the forenoon. Two of these were assigned a northerly sector, and the remainder a westerly sector.

The utility planes are for service to the Fleet and are not really military planes, but they were part of this naval defense air force, and some were made available.

Six VO-VS ship-spaced planes, short range, were assigned to a sector to the southward.

In the afternoon 9-SBD carrier planes of the *Lexington*, short range, were assigned to sector from NW to NE.

In the late afternoon, three B-17's (Army) took off to cover a sector to the southeast. This sector was at the instance of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, as a result of a supposedly radio compass bearing on Japan's radio.

It was impossible to formulate and carry out a thorough search plan because as planes at the air-bases were assigned and detailed for sectors, many were put out of commission, at least temporarily, by the Japanese attack.

In accordance with my data, the following planes engaged in search operations on December 7, with ranges from long to show:

10—Patrol planes (Navy).

8—Utility planes (Navy).

[9340] 6—VO-VS planes (Navy).

9—SBD planes from *Lexington* group (Navy).

5—B-17's (Army).

3—B-18's (Army).

6—A-20's (Army).

Total—47 planes.

[9341] Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was all after the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. During and after.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Please answer my question. Did you make any search while the attack was on by any planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Immediately.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What kind of a search did you make while the attack was on? What did you search for?

Admiral BELLINGER. To search for where the carriers were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were right there pouring bombs on you, weren't they?

Admiral BELLINGER. The planes were, not the carriers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you mean to tell me that planes were sent out during the first or second attack—

Admiral BELLINGER. I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON (continuing). On long-distance reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What planes? Before 11 o'clock—before 10:30 on Sunday morning, what planes were sent out on any search in any direction for any purpose?

Admiral BELLINGER. Two patrol planes, 23 Prep. 1 and 6, 1 patrol plane Prep. 34—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Wait just a minute. Who sent them out? Who sent out the two?

[9342] Admiral BELLINGER. I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What kind of planes were they?

Admiral BELLINGER. Patrol planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Long-distance patrol?

Admiral BELLINGER. Long-distance patrol.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What were their orders?

Admiral BELLINGER. 23 Prep. No. 16 were assigned a sector to the southwest. 23 Prep. 4 were assigned a sector to the westward.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute. That was the area where you had your three task forces, and these various planes that you have told about earlier was the southwest, wasn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. The question was where was this task force going to go after it made a strike.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which task force do you mean?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, in order to find them you sent two more planes out into the area where all your task forces were and the rest of your planes. Was that your order, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. I take responsibility for it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, let me ask you a question there. Had you familiarized yourself at all with your radar?

Admiral BELLINGER. We did not have any radar in planes.

[9343] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you familiarize yourself—

Admiral BELLINGER. We were familiar with it by technical information and had asked for it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I did not make myself clear. Did you have any information with reference to the operation of the Army radar?

Admiral BELLINGER. I knew the Army were setting up their radar section and combining it in the air combat command.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know it was working?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I did not think it was working.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you telephone to find out on the morning of December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I did not telephone to find out but I knew somewhat about it because Navy Lieutenant Commander Taylor was sent over; I don't know whether it was definitely on my initiative or not, to work with the Army in connection with this and he was working with the Army air combat group in connection with the establishment of this center.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, did you have any contact with him on the morning of the 7th?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not positive but I think I telephoned—I think he called me up.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why would he call you? You did not have [9344] any information, did you?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not have any information but we were—

Mr. RICHARDSON. He might have had some?

Admiral BELLINGER. We were interested in any information about where the planes were coming from, these Japanese planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And did you call anybody in the Army that had anything to do with their radar in order to get what information they had?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I did not know if it was working.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As far as you were concerned that radar station of the Army might just as well have been in Australia.

Admiral BELLINGER. Insofar as what good it did me on December 7, correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you knew there was no information center for the radar, didn't you?

Admiral BELLINGER. I knew that there was a center where this information came into; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you phone that center?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I did not phone that center.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is one of the reasons why you did not know which way the planes came in from, wasn't it, Admiral?

[9345] Admiral BELLINGER. I doubt that very seriously.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if it is true that the chart in the radar section showed planes discovered 132 miles north of Oahu and the chart showed them followed in until they were within a few miles of Oahu, there would have been some information there as to where the planes came from, wouldn't there?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, if those planes had been identified. That was one thing that at that stage of war readiness that we had, the question of identifying planes. Now, radar can pick up planes but the question is what planes are they?

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you did not go to the trouble of telephoning the station to get what information they might have had?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I was pretty busy doing other things, and I did not know that I would get any information from them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you were not doing anything more important than to find out where those attacking planes came from?

Admiral BELLINGER. I would have been delighted to find out where they came from, but it did not seem to me that they could tell me and I don't think they could have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At any rate, as the result of your efforts [9346] in that connection practically all of the search that was made to find where the raiders came from was to the west and southwest?

Admiral BELLINGER. As I said in my statement here, our first effort was to cover the northwest area. Two planes were removed from that by a combination of circumstances. That was not known.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was not known?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was not known, what I just read in this statement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was not known?

Admiral BELLINGER. That they were removed from the search in that area.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Somebody must have removed them, mustn't they?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. I just read it for you.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who removed them?

Admiral BELLINGER. Commander of the Patrol Wing, in his effort to carry out what he understood to be a prior directive.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was the one to the southwest?

Admiral BELLINGER. We had two patrol planes to the north-northwest area.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I don't seem to get it into my thick head. You started out two planes to the northwest [9347] and then they were removed. Now, where were they removed to?

Admiral BELLINGER. I would like to repeat just exactly what I read.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, please tell me again.

Admiral BELLINGER. There were three planes assigned to a sector between north and northwest.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And who assigned them?

Admiral BELLINGER. My organization.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER. The operations officer, to be exact.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What became of those three planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. One proceeded on. That was the one furthest to the north.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How far did it go?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not positive exactly, but I think it was about 450 miles. I am not positive on that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What became of the other two?

Admiral BELLINGER. The other two, as I said, were diverted after they were on this search to the westward.

Mr. RICHARDSON. By whom?

Admiral BELLINGER. By commander Patrol Wing 1's organization.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And was that because of a report that sent the search to the south and southwest?

[9348] Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Where were they diverted to?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were diverted to a westerly area.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was the area that was being covered by the two task forces?

Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me. The reason that the—I would like to repeat this. In making out a search plan you try to cover an area and you take the planes in almost in sequence as we can get them, as they are located, and we were trying to cover a north to west sector first. The planes that we thought were available to cover certain sectors did not become available later on account of being put out of commission. Two planes that were on this north-northwesterly area were diverted to a westerly area to comply with the instruction which we had given to the commander of the Patrol Wing some time previous to that when he said he had two planes available, but those two planes did not become available later because of being knocked out by the Japanese. So in an effort to comply with the original instructions he diverted those two planes that were with the third up north.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, how many planes went into the north sector before 10:30 o'clock on Sunday?

Admiral BELLINGER. That I cannot give exactly. I do not know the time proposition on that.

[9349] Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, let me ask you this: Had you any knowledge at the time of the attack that the Army was on a sabotage alert?

Admiral BELLINGER. I cannot say as a fact that I did. I probably did. I knew—in looking back I remember that there was a consider-

able effort made to prevent sabotage. I know I was concerned with that to give the general lay of the land and in the general set-up of security measures on shore.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me ask you this question: It has interested me, Admiral. You saw these planes come in and bomb Pearl Harbor, didn't you?

Admiral BELLINGER. The first planes I saw were three planes that—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you saw some of them?

Admiral BELLINGER (continuing).—which passed over the *Arizona*. The next instant the *Arizona* blew up. I had also been informed at that time, just about 2 minutes prior to that, by telephone that we were under attack, so I assumed those were Japanese planes after the *Arizona* blew up. The next I saw was nine planes overhead and I assumed that they were Japanese planes, too.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not interested in how many planes you saw. I am simply asking you the general question if you saw the planes coming in on the attack?

[9350] Admiral BELLINGER. I did not see them coming in. I saw them there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, then, did you see the planes that were using the aerial torpedoes?

Admiral BELLINGER. I assumed these planes that passed over the *Arizona* had used torpedoes because they acted like it. They were flying at about 150 feet and had just dropped their torpedoes, apparently, and had passed over the *Arizona*.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, would it be fair to say that the planes which did the bombing with the torpedoes came in over the harbor at approximately 150 to 200 feet height?

Admiral BELLINGER. I would say so; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Could you, in your opinion, Admiral, have done the full duty of long distance reconnaissance during the week prior to Pearl Harbor without neglecting or slowing down the training program that the fleet was undergoing?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were really two irreconcilable duties, were they not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; I would say very definitely.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when you went on the job out there, or shortly afterward, you got together with Martin and made an estimate, didn't you?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

[9351] Mr. RICHARDSON. And that estimate was never used after that prior to December 7, was it?

Admiral BELLINGER. The estimate was not used.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. Now, you also testified, did you not, Admiral, that the mission sanction in the plan that you and Martin prepared was that there was no unity of command?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that plan in order to be a successful plan, or to have the greatest chance of success, should have had unity of command?

Admiral BELLINGER. You are asking me?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, that is the answer, unity of command.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you also testified——

Admiral BELLINGER. In other words, definite, specific command in one individual.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. Now, you also testified in one of your former hearings, did you not, that the primary duty of the Army aircraft you considered to be in expansion training?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Army? You said "the Army"?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Referring to the Army aircraft.

[9352] **Admiral BELLINGER.** I don't think I said that, sir. I never used the word "expansion." I think the Navy used that term. The Army had "training."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Didn't you also testify that the primary duty of the Navy aircraft was in expansion training?

Admiral BELLINGER. The primary duty was getting ready for war and in connection with that duty it required definite expansion training and that was assigned as such.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then you further testified, did you not, that when you came to look around you after you took command you found you were operating on a shoestring and a very slim shoe string at that?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you mean by that? Or let me make it more direct.

Admiral BELLINGER. That is all right, I can answer that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You meant by that, didn't you, that you did not have enough planes and you did not have enough spare parts and you did not have enough crews to do a good job?

Admiral BELLINGER. I mean that and a lot more.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you meant that, as far as I went?

Admiral BELLINGER. I meant that definitely but a lot more.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you also came to the conclusion, [9353] did you not, when you surveyed this shoestring that you were supposed to operate on, you came to the conclusion and testified that the Navy Department, in your opinion, could not view the situation at Hawaii with any alarm if that was all they gave you to go on?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is what I inferred in my letter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was your opinion.

Admiral BELLINGER. You must remember this: I came out there to Pearl Harbor; I thought the situation was going to gradually run into war. The question was what did we have and what did we require and what could I do about it? That letter was a month—took a month to prepare, trying to figure how was the best way to bring this to the attention, the situation, and I used certain language in there with the idea of making that letter strong enough to bring it to the attention.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Admiral, I am not referring to that letter. I am not referring to what you wrote to the War Department.

Admiral BELLINGER. That is the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Or the Navy Department. I am referring to your own testimony, as to whether you did not testify that from all of these facts you concluded that the Navy Department did not view

the situation in Hawaii with alarm in view [9354] of what they gave you to do business with. Isn't that——

Admiral BELLINGER. In view of——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Didn't you so testify?

Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me; you have got to be correct on this.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Didn't you so testify?

Admiral BELLINGER. There is a reference in the letter and I spoke about a reference.

Mr. RICHARDSON (to counsel). Will you give me 668 of the Naval Court?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think reference A indicates that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You will find you never mentioned reference A here in the testimony.

Admiral BELLINGER. Maybe not. It is a long time ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will pass it until it comes in.

You also envisioned at the time, did you not, Admiral, as an air expert, after you had surveyed the situation in Hawaii, that an attack from the air was the most likely form of attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Correct. I would like to invite particular attention to that statement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER. This estimate of the situation has this introduction on top:

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air [9355] action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area.

By that I mean to infer that this is not an estimate of Japanese strategy, over-all strategy. It is the strategy they would employ and the tactics they would employ when they decided to make an attack on Oahu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, was an air attack on Pearl Harbor, in your opinion, the most likely form of attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. That is what I asked you in the first place, Admiral.

Now, between November 26 and December 7 you never had occasion to confer with the Army or any representative of the Army in reference to the installation of long distance reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, if you had had your planes ready and you had received the radar warning promptly as soon as they discovered it, which was, say, an hour before the attack, in your opinion from your experience could you have taken any measures which would have reasonably insured minimizing the strength and force and damage of that attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. The question of minimizing would have been ready at the guns, knowing that the attack was coming and [9356] the readiness of the air combat planes to meet the attack. There would have been an indication of where the carrier force was and there is a possibility that some planes might have gotten through without being shot down and we might have located the carrier.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, do you think that on the Pearl Harbor end there would have been any reasonable certainty that the attack could have been seriously minimized if you had had that information?

What I am driving at is, once planes leave the carrier in force and that force is greater than the number of defending planes, don't you as an expert on the matter recognize that the probability is that the attack can be carried through in substantial force regardless of the defense?

Admiral BELLINGER. The attack could have been carried through, there is no doubt about that, under those conditions that you just mentioned, but the severity of the attack might have been reduced. For instance, on ships the antiaircraft guns knowing that the planes coming in were Japanese prior to their coming in within gunfire, for instance, would have brought about a situation which would have been quite different.

[9357] Mr. RICHARDSON. How long would it take to put a plane that was on the concrete of your beach in readiness to go in the air either for search or combat?

Admiral BELLINGER. You are speaking about patrol planes, I assume.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. The degree of readiness has a great deal to do with it. Fifteen minutes, I would say, if the plane is standing by ready with the crew.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am speaking about a plane that is not ready at all. That is a perfectly cold plane. It hasn't done anything to get ready. How long would it take to get the plane in the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is a difficult question to answer, because where do you start from?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am starting from just where you started when you said in your statement that you had planes on 15 minutes' notice, and you had planes on 30 minutes' notice, and planes on 4 hours' notice.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what I am wondering is why the difference in that time.

Admiral BELLINGER. The 15 minutes' notice was in order to keep a plane available at Kaneohe and one at Pearl [9358] Harbor, available to go immediately on call.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were all ready to go?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were all ready to go.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What about the next group?

Admiral BELLINGER. The 30 minutes were the detail on alert.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me ask you a question right there, Admiral.

When these planes were on the beach, were they fueled?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And did they have ammunition?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were ready for every purpose, then?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Except to put the men in and warm the engine up?

Admiral BELLINGER. To warm the engine up, to put the men in, and get their orders.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what is it that would cause a delay of 4 hours?

Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, the 4-hour information is the availability that was ordered by the naval base defense force commander. The idea was not [9359] that the planes themselves would be only ready in 4 hours but that they were not supposed to be called prior to giving a 4-hour notice.

Now, for instance, I know one plane got under way out of Pearl Harbor when the attack was on and was even fired at by our own people. That plane was one of those on a 4-hour basis, and it got under way in about between 30 and 40 minutes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. By the way, Admiral, when Halsey's task force came in, some of the planes of his carrier that were coming in to the base at Pearl Harbor were fired on as hostile planes, were they not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was not sufficient control of communications between Pearl Harbor and the Halsey task force to prevent that disaster?

Admiral BELLINGER. Either a question of that or a question of itchy fingers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is that?

Admiral BELLINGER. Itchy fingers of inexperienced personnel. I knew they were coming in. I made arrangements with every command that it was possible to get through on to inform them that they were coming in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any way of contacting [9360] your planes in the air with information?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why did not that work?

Admiral BELLINGER. What planes do you mean in the air? Do you mean the Halsey planes?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. These Halsey planes that were shot down were shot down by what fire? The fleet or antiaircraft guns?

Admiral BELLINGER. Both. I do not know which ones actually hit them, but I saw the fire, which was considerable fire.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any attempt made when you found out that Halsey's planes were coming in to notify the antiaircraft batteries and the fleet that they were coming in?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And despite that, they were fired on?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I call your attention to a colloquy—

Senator LUCAS. Will the counsel yield for one point that I would like to get clear in my mind?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Did you get the proper information to [9361] all these battery commanders, advising them that Halsey's planes were coming in?

Admiral BELLINGER. I got it through the channel that I could get, which was a set-up for that whole control. In other words, the control base at the navy yard—not my base, but the control base at the navy yard—had their circuits which went out.

Senator LUCAS. Were they all working?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; as far as I know.

Senator LUCAS. Then they all did get the information?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think so.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield? I believe you will find in the record the reason for it was there was an order not to fire; but as they came in there was a very peculiar smoke condition there, and these planes came in through the smoke; and when they did, one fellow got itchy fingers and started firing, and the others followed suit, and Admiral Kimmel ordered them to stop firing, in order to stop that.

Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, I tried to stop it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, Admiral Kimmel took credit for it, no matter who did it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I assume if Admiral Kimmel was to get the benefit of the good results, he must take the burden [9362] too of the bad ones.

Going back to my colloquy a moment ago, let me read from your testimony before the naval board, page 668:

I refer to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, Serial O95323, in which it was indicated to me that there was no intention to replace present obsolescent type of patrol planes of Patrol Wing Two, prior to one year, and that Patrol Wing Two would practically be the last wing to be furnished new planes. I stated that this, together with the many existing deficiencies indicated to me that the Navy Department as a whole, did not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm, or else is not taking steps in keeping with their views.

You remember so testifying, don't you?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was your information at the time?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct, sir. All I wanted to point out was that reference A had a bearing on the subject. It indicated that the Patrol Wing 2 was to be the last wing to be equipped with new planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, you did not see the warning message of November 24?

Admiral BELLINGER. I saw none of the warning messages.

[9363] Mr. RICHARDSON. You received no information with reference to any of the diplomatic intercepts?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You have seen them since?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have read most of them, I think.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I will ask you this:

If you had had knowledge of those dispatches and the information conveyed thereby, would your orders, or action or advice, or efforts have been changed with respect to the status quo of the part of the Navy that was under you in Hawaii on December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was asked that question on two different boards, and I can only state this: As to whether I would have done it, I would like to think I would have done it, but only God knows what I would have done. I would rather leave that for those who know me to make their estimate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, when did you arrive in Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think it was the 28th of October 1940. I took over on the 1st of November 1940.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You took over on November 1, 1940?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

[9364] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just what was your appointment?
Admiral BELLINGER. Commander of Patrol Wing 2.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you continued thereon until the time of the attack on December 7, 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. Things changed a little bit. For instance, Patrol Wing 1 was established, and I was given control over that wing also as an additional job.

It had a patrol wing commander, but I had control over it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you finally reach the point that you were the air officer of the Pacific Fleet based in Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I never reached that condition at any time. For instance, the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, had an aviator on his staff who was called the aviation aide on his staff, so he was the staff officer of the revised commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was Commander A. C. Davis, now rear admiral. There were other commands out in that area in the carrier forces.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, I understand you to state that from the time you arrived in Hawaii you expected war. Is [9365] that correct?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And your defense plan that you prepared provided for defense against air attack, because you thought that was the most likely form of hostile attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, Admiral Kimmel had the idea that it was necessary to bring about a cooperative, or coordinated, so far as practical, plan of air defense of the Pearl Harbor area, and the reason for this estimate of the situation was his directive to me to report to Admiral Bloch, who was going to be the commander of the naval base defense force, and to work out a plan with General Martin, the commander, Hawaiian Air Force.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Martin was the commander of the Army Air Force at Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the commander of the Navy Air Force at Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. Martin, did you say?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Martin.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Martin was the commander of the Army Air Force at Hawaii?

[9366] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the commander of the Navy Air Force at Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. There was no such term as Navy Air Force at that time. I was merely commander of Patrol Wing 2 and later commander of Patrol Wings, Hawaiian Area.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, in that capacity, were you Martin's opposite number?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not exactly. In many cases, I was, and in this particular set-up, which I was directed to work out with him, in that I was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was one of the reasons I was inquiring, Admiral, as to why it was that you happened to be the Navy man who participated in the Martin-Bellinger report unless you were the opposite of General Martin.

Admiral BELLINGER. On account of the nature of patrol planes, my base of operation was necessarily on shore, except when I went out on tenders at bases where they may operate, and on account of my being based on shore, and also on account of the fact that in connection with this defense plan patrol planes would undoubtedly enter into it to a big extent—that, I think, was the particular reason that Admiral Kimmel gave this to me.

[9367] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you say at the time you arrived at Hawaii, and all the time after that, you expected war.

Admiral BELLINGER. Eventually; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you think the war would start by a surprise air attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Knowing the background of the Japanese, I thought it would probably start with an attack somewhere; not necessarily at Oahu, and not necessarily an air attack, but that if an attack was planned for Oahu, that it would be an air attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. But you had not reached the point in your thinking that your conclusion was that the war would start with an attack on the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. At Pearl Harbor?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Wherever the Pacific Fleet was.

Admiral BELLINGER. I had not reached any definite conclusion; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, how did you think the attack would start?

Admiral BELLINGER. I thought the attack would probably start in the Philippines.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In the form of an air attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes; air attack combined with surface attack.

[9368] The VICE CHAIRMAN. On the Philippines?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And in your thinking, you had not reached the point that you had reached the conclusion that there would be an air attack on Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. No; I had not reached the conclusion that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor. I think they made a big mistake, and it was very poor strategy on their part.

I could not have anticipated the poor strategy prior to December, though.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At least you did not agree with them in the strategy they used?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

[9369] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now on page 4 of your statement, Admiral, at the bottom of the page you state:

Those patrol planes that were initially in the highest degree of readiness were assigned to the northwest sectors which were considered the most vital.

In your note there you state:

This was because the prevailing winds were from the northeast and enemy carriers could thus recover their planes while retiring from the Oahu area.

That would clearly show that it was your thought that if an air attack on Hawaii did come it would come from the northwest sector?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not absolutely, but when it came to starting something you had to start somewhere so you start with the most probable. For instance, on that base they sometimes have corner winds which are from the opposite direction, and under those conditions, why, it might have been another problem.

Presumably the Japanese could have done their own selection as to when they were going to make the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Assuming that Japan decided to initiate the war by an air attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, then would you assume that the most likely way they would come would be from the northwest [9370] sector?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I thought that would give them the most chances.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Now, as you have indicated in your answers given to the counsel, that sector was not covered by long-distance patrol or reconnaissance on the 6th of December.

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Had it been on the 5th of December?

Admiral BELLINGER. Probably out to 300 miles.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just to 300 miles, but under your definition that is not long-range reconnaissance.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. That was entirely connected with the wing tactical exercises and was not for purposes of security.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, had such a search been made at any time before the attack on December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. Searches beyond 500 miles I believe had never been carried out before from Hawaii, or from Oahu.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I mean by planes from Oahu.

Admiral BELLINGER. From Oahu?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. Had that ever been done?

Admiral BELLINGER. Searches beyond 500 miles, sir, had [9371] never been carried out from Oahu prior to December 7, to my knowledge.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER. But searches of lesser distance, of perhaps 400 or 450 miles, had been carried out on occasions, when ordered.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But under your definition of long-range reconnaissance or searches, those particular searches would not qualify as such?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not from the point of view of determining security from air attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what we are talking about, security from air attack.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was done after December 7 in the way of long-range reconnaissance from Oahu?

Admiral BELLINGER. Immediately the situation was examined into to determine how many planes we had available and there were prorated on long-distance search, 700 miles to 800 miles.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was initiated after the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. After the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that it was done after the attack but had not been done at any time before the attack?

[9372] Admiral BELLINGER. All concentration of effort of our patrol wing after December 7 was long-range search.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. How many planes did you use in that long-range search after December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. We used about 25 to 30 planes a day, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Twenty-five to thirty planes a day?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, from the patrol squadron.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And those searches were made from Oahu?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the number of planes you had after December 7 were just slightly more than half of what you had before December 7, was it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir—immediately after?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Considerably less than that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Considerably less than half?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The planes available?

Admiral BELLINGER. Immediately after.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Immediately after, than was true before the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

[9373] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, at this point we will have to recess until 2 o'clock. I will ask you to be back at that time, please, Admiral.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[9374]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Chair understands that at the noon recess Congressman Cooper had finished with his examination.

Senator George is not here at the moment, but will be here, and Mr. Clark will be here.

Senator Lucas, you may go ahead.

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. PATRICK NEISON LYNCH BELLINGER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Bellinger, on page 3 of your statement you state:

The term "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force" might be considered a misnomer as it was not an actual command until the Naval Base Defense Force organization was placed in a functioning status.

Who is responsible for placing it in a functioning status?

Admiral BELLINGER. The commander Naval Base Defense Force was the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch. He did not have full control of patrol planes or any definitely assigned to him, so before he could have put it actually in a functioning status he would have really had to talk to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, Admiral Kimmel had the last word as to whether or not the command was in a functioning status? [9375]

Admiral BELLINGER. That is with reference to the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I am talking about.

Admiral BELLINGER. With reference to the Army going into it, you would have to get the concurrence of the Army commander.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that. I am only talking now about the Navy, in respect to the functioning status.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What do you mean by "functioning status"?

Admiral BELLINGER. I mean an actual business operating schedule.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I am speaking primarily now with respect to the condition of war being imminent. What would the functioning status mean to you if you knew that war was imminent with Japan?

Admiral BELLINGER. A function status would have meant that the patrols would have been run every day, that fighter planes would have been standing by on an alert status, that bomber planes would have been standing by on a ready status, antiaircraft guns would have been ready to have been put in action.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand, nothing like that was ordered by Admiral Kimmel previous to the attack.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

[9376] Senator LUCAS. You were more or less on a routine duty during the months of November and December.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; in accordance with approved schedules.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever detect any change from the regular routine duty that you were on during the month of November?

Admiral BELLINGER. We kept one squadron ready to go wherever it might be ordered in an expeditious fashion. We placed a service group for patrol planes on Wake Island. One squadron went to Midway on October 17, I think it was. It was still out there until it returned on December 5. Another squadron went out to Midway, and the other squadron that was there went to Wake, and that was all in connection with special operations, in connection with reinforcement of Wake and Midway with Marine planes.

Senator LUCAS. When was that order put into effect? Do you recall when that was?

Admiral BELLINGER. On November 28 I received an order from the commander in chief, Pacific, to direct 12 patrol planes to Midway, proceed to Wake on December 1, search en route.

Senator LUCAS. That was an order merely carrying out the plans which had been agreed upon by Admiral Kimmel and [9377] Naval Operations in Washington to transmit those planes out to Midway.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What I am talking about now is the regular, ordinary routine duties that you had. Were they changed in any way whatsoever after November 27, 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; not to my recollection.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, the only change in your duties was with respect to some specific order that came along, and you have given us an example of that when you told us about sending these planes out to Wake Island?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now you state on the same page:

The Naval Base Defense Air Force was a paper organization; it did not exist, in fact, as an entity unto itself.

What do you mean by "Naval Base Defense Air Force was a paper organization"?

Admiral BELLINGER. I mean that the nearest analogy I can give you as an explanation is that if a division of ships had a landing force organized on board of the various ships there would be someone to take command of that when the landing force was ordered to be landed. That was not in effect and would be merely a paper organization until the order came to put it into effect.

[9378] Senator LUCAS. In other words, until the outbreak of war this probably would not be in effect?

Admiral BELLINGER. Either that, or until joint action had been taken to put it into effect by proper authority.

Senator LUCAS. You were the same Admiral Bellinger who prepared or aided in preparing the so-called Martin-Bellinger report, were you not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Was that submitted to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; copies went to him.

Senator LUCAS. And he approved it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did he have the material to carry that plan into effect?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not in the complete state; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did he ever do anything? Did Admiral Kimmel ever do anything toward carrying into effect the Martin-Bellinger report?

Admiral BELLINGER. He initiated this at the very beginning. That is the reason it was drawn up and became the organization that it was. Except for drills it was never put into a functioning status.

Senator LUCAS. What was the nature of the drills that you had?

[9379] Admiral BELLINGER. The drills I am speaking about are the drills for the Naval Base Air Defense.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. How were they carried out?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were carried out by having—excuse me. This paper describes it minutely. The only thing left out of it was that a target was usually placed out at sea in the shape of a ship, a carrier or another type of ship, and the location of that ship would not be known and it would be a question of the ship being there at some time during the period of the drill, and it was necessary to fire on that ship and simulate an attack group going out to attack it and

simulate planes coming in from the direction in which that ship was, simulating aircraft coming in for attack.

[9380] Senator LUCAS. Now, were those drills held in contemplation of an air raid?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. By an enemy?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. That is the whole basis of it.

Senator LUCAS. Were they held in contemplation of a surprise attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. For a real surprise, no drill is going to be satisfactory, because it is too late then.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you discussed in this remarkable report that you and General Martin, as I recall, the very route that the Japanese would take in coming into Pearl Harbor on a surprise attack, and you also said it would be preceded by submarines, three or five submarines probably around the harbor.

I was tremendously interested in that report, and I wondered whether you and General Martin were not thinking about a surprise attack when you drew that report.

Admiral BELLINGER. This organization, unless it is working prior to an attack, is not worth the paper it is drawn on.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that it is not worth the paper it is drawn on unless it is working prior to an [9381] attack, but you fellows drew it and you drew a remarkable picture of what was going to happen to Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And what did happen.

Senator LUCAS. And what did happen. It is just a little bit difficult for me to understand, after such a remarkable report was drawn in contemplation of a surprise attack, that everybody was surprised by the attack.

I wonder if you can throw any light on it.

Admiral BELLINGER. As to why we were surprised?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, we were at peace on December 6.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. There was certain information in Washington and certain information in Hawaii. It is a question whether or not, analyzing and estimating the situation, it could have been predicted that the attack was going to be made there, and when.

Senator LUCAS. I appreciate that. No one knew, and I do not think there is any evidence in this record to show that the Japs were going to attack at the time they did, but, nevertheless, the Navy and Army were out in the Pacific, and you had gone through all these air drills, you had drawn this plan, and it is a little difficult for me to understand just why there was not a little more [9382] confidence on the part of the Navy that there would be a possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral BELLINGER. To go back to this estimate again, as I brought out this morning, this estimate was an estimate covering the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu. It was not an estimate of the strategy that the Japanese would employ in starting this war.

In other words, it was not an estimate which indicated that they were going to strike against Oahu as part of their national strategy.

In other words, if they were going to strike Oahu, this was the estimate of how it would be done.

Senator LUCAS. If they were going to strike?

Admiral BELLINGER. If they were going to strike.

Senator LUCAS. Well now, on the question of training the men to fly these ships, you discussed that at some length. Did not you, as the commanding officer there, feel that it was necessary for these boys to get some training on long reconnaissance ships?

Admiral BELLINGER. They got it, but the question is "How long?"

For instance, during the week of December 2 to 5 squadrons were used on reconnaissance. Three hundred miles was about the distance they went out. The question [9383] of how far to send them does not necessarily enter so much in the picture, except for the results obtained.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is a fact that one of these aviators can get valuable training in doing long reconnaissance search; can he not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; they had to be trained in that.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. And in 1940, when Admiral Richardson was out there, he had his naval planes on reconnaissance, as I recall, for some 6 weeks. Are you familiar with that?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes; I remember that.

Senator LUCAS. Were you out there at that time?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; part of the time.

Senator LUCAS. You recall that he and the Army as a combination, ran a long-range reconnaissance after they received the alert order from the Chief of Naval Operations here in Washington; do you not?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not think the Army took part in that.

Senator LUCAS. Just the Navy alone?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I have never been able to understand if Admiral Richardson could run long-range reconnaissance in 1940, why it was that Admiral Kimmel could not have [9384] run a long-range reconnaissance in 1941.

Can you give me any answer to that?

Admiral BELLINGER. The range of that reconnaissance that you are speaking about by Admiral Richardson, I think, was 300 miles.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. It may have been 400. I have forgotten now, but I do not think it was over 400 miles.

Senator LUCAS. That may be true.

Admiral BELLINGER. I am now trying to analyze the point of view maybe of Admiral Kimmel, in connection with trying to give you an answer.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. A question was asked this morning, I believe, as to why we did not make a long-range reconnaissance. Maybe I can answer that a little more fully right now.

Senator LUCAS. All right, sir. I think we are all interested in it.

Admiral BELLINGER. Admiral Kimmel knew the general situation in regard to patrol planes. I kept him so informed. We were trying to get these planes re-equipped with the new planes as quickly as we could.

From October 28 until November 23, 1941, 54 planes [9385] came out there, new planes.

Those planes were a late type and were not equipped with spares to keep them in operation.

The planes had been giving trouble with engine cowling, the nose section of the engine was cracking.

That was on the first squadron that came out about midsummer.

It was expected that these would have corrected features in them. It was not exactly known at that time that the full effect of correction was satisfactory.

[9386] I think he knew all of that and knew when these planes arrived, and I think he also realized what was involved in patrol planes in connection with carrying out war plan 46, I am sure he did, and perhaps all of those considerations were borne in his mind.

Senator LUCAS. Assuming that you had been the commander out there and that you knew war was imminent, and you received a war-warning message, would that have made any difference in respect to using these planes for reconnaissance work?

Admiral BELLINGER. Perhaps. I answered that question this morning and said God only knows what I would have done. But I can say this, that I was very much surprised when I heard that there had been a message.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I was just coming to that. I was wondering whether or not Admiral Kimmel ever discussed with you any of these messages that came from the Chief of Naval Operations to him, starting with April on up to the time of the attack.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now General Davis was his air officer, as I understand it.

Admiral BELLINGER. Commander Davis.

Senator LUCAS. Commander Davis. How close were you to [9387] Commander Davis?

Admiral BELLINGER. Very close.

Senator LUCAS. Did Commander Davis discuss with you at any time the acceptance of any of these messages that came from the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I do not know that he knew about that.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield? I expect to go into the Davis matter and show that he did not know about that either.

Senator LUCAS. What were the duties of General Davis?

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Davis.

Senator LUCAS. I keep getting my generals and commanders mixed.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. Pardon the interruption.

Senator LUCAS. It is perfectly all right, sir.

What were the duties of Commander Davis?

Admiral BELLINGER. He was the aviation aide on the staff of Admiral Kimmel and his duties were assigned by Admiral Kimmel.

Senator LUCAS. How often did you see him?

Admiral BELLINGER. I would say I was in communication with him by telephone or saw him at least, I should say, on the average of every day.

[9388] Senator LUCAS. Did he give you any direct orders as to what you should do with respect to the Air Force?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. He had no authority except by virtue of being on the staff of Admiral Kimmel.

Senator LUCAS. What he was then was sort of a liaison man; is that it?

Admiral BELLINGER. He was an aide to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator LUCAS. And Admiral Kimmel was the only one who could give you orders as to what to do then?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. At no time, as I understand it, during the months of November and October did Admiral Kimmel talk to you about any messages that he might have received from Washington, D. C.?

Admiral BELLINGER. He did not talk to me about them.

Senator LUCAS. I call your attention to Exhibit 37. As an example, page 1, the message of April 1, 1941, which was sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. It says:

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

[9389] Are you familiar with that order?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; but I was familiar with the general situation in that respect. As a matter of fact, my operations officer wrote an article which was published in the Naval Institute, I think in 1936, which practically duplicated this estimate of the situation in regard to an attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. So that this was not any news, particularly.

Senator LUCAS. I see. It was no news at all? It was merely a reminder of something you already knew?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, what was the condition of these planes that were destroyed by the Japanese on December 7, on the Saturday before? Were they in the same places, the same conditions, the same spots?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I don't think so. I can't say for sure but I would be willing to bet they were not in the same places.

Senator LUCAS. Were there more planes on hand at that particular time than there were during the other days of the week, on this particular Sunday morning? I presume your operation schedule would show exactly as to the dispersal [9390] of your planes during that week.

Admiral BELLINGER. I believe there were more, perhaps, on the beach on Saturday than there were on Sunday.

Senator LUCAS. Why was that? Was that pay day?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, we had been working pretty strong on the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th, and you have got to do something about easing up on personnel.

Senator LUCAS. I appreciate that.

Admiral BELLINGER. But every day was a working day. That was started in my forces about March 1, or maybe April 1.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is a fact that there were more naval officers and men at Pearl Harbor on the week end than at any other time; is it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. On week days?

Senator LUCAS. No; on the week ends, Saturdays and Sundays. That was the custom, wasn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not necessarily. As far as my outfit was concerned I tried to make a schedule that would hold water utilizing every day as a work day, Saturdays and Sundays the same as Tuesdays or Wednesdays. But there were certain combinations which did make a let-up at times maybe more than others.

As I said before, if you look at this schedule you will find on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday there [9391] was considerable activity and that was when we were having wing tactics.

Senator LUCAS. Well, was that the regular operation schedule every week?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, not every week; but it was in our schedule of employment.

Senator LUCAS. It shows that you were busy the first part of the week and then over the week end these fellows were entitled to some rest and recreation.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes; but that doesn't follow necessarily all the way through.

Senator LUCAS. Now, where were you when the attack took place?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was taken sick with what they call acute laryngitis, I believe, a type of flu, on December 2, and on December 7, that was to be my first day up.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

Admiral BELLINGER. I got up very hurriedly.

Senator LUCAS. You didn't wait for the doctor to tell you?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Who was in command while you were away?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was still in command and in touch every day with my operations officer who was my second in command, at that time Commander Ramsey.

[9392] Senator LUCAS. Were you in the hospital?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I was at home. The first message that I received about the attack was from Commander Ramsey, now captain, and I would say that it was probably a few seconds before 8 o'clock.

Senator LUCAS. When did you first see Admiral Kimmel after the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. I talked to him on the telephone the day of the attack, over the telephone. I did not see him until a few days later.

Senator LUCAS. When was the last—

Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, I stayed in the office practically all the time.

Senator LUCAS. When was the last time you talked to Admiral Kimmel before December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember exactly, but I think the latter part of November, probably the 26th or 27th.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall what you talked about?

Admiral BELLINGER. There was a conference, I remember, in connection with—whether that was the last time or not I am not sure—but I know I was over there in a conference with reference to making plans for these planes to be put on Wake and Midway.

Senator LUCAS. There was nothing at that time said [9393] about the imminence of war with Japan?

Admiral BELLINGER. No; not with reference to any war warning or dispatches from Washington in connection with it.

Senator LUCAS. I direct your attention again to Exhibit 37. Just take a cursory glance at the messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations, particularly the one of October 16, which says:

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U. S.

And so on. Are you familiar with that message?

Admiral BELLINGER. One minute until I find it. What page is it?

Senator LUCAS. Page 18. Did you ever see that message?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I don't remember seeing that before December 7.

Senator LUCAS. Have you read it since these hearings started?

Admiral BELLINGER. Sir?

Senator LUCAS. Have you read that message since these hearings started?

[9394] Admiral BELLINGER. I think I have seen them all.

Senator LUCAS. You have seen them all?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think so. Most of these were shown to me at various investigations on this subject. And, as a matter of fact, I didn't know that there was any message other than one message, the war-warning message, until 1944.

Senator LUCAS. You are familiar with all of these top secret messages that were sent?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; not familiar.

Senator LUCAS. You have read them all?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have read the testimony on a good many of them.

Senator LUCAS. Directing your attention to the message of November 24, assuming Admiral Kimmel had given you that message—the Admiral has complained bitterly because Washington didn't give him all the information they had—I am wondering what you would have done had Admiral Kimmel given to you the message of November 24. It is found on page 36. That is the message that says a surprise aggressive movement is possible in any direction. What would that message have conveyed to you, if anything? Give us your best judgment on it now, although I appreciate it is hindsight.

Admiral BELLINGER. Hindsight is one thing and foresight is another. This situation at Pearl Harbor was another. I [9395] have been asked that question many times.

Senator LUCAS. The reason I ask—

Admiral BELLINGER. I wish I had seen it. I don't know what I would have done. I would rather have the people who know me think what I would have done. Only God knows what I would have done. I can't make any statement on that.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the reason I ask the question is that you were in charge of, more or less in charge of, the air forces there.

Admiral BELLINGER. Patrol planes only.

Senator LUCAS. Who had charge of the other planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Various commands of the air in the fleet. For instance, there were utility planes headed by a wing commander. There were marine planes headed by a colonel. There were carrier planes and organization headed by Admiral Halsey.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

I suppose what you have said about this message would be true about the war-warning message, too, of November 27?

Admiral BELLINGER. If I would have gotten any of these messages I would have made an estimate of the situation, with my knowledge and understanding at the time, and taken action accordingly.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe now, Admiral, that you [9396] were entitled to receive these messages from Admiral Kimmel in view of the position that you had there as commander of the patrol fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think that was Admiral Kimmel's business entirely. I can't answer for that.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I was wondering what your position would be. You say that you would have liked to have seen the messages, you would have liked to have had them in your possession. You at least by implication say you would have had more insight into what was going on. I am wondering whether or not you thought it was the duty of Admiral Kimmel to pass this kind of message on to you under the arrangement that you had out there.

Admiral BELLINGER. I certainly am not one to say what the commander in chief's duty was. I was under him.

[9397] Senator LUCAS. In other words, whatever he did was all right with you?

Admiral BELLINGER. I wouldn't have been full of inhibitions, as I remember. I think that if I saw something that I thought I should have seen at the time, I think I probably would have brought the question up with him.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that is what I am trying to ask you about, that is what I am trying to find out, whether or not you think you should have seen any of these messages. I am basing that now, primarily, on the contention that Admiral Kimmel has made in his case before the committee. He complains bitterly because Admiral Stark didn't send him information.

In view of the fact that you were a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel, I am wondering what you think of his failing to send you information, if he did.

Admiral BELLINGER. I think your guess is about as good as mine. I can express an opinion. I can say that if he had shown me the messages and the situation did remain as is, why, I would be in a different situation at the present time.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I don't know what that situation is, and I am not going to inquire into it.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the Senator yield?

[9398] Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I want to make just this observation. I think it is quite apparent that Admiral Bellinger at that time was a commander. Is that true?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; a rear admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. A rear admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But you were serving under the direct orders of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were not a member of his staff?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I was a task force commander under him.

Mr. KEEFE. You took orders from him?

Admiral BELLINGER. Took orders from him; yes sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the way it works in the Navy isn't it, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In the line of command?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Fellows down below don't usually dispute the higher-ups, do they?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. In good teamwork opinions are expressed back and forth.

[9399] Mr. KEEFE. We have had some evidence of that before this committee, I think.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. One other question.

The only reason I raised these questions is that you raise it yourself. In other words, you must have attached some significance to the fact that you never saw any of these papers given to Admiral Kimmel until after the war was on, because you so state. You state in your statement on page 8:

I had no knowledge of any of the warning messages emanating from the Navy and War Departments, during October November and December. I never knew of any warning dispatches until a few days after the attack—on the evening of about December 10, I think it was—when I was told by one of my officers that he had just heard that there had been a warning dispatch received in the District Naval Intelligence Office, and that the local Intelligence officer of the Naval Air Station knew about it. I immediately sent for that Intelligence officer, and he confirmed this information. Several days after that, when I was working on some papers with Admiral Kimmel, I first saw one of the warning dispatches.

[9400] In other words, it apparently disturbed you at the time that you hadn't seen any of these messages, and you immediately contacted the district naval intelligence office.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; I did that. I could have recommended to him that we do start patrols.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. That is the point I am trying to develop. You did have it within your power to make such a recommendation, that long-distance reconnaissance be used. The point that I was hoping you would answer was whether or not, if you had all of this information at hand and had the chance to analyze it, whether or not it might have made a difference with you in respect to the recommendations that at least you might have made?

Admiral BELLINGER. There is a possibility.

Senator LUCAS. There is a possibility. Was Admiral Kimmel depending upon you for recommendations as to whether or not the long-distance reconnaissance would be made?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not to my knowledge.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I wanted to know about. You were concerned about this. You wanted the committee to know that you didn't receive any of these messages after November 27 and before. I was trying to find out why you wanted the committee to know about it.

[9401] Admiral BELLINGER. I want everybody to know about it.

Senator LUCAS. I see. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George would be next, but he will inquire later. The Chair would like to advise that he is advised that if possible without restricting any members' interrogation, that Admiral Bellinger is on an assignment that makes it important that he get away tonight, if possible; but I am just advising the committee of that so we may keep it in mind.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Bellinger, there has been handed to the committee a statement on your career with the United States Navy covering the time from 1913 on.

I note in the sketch that was given to us that from 1914 on, you had a very active participation in the air activities of the United States Navy; that is a fact, is it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You were in the first Navy plane that was ever struck by an enemy bullet; isn't that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

[9402] Mr. MURPHY. That was down at Vera Cruz?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you went to Pensacola, Fla., in 1915 and in the following year—rather, on January 21, you were designated naval air pilot No. 4?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Thereafter, in 1915, you participated in the development of the use of the catapult; is that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Thereafter you piloted flying boat AB-3 and were on the first extended flight of this kind ordered and carried out?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In 1915 you made the American altitude record for a seaplane of 10,000 feet; in 1915 you participated in the first actual instance in the Navy where Navy aircraft spotted actual gun or mortar fire; in 1916 you conducted live bomb-dropping tests from a plane, the first test of this nature to be conducted by the Navy; in 1916 you participated in the first instance of spotting, and firing at regular targets at sea by the Navy.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In 1916, you conducted experimental tests with radio set in pontoon type of seaplanes; in 1917 you made the first machine-gun firing tests ever made in a Navy plane; in 1917 you conducted the first night seaplane flight in which floodlights were employed on the beach for illuminating the water, and that marks the beginning

of night flying at Pensacola and of regular night flying instructions in the Navy.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In 1919, you participated in the first trans-Atlantic flight as commanding officer of the NC-1. You made a long overseas flight from Newfoundland to the vicinity of the Azores in May 1919.

In other words, on down through the years, those I have outlined together with others that follow, you had a very distinguished and outstanding career in the Navy, on which I want to congratulate you at this time.

And you were the type of man that was selected by Washington to be sent to Honolulu; that is right, isn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; but—

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you were sent there?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was ordered there.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, after you got to Honolulu, you were also ordered to conduct a survey and to prepare a plan in conjunction with General Martin of the Army Air Corps; that is right too, isn't it?

[9404] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And that plan which you developed, was in effect a chart of exactly what happened at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, with the exception of a few details; that is right, too, isn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now then, you were placed under that plan in charge of certain operations which you did not have the authority to carry out until the means with which to carry it out were made available to you by higher authority; isn't that so?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that throughout this entire critical period, you were never shown any of these dispatches which in an official way showed the development of a tense and critical situation; that is true, isn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. When Admiral Kimmel was on the stand I questioned him as to why he had not consulted you who were unquestionably an outstanding air expert, and he said that he consulted his own man, Commander Davis. I would now like to direct your attention to the fact that Commander Davis was called to testify before Admiral Hewitt [9405] and his testimony appears in the record as that of Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, commencing at page 96.

Mr. MASTEN. Pardon me. Is that the Hart or the Hewitt report?

Mr. MURPHY. This is the Hart report. I beg your pardon.

And the same Rear Adm. Arthur C. Davis was the airman on the staff of Admiral Kimmel immediately preceding—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The air aide.

Mr. MURPHY. —was his air aide on the staff of Admiral Kimmel immediately preceding December 1941.

Isn't that right, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to go to the testimony in question.

Admiral Davis, as I recollect it, did think that there could have been instituted a system of reconnaissance whereby you would use certain planes in the less critical areas and other planes in the more

critical areas. Do you know of any such possibility? For reconnaissance purposes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Actually, on December 7 we used planes of every type and description, some that could only go 200 miles. On the days following December 7 we used [9406] planes that were made available for the distances that they could go. That was to get information as far out as we could through all the various sectors surrounding Pearl Harbor.

Actually, in fact, for prevention of an air raid, the farther out you can get information the better. And in order to figure on preventing an air raid in the early morning and having this information, it was considered that the patrol planes should go out between 7 and 8 hundred miles.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, Admiral, you were never confronted with the problem because you weren't taken into the confidence of those in command; isn't that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. In general, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And the best—excuse me.

Admiral BELLINGER. I was not asked or shown.

Mr. MURPHY. The best we can do is to ask you as an air expert to speculate by way of hindsight what you would have done before December 7; that is right too, isn't it?

At any rate, you didn't see them, you weren't asked to pass on them; it wasn't your problem directly until you were consulted on them; isn't that true?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I—excuse me.

[9407] Admiral BELLINGER. On December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. I say, up to December 7, Admiral.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Up to December 7.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that up to the morning of December 7, you were a man sick in bed and pretty much concerned about improving the health of Admiral Bellinger, I assume. I didn't mean to go into the actual attack itself.

Now, then, on page 97, the question was asked—you do not have this, Admiral—page 97, the question was asked of Rear Admiral Davis, who was the air aide on Admiral Kimmel's staff:

Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on 7 December, 1941. Please state the facts within your knowledge concerning the attack and the major events leading up thereto. It is especially desired that you cover the following, and a written copy of this question is handed you so that you may refer to it as you testify—

Now, then, the admiral testified for several paragraphs as to the question itself, and what it was looking for, and [9408] then appears his answer, the last paragraph on the bottom of page 97:

A. My duty as Fleet Aviation Officer was primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical training and logistics matters. As the case with the Staff as a whole, our primary interest for many months had been the improvement in strength and proficiency of the Pacific Fleet.

As is no doubt well known, it had not been possible, for various reasons, including appropriations, to develop the Fleet to a point which, it is now known, was

necessary. However, this fact made it all the more important to concentrate on all phases of matériel and training.

I, myself, had little to do with considerations of attack possibilities, and I do not recall ever being directly consulted on such matters by the Commander in Chief. Naturally, the subject was frequently discussed among members of the Staff and also by the Commander in Chief with the Staff at times when I was present.

From these discussions, I can definitely state my opinion that it was the Commander in Chief's belief that it was vitally necessary to continue as long as possible with the training and other Fleet improvements, and that going into a defensive status would interfere with this [9409] work, so that I am convinced it was his sincere intention to accomplish all that could be done before hostilities began and that he believed there was still time to keep the work going.

As to the imminent possibility of attack, I only occasionally saw or heard of warnings that may have been received by the Commander in Chief. I know that there had been many warnings of varying degrees of seriousness over a number of months, and I had the impression that it was within the Commander in Chief's discretion to determine how far to go in action with regard to such warnings.

I believe his thought throughout was to take precautionary steps within reason but to regard the warnings as all the more reason for concentration on improving the Fleet's readiness.

During the period of strain which finally led up to the events of 7 December, I am certain that the Commander in Chief gave the situation the carefulest possible consideration. I have to admit, however, that I was, myself concerned because of information that was available in the press and that I concluded that there must be other information which had not been shown me that influenced the decision to take no greater precautionary steps than were taken.

As to advice with regard to precautions, I was asked [9410] not so much for an opinion as to whether or not the fullest precautions should be taken, as for information with regard to the practicability of comprehensive searches, and their effect on training. Comprehensive and extensive air searches were practicable, and I so stated. I also stated the fact that this would very definitely interfere with the progress in general in aviation training in the Fleet.

This, as was the case in the Fleet as a whole, was important in view of the training demanded by the rapid expansion that was already beginning to take place.

With respect to the surprise air attack, I naturally expressed the opinion that this was possible and that it could only be prevented by the most extensive searches and efforts to intercept at sea by air and surface vessels.

I did not, however, realize to what a high degree of proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed. I do not believe that anybody else in the American Navy had any proper conception of this development either. Certainly I had never seen anything, either officially or unofficially that would lead me to suppose that Japanese naval aviation was so tremendously effective and well developed as it turned out to be.

At that point I would like to ask you, did you in [9411] Hawaii, consider the ability of Yamamoto and his daring?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was asked the question at one other hearing, whether I was fully cognizant of Yamamoto's background. I am not sure whether I was conscious of it before December 7 or after. I think I was.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Layton—Excuse me. Go ahead.

Admiral BELLINGER. With reference to the ability of the Japanese, which they showed in their attack on December 7, it far surpassed my estimate of their ability.

Mr. MURPHY. There was a book about which Captain Layton testified in the Hart proceedings, and that book seemed to discuss the question of a possible raid on Pearl Harbor and the capabilities of the Japanese. Were you considered and brought into those discussions or given the benefit of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to refer now particularly to the testimony of Captain Layton, at page 214. At any rate you were not in those discussions about Yamamoto and this book that was published and the discussions about a possible raid on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, there has also been testimony in this record that the north was not the most dangerous [9412] section. As I recall, reading the record of all the hearings, there seemed to be almost a unanimous opinion that the north was the most dangerous, and in your statement you so state, do you not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you give as the reason for feeling that it was the most dangerous, the wind conditions. Did you also take into consideration the fact that in the north, where they did come from, was the so-called "vacant sea"?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you also—

Excuse me. Let me add this, and then you can answer both. Did you also take into consideration the fact that whatever shipping there had been previously in that area, it had been eliminated prior to December 7?

Now, will you answer both?

Admiral BELLINGER. I didn't know that it had been eliminated up there. I am not so sure that it was.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there is some testimony to that effect.

Admiral BELLINGER. The question was where the Japanese were going to come from, and we were not conducting patrols from Palmyra, or Johnston Islands, as a regular proposition, and I presume that the Japanese would have known [9413] about it, so there was nothing to stop them from coming from that direction either; but it is a very serious proposition, a vital proposition to a carrier, in connection with the operation of planes.

It must head into the wind, and it must get up enough speed to compensate for the wind that is blowing in order to have a sufficient force of wind over the deck. So that the wind controls the direction of movement of the carrier, and I don't believe an attack of the kind that was made on Pearl Harbor where surprise was expected to be the major affair, or where they felt there might be considerable jeopardy would take place in a direction wherein the carrier had to take on her planes after having launched them, heading toward the island.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, Admiral, had you had any knowledge of the fact that all shipping had been directed to the south through the Torres Strait before December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That had been done since October, but you didn't know about that, did you?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am practically sure, I didn't. I don't recall any knowledge of it.

[9414] Mr. MURPHY. That is another of the dispatches in that period.

Now, there was a conference at which time the possibility of an air raid on Oahu or Hawaii was discussed, at which time Captain Mc-

Morris made a certain statement. That would be on November 27 or 28. You were not present at that conference, were you?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you do believe that there could have been reconnaissance if the command had been issued to have it; isn't that so?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. With the planes we had there could have been reconnaissance.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to direct your attention in that regard to the testimony of your Chief of Staff at page 595 of the record of the court of inquiry conducted by officers of the Navy. On page 596:

Q. That is a very clear explanation. However, will you please answer the question. We will put the question another way. Where were any planes at Pearl Harbor which could have been used and were not used for distance reconnaissance on the morning of December 7?

A. Yes, sir; there were planes that could have been used had such a search been ordered by higher [9415] authority.

Q. How many of these planes were in that category?

A. For an emergency effort, approximately 60 planes could have been made available in four hours or less.

Q. Who would have ordered the distance reconnaissance and under whose authority would the directive have been made?

A. For the full utilization of all aircraft, both Army and Navy, available on Oahu, the orders to us would have come from the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force.

Q. Who is that?

A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District. Orders solely for the Navy planes would probably have come from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Q. Did you consider in these plans and orders which you had that the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force was the one who would have originated the idea of distance reconnaissance and would have directed you or Admiral Bellinger to have sent planes out on this mission?

A. I would have assumed it would be the duty of any officer higher in the echelon of command above Admiral Bellinger to have taken action on receipt of the information indicating that action was necessary.

[9416] Do you agree with those answers of your chief of staff?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What was the name of your chief of staff at that time, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. He was Commander Ramsey; Logan C. Ramsey.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Now I direct your attention to the questions at page 597 of the same record, question 110:

Q. You stated that in your opinion there might be or could be an air attack on Oahu. Had you ever thought from what direction the air attack would come or the most probable direction?

A. Yes, sir, we had. We had great discussions on it, and in view of the prevailing wind conditions and the presence of outlying islands and other factors, we had decided the northwest sector was the most likely line of approach, and in our drills the squadron in the highest degree of readiness was always ordered to take up that sector from 315 to 00.

Then, if you, with your limited number of planes, had sent out distance reconnaissance, you would have sent them to the northwest sector so as to cover that sector?

For any single day, yes, sir.

[9417] Question 115:

Why did you select that sector?

A. Because we had always decided that was the most likely direction of approach.

Q. But that sector was not based on the sighting of any Japanese planes?

A. No, sir, it was in accordance with our estimate and preconceived ideas. We always selected that sector 315 to 00, as the first sector. The second sector was from 315 to around 270. We placed other sectors in their relative idea of importance.

I take it you agree with that statement or testimony because it is substantially what you yourself have stated.

Admiral BELLINGER. I do.

Mr. MURPHY. I would now like to refer to page 578 of the same record and the same witness, question 24:

Arriving at this estimate, did you consider any particular nation—he was speaking of the Martin-Bellinger report—

did you consider any particular nation, or was this just a generality for any country—any enemy which might attack without a declaration of war?

A. It was obviously and solely Japan. I use the pre-war phraseology intentionally in trying to get myself into a pre-war frame of mind.

[9418] Q. Then your conclusion was that if any attack at all were made on Oahu it would be by air and not by some other means?

A. That is correct.

Q. At the time you made this estimate of the situation, did you conclude from the international situation as it existed on that date, that Japan would attack the United States?

A. It is impossible for me to say at this late date, but I do recall having mentioned to Admiral Bellinger, half in earnest and half in pure speculation, that it was my belief that if the Japanese did attack us by an air raid, that the attack would probably come on Christmas Eve or New Year's Day.

Of course, that was just discussion over the table I assume, but the fact is, Admiral, that if you had been at a conference—and now I am taking you back before December 7—and the discussions were to come up as to the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor, would it not have been your opinion at that conference, being an airman, that the most likely danger was air rather than submarine?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; that was my estimate throughout.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, at the conferences that were [9419] held Rear Admiral Davis was not voicing too much of an opinion or asked for too many opinions and you were not consulted at all, the opinion of those at the conference was that there would be an attack on Hawaii but it would be a mass submarine attack and I take it you would have differed with that. You felt it would come from the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. The attack most easily for the Japanese to make would be a submarine attack and a general submarine menace in and around Pearl Harbor area. If they had contemplated an attack on Pearl Harbor, why, I certainly thought it would be air, an air attack. We suspected submarines to be out in the area, in the operating area, for some time. There were many contacts, sound contacts that were investigated but did not conclusively show any definite results, but there was a suspicion that their submarines were about, even before December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, were you at any time between the 1st of December and the 7th of December acquainted with the fact that there was some definite uncertainty as to where the Japanese carriers were?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that between November 27 and December 7 you yourself or no one under you ordered any change in the status of alert of the planes under your command, isn't [9420] that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean it is right?

Admiral BELLINGER. I mean the schedule was being carried out, to the best of my knowledge, in the activities connected with fleet tactics that I referred to before. There may have been certain changes so far as readiness made in those squadrons and connected in that exercise, but not in connection with any security.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to now refer, Admiral, to page 583 of the naval court of inquiry, question 44, to your chief of staff. [Reading:]

Q. With the combined Navy-Army aircraft that were available for operation between 27 November and 7 December 1941, could you have complied with a directive to conduct a long-range reconnaissance through 360 degrees?

A. No. Using the most economical aircraft type of search that we could devise, a single plane going to 700 miles would only cover a sector of 8 degrees. Therefore, with 66 planes, only 50 per cent of which could be used continuously from a maintenance and pilot fatigue standpoint, only 264 degrees could be covered daily. 360 degrees could be covered only one day, possibly only two days as an emergency measure, but it could not be [9421] maintained. It would only cover about three-quarters of the circle day in and day out until the exhaustion point from not only of personnel but from the matériel standpoint, as well, was reached. The exhaustion period would have been reached in matériel before it was reached in personnel. As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view of our almost total lack of spare parts for the PBY-5 planes, I believe that three weeks of intensive daily searches would have been approximately a 75 per cent reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approximately a six week period, but at the end of that time they would have all required a protracted rest period.

I take it you agree with that?

Admiral BELLINGER. In general, yes. I think very probably the pilots could not have kept up that long. That is at least a 14- to a 16-hour flight. We have on occasions, particularly in the Battle of Midway, I think, put pilots on patrol covering longer periods of patrol for consecutive days and any time I know of they were practically on their last legs at the end of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, under the plan, the Martin-Bellinger [9422] plan, in order for you to have any authority it was necessary for an emergency to arise. That is right, isn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. It had to be apparent.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. It would be rather difficult for you, who was to be apprised of the existence of an emergency, to recognize the existence of one if you did not have this information, isn't that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, on page 584 the question was asked of your chief of staff:

Had you heard anything about an Army condition of readiness designed to prevent sabotage?

A. I had heard indirectly and unofficially of various rumors of attempted sabotage and counter measures against sabotage, none of which appeared at the time to be of great importance.

My question to you is, did you know what type of alert the Army was on?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't think so. I knew that at some stage of events at that time there was a great deal of thought given to sabotage. I am not sure whether I knew that they were in a sabotage alert or not, but I do know that the subject was a live subject and I had done something about it in my force and various other naval

forces were taking action [9423] of that kind and whether I knew the Army was actually in it or not I am not sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Your chief of staff, of course, had no more information about these war-warning messages than you had, did he?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I questioned him on that.

Mr. MURPHY. You also, I take it, Admiral, had no information whatsoever to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes and their systems?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I knew nothing of that.

Mr. MURPHY. Nor any information about the Japanese consul at Honolulu destroying some of his systems or all of them, I take it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I did not know that.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. With respect to your not knowing the Army was alerted to sabotage, did you have occasion to see on the Saturday before the Sunday morning how the Army planes were lined up on their fields from wing tip to wing tip?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I was in bed most of Saturday.

Senator LUCAS. Oh, yes; that is right. And you did not receive any information from anyone that the Army was alerted [9424] to sabotage?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not that I can say definitely. I may have known it; I am not sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you through, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like also to refer to page 99 of the Hart inquiry, Rear Admiral Davis speaking:

Although I did not feel that I had sufficient information as to the actual situation to undertake to question the Commander-in-Chief's policy as 7 December approached, I was concerned about the general situation with respect to our outlying islands. For this reason I stressed the necessity for providing some form of air protection at Wake and Midway, which it would have been too late to attempt after actual emergency had arisen. Action was finally taken in this connection and that is why the attack on 7 December found the *Enterprise* task force on its way back, having landed Marine fighting planes at Wake, and the *Lexington* task force on its way to land Marine aircraft at Midway.

Now, the question was asked of Admiral Davis, referring to the Martin Bellinger report, a question on page 99:

Did you have that estimate at all in mind during the days which led up to 7 December?

[9425] A. I did.

Q. But I understand, from your testimony, that you made no particular estimate yourself along that same line, formal or otherwise?

A. No, sir; it was not that I made no estimate, or did not consider it; it was rather that this, like all of the other very comprehensive and thorough preparatory plans that were made, was contingent, as to its being placed in effect, on prior decision that the situation justified taking up what might be called a defensive deployment. As to whether or not it should, at any given point, have been taken up, I necessarily considered that the Commander-in-Chief's estimate was final.

Q. And your advice on the point was not asked?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see the Navy Department's dispatch of 27 November, the one which has come to be known as the war warning [indicating exhibit 8]?

A. No, sir.

Q. You never saw it prior to 7 December?

A. No, sir.

Q. Admiral, did I understand you correctly earlier in your testimony to say that in your opinion a comprehensive air search could have been carried on at that time?

[9426] A. Yes, it could.

Q. Would you elaborate on that just a little bit, as to how a 360 degree distant reconnaissance could have been carried on with the material at hand at that time?

A. There were not enough planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long-range, 360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There were, however, enough to approximate this by using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft, so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been considered essential, on the basis that reinforcements could have arrived before personnel and material fatigue set in. Unless reinforcements arrived, it could not have been maintained.

Q. You may proceed to the written question given you, passing on to the Army part.

A. Prior to 7 December I had relatively little detailed information regarding the Army Interceptor Command. I knew approximately the numbers and types and my recollection is that they had about 170 P-36's, P-39's, and P-40's, of which the greater number were P-36's and P-39's. Judged by modern war standards, there were enough air fields to operate them, but not enough to [9427] provide adequate dispersal and protection, nor were revetments and dispersal runways provided at the various fields.

In that connection, Admiral, as I understand your testimony you knew that the Interceptor Command was not properly functioning, or not? Do you recall what your state of mind was before December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. It is my understanding that it was not functioning as a regular agency.

Mr. MURPHY. You say what?

Admiral BELLINGER. That it was not functioning as a regular continuous agency.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel testified that radar would give him coverage, at one time in one hearing, of 200 miles and in this hearing, of 100 miles. Did you so understand it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I did not expect it to be that effective. As a matter of fact, it was not that effective to the fullest extent several months after December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in connection with that and in corroboration of your feeling about it in connection with Admiral Kimmel's testimony, his airman said at page 100:

I did not feel, however, that it was yet ready for full effective employment.

[9428] That is Admiral Davis speaking.

Now, what was your information as to the ability of the Army to participate in or cooperate with you by way of help in the event you called on them? Did you feel the fliers were competent?

Admiral BELLINGER. From my information from General Martin, he had difficulty in getting enough competent crews, air combat crews to man the planes he had and he was also confronted with a job of training personnel to man B-17's for further transfer to the Philippines. I know of this only because of conversations with General Martin, so that I know that he had problems of that nature which were of considerable importance.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I would like to direct your attention to page 44 of the Hart inquiry, to the testimony of Vice Admiral Smith. Question 81:

What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards personnel?

Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based upon our observation during Fleet Operations, when their Flying Fortresses would come over at almost smoke-stack level, and showed an utter disregard for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly [9429] prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not very good.

I was wondering if that feeling prevailed so that it would prevent calling on the Army to help in reconnaissance. It certainly did not with you, did it?

Admiral BELLINGER. I knew that reconnaissance requires special training; it requires training which the Army had not utilized very much because it was not considered part of the job that they were going to do; at least, they had not undertaken it. Therefore, I did not think that the Army could do very much in assisting in long-range reconnaissance. It took some time after December the 7th for them to train their crews sufficiently to be really effective. That was shown up actually after December the 7th, when they did assist in the reconnaissance around Oahu.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know, Admiral, that when Kurusu was on his way to the States to participate in the conferences in Washington that his plane landed at Midway?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you believe that the plane had really broken down?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't know, but I was directed to have two planes to bring him to Oahu in case the Pan American plane was not made ready in time.

[9430] Mr. MURPHY. You decided to let him wait there, didn't you? You did not use the planes, did you?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. He came finally by Pan American.

[9431] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, on his way to America Kurusu's plane appeared apparently to be disabled and did land at Midway for some time, did it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. I have been told Kurusu was kept in the hotel there, and I have also been told that the Marine guard, every time they moved, went around the building three times.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have called to your attention, Admiral, the fact that the Army, on November 5, had a new operating procedure order? Admiral Kimmel apparently did not know of it and I was wondering if you did.

Admiral BELLINGER. The one with reference to one, two, and three alerts?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I do not think I knew of that, or the details of it. I would not normally know of the details of it, so I do not think I did know of it.

Mr. MURPHY. For a long time the Army had only one kind of an alert, and then they had three alerts and they sent copies to the Navy?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not think they sent me a copy. If I knew about it, it was from conversation with General Martin.

Mr. MURPHY. There has been some testimony here that [9432] the Japanese knew about the workings of our radars. The fact is that the radar at the Opana station did detect the Japanese at dis-

tances of 132 miles. If the Japanese were aware of our radar functioning that morning, would they have been at a sufficient height in the air for radar to have detected them at 132 miles?

Admiral BELLINGER. The high altitude bombing planes—and they were I assume between eight and ten thousand feet when they made their attack—probably would have been detected. The torpedo planes, according to my information, assembled at very low altitudes and made their approach at a very low altitude, and they probably would not have been detected that far by radar.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to just ask one question. Do we have available any Navy exhibit showing the damage to the *Arizona*? I understood you to say this morning that the damage to the *Arizona* was from torpedoes.

Admiral BELLINGER. This was the first attack on the *Arizona*, and I assume that there were three torpedoes that hit the *Arizona*, merely from seeing these three planes pass over the *Arizona*.

Mr. MURPHY. I just wanted to check it.

Admiral BELLINGER. And immediately afterward a tremendous explosion.

[9433] Mr. MURPHY. I just wanted to check with the actual records so we will have it straight. I believe there were some bombs.

Admiral BELLINGER. There may have been bombs, in addition.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not know. Do you have that, Counsel?

Let me ask two other questions, Admiral. You did prepare, did you not, a report, which is in the record as exhibit No. 120, dated December 19, 1941, a memorandum for information for Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, I have it right here.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you prepare that report then at the request of Admiral Kimmel, as to what occurred on December 7 and immediately thereafter?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not sure whether it was made at his request or not, but I made it up for him.

Mr. MURPHY. And that was your judgment, as of that date, as to what actually occurred at that time?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; that was the situation as I knew about it on that day.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, in regard to the *Arizona*, the Navy report is that she was hit by one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bombs.

I have no other questions.

[9434] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

The Senator indicates that he is willing to yield to Congressman Keefe.

Senator FERGUSON. I am willing to yield to Congressman Keefe. He is always on the end.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman, the Chair takes great pleasure in recognizing you.

Senator LUCAS. I want to remind the Congressman it is a quarter of 4.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand this is just a temporary yielding or does that end the examination?

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; I cannot guarantee anything of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. I will take what is left.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you can take it all, because it will be very brief.

Admiral, I listened carefully to your testimony and I am interested in certain ultimate facts. From listening to your testimony I gained certain impressions, and I want to ascertain whether they are in accord with what you have testified.

You were a task force commander prior to December 7, in charge of the reconnaissance planes; is that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were called patrol planes.

[9435] Mr. KEEFE. We will call them patrol planes, then.

Admiral BELLINGER. We expected to use them for anything and everything we could.

Mr. KEEFE. As such you were not a member of the staff of the Commander in Chief, Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was not a member of his staff.

Mr. KEEFE. And as such you were not given information as to the so-called warning messages that were sent to Admiral Kimmel from Washington?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was not given those warnings; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had no information concerning those until after the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not until after the attack.

Mr. KEEFE. Am I correct in the assumption that you had sufficient planes at Pearl Harbor on December 7, and prior thereto, for a period of at least a week, to have enabled you to conduct long-range reconnaissance to the north for a period of a week?

Admiral BELLINGER. I would say "yes" to that question.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand that you, yourself, as a task force commander, would not put into effect the provisions of the Martin-Bellinger plan for long-range reconnaissance without an order from the commander in chief, except in case of an emergency. Is that your testimony?

[9436] Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Therefore, do I understand your testimony to be that the reason there was no long-range reconnaissance in the sector to the north in the week preceding Pearl Harbor is because you had received no order from the commander in chief to effect or carry out such reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand your testimony also to be—and you may correct me if I am in error—that as an air man familiar with the situation in Hawaii you were in agreement with Admiral Davis that the greatest possibility of a successful air attack lay in an attack coming in from the sector to the north because of the prevailing wind conditions; is that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is practically correct; yes, sir. You have got to utilize the conditions as you find them at the time when you make the attack, and the prevailing wind was normally about 65° or 70° coming from that direction.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand your testimony to be in order to recapture your planes you have to head into the wind.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So if planes were launched downwind—

Admiral BELLINGER. (interposing). Into the wind.

Mr. KEEFE. They were launched into the wind?

[9437] Admiral BELLINGER. Into the wind.

Mr. KEEFE. Now when they leave the carrier they would come downwind, would they not? I am not an air expert, but I have been following your testimony. When they come back onto the carrier they have to land into the wind; is that correct, or am I in error?

Admiral BELLINGER. They take off and land with the carrier heading into the wind.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the carrier turns around when they take off to head into the wind?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. If the prevailing wind is down toward Oahu and they are assembled up to the northwest, then when they take off they take off into the wind and circle and come down; is that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. So the best opportunity to get away is when the carriers are headed out away from Oahu and the planes can be recaptured by the carrier heading right into the wind?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is, as I understood, your plan set out [9438] in the Martin-Bellinger Report. You set that out, did you not?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, that is not in that report.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I got it from some place else. I would not be surprised if I misunderstood what the report might be. At any rate, whether it is in the report or whether it is not, that is a fact, isn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is a fact; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not make any complaint today because you were not made aware of the messages that were received by the commander in chief, do you, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. My recollection of this war-warning message is that at the end an injunction was laid upon the commander in chief to distribute it only to certain restricted essential officers. Do you remember that?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I think it was left to his own discretion, but I know nothing about that.

Mr. KEEFE. Isn't that in the record? I have forgotten.

Admiral BELLINGER. I think you are correct on some messages, but I am not familiar with them enough to answer.

Mr. KEEFE. I guess that is right. That would be the Army message. That was General Short.

Then am I to see this picture from your testimony to the effect that here is a task force commander in command of [9439] patrol planes who isn't given any information at all as to what is going on in the international situation and in the relations with Japan except what you got from the newspapers, perhaps, while you were lying sick in bed 4 or 5 days before the 7th of December; that no long-distance reconnaissance is ordered at all, some people claiming that that could not be effected because of lack of personnel and lack of planes, but you are of the opinion that if there had been a utilization of the

patrol planes that were available it could have been carried on for at least a week.

Admiral BELLINGER. I think it could have, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And effectively covered the arc from which you, as an Air Force commander, at all times believed an air attack on Hawaii would come. Do I so understand it to be your testimony?

Admiral BELLINGER. It could have covered that particular arc; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Narrowing this matter down, if I interpret your testimony correctly—and if I am in error you can challenge me, Admiral—the failure to conduct a long-range reconnaissance which was, under the circumstances existant on December 7 at Pearl Harbor, practically the only way in which an attacking force of carriers could be discovered, rested entirely with the commander in chief and his staff, [9440] and until an order came from the commander in chief you would not, as a task force commander, control the planes to effect such reconnaissance, is that correct?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, did you have a conversation with Admiral Smith in relation to the Kurusu plane at Midway?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not sure whether it was Admiral Smith or who it was. I got the message from someone, from the commander in chief, Pacific, to have two planes out there in case they were needed.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me refresh your memory. Admiral Smith was asked this question on page 52 of the Hart Board, No. 147:

This particular dispatch [indicating exhibit 8] is different from all other warnings received previously in that the words "war warning" were used. What was your own reaction to those particular words?

He answers this way:

My reaction was we knew that negotiations were still going on; Mr. Kurusu had flown through a few days before; we were in great doubt as to what was happening. Mr. [9441] Kurusu's plane broke down in Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and I said "No, it may be that the plane was told by the administration to break down. They know more what's going on than we do. Let him stay there."

Did you have a conversation like that with Admiral Smith?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not remember that; no, sir. I remember a conversation with reference to Kurusu and with reference to bringing him from Midway to Pearl. I do not remember that any of my organization suggested it in any way.

Now in connection with the two planes standing by to bring him, one being an escort plane, as I remember now, they were sent out there to stand by to bring him back. The question was evidently whether to bring him or let him wait for the Pan American plane which appeared to be about to be fixed.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were you concerned about bringing him? Why did you want to get him to Washington?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was not concerned about him at all, except I was told by the commander in chief, as I remember now, to furnish these planes to bring him. The question was whether they should sit there waiting for him to make [9442] up his mind and wait

for the Pan American, or to bring him right away. I had no reason to get him to Honolulu or anywhere.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you did not fly the PB Y?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you have in your statement here something that I would like to have cleared up. You say:

As pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem of when to place the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan, and required specific information as to the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time limits.

Now what do you mean by "rather narrow time limits"?

Admiral BELLINGER. For instance, the question comes up now could we have covered a sector or could we have covered 360°; "for how long could you cover 360°, and for how long could you cover a sector of about 90°?" The only definite assurance of early information of an air attack is by covering 360°, and—

Senator FERGUSON. Now take that answer—

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think he finished his answer, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you want to go on?

[9443] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER. So that if you were going to cover 360° it is going to come down to a question of a very few days. If it is going to come to the question of a sector of 90° even, that is going to cause a reduction in your forces sooner or later.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it better, in case of an anticipated attack, to use what you have even though you are not able to use the full 360°?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, that is perfectly true.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why consider the question of 360° when we did not have enough planes for 360°?

Admiral BELLINGER. In an estimate of the situation you are trying to work this out so as to weigh all the situations; 360° on an island is the only way you can make sure that there is not a force coming in. Actually for months after Pearl Harbor, December 7, we endeavored to have 360° covered from Oahu.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this the trouble, that we were trying to work from a war plan which said that the absolute way was to cover 360°, and if we could not work from the war plan we were not going to work at all?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, no, sir; that is not the idea. [9444] The estimate can only figure on a basis of 360°, otherwise where is the attack going to come from? If you do not put the 360° in what are you going to put in? The idea is to stop the raid.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it a question of trying to figure out where he may come from? Isn't that part of your Intelligence system?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is part of it, and that was the plan as devolved from this estimate later with reference to where we put the first available planes, and if we had no more, why, that was all.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you consider in any plan that if you did not have enough planes for 360°—and we were in that condition up to the time we were going to war—that you would use the planes that you did have? Did we have any war plan on such a basis?

Admiral BELLINGER. The war plans called for planes to be on Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston, and Oahu.

Senator FERGUSON. On Oahu?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any war plan that called for anything less, on long-distance reconnaissance, than 360°, the entire circle?

Admiral BELLINGER. Why, certainly. The operating plan [9445] called for planes as they were available.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you have a plan that said if war was imminent you would conduct a reconnaissance in the segment north, into the vacant sea?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not sure. I haven't a copy of this latest subsidiary plan that was gotten out over my signature. I do not know whether that is available or not. I was discussing the other day with my operations officer if he remembered whether or not that northwest sector was put down in that plan as a vital sector. He thought it was. I am not sure. That was a question in our minds anyway, if not definitely on paper.

Senator FERGUSON. Now isn't this true, that your plan with General Martin covered a 360° reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it did not cover any particular segment in case you did not have enough to go on 360°?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, that is down in black and white. If you have got something and haven't got enough you will do what you can with what you have got.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you have a plan to do what you could with what you had?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; that is exactly what I read out this morning. The first sector was from north around [9446] to west to be covered by the first available planes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then I will ask you this: If you did not know where these carriers were, why did not you send your planes up in that direction, with the first planes that you got off the ground, to locate these carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 7?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. That is what was done.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you get me the evidence that you sent them up north? You sent one up north.

Admiral BELLINGER. It is in my statement this morning, I thought very clearly.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what time you sent them up there, up to the north?

Admiral BELLINGER. The three patrol planes 14 P-1, 2, and 3 on early morning security search were assigned a search sector between north and northwest. Those were the first ones available.

Senator FERGUSON. What time was that?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was about 8 o'clock, or 8:05 when they got the message, according to my information.

Senator FERGUSON. 8:05, and the attack took place at 7:55.

Admiral BELLINGER. Now there is a little hitch in [9447] that.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to get the hitch out of it. Let us know what happened.

Admiral BELLINGER. These three planes were assigned this north to northwest sector and proceeded on search. After the first phase of the attack Patrol Wing 1 reported two planes at Kaneohe available for immediate operation and was directed to send these two planes on a northwesterly sector.

Senator FERGUSON. That is another search?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is another besides those three?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. One second. Before these could be dispatched another Japanese attack put them out of commission.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. At about the same time communications between Kaneohe and Pearl were knocked out. Patrol Wing 1 on own initiative diverted the two planes then on that northerly sector, that is the 1 and 3, to cover a westerly sector because of the loss of the two planes originally detailed.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER. In an effort to comply with instructions.

[9448] Senator FERGUSON. Then they violated the war plan that you and Martin had drawn up, because your first one was to be to the north?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. They may have violated it but not with the idea of violating, because they were not controlling the plan. They were carrying out orders from the patrol wing to headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. But the headquarters policy was to send them in another direction. How do you account for the fact, if this map is correct, of these carriers, six of them, and their task force, as being 200 miles north of Hawaii, if you had these planes and if you did have them sent up there, that you did not see these carriers?

I think from the data we have now they were 200 miles out, that is where they were stationed when their planes took off.

Admiral BELLINGER. This diversion of those two planes removed two planes from the sector where the Japanese task force was later determined to be near.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I have that answer read?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

[9449] Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that someone at headquarters diverted the two planes and that if they hadn't been diverted, they would have located the task force?

Admiral BELLINGER. I wouldn't say they would have, but it was in that area.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who was the man that diverted those two planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Patrol Wing 1 organization.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Admiral BELLINGER. Over Kaneohe.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the one plane that kept going up, how do you account for not seeing those planes going back to the carrier and landing?

Admiral BELLINGER. They didn't see it go.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever see this radar chart, where these planes came down and they caught them at 302, and they came straight down, and we found planes going straight back to the north?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, I never saw that before.

Senator FERGUSON. Well——

Admiral BELLINGER. I would like to elaborate on a [9450] question of this morning, if I may, in connection with this general subject.

I understand that my operations officer, Captain Ramsey, made a statement that he had telephoned and he thought I had telephoned to the Army on December 7 with reference to the radar detection on those planes going north after they had left.

Now, in the plan for the carrying out of this Naval Base Defense Air Force in the event of a raid, there were planes assigned by the Army to follow the carrier planes back with the idea that this radar existed at this time, which it didn't, when this was made out. And so I was interested in trying to find out where these planes went to.

Commander Ramsey was also.

He says I telephoned over to Army headquarters to find out about it. I don't know whether I did or not. I don't remember doing it now, but I did ask him questions to find out where they went. We did not get information from the radar at that time that planes went north to the carrier.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any communication, any means of communication to the radar station?

Admiral BELLINGER. Only through the Army.

[9451] Senator FERGUSON. Only through the Army?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You had to go through headquarters?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It turns up that the Army had this chart, and knew about it. How do you account for your not getting it?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know the radars were not supposed to be working that morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was surprised that they were working that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would you be surprised that the radar was working?

Admiral BELLINGER. Because I didn't think they were set up and ready to go.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you didn't even know that the Island had radar?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, I knew that the radar was being installed, we were very interested in that.

Senator FERGUSON. But you didn't know they had actually the radar working?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, I didn't know it was actually working that morning.

[9452] Senator FERGUSON. At any time did you know it was working before that?

Admiral BELLINGER. I knew that they were establishing their system and the radar had been set up, and the individual radars were working, yes, but the system had to be set up to make it work intelligently, and they were in the process of putting that into effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that isn't quite an answer to my question. My question is, did you know prior to the 7th that radar was established on the Island?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, why didn't you get in touch with the radar stations to ascertain if they had picked up anything coming in or going out?

Admiral BELLINGER. It would have been impossible to have gotten in touch with the radar station. You have got to go through the Army headquarters to get in touch with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you have to call General Short?

Admiral BELLINGER. General Martin, General Martin's office.

Senator FERGUSON. Why didn't you call General Martin to find out what he had from his radar? That was one of [9453] the greatest instruments we had, wasn't it?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not positive I didn't do it. I talked to Martin that day twice. I think I did, as a matter of fact. I am not saying positively I did or not.

I could have also gotten that information from the Air Combat, the fighter commander. He had that—General Davidson was the one that was in charge of the interceptor.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, we come down to this, that you did not get any news about any radar on the 7th?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, we did not not; at least I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in command?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was in command of the long-range reconnaissance, and this striking force.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, part of the duty of the striking force would be to go out and get these carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; we wanted to know about that; that was our main effort then.

Senator FERGUSON. The reconnaissance would be to locate them, so you had the most important force, as far as intercepting this task force was concerned; is that not true?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't remember now that you ever [9454] made any inquiry as to what radar showed?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. If he had asked General Davidson, General Davidson couldn't tell him. He didn't know.

Admiral BELLINGER. You are trying to get me to say something definite describing my action. I probably did. I don't know. I know I wanted that information. I took it up with my operations officers to see if he couldn't get it too. We were both trying to figure how we could get that information.

Whether I talked personally, I am not sure. We were trying to get the information.

Senator FERGUSON. How far would your headquarters be from where this information would be?

Admiral BELLINGER. About 6 miles.

Senator FERGUSON. And the first attack was at 7:55. When was the last one?

Admiral BELLINGER. It lasted about 2 hours.

Senator FERGUSON. About 2 hours.

So you had 2 hours time there to try to locate where this task force was?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. If they have got the information coming in there is the question of getting the [9455] information. It is 2 hours then, yes, but the getting of the information is only while the planes are in motion, coming from and going to.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is this true, that you had an untrained Navy there as far as getting intelligence from radar? Is that true, that you didn't know how to use radar, you had it but you didn't know that it was operating and you didn't know whether it was operating that morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. The radar installations, the whole set-up was an Army project.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do we come—

Admiral BELLINGER. The Navy did have radar on some of their ships. As a matter of fact that question has been discussed with reference to the use of that radar, when it could be used, and where it could be used.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the answer?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were certain sectors, certain places in Pearl Harbor where it could work.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it work in the sector here [indicating chart]?

Admiral BELLINGER. It would have to work in a sector to the south, to the southward, on account of the hills, et cetera.

Senator FERGUSON. You are talking about the ship radar?

[9456] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about the Army radar.

Admiral BELLINGER. What I meant was that the ship radar augmented and could augment Army radar when it was in a place where it could be used.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did the Army have radio to the Navy airplanes and did the Navy airplanes have radio to the Army airplanes?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words—

Admiral BELLINGER. The communication to the Navy planes was by Navy and the Army planes by the Army, and if the Navy wanted to send information to any Army planes, the information was telephoned over and they sent it.

[9457] Senator FERGUSON. Then I understand that if the communications center had wanted to know, desired to know whether those were Army planes up to the north that morning the Army would have to get in touch with the Army, and if they desired to know whether they were Navy planes they would have to call the Navy?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you could not communicate—

Admiral BELLINGER. There was no set-up at that time for the control of all planes to keep knowledge of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did we have such a system that the planes of the Navy had no communication with the Army radio? Is that where we stand on the 7th?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Why was that true? Was that coordination?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was the situation. The Army did not control Navy and Navy did not control Army.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand.

Admiral BELLINGER. And, as a matter of fact, even up until about 2 months after December the 7th did we work out a situation whereby the Army planes on long-range scouting could be communicated with directly from my headquarters. Now, that had to be worked out and, as I say, it took about [9458] 2 months to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Was that due to lack of material and manpower?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is a difficult thing to say. I would say no, it was not.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it due to? Because the two departments did not coordinate?

Admiral BELLINGER. Primarily that, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how do you account for the Army and the Navy expecting war and no cooperation to the extent that you could communicate from the ground to both the Army and the Navy planes in each of the Army and Navy set-ups?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, that is very easily explained.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, explain it.

Admiral BELLINGER. There was one and there was another. One force was working under the Navy Department and one was working under the War Department. They were two separate entities.

Senator FERGUSON. And do I understand that you thought that war was imminent?

Admiral BELLINGER. I thought war was coming.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how far away?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, that was a question which I was very much interested in.

[9459] Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were out there on the ground.

Admiral BELLINGER. When I went out there in 1940 I felt that it was coming. It was a question how soon.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you knew in 1940 that war was coming; it was a question of how soon. Then why didn't you get into a condition so that you would have one command on that small island?

Admiral BELLINGER. I would like to ask you how I was going to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I will ask you. I won't answer you but I will ask you.

Admiral BELLINGER. I brought that subject up, too.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER. I mean in Oahu.

Senator FERGUSON. Why couldn't it be done? You give me the facts.

Admiral BELLINGER. I think you are in a much better position than I am. I have been watching this.

Senator FERGUSON. It could be done. You did it after Pearl Harbor, didn't you?

Admiral BELLINGER. Unity of command was placed in effect very shortly after Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, could someone of the superiors in Washington in the Army and Navy cause that to be done.

[9460] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, I should think so.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt about that, is there?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't think there is any doubt about it. There might have been some objections raised; I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask there, Senator? Could that have been done in Oahu without referring it to Washington, under what they had as an agreement as to the cooperation between the Army and Navy forces out there?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't believe it could have been.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not.

Admiral BELLINGER. At least I know I discussed this same subject with Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to just—

Mr. MURPHY. There is evidence in the record that it could be done in Oahu.

Admiral BELLINGER. It could be?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, very definite evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read his answer now.

Mr. MURPHY. There is also evidence that they talked for 4 or 5 days on some little island.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked this question:

If a message had been relayed to the Army that an [9461] enemy submarine had been sunk, would that have placed your air operating plan in effect?

Now, this answer is not clear to me and that is the reason I am going to read it. [Reading:]

I doubt it. I think it would have required some higher authority in the Army to place it in effect. Now, in order to amplify that statement, I would like to refer to an air raid drill which was planned by the Army subsequent to the joint estimate and orders issued setting up the air defense plan. During one night, prior to the operations for the next day, I received a message stating that the Bomber Command was no longer subject to the order of Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I wondered what was the matter. I finally found out that the Army wanted to revert to the old "Joint Action" wherein, if the Navy wanted the Army to assist, it was necessary for the Navy command to so request the Army. Therefore, in the early morning, at five o'clock, the Army Bomber command asked if I was going to request the Army to assist. I informed him that I did not understand that that was necessary in our agreement, that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, was the only one to ask the Army to assist. He stated he would like to participate in this drill. I said I would give him the information and he could act as [9462] he saw fit, and in accordance with his orders. After that I made an official report of same to the Commander-in-Chief and also the Commander, Naval Base Defense, and also prepared a letter for the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to General Short, trying

to straighten this out. In other words, to place the plan for air defense into effect evidently required authorization from higher Army authority for each instance. My letter, just referred to, was designed to correct that situation.

Did you ever correct the situation?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When was this?

Admiral BELLINGER. Within limitations. It did not actually bring about a coordination like was necessary or unity of command like was necessary, but we did not have that same situation come up again.

Senator FERGUSON. When had this happened at five o'clock in the morning that you tried to get this straightened out? Do you know about what month or what part of the month?

Admiral BELLINGER. It happened about July; July 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you told us this morning that your intelligence officer knew about these war warnings.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose intelligence officer?

[9463] Admiral BELLINGER. An intelligence officer of the naval air station, who was attached to the district but he was on the air station.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't you have access to him?

Admiral BELLINGER. I had access to him by sending for him and he came. He was not under me, not part of my command, no.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you send for him?

Admiral BELLINGER. I sent for him when I heard that there was or had been a warning message of some description and he was supposed to have known about it and he was the one that gave information to this officer who was in my command.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, on the sixth you have told us that there was peace in Hawaii.

Admiral BELLINGER. Peace with Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Well, between whom was the war going on in Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me.

Senator FERGUSON. You indicate then that there was war in Hawaii between some other people, not Japan. Who was it between?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't know exactly what you mean.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I took your answer when you said "peace with Japan"—

[9464] Admiral BELLINGER. That is what I meant, what I was referring to. We were at peace with Japan, that is all.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And you did not anticipate any war that morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was the farthest thing from your mind probably, is that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. He was thinking about his sore throat.

Senator FERGUSON. If you would have had more air fields in Hawaii—you said something about you did not have space for your planes. Were you crowded for air space?

Admiral BELLINGER. Let me go back to that. The planes that I am speaking about are seaplanes, great big two-motored seaplanes.

which come out of the water, come up a concrete ramp and are pulled up a concrete platform and you have got to keep them on that or else you cannot handle them.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the Navy ready for war on the 6th and 7th of December 1941 as far as Hawaii was concerned—Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BELLINGER. Ready for war?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. I would say "No," neither was any other place in the United States.

[9465] Senator FERGUSON. And you are definite that in that month, that we were not ready for war in Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. When I say "ready for war" I mean in every way that they are supposed to be ready. I do not mean just merely the individual but I mean in the over-all picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have enough of equipment?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as I understand it, you were not ready for war.

Admiral BELLINGER. That is what I said; we were not ready for war.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not expect it?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not expect it then; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask this question?

Admiral, we were still getting ready for war a month before and a day before the war ended, weren't we, still getting more prepared?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir; we were.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever see a commander who felt that he had what he would have liked to have to fight the enemy and feel perfectly satisfied, fully satisfied?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; but there are times that you like to get at the enemy with what you have got.

[9466] Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to say this: The question was asked of you why didn't you call the interceptor command? The evidence in that regard is that General Short did not have this information at least until the day after, that Admiral Kimmel did not know it until at least the day after and if you called General Davidson he would not know and if you had called the interceptor command, unless Lieutenant Tyler was there to tell you, you would not be able to find out, either him or McDonald.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were you through, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. No, I had a question, but go ahead, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Bellinger, what did you understand by the war warning message of November 27, 1941, sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel when Admiral Stark advised Admiral Kimmel to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46"? What does that mean to you? What would that mean to you?

Admiral BELLINGER. Of course, now it would mean a great deal different than it might have meant then and that is one of those questions that your guess is as good as mine now.

Senator LUCAS. Well, what did the Navy Department have [9467] in mind when they said, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment"? What did that mean to you as a part of the force out there?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, "deployment" means to place units.

Senator LUCAS. What would you do with your planes under that sort of an order?

(No response.)

Senator LUCAS. You don't know?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is a question, of course, that I could say I might have done anything, I could have done anything, but what does it mean now? I am not an individual that wants to say what I am going to do or what I could have done.

Senator LUCAS. I understand.

Admiral BELLINGER. I am perfectly willing to stand on what I do.

Senator LUCAS. Assuming that you had seen General Marshall's message, which went to Admiral Kimmel, where they directed long-range reconnaissance in his message—you are familiar with that?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Take Marshall's message and take Stark's message and construe them together. What would you have done [9468] with your planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, it does say, "Make a reconnaissance." I have forgotten whether it said "long-range" or not.

Senator LUCAS. Well, "make a reconnaissance," I think is what it says, "that you deem necessary." "Make such reconnaissance as you deem necessary," I think is the way it reads.

Senator LUCAS. Take Marshall's message and take Stark's message of Admiral Stark's, which starts out, "This is a war warning and take appropriate defensive deployment", a combination of the two of them. What would that tell you as a man that had charge of the patrol and long-range planes? Don't you scratch your head too hard over that one.

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, I see you are trying to get me to make an answer which—

Senator LUCAS. No, if you cannot make an answer I don't want you to.

Admiral BELLINGER (continuing). I don't think I can do. As I say, I am not going to make an answer as to saying what I might have done or what I would have done because this is 4 years since it happened. As I say, I would like to think I would have taken the appropriate action immediately.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. I appreciate that it is a most [9469] difficult question for you to answer and the only reason—

Admiral BELLINGER. I cannot answer it.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). That I place that question before you, sir, is in view of the fact that you desired to have before the committee the fact that you did not have any of these messages and I presumed that you would want us to interrogate you just a little bit upon that fact because you told us that you did not see any of these messages and it would give me some indication that you thought somebody should have given them to you, otherwise you would not have told the committee that.

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, I assumed you would have asked me if I had not told you.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that may be true.

Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, I did not state that in any statement.

Senator LUCAS. I will not press the question, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson has some questions to ask at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, I would like to read to you the last sentence:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these [9470] measures should be carried out so as not, comma, repeat not, comma, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

Would that have made any difference with that in it?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think all modifications have a bearing on the general thought.

[9471] Senator FERGUSON. One or two more questions. You got out a letter on November 19, a revised schedule for remainder of the second quarter fiscal year. Did that carry through December, November and December?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was going on in December, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. 1941?

Senator FERGUSON. That is Exhibit 113-C. Now that would cover November and December?

Admiral BELLINGER. That covers a part of November and December. I believe I am correct in that.

Mr. MURPHY. 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. It covers a part of November and December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What year?

Admiral BELLINGER. 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Kimmel approved that, did he not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He approved it on November 22, 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we have charts in the back of that indicating what you did with certain planes.

[9472] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there any alteration of that after you had it approved by Admiral Kimmel? Did you make any changes in the schedule?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not to my knowledge; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There were no changes at all?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

Admiral BELLINGER. Except this; to be technically correct, patrol squadron 22 came back on the 5th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. But that was under a specific order?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy has a question.

Mr. MURPHY. I was just going to say in conclusion, Admiral, that I am not asking you to place yourself in Admiral Kimmel's position with all of the material he had through the months, but, as I take it,

since you were an air officer, and air-minded, if there was a discussion about the possibility of an attack on Hawaii, your mind would have been that it would be from the air and there was danger of the attack coming from the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. If there was danger of an attack [9473] on Hawaii, I would expect it to come from the air.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you have any further information that you feel could be of assistance to this committee in considering the question here under consideration?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I do not think I can add anything more to it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have any other evidence that you desire to present?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On behalf of the committee I want to thank you for your appearance, the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry.

Admiral BELLINGER. Thank you very much. I appreciate the committee's consideration.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may now be excused with the thanks of the committee.

Admiral BELLINGER. Thank you very much, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will now adjourn until 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p. m. January 31, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, February 1, 1946.)

[9474]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION,
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[9475] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

When the examination of Admiral Smith was suspended the other day, Mr. Murphy was in the process of examining, so you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM WARD SMITH, UNITED
STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Admiral SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief statement, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral SMITH. In connection with the length of the meeting between Admiral Kimmel and Captain Zacharias, when I last took the stand the chairman remarked on the fact that Admiral Kimmel had agreed that the meeting was an hour and a half long, and I had said 15 minutes. I have searched the record of Admiral Kimmel's testimony, and I cannot find that anywhere he mentioned any time.

However, sometime prior to his testimony, in the presence of two or more members of his staff, the legal staff, he told me that the meeting was, as he placed it, not more than 30 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. I was speaking from memory when I was quoting him.

Admiral SMITH. Yes. I would like to make a brief [9476] statement of fact to the committee in connection with the berthing system at Pearl Harbor. I believe this is pertinent to the testimony of two witnesses whom I have heard, and possibly to that of more whom I did not hear.

General Marshall, when asked how long it would take for the fleet to sortie from Pearl Harbor, qualified his answer by stating it depended on whether the ships were headed in or out. Captain McCollum in his testimony—

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). May I inquire, you said General Marshall? Did I understand you correctly?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; General Marshall. He was asked the question, "Had the message gone through, how long would it take the fleet to go out?" Captain McCollum, in discussing what is now called the bomb plot message, where Pearl Harbor is divided into five sections, five areas, said possibly because in some of those areas ships were headed in while in others they were headed out.

Now, anywhere in Pearl Harbor, to turn a big ship, battleship, or carrier, results in a temporary blocking of the passage. For that reason, and to facilitate very quick sortie, either day or night, all big ships throughout the period of Admiral Kimmel's command, all big ships, on entering Pearl Harbor, were turned around and pointed out before they were moored. That reduced the tugboat operations [9477] in getting them clear. All other ships, cruisers, and destroyers, were nested between buoys and they were enabled to get out without the use of tugs, and as all ships could pass on either side of Ford Island, there was no difficulty on the part of the light forces in getting clear when the battleships were leaving their moorings.

Like Captain McCollum, I was once a fleet operations officer and I know that when the fleet went to Pearl Harbor once per year, or once in 2 years, it was a staff study proposition to get the fleet into Pearl Harbor and practically an all-day job to get them out.

We had been working in 1941 in and out of Pearl Harbor so much that we could clear the entire fleet in about 3 hours. The only limit to getting them out was the fact that they had to go in single file through the channel entrance, and that the speed was limited to 12 knots. Beyond that, in shallow water, the light forces pulled such a wave that they would have wrecked everything on the beach on both sides.

But there was never any difficulty in sortieing and, as I said, the big ships were always headed out.

[9478] The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Smith, you testified, did you not, before Admiral Hart?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to page 38 of the testimony, your testimony before Admiral Hart. At that time you were asked this question:

What was the result in your opinion, of these personnel and matériel shortages on the training program—the efficiency of the training program of the fleet?

Answer. I think it did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet. As a matter of fact the complements had just been revised, and I have always felt that they were unnecessarily large. The fleet was adequately manned, and I consider the ships very efficient, and the efficiency of the fleet was not harmed by this; but the Commander in Chief was looking into the future when he would have to send these men home for new construction.

Were you asked that question, and did you make that answer?

Admiral SMITH. That is correct. If I may do so, I would like to modify it slightly.

I will say that I went into the Hart Board absolutely cold. In the year immediately following Pearl Harbor, I [9479] was at sea practically all the time, with six different flagships from the Coral Sea through Midway, and 6 months in the Aleutians.

At the time I was called before the Hart Board I had a busy war-time job, and since I never kept a diary, I had no papers to refresh my memory. I believe my testimony, now that I have had a chance to think about it, is probably better than it was then—on the other hand, it may be worse. In either case, I stand responsible for my testimony.

As to the efficiency of the fleet, I did believe that the complements as revised were larger than necessary at that time because we had not received the additional antiaircraft guns and radar and many things that we needed.

The fleet was in a very efficient condition. We had the highest type of men I have ever seen in this Navy at that time. They learned quickly.

I believe what is meant in men being demanded more and more, it required more constant training; whereas if you had a crew that is well experienced, every man knows his station, and knows what to do, you do not require this constant day and night training that you have to have.

Very few officers had ever seen one of these permanent crews.

[9480] I had one on one occasion for 2 years, which makes all the difference in the world. We did not have it then. But the efficiency of the fleet was not impaired by the turn-over, in my opinion.

Mr. MURPHY. You were also asked this question:

Q. Did that condition ever develop prior to the 7th of December whereby the Fleet was reduced due to transfers to new construction?

A. No, it did not; not below the level necessary.

And again, question 47:

Q. Did any of these matters affect the maintenance of the Fleet and the efficient condition of maintenance of matériel?

A. No. Units of the Fleet were sent to the Coast shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed his duties of Commander in Chief for degaussing and the installation of armor—what do you call it, splinter armor around the decks and anti-aircraft guns. We had a plan mapped out approximately a year in advance for the overhaul of ships when they needed docking and repairs, and that was continued and was in effect when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The matériel condition of the Fleet was all right. It was satisfactory to the Commander in Chief.

[9481] And again, question 50:

Q. Did these conditions such as you have outlined have any adverse effect on the morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet?

A. As far as morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet is concerned, remember that the Fleet went out there in April of 1940, with the idea of carrying on a six-weeks Fleet problem, and was held out there indefinitely.

There is considerable more in that paragraph, but I just read that part.

Now, question 51:

Q. Did the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor rather than on the mainland, affect the material conditions and the matériel readiness of the fleet?

A. No, it did not.

And question 52:

Q. For war?

A. No, it did not. I might add to that last statement that he often discussed the question of the condition of the Fleet and we felt that it was better out

there than when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Commander in Chief making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for [9482] the day, and shooting, that he found the best thing was for them to take them out for a week and keep them going day and night.

You were asked that question, and you made that answer?

Admiral SMITH. That is correct. I believe what Admiral Kimmel actually said was if the fleet were to return to the coast, he would not keep them in San Pedro where they anchored off San Clementine every night, and came in every Friday, he would keep them going day and night for a week.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you make that statement at any rate? [Reading:]

when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Commander in Chief making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for the day and shooting, that he found the best thing was for them to take them out for a week and keep going day and night.

Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, question 53:

Q. Within your knowledge, did Kimmel ever make any definite recommendations that the custom of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor should be changed—during 1941, I am speaking of—and returning to the old way of basing [9483] on the California coast?

A. To my absolute knowledge, he never made such a recommendation by letter or dispatch. In July, I think, 1941, he made a trip to Washington. He was accompanied only by Captain McMorris. If he ever made any such recommendation, it might have been done at that time, but I think I should have heard about it. I never heard him say to me or any member of his staff that the fleet should return to the coast, although he knew that his predecessor had recommended it.

Then again, question 55:

Q. Then, I understand you to mean that, in your opinion, the general war-mindedness of the personnel of the fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii?

A. Yes, sir; I think it was. You see, in the early part of our stay out there the entire fleet was anchored at Lahaina Roads, with all lights on. I think the Fleet did get war-minded, because they began moving into Pearl Harbor, and even moved the carriers in—moved everything in, and, of course, invariably operated without lights.

Admiral, yesterday, in questioning Admiral Bellinger—you were here, were you?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. MURPHY. I recalled that when Admiral Kimmel was [9484] on the stand, he said that he did not take the air matters up with Admiral Bellinger, that he took them up with his own air man, Admiral Davis. I read from testimony yesterday to the effect that Admiral Davis said he apparently was not consulted except as to logistics.

Do you know who was consulted in the air matters, if it wasn't Admiral Davis, or Admiral Bellinger?

Admiral SMITH. I think I can make a good effort to explain that if I may have the time to do it, sir.

Davis was the fleet aviation officer. Dispatches such as the war warning, which Davis states he did not get, passed first, of course, through the communications officer.

The communications officer or the communications security officer, checked on each message the officers to whom it should be shown. These

messages were carried about by a junior officer of the communications department, and shown to the officers whose names had been checked.

A copy of the message was never left with the officer, even with the commander in chief. As the commander in chief read the secret dispatch, the officer waited outside and took custody of it.

Now, Davis and I lived within a few blocks of each other in Honolulu. We almost invariably drove to and from Pearl Harbor together. That gave us a half hour going and [9485] a half hour returning each day. We talked a great deal of shop and did a great deal of business on those trips.

For example, on the evening of the 27th of November 1941, Davis drove his car, a roadster, and had great difficulty in getting to Honolulu because of the caravans of trucks and troops. I do not know what we talked about that afternoon, but I think it very probable that we talked about the war warning.

Davis was a very good friend of mine and I had no secrets from him on anything that happened. I think it might be well to read the duties of the fleet aviation officer as written in staff instructions, signed by me, and approved by Admiral Kimmel on July 14, 1941:

Fleet Aviation Officer—

- (a) advises with reference to:
 - (1) all aircraft operations and aviation matters including those pertaining to policy with respect to:
 - (A) matériel; (B) personnel; (C) gunnery and bombing; (D) radio.
 - (2) aircraft operations and aviation short facilities.
 - (3) coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet.
 - [9486] (4) employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analyses and reports thereon.
 - (5) by the development of aircraft tactics, gunnery, and doctrine.
 - (6) naval air operating policy.
- (b) assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of war plans.
- (c) keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet.
- (d) assists Operations Officer in the preparation of Fleet schedules dealing with aircraft and aircraft services.
- (e) consults gunnery officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft gunnery—

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I have no objection to your reading that, but will it in any way clear the fact that the airman was not consulted about these matters, and was not shown the war warning and the other messages?

Admiral SMITH. I am merely trying to confirm an impression that I have that he was consulted. Now, I don't know what was shown to him, but his desk was almost adjoining that of the operations officer—

Mr. MURPHY. Are you going to show us by way of contradiction of his sworn testimony something in the staff [9487] regulations to the effect that he should have been shown them but was not shown them?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir. I am telling you that he was an excellent fleet aviation officer and these were some of the reasons why he had to keep in close touch, and he did.

[9488] **Mr. MURPHY.** He was an excellent Fleet Aviation Officer.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you had the No. 2 aviation man at Pearl Harbor, you had some of the best air brains there, and they both say they weren't consulted.

Admiral SMITH. We had another airman at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Was he the man consulted?

Admiral SMITH. Davis was consulted by the commander in chief.

Mr. MURPHY. You heard me read yesterday testimony where he said he wasn't?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you say there was another airman there?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was that?

Admiral SMITH. Admiral Halsey was the No. 1 airman in the whole area. He had more planes than all of them.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Halsey was a busy man, was he not?

Admiral SMITH. When Halsey came into port the first thing he did was to come over to see the commander in chief.

Mr. MURPHY. When did Halsey leave port, Admiral, before December 7?

[9489] Admiral SMITH. He left on the 28th.

Mr. MURPHY. The 28th. And the message came in on the 27th, didn't it?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that he was gone from then until after December 7?

Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. So, surely he wasn't consulted in his absence?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; but he was present, he saw the 27th message.

Mr. MURPHY. He saw the 27th message and went out with orders to shoot down every plane seen and to sink every submarine in the ocean, every submarine sighted; is that not correct?

Admiral SMITH. That is what I understand him to say; that was not his orders but I understand that is what he says.

Mr. MURPHY. That is what he did with his ships, wasn't it?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, as I understand it, on the night of the 27th you were going over to the city of Honolulu in your car—

Admiral SMITH. No, Captain Davis' car. He was driving.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And the Army had some men out and [9490] some matériel out, the roads were blocked?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that every civilian could at least see that the roads were blocked with the Army going on an alert?

Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. There is no doubt in your mind that anyone who had eyes could see that the Army was making some special move?

Admiral SMITH. Not only then but after that they were at the bridges along the highways; they were very much in evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. Different than they had been before November 27?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to question 106:

Q. What about the carriers?

A. We had no knowledge of those; no. The Fleet Intelligence Officer said that he did not know where they were.

That was your impression?

Admiral SMITH. That was my impression at that time. I am informed now that I was in error. The only one that I recalled was the report of two carriers in the Marshalls sometime previously.

[9491] Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to question 87:

Q. Do you recall the Fleet Aviation Officer having given any opinions or advice on the matter?

A. No, sir; I do not recall that he ever did.

That was Admiral Davis, wasn't it?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Question 85:

Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning?

A. Yes, sir.

That was your testimony, was it not?

Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral Kimmel says that he expected a warning, was quite sure he was going to get a warning of 100 miles. How would you account for that difference of opinion on a vital subject if this had been discussed at a conference?

Admiral SMITH. I believe it has been thoroughly covered that the radar had been working and had been working in exercises with the fleet very shortly previous to Pearl Harbor but the system was not complete. The information center, as I understand it, was not working. As the radar works today there would have been in one room a representative [9492] from each command.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I would like to talk about December 7 and prior thereto. As I understand it, you say that you knew you would not get a warning. Admiral Kimmel felt that he would get a warning. Now, if there was a conference, how do you account for that disparity, you feeling you were not going to get a warning and the commander in chief saying he expected and was assured at one time of 200 miles and later correct it 100 miles, that he was depending on Army radar for a warning and you, as Chief of Staff, say you knew there wasn't going to be any.

Admiral SMITH. I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Question 85.

Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could not be depended on to give warning?

A. Yes, sir.

Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Question 86:

Q. Then, if you realized the danger of such an air raid, which events proved was not only possible but probable, you would have seen that outside of anti-aircraft gunfire, there was no security to our installations in Pearl Harbor, including the fleet—is that right?

[9493] A. Yes, sir.

Now, Admiral, I would like to ask you a question or two about your feeling about the competency of the Army flyers. Did you have an opinion on that matter? And particularly I would like to read to you question 81:

Q. What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards personnel.

A. Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based upon our observations during Fleet operations, when their Flying Fortresses would come over at almost smokestack level and showed an utter disregard for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly, prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not very good.

Question 82:

Q. Now, you are talking about the Army bombers, or the Army pursuits?

A. Both.

Was that the feeling of the Navy at that time, Admiral, in regard to the flyers?

Admiral SMITH. I do not know what the feeling of the Navy was. That was probably an unfortunate statement of mine. I believe that I gathered most of that information from my conversations to and from Pearl Harbor with the fleet [9494] aviator.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I might say you are justified in that—

Admiral SMITH. I might also say probably he got his reports from young aviators, who were rivals, and who were prejudiced.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate you stated that?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Question 84:

Q. Do you say that because of the doubt you had of the efficiency of Army aircraft?

A. That is part of it, yes, sir. I may be unjust to the Army in that. It may have been prejudice on the part of Navy flyers, but the opinions expressed by our aviators, as I saw, were not very complimentary to the Army flyers.

You were asked question 90:

Q. Do you recall whether the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were offensive or defensive, in their nature?

A. My recollection is—they were defensive.

You were in error a little, in part, there?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. As I say, I went into that cold, and I believe they told me to refresh my memory on that.

[9495] Mr. MURPHY. There is one other thing I would like to ask you in conclusion. When you were before the Navy Board you made a statement from which I get the impression that the feeling you and the entire staff had was that the fleet had a job to do, to carry out a certain defensive operation, and that it was not a part of the fleet's duty to be defending Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. And is it a fair assumption that the fact that the fleet did have this offensive problem ahead of them, that having concentrated so much on the anxiety to be ready for the offensive, they overlooked the duty they had by command from the Chief of Naval Operations to help and aid the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor because of the deficiency of the local forces in matériel?

Admiral SMITH. I would not say that they overlooked anything. The matter of an air attack on the fleet, either at its base or at sea, was frequently the subject of discussion in the staff and with the commander in chief.

[9496] I do not recall at which conferences these discussions were held but they were so frequent that I would say we did not overlook the possibility. We did not expect the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I do not mean overlook in the sense of entirely ignoring, but the fact is you were so offensive minded that you stressed

offense to the detriment, perhaps, of a little bit of defense in order to protect the base itself.

Admiral SMITH. Well, I believe that is for you gentlemen to decide.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Admiral SMITH. I did not think so at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I have no other questions. I am awfully sorry, Admiral, to have kept you waiting.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster? Not present. Mr. Gearhart? You passed, I believe, once, didn't you?

Mr. GEARHART. I did once but I would like to ask a question or two now, if I may.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You told the committee that you did pass, as I recall it.

Mr. GEARHART. I think nearly all of us did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think all of us did down to—as [9497] I remember, Mr. Murphy was examining Admiral Smith at his last appearance, and I was thinking no one passed except possibly Mr. Keefe and Senator Ferguson. If there is no objection from the committee I think you can go ahead.

Mr. MURPHY. I think the facts are the Admiral had been taken around down the line and when he was about to be excused I asked permission of the committee to ask him a few questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. GEARHART. I think everybody has passed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, you are probably correct.

Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Admiral.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral, were you with the Pacific Fleet during the days when Admiral Richardson was the commander in chief?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. From June 1939—well, I was in the fleet when Admiral Richardson took over in 1940. I joined the fleet in 1939 with the command of the cruiser *Brooklyn*.

Mr. GEARHART. When did you become a member of Admiral Richardson's staff, if you ever did?

Admiral SMITH. I never did. I was present at a conference between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel on Admiral Richardson's flagship about mid-January prior to the time [9498] that Admiral Kimmel had taken over but after Admiral Kimmel had asked me to become his Chief of Staff.

Mr. GEARHART. Those were conferences after Admiral Kimmel had learned that he was to take over?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As Fleet Chief of Staff you were present at all staff meetings?

Admiral SMITH. All of the important ones, yes, sir, where the commander in chief was present.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you if there were any discussions at the staff meetings you attended from the beginning down until the fateful day of the Japanese problem insofar as hostilities with the United States was concerned?

Admiral SMITH. Well, there were many discussions along that line; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And in those discussions members of the staff would endeavor to put themselves in the position of the Japanese and try to think as the Jap would in order to be able to think through the answers to the questions that might be in the Japanese mind?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. In those discussions that preceded the catastrophe of December 7 did anybody in any of those staff meetings raise the question of the necessity for Japan's [9499] immobilization of our fleet?

Admiral SMITH. Not that I recall; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, everyone knew that Japan was interested in the Southwest Pacific?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Everyone expected that their ultimate objective was to conquer and to consolidate their conquests in that area?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; but also it must be remembered that the Japanese undoubtedly knew that our fleet could not leave Pearl Harbor to interfere with their movement to the southwest. We did not have the auxiliaries to do it. I believe Admiral Kimmel testified that we had 11 oilers, only 4 of which could fuel at sea, whereas I know from experience this summer as Commander Surface Forces, Pacific, that for operations that we were carrying out in the Far East we had 71 modern oilers with the fleet that could fuel at sea and 467 commercial tankers on the pipe line and the same was true of food and ammunition. We did not have these things out there in the Pacific Ocean or in the Atlantic which could have supported a movement so far west as the Philippines.

Mr. GEARHART. Why are you so sure or were you so sure at that time that the Japanese knew that we were that short of auxiliary ships?

[9500] Admiral SMITH. Well, we were very positive that they were watching our every move. All they had to do was stand on the hills surrounding Pearl Harbor and they could see what we had.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if they were sure of that and sure of our lack of capacity to go to the aid of the Philippines and interfere with their operations in the South Pacific why did they take this great chance and come to the Hawaiian Islands to immobilize the American fleet?

Admiral SMITH. I do not know. That is where they took us by surprise.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if they knew that we lacked the auxiliary ships and supply ships so necessary and the other necessary equipment to go to the aid of the Philippines their coming to Hawaii was an unnecessary action and one which would result in no benefit to them whatsoever, isn't that correct?

Admiral SMITH. I believe that is the way it turned out, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, in view of the fact that they came, are you willing to say that in your opinion that they knew that we could not go to the aid of MacArthur had we desired to do so?

Admiral SMITH. It would appear from the results that they did not but I do not know why they could not have known. [9501] I would have thought that if in an attack on Pearl Harbor their idea would have been to blast out the oil tanks and the machine shops, then we would have been helpless for a very long time.

Mr. GEARHART. But in coming to the Islands to attack our fleet in Pearl Harbor they risked a good proportion or segment of their own fleet, did they not?

Admiral SMITH. Very much so, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And since there was no purpose in their mind to serve by immobilizing our fleet doesn't it seem absurd that they should have come at all?

Admiral SMITH. It does, but long before Pearl Harbor, sir, we often said it was impossible to read the Oriental mind, what they might do.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, now, supposing our fleet had been taken to the Pacific coast do you think they would have still risked this large armada of theirs in going to the Pacific coast to immobilize the fleet which could not be, according to your testimony, any source of danger to them?

Admiral SMITH. I have been interested here in some of the naval strategy I have heard from officers who are not naval strategists and I do not claim to be one by any means, but it is my opinion, had the fleet been on the Pacific coast, the Japanese would not have attacked it in the manner of the [9502] attack on Pearl Harbor.

It is ridiculous to believe that a large force such as the Japs had could approach San Pedro without being detected because that part of the ocean is pretty well filled with merchant ships. They would have been detected by someone.

Then there was the question they would probably have had to fuel three times on the way over and the same on the way back. They would not have dared, in my opinion, to approach the west coast of the United States.

I have even heard testimony that they might have attacked at Panama or anywhere. I suppose that includes New York, I do not know, but I do not believe that any intelligent enemy would attack the west coast and leave Hawaii as a place from which we could hit it on its way back, because it is a simple matter to fly bombers from the United States to the fields on Hawaii.

What I believe the Japs would have done had our fleet been on the coast is that they would have taken Oahu or one of the other islands of the Pacific in an amphibious operation and it is my opinion that they could have done it.

Mr. GEARHART. It is your opinion that they could what?

Admiral SMITH. That they could have done it.

Mr. GEARHART. That they could have made a landing on Oahu if our fleet had been on the Pacific coast?

[9503] Admiral SMITH. I would say that from what we know now of amphibious operations, certainly we could have done it to other islands. Maui, Hawaii, were not protected at all. They could have taken one of those islands without any difficulty and from there attack Pearl Harbor.

I do not believe that they would have risked their fleet to the Pacific coast of the United States without first knocking out Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GEARHART. Anyway, the—

Admiral SMITH. I am an amateur strategist like the rest of them. I am just giving my opinions.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I know you haven't got your ruler and your rocking chair there but I am willing to concede that you are a naval

strategist because I don't think you could live for so many years in that sort of atmosphere and in constant touch with people who do know that without being one yourself, but anyway it is plain to you as one who is not a strategist that the hazards to the Japanese fleet and to the Japanese as such would have been greatly increased if they had attempted to negotiate an additional 2,000 miles to the Pacific coast?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And the reasons for it are that they would have been compelled to cross many a shipping lane which would [9504] be in use at that time even though one was anticipated?

Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. All right; you said no intelligent enemy would do a thing of that kind. You have already stripped the enemy of intelligence in saying that their expedition to Hawaii was a useless one.

Admiral SMITH. I would say even the Japanese would not have attempted that, in my opinion.

Mr. GEARHART. So you say this whole Pacific operation was one that was devoid of intelligence, not only the question of intelligence work. I mean intelligence in the contemplation of that which exists under the canopy known as the skull. Is that correct?

Admiral SMITH. I think so; yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, in view of the fact that the Japanese were not prepared for that landing, were not prepared for any landing operations, brought no transports with their armada, it would seem that they had but one objective and that was to immobilize our fleet.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; there is no question about it.

Mr. GEARHART. And in view of the fact that you say they knew or must have known or must be held to have known that we had no auxiliary ships, which would make it impossible for our fleet to be ready to interfere in any way with their [9505] operations in their advance in the Southwest Pacific—I am asking you for your hind thought—why did they do all these things?

Admiral SMITH. We had for years had a plan of what we would do in the Pacific in case of war with Japan and it had been studied at the War College for years. It was steam roller tactics, but we departed from that plan in this war. I do not know but I think it possible that the Japanese had had a similar plan for years and they have shown in this war that once a plan is made they rarely depart from it.

It may be they carried that plan too long. I mean if they had had a plan years ago to do that, to immobilize our fleet, they naturally would not suppose that our fleet could move to the westward that far. I think that it was the greatest mistake they ever made to have hit Pearl Harbor as they did but it is without question that the purpose was to immobilize our heavy ships.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, have you learned either prior to Pearl Harbor or since Pearl Harbor anything which would lead you to believe that they possessed this WPL No. 46?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; I do not believe they had. I have not heard anything to that effect.

Mr. GEARHART. Then in coming to the Hawaii attack you do not know that they know about our intentions with respect [9506] to the Marshalls?

Admiral SMITH. No, I do not; no, sir,

Mr. GEARHART. The fact that they came when there was so little reason behind their coming, does it not suggest to your mind that possibly they had some idea of WPL-46 and wanted to prevent us from going into the Marshalls and interfering with their installations in that neighborhood?

Admiral SMITH. It does look that way, yes, sir. Now, it may be possible that such information is now available in the Navy Department. A great deal of intelligence has been gathered after the war I understand. That is a very interesting subject and it may be true; I don't know.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, did you have discussions in the staff meetings prior to Pearl Harbor about these same things that I have been interrogating you about these last few minutes?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir, we had them very frequently.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there an assumption upon the part of those who participated in those staff conferences that the Japanese were too intelligent to have undertaken such an operation against Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you think that any sense of security was developed or grew from that conviction among the members of the staff?

[9507] Admiral SMITH. It is possible. I do not know.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, drawing upon your opinion, because you were there and you took part in those conferences, I will ask you, do you think that the Navy air force would have been used in long distance patrols if they did not have that conviction and that belief that the Japanese were too intelligent to have embarked upon so dangerous an enterprise and so foolhardy an enterprise in the light of the lack of profit to result from an unsuccessful attack? Does that account for the lack of patrols and lack of plans for the protection of the island against such an attack?

Admiral SMITH. I would say no, sir. I believe that the lack of patrols was not only due to the small number of planes we had and the offensive operations that were planned, where it was stated maximum operations out of Wake would take a minimum of two patrol squadrons to be held at Oahu—I believe the greatest influence was our intelligence as to the position of the Japanese fleet, the fact that we knew they were on the way south, had been seen going south, and although it is true we did not know the position of the carriers, the last intelligence information that we had and I believe that the intelligence issued in the biweekly bulletin by ONI on December 1 showed that the main carrier strength was in Japanese waters.

[9508] It has been testified here that planes could have been sent out there and that the crews would have broken down in a few weeks and the planes would have broken down also. When the time came that there was an indication of any such possible movement toward Hawaii, then it would have been time to put the planes out to their maximum at the risk of wearing them out entirely, but we had no such intelligence and did not expect it. Everyone kept talking about the Philippines, Guam, and the Kra Peninsula; they never got east of that. I don't know what else I can add to that, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, let us pass the whole subject.

Now, in some of the testimony that has been taken in the course of this investigation it has appeared that there was a radio silence order which was made shortly before Pearl Harbor. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral SMITH. On the part of whom, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. I got the impression it was made by the commander-in-chief of the fleet restricting the use of radio by ships at sea. Is that not correct?

Admiral SMITH. That had been an order in effect for a very long time. Individual ships were not allowed to use their radio. If a message was absolutely necessary it would be sent out by one of the task force commanders perhaps. They even went so far—well, I wouldn't be so sure of that [9509] because I get events just before Pearl Harbor and just after mixed, but it was the practice when it was necessary to send a message either to fly planes inshore and send it over a shore station or if too far at sea to send a destroyer on the flank fifty to a hundred miles and have him broadcast the message from there so that no one could cut the fleet in.

Mr. GEARHART. So that the position of the ships or the group of ships might not be disclosed?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; and when the move of taking ships was made from the Pacific to the Atlantic in May 1941 they observed radio silence all the way and arrived at Panama with their names painted out and were supposed to have gone through as a complete surprise. Those ships had no radio whatever all the way.

Mr. GEARHART. Were any changes tightening or broadening the radio restriction made within a few weeks before Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; that had been going on for well, almost from the time that Admiral Kimmel took over, possibly before.

Mr. GEARHART. We have had the log of the USS *Boise* before us and it discloses that on the 27th and 28th of November 1941 that ship encountered enemy ships in Guam waters to whom they signaled but their signals were not returned and [9510] then the *Boise* turned out of its course.

Admiral SMITH. I believe she was on the way from Pearl Harbor to Manila escorting a transport or something. She was away from the fleet.

Mr. GEARHART. Information has reached me that an argument ensued between the captain of the ship and the chief executive officer as to whether or not radio silence should be broken to transmit that information to American naval authorities in higher authority but that under the letter of the regulation that it was determined not to send that information. You did not receive any radios as chief of staff, did you?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Or in general with respect to the presence in American waters around Guam that there was enemy craft?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; I heard that rumor long after the war. I never heard it at the time. I would say that it is possible. I know of one transport that went out and she carried radar to be delivered to our submarines in the Philippines and the commanding officer told me that his orders from the Navy Department were to destroy the ship if she were overhauled by Japanese forces because conditions

were tight, but it is possible the *Boise* was escorting that ship, in which case he would have been very reluctant to use radio under [9511] any conditions.

Mr. GEARHART. Wouldn't it have been the duty—wouldn't you conceive it to have been your duty if you had been captain of that ship, to have changed your course and gotten beyond the range of the Japanese patrols or warships of whatever type they were and to advise your commander in chief of their presence in American waters?

Admiral SMITH. I would not have avoided them unless he was too big, but I would have found some way, I believe, to inform the commander in chief and his best method of doing that was to, if within perhaps 300 miles of Guam, to have flown one of his planes to shore and sent the message from there.

Mr. GEARHART. But that was not done either?

Admiral SMITH. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. You as chief of staff saw no message?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Or received a message to that effect?

Admiral SMITH. None whatever, sir. That would have been the captain's responsibility, what he did by his action, but I know of no such messages.

Mr. GEARHART. If you received information at that time, you having just received the so-called war warning message, that the Japanese were prowling American waters in the neighbor- [9512] hood of Guam, would that have made any difference in your attitude towards the kind of a defense that should have been invoked at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral SMITH. Well, we had been told that Guam was one of the probable places to come under attack and it could not be defended. I don't know what effect that might have had on us, but it seems to me that it would have confirmed the information that they were going to hit Guam and possibly the Philippines. We knew they were on the move to the southward.

Mr. GEARHART. But in all messages received they spoke of an attack upon Guam and an attack on Borneo as merely the outside possibilities, did they not?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. One message said:

In any direction, including Guam and the Philippines.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And you interpreted that, didn't you, as meaning the outside limits—

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. GEARHART (continuing). Of the Japanese operations?

Admiral SMITH. I did; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, would the knowledge that the Japanese warships were prowling Guam waters have made any difference in your orders or activities if you had been informed of it?

Admiral SMITH. It depends upon the nature of the prowl. [9513] If they were light forces, not concentrated, they might have been merely scouting their flank to make certain that we did not put something over there.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, all right. If you had received air messages that the U. S. S. *Wright* on the 6th of December had sighted planes

that they could not identify as bearing American insignia, unidentified planes—if you had received a radio indication to that effect—what would you have done?

Admiral SMITH. That would depend, of course, upon the position of the U. S. S. *Wright*. I don't know where she was at that time, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. According to the testimony, she was then three or four hundred miles off Hawaii.

Admiral SMITH. I never received any such report.

Mr. GEARHART. She was returning with Admiral Halsey's contingent.

Admiral SMITH. I don't remember that rumor. We had another one that went out that Admiral Halsey's planes had sighted two planes that they could not identify; but when that was run down, it proved to be incorrect. I don't remember—

Mr. GEARHART. But this one I am asking you about is not rumor. It is fact. These unidentified planes were flying in American waters surrounding Hawaii just preceding the attack on Hawaii. Now, did you receive any radio messages [9514] from the U. S. S. *Wright*—

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART (continuing). That they had seen this?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; absolutely no. Had we received—

Mr. GEARHART. You have been informed that the log discloses that fact, haven't you, since that time?

Admiral SMITH. No; I never heard it until you just told me.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, we have the log before the committee, and I read it. Now, the presence of unidentified planes or an unidentified plane would indicate that there was a carrier somewhere near, wouldn't it?

Admiral SMITH. It could not indicate anything else, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. But because of your order for radio silence, no message was received by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet of this suspicious circumstance?

Admiral SMITH. I would not say because of an order for radio silence. I would say it was because the captain of the ship had very poor judgment. Any order of that nature should be broken in an emergency. I am astounded, if such a thing had happened, why he did not report it, because the *Wright*, as I recall now, was plying between Pearl Harbor and Midway, possibly Wake. He was in our waters.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it has been disclosed that the ship [9515] was part of the detachment which Admiral Halsey was the commander of and had been recently delivering planes to one of the far western islands of the United States.

Admiral SMITH. It could not have been a part of Admiral Halsey's forces, because the *Wright* is not fast enough to go with that force.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it has been identified by naval experts to have been within three or four hundred miles of Hawaii.

Admiral SMITH. It is all new to me, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. What?

Admiral SMITH. It is all new to me. I never heard of it.

Mr. GEARHART. Then what would you have done if, on the 6th day of December, a message had been received indicating that there were

unidentified planes flying within three or four hundred miles of Hawaii?

Admiral SMITH. I would have made every effort to locate her, both by patrol planes and by the task force that was in that area not too far away.

Mr. GEARHART. You would have probably—even though you had a few planes to keep at your command—you would have inaugurated, would you not—

Admiral SMITH. Stopped everything.

Mr. GEARHART (continuing). A distance reconnaissance?

[9516] Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; stopped everything and put all effort on that one problem.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield so that I can ask one question?

Mr. GEARHART. I yield; yes.

Senator LUCAS. What date was the *Wright* seen?

Mr. GEARHART. I understood it to be the 6th.

Senator LUCAS. The day before the attack?

Mr. GEARHART. The day before the attack.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Mr. MURPHY. The *Wright* is shown directly above the islands there. The log is available to the members of the committee.

Mr. GEARHART. May I have the log of the *Wright*? It is in my file, but I do not know where to look for it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have already sent for it, Mr. Congressman. It will be up in a moment.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel has already sent for it. It will be up in a moment.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have already sent for the log of the *Wright*, and it will be up here in a moment, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, while we are waiting for the log—and I won't wait very long for it, because we can return to it later—did you during all of the time that you were acting [9517] as Chief of Staff see any reports of any shooting or firing between American and Japanese ships?

Admiral SMITH. None whatever; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Would you receive—as the chief of staff for the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet—would you receive any reports from the Asiatic Fleet in that regard if there had been any exchange of fire between American and Japanese ships?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I am positive we should have, because Admiral Hart kept us very well informed on what he was doing. The report would certainly have gone to the Navy Department, and it would in any case have gone to us for information.

Mr. GEARHART. Then out at Pearl Harbor there was no knowledge of any firing in the Pacific, so far as you know, as between the fleet of the United States and the fleet of Japan, or any of its ships?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir. There had not even been a depth charge dropped.

Mr. GEARHART. I beg pardon?

Admiral SMITH. There had not even been a depth charge dropped.

Mr. GEARHART. That is, until the morning of the 7th.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

[9518] Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield for a moment?
Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, on the ship-location charts which we have been furnished, I understand that the Navy has been asked to give the list of the names; but on the 5th and the 6th of December there was some ship right up in the vicinity from which that attack came. Now, I don't mean the exact vicinity, but to the north, and it went into Pearl Harbor that Sunday. It was not indicated what that ship was. Do we have those ship-location charts here?

Admiral SMITH. I think it is very probable that was one of our destroyers.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, on the 5th and 6th Senator Ferguson and I remember observing that there was a ship to the north of Oahu, and then it is gradually going in and it is in port on Sunday.

I ask counsel if they will produce those ship charts? Will you please produce those ship-location charts? They are photostats. Do you have the one I mean? There it is.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a large map.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I will read this to you:

Saturday, December 6-20 to 24. Sighted vessel bearing one point abaft port beam running without lights on course approximately 300 degrees, true, distance four [9519] miles. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R. P. M., 86.1.

Now, I will ask you if that was sighted—that ship was sighted—and that seems to be a ship on the seas—on the 6th day of December and they could not identify it, what would you have done under the silence of the radio order?

Admiral SMITH. Told the ship who reported it to identify it or send a destroyer immediately to investigate.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, here is a ship that had a one-point bearing and was running without lights on a course approximately 300°, true, whatever that means.

Admiral SMITH. Of course, the first thing to have been done in that case was to go to the operations officer's board and find whether we had a possible ship in that location, because a ship then, a merchant ship, was not running without lights at that time. If we could not identify her, then send something out to identify her. Of course, I don't know what ship reported this.

Mr. GEARHART. This was reported by the *Wright*.

Admiral SMITH. Oh, that was reported by the *Wright*.

Mr. GEARHART. This was recorded in the log of the *Wright* as of the 6th day of December 1941 between the hours of 20 and 24.

Now, if that had been reported to you as chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, would that have [9520] alerted the fleet?

Admiral SMITH. I believe it would have; yes, sir. The probability, of course, was that that ship was a submarine on the surface.

[9521] Senator LUCAS. Do I understand it was an unidentified ship rather than an unidentified plane?

Mr. GEARHART. This particular item I read reveals the presence of an unidentified surface ship. My interrogatories prior to getting this log in my hand were in reference to an unidentified aircraft.

Senator LUCAS. Is the unidentified aircraft in the log also?

Mr. GEARHART. I saw it the other time I had the log in my hand. This is an additional item that I have run across.

Senator LUCAS. What kind of a ship was the *Wright*, Admiral? It was an airplane tender, was it not?

Admiral SMITH. The *Wright* was an airplane tender of the type like the transport *Chateau Thierry*. They were built during the last war. The bow and stern looked alike; they were good for 12 knots, and 14 if they were in good shape.

Their speed is limited. She carried mostly parts for seaplanes and I believe was on the way to Midway at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. GEARHART. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I show you a Guide to Symbols, [9522] and then I show you a chart. What would be the technical name of that chart, Admiral, do you know, in the Navy? That would be a ship-location chart, would it not?

Admiral SMITH. No; I would not say so.

Mr. MURPHY. What would you call that? I understand it is to keep a daily record of the ships of the United States throughout the world.

Admiral SMITH. Yes. That is a secret chart and would show the convoys. These are Great Circle routes, of course.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, with particular reference to the Guide to Symbols, I direct your attention to a ship which is to the north of Pearl Harbor. At what degree would you say that was on the chart, this being 160 here [indicating]?

Admiral SMITH. It would be about 155 west, I should say.

Mr. MURPHY. And how many degrees north?

Admiral SMITH. I should say about 3° south.

Senator FERGUSON. How many?

Admiral SMITH. No; no. That is north latitude. I think that is about 18° north. It looks like it to me. The chart should have in the margin somewhere the latitudes. That is probably about 18° north, I should say.

[9523] Mr. MURPHY. Will you resume your seat, Admiral, and I will put this before you.

I direct your attention to Exhibit 109, a secret chart that is part of Exhibit 109, and I direct particularly your attention to a ship to the north of Oahu, and about 155° west longitude, the location being that of the ship in question on the 5th of December 1941, and I ask you if you will look to the Guide to Symbols and tell us what kind of a ship that is.

Admiral SMITH. It would appear to be a patrol vessel.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I show you another exhibit, a chart in the same exhibit, the secret chart for December 6. With reference to the same patrol vessel, will you compare for us the relative position of the vessel in question on the 6th of December as compared to the 5th? Is there anything that would indicate to you on the chart on the 6th as to the relative position of the vessel which was to the north of Oahu, 155° longitude, on the 5th?

Admiral SMITH. It seems to have disappeared from this chart. I see nothing of the same ship or symbol.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, Admiral, will you look at the map on the wall, the Disposition of United States Pacific Fleet, 7 December, 1941, and the point from which the Japanese force came, and compare it with the secret chart [9524] for December 5? What, in your judgment, is the relative position of the vessel in question to the north of Oahu, as compared with the point from which the Japanese force came. I am referring to this one right here [indicating].

Admiral SMITH. Yes; I see it. Slightly to the east of the path, through which the Japanese force went.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it is in the same general location, is it not?

Admiral SMITH. It is; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. On the 5th of December?

Admiral SMITH. Yes. If you are trying to identify that ship—

Mr. MURPHY. I would like very much to.

Admiral SMITH. If you are trying to identify that ship, I would say that since we now know that the Japanese had special code messages arranged between the consul general and Tokyo about the meaning of a light in one or two houses on the north shore of Oahu, and the meaning of two lights so far as the movement of our ships in and out of Pearl Harbor is concerned, and of the hanging of sheets, I believe, in the back yard during the day, that there is no question whatever that Japanese submarines were operating to the north of Oahu, and they came to see those signals, and instead of a patrol boat this may very well have [9525] been a submarine.

Mr. MURPHY. That is an American ship, Admiral. These are our reports of only American ships.

Admiral SMITH. I did not know that.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, this is the American secret chart.

Admiral SMITH. I cannot identify it; no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just to interpolate a question right there, Admiral, on the chart of the 6th, that vessel seems not to be present. It seems to have moved out of that area.

Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you identify where that vessel is on the 6th on that chart?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; I cannot on the chart.

Senator LUCAS. I suggest the Congressman from Pennsylvania start all over again.

Mr. MURPHY. I will ask the naval liaison officer to furnish us with an explanation of the ship and its name to the north of Oahu on December 6, the name of the ship, the type of the ship, and where it went after it was in the position of 155° west, and 18° north.¹

Senator FERGUSON. We had asked for that before.

Mr. MURPHY. I am renewing it. I would like to know what happened to the ship that was to the north of Oahu [9526] on December 5, and where it went on the 7th.

I refer to the ship shown on the secret chart, giving the location of the United States ships on December 5, 1941.

Admiral SMITH. It would have been possible that that ship was proceeding to or from Pearl Harbor, to Pearl Harbor from the coast, and it is not very far from the great circle course between San Francisco and Oahu.

¹ The information, supplied by the Navy Department, appears in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5504.

Mr. MURPHY. Except, as I understand, Admiral, there had been some order or understanding that all vessels were to be out of the north and were to take some other route, and we would ship everything down by the Torres Strait. If it was a merchant vessel, I do not know whether it would have shown on that secret chart, or not.

I believe it is only meant to show United States vessels as such. I mean patrol vessels, war vessels of different types. So, at any rate, on the chart that is before you that ship to the north of the island of Oahu appears to be in the same general direction, does it not, as the point from which the Japanese came on December 7?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; it does.

[9527] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. I find, as far as I can find from this log, that we sighted a surface ship. This is a verification of a letter which I have referred to from one of the lookouts on that ship who has written to the effect that that ship was challenged and it turned and fled, and they turned and went the other way.

It appears conclusively on the log of the ship of December 6 that between the hours of 20 and 24 a ship was sighted by the U. S. S. *Wright*.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You cannot find any airships on there?

Mr. GEARHART. No. It must be in one of the other logs. It is not in this one. I read it into the record the last time I had a log in my hand. There were two unidentified planes.

Mr. MURPHY. One plane.

Mr. GEARHART. So if we are looking for precise reasons for Pearl Harbor we might fasten upon the failure of the captain of the *Wright* to have reported to you the unidentified vessel in Hawaiian waters on the 6th day of December 1941?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. There is no order issued that is so hard and fast that in the interests of the security of the fleet or of the country a captain with any judgment cannot break a radio silence when it is necessary.

[9528] Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral. I would like to ask a question or two, if I may, on some of the information you gave us a short time ago.

I believe you stated that, in your opinion, the Japs could have captured Pearl Harbor or the adjacent islands if the fleet were not present there on December 7, 1941.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. By that I mean their objective would have been different. In fact, had they been accompanied by an amphibious force two days behind that strike they could have accomplished the same thing. But I believe their intentions would have been different.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, if that had happened, if they had captured Pearl Harbor or the adjacent islands there, then we would have had to recapture Hawaii in order to conduct a successful war against Japan, would we not?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you also to state that if they had destroyed our oil supplies and our shore installations there rather

than attacking the fleet, the situation would have been worse for this country than it was by what they did do.

Admiral SMITH. Much worse; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

[9529] Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I have some.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. You think then that the oil at Pearl Harbor was more important than our fleet? Is that your answer?

Admiral SMITH. The type of ships that we had at that time in Pearl Harbor, the battleships, had been so overloaded with additional gear in the past 20 years that they were well down in the water, their speed was so reduced that we had a fleet speed of 15 knots. Our light forces were not hurt very much, and it is the light forces and carriers that carried on the war from that point until we got modern heavy ships that could travel at a fleet speed of, say, 28 knots. I would say that the result of the disaster in Pearl Harbor is, first, the unfortunate and terrible loss of life.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt about that.

Admiral SMITH. The other, the material, the expense, is not so important, because after those ships were raised they were entirely modernized and rebuilt along the lines that they should have been rebuilt several years before.

Senator FERGUSON. Then this fleet that we had at Pearl Harbor, in your opinion, was of very little value as far as a fighting force is concerned?

[9530] Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. It did not make any difference where it was, as far as the actual ships were concerned?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; except as a supporting force. That is, if the Japs sent over surface ships in connection with our move against the Marshalls—after our strike in the Marshalls we needed a supporting force beyond which the carriers could go for protection, fueling, getting ready for something else.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was a real value?

Admiral SMITH. It was a real value in that respect, yes, sir, but not as a fleet that could have gone to seek out the Japanese fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. But we had more than that to do. They had taken so many islands that there was a lot to do. Would not it have been valuable to go with our landing forces, with these large guns and all, and did not it delay us because we did not have this fleet?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; it did not delay us, because to recapture those islands, to take the islands away from them we had to develop an enormous amphibious force with trained men, and we did not have them at that time. By the time we got ready to move we had the ships necessary, not only for support but for bombardment.

[9531] Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, this fleet was of no value to defend Midway or to defend Guam in case they would have struck there, or struck first in the Philippines?

Admiral SMITH. We could have defended Midway; yes, sir, but not Guam. Midway is not so far.

Senator FERGUSON. Could not have defended Guam?

Admiral SMITH. Not in my opinion; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It could not have gone down there after they were trying to take Guam and been of any aid?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you come back to this, that this fleet was of very little value at the time, as far as the big ships were concerned?

Admiral SMITH. The heavy ships were of very little value, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the airplanes that were destroyed? What value were they? We were very low in airplanes, were we not?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did that interfere with our action in the Pacific, the destruction of these planes?

Admiral SMITH. I do not know how rapidly those planes were replaced because I left very shortly afterward, but it [9532] seems to me that we were very soon able to carry out a proper reconnaissance and that Army and Navy planes must have been sent out there promptly. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not we had long-range reconnaissance there in July, or previous to July?

Admiral SMITH. Only intermittently.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any order that ever was issued by anyone stopping that reconnaissance sometime during the summer?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard of an order to stop it?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it only for training purposes?

Admiral SMITH. That I am unable to state. There were times when the fleet exercises were carried out to the north. Wherever we carried out the exercises the long-range reconnaissance planes took part.

Yes; you might say it was for training exercises.

Senator FERGUSON. It was training?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not wish to go back to the alert in the summer of 1940, I was not talking about that reconnaissance at all. There was never any reconnaissance for any other purposes than training, and there was no order [9533] stopping long-distance reconnaissance?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Any time during the year 1941?

Admiral SMITH. To the best of my knowledge there was never any such order.

Senator FERGUSON. You would know about that?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the Chief of Staff, were you not?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I would know.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give me the order of command, as far as air was concerned, in Hawaii? How did Admiral Bloch fit into the command?

Admiral SMITH. I will try to explain the command organization at that time. Admiral Bellinger, as he showed yesterday, had several different titles. As Commander Task Force 9, he worked with the Fleet, and had we advanced on the Marshalls he would have done so as Commander of Task Force 9, working directly under the Commander in Chief.

Now Admiral Bloch was the Naval Base Defense Officer and as such he was charged by this order, which is an exhibit, the letter

2 CL-41, he was charged with the distant reconnaissance. Two short excerpts from those orders are:

The Commandant 14th Naval District is the Naval Base [9534] Defense Officer. As such he shall—

and one of his duties is—

exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing 2—

that is Bellinger—

for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

And later:

In case of an attack the Naval Base Defense Officer shall launch air search for enemy ships.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. If you look at page 398 of this hearing you will find Admiral Bloch says all they were was a volunteer fire department.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though they were a volunteer fire department I want to know who was the head of the volunteer fire department.

Admiral SMITH. I believe I am coming to that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, go ahead.

Admiral SMITH. So you see, had Admiral Bellinger had all this information which he said yesterday he did not have, he could not initiate a long-range search.

Senator FERGUSON. Who could?

Admiral SMITH. Admiral Bloch. But, of course, had that information been in Bellinger's hands he could have advised Admiral Block of the search that should be carried out. Now [9535] Admiral Bloch knew all of these things, but Admiral Bloch had no planes. So as naval base defense officer he executed these orders.

Senator FERGUSON. Without planes?

Admiral SMITH. By borrowing planes from the fleet, by getting his planes from Admiral Kimmel, and he had the planes that Admiral Kimmel could spare from his other exercises or intentions.

[9536] Senator FERGUSON. Well, as Chief of Staff, did you ever find these men getting tangled up in these orders?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They were able to keep everything in mind?

Admiral SMITH. Yes.

So that if a long-range reconnaissance was thought necessary—

Senator FERGUSON. If you had really had to operate this system, in anticipation of an air attack, wasn't it very confusing?

Is it because they weren't doing anything that they didn't get tangled up in the red tape?

Admiral SMITH. Well, they were doing things. Admiral Bellinger was over there very often. The commander in chief sent for him very often.

But if I may continue, this involved command organization—

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral SMITH. So Admiral Bloch had the responsibility of conducting this search. To do so, he had to call upon the commander in

chief for planes, and the commander in chief could say "yes," or "no," of course.

On the other hand, if the commander in chief thought [9537] a long-distance reconnaissance necessary, he would have commanded Admiral Bloch, who was one of his task-force commanders, to carry on the search. So that after you analyze it, the responsibility comes back to the commander in chief and Admiral Kimmel in his testimony has accepted that responsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, between Admiral Kimmel, there came next in line Admiral Bloch.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then who would be under that, on long-range reconnaissance?

Admiral SMITH. Bellinger.

Senator FERGUSON. Bellinger?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So if Bloch and Kimmel decided there wasn't to be any long-range reconnaissance, Bellinger would never hear about it?

Admiral SMITH. Quite possible; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Quite possible? There wouldn't be any need for him to know about it if they decided not to have long-distance reconnaissance, would there?

Admiral SMITH. I think he would have heard about it.

[9558] Senator FERGUSON. How? Did they have rumors that they relied upon?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; but—

Senator FERGUSON. Was it his duty to ask about it?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; but the fleet aviator, as Admiral Bellinger testified yesterday, I believe, was in touch with him every day by telephone and certainly the fleet aviation officer would have known had the staff met and decided not to have a reconnaissance.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, as I understand it, it never arose. They never decided yes or no, on long-distance reconnaissance; isn't that right? There was no decision, was there?

Admiral SMITH. Not that I know of; no, sir. The matter was discussed very frequently, but I don't know that they ever reached a decision not to do it.

Senator FERGUSON. They didn't reach any decision to do it; is that right?

Admiral SMITH. I know that they always had in mind doing it, because you note that Admiral Bloch had requested 200 long-range planes and received none of them. There is only one reason he wanted those planes and that was for reconnaissance. That was his job.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you stated that the Japanese [9539] were taking great chances on this attack, and, in fact, it was a wrong thing to do.

Did you know that on the 6th day of December, 1941, that Honolulu notified Tokyo and we intercepted a message, we didn't translate it, but we intercepted it, and had it, with this statement in it:

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm.

On page 27 of Exhibit 2, Honolulu notifies Tokyo, December 6, 1941. It was intercepted but not shown to have been decoded on the 6th. Then there is this information:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

Now, suppose that the task force was up, as shown on that map, up there, and was receiving this information, and knew by their intelligence that our radar was shut off at 7 o'clock, and that we had no balloons over the ships, and the information that I have read to you was available, what changes were they taking? Your ships were tied up there. There was nobody manning the anti-aircraft guns. They knew that. They knew there was no air reconnaissance. What chance were the Japanese taking?

[9540] We had cut off the traffic from the north. We had issued two orders, one of the 16th of October and one on the 25th of November to divert all traffic south.

Admiral SMITH. The only traffic north, I believe, was Russian ships carrying lend-lease materials to Vladivostok.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't we divert all those ships?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; we had no control over the Russian ships.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, the Russian ships.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. Those are the only ships that might have been in the area.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you anticipate that if Russia had seen this Japanese task force they would have done anything about it?

Admiral SMITH. I doubt it very much. In fact, I understand that the Japanese task force had orders to sink them.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, with what you know now, with what I read you here, what risks were the Japanese taking for the opportunity to sink all of our battleships, or destroy them, and to destroy as many planes as they did on our airfields, and in our hangars; what risks were they taking? Use hindsight on that.

[9541] Admiral SMITH. Well, there was a risk, of course, from our two carrier task forces that were missing from Pearl Harbor. They couldn't have known where those ships were, and they were prepared to meet them anyway. But if these two messages that you read—the first one I heard read for the first time, I believe, here yesterday, the second I had never heard—

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In the light of this, this intelligence that was going out of Honolulu to the Japs—and we must assume that it was going to their fleet?

Admiral SMITH. It was, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the purpose. They had a design map of the harbor and these messages were going from Pearl Harbor to the Japs, and the Japs were making inquiries right along, as shown by these exhibits.

Now, under those circumstances, with that kind of intelligence against us, what chance were they taking?

Admiral SMITH. Not so much as I had testified to, sir. That makes a great difference.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to show you this message of the 25th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

[9542] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I didn't quite understand you at one place. You said something with respect to the Russian ships and the Japanese striking force, that somebody had orders to sink somebody else. What was that?

Admiral SMITH. There is always the opportunity in a movement of a large naval force that a merchant vessel will sight that force and report it to someone, so that it would be necessary for the Japs to have intercepted that ship and secured or destroyed her radio, or otherwise to have sunk her. I have been told since the war ended that the orders of that Jap task force were to sink anything that they found on the way.

I don't know that that is absolutely correct, but I believe it is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Even though it might have been a Russian ship?

Admiral SMITH. Even though it might have been their own ships.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, let's assume that they were 20 miles away: the message would be sent communicating that prior to their sinking it, would it not?

Admiral SMITH. Naturally, if they expected—

[9543] Senator FERGUSON. It would be too late to sink it after they communicated with their Government?

Admiral SMITH. What I mean is that had they sighted a ship 20 miles from their course, they probably would have sent a destroyer or a light ship and placed a boarding officer on board merely to ask questions. Once he arrived on board it would be too late to send a radio.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral SMITH. If the neutral ship suspected that she was going to be sunk, of course she would send a radio.

Senator FERGUSON. So we must also assume that they would send a radio first, the minute she sighted that Japanese Fleet.

Look at this message that we had changing the course of our ships.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I remember that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, didn't that take our vessels out of this area?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, we had one area that we weren't looking into at all, we were not using submarines, we were not using air reconnaissance, we were not using our battleships, we were using no ships at all; isn't that true?

[9544] Admiral SMITH. By routing through Torres Strait, you will notice that the ships are not only south of that area, but they were well south of the Hawaiian Islands. I mean, between Oahu and the Marshalls, and the Carolines there was no shipping either.

Senator FERGUSON. So we left our flank to the south open?

Admiral SMITH. We moved all the merchant shipping well to the south so that the area to the northward and to the westward and to the southwestward was clear of our shipping.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say they were taking a chance so far as our two task forces were concerned. That is, Halsey and Newton.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing now what the Japanese had, six carriers, three battleships, and whatever the other part of the task force was, was either one of these task forces a match for that task force of the Japanese?

Admiral SMITH. By no means. If they had joined up, they were not a match for it, unless they caught them while the Jap planes were over Pearl Harbor. If they caught them with their planes not on the deck, they would have then done considerable damage.

[9545] Senator FERGUSON. But our airplanes, our bombers, would have been quite a match for them either with the planes on them, or the planes off?

Admiral SMITH. You mean our long-range bombers?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral SMITH. We had only six, as I understand. They wouldn't have lasted very long.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, do I understand that we were absolutely helpless, whether we knew it or not? Is that what you want to tell us?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; I wouldn't say that. I will say that, as has been proved throughout this war, there is no way to stop a determined air attack. Some of them will get through no matter how strong you are in the anti-aircraft guns and fighters. Some will always get through if it is a determined attack, as all Japanese attacks were.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we know that on the 6th and the 7th?

Admiral SMITH. I think so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we couldn't have stopped them?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; we couldn't have stopped them. In the sinking of the *Yorktown*, 18 planes came in. Sixteen were shot down. Two got off their torpedoes [9546] and were shot down. But the *Yorktown* was sunk. That is a determined air attack. None of them got out, but they sank their ship.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the thing to have done here would have been to have taken all the men off of the ships, except those with the anti-aircraft guns, and in that way minimize our loss of sailors; is that what you would say? Whether we knew they were coming or not?

Admiral SMITH. It depends on how much advance information we had, sir. The first thing to do was to get the light forces at sea and get everything at sea, if possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we have enough at Pearl Harbor to get them at sea and take care of these carriers and win a battle with this Japanese task force?

Admiral SMITH. No; but had we gotten that fleet to sea, of course, any commander in chief would seek out the enemy. He probably would have suffered great damage.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you anticipate he would have inflicted on the enemy? That is the test, isn't it?

Admiral SMITH. I think we probably would have sunk at least two of their carriers, but we would probably have lost our own in doing it.

We would have delayed the war for another year. There would be no battle of the Coral Sea and probably no battle [9547] of Midway had we lost those two carriers at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, you come back to the proposition that we were not prepared for war in the Pacific?

Admiral SMITH. Not for the kind of war that was thrust upon us; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, didn't we know the kind of war the Japanese could wage in the Pacific? Weren't we prepared on that? Didn't our intelligence tell us that?

I am asking you as chief of staff.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As chief of staff of the commander in chief of the Pacific.

Admiral SMITH. But to meet that kind of an attack you had to have more fighting planes and long-range planes, of course, and you had to have modern antiaircraft guns which we did not have.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what Admiral Stark and General Marshall were talking about when they wrote the message of the 5th of November and the message of the 27th of November telling Mr. Hull that they didn't want any ultimatum with Japan?

Admiral SMITH. That is what I understand from their testimony; yes, sir. They wanted a delay so that these things could be provided.

[9548] Senator FERGUSON. That is what you are telling us this morning?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That we were not prepared for war?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. With the Japanese at that time; is that right?

Admiral SMITH. That is right, and we did not get such things as 40 millimeter guns and modern radar on some of the ships for almost a year. We had, for example, a 4-barreled antiaircraft gun called the 1.1, but no controls had been installed for it, and after a few rounds, the men were blinded by the smoke from the barrels.

It turned out to be a very poor gun, but that was the best we had at that time, and very few ships had that.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't we ever try it out before?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. We tried it out repeatedly.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we know that this would happen with it, that the men would be blinded after a few rounds?

Admiral SMITH. The controls had been designed, the foundations were in place on the battleships, but the gear had not arrived from the United States so that a man could control that gun from one side, to keep him clear of the gun blast.

[9549] Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned a letter the other day, and I would like to straighten that matter out.

To refresh your memory on the letter, I will read from the Hart report:

In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor, we received an official letter stating, "I know that you would like to have 20,000 men and we would like to give them to you," as I remember the exact wording: "The war is in the Atlantic and we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific." This letter was actually received a few days after Pearl Harbor, although written before, of course.

Now, there is a note—and you indicated in your testimony that this was sent by Admiral Stark?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir. I notice I was quoted in the newspapers that way. I did not say by Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. The newspaper item said Admiral Stark.

Admiral SMITH. No; that is incorrect.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was Admiral Nimitz; was it not?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That letter was written by Admiral Nimitz?

[9549a] Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; and I mentioned that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now Personnel, was in no way responsible for not furnishing us with information.

I merely mentioned that to show the apparent attitude of mind among the Navy in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in Washington?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read this note:

The Examining Officer identified the letter mentioned by the witness as being one in the form of a personal letter from the Chief of Bureau of Navigation to Admiral H. E. Kimmel, dated 25 November, 1941, file No. FF 12/MM (55) and copy is now on file in the secret-confidential file room of the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

How long was it taking you to get mail there—if a letter was written on the 25th of November?

Admiral SMITH. The air mail was rather uncertain. It was carried by the clipper. I remember that many people decided that straight ship mail was, for personal letters, was quicker than air mail, because often the plane would take off and have to come back. That is, going to the eastward, which is the worst way, but the mail by air was not nearly so rapid as it is today, and was not [9550] reliable.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have. I will ask counsel to get this letter.¹

Mr. KAUFMAN. I think it is in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I have looked for it, and I haven't found it.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

If not, Admiral, do you have any further information that you can give this committee that would be helpful in this investigation that has not been brought out by questions?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir. I wish I could give you more. I would only like to say that if any impression has been gained by the committee that Admiral Hart—or that Admiral Kimmel, rather, was closed to suggestions, that impression is in error. All channels to him were open at all times, and I could take anyone to see him, and I believe he listened to everyone.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question or two of this witness, in view of what has gone on.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement, Admiral?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

[9551] Mr. KEEFE. Admiral, were there minutes kept of the meetings of the staff out at Hawaii?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir; never.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have a present recollection of the staff meeting which discussed the receipt of the message of November 24?

Admiral SMITH. No, I do not, sir. There were too many of them for me to remember that. I do remember the one of the 27th, because it was held the same afternoon.

¹ The letter referred to appears in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5804 et seq.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have a present recollection as to the discussion that took place at the staff meeting after the receipt of the so-called war-warning message of November 27?

Admiral SMITH. I do not recall the details of the discussion; no, sir. I know that there was a discussion and meeting.

Mr. KEEFE. Is there anybody that would be able to say and tell this committee what took place in your staff and what the discussion was when this war-warning message was discussed?

Admiral SMITH. Not unless someone present at that time has a better memory than I have, sir. I do not know.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall who was present at that particular staff meeting?

[9552] **Admiral SMITH.** There were present Captain McMorris and Captain DeLany, both of whom are now admirals. I believe Admiral McMorris is scheduled to be a witness before this committee. He is in the city.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, in view of the tremendous amount of paper work that seems to be obvious in connection with the slightest activity of the Navy, it is rather astonishing to me that there wasn't a secretary of these meetings that kept some minutes or some records; but I assume that your statement is correct that there was no record kept of any of these staff meetings.

Admiral SMITH. There was no record. The paper work load was very high, and we had been trying for years, and I suppose they are still trying to reduce it.

Mr. KEEFE. I should hope so.

Admiral SMITH. And I too, sir. But to have brought in a secretary and taken down minutes for all of the meetings we had would have filled the files with a lot more of this secret correspondence, or paper work.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral, my purpose is this. It appears quite clearly that the message of November 27 in which the language appears "This is a war warning" is the first message of that character that any witness from the Navy has ever remembered ever having been received by the Navy— [9553] "this is a war warning."

Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, that would mean that a staff meeting would be called to discuss the meaning of that message and the measures that should be taken in connection therewith.

Am I to understand your testimony to be that you cannot tell now, or have no present recollection as to what took place at the staff meeting at which this very unusual message was discussed?

Admiral SMITH. I cannot, sir. I know that a meeting was called as soon as the message came in, and that Admiral Bloch was sent for, but what the details of the discussion were, I simply cannot remember.

Mr. KEEFE. Can you tell us what determination was arrived, if any, as a result of the collective judgment of the members of the staff?

Admiral SMITH. The action paragraph of that dispatch said "Take defensive deployment." The other was information. The steps that we had taken in defensive deployment—

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral, I haven't asked you that—

Admiral SMITH. Had already been made.

Mr. KEEFE. I didn't ask you that.

Admiral SMITH. You are asking what action we took.

Mr. KEEFE. No. I asked you whether you have any. [9554]
present recollection of the agreement that was reached as a result of that staff meeting.

Admiral SMITH. I have not.

Mr. KEEFE. Held on the 27th.

Admiral SMITH. I have not.

Mr. KEEFE. Resulting from the receipt of this telegram.

Admiral SMITH. I have not.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you any present recollection of any discussion by the staff after the receipt of the November 24 message?

Admiral SMITH. I have not. We had too many conferences. I can't remember the details of one from another. It is too long ago.

Mr. KEEFE. And there is no record of any kind that you can think of that would assist this committee in gaining information along the lines that I have inquired?

Admiral SMITH. It possibly may be found in the daily estimate submitted to the commander in chief on steps to be taken in the event of war with Japan within 24 hours. That would show, I believe—would reflect the action that was taken in those meetings.

[9555] Mr. KEEFE. There was offered here the other day in connection with the examination of one of the witnesses two written proposals as to steps to be taken in the event of war within 48 hours, I believe, and steps to be taken in the event of war within 24 hours. Do you recall that memorandum?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Who prepared that?

Admiral SMITH. That was prepared by Captain McMorris, the war plans officer, and was considered by the commander in chief, the operations officer and myself every morning.

Mr. KEEFE. That is signed by C. H. McMorris.

Admiral SMITH. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The first one is dated the 30th day of November 1941 and the next one is dated December 5, 1941. The first is entitled "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 24 hours," and the next one is entitled "Recommended steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 48 hours."

Were those orders or were those just suggestions?

Admiral SMITH. That was an estimate of the situation, of what we should do, something there to put right on the air when we got word, "This is war."

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you got word on November 27th, "This is a war warning"?

[9556] Admiral SMITH. They did not say, "This is war." We could not go ahead with WPL-46. There is a difference between a war warning and war. They did not mobilize and they did not execute the plan.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you testified before the Navy court of inquiry that you thought it was the intent to put you on your toes and get ready to carry out the mission required in the war plans.

Admiral SMITH. That is right, sir; but we had been on our toes for some time, or thought we had.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't want to prolong this, Admiral, to any extent, but I confess that I would like very much to get clearly in my mind just what you do at these so-called meetings that the staff had out there. A message comes in, it is brought in to somebody and you sit around a table and talk about it and decide what you are going to do and you had those meetings almost daily.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; and whenever an important message came in we also had the type and force commanders, task force commanders present in port over, and always Admiral Bloch.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was there always a unanimity of opinion expressed in the meetings?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.

[9557] Mr. KEEFE. Or was there debate? Didn't anybody ever disagree with—

Admiral SMITH. Oh, plenty; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was there any disagreement as to what this message of November 27 meant?

Admiral SMITH. I cannot remember that far back just what the particular debate on that message was. I wish I could but I do not.

Mr. KEEFE. That is a pretty important matter for this committee, at least it is for me. You cannot recall whether there was any disagreement among any members of the staff as to whether or not that message meant war, "Let's get to it and go to it"?

Admiral SMITH. I do not; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you cannot recall now whether at the staff meeting which considered that November 27 war-warning message there was any disagreement at all?

Admiral SMITH. I don't remember whether there was or not.

Mr. KEEFE. Obviously I cannot ask you any more questions because you don't remember anything that took place then.

Admiral SMITH. I cannot remember any particular one conference. We had been there practically a year and we were having conferences all the time and debates all the time and [9558] now—you will have before you, if anyone will remember, the opinions it is more likely to be Admiral Pye or Admiral McMorris.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Admiral, so far as any action that was taken or not taken, either affirmative or negative, the staff evidently was in agreement with the action taken by the commander in chief; is that a fair statement?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEEFE. And all of you experienced officers out there agreed with the course of action, or took the course of action that represented your considered judgment?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir. I would say that, assuming that this debate or conference was similar to all others held, that the commander in chief did not make his decision until the discussion had finished. We did not go in there to discuss whether his decision was correct or not. We debated it before he reached his decision.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand.

Admiral SMITH. And very often some of his decisions.

Mr. KEEFE. Was Halsey at this meeting on the 27th?

Admiral SMITH. Halsey did not get in there until the—yes, Halsey was in on the 27th. He left on the 28th. Admiral Pye was in on the

morning of the 28th, when we had another [9559] conference with the Army present at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Did Halsey's so-called shooting orders have anything to do with this message of the 27th, do you suppose?

Admiral SMITH. I think it very probably did.

Mr. KEEFE. It was known that Halsey was going to leave on the 28th, wasn't it?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was the question discussed at that meeting, if I can refresh your recollection, as to what kind of orders Halsey would sail under?

Admiral SMITH. No, sir. Admiral Halsey received his orders from the commander in chief direct.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, didn't the staff discuss the question, "Now, if we are going to send these task forces out to deliver planes to Midway and Wake, what kind of orders are they going to go under?"

Admiral SMITH. I think they very probably did.

Mr. KEEFE. You wouldn't think that the commanding officer, Admiral Kimmel, would give shooting orders to Halsey unless there had been some unanimity of thought in the discussion of the staff, would you?

Admiral SMITH. No, I would not; no, sir. I think there very probably was a discussion in the staff, but I do not remember it.

[9560] Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I want to add but very little right there.

You said that Admiral Pye had to make a report, but I think you will find on page 424, question 31, in the Naval Court of Inquiry that Admiral Pye testified:

The instructions in effect to the Pacific Fleet were that task force commanders would not report to the Commander-in-Chief upon their return from duties unless they were so directed. I therefore did not see the Commander-in-Chief until Saturday, when I went to talk to him concerning the tactical exercises which had been carried out during the last period at sea. He then showed me this dispatch.

That was on the 29th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On what date?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, on the 29th. He was not present at the conferences of the 27th and 28th.

Reference was made to another thing. The reference which the distinguished Congressman from Wisconsin asked you about, I think is on page 561, question 159, before the Naval Court of Inquiry:

Q. Well, what did you consider the intent of this message by heading it "A war warning"?

[9561] A. Well, I thought that the intent was to put us on our toes and get ready to carry out the mission required by the War Plan. The War Plan was not executed by the Navy Department.

And, lastly, on page 351 of the Hewitt report:

Q. Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what that was?

Vice Admiral SMITH. During the discussion, we informed the Army that the planes they placed on Wake would have to remain there for the duration of a war, if any, because it was impossible to put a ship in there and take them out and Army planes are not equipped to land on a carrier, although they can take off from a carrier. Admiral Kimmel then asked, "What may I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" and General Martin of the Army Air Force replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles offshore," to which Admiral Kimmel

replied, "Then they are no damn good to me," or words to that effect. General Short stated, not angrily at all, that, "If I man these islands, I must command them," and Kimmel replied, "Only over my dead body. The Army should exercise no command over Navy bases." General Short replied, "Mind you, I do not want these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put troops and planes on them, then I must command them."

[9562] And that was the extent of the controversy.

Which was the extent of the controversy. No more questions.

Admiral SMITH. I will say that they both smiled when that discussion was going on.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Admiral, for your appearance and the information given the committee and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry. You may be excused.

(The witness was excused.)

The committee will now adjourn until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[9563]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Counsel will please call the next witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to the committee Captain Safford. I may state for the information of the committee that Captain Safford's testimony is desired on two main questions: First his knowledge and information with reference to the so-called 14-part message which came in on December 6 and 7, and the second subject is the question of the winds execute message which has been a matter of some interest and controversy with the committee.

I propose, with the permission of the Chairman, to go over the 14-part message testimony of Captain Safford first. Then he has advised me, and there has been circulated to the committee, a written statement which he has prepared concerning his views on the winds message.

I would like to suggest that the Chair permit him to read his statement on the winds message, after which I will ask him a few questions and then turn him over to the committee for general examination on both of these subjects.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

Captain, will you please be sworn.

[9564]

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain Safford, will give your full name and your age to the reporter?

Captain SAFFORD. Laurence Frye Safford. Age 53 years.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. Thirty-four years this June.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you detail in a general way to the committee, Captain, just what your naval experience has been, the general work that you have done and the present position which you occupy?

Captain SAFFORD. After graduation from the Naval Academy I served in battleships, destroyers, submarines, mine craft, cruisers, and battleships. I have had a total of 14 years' sea duty, the last 3

of which being spent as gunnery officer on the battleship *New Mexico*.

I was in charge of the Antiaircraft Gunnery School in the summer of 1935, which was fairly successful.

All my shore duty has been spent in my specialty as a cipher expert and radio intelligence expert. I came ashore to assume this duty in charge of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit in May 1936, and remained on that duty until February 15, 1942, at which time I was removed [9565] by the orders of Admiral Horne.

In 1938 I was assigned to engineering duty only by the Secretary of the Navy and ordered to remain on shore duty at my post at that time in order to get ready for the war which everybody could see was coming.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you on active service in the Navy now?

Captain SAFFORD. At the present time I am on active service in the Navy and am called the Assistant Director of Naval Communications for cryptographic research.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you detail a little more what you mean by the work that you did in cryptology and in intelligence, what the scope of those activities was, what the general field was that you were working in when you were doing that work?

Captain SAFFORD. I was ordered to duty in the Navy Department in January 1924, to establish a radio intelligence system for the United States Navy. At that time, and previous to that time, I was given some reports and told to study them and to see what I could accomplish.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by "radio intelligence"?

Captain SAFFORD. By "radio intelligence" I mean the interception of the radio messages of enemy foreign nations and agents, their solution by cryptanalytic processes.

[9567] Mr. RICHARDSON. You recall in a general way that it was a message which came into this country from Japan in 13—first a pilot message that was followed by a 13-part message.

Now, will you tell me when you first heard of anything with reference to what turned out to be the 14th part message?

Captain SAFFORD. I probably heard of the pilot message in the early afternoon of Saturday, December 6, 1941, although I cannot recall it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would it have been the regular procedure or custom there to have acquainted you with such a pilot message?

Captain SAFFORD. It was the regular procedure to immediately acquaint me with anything of particular importance and this was of particular importance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why would you think that would be a particularly important message?

Captain SAFFORD. Because it gave information that the long-awaited reply to the Secretary of State note of the 26th of November was about to be transmitted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you were acquainted, were you not, with the fact that the Secretary of State had submitted such a note about the 26th?

Captain SAFFORD. We had read the text of his note from [9568] the Japanese intercept. We also knew the Japanese reaction to it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your knowledge and that reaction made you very much interested in when the answer would come in?

Captain SAFFORD. That was extremely important to me, both for information and to perform my duty, in getting this information to higher authority with the least possible delay.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, would there be any duty on your part when the pilot message came in to take any steps to circulate the pilot message as an independent message of itself?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the duty of Naval Intelligence and was normally performed by Lieutenant Commander Kramer who was attached to that office but working under me in space of my section.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would it have been the regular practice where the first message that came in was a pilot message for Lieutenant Kramer to proceed to deliver that message without waiting for any further message in confirmation thereof?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, it would be, and this pilot message indicated that the next message would probably not be received until the following day.

[9569] Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection that the pilot message as a separate message was delivered by Lieutenant Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was absent from the office from noon until about 3:00 p. m. I do not know where he was. I doubt if he can recall, but he was probably delivering this message. We know now from information which has become available to me in the last 2 weeks that there was a time stamp on the War Department copy of this message which said, "Received 12:05 p. m. December 6." I think that is the time. That is a matter of record. It was about 12:05.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would refer to the pilot message?

Captain SAFFORD. That refers to the pilot message.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, there was an answer of the witness to the question just before that indicated there was something that said the 14th part would come in the next day. May I have that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me ask him.

Captain, was there anything in connection with the pilot message that would inform you that there was another message to come?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes. It says in the second paragraph, "This separate message is a very long one. I will send [9570] it in 14 parts and imagine that you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure."

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it was that language which informed you that there would be more to follow?

Captain SAFFORD. It was that language which informed me there was more to follow.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, if this message was delivered and how it was delivered would be the responsibility and act of someone other than yourself?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct. That message was translated by the Army and the time of delivery in the Navy Department all depended upon what time the Army sent our copies of the translation over to the Navy Department. That is not a matter of record and we can only guess.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you tell me how long it was after your attention was called to the pilot message that any execute appeared on the long 14-part message to which it referred?

Captain SAFFORD. The long 14-part message actually was received in the Navy Department and our men on watch began what we call processing it before I could have seen the translation of the pilot message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by, before your men were processing it, what do you mean by that, what is "processing"?

Captain SAFFORD. The first five or six parts of the long 14-part message were received in the Navy Department I believe about 10 minutes of 12, just before noon. The officer on watch telephoned over to the War Department and found out that the War Department unit was securing it at 1 o'clock because they were observing the normal working hours prescribed by the Civil Service Commission at that time and therefore he held it and worked on it himself although it was an Army responsibility under a joint agreement under date of 1941 whereby the Army processed the messages on the even days of the month and the Navy on the odd days. Processing means decoding or decrypting where it had to be done, exclusion of the code where that had to be done, recovery of the key where that had to be done, translation and finally smoothing up and typing the smooth copies for distribution to higher authority.

A number of copies were typed; early in the year I think we were limited to 4; by December 1941 I think there were 12 or 14 copies prepared, half of which went to the Navy and half to the Army for distribution.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would they go to anyone else than the Army and the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. By agreement which was made and [9572] approved on the 12th of November 1941 the Navy made all deliveries to the White House via the Naval Aide to the President, who at that time was Rear Admiral Beardall and the Army made all deliveries to the Secretary of State.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, would those deliveries be made out of the number of copies that had been furnished to the Navy and to the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. They were made out of the total number of copies and their copy was identical with the ones of the Army and Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would there be new copies or simply one of the multifold copies that had been delivered to them?

Captain SAFFORD. They were one of the multifold number of copies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, when that message was delivered in that way a copy of what was delivered, in the ordinary course of recording, would appear in the files of the particular department that got the copy?

Captain SAFFORD. There was a file copy kept in the Navy Department in my section. There was a file copy kept in the War Department. I think it was originally kept by the SIS and later taken over by G-2 after there had been an unfortunate leak and name calling in connection with it which was followed by a controversy as to who was responsible [9573] for the leak.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the Navy assumed the responsibility for sending one of these copies to the White House?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the Army would have the responsibility of sending a copy to the Secretary of State?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when those copies were delivered they would become a part of the files of the office or person to whom they were delivered?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. They were collected afterwards. Sometimes they were allowed to keep them 24 hours. We wanted them back as soon as we could get them. And they were destroyed. I believe the Army destroyed everything but the file copy. The Navy kept one file copy and also another copy so that we would have a loose copy to work with and not have to remove a copy from the file.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then there would be one copy remaining in the files of the Navy and one copy remaining in the files of the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. At all times.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many copies would come to rest and remain in your files?

Captain SAFFORD. Always one; generally a second.

[9574] Mr. RICHARDSON. How many communications units, where messages were being intercepted and brought in, were we maintaining at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. Do you mean the intercept stations where we were intercepting?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I want the intercept stations first.

Captain SAFFORD. We had major intercept stations at Winter Harbor, Me.; Cheltenham, Md.; Bainbridge Island, Wash.; Heeia on the island of Oahu, and at Corregidor.

We had a small intercept direction-finding station at Guam, a small one at Imperial Beach, Calif. We had a small intercepting direction-finding station at Amagansett, Long Island; and Jupiter, Fla.

In addition a number of direction-finder stations which did not attempt any intercepting.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If anyone made an intercept that would be transferred by them where?

Captain SAFFORD. Normally to their primary control station or office, or CI unit, as we called it.

Occasionally it would come direct to Washington, depending upon what type of message it was, and what the instructions were in the case.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is a fact, is it not, Captain, that [9575] the Washington office had the most experienced personnel and was

the most extensive office of that kind that we had in the world, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. It had a few of the most experienced personnel, but 90 percent of them had been in service less than a year. It was a training ground, as well as a working place.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But it was the best we had?

Captain SAFFORD. It was the largest we had. I would say that the best we had, as far as experience and all-around skill was up at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any division of activity assigned to these various stations, for instance, Washington, Pearl Harbor, and Corregidor, as to what character of work they should do, or were they all doing the same thing?

Captain SAFFORD. That was highly specialized. The Navy Department was responsible exclusively for the handling of anything which originated in the Atlantic Ocean, I mean from the European Continent. It was responsible for Japanese diplomatic communications; it was responsible for backing up our other two stations on their particular problems, and was responsible for the training of personnel to send out to the outlying stations, because we did not believe in sending untrained personnel into the field.

[9576] Mr. RICHARDSON. Then this 14th part message we are talking about came into the station here in Washington in the regular course of the kind of intercepting that that station was supposed to do?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I think you testified that around 12 o'clock the first four or five sections of this 14-part message came in.

Does that mean when they came in in code?

Captain SAFFORD. That is when they came in, in code in teletype from Bainbridge Island, Wash., or other stations which had intercepted the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, how long did it take before those various sections of the message that came in were translated into English?

Captain SAFFORD. Bainbridge Island copied a whole what we call schedule of radio transmissions from Tokyo to San Francisco. They transcribed all of the Government messages and ignored the commercial messages. The Government messages included in other systems on other points, and a lot of messages which had no connection with the 14-part. There was no external way to differentiate. Everything of interest to Washington was punched on a [9577] teletype tape and when the tape was completely prepared it was sent into the Navy Department by TWX through the teletype wire exchange by mechanical transmission at a rate of 60 words a minute, and received by the Navy Department.

This high speed transmission cut our tolls to a third, and we got faster service.

[9578] . Then it was taken by the watch officer and decoded into the basic form as rapidly as possible. Then we knew what we had to do with it next. In many cases the Japanese would use another code underneath this so-called purple machine. In this case they did not. Therefore we saved time. Usually these messages came in Japanese

and had to be translated into English. In this case it came in English.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me be sure that I understand. This message, 14-part, as I understand it, came in in ordinary code which, when translated in the ordinary way, gave you the English translation?

Captain SAFFORD. Not translated in the ordinary way. We were in possession of the Japanese diplomatic cipher machine known as purple to conceal its real nature. The Army got that for us. We helped build the machines.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if it is necessary to go into technicalities. We have gone far enough in attacking national security without going into details on this.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Since this is the first time anybody has raised that point I am perfectly willing to stop.

Mr. MURPHY. It was raised before by me and I want to again protest the necessity of the Captain revealing the mechanics and the details of how we broke the code. I do [9579] not see how it could help national security or help national defense or add anything to the inquiry.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I have no intention of going into it.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't mean counsel; I don't mean to criticise counsel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, don't give us any of the operative details as to just how a code is broken. All I am interested in is that the code came in.

[9580] Mr. MURPHY. May I move that the part that the witness already related so far as the mechanics are concerned be stricken from the record?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, that is absurd. Why be so secretive about things that every foreign agent in the world knows all about? These matters are well known, well understood, have already been the subject of books and magazine articles, there is no secret about them and there is no use pretending that there is.

Mr. MURPHY. I want my position to be clear. I move that the part that is in the record about the mechanics and the construction of the where-with-all be stricken from the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to inquire. You are in a position, Captain, to know better than we are what the situation is with respect to this matter.

Captain SAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I think I can answer the essential part of the questions as regards the time element, which is very important, and not give away anything that is essential to security.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, have you said anything so far that would endanger the element of security?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; nothing that has not been brought out in the papers.

[9581] The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Does that take care of the situation?

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask one question? You say that the mechanics which you have just outlined have been in the papers?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to know which one? Well, I will go into that later, as to what paper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. You understand the counsel's statement?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the committee's desire along that line, Captain, and I feel sure that you are in better position to help take care of that than even we are.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When this message began to come in was there any attempt made to make any delivery of any portion of it prior to the reception of the first 13 parts?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; not to my knowledge, except that Commander McCollum, who was the head of the Japanese section of Naval Intelligence, knew that the message was in and coming in and being worked on when it was partially in. I think he knew that around 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But there was no delivery outside of [9582] your office of this message so that anyone could read it or see it or know of it or act on it or deliver it until the first 13 parts had come in, was there?

Captain SAFFORD. The message was not ready for delivery until about 9 o'clock in the evening. It might have been ready for delivery a little earlier on a limited scale.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, by "the message" you refer to the first 13 parts?

Captain SAFFORD. I mean the first 13 parts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you consider the first 13 parts as a complete message for the purpose of delivery?

Captain SAFFORD. I never saw the first 13 parts until Monday morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you last see or hear anything of this message of Saturday, December 6th?

Captain SAFFORD. I left the office at the close of working hours, at 4:30 p. m. on Saturday, December 6th. It was the first time in 2 weeks that I had observed normal working hours.

At that time Commander Linn had come on and was re-working the message. There had been a mistake in the key which was set up on the machine which decoded the message and the whole entire part we had in there was badly garbled and because of its importance Linn thought it was better to check the key [9583] first and find out the mistake and produce perfect copy rather than to clear the garble by guess and maybe make mistakes at critical points in the message. This would take quite a little bit of time and we simply had to throw away all the work that had been done before.

Linn was my best man on the watch side. Normally I do not expect watches from a man in charge of a section. He was taking the place of a man whom we had let go on Christmas eve and we were hoping that we would be able to get somebody else to take his place.

Kramer was standing by to deliver the message. As soon as it was completed McCollum knew about it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you there?

Captain SAFFORD. I was there until 4:30. I checked it and said:

There is nothing I can do but get in your way and make you nervous. I am going home.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then after 4:30 you knew nothing of your own knowledge as to what happened to the 13-part message?

Captain SAFFORD. Until Monday morning, when I got the reports from Linn and Kramer on it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, did you on Monday morning get reports from them with reference to the 13 parts?

Captain SAFFORD. I did immediately and about anything [9584] else that happened over the week end.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask a question at this point, counsel?

Captain, did you know that these 13 parts were coming?

Captain SAFFORD. We could read enough to——

Senator LUCAS. No, I am talking about you, not "we". Did you yourself personally know that these 13 parts were coming?

Captain SAFFORD. We knew—I knew at 4:30 from what we had that it was the first part of the long message. In fact, the rest of it was coming in, began coming in I think around 3:30 and it took about an hour for the whole message to come in and other messages mixed up with it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you see the 13 parts before you left at 4:30 that afternoon?

Captain SAFFORD. No. I saw all 13 parts in their original code form but you could not identify them until they had been decoded.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I say. You could not identify them.

Captain SAFFORD. They had probably 20 or 25 messages on hand, 13 of which were the various parts of this and the rest were other messages. They could not be [9585] identified until they had all been decoded.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you left your office at 4:30?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you did not again see any part of this message until Monday?

Captain SAFFORD. Until Monday.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And all of the transactions that occurred after 4:30 on Saturday—on Saturday evening and Sunday morning came after you left?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you had no independent knowledge of this?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Might I ask of the committee——

Senator FERGUSON. Did he work Sunday?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Might I ask the committee whether the committee desires me to interrogate Captain Safford as to the hearsay report which he got with reference to this message on Monday? Because it is apparent from his testimony that his own personal knowledge ceased at 4:30 on Saturday afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think we should have that because that was an official report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, permit the Chair to inquire at [9586] this point. Is counsel prepared to present other witnesses who can give definite testimony and not hearsay on these points?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, that is right.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask counsel if there is any conflict in the report that was made to the captain and what the witnesses will testify to when they come to the stand?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I do not know what the captain's testimony will be. I am entirely willing to elicit that if the committee wants it, in view of the fact that it came to him on Monday.

Mr. MURPHY. May I, as one member of the committee, say that I would like to hear what he heard on Monday? I am very much interested in that.

Senator FERGUSON. I move, Mr. Chairman, that we take that because it was an official report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I had rather assumed that the committee would prefer to have the best evidence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you will have it anyway.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that is the reason I was inquiring of counsel, if he expects to get the best evidence, which is not hearsay. Does counsel state that he expects to present that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, we expect to have Lieutenant Kramer, [9587] who is the man who handled it, who was there and knows more about it than anyone else and I just want to exhaust the point with Captain Safford and to do it I would have to ask him now to relate to you what he learned on Monday when he returned to his office.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be, of course, hearsay evidence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the events that occurred between Saturday and Monday would be hearsay but what he heard on Monday is direct evidence and in view of him being here and covering the general picture, what he heard on Monday and, therefore, as it impressed him, I think the whole situation would be direct evidence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let us be realistic. What the captain heard on Monday would be a fact, of course, but it would be a fact that would ordinarily be best testified to by the people who created the acts which he heard.

The CHAIRMAN. Permit me to inquire of counsel. Are the people who reported to Captain Safford on Monday and gave him this hearsay information that is now being discussed the witnesses that counsel expects to present here?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, until I hear the captain's statement I would not be able to say that I have the witnesses that [9588] he contacted, that all of the witnesses that he contacted on Monday will be here.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I propose, in view of the interest of so many members, to go right on and inquire.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, without objection then, you may proceed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That takes care of your motion, doesn't it, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At what time did you return to your office on Monday?

Captain SAFFORD. At the beginning of working hours, which I believe was 8 a. m. at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And was your attention then called to anything relating to this 14-part message?

Captain SAFFORD. I immediately called all of my heads of subsections under me into conference.

Senator LUCAS. Who was it that you called?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whom did you call into conference?

Captain SAFFORD. Commander Kramer, Commander Linn, particularly, and Commander Parke. I believe they were all lieutenants at the time. I called them in to find out what [9589] had gone wrong and how the people had been surprised the way they had; first, to see if our section had been to blame in any other way and the second, to immediately start writing out a full report of the circumstances, as required by Navy regulations, I believe, and certainly by Navy custom.

Now, I have been in other accidents and collisions, and so forth, and that was always done. In view of so many people being involved it seemed better to prepare such a statement or report of those in my section and let those who were in agreement with that report sign with me and those who held counterviews submit their own views.

Sometime within the week following Pearl Harbor I and the other officers were called into conference in the office of the Director of Naval Communications; I am not certain whether Admiral Noyes presided and he was called away suddenly and Captain Redmond, the Assistant Director of Naval Communications, presided.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was this?

Captain SAFFORD. This was in the week following the attack on Pearl Harbor; some time prior to the 15th I remember, probably Thursday or Friday.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And where did it take place?

Captain SAFFORD. In the office of the Director of Naval Communications.

[9590] Mr. RICHARDSON. The meeting was called for what purpose?

Captain SAFFORD. The meeting was called of all of the section heads to discuss the attack on Pearl Harbor and the whispering campaign against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch which was then getting into full swing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, we are concentrating here at this moment on the 14-part message.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. May I finish my statement?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you bring your testimony to that point?

Captain SAFFORD. The discussion in that meeting was that all section heads were asked to tell all the people not to talk, there was too much loose talk going around, that there would undoubtedly be an investigation later and that anybody who had anything to say would be called before that investigation and permitted to say all they had to say, if they had anything to say, and if we had written out anything to destroy it immediately. I considered it a perfectly logical order from my superior.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who gave you the order that you were to destroy anything, name these people?

Captain SAFFORD. It was either Admiral Noyes or Captain Redmond, the director or assistant director, on the instructions of Admiral Stark.

[9591] Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it in writing?

Captain SAFFORD. It was not in writing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who told it to you?

Captain SAFFORD. Whichever officer presided at this conference and I cannot remember which one they sent.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It was an oral direction?

Captain SAFFORD. It was an oral direction.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Given to you by either Noyes or Redmond?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did they say?

Captain SAFFORD. I have said it once before.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Say it again.

Captain SAFFORD. We had standing orders not to talk, not to spread the gossip against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, to keep anything we had to ourselves until we were called to a witness stand to testify officially and if we had anything in writing to destroy it immediately and pass that word on to our subordinates, and I carried out that order.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was meant by "anything in writing"? What did you understand it to mean?

Captain SAFFORD. I presumed it to mean notes or any other kind of records which he had in writing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. About what?

[9592] Captain SAFFORD. About the circumstances leading up to the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, you understood that it became your duty to go to your office, accumulate all of the files of your office that had to do with the events leading up to Pearl Harbor, and destroy them?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; only notes which we had made ourselves.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Oh. Was there any reason given why those should be destroyed?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes; that this was an emergency situation, we had just suffered a terrible defeat, the morale was low, that all kinds of rumors were going out from the Navy Department and we had to put a stop to this whispering campaign. It seemed perfectly logical at the time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, how would you stop the whispering campaign by destroying the notes you made as to the facts?

Captain SAFFORD. At that time I did not question my orders any more than Admiral Wilkinson questioned his verbal orders. We carried them out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you destroy yourself?

Captain SAFFORD. I destroyed considerable notes concerning statements given to me by Lieutenant Linn and Lieutenant Commander Kramer and other people who were intimately associated with them. [9593]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, let us get this straight. Before you left on Saturday at 4:30 the first part of the 14-part message was coming in, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you did not have any notes with you about anything informative with reference to the parts of that message that had come in, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. The 14-part message is only one small part of the whole affair.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That may be and you may be very anxious to get on to the other points, but what I am driving at now is to give the committee all of the facts we can find out about the 14-part message.

Now, you say that when you came back on Monday you got a report with reference to the 14-part message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was that report? Give us the details of it.

Captain SAFFORD. Well, I—

Mr. KEEFE. May we find out whether that report was in writing, Mr. Chairman? I understood the captain to say that he destroyed, that he instructed his heads, that as a result of calling his heads in, he instructed them to make [9594] sure that they make out a report in writing and sign it.

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. Those were verbal reports to me. I was going to make up a consolidated report which everybody would sign when we had all of the facts straightened out.

Mr. KEEFE. And those that were in opposition to that, that were dissatisfied with that report?

Captain SAFFORD. They could make out their own report if they thought that were incorrect as to the facts.

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask counsel, was such a report as that actually made up in writing and signed by him and the other persons involved?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let us get first things first.

When you went back on Monday to your office and met with your associates and subordinates was there any discussion there before any report was made up? Was there any discussion there as to what had happened with respect to the 14-part message?

Captain SAFFORD. There were many discussions.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, tell us what that discussion was, what was it about, if anything?

Captain SAFFORD. Linn told me that the fourteenth part did not come in before midnight. He had waited up beyond midnight and it had not come in until the next morning. We [9595] found out from the records of the people on watch that it had come in around 5 a. m. on Sunday morning and had been sent over to the Army for translation and there was a little doubt as to just what time the Army had sent the translation back.

Commander Kramer—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said about what had been done with the 13 parts?

Captain SAFFORD. Lieutenant Linn said that his work on the 13 parts had been completed about 7 p. m. and after that it was Kramer's responsibility to straighten the message out and get it typed.

Kramer told me that he left the Navy Department about 9 p. m.; that he first telephoned to Admiral Stark at his residence in the Observatory Circle and found that he was not at home. Then he telephoned to Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and requested instructions.

Admiral Wilkinson ordered him to leave a copy at the White House with the President, explaining its urgency and then to come out to Admiral Wilkinson's residence and report to him with the other copies.

Kramer carried those orders out. Kramer told me he did not see the President because the President was having a dinner party and entertaining some high-ranking British official, who I think has turned out to be Vice Admiral [9596] French.

Kramer left the copy of that with the President's aide, out in the code room, and told him to get word to the President that this was very urgent, and he was to interrupt his dinner party and let him see it as soon as possible.

Senator LUCAS. What night was this, now?

Captain SAFFORD. This is the night of Saturday, December 6, 1941.

I believe that Kramer—Kramer told me a lot of things at that time which are rather dim in my memory, having lost the notes. I believe that on the way to Admiral Wilkinson's residence he stopped at the Wardman Park and gave a copy to Secretary Hull and discussed the matter at length with the Secretary. I know that he saw the Secretary that night and then took the copy to Admiral Wilkinson's residence. Secretary Hull called up several people—

Mr. KEEFE. You don't mean Secretary Hull?

Captain SAFFORD. Secretary Knox.

Mr. MURPHY. He said "Hull" twice.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let us get this straight. Was this delivered at the Wardman Park or to Secretary Knox?

Captain SAFFORD. It was Secretary Knox, and Secretary Knox called up Secretary Hull and other people and discussed the message with him. In the meantime, Secretary Hull had [9597] received his copy—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go on.

Captain SAFFORD. (Continuing). From the Army, and an appointment was made the next morning for Secretary Knox, Secretary Hull, and Secretary Stimson to meet in Secretary Hull's office at 10 o'clock and Kramer and Colonel Bratton were requested to be there also.

Then Kramer went to Admiral Wilkinson's house, gave him the messages; he had given him the substance of the message over the telephone.

Mr. KEEFE. May I interrupt you a moment? What you are telling now is what you claim Kramer told you on Monday?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer told me on Monday the best I can remember it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. So they got it, and I specifically asked him, I asked him about Admiral Stark, and he said Admiral Stark did not receive it but that he was told about it Saturday night and gave orders which he received through Admiral Wilkinson—I think he was a captain at that particular time—to deliver the written message to Admiral Stark's office the following morning, Sunday, at 9 a. m., which he did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Anything said about General Marshall?

[9598] Captain SAFFORD. I asked him about the Army and the only thing he said that he knew about the Army was that they had been given their copies at 9 p. m. and that Colonel Bratton had gotten a copy to Secretary Hull. He knew nothing about the rest of the Army delivery.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Go right ahead and give us all that you can recall, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. He had made personal delivery to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, who was Rear Admiral Ingersoll. He had also given a copy to the Director of War Plans, who was Rear Admiral Turner.

Kramer remained at Admiral Wilkinson's until about midnight, and then when he went home he stopped by the Navy Department to see if the fourteenth part had come in there, to find out if it had been, and he told the man on watch to give him a call if anything happened and that he would be down the next morning early because he had to make this 9 o'clock appointment at Admiral Stark's office with the thirteen parts of the message.

I believe that some time during the evening that Kramer had phoned Captain McCollum, but Captain McCollum lived way out in Virginia and did not see the message until the next morning when he came into his own office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, do you recall any other facts which [9599] were reported to you when you got back to your office on Monday? I am only asking you to tell us what you can remember.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not blaming you for not remembering, but is that all you can remember?

Captain SAFFORD. That is, in regard to the 14-part message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. MURPHY. May I interrupt, counsel? He said that after he was told to destroy the papers that he went and gave orders to those under him. I would like to know whom he gave orders to to destroy papers, the names.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, that is later in the week.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me ask the chairman this: This is the testimony by this witness with reference to the 14-part message. Is it the desire of the committee to interrogate now individually on that examination of the witness as to the 14-part message, or is it the desire of the committee to have me now turn from the 14-part message to the question of the winds message?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have a request to make. Here is a witness who has told us that he went out and carried out orders to destroy papers and that he ordered those under his jurisdiction to destroy them and I think that is one of the most [9600] important things before us, and I suggest that we proceed to it immediately.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the counsel proceed with the whole examination of this witness on every point that there is, and then when the committee gets to examining him it will be an over-all coverage, just like we have done with every other witness.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am really inclined to think that would be the better course. In other words, counsel, you conduct the examination of this witness as you have on the others.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Until I am through.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Until you get through, and then the committee will inquire.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, go right ahead, Captain, if you think of anything that you have overlooked.

Captain SAFFORD. I asked him if he was certain that the——

Mr. RICHARDSON. You asked whom?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer; if he thought that the President had seen it that night, and he said he thought he did, that——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Repeat that, Captain. I am sorry, I did not hear it.

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer said he thought that the President had seen it that night; that the naval aide to the Presi- [9601] dent, Admiral Beardall, was a dinner guest at Admiral Wilkinson's and that he had phoned in at the White House and that the aide had informed him that the President had seen those 13 parts, and the President then had expressed the desire to do everything possible to get the fourteenth part to him as soon as it came in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you think of anything else now?

Captain SAFFORD. Not on the 14 parts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, Captain, a few moments ago you referred to a meeting later in the week at which some instructions were given with respect to a whispering campaign and about destruction of notes. When did that take place?

Captain SAFFORD. It was probably a Thursday or Friday following the 7th of December.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in whose office?

Captain SAFFORD. It was in the office of the Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would be Wilkinson?

Captain SAFFORD. That would be Admiral Noyes' office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And who were present?

Captain SAFFORD. All the section heads who were on duty at that time and who were present in the building that day.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And as far as you can remember them give me the names. Who presided?

[9602] Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Noyes presided at the meeting. Then he was called away——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. He was the Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Go ahead, now.

Captain SAFFORD. He was called away some time before the conference broke up and Captain Redmond, the Assistant Director of Naval Communications, took on in his place.

This word was given us, came down in the name of the Chief of Naval Operations. It seemed a perfectly logical and reasonable order. We were in an emergency situation and there was panic running through the Navy Department at that particular time and there were desperate measures used, it seemed, to get the situation in hand.

Mr. MURPHY. I suggest to counsel, he says it came down in the name of the Chief of Naval Operations. Was it written?

Mr. RICHARDSON. How did it come down, orally or in writing?

Captain SAFFORD. It came down orally. I presumed there had been an earlier conference in Admiral Stark's office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And who purported to convey the information in the first instance, what person?

[9603] Captain SAFFORD. The Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was that?

Captain SAFFORD. Rear Admiral Noyes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just what did he say as near as you can recall it? How did he phrase what he had to tell you? Give me your best recollection, that is all I want, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. He started off that there were altogether too many rumors running around the Navy Department and people running to the newspapers telling them, they were getting in the newspapers and on the radio, they were saying all manner of things against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch which were not true, that we had to put a stop to that; that we would have to stop these rumors ourselves, if we knew anything let it die with us, pass that word to our subordinates; we have got to stop this thing and not originate any rumors ourselves or any suspicion or anything.

He said if anybody wanted to talk they would be given all the opportunity to talk that they wanted because there would be an official investigation held, and we could appear on the witness stand under oath and be responsible for what we said.

He said:

Furthermore, if you have got any notes or anything in writing, destroy them because somebody might see them and start something which you don't intend.

[9604] It seemed a perfectly logical and fair order at the time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, you had present, according to the record, yourself and Admiral Noyes and Captain Redmond. Can you think of anyone else who was there?

Captain SAFFORD. I am not certain what ranks they hold now. They were all captains at the time.

Captain Patterson I believe was there; Capt. F. O. Willenbucher. I could probably get a list of the other section heads on duty at the time. I cannot remember them all from memory.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you give us your present recollection?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Give us your present recollection of all who were present. Give them slowly and if there is any doubt about the spelling of the name give the spelling of the name to the reporter.

Senator LUCAS. And also what department they were the head of.

Mr. MURPHY. If you know.

Senator LUCAS. If you know.

Mr. MURPHY. We have already, I think, the names of Noyes, Redmond, Patterson, Willenbucher, and yourself.

Captain SAFFORD. I could not give any more names at the present time without a chance to refresh my memory, without guessing. I did not expect to make this statement, I did [9605] not expect this matter to come up at all. I am totally unprepared to answer that question any further.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you given any direction to destroy any files or official records?

Captain SAFFORD. We were not given any instructions to destroy files or any official records.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, did you destroy any notes as a result of that direction?

Captain SAFFORD. I destroyed all the notes I had prepared.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you destroy any note that had reference to the 14-part message?

Captain SAFFORD. Only such notes as I had made concerning the time of delivery, yes, I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And those were the notes you had made when Kramer reported to you?

Captain SAFFORD. When Kramer reported to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, we have spoken of the fourteenth part message. There was a part of that message that contained the equivalent of 1 o'clock p. m. Was that a part of the fourteenth part?

Captain SAFFORD. No; that was a separate message, No. 907.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did it come in in the same sort of a code [9606] that the other message did?

Captain SAFFORD. It came in the same sort of a code exactly except that it was in Japanese and had to be translated.

Mr. MURPHY. May I inquire, counsel? Will you have him give the names of the people that he gave orders to to destroy it? I think that is important.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you give any specific orders yourself, based upon what Admiral Noyes said, to any other persons with reference to the destruction of any of their notes?

Captain SAFFORD. I passed these orders down to my immediate subordinates whom I can name.

Mr. MURPHY. Can or cannot?

Captain SAFFORD. I can.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you name them, please, the ones that you gave orders to to destroy notes?

Captain SAFFORD. Captain G. W. Welker, OP 20-GX. That was his official designation. Captain L. W. Parke, OP 20-GY. Captain A. D. Kramer, OP 20-GZ. These were the people it directly applied to.

Mr. MURPHY. How about Linn?

Captain SAFFORD. I probably also told Linn the same thing, although Linn came under Parke, and we would have depended upon Parke to do it.

[9607] Mr. MURPHY. How about Brotherhood?

Captain SAFFORD. Brotherhood was only one of the watch officers who came in there under Linn. I did not give it to the watch officers individually, with the possible exception of Linn, who was the senior watch officer.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to object, but it seems to me that there is quite a radical departure from the usual practice of the committee. I thought it was understood that counsel was to examine the witness, and when he is through each individual member of the committee would have a right to go into any matter that he wanted to. I do not want to interrupt the witness or the counsel during his examination.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that I rather welcome Mr. Murphy's suggestions. I have no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair will say that the point made by Congressman Keefe is well taken, although the members have, since the beginning of the hearing, violated it by interjecting questions dur-

ing the interrogation of counsel and other members of the committee, but the Chair thinks it ought to be observed. If the witness makes a statement that any member of the committee does not understand or gives some name that is indistinct the member has a right, of course, to clarify that, but the Chair thinks that counsel and mem- [9608] bers of the committee when they are interrogating a witness should be permitted to do so without interruption.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, you stated that the so-called 1 o'clock section of the message came in in a separate message in Japanese.

Captain SAFFORD. In Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was different from the way the first 14 parts came in?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, because they were in English.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, do you know, or was it reported to you how long after the 14th part came in that the 1 o'clock message came in?

Captain SAFFORD. The two parts came in about half an hour or an hour apart, maybe closer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, what was your information that you got on Monday as to when the 1 o'clock message came in and was ready for delivery on Sunday?

Captain SAFFORD. It was ready for delivery some time Sunday morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You cannot be more definite than that?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot be more definite from my memory.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, is it your distinct recollection, Captain, that Lieutenant Commander Kramer told you that this 13- [9609] part message, the arrival of the 13-part message had been telephoned to Admiral Stark on Saturday night?

Captain SAFFORD. That was his report to me; it is my recollection that it was his report to me at the time. I asked him about that particularly because everybody else in authority had received a written copy in person and Admiral Stark had not and I particularly asked him about that, "Did Admiral Stark get it?" and he said, "Yes." He assured me that Admiral Stark knew about that message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know whether any part of the 13-part message as such had been sent to Hawaii? I am speaking of the 13 parts now.

Captain SAFFORD. I know that none of that was ever sent to Hawaii. I did not know that Monday morning, I will add.

[9610] Mr. RICHARDSON. From your experience in that office, did you regard the 13-part section of the whole message as important?

Captain SAFFORD. I regarded the first 13 parts just as important as the 14th part.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything about the first 13 parts that was unusual?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese, for the first time in the whole series of negotiations, became very abusive in their language in an official note to be presented to the United States Government.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what conclusion did you draw or would you draw, in view of your experience, with those messages, from the tone of those first 13 parts?

Captain SAFFORD. That they were breaking off diplomatic relations with the presentation of that note, and this was particularly in view

of the instructions which they had given in the pilot message about its presentation and holding its presentation until they were told to do it.

Mr. MURPHY. What was that last?

Captain SAFFORD. Holding the presentation until they were told to present it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That made you intensely interested, did it not, in the 14th part that was coming?

[9611] Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then will you explain to me why it was that you made no inquiry about the 14th part of the message until you got to your office on Monday? Why did not you call up Sunday morning the first thing and find out about the 14th part? Have you any explanation for that?

Captain SAFFORD. I have an explanation that is perfectly logical in my own mind.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Give it to me.

Captain SAFFORD. I stayed out late Saturday night. I was eating breakfast in my pajamas and bathrobe when I received a telephone call from the watch officer that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii. I realized there had been a slip and a bad slip high up in the Navy Department.

Senator LUCAS. What was that last?

Captain SAFFORD. That there was a slip in the Navy Department, high up. I told the watch officer I would be on call, I would not leave my house, but if my presence was needed in the Navy Department I would go down, but I would not go down unless called for.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make any reference at all to the 14th part of the message?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not make any reference to the 14th part to him that I can recall.

[9612] Mr. RICHARDSON. Before you left at 4:30, Captain, did you read and understand the character of the parts of the 14-part message that had come in up to the time you left?

Captain SAFFORD. Enough to realize that it was the 14th part of it that they were talking about.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you read it far enough to conclude that there was anything unusual about it?

Captain SAFFORD. To conclude that it was particularly hot, and it was probably the last message we would ever receive from the Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you say you read enough of it to arouse your curiosity as to what the rest of it would be?

Captain SAFFORD. Not curiosity. It gave me a sample of what the rest of it would be.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At any rate, whatever you knew about it, when you left your office at 4:30 you did not thereafter make any inquiry with reference to it until you came to your office on Monday?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Your office was then on a 24-hour basis?

Captain SAFFORD. My office was on a 24-hour basis since the first of February, 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then there were in your office persons to whom you could have telephoned on Sunday morning and gotten [9613] the particulars of whatever had happened to the 14th part message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you receive any telephone from anybody until you got the telephone about the attack?

Captain SAFFORD. Not that I can definitely recall. I usually got three or four telephone calls at night and one more or less telephone call made no impression on me whatsoever. I imagine I was called and told what they had delivered and I promptly forgot about it. I cannot say I recall receiving any calls until I received the call that the attack was on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are quite sure that there was no telephone to you that had any reference specifically to this so-called fourteenth part message?

Captain SAFFORD. I can recall nothing about the fourteenth part specifically.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said about the 14-part message in this conference that you had later in the week that you testified to?

Captain SAFFORD. There was no mention of the 14-part message whatsoever.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you talk to anybody else about the 14-part message after you talked with Kramer on Monday when you got back and got his report?

[9614] Captain SAFFORD. I asked Kramer if a warning message had been sent out and he said he thought of course it had been, but that would be for his superior officers and he did not know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How far did you live from your office?

Captain SAFFORD. About 2 miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you anything further, Captain, that you would like to tell the committee with reference to the 14-part message, or the 14th part, or the 1:00 o'clock end of it, or the pilot message? Is there anything further you would like to tell the committee?

Captain SAFFORD. In checking up on the message afterwards we discovered that Tokyo filed the first 13 parts as separate messages a few minutes apart over a span of about 3 or 4 hours, apparently, to finish encoding it. Then they delayed about 12 hours before they filed the 14th part. We received the messages, or the parts of it in approximately the same order and the same span of time in which filed. Our people had thought for a long time that they had missed the 14th part, or for some reason we failed to intercept it, and they put in some very worried hours, the men who watched it, and they were very relieved themselves when the fourteenth part came in and they knew their job was done.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long was it from the time that [9615] they reported to you that the first part came in until the fourteenth part showed up?

Captain SAFFORD. It was roughly 12 hours.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now was there anyone else at this meeting later in the week, when there was this admonition from Admiral Noyes, was there anyone else there from your immediate section but you?

Captain SAFFORD. I was the only one from my immediate section.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What time of day was that meeting?

Captain SAFFORD. In the morning, I would say around 10:00 o'clock, 10:00 or 10:30.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did it last?

Captain SAFFORD. About 15 minutes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you left it did you go right back to your section?

Captain SAFFORD. I went right back to my section, called my section heads in, and passed the news to them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Orally?

Captain SAFFORD. Orally; nothing in writing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And told them just what Noyes told you?

Captain SAFFORD. Just what I had been told, and if they had any notes about the thing, to get rid of them. There was nothing said about destruction of official papers.

[9616] Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you tell us a little more in detail as to what you said? Is your recollection keen enough to tell us just what you said to your men?

Captain SAFFORD. As well as I could, I passed on to them the exact words that had been given to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion of that?

Captain SAFFORD. There was no discussion. It seemed the correct thing to do under the circumstances.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had no idea, did you, Captain, that you were being asked to do anything that was improper or surreptitious?

Captain SAFFORD. Absolutely not, or I would not have done it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You have no sense of embarrassment or shame for transmitting the report to your division heads?

Captain SAFFORD. None at all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now when this message would come in, as you testified it did, would it be taken by one man or would several people cooperate in receiving it?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not quite understand the question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had how many watch officers on duty?

Captain SAFFORD. We had two men on watch, an officer and chief petty officer on a particular system. We had [9617] four of each on the watch list, and each one stood 8 hours on and 16 off.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would such a message, when it came in, be handled by one man or more than one man?

Captain SAFFORD. By two men together.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It would take two men to handle this 14-part message as it came in?

Captain SAFFORD. The 14-part message, in order to save time we called the Army in and they ran off part of it on their machine in the Munitions Building, and part of it was run on our machine in the Navy Building.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long after the pilot message came in did you ask the Army for help?

Captain SAFFORD. We did not ask the Army for help until about 3:00 p. m. when the rest of the 14-part message came in and decided with what we had it was more than we could handle.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you wanted help?

Captain SAFFORD. Then we wanted help.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you called on the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. We called on the Army.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now who called on the Army? Did you?

Captain SAFFORD. Commander Kramer called the Army and got in touch with some officer over there and he called [9618] some of his people.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would they come to your office?

Captain SAFFORD. They worked in their own office on their own machine.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then when all the work was done it was brought together as a complete job?

Captain SAFFORD. It was brought together as a complete job.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you mean by your reference a few moments ago of having it translated by the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the 1:00 p. m. message. It is in Japanese and we did not have a Japanese-speaking officer on watch, so we had to send it over to the Army where they arranged for that Sunday, they would handle any transmission, because Kramer had all these appointments with Admiral Stark and with Secretary Knox.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you speak Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Kramer does, does he not?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer does.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you anything further now that you would like to tell us that has any reference to the 14-part message, or any part of it?

Captain SAFFORD. I would like to say this, that calling [9619] extra men in the Navy would not have speeded up any work because we only had one machine and could only run one thing at a time. We had to call the Army people, to use their machine over in their own office.

Furthermore, the 6th was supposed to be the Army's day of responsibility, and the only reason we were handling this message was because we were standing a 24-hour watch, week-ends and everything else, and that is the reason for breaking the normal day's duty that was carried on up until this time. I think they went on a 24-hour basis at 6 p. m. on Saturday, December 6, 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you known Commander Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. He had served under me 2 years, I believe.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I now want to ask you some questions, Captain, about what is known as the winds code.

How many times, in how many different investigations of this Pearl Harbor matter, have you testified?

Captain SAFFORD. I have testified four times.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In which hearings?

Captain SAFFORD. I testified before Admiral Hart, before the Navy Court of Inquiry, before the Army Board of Investigation, before Admiral Hewitt, but I was not permitted [9620] to testify before the Roberts Commission.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in each of those examinations you testified in considerable detail to the various particulars in connection with what we call the winds code and winds code execute?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when you were called, you knew you were going to be a witness here, you prepared a written statement as indicating what you wished to present to the committee on the winds code?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And would you like to read that in presentation to the committee at this time?

Captain SAFFORD. I would.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With the committee's permission I would ask him to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be read.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, in order to save time; I believe every member of the committee has read the statement, and I was just wondering whether or not counsel could proceed to examine him on it and let the statement go in the record at this time?

I do not care to read it again. I would rather have counsel get through with his examination.

[9621] Mr. KEEFE. I would like to hear the witness read this statement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed to read it.

Mr. KEEFE. I have read it carefully, but I would like to have him read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I forgot to bring my copy over. Is there an extra copy?

Senator LUCAS. I would like to have a copy too, as long as he is going to read it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, before the starting of the reading of this statement, I would like to say I think Captain Safford has put parts in this statement that reveal certain mechanics which should not be revealed. I think the captain knows where they are. However, the statement has been given out so the press and everybody else has it. I will call attention to that when you come to it.

Mr. KEEFE. Everything is revealed in the letters of Dewey and Marshall.

The CHAIRMAN. We will not go into the Dewey and Marshall letters. Everything that has been produced before this committee has been produced without any deletion or [9622] any exceptions to it, and we will make no exception in this case. You will read the entire statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, as one member of the committee when we come to that part, I would just like to enter my protest.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. It will be entered. Enter it now.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not want to single it out now, but I have it marked.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you go ahead, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. The statement regarding the winds message will start with—

PREVIEW

There was a Winds Message. It meant War—and we knew it meant War. By the best estimate that can be made from my recollection and the circumstantial evidence now available, the "Winds Message" was part of a Japanese Overseas "News" Broadcast from Station JAP (Tokyo) on 11980 kilocycles beginning at 1330 Greenwich Civil Time on Thursday, December 4, 1941. This time corresponded to 10:30 p. m. Tokyo time and 8:30 a. m. Washington time, December 4, 1941. The broadcast was probably in Japanese Morse code, and was originally written in the Kata-Kana form of written, plain-language Japanese. It was intercepted by the U. S. [9623] Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland, which serves the Navy Department. It was recorded on a special typewriter, developed by the Navy, which types the Roman-letter equivalents of the Japanese characters.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the part I do not think should be in this statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will note your objection to the reading of that at this point.

Mr. MURPHY. I just want to say I do not think the witness should go into the mechanics of how this thing was done.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the will of the committee about it?

Mr. MURPHY. All the papers have been given copies. I just call attention to that fact, that it is improper to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it. If the Chair is going to pass on it, he will hold that it will all be read without deletion.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. May I interrupt at this time to ask the captain who is an officer in the United States Navy, and [9624] who has carefully prepared this statement, who knows the limitations that have been placed upon him in statements heretofore made by the committee, whether or not there is anything in this statement that, in his judgment as an expert in this field, reveals anything that would be of value today to any potential or real enemy of the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. I have gone over this whole statement with the legal representative of the Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. KEEFE. And it has his approval?

Captain SAFFORD. His qualified approval.

Mr. KEEFE. I mean as to the question raised by Congressman Murphy.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

Captain SAFFORD. And it has been given thorough weight by me.

The Winds Message broadcast was forwarded to the Navy Department by TWX (teletypewriter exchange) from the teletype-transmitter in the "Intercept" receiving room at Cheltenham to "WA91," the page-printer located beside the GY Watch Officer's desk, in the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Unit

under my command. I saw the Winds Message [9625] typed in page form on yellow teletype paper, with the translation written below. I immediately forwarded this message to my Commanding Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter.

PREPARATIONS FOR INTERCEPTION

There are various sources of the so-called "Winds Code," two of which have already been introduced as evidence: Tokyo Circular 2353 on page 154 of Exhibit No. 1 and Tokyo Circular 2354 on page 155 of Exhibit No. 1. The most important source was Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet secret dispatch 281430 of November 28, 1941, addressed for information to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Commandant 14th Naval District—thus letting them in on the secret. I had taken no action personally on the first tip-off (Tokyo Circular 2354), because I was still awaiting the instructions of higher authority. CINCAF 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 2353 and other collateral intercept information apparently made an impression upon the Director of Naval Intelligence, for he immediately sent word to me, through the Director of Naval Communications, that he wished the Communication Intelligence Organization to make every attempt to intercept any message sent in accordance with the Winds Codes. It was a request from Admiral Wilkinson and an order from Admiral Noyes.

[9626] I hastened to comply, with the secondary motive that it would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got it and our sister service didn't.

Just about the time I received Admiral Wilkinson's request, I was shown Tokyo to Washington Serial 843, dated November 27, 1941, prescribing a "schedule of (Tokyo News) Broadcasts," which gave me something tangible to work with as well as giving added meaning to the Winds Code. The "November 29 deadline" indicated that the Winds Code might be used to notify overseas officials as to things which would "automatically begin to happen." Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354 blueprinted what this action would be. Tokyo Serial 843 implied that such notification would be made. After a conference with my subordinates, I drafted a summary of Tokyo Serial 843 (or had Kramer do it for me), had it coded in the COPEK system, and released it myself at 6 p. m. (Washington time) on November 28, 1941. This secret message was transmitted "Priority" to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts for action, and to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet for information, and may be identified as OPNAV 282301. This took care of our overseas Communication Intelligence Units; they now had all the available technical information on the subject. I know that they monitored the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts; I [9627] also know that Corregidor monitored the Tokyo Morse Broadcasts; in fact, Corregidor and Heeia went beyond their instructions and guarded the Tokyo Broadcasts 24 hours a day. Captain Rochefort and Commander Lietwiler can verify this.

I discussed the situation with Commander Welker, in charge of the intercept and direction-finder stations, and with Chief Radioman

Lewis, his technical assistant. Our prospects for interception looked somewhat dubious. We were not encouraged when a day or two later Washington and Rio objected to the new frequency assignments and Rome complained about the poor quality of the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts.

I would like to digress long enough to invite the attention of the committee to the fact that OPNAV 282301 is not included in the "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches" (Exhibit No. 37), and that Tokyo Serial 843 (JD-1 #6899: SIS #25446) is not included in the "Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic Messages" (Exhibit No. 1). Three other relevant intercepts not appearing in Exhibit No. 1 are also of interest at this point, namely: Washington to Tokyo Serial 1197 of November 27, 1941 (JD-1 #6908: SIS #25476), Rio to Tokyo Serial 482 of November 30, 1941 (JD-1 #6982: SIS 25571), Rome to Tokyo Serial 768 of November 29, 1941 (JD-1 #6981: SIS #25604).

These 5 documents should be introduced as evidence for the purposes of record.

[9628] Welker, Lewis and I agreed that 5160 kilocycles would probably come in nicely at Manila and at Pearl Harbor. Station JHL was of too low power to reach the greater distances to the continental United States. 9430 kilocycles appeared a bit high for a night frequency in winter, as far as the West Coast was concerned. There did not seem to be a remote possibility of the 11980 kilocycles and 12265 kilocycles being heard by any station in the Pacific Ocean or along either shore at the time of day scheduled.

Nevertheless, we decided to have Bainbridge Island monitor the Tokyo Morse Code Broadcasts on the chance that the times given in Tokyo Serial 843 might not be given in Tokyo time or the schedules could be heard because of freak conditions.

We did not order Bainbridge Island to monitor the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts because its two sound recorders were guarding the two ends of the Tokyo-San Francisco radio telephone circuit. Our estimates for Bainbridge Island were closely realized: Excellent receivability at the wrong time of day and almost a complete "black-out" of reception on the higher frequencies during the period scheduled for the winds message broadcast.

We agreed that the best chance of intercepting the listed schedules (other than those on 5160 kilocycles) was [9629] on the East Coast of the United States. During the winter months the East Coast had good reception of Tokyo during the few hours included in the schedules. Our best bet was Cheltenham, which had been guarding the MAM (Tokyo) Broadcasts to Japanese merchant vessels, so we had up-to-the-minute data on the receivability of Tokyo.

According to my memory we decided to play safe and have all East Coast intercept stations monitor the Tokyo broadcasts. We agreed it would be impossible to hear voice broadcasts from Tokyo on the East Coast and therefore did not attempt it. We did not order Guam or Imperial Beach (California) to monitor any of the Tokyo broadcast schedules.

Commander Welker or I sent TWX messages directing the intercept stations at Bainbridge Island (Washington) and at Cheltenham (Maryland) to monitor the schedules given in Tokyo Serial 843 as first priority and to forward all plain-language Japanese intercepts

on these schedules to the Navy Department by teletype. We may have set these instructions to other stations also. We did not want English or coded messages—only written Japanese. We gave the same instructions to both stations, and sent them out immediately after releasing the previously mentioned OPNAV 282301.

[9630] I have confirmation of the above orders plus knowledge of existing receiving conditions in the monthly reports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, extracts from which are quoted below:

Station "M" (Cheltenham)—Operations—November 1941

Receiving conditions throughout the month were very good on all frequencies. Atmospheric disturbances have been at a minimum. Orders received from OP-20-GX at 2315 (GCT) November 28, via teletype to give highest priority to various broadcasts at designated Japanese broadcast stations. These schedules were covered and found to be press broadcasts sent in both Kana and English. Log sheets were forwarded to OP-20-GX daily with regular traffic files.

Station "M" (Cheltenham)—Operations—December 1941

Receiving conditions during the month were fair to good on all frequencies. At 2300, 7 December 1941, telephone orders received from OP-20-GX to drop the Tokyo JJC/MAM schedules and assignments; continued watch for Orange activity.

Station "W" (Winter Harbor)—Operations—December 1941

Receiving conditions in general. Daily attempts were made to intercept Tokyo and Osaka channels employed to Europe, but only on a few occasions was any intercept [9631] possible.

Station "S" (Bainbridge Island)—Operations—November 1941

During the month of November a sharp increase has been noticed in the amount of message traffic sent on the Kana General Information Broadcasts. Where before we seldom averaged more than one or two such messages monthly, it is now not unusual for two or three such messages to appear daily. These messages are sent in both number code and Kana.

On 28 November, a directive was received by TWX from OP-20-GX which called for coverage of the following stations at times specified, with priority transmission of intercepted material by TWX. Times listed were given as PST. Because the use of PST time designation is unusual, we asked for a verification, but were told that time zone was uncertain and verification was not possible.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if the witness would tell us as he goes along what those symbols mean.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes. TWX was the teletype exchange you call the switchboard. They plug you in and charge you by the minute.

PST is Pacific Standard Time. And GCT, Greenwich Civil [9632] Time.

PST	GCT	Station	Frequency
0100	(0900)	JVJ	12275
0130	(0930)	JUO	9430
0200	(1000)	JVJ	12275
0600	(1100)	JHL	5160
0400	(1200)	JHL	5160
0500	(1300)	JHL	5160
0530	(1330)	JHP	11980

Since the time zone indicated was not certain, we were faced with the possibility that the time could be either GCT, PST, zone-9, or even a combination of these. As soon as the directive was received we started copying all broadcasts of this same type which were readable at "S". We found that in some cases other stations were tied in with the stations listed in the original directive, and that although we could not copy the station listed we could copy the cornetted channel carrying the same broadcast.

The stations and times that we can copy are listed below. Time used is GCT.

<i>GCT</i>	<i>Station</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Correlated with</i>
0000	JVJ	12275	JUP
0030	JUD	15880	JVJ/JAU2
0100	JUD	15880	JVJ
[9633] <i>GCT</i>	<i>Station</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Correlated with</i>
0130	JVJ	12275	
0200	JVJ	12275	
0230	JVJ	12275	JUP/JUD
0300	JVJ	12275	JUD
0330	JVJ	12275	JUD
0400	JVJ	12275	
0430	JVJ	12275	
0500	JVJ	12275	JUD
1300	JHL	5160	
2200	JVJ	12275	
2300	JVJ	12275	
2330	JVJ	12275	

The important thing is that with the exception of the 1300 schedule from station JHL on 5160 kilocycles there was a complete "black-out" for 16 or 18 hours where no broadcasts from Tokyo could be heard and the schedules on which we expected the winds message came in the middle of this long period of "black-out".

At my instructions, or at least with my concurrence, Commander Welker consulted with his opposite number in the War Department, Captain Schukraft, and ascertained that the Army was monitoring for the winds message at San Francisco, and possibly elsewhere, but was not monitoring [9634] for the winds message anywhere on the East Coast of the United States. I do not know what sort of instructions the Army gave its intercept stations. I do not know why the Army failed to monitor for the winds message on the East Coast of the United States; Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Schukraft may remember.

I believe that the above-mentioned conference was held before we issued instructions to our own intercept stations.

The F. C. C. was requested by the War Department to monitor for the winds message on the Tokyo voice broadcasts and was given the code words of Tokyo Circular 2353 but without their meaning. The F. C. C. was not furnished the Tokyo broadcast schedules nor any mention of the fact that the winds message could come by Morse code.

The F. C. C. was requested to monitor the winds message at its monitor station at Portland, Oregon, and also at one of its monitoring stations on the East Coast of the United States. The latter request was not complied with because the F. C. C. doubted if voice broadcasts from Tokyo could be heard on the East Coast of the United States. The F. C. C. monitor station at Honolulu also monitored for the winds message, at the request of the local military authorities.

The F. C. C. monitor station at Portland, Oregon, could [9635] not possibly have intercepted the same winds message that Cheltenham did because Cheltenham was monitoring for Morse code, exclusively, and the F. C. C. station at Portland was monitoring for voice, exclusively.

In addition to the stations previously named, the winds message was monitored for at the following localities, to my personal knowledge:

Heeia, T. H.	(U. S. Navy)	Voice only
Corregidor, P. I.	(U. S. Navy)	Voice and Morse
Singapore	(British Intelligence)	—?—
Australia	(Australian Intelligence)	—?—
Java	(NEI Intelligence)	—?—

Intercept stations in Canada, England, and China probably watched for it too. And, of course, the Japanese diplomatic and consular stations listened for the winds message themselves on their own receiving sets.

On December 1, 1941, I was shown the translation of Tokyo Circular 2444 (Exhibit No. 1, page 209), advising that London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila had been ordered to destroy their code machines, and instructing Washington to retain its machine regardless of other instructions.

The significance of the winds message now became very clear to me and I began to take the matter most seriously. [9636] So did Colonel Sadtler, over in the War Department. The only means by which Tokyo could announce its decisions of peace or war to its overseas diplomatic representatives who had destroyed their regular codes was by means of the emergency winds code. This applied to London and the Far East but not to Washington. Higher authority in the War and Navy Departments likewise took a greatly increased interest in the winds message, and began heckling me as to the possibility of having missed it. I instituted a daily check of the incoming teletype messages to see that our intercept stations were doing as much as could be expected of them.

One evening, about December 1, 1941, I drove out to Station "M" at Cheltenham, Maryland, and remained until about midnight. The primary purpose of my visit was to inspect the new landline telegraph for direction-finder control which had been completed at Cheltenham and the Navy Department, which was scheduled to be placed in service on December 1, 1941, but which had been delayed by installation difficulties at some of the outlying stations. I made a personal check of the winds message watch and, as I recall, found that Chief Radioman Wigle was monitoring the Tokyo News Broadcasts 24 hours a day and had assigned qualified Kana operators to this duty. I have further [9637] documentary proof that Cheltenham was monitoring the Tokyo broadcasts in the fact that between 1200 and 1500 GCT, on December 6, 1941, Cheltenham intercepted and forwarded to the Navy Department Tokyo Serials 902-2 and 904, plus two other messages. This is entered in the GY log for December 6, 1941: Items Nos. 6609, 6610, 6618, and 6619. These messages were transmitted by Station JAH (Tokyo) to San Francisco on 7630 kilocycles. The Tokyo-San Francisco circuit was not a regular Cheltenham assignment.

I may summarize the preparations for interception by stating that the United States Navy listened for the winds message at Cheltenham, Maryland, and did everything that it possibly could to intercept it elsewhere, and that the other services did all that they considered reasonable.

INTERCEPTION

There is no basis for assuming that the winds message had to be sent on a voice broadcast. In 1941, the Japanese Government was sending out "General Information Broadcasts" as well as "Domei News" to its diplomatic and consular officials in foreign lands. This was partly to give speedier service, partly to permit use of the Japanese Morse Code and the Kata-Kana form of written Japanese, and partly to be independent of foreign communication [9638] systems in emergency.

Each office had its own Japanese radio operator and its own short-wave receiving set. We knew it. The United States Government was doing the same thing itself, with a Navy radio operator serving at each post. The German Government was doing likewise but was a bit ahead of us, with machine reception. We used to "sample" these broadcasts periodically until the F. C. C.'s Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service came into existence and relieved the U. S. Navy of this duty. I wish to reiterate that neither Japan, the United States, nor Germany was dependent on voice broadcasts for direct communication from the seat of government to overseas officials.

The radio schedules listed in Tokyo Serial 843 were in Morse (i. e., dot-and-dash) code exclusively; either Japanese Morse, International Morse, or both. We expected that the winds message would be sent in Morse Code—and it was. If the winds message had been sent on a voice broadcast the U. S. Navy would have missed it, unless it came on a schedule receivable at Pearl Harbor or Corregidor.

The original documents giving details of the interception of the winds message are not available. Therefore it is necessary to reconstruct the situation from circumstantial evidence and by process of elimination. Collateral [9639] information has been plotted or recorded on a single sheet, a reduced size photograph of which is appended. This graph tells the story better than words and shows just what actually happened. It should convince the most skeptical.

As I have previously testified, the frequency, distances, and time of day were such that the winds message could be heard on the East Coasts of the United States and Canada, while it was a physical impossibility for it to be heard (except under freak conditions) on the West Coast of the United States and Canada, Pearl Harbor, Manila, Java, and Singapore. Everything checks perfectly; there is no element of doubt as to conditions of radio wave propagation.

The winds message could be heard also in the North Atlantic Ocean, British Isles, and Western Europe, but it could not be heard in Burma, Australia, or in Rio de Janeiro. It was sent on the so-called "European Schedule" of Tokyo's big foreign broadcasting station "J-A-P" and was intended for London. We knew that the Japanese Ambassador in London had destroyed his secret codes three days previously; this was the only way that Tokyo could get news to him secretly. Reception or non-reception at other points was irrelevant. Tokyo knew full well, before the winds message was sent, that it probably would not be [9640] received in Washington or in Rio. That was immaterial—the winds message was intended for London.

In the next sentence I would like to make a change. I would like to change the word "my" to "our", so that the sentence would read:

[9641] Our ability to intercept it was due partly to good luck, partly to our foresight, and partly to the high quality of the Navy operators and receiving apparatus at Cheltenham.

The winds message broadcast was forwarded by teletype (TWX) from Cheltenham to the Navy Department (Op-20-GY) shortly before 9 a. m. on December 4, 1941. Kramer distinctly recalls that the Winds Message was shown to him by the GY watch Officer after 8:30 a. m. on that date. It was my recollection, as stated in previous testimony, that I had first seen the Winds Message a little after eight a. m. on December 4, 1941. The Winds Message broadcast was about 200 words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo Circular 2353 appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo Circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast. All three "code words" were used, but the expression meaning "North Wind Cloudy" was in the negative form.

When I first saw the Winds Message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored [9642] crayon in Kramer's handwriting, the following free translations:

War with England (including NEI, etc.)
 War with the U. S.
 Peace with Russia.

I am not sure of the order; but it was the same as in the broadcast and I think England appeared first. I think Kramer used "U. S." rather than "United States." It is possible that the words "No war," instead of "Peace," were used to describe Japan's intentions with regards to Russia.

"This is it!" said Kramer as he handed me the Winds Message. This was the broadcast we had strained every nerve to intercept. This was the feather in our cap. This was the tip-off which would prevent the U. S. Pacific Fleet being surprised at Pearl Harbor the way the Russians had been surprised at Port Arthur. This was what the Navy Communication Intelligence had been preparing for since its establishment in 1924—*War with Japan!*

DISTRIBUTION

I immediately sent the original of the Winds Message up to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track him down and not take "no" for an answer, and if he could [9643] not find him in a reasonable time to let me know. I did not explain the nature or significance of the Winds Message to this officer. In a few minutes I received a report to the effect that the message had been delivered.

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the Winds Message to the War Department, to the "Magic" distribution list in the Navy

Department, and to the Naval Aide to the President. For that reason, no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds Message was made in the Navy Department. The six or seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible: here the Navy's responsibility ended. The individual smooth translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with standard operating procedure. I have no reason for believing that the Army failed to make a prompt distribution of its translations of the Winds Message.

I am thoroughly satisfied in my own mind that Admiral Noyes telephoned to everyone on his list without delay; I cannot bring myself to imagine otherwise. There is some question as to whether the Admiral was understood, but this only shows the unreliability of telephone messages. Any [9644] misunderstanding of what Admiral Noyes said was of negligible effect because written translations of the Winds Message were distributed within 2 or 3 hours of his telephone calls. In fact it was not until 1944 that any suggestion or criticism was offered that any official on the "Magic" distribution list—Navy, Army, State Department, or White House—had not been notified that the Winds Message had been received or that the Winds Message had been translated in any terms other than War and Peace.

My final verification of the fact that the Winds Message translation was typed and distributed lies in the fact that about December 15, 1941, I saw a copy of it in the special folder of messages which were being assembled for Admiral Noyes to present to the Roberts Commission. I checked these over with Kramer for completeness as well as for the elimination of irrelevant material. Kramer told me in 1944 that he had shown Assistant Secretary Forrestal a special set of Pre-Pearl Harbor messages about December 10, 1941, when Secretary Knox was making his personal investigation at Pearl Harbor, and that he discussed those messages with Mr. Forrestal for about two hours. This set of messages was apparently the basis and possibly the identical file that was given Admiral Noyes and shown to the Roberts Commission via Admiral Wilkinson. This was the last time I [9645] saw the Winds Message. I believe that the translation of the Winds Message was given the JD-1 Serial number of 7001, because this number is missing and unaccounted for, and comes within the range of messages translated on December 3 and 4, 1941.

The distribution of the Winds Message was the responsibility of Naval Intelligence and not Naval Communications. I had no responsibility in the matter after forwarding the original message to Admiral Noyes and after checking Kramer's "folder" to see that the messages were presented in a logical and understandable order.

ACTION TAKEN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE WINDS MESSAGE

About an hour after I had sent the original Winds Message up to Admiral Noyes, I received a call from him on the inter-phone to the effect that we ought to tell Guam to burn their excess codes and ciphers. I replied that I was in full agreement but there were other odds and ends to be taken care of, and that I would have some messages ready for his approval by noon.

As a direct result of the Winds Message and other contemporaneous information from intercepted Japanese messages, I prepared the following secret message:

OPNAV 041754 (Priority)—Not yet introduced as evidence.

OPNAV 042000 (Priority)—Not yet introduced as evidence.

[9646] OPNAV 042017 (Deferred)—Page 44 of Exhibit No. 37.

OPNAV 042018 (Deferred)—Not yet introduced as evidence.

OPNAV 042019 (Deferred)—Not yet introduced as evidence.

I took four of these messages up to Admiral Noyes' office, cleared them through the Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Captain Joseph R. Redman) and made an appointment to see the Admiral with his secretary, as per office instruction. I was called to his office shortly before 3:00 p. m.

OPNAV 041754 was a correction to a previous Priority message, and was sent in response to a Priority service message requesting verification of the last four groups of OPNAV 040343 (page 43 of Exhibit No. 37). I released this message myself during the noon hour to save time.

OPNAV Priority 042000 for action of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16, COM14, Guam and Samoa, made a "new Intelligence" cipher effective immediately and directed the immediate destruction of the old cipher by Guam and Samoa. This message was released by Admiral Noyes himself, and is the most important of the five which were sent on this occasion because the precedence did give some idea of urgency.

OPNAV Deferred 042017, for action of Guam and for information of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14 and COM 16 was sent in the new cipher made effective by OPNAV 042000. It [9647] directed Guam to destroy excess cryptographic aids and other secret matter. This message was rewritten by Admiral Noyes and was released by Admiral Ingersoll. My original wording was much stronger than the message actually sent, because I had directed the destruction of everything except the system in which sent and the current edition of the Direction Finder Code. However, I was not trying to use this message as the vehicle for a war warning as I had the day before in OPNAV 031855 (page 41, Exhibit No. 37). I was just trying to insure that Grum "stripped ship" before a Japanese Commando-raid from Saipan, 100 miles away, captured a complete allowance of codes and ciphers, a matter for which I was officially responsible. Admiral Noyes made no mention of a war warning when he directed me to prepare this message and I feel sure he did not have any such warning in mind when he toned down my original draft. This message had to be sent "for Information" to CINCPAC, and others, as notification that Guam's allowance of codes and ciphers was being reduced, and as a reminder to Guam to notify the addressees what systems would be available for its future communications. This message was sent DEFERRED to insure that OPNAV 042000 would arrive well in advance and thus avoid confusion and unnecessary messages at this critical time.

[9648] OPNAV 042018 and OPNAV 042019 are not important except that they help establish the date the Winds Message was intercepted and the time and date that the unsent warning message, prepared by Commander McCollum, was seen by me.

EVALUATION OF THE WINDS MESSAGE

Evaluation of the Winds Message was not based on JD-1 #6850 and #6875 alone. CINCAF 281430 gave much stronger translations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354, which dispelled any doubt as to whether or not WAR was meant by the literal translation:

Japan=(blank) relations are in danger.

This message contained official British translation furnished by Singapore, from which I quote:

NISHI NISHI England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malay and N. E. I.

That means war, no matter how worded. No one disputed this British translation in November-December, 1941: in fact our own translation was considered consistent with it.

Two confirmations of the British translation came from the official Netherlands East Indies Government translations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354. Colonel Thorpe, the Senior Army Intelligence Officer in Java, sent an official message via the Navy addressed to General Miles, the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington, which is a [9649] matter of record in previous Pearl Harbor investigations. This message may be identified as Alusna Batavia 031030 dated December 3, 1941. I quoted from this message:

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code intercept:

Japan will notify her consults of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end.

East wind rain United States;

North wind cloudy Russia;

West wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies.

Copies of this message were circulated in the Navy Department, and the Chief of Naval Operations was indicated as receiving a copy.

Consul General Foote, our Senior Diplomatic Representative in the Netherlands East Indies, on December 4, 1941 (Java time), which is December 3, 1941 (Washington time) sent a similar message to the Secretary of State, from which I quote:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports:

One east wind rain war with United States,

Two north wind cloudy war with Russia,

Three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies.

[9650] When threat of crisis exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts:

One HIGASHI east America,

Two KITA north Russia,

Three NISHI west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies.

This message was received in the State Department at 9:19 a. m. on December 4, 1941 (Washington time). Copies were forwarded to the War and Navy Departments by the State Department liaison officer, Mr. Orme Wilson. They were given a wide circulation in the Navy Department.

My own evaluation of the foregoing, on December 4, 1941, was about as follows:

(A) The Basic Japanese War Plan was divided into 3 categories or provided for 3 contingencies, any or all of which might be followed, namely:

- (1) War with the United States.
- (2) War with Russia.
- (3) With with England including the invasion of Thailand and the capture of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

(B) The Winds Message gave us the answer in all 3 cases:

Affirmative for the 1st and 3rd categories, and Negative for the 2nd.

[9651] (C) The Winds Message was probably a "Signal of Execute" of some sort.

The "Signal of Execute" theory received strong confirmation from a secret message received from the Philippines in the early afternoon of December 4, 1941. This message informed us that the Japanese Navy had introduced a new cipher system for its so-called "Operations Code" at 0600 GCT that date. This time was 7½ hours before the Winds Message was broadcast. I might add that there was only one J-A-P European broadcast per day, so the times coincided as closely as possible. I would like to add also that my subordinates on Corregidor spotted and reported this change only nine hours after it was made. The message may be identified as Commandant 16th Naval District Priority 041502 dated December 4, 1941, and was addressed to Naval Operations and the Commandant 14th Naval District but not to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. So far as I know, this message has not been introduced as evidence before any previous investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. In fact, this is the first time it has ever been mentioned except to Admiral Hart. The unusual hour and unusual date at which the Japanese Navy changed its "Operations Code," combined with the Winds Message and other collateral information available in the Navy Department, [9652] made this message highly significant as the probable "Signal of Execute" to the Japanese Navy. Up till now the Winds Message has had to bear a double burden in my testimony.

[9653] As I have previously testified, we expected that if the Japanese did suddenly attack the United States this attack would come on a week-end or national holiday. In fact, a warning message to this effect had been sent out in April, 1941 (page 1 of Exhibit No. 37). The War Department over-emphasized the imminence of war as forecast by the "November 29, deadline" and predicted that the Japanese would strike during the week-end of November 29-30, 1941.

The Navy Department estimated the situation more accurately—the Japanese armada which had been concentrating for the southern invasion was too far from any conceivable objective to give serious consideration to this date. Also the covering Naval forces were not yet deployed and other signs indicated that the U. S. Army estimate was a bit premature.

The next week-end, December 6-7, 1941, was just the reverse. The winds message and the change of the Naval Operations Code came in the middle of the week; 2 days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday. It was unthinkable that the Japanese would surrender their hopes of surprise by delaying until the week-end of December 13-14, 1941. This was not crystal gazing or "intuition"—it was just the plain, common sense acceptance of a self-evident proposition. Colonel

Sadtler saw it, and so did Captain Joseph [9654] R. Redman, U. S. N.—according to Colonel Sadtler's testimony in 1944, before the Army Board of Investigation.

The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday, December 6, 1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941.

In the next sentence I would like to change the words "Pearl Harbor" to "England and the United States", so that the sentence reads:

The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on England and the United States by the Japanese themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now a quarter after four, and we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m. February 1, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Saturday, February 2, 1946.)

[9655]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[9656] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Counsel, I believe, was still examining the witness.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, have you a copy of Exhibit 142 before you?

Captain SAFFORD. I have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As I understand it, the first winds message that was intercepted was Circular No. 2353 shown in Exhibit 142; is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. Not necessarily.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, was there one before that?

Captain SAFFORD. Circulars 2353 and 2354 were intercepted on the same date, and I do not know which came first. Circular 2354 was translated by us 2 days before 2353.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the only two intercepts establishing the so-called winds codes are contained in circulars 2353 and 2354?

Captain SAFFORD. The only ones that we had in the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The only ones that we knew anything about at the time of this episode?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

[9657] Mr. RICHARDSON. And after those messages came in every effort was made that could be made to see to it that stations were warned to monitor, for the executes under those messages?

Captain SAFFORD. Nothing was done until we had received a message from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, containing the translation of the same messages made by the British at Singapore.

Then we made every effort to monitor for those messages.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long after this message came in on November 19 then was the first monitoring direction given to intercepting stations?

Captain SAFFORD. It was sent out about 6 p. m. Washington time on November 28, 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it sent generally to all stations that it was felt might be in a position to intercept the execute?

Captain SAFFORD. It was sent to all stations which we considered had the personnel problem, the trained personnel, available personnel, and proper material, to intercept the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many stations do you know picked up the messages now identified as 2353 and 2354?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot tell you off-hand. I will [9658] have to search through the records.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were there a great many of them?

Captain SAFFORD. There were at least two in the United States Navy, because they had translated the message, the Dutch must have intercepted it because they translated it, and the Australians knew about it, and I don't know how they got it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, how did 2353 come in in the first instance to the intercepting station in the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. It was in the intercept of a radio message from Tokyo to San Francisco, but addressed to Washington.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it in code?

Captain SAFFORD. It was in code, in the Japanese code which we call J-19.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it in the form of message in which the Japanese were accustomed to send out weather broadcasts?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't understand that question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know of weather broadcasts the Japanese stations were sending out generally?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese sent out weather forecasts on most of their broadcasts just the way the United [9659] States sent out weather forecasts on most of its official broadcasts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would the form of broadcast as sent out by the Japanese be the form in which Circular 2353 came in?

Captain SAFFORD. No; because a weather broadcast would consist of nothing but weather, and this prescribed that an apparent or false weather report be inserted in the middle of news. That was never done in the Japanese broadcasts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was 2353 sent out in Morse code?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not understand.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You understand what the Japanese sending messages in the Morse code in Japanese means?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was this message 2353 sent out in that way?

Captain SAFFORD. That was sent out in International Morse Code, because it had to be received by American operators at San Francisco who did not know the Morse code.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was true of 2353?

Captain SAFFORD. It was true of 2353 and true of every translation given in this book.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would include 2353?

[9660] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, the witness had some paper in his left hand when he said everything in there was by International Morse Code. May we have what that paper is? He had it in his left hand. He said everything was International Morse Code.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is exhibit 142.

Captain SAFFORD. Every message quoted in exhibit 142, also the message quoted in exhibit 1, was sent out in International Morse Code.

Mr. MURPHY. Every message?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Now, in that code, the Japanese words which are shown in Circular 2353 as appear in Exhibit 142, appear as shown:

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.

The three Japanese words were in the message as sent out in International Code?

Captain SAFFORD. The words HIGASHI NO KAZEAME and the other two Japanese expressions were taken after decrypting the original Japanese message and converting the codes language into Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then the next step would be to translate the Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. The next step would be to translate [9661] the Japanese into English, but leaving the code expressions alone because we didn't want to alter the exact wording used.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the meaning of the Japanese words that remain in Circular 2353 as it appears in Exhibit 142 is the meaning that appears in the lower left-hand corner:

East wind rain, would be HIGASHI NO KAZEAME;

North wind cloudy—you pronounce that——

Captain SAFFORD. Kitanokaze Kumori.

Mr. RICHARDSON. West wind clear.

Captain SAFFORD. Nishi no kaze hare.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, when you turn to Circular 2354, the only difference between the two messages would be that under 2354 only a single word indicating a compass point would be included in the general intelligence broadcast referred to in that dispatch?

Captain SAFFORD. That is partially correct. There was also the further requirement that that single word be repeated five times at the beginning and at the end of the message. 2353 required that phrase be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave broadcast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As a matter of fact there were three [9662] requirements to comply with 2353?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The signal had to be in the middle, it also had to be at the end; the broadcast had to be a weather forecast, and each sentence had to be repeated twice?

Captain SAFFORD. And it had to be in the Japanese language.

[9663] Mr. RICHARDSON. Where do you find in circular 2353 that it had to be in the Japanese language?

Captain SAFFORD. It says:

The following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You interpreted that to mean that in addition to being in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast the words themselves had to be in Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. That is true, and the rest of the broadcast had to be in Japanese also.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, it doesn't say so; does it?

Captain SAFFORD. It does say so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where?

Captain SAFFORD. It says:

The daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes; it says that the warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But it does not say what is put in the middle had to be in Sanskrit or Latin or English or Japanese, does it?

Captain SAFFORD. It merely gave the words which they [9664] would use.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Right. Now, on 2345, Captain, the first requirement was that the dispatch—the notice was to be a general intelligence broadcast?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would that mean a radio broadcast?

Captain SAFFORD. That meant a radio broadcast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then those compass words that we have referred to that are shown in 2354 had to be at the beginning of that broadcast?

Captain SAFFORD. And at the end.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And at the end of the broadcast and had to be repeated five times?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And included at the beginning and end?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, unless the execute or an alleged execute that came to your attention complied with the directions contained in one or the other of those two code messages, would you interpret it to be an execute of the original message?

Captain SAFFORD. If it departed radically from those instructions, we would regard it as having nothing to do with the expected execute of those messages.

[9665] Mr. RICHARDSON. Suppose it did not appear in the middle, would that eliminate it?

Captain SAFFORD. Not necessarily, but we would regard it with suspicion.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Suppose it was not in a short wave news broadcast, would that eliminate it?

Captain SAFFORD. The word on "short wave" was incorrectly translated by a green translator. The correct translation of that word was "overseas broadcast."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, just wait a minute. You do not understand the Japanese language yourself, do you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, are you in a position of your own knowledge to tell us what that correct translation would be?

Captain SAFFORD. I suggest that the committee get a correct translation both in 2353 and 2354, a full translation with no words on it at the discretion of the translator.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the only message that you knew anything about when this episode on the winds execute came up was this message 2353 and 2354?

Captain SAFFORD. Oh, no; we had the British translation at the same time, and we had probably verified our own translations immediately we found a conflicting translation coming [9666] in from the Navy, from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet. That was custom.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't want any probably business in this. Was there another translation of the Japanese broadcast that was the basis for 2353 that was made by our authority here? If so, where is it?

Captain SAFFORD. There is no other on record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, the only one that you had available to you that was over our own stations was 2353 and 2354 on the morning of December 4?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, if we are restricted to what was intercepted by our own stations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. Now, the only other one available to you was the one sent in from the commander of the Asiatic Fleet?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, up until shortly after we had actually intercepted the winds execute message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The fact is, is it not, Captain, that in your earlier testimony before Admiral Hewitt and in your earlier testimony before Admiral Hart you testified, did you not, that the interpretation that was placed upon the message that you saw on the morning of December 4 was based upon the meaning given to you by the Foote and the Thorpe broadcast that had come in from Canberra and Batavia? Didn't you so [9667] testify?

Captain SAFFORD. I will have to check that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. What page is that on?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am referring first to page 748 of the Navy court of inquiry. My point is, Captain—I want you to get the point—didn't you in your testimony there base your interpretation of the meaning of this execute on the Dutch translation and the Foote translation and that you did not say anything whatever about the Hart translation?

Mr. MURPHY. Hart? The Hart translation?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral Hart, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Captain SAFFORD. What page is that again, please?

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is 748 of the Navy inquiry.

Captain SAFFORD. I answered those questions as you stated.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. And in your written statement that you have read to the committee in this proceeding you base your

interpretation on the message that had come in on November 28 from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, isn't the reason that you changed because you discovered that the Foote message and the Thorpe [9668] message had come in after you made your interpretation of the message on the morning of December 4 and therefore you could not have relied on it, and then didn't you turn to the message from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet as the source of your interpretation? Isn't that a specific reason why you did it?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right; that is all; that answers it.

Now, will you turn to 1-C in Exhibit 142? It is about the third or fourth page.

Captain SAFFORD. I see it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, that is a copy of our message from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that is the one that in your statement to the committee you relied on for your interpretation of the message that you got on the morning of December 4?

Captain SAFFORD. At the time the winds message was intercepted and translated by Kramer and sent up to higher authority; that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, will you tell me what there is in that message that says that the language that was to be used meant war? Read it to me from the message.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

NISHI NISHI England including occupa- [9669] tion of Thai or invasion of Malaya and NEI—

which is an abbreviation for Netherlands East Indies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, stop right there. We had been getting messages, had we not, for 10 days with reference to the movements of the Japanese toward the Thai Peninsula and the occupation of Malasia, hadn't we?

Captain SAFFORD. We had numerous signs indicating that they were possibly contemplating an act of war; correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Toward those places; toward the Thai Peninsula and Malasia?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So there wasn't anything in that language with reference to "NISHI NISHI" that was either new or particularly startling to us, was there, at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. Nothing except the confirmation of our suspicions or deductions.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the only thing you could draw—the only deduction you could draw from it fairly, Captain, would be that if the execute message came in that said "NISHI NISH" it would mean that the Japs were going after England by going upon that occupation, did it not, or invasion of Malaya?

Captain SAFFORD. And the Netherlands East Indies; that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, proceed and show me what there is [9670] in that dispatch that shows war on the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. There is nothing in the literal translation of that dispatch which says war on the United States.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when you turn back, Captain, to 1-A, which is 2353, you find the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME," with the definition, "Japan-U. S. relations in danger."

Do you find anything in the dispatch from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet that changes that interpretation of "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME," or whatever it is?

Captain SAFFORD. There is nothing that changes the translation of that phrase.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. This dispatch that you say was the execute, which you say was what you had been looking for, which was the great triumph of the Navy over the Army, you say came in on the morning of December 4 about 8 o'clock?

Captain SAFFORD. After 8:30; shortly before 9.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, you testified at least twice before, didn't you, Captain, that it came in on the evening of December 3?

Captain SAFFORD. I was testifying from memory and doing the best I could without the aid of the written notes which I had unfortunately destroyed in December 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, they were still destroyed when you [9671] made your statement here to the committee, weren't they? They still remained destroyed, didn't they?

Captain SAFFORD. Those notes remained destroyed; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, what you mean is after you testified in these earlier hearings you sat down with yourself and your pencil and you made some new notes, is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. I got new written evidence about 2 weeks ago which up till that time had not been in my possession. It helped me tremendously in reconstructing what had happened as well as refreshing my memory.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Captain, let us go into this question.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I request that the written evidence be now produced so that we may examine it? I ask that his written evidence that was produced 2 weeks ago be submitted to the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He said he obtained written evidence about 2 weeks ago that refreshed his memory. Mr. Murphy asks that that written evidence be produced.

Mr. MURPHY. And that it be spread on the record.¹

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was that written evidence, Captain—what is the nature of it?

Captain SAFFORD. Monthly reports from the interceptor stations at Winter Harbor, Maine, and at Cheltenham, Md., [9672] which I had requested 2 years ago and had been informed could not be discovered. We made one more attempt about 2 weeks ago, and those particular reports were located, and my assistant read them and got pertinent parts for me, and I have his penciled copies of that stuff. I have quoted those parts in my testimony, in these extracts from the logs—rather, the monthly reports of Winter Harbor, Maine, and Cheltenham, Md.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But it is true, Captain, is it not, that at least twice before under oath you placed the date of the receipt of this

¹ In this connection see a letter from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5493.

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execute message that you testified concerning on the evening of December 3?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I said "December 3 or 4." I think I made it broader than that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't think you did. Let me call your attention to your testimony at page 361 of the Hart investigation. Didn't you testify there as follows:

The winds message was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 Washington time, which was December 4th by Greenwich time and Tokyo time.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then, to make sure that that was not an error, didn't you testify a little later in that same examination as follows:

[9673] The winds message was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3rd while Lieutenant (J. G.) Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR, was on watch.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Captain, you do not know yourself of your own knowledge, when the message was received, do you?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know from first-hand knowledge exactly what time it was received.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All you know, Captain, is that Kramer came to you with a piece of paper in his hand that had a message on it?

Captain SAFFORD. It was a piece of paper which I recognized as the yellow paper from a roll on a teletype machine.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, before we go into that, let me inquire, Captain, along this line: Now, after all of this episode had transpired and you had destroyed your notes—by the way, do you now contend that you made notes of what occurred at the time this message came in?

Captain SAFFORD. I made notes while events were fresh in my memory as to the things which were not matters of official record and were important to know, such as such things as times of deliveries of certain messages, and so forth. The winds message was then in existence. I could have re- [9674] ferred to it for anything that I wanted, and there would be no occasion to try to check the exact time at which it was intercepted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You testified before the Army board, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And I refer now to page 160 of the Army board. Didn't you testify as follows there, Captain:

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer made his statements of 8th and 9th of December immediately after the event when I discussed it fully with him. I called for statements. I talked to everybody concerned to see if my people had been negligent in any way, that this thing had been our fault. I made a very careful investigation.

General RUSSELL. Did you make any records of that investigation?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Was that true?

Captain SAFFORD. There was no written record made. All the notes I had in the rough form were destroyed when I got the orders.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, Captain—

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I—well, I don't want to interrupt. He testified yesterday the meeting was on the [9675] 15th and now he says there were notes made on the 8th and now he says that on the 14th or 15th they were destroyed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, after all of this episode and at the time of this episode you had been a very busy man, hadn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You might almost say that you worked day and night.

Captain SAFFORD. Not quite that much, but I was working long hours.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your staff was working hard?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your office had never been as busy as it was during this week before the Pearl Harbor attack, had it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

[9676] Mr. RICHARDSON. And after this episode with reference to this so-called winds execute, you never turned your attention to that matter until prior to the summer or fall of 1943, did you, approximately 2 years?

Captain SAFFORD. Approximately 2 years; a few months less.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the fact is, is it not, Captain, that in the fall of 1943, you concluded that you might be a witness, and then you undertook, by inquiry, by investigation, by conversation, by letters, to try and remember what occurred during that period before the attack in December 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. I was doing more than that at that time. I was engaged in writing up a history of radio intelligence from 1924 to 1941 by the direction and instruction of the Director of Naval Intelligence. That was carried for 7 months in my monthly report of progress, in addition to doing that work.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It was the official work you had to do. You were very deeply exercised in trying to make up your mind as to what you might testify to, if you were called as a witness?

Captain SAFFORD. I was trying to do double duty with the same set of data.

[9677] Mr. RICHARDSON. And the other duty, I repeat again, was to get your mind made up as to what the facts were, so if you were called as a witness you could testify?

Captain SAFFORD. So I could testify and not be confused on the witness stand by counsel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, I want you to know that I do not care a tinker's damn whether the winds execute message came in or whether it did not. I am only interested in whether there should be reviewed by the committee all of the reliable facts that can be adduced so they can reach a conclusion.

I do not want to mislead you or browbeat you, if I talk rather loudly. It is because I am a rather loud talking individual.

I just want to make it clear that when you started, in the fall of 1943 to prepare yourself as a witness, your whole recollection was exceedingly hazy as to what had happened 2 years before, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. There were a few outstanding facts and the details linking them together were very hazy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let me read you what you testified to on that point in the Hewitt investigation, at page 112:

Captain SAFFORD. In the fall of 1943, it appeared [9678] there was going to be a trial, a court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony ready for it. I realized I would be one of the important witnesses, that my memory was very vague, and I began looking around to get everything that I could to prepare a written statement which I could follow as testimony.

That was the time when I studied the Roberts report carefully for the first time, and noted no reference to the winds message, or to the message which McCollum had written, and which I had seen, and which I thought had been sent, and then I began talking to everybody who had been around at the time and who knew I had been mixed up in it, to see what they could remember to straighten me out on the thing, and give me leads to follow down to where I got my hands on official messages, and things so it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory.

I also talked the thing over with whatever Army people were still around at the time, and had anything in this line, and bit by bit these facts appeared to come together.

The investigation was conducted, if you call it that, for the purpose of preparing myself to take the stand as a witness in a prospective court martial of Admiral Kimmel.

[9679] Now, you regard that today, do you not, Captain, as a fair statement of how you brought your mind to a factual conclusion as to what happened during that period, that week prior to Pearl Harbor, in the fall of 1943?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. 1941?

Mr. RICHARDSON. 1943.

Now, Captain—

Captain SAFFORD. May I add something to that statement?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. At the time I did this, I expected to be called as a witness for the prosecution, to represent the Navy Department, in the charges which I thought would be preferred against Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that made it all the more important, did it not, Captain, that you should testify as to what you knew and not what you found out from what somebody told you, because you were then dealing with the guilt or innocence of a human being?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, you were exceedingly anxious to get hold of an execute message to the winds code, were you not?

Captain SAFFORD. I first looked for the—

[9680] Mr. RICHARDSON (interposing). No, no. I am asking you as to your mental condition. You were very anxious, while you waited to see what the monitoring stations would send in to see when an execute code would come in?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now the first time you ever saw the message that you say in your statement was an execute message, was when Kramer brought it to you, sometime after 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were not a Japanese linguist?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You did not decode the message?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know under whose watch station the message came in?

Captain SAFFORD. Lieutenant Murray was on watch at the time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did not you specifically testify in the former hearing that it came in to Lieutenant Brotherhood?

Captain SAFFORD. I did on the first hearing, when I was under the belief that it had come in on Brotherhood's watch, because he told me it had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I will take up the Brotherhood [9681] matter with you a little later.

I want to pursue this matter just a moment.

Now, Kramer brought you this message, is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, there was some writing on the message when he brought it to you?

Captain SAFFORD. There was writing on the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, outside of that writing, what was on that message when he brought it to you?

Captain SAFFORD. He had underscored the code words in the middle of the message, so they stood out very plainly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just tell me Captain, in what form was this message? Was it in English?

Captain SAFFORD. The message was in Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All of it?

Captain SAFFORD. All of it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you could not read Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. I can read a few words in Japanese, if they point it out by underscoring, and I compared them with the original words of the two winds codes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let us not go quite so fast on that, Captain. [9682] When the message was brought to you by Kramer, was it typewritten?

Captain SAFFORD. It was the teletype message as it came in the machine.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. In Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And with the exception of these specific words that you were watching for, you did not attempt to read it in Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not attempt to read it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, there was some writing on that message, was there not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In handwriting?

Captain SAFFORD. In handwriting.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In English?

Captain SAFFORD. In English.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was written in longhand on that message?

Captain SAFFORD. "War with England including NEI," and so forth. "War with the U. S.," or possibly United States, and "Peace with Russia."

That is to the best of my recollection after 4 years.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, it is not quite 4 years, [9683] in view of the fact that this is the fifth time you are testifying on it, is it, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything else written in longhand on this message in Japanese, except those three phrases?

Captain SAFFORD. There was nothing in Kramer's handwriting.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, there was no other handwriting on it but Kramer's?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The only other writing there was on the paper was the teletype message in Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. And the identifying data, such as the frequency, time of intercept, station which sent it, which I glanced at, but promptly forgot.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that is not unreasonable.

Now then Captain, that message that you got, with respect to the Japanese words that were underlined, which you say Kramer interpreted in longhand on the message, was a dead ringer execute for the original code message 2353 that had been sent out, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, except that it reversed it in the case of Russia, because we thought no [9684] war would be no mention, but they gave a positive, specific mention as to Russia, but in a negative sense, which we concluded meant peace, or not war as yet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, Captain, we can dismiss from our attention in connection with any examination of you, or any contention of you as to the winds execute circular 2354, cannot we?

Captain SAFFORD. Let me see that.

Mr. RICHARDS. Because this execute could not have been in completion of circular 2354, could it?

Captain SAFFORD. 2354 is out completely, except for the fact that is what we expected to find in a Morse code message, and it did not turn out that way.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that the only code message, winds code message, so far as your testimony is concerned, that the committee need pay any attention to is 2353?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, were the words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" in the middle of the broadcast?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the place they were underscored.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were they also at the end?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know now. They were not [9685] underscored at the end if they were there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would be a very important item in order to ascertain whether this was intended to be an execute of 2353, would it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Not necessarily. They would be repeated at the end only as a precaution so that if they missed the early part of the broadcast, they could pick it up at the last and not lose it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute, Captain. Don't you think you are extending your authority a little when you interpret what the Japanese

meant in a code direction? Did not you tell me a few minutes ago that every one of those directions that were contained in 2353 were important to be considered in determining whether or not a given message was an execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. I said they were important, that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you did not even look to find out whether these three sets of words that had been translated were also at the end of the message, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I never made such a statement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you did not?

Captain SAFFORD. I said I cannot remember whether they were repeated at the end or not. I was well satisfied that [9686] that message was authentic, an authentic signal of the execute given by the Japanese Government.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, I am not the least interested in whether you are satisfied or not. I am only interested in ascertaining whether, when you saw the message, you endeavored to ascertain, as a careful, trained Intelligence man, whether it was an execute of the winds code message 2353, and consequently I asked you, first, was it in the middle and you said "yes"; and I then asked you, was it at the end, and you said you did not look.

Now, third, was each sentence repeated twice?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not say I did not look. I said I could not tell you from present memory.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, you cannot give us any help as to whether it was at the end, can you?

Captain SAFFORD. I can give you no help at the present time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But the fact that it was in the message just impressed you, so that to this day you can remember just those words that were underlined, cannot you?

Captain SAFFORD. I can remember them because we had the words preserved in the written record in circular 2353. I cannot remember the words in my mind. I can only leave them to this which had been preserved in the written record, [9687] and I knew it was this form, and not the other form.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when you looked at 2353, right in front of your nose was the phrase that all three of these phrases had also to appear at the end of the broadcast message, but that did not seem to impress you as being important.

Have you any reaction on that now? Does your mind give any reaction on that now?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no doubt that I checked through the rest of the message, and found everything in due form and technically correct, according to 2353, but I cannot swear from memory to it at this late date.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, at the present time, Captain, regardless of what you had no doubt of, you have no recollection, under oath, that you saw anything in that message except the three phrases underlined by Kramer in the message he handed you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct. Those are the things that remain in my memory through all this period of time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now do you have any recollection, Captain, that these sentences, these groups of words were repeated twice in the message? That would be important, would it not?

Captain SAFFORD. It is my impression they were, but [9688]
I am not certain.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was this message, Captain, a short-wave news broadcast?

Captain SAFFORD. It was a short-wave news broadcast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How do you know?

Captain SAFFORD. Because the frequency was recorded on the message, and we could not hear the long wave or low-power stuff, anyhow; the only thing we could hear in Washington from Tokyo was on short wave.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How did you know it was news if you could not read Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. I counted on Kramer to do that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you could have counted on Kramer to do it, but now you have not testified that you asked him anything about it.

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer told me when he gave me the paper, he said, "This is it." There is no question in my mind or the mind of anybody else what he meant by it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let us just temporarily, because I am going to question you about it again, Captain, probe that question.

You know, do you not, Captain, now that Kramer has three times in his sworn testimony heretofore, denied that he saw anything in this message with reference to Japanese [9689] words relating to the United States, and says that the only thing there was in the message he saw had reference to Russia. You know that, don't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He told you that, didn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer never told me anything about Russia.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did not he tell you that he was completely uncertain as to what the Japanese words were in this message?

Captain SAFFORD. I think that Kramer had been pretty well befuddled by the middle of 1945.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Had been pretty well what?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, befuddled.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, did the befuddling, Captain apply only to Kramer? Were you befuddled at all in 1945?

Captain SAFFORD. In 1945 there was a determined effort made to have me reverse my testimony before previous investigations and to say I had never seen the winds message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, explain to the committee in detail just who started to exercise influence on you to make you change your testimony. Give name and dates, and the full conversations.

Mr. MURPHY. May I request, Mr. Chairman, that we also [9690] have him produce the original memorandum he made 2 weeks ago?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I did not hear that.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to request that we have presented the written memorandum of 2 weeks ago. He said he had a written memorandum of 2 weeks ago that he just got for the first time.

Mr. KEEFE. He already identified it.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have that produced.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead and read it in detail. Give us now all of the evidence that you have to indicate that anybody tried to get

you to change your testimony in just as much detail as you can, Captain.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Counsel, may I inquire when this statement was prepared?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which statement?

Senator LUCAS. What he is about to read.

Captain SAFFORD. This statement was prepared on the 14th of July 1945.

Senator LUCAS. How did you happen to prepare that statement at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. There were certain things that occurred that struck me as quite unusual. I had never seen anything like it in all my experience as a commissioned officer [9691] of the Navy, and I made notes on the spot, and combined it all into one memorandum while the events were still fresh in my memory.

Senator LUCAS. You did not have this previously?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, this is the first I have heard of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you set out in that statement what those certain events were that impressed you?

Captain SAFFORD. I have it here. I merely had it with me to refresh my memory. I did not expect to produce it as evidence. I am now asked to produce it, and I have it here, if it is desired by the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Captain SAFFORD. I would just as soon not go into this here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think it would be well, if he read his paper rather than testifying from it, simply in refreshing his recollection.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, just read your paper completely to the committee, please, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. May I suggest, counsel, if there is anything that is not in this memorandum that he recalls, that he give that also?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. I thought it was all oral, when [9692] I asked the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read your paper completely, and distinctly, so we may all hear it, and then when you have finished reading it, why you may supplement it by any other statement you desire to make on this subject, in response to the question counsel has asked you.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I suggest that he read it not so fast.

Captain SAFFORD. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. I have difficulty at times hearing you.

Captain SAFFORD. This paper is dated July 14, 1945: "Memorandum of Conversations in Connection With Admiral Hewitt's Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Disaster."

Mr. RICHARDSON. This was after you had testified before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain SAFFORD. This was after I had testified before Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, go ahead.

Captain SAFFORD. I believe—I am not certain on the dates.

Mr. MURPHY. The Hewitt testimony was taken between May 14 and July 12, 1945, and this memorandum is [9693] July 14, 2 days after Admiral Hewitt concluded taking testimony.

Captain SAFFORD (reading) :

1. This memorandum is prepared, while events are still fresh in my mind, for possible use in connection with future investigation of the Pearl Harbor Disaster, or Court-martials in connection with Pearl Harbor. It includes certain acts which strike me as irregular or unusual, and probably illegal.

2. On or about Friday, 11 May 1945, I was called to an unofficial conference (or meeting) conducted by Lieutenant Commander John Sonnett, U. S. N. R., in room 1083A, Navy Building.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Spell that man's name.

Captain SAFFORD. S-o-n-n-e-t-t.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, he has been connected with the Hart hearing, had not he?

Captain SAFFORD. He had not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What hearing was he connected with?

Captain SAFFORD. He was connected with the Hewitt hearing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I mean the Hewitt hearing. What was his function in the Hewitt hearing? Do you remember?

Captain SAFFORD. He was a legal adviser to Admiral [9694] Hewitt, and a special representative of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And took part in that investigation?

Captain SAFFORD. And took part in that investigation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now go ahead.

Captain SAFFORD. (continuing reading) :

He was in civilian clothes, as he has been on every occasion on which I have seen him. Sonnet told me that he had been assigned as a legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt in an investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor Disaster, that he was also a special representative for Secretary Forrestal in this investigation and that he was authorized to handle Top-Secret and Secret information and documents. He showed me papers signed by Secretary Forrestal and Fleet Admiral King verifying these statements.

At my request he let me read the Precept which directed Admiral Hewitt to conduct the investigation. It was my understanding that Admiral Hewitt had not yet returned to Washington and that Sonnett was getting things lined up to expedite matters after the Admiral's arrival.

3. I answered many questions pertaining to my testimony before previous investigations, and discussed discrepancies between my testimony and the testimony of other [9695] witnesses.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me stop you right there, Captain.

Does not it commence to dawn on you that this statement of yours was made before you testified in the Hewitt examination?

Captain SAFFORD. Some of the notes were made before, but it was written up and typed and dated afterward.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see. But this conversation that you had with Sonnett took place before you testified in the Hewitt investigation?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain SAFFORD (continuing reading) :

Sonnett requested that I give him, by the end of the next week, written memoranda to be used as a basis of study and examination (under oath) on the subjects listed below. This was done and the memoranda submitted as follows :

Subject	Date submitted	Remarks
"Winds Message" (6 pages)-----	15 May 1945.....	Withdrawn on 18 May 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Comdr. Sonnett. Original retained for possible future use.

Mr. RICHARDSON. By the way, have you a copy of that paper that you gave to Sonnett?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I have.

[9696] Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, go ahead.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the captain go a little more slowly?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There was something said before May 15, 1945. What was that?

Captain SAFFORD. "Six pages."

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

Subject	Date submitted	Remarks
Evaluation of messages of 26 Nov. 1941 (6 pages).	17 May 1945...	Also lists the 6 carriers described by Com. 16 as "all known first and second fleet carriers."
Evaluation of "UTU" broadcasts (8 pages).	19 May 1945...	No action was taken because Jap invasion fleet had been sighted by RAF planes off Kota Bharu.
Tatuta Maru and the President Maidson (1 page).	21 May 1945...	Indicates that on 7 Dec. 1941 the CNO refused to believe that the U. S. would be involved in the war that was imminent in East Asia.

On Sonnett's request, I prepared and furnished him copies of certain U. S. Naval messages, the Station "H" Chronology for 1-6 December, 1941, and Com 14 Daily CI Summaries for 1 Nov.-6 Dec. 1941.

4. It was apparent to me on my very first meeting with Lieutenant Commander Sonnett that he was acting as [9697] a "counsel for the defense" for the late Secretary Knox, and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to the investigating officer. His purpose seemed to be to refute testimony (before earlier investigations) that was unfavorable to anyone in Washington, to beguile "hostile" witnesses into changing their stories and to introduce an element of doubt where he could not effect a reversal of testimony. Above all, he attempted to make me reverse my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and to make me believe I was suffering from hallucinations.

5. I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May 1945, and the third time a day or two later. On these latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to persuade me that there had been no "Winds Execute" Message, that my memory had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the "False Winds Message" with what I had been expecting, and that I ought to change my testimony to permit reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair. In some cases the idea was stated outright, in some cases it was implied, and in other cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view.

Senator LUCAS. The what?

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

The end in view.

6. I distinctly recall Lieutenant Commander John [9698] Sonnett, U. S. N. R., making the following statements to me during the course of the above-mentioned conferences:

"You are the only one who seems to have ever seen the 'Winds Execute' Message."

"How could the 'Winds Execute' be heard on the east coast of the U. S. and not at any of the places nearer Japan?"

"It is very doubtful that there ever was a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"It is no reflection on your veracity to change your testimony."

"It is no reflection on your mentality to have your memory play you tricks—after such a long period."

"Numerous witnesses that you have named have denied all knowledge of a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"You do not have to carry the torch for Admiral Kimmel."

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7. I testified before Admiral Hewitt the first time on or about 24 May 1945, before he went to Pearl Harbor. I testified before Admiral Hewitt a second time on 22 June, 1945, after his return from examining witnesses at Pearl Harbor. Upon completion of my testimony (in which the "Winds Execute" Message had figured), I asked him, "off-the-record" [9699] If there was still any doubts in his mind as to the "Winds Message" having been sent by Japan and disseminated in the War and Navy Departments. The Admiral looked startled, and before he could reply Sonnett said:

"Of course, I am not conducting the case, and I do not know what Admiral Hewitt has decided, but to me it is very doubtful that the so-called 'Winds Execute' Message was ever sent."

Admiral Hewitt thought a minute or two more, and then said:
"You are not entitled to my opinion, but I will answer your question. There is no evidence of a 'Winds Execute' Message beyond your unsupported testimony. I do not doubt your sincerity, but I believe that you have confused one of the other messages containing the name of a wind with the message you were expecting to receive."

Maybe I ought to go on with paragraph 9.

8. For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. You are reading everything that is on that paper?

Captain SAFFORD. I am reading everything that is on this paper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead.

[9700] Captain SAFFORD (reading):

For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity, but I do believe that Sonnett has succeeded in pulling the wool over his eyes.

9. I also believe that Sonnett employed similar tactics on other witnesses whose testimony had favored Admiral Kimmel, particularly Rochefort and Kramer.

10. Copies of the Memorandum described in paragraph 3 are appended hereto. Also appended is a memorandum to Admiral Hewitt dated 22 June, 1945, clarifying my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and indicating that Sonnett had attempted to trick me into stating the opposite of what I intended to say.

Signed, "L. F. Safford, Captain, U. S. N."

Mr. MURPHY. There are more pages?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement?

Captain SAFFORD. That completes my statement. The other pages appended are copies of the memoranda which were referred to in paragraph 2.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed and read them, read every word of those papers attached to your statement.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

Secret

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R.

[9701] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit me to ask you, is that your memorandum?

Captain SAFFORD. That is my memorandum.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Prepared by you?

Captain SAFFORD. Prepared by me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

Subject: Winds Message.

1. To the best of my knowledge and believe, the following officers knew, in December, 1941, that the Winds "Execute" message had been broadcast from Tokyo on (or about) 4 December, 1941 (and prior to 7 December 1941) although some of them did not learn about it until after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Then I have listed the name, present rank, station, and duty on December 7, 1941, first for the Army, and second for the Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are those names there?

Captain SAFFORD. The names are there, which I will read, if you are interested.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

[9702]	Name	Present Rank	Station and Duty on 7 December 1941
	George C. Marshall.....	General of the Army.....	Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
	Leonard T. Gerow.....	Lt. Gen., U. S. A.....	Director, War Plans Div.
	Dawson Olmstead.....	Maj. Gen., U. S. A. (Ret.)..	Chief Signal Officer.
	Sherman Miles.....	Maj. Gen., U. S. A.....	Director of Military Intelligence.
	Clayton Bissell.....	Maj. Gen., U. S. A.....	War Plans Division (WDGS).
	Otis K. Sadtler.....	Col., U. S. A.....	Army Communications, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
	Rufus S. Bratton.....	Brig. Gen., U. S. A.....	In charge, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence.

I believe I was mistaken. He was only a colonel at the time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the first time you heard of him being a brigadier general?

Captain SAFFORD. I heard he had been promoted. That was my mistake. That is what it should be. [Resumes reading:]

[9702]	Name	Present Rank	Station and Duty on 7 December 1941
	Rex W. Minckler.....	Col., U. S. A.....	Chief of Signal Intelligence, Service, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
	Harold Doud.....	Col., U. S. A.....	In charge, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
	Robert E. Schukraft.....	Col., U. S. A.....	In charge, Intercept Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
[9703]	Frank B. Rowlett.....	Lt Col. (Signal Corps Reserve), U. S. Army.	Principal Cryptanalyst Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
	H. R. Stark.....	Admiral, U. S. Navy.....	Chief of Naval Operations.
	H. E. Ingersoll.....	Admiral, U. S. Navy.....	Asst., Chief of Naval Operations.
	R. K. Turner.....	Vice Adm., U. S. N.....	Director, War Plans Division.
	T. S. Wilkinson.....	Vice Adm., U. S. N.....	Director of Naval Intelligence.
	Leigh Noyes.....	Rear Adm., U. S. N.....	Director of Naval Communications.
	J. R. Beardall.....	Rear Adm., U. S. N.....	Naval Aide to the President.
	J. R. Redman.....	Rear Adm., U. S. N.....	Asst. Director of Naval Communications.
	F. E. Beatty.....	Rear Adm., U. S. N.....	Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.
	L. F. Safford.....	Capt., U. S. N.....	Op-20-G. In charge, Security Section, Naval Communications.
	A. H. McCollum.....	Capt., U. S. N.....	Op-16-F2. In charge, Far Eastern Sect., Naval Intelligence.
	G. W. Welker.....	Capt., U. S. N.....	Op-20-GX. In charge Intercept and Direction Finding Section.
	A. D. Kramer.....	Capt., U. S. N.....	Op-20-GZ. In charge, Translation and Dissemination Section. (Actually attached to Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.)
[9704]	L. W. Parke.....	Comdr., U. S. N.....	Op-20-GY. In charge, Cryptanalytical Section.
	A. A. Murray.....	Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.....	Watch Officer in Op-20-GY.
	H. L. Bryant.....	Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. N.....	Confidential Yeoman in Op-20-GZ.

[9705] Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question? Are those names you read those who are presumed to have seen the winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. Seen or have been told about it; knew about it at the time. Whether they have forgotten it since I have no idea.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You might indicate at this point which ones of these names according to your information actually saw this message that you say was the winds execute.

Senator FERGUSON. Those that were in position to see it or that did see it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That he knows saw it.

Captain, I don't want the report, or anything, but I want your own knowledge as to which ones of these names saw it.

Captain SAFFORD. In this memorandum which I gave Commander Sonnett I only told him which ones knew about the winds message either before December 7 or shortly after.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you don't know of your own knowledge that any one of these persons so named ever actually saw the message?

Mr. KEEFE. Except Kramer, who he has testified gave him the message.

[9706] Mr. RICHARDSON. Wait just a minute—

Captain SAFFORD. So far as direct evidence is concerned I have no knowledge that any of those people saw it. These are turned in as a list of prospective witnesses on the winds code.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You do know that Kramer saw it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the only one.

Captain SAFFORD. And I saw it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. And I sent it to Admiral Noyes and the courier who took it up reported, "Message delivered."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, have you anything further?

Captain SAFFORD. I have a great deal more.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead from where you left off.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel inquire as to whether these exhibits he is now reading were turned over to Commander Sonnett?

Captain SAFFORD. These were all turned over on the days indicated. He talked to me about these things and asked me to write a complete statement to help him and Admiral Hewitt in the subsequent investigation conducted. They were not evidence. These were leads. Off the record and [9707] private examinations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But all given to Sonnett?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; to help him and help Admiral Hewitt.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I wanted.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand that just Kramer and yourself saw this message?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is of his own knowledge.

Captain SAFFORD. That I know from my own knowledge.

Senator LUCAS. McCollum didn't see the message?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no direct knowledge that McCollum ever saw it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in the statement he gives us he said they all had them delivered to them. He is only reading now the memorandum.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes; on this list were people who knew about it, not people who necessarily had copies.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Captain, read from the point you left off.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

2. An element of confusion was caused by the Tokyo weather forecast or "false" winds message intercepted by the FCC at 2200 GCT, 4 December 1941,

and phones to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood during the evening of 4 December 1941. It is believed that certain [9708] officers attached to Op-20-G—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Not quite so fast.

Captain SAFFORD (continuing):

in December 1941 had in mind the "false" winds message when they informed me that they knew of the "winds message". Their names are as follows:

Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.—

Senator LUCAS. Pull the microphone in front of you, please.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R.

Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, U. S. N. R.

Lieutenant F. L. Freeman, U. S. N.

Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N.

The FCC interception of another winds execute message between 0002 and 0035 (GCT), 8 December 1941, proves that the Japanese Government did use this system for broadcasting war warnings.

3. There never has been any doubt in my mind that the winds execute message was broadcast from Tokyo two or three days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and forwarded to the Navy Department. The points in doubt, which I sought to clarify by sighting the incoming Japanese message (or its translation), were: [7909] (a) Exact date [i. e. December 4 (Thursday) or December 5 (Friday) 1941].

(b) Exact wording of the original Japanese broadcast.

(c) Station call, time and frequency of the Japanese Radio Station which broadcast it. (This would reconcile "skip" phenomena.)

(d) Whether received in voice or Morse code.

(e) Station which intercepted the message.

4. After receiving the winds "execute" message I discussed with Lieutenant Commander Welker (Op-20-GX) the advisability of discontinuing the special intercept watches being maintained to pick up the winds "execute". However, only two days previously we had translated Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD #6985) dated 27 November 1941—setting up a system for sending out "Hidden Word Messages" (INGO DENPO) in event of strained relations. Although we expected these would come over regular commercial circuits (as proved the case on the morning of 7 December 1941), we could not be sure, and it seemed advisable to continue the existing set-up which covered all possibilities (even though it meant the operators continuing their doubled-up watches), and required no further orders and no possibility of misunderstanding and confusion. It is my impression that Welker discussed the matter with Captain Schukraft, and [9710] the Army made a similar decision. I have not discussed this with Welker since September 1942 and I have no idea how well he remembers this incident.

5. Somebody must have notified the War Department about the winds "execute" message because Colonel Bratton telephoned to Admiral Noyes and requested a copy of the original Japanese broadcast so that he could verify the translation. (This was customary in highly important intercepts). Admiral Noyes got quite indignant and told Colonel Bratton that the Navy's translation was correct and that the War Department would not be furnished a copy of the original message.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask if you are now speaking of the actual intercept which you claim you saw right there?

Captain SAFFORD. Speaking of what account I could get of the winds message from people in the War Department, and this was not testimony, this was furnished as a lead.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But it referred to your winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

The foregoing incident, if verified by Colonel Bratton, will prove that the winds "execute" got as far as Rear Admiral Noyes and G-2.

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[9711] 6. There is one possible source of information on the winds message which has not been checked, namely—the Australian C. I. Organization. The Australians had a small C. I. Organization and in December 1941 they were intercepting Japanese diplomatic radio traffic and reading messages in the J-19 system. (The Dutch in Java were also reading J-19, as well as the British in Singapore and London and the U. S. Army and Navy in Corregidor and Washington.) The Australian C. I. Unit had liaison with the Singapore C. I. Unit, including exchange of translation and keys, except for the purple and red machines. The winds "set-up" message (Tokyo Circulars #2353 (JD #6875) and #2354 (JD #6850), dated 19 November 1941) were in J-19. Singapore sent translations to Corregidor (CinCAF 281430 (COPEK) to OpNav) and undoubtedly sent these same translations to Australia. The Australians may have intercepted the winds "execute" message on 4 December 1941. If so, this was the basis of Senator Ferguson's "Australian War Warning" which received much publicity in December 1943.

Mr. MURPHY. Read that again, please.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

The Australians may have intercepted the winds "execute" message on 4 December 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

If so, this was the basis of Senator [9712] Ferguson's "Australian War Warning" which received much publicity in December 1943.

Maybe it was 1944.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator Ferguson's Australian war warning?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You heard it the first time.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

This hypothesis could be easily proved or dis-proved.

And remember this is written in July 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire whether or not that was to Australian Minister Dixon?

Captain SAFFORD. That is what I was referring to, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

Captain SAFFORD. I think I have a newspaper clipping of it. That is what I was referring to:

This hypothesis could be easily proved or dis-proved. The following secret message to the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne, is suggested:—

And I have a proposed message from the Secretary of the Navy to that Unit in which they were being asked to contact the Australians and see if the Australians would tell them yes or no. I will quote the message if desired.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Quote it.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

[9713] "From: Secretary of the Navy

"To: Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne

"Referring CINCAF Twentyeight Fourteen Thlrty November Nineteen Fortyone and Tokyo circulars Twentythree Fiftythree and Twentythree Fiftyfour dated Nineteen November same year in JIG Nineteen did Australians intercept or know of such a warning broadcast from Tokyo on or about Four December Nineteen Fortyone X if affirmative forward by airmail certified transcript of broadcast as received with notation as to date X time X frequency X voice or Morse X call letters of transmitting station X location of intercepting station and other relevant data"

7. Lieutenant Colonel Rowlett heard of the winds "execute" by office gossip a day or two before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A few days after the

attack Colonel Sadtler came to him and said, "I would like to see the winds message," or words to that effect. Rowlett referred him to Major Doud, in charge of the section, who in turn referred him to Colonel Minckler, the Chief of SIS. The rest of the story belongs to the Army Investigation rather than the Navy Investigation except for the fact that it furnishes further proof of the authenticity of the winds "execute" message and that some written record of it did exist in the War Department in December 1941.

[9715A] 8. A complete exposition of radio wave propagation would be very lengthy and out of place. It is sufficient to say that the radio frequencies used between Japan and the United States were quite erratic in performance, and that long distance radio communications in an East-West direction are more difficult and less reliable than those in a North-South direction. A few pertinent examples can be given, namely:

(a) The long fourteen (14) part Tokyo Serial #902 (JD-1 #7143) was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. Part Two (of Tokyo Serial #902) and Tokyo Serial #904 (JD-1 #7144) were also copied at Cheltenham, Maryland, and forwarded to the Navy Department and used for the actual decryption. (This is verified in the GY Log for 6 December 1941.) The rest of Tokyo Serial #902 was "uncopyable" at Cheltenham.

I would like to add after the memorandum, outside the memorandum, that that statement was possibly incorrect, but it was my recollection at the time.

(b) Part Two of the very important three-part Tokyo to Berlin #985 (JD-1 #6943) was missed but the first and third parts were copied solid.

I would like to add, this is not in the memorandum, that both Corregidor and England missed, and we only have [9714] the first and third parts here. We received a copy from London as well as a copy from Corregidor.

(c) We finally had to call on Corregidor to cover the Berlin-Tokyo circuits as the combined efforts of intercept stations in the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty (50) percent coverage. During the period 1 December-7 December 1941, the Navy Department received seventy (70) Japanese diplomatic intercepts from Corregidor as compared with seventy-three (73) from Bainbridge Island, twenty (20) for all other U. S. Navy Stations, and ninety-three (93) for all U. S. Army stations. The Japanese were trying to reach Rio and Buenos Aires as well as San Francisco, Mexico City, and Washington. (See distribution of Tokyo Serial #2354). It is not at all surprising that the frequency used to reach Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires skipped over the West Coast and Hawaii. There is a possibility that this frequency was heard in Australia even though it skipped over Manila, Singapore and Java.

I would like to add also, off the memorandum, that this is written many months ago, when I did not have information which I now have.

9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the winds "execute" message may exist—the Record of [9715] Proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the winds "execute" did not slip into the record. First they said I didn't know what was going on around me; now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity, as well as my intelligence and my veracity.

10. In conclusion the following quotation from my secret memorandum to Colonel West, dated 2 October 1944, is submitted for consideration:—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just one moment, Captain. Was there a memorandum that you gave to Colonel West?

Captain SAFFORD. There was a memorandum.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you a copy of that memorandum?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I can find a copy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you produce it so that we may see it, if you can? You don't need to do it now.

Captain SAFFORD. I will later. [Reading:]

"The reason for my stressing the 'winds message' so much in my testimony (in all three cases) is because we could afford to talk about it, even print it in the newspaper, without detriment to the war effort. Even the Dutch knew of the code and the FCC listened for the message. [9716] We had the same information—at the same time—from more secret but less dramatic sources. Also the 'winds set-up' was the nearest thing to a warning CINCPAC ever got. If the 'winds execute' had been heard at Pearl Harbor, the fleet would not have been surprised. And because CINCPAC was given no information that the 'winds execute' had been sent, everybody at Pearl Harbor believed it had not been sent and that the Japs were still making up their minds as to the next step."

Mr. MURPHY. There is still more?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the end of that memorandum on the winds message, which is official and before the investigation given to Mr. Sonnett to help him and Admiral Hewitt get leads for their investigation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What else do you have?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you finished with that statement?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you some other memorandums?

Captain SAFFORD. The other memorandums do not have a bearing on the winds message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me ask you this: You prefaced this reading with a statement that efforts had been made to silence you and influence you. Have you any other record of any kind, manner of description, that shows or tends to [9717] show or relates to any pressure or influence exerted upon you or towards you to get you to change your testimony or give no testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. This has been the only time and it was before the investigation. Not during the investigation. I want to make that very distinct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you have no more to add to what you have read?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, after you wrote that and gave that to Sonnett you were examined before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain SAFFORD. I was examined before Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you were given an opportunity to testify fully and completely on every subject that you wanted to?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you were sworn on that testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. I was sworn on that testimony.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And after the testimony was taken and transcribed, you read it and signed it, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not believe that I ever read it or was given the opportunity to verify it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you ever read it since?

Captain SAFFORD. I have read it since.

[9718] Mr. RICHARDSON. It is correct, is it not, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. It is correct with a few minor errors in typing where they left out some words.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Oh, I see. But generally speaking—

Captain SAFFORD. General speaking it is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON (continuing). It was a correct report?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain—

Mr. KEEFE. May we understand what these other items are that are attached to this so-called exhibit that he has there? He says it does not have reference to the winds code but it may have quite a bearing on this case. They are part of the same exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, tell us—

Captain SAFFORD. Could I explain them?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Tell us as plainly and as completely as you can what the other papers are that you have in your hand in addition to what you have read to the committee?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe there were two conflicting Intelligence reports, one sent on the 26th of November 1941, one was sent from the Fourteenth District at Pearl Harbor and the other from the Sixteenth District at Manila, this concerning the question or the possibility of Japanese carriers in the Mandated Islands. They did not agree.

[9719] This is a long dissertation on that giving my impression or evaluation of it for their benefit. I was also asked to explain what the commandant Sixteenth District meant when he said, "All known first and second fleet carriers." That is the number and their identity.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the contents of the second memorandum after the point where you stopped reading?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then tell us what the next is. Each additional paper that you have in your hand, tell us what it is.

Mr. MURPHY. May we find out how many pages there are on the carriers?

Captain SAFFORD. Six pages.

Mr. MURPHY. You say there are only six between what you read and what you have there in your hand, you mean there are only six pages there?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct. It is that one [indicating].

Mr. MURPHY. Oh, I see.

Captain SAFFORD. It was the one I just read.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, Captain, excuse me.

Captain SAFFORD. On the 5th of December 1941—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, what is this—a memo- [9720]
randum?

Captain SAFFORD. This is the evaluation of the "UTU" broadcasts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This is a memorandum from you?

Captain SAFFORD. It is a memorandum of eight pages from me to Mr. Sonnett.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From you to whom, please?

Captain SAFFORD. To Lieutenant Commander Sonnett.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; give us an idea of what is in it.

Captain SAFFORD. Dated the 19th of May 1941 and it is my evaluation—

Mr. MURPHY. May I just inquire, Mr. Chairman? The six pages on the carriers was also given to Sonnett?

Captain SAFFORD. That was also given to him.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Tell us what these eight pages are that you have before you now?

Captain SAFFORD. On the 5th of December 1941 the commandant Fourteenth Naval District reported to the commandant Sixteenth District and Chief of Naval Operations by a message identified as 052220:

UTU's are being sent by HA FU 6 (Tokyo Radio) [9721] on 32 kilocycles instead of 39 kcs as before—

and there had been a lot of discussion. I explained it all to Mr. Sonnett and then he asked me to give him a complete writeup, as much as I could tell him about it, which I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And what does this relate to now?

Captain SAFFORD. Tokyo normally broadcast messages to the fleet on 39 kilocycles. On the 5th of December 1941 they suddenly discontinued their 39 kilocycles and opened up on 32.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that is what this eight-page memorandum is?

Captain SAFFORD. This is all about what significance that might have had as a war warning or as regards Japanese intentions of a naval war.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, I think that it is important that we go into that for the reason that the Captain in his statement said that the codes were changed on December 4.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. He now says that there was a change on December 5.

Captain SAFFORD. In the broadcasting frequency.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, and the naval narrative says—

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, that is not a correct statement of the witness, that he testified to a change in code. [9722]

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I move that we proceed in order.

Mr. MURPHY. I am taking it from the statement of the witness. So far as I know the witness is now referring to December 5.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. In his statement he refers to December 4.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. And the naval narrative refers to December 1 on the change of signals. I think we ought to have it shown.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you request that this eight-page memorandum be read?

Mr. MURPHY. I request that it be examined over the noon hour by counsel to see whether or not it is of help to the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered. Now, what is the next, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. The final memorandum was a one-page memorandum from myself to Commander Sonnett dated 21 May 1945 concerning the *Tatuta Maru* and the American passenger ship *President Madison*.

The circumstances of that were there had been a lot of, [9723] I believe newspaper talk, possibly something elsewhere, that the Jap-

anese had sent the *Tatuta Maru* over as a kind of a spy, a decoy, and that we had been taken in with it and I just brought out that they had arranged it long in advance, they had clearance from the State Department, that everything was in proper order and that no significance could have attached to this whatever, to this trip of the *Tatuta Maru*, so far as I could see.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, does that complete either a reading or a description of all the papers that you have there before you?

Captain SAFFORD. Those were all that were referenced in this memorandum. I had some additional papers clipped together for convenience, so that they would not get displaced. I will hand them in if you care to have me to.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is that now?

Captain SAFFORD. I had some additional papers clipped to this other bunch for convenience so they would not get displaced.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where are those papers that were clipped? What were they?

Captain SAFFORD. I have a memorandum addressed to Admiral Hewitt dated June 22, 1945, correcting some of my previous testimony before him, where I had slipped and said [9724] things which were not quite correct and I was able to verify it on the spot and turn it in so that my testimony would be corrected.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I think you had better read that memorandum. It was addressed to Admiral Hewitt?

Captain SAFFORD. It was addressed to Admiral Hewitt.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About your testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. About my testimony.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, read it, please, sir.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

SECRET

22 JUNE 1945.

Memorandum for Admiral Hewitt

Subj: Pearl Harbor Investigation.

Ref: (a) My testimony given this date.

1. I now recall that Lieut. Commander Brotherhood told me that he did not receive a written copy of the "False" Winds Message from the F. C. C., but merely received the information by telephone. The only written version of the "False" Winds Message we ever had prior to 1944 was a memorandum of the phone call in Brotherhood's handwriting. Only one significant word (North) appeared and it was in English. It was this memorandum that Kramer threw in the "burn bag" after [9725] telling Brotherhood that this was not what we were looking for.

2. The Winds "Execute" Message which passed through my hands on the morning of 4 December 1941 was a teletype copy (typed on yellow teletype paper) of the entire Japanese broadcast about 200 or 300 words long. Three significant words (Kita, Higashi, and Nishi) appeared and they were in Japanese. Kramer's translation appeared in pencil, or colored crayon, at the bottom of the sheet. There was very little chance of confusion.

3. I would like to make one correction in the testimony I gave today:

"Mr. Phillip Cate, Japanese translator, employed by the Navy Department is still alive. It was his brother, employed as a Japanese translator by the War Department, who died a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor."

Respectfully,

L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. What else is there?

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is the date of that memo?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the 22d of June 1945.

[9726] Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was to Sonnett?

Captain SAFFORD. No, that was to Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Oh, yes, I see.

Captain SAFFORD. That was referring to——

Mr. RICHARDSON. 22d of what?

Captain SAFFORD. June. He will have that with his papers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 22d of June 1945?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes. In going over it afterward I realized that possibly my answers had not been clear or correct in one case, where I had him alive, Cate, and I was simply trying to make minor corrections in the testimony I had given.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think we understand your reasons for the memorandum. Now, what is the next?

Captain SAFFORD. The other, the final one is a memorandum of a conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the State Department on Wednesday, May 30, 1945, and I have a note, "Not given to Admiral Hewitt or Lieutenant Sonnett," but I did discuss it with them and I gave a very, very brief summary of this memorandum, which I believe is contained in the record of the Hewitt investigation.

Mr. Walter Foote was the American Consul General at [9727] Batavia who sent one of the winds code messages and he was in touch with the situation.

When he came back to the United States I talked with him to see if he could recall any further information on the subject. Mr. Foote said that he was positive that the Dutch in Java had not received the execute on the winds message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that is what is covered in that statement?

Captain SAFFORD. No, this is a part of it; that is the substance of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. And it was in the Hewitt report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was a memorandum from you?

Captain SAFFORD. That was a memorandum of me to myself just so I would not forget what Mr. Foote had said on the subject.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was not given to Sonnett or Hewitt?

Captain SAFFORD. It was taken in and they merely asked me to take it and condense it in one paragraph in my testimony, which I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. What else can you think of?

Captain SAFFORD. The other papers here are merely cop- [9728] ies of the various circulars and forms of the winds code to refresh my memory.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "circulars and copies"?

Captain SAFFORD. Tokyo circular 2353, 2354.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just copies of those exhibits?

Captain SAFFORD. Copies of those exhibits.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Anything else?

Captain SAFFORD. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all, all right. Please go on now. Please hand that to counsel so they may examine the part they were requested to examine.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I think this is important and I ask that all of the papers from which the witness read be made an exhibit and that we have an exact copy of those papers.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, all that he read has gone in the transcript of the record.

Mr. MURPHY. All that he read and quoted from here is in the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, counsel has been requested to examine the other parts that he did not read and when he reports to us on that we will be prepared to pass on that question, I imagine.

[9729] Mr. MURPHY. I am just being thorough. I think counsel ought to examine what was read in connection with what we actually heard here and see if we have all of the papers in the record that are in the group.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I do not care, Mr. Chairman, to raise any question that the Captain has read his records correctly. I am perfectly willing to examine them but I do not raise any question but what he read them correctly and the record has all of them in, unless there is a point to the Congressman's point that if these were in an exhibit they would be a little easier of examination by the committee possibly as a unit than to follow it through the transcript.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, probably it might be helpful to have them as exhibits so that we might have them together. You can have it mimeographed for us and furnish it to the committee. Without objection then that will be done.

Now, I would think that the reporter might want to refer to the part that the Captain read because there were a great many names and some Japanese words that most any reporter might have difficulty in getting exactly right, so, Captain, will you please hand them over to counsel?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Counsel will proceed.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question of the Captain? [9730]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Are these some of your personal papers, part of your personal files that you are reading from now?

Captain SAFFORD. This is a part of my personal records which I have made up in connection with these investigations from the beginning.

Senator LUCAS. But do you care to have them at some time returned to you?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not care to have them returned. That is final, I hope.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We hope so, too. All right, counsel may proceed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Our hopes synchronize on that last, Captain.

Two things came to my attention as you read. You have no doubt that the Dutch stations did not get any execute of the winds message.

Captain SAFFORD. I have it from two sources now; an officer who was there serving in liaison with the Dutch and Mr. Foote.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And they both said they did not get it?

Captain SAFFORD. And they both said they did not get it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that station did get the original winds message? [9731]

Captain SAFFORD. They knew about the original message, either got it direct or possibly the British sent it to them or we presumed they got it themselves.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, a second thing that caught my attention was that in one of these documents that you wrote for your own reference you said that the message that came in had the single words "HIGASHI NISHI" and something else. Now, there is no doubt in your mind, is there, that the execute message you saw had the three groups of Japanese words that are contained in 2353, with the exception of the negative being applied to Russia?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. I was trying to clarify the question of misinterpretation of one of those compass directions which were the governing things.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If counsel permits an interruption, the Captain states that in his written statement on page 12.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, in circular 2353 the emergency which gave birth to the desire for the new code, winds code, is recited as "the danger of cutting off of our diplomatic relations and the cutting off of international [9732] communications," is it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would mean, would it not, that the Japanese felt that there might come a time when because of the status of their diplomatic relations and their international communications that they would have to have some new way of communicating and to furnish that new way they invented this so-called winds code?

Captain SAFFORD. This so-called winds code which was to be used there by their broadcasts and not by the commercial telegraph companies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, it is a fact, is it not, Captain, that on the 4th of December all of the methods of communication were open to the Japanese that had been open at any time since the 1st of January 1941, were they not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So there wasn't any reason on the basis of a loss of other methods of communication on December 4th to use this winds code at all, was there?

Captain SAFFORD. There was no reason that you could account for but we had been listening for it from the 28th of November and we had made every effort to get it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, keeping in mind your testimony that the message which Lieutenant Kramer brought to you was in [9733] Japanese and in that message, in the middle of that message were the phrases in Japanese which are used as 1, 2, and 3 and mentioned in circular 2353, keeping that in mind can you point to any record then in existence of which either you or Kramer had any knowledge that interpreted or translated those words as meaning war?

Captain SAFFORD. War was the meaning that we gave it and war was what appeared in the translation, whether justified or not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Except for the written words that Lieutenant Commander Kramer put on this dispatch there is no known writing emanating from Japan or any other source at that time that puts the interpretation on the language "HIGASHI NA KAZEAME" as meaning war with the United States, is there?

Captain SAFFORD. If that word had appeared alone it might have merely meant the breaking off of diplomatic relations, they might have meant nothing else.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, you pay attention to my question. I want to find out whether you can put your finger on any existing authority that up to the time you saw the message interpreted the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" to mean war with the United States?

Now, let me carry it further. The message from the [9734] Commander of the Asiatic Fleet does not so say, does it?

Captain SAFFORD. Not for "Higashi", and so forth.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the message 2353 does not so say, does it?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you did not have the Foote or Thorpe messages available at 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that so far as you know the definition of those words that appeared on that message that morning was the invention of Lieutenant Commander Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. I would not call it that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, it was the act of Lieutenant Commander Kramer.

Captain SAFFORD. I would say that all the higher authority—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, wait a minute, I am speaking about this specific message when it was brought to you by Lieutenant Commander Kramer and I want to know what authority he had, if you know, for translating the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" as meaning war with the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know now what authority he [9735] had for using those words.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. And it was the first time in your whole life up to that point that you had ever seen the word "War" used as a part of the definition of the words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME"?

Captain SAFFORD. In written form, correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. But when this yellow sheet was brought to you with Lieutenant Commander Kramer's notation on it he had written out, as I understand it, "War with the United States" in English?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you sure about that, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. As sure as I can be about anything when I first recorded it in writing at the end of 2 years.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, was that point, Captain, one of the things which you said was very hazy in your mind when you commenced to remembering in the fall of 1943 under your testimony that I have read to you? Was that one of the points that was very hazy in your mind as to just what that interpretation of Lieutenant Commander Kramer read?

Captain SAFFORD. I wanted verification of my memory that he used the actual word "war." That was the only word that I could remember.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you remembered the word "war"?

[9736] Captain SAFFORD. Rather than merely the weaker form, "Relations in danger."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the form "Relations in danger" would be a good deal weaker, wouldn't it, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. It would be very much weaker.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It would be right along the line of the various messages that had been going back and forth for several days, wouldn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, as far as the wording is concerned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew that the Japanese-United States relations were in danger?

Captain SAFFORD. We had known that for 3 months.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, after you saw the message, the yellow message that had the written words on it from Lieutenant Commander Kramer, you sent that to Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. I sent it up to Admiral Noyes exactly as it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And who took it up to Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. One of the officers serving under me, and I cannot be certain who it was. It was probably Lieutenant Howes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Lieutenant who?

Captain SAFFORD. Howes.

[9737] Mr. RICHARDSON. Spell it.

Captain SAFFORD. H-o-w-e-s. The natural presumption would be that Kramer or Morey had taken it up there but both of them said they did not, and I should think their memory on that is better than mine.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then your idea as to who took it up is just a guess on your part at this time?

Captain SAFFORD. I stated in my written statement it was taken up by one of the officers serving under me; I did not take it up myself, and I received a report from him "Message delivered."

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you have no recollection what officer it was?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot be certain which of about five officers, who might have taken it up, actually took it up.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, give us the names of the five officers, one of whom must have taken it up.

Captain SAFFORD. From memory it was Howes—I can give you the initials later—Peterson, Densford, Clark, or White—P. R. White, Paul R. White.

Their names and present stations are:

Commander Robert L. Densford, U. S. N., staff, commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, headquarters Pearl Harbor, Hawaiian Islands.

[9738] Commander William C. Howes, USNR, 142 Southwest Seventeenth Court, Miami, Fla. I believe that he has been demobilized.

Lieutenant Commander Frederick A. Peterson, Jr., USNR, Southborough, Mass. He has also been demobilized.

Commander C. F. Clark, USNR, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

And finally Lieutenant Commander Paul R. White, USNR, who is on duty in Naval Communications in Washington.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it this was a list of the possible persons who might have been the one who took the paper to Admiral Noyes.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, he said, as I understood him, one of those named would have.

Captain SAFFORD. One of those named.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would have had to have taken it to Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. One thing further I neglected to call to your attention in circular 2353 and that is the notation toward the end, "When this is heard, please destroy all code papers."

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are familiar with that?

[9739] Captain SAFFORD. Very definitely; I was familiar with that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, as a matter of fact, Captain, before this message was received there had been a series of messages sent out by Japanese by other methods of communication all over the world directing the destruction of codes?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So there wasn't any reason to use this message on December 4 for that purpose either, was there?

Captain SAFFORD. Not for just the destruction of codes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

Mr. GEARHART. But there was a purpose indicated by you in your original statement, was there not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. The British had destroyed their codes. There were no Japanese codes in London. This is the only way they had of informing the Japanese at London that something was imminent?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, and the same situation existed at Singapore and Hong Kong.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like at this point, in view of the interrogation of the Congressman, to advise the committee that under date of January 31, 1946, we have a memorandum from the War Department reading as follows:

[9740] Pursuant to your request the War Department has made inquiry of the British concerning the number of coded messages sent by the Japanese representatives in London subsequent to December 2, 1941.

The War Department has been informed that two coded messages were sent by the Japanese representatives in London on the 3rd of December 1941 and one coded message on the 5th of December 1941 and one coded message sent on the 6th of December 1941 and all four messages were sent on the code system known as PA-K2—

indicating that coded messages were proceeding to England both before and after December 4.

[9741] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may we request that we have produced the memorandum which the witness acquired 2 weeks ago? If there was information made available to him 2 weeks, I think it should be produced at this time.

Mr. GEARHART. May I inquire of counsel? I am interested in it very, very much. If that is true, as reported by the British, it merely means the British Ambassador had violated the instructions and had not destroyed his codes; isn't that right?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not going into the implication.

Captain SAFFORD. May I explain that?

There were two systems that were exempt from destruction. One was PA-K2, and the other was LA, neither of which were considered by ourselves as secret, and we presumed the Japanese did not consider them secret.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The only point, Captain, involved in it would be there was still a method open to the Japanese to communicate with the British outside of the winds code.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, but not to communicate secretly. I used that word "secretly" in my statement.

Mr. GEARHART. That is the point.

Senator LUCAS. Does the counsel now know what messages went from Japan?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I read everything that the War Department [9742] gave us.

What is the system known as PA-K2?

Captain SAFFORD. That is a minor system which had been in effect for a very long time, and was used for matters of negligible importance, but they presumably wanted to keep up with the newspapers, minor money matters, visas, things like that.

I believe there were only three or four PA-K2 messages that had ever been submitted in evidence before this investigation and that were sent by Pearl Harbor after Pearl Harbor had destroyed its J-19 system, and I do not—I won't go into that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you sure, Captain, that you are correct when you say that important messages were not sent in this code PA-K2?

Captain SAFFORD. Until after Pearl Harbor had destroyed its J-19 system, which really had some security.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me read you from Exhibit 2, page 29, which is a message that went from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6, 1941. It is No. 254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were . . . and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, [9743] 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and air plane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm.

That would be a rather important message, would it not, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, and that message was sent after the Japanese Consulate had destroyed its J-19 system.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, there was in existence, between Honolulu and Tokyo, after the winds code had been promulgated and after the codes had been directed to be destroyed, a method of communicating under PA-K2 that took care of important messages, was there not?

Captain SAFFORD. There was not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was not?

Captain SAFFORD. PA-K2 was specifically exempt from destruction by the orders telling them to destroy the other things.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. It was in existence, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. There was a code of a very low security substantially no better than plain language, which [9744] they had, and could use.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just forget the low security for a moment. The code was in existence, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it was in use, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. It was in use by one man.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, it was in use, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. It was in use at one station.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, we only live once. It was in use by one station, then?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that man at that one station could send in that code to Tokyo?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And he could send important messages to Tokyo?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any reason that London could not send under that code to Tokyo?

Captain SAFFORD. But Tokyo was not sending anything important to London in that code, or to Honolulu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let us not go into that. Let us inquire whether it was possible for London to use that code for communicating with Tokyo.

[9745] Captain SAFFORD. It was physically possible.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, do you see anything particularly exciting in a code that only broadcasts the weather message? Is not that a very low degree of secret information?

Captain SAFFORD. That was set up in what the Japanese considered one of the high security systems, their second level of security.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it is your idea, is it, that the Japanese, in promulgating a weather report, a daily weather report in the ordinary news broadcast, was putting it into their most difficult code in order to convince them that it was an ordinary weather broadcast? Is that your testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. Not at all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, wherein do not we agree?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not follow you, that is all, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What I am interested in is this. It was my idea of the winds code, Captain, that it was to be used to deceive other nations, because the broadcasting of weather information in a news broadcast was relatively unimportant, and by injecting certain key words in that message you could use the humble method of a news broadcast [9746] to convey very important information.

Now, was that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is not correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, all right. Give me your explanation.

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese Government had been sending these news broadcasts to its stations overseas, diplomatic posts, for several months. They were always copied; they knew they could be heard, and therefore if they wanted to send a message not through any commercial channels and be certain it would not be held up by censorship or delayed purposely, as sometimes happens, to be absolutely certain of it, they could include a war warning message or any-

thing else of that nature in one of their own news broadcasts, which they controlled.

They could not afford to send it out in plain language, that "we are going to have war," they had to give it a somewhat disguised form which could be understood when received.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why would they put it in a weather message?

Captain SAFFORD. Because that is merely the form that they happened to choose for it. If we had merely the word "higashi" and the rest of it, and had not had the translation of these messages, we would not have had the slightest idea [9747] what they were talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, the witness has said this could be translated easily, as I understand it, the one sent from Honolulu to Tokyo. I think it is important, since it says:

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm.

I do not see why it could not have been translated before December 8. It is of the utmost importance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I did not get your point.

Mr. MURPHY. It was sent out on the 6th, and not translated until the 8th, and it says

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm.

That was an important message from Honolulu to Tokyo, so why was not it translated before the 8th?

[9748] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, my associate suggests to me that that is an Army translation.

Mr. MURPHY. He said it is easy. It is one of the most important messages.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you can take it up with him.

Now, Captain, will you turn—

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we let counsel proceed in order so as not to interrupt his train of thought.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; I think it is better if counsel proceeds. Go ahead, Counsel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, let me call your attention to document No. 4—3 (d) of Exhibit 142.

Captain SAFFORD. That is what?

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is 3 (d).

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Entitled "Document No. 4."

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, referring back to 2353, what did "West Wind Clear" mean when translated under the Japanese phrase, according to 2353?

Captain SAFFORD. According to the full and correct translation of 2353, it meant Japan-British relations in- [9749] cluding invasion of Thailand and occupation of Malay and the Netherlands East Indies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, turning to document 4, that you have there, have you not, a full admitted execute of the winds message 2353, don't you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the words "West Winds Clear" are repeated twice?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At the end of the document?

Captain SAFFORD. It would appear they were repeated twice in the middle of the document rather than the end.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did that message "Document No. 4"—did that look anything like the message that you saw on the morning of December 7?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; because this was a transcript of a voice broadcast, and what I saw was the Morse broadcast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the only actual execute that we all agree was sent, didn't look anything like the message that Kramer handed to you on the morning of December 4, did it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you have been very much concerned about this wind execute, haven't you, Captain, for a number [9750] of years?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You made a great many inquiries?

Captain SAFFORD. I have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know a single intercepting station on the face of the earth that has ever reported it received a wind-code execute, except the one, document No. 4, that came from Japan on December 8?

Captain SAFFORD. I know of my own personal knowledge that it was received from one of the east-coast intercept stations, and shown to me shortly after 8 or shortly before 9 o'clock on Thursday, December 4, 1941.

At the time I, within a few months, I could have named the station. Later on that detail slipped my memory. I discussed the matter afterward with Welker and we remarked how fortunate it had been that we had made a careful study of the proposition and it seemed that our best chances for interception were on the east coast of the United States rather than the west coast. If we, like the Army, had failed to monitor for it on the east coast of the United States, we never would have received it at all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You have covered that. You said that in some detail. But conceding the correctness of your analysis, that is the only single station on earth that you [9751] claim picked up this execute winds broadcast?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know what provisions the English may have made to monitor for this message in London and whether there were in England any operators capable of copying the Japanese Morse code. They had such operators at Singapore and Singapore was listening for the winds code, but I have been assured by a British officer who was in Singapore at the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, and who later came to Washington, that the British listened in vain for the winds message at Singapore, and when the attack at Pearl Harbor did come, they were just as much surprised as we were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, Captain.

Again I say—we have that in your statement. I repeat my question: Do you know of any station on the face of the earth that has ever reported to anybody, you or anybody else, that they received a wind

execute message prior to the one on December 8 except what you now testify with reference to Cheltenham, the Cheltenham station?

Please answer that question directly, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. None, except Cheltenham station.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are familiar with the documents contained in exhibit 142, are you?

Captain SAFFORD. I am.

[9752] Mr. RICHARDSON. You know that they indicate, in the reports given by the British, that they have intercepted, they found no record of the intercept of a winds execute?

Captain SAFFORD. That is possibly true.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you found out that the Dutch hadn't, when you talked to the representative of the Dutch Government?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let's go into this Cheltenham matter for just a minute. When you testified in the Hart hearing you testified that you didn't know what station in the east got the message, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when you testified before the naval board you testified you didn't know what station got the message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you told the reason why you couldn't find it, didn't you, before the naval board?

Captain SAFFORD. I also told Admiral Hart, but he didn't include it in the record because he thought it was irrelevant.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you said before the naval board that the reason you couldn't get the message was because all the records had been destroyed?

[9753] Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then at the Hewitt hearing, less than a year ago you testified that you didn't know what station got it, but you gave first guess to Cheltenham or Winter Harbor because they had better facilities?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, have you got any record from the Cheltenham station that shows that this wind execute message that came into Washington and came to you from Kramer on the morning of December 4 was ever received at the Cheltenham station?

Captain SAFFORD. There is no existing record because all the intercepted messages for that period have been destroyed and cannot be located in spite of repeated search for more than 2 years now.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you don't know any more about what station intercepted the message today than you did when you started to make up your memory test in the fall of 1942, do you?

Captain SAFFORD. I know a great deal more now.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What more information have you had?

Captain SAFFORD. About 2 weeks ago I was given access, or one of the officers under me was given access and permitted to read the reports from the stations at Winter Harbor, [9754] Maine, and at Cheltenham, Md., for the months of November and December 1941. Where they had been before I don't know. I had requested them 2 years ago and was informed they could not be located. The inter-

cepted messages are still missing. We have nothing but the reports. We did not tell the operators what to listen for. They did not know anything about the winds message. We merely told them to copy everything on the schedules and forward them to us.

The operator who did get the winds message never knew and was never told because we were afraid there would be a leak.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, Captain, what you are telling me is this, if I understand, you are proving conclusively that you have no evidence that the message was ever received at Cheltenham; isn't that the result of it?

Captain SAFFORD. There is——

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not objecting to it. I simply want to know if you have any evidence that Cheltenham got this message.

Captain SAFFORD. There is no evidence in existence now that Cheltenham actually got that message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Then your information as to what station got the message is just as indefinite today [9755] as it was in the fall of 1942 when you started to make up your mind?

Captain SAFFORD. Not at all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What evidence have you discovered?

Captain SAFFORD. We know from the record that——

Mr. RICHARDSON. What record, what record that you have seen and examined?

Captain SAFFORD. That Cheltenham received the order to monitor for these messages.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Agreed.

Captain SAFFORD. That it did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Agreed.

Captain SAFFORD. It could hear them all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Agreed.

Captain SAFFORD. That some were in English, which we weren't interested in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Agreed.

Captain SAFFORD. Others in Japanese Morse code. They were all sent into the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then your point is that since you think Cheltenham could get them all and since you are convinced that this came it must have got this one?

Captain SAFFORD. We also had another thing from Winter Haven which said they had been unable to copy Tokyo or Osaka [9756] communicating with Europe except at rare intervals, which eliminates Winter Harbor. That refreshes my memory and I remembered at the time of Pearl Harbor receiving conditions at Winter Haven were very unsatisfactory. It was on Interior Department land, and we were up against the same thing the Army were with regard to the radars at Pearl Harbor, except this was less important. We could hear the strongest signals but the pine trees, which were higher than the antenna, shielded out the weaker signals, and we couldn't get them.

As a result we gave the easier work to Winter Harbor and the harder work to Cheltenham. Immediately after Pearl Harbor the park system said those trees could be cut down and the receivability increased. So, by the middle of 1943 Winter Harbor was as good

or better than Cheltenham. Winter Harbor had the best of apparatus, but we had this other unfortunate situation. I did not remember in 1943 that it was not until after Pearl Harbor that we had improved the receivability.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What you mean is that when you discovered that it couldn't have been received by Winter Harbor, then you crossed Winter Harbor off?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then that left Cheltenham?

Captain SAFFORD. We—

[9757] Mr. RICHARDSON. Wait a minute. Please answer the question.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you came to Cheltenham, didn't you, in your mind?

Captain SAFFORD. At the same time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, then, you took the position, did you not that Cheltenham could get all the stations because of its location?

Captain SAFFORD. And for—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Please answer my question, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. Not all but certain frequencies at certain times of day.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you felt that this message would come in under one of those frequencies?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And because of that you inferred that since Winter Harbor was out it must have come in through Cheltenham; is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, if it never came to Cheltenham you would be in exactly the same position you are today, wouldn't you?

In other words, Captain—I don't want to misstate you— [9758] you have got to presume that the message was sent out by Japan.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Before you can ever get to Cheltenham?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if you assume that the message was sent out by Japan then you think Cheltenham must have got it because it was on that wave length and because they were properly situated?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, do you suppose that broadcast was intended to go to England?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese themselves, in their own instructions, said that, the literal translation of that message said, smoother up a little, "From JAP to Europe," at such and such a frequency, at the 1330 GC schedule.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What I want to find out is whether the message which you say Cheltenham might have picked up if there was such a message—was that a message started by Japan to go to England?

Captain SAFFORD. By Japan presumably intended for England, but it was broadcast with no address.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it would be rather significant, wouldn't it that England reports to us officially that they [9759] have been unable to find any such message?

Captain SAFFORD. Not necessarily.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Not necessarily, but it would be a strong probability, wouldn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It wouldn't?

Well, we come back, Captain—I want to labor the point so that you can't be misled—the only station that you think could have gotten it was Cheltenham, and you don't know whether it got it or not?

Captain SAFFORD. Or Halifax. They would be in a receiving condition and the Canadians were guarding those Japanese stations the way we were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, don't give me any more stations that couldn't get it, tell me some stations that could.

Captain SAFFORD. Halifax could have got it if they were capable of copying the Japanese Morse code.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You didn't hear anybody suggest that Halifax did get it?

Captain SAFFORD. I never did; and never that they didn't.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I press you again, the only station on which you pin your faith that they received this execute message was Cheltenham; isn't that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. We had two—

[9760] Mr. RICHARDSON. Please answer my question. Wasn't Cheltenham the only station at the conclusion of your evidentiary efforts at which you now assert to the committee this message was received?

Captain SAFFORD. With any degree of confidence, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any other intercepting station in which you didn't have so much confidence that you have any evidence they received it?

Captain SAFFORD. To my recollection I think we told Amagansett, Long Island, to listen for it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did they report—

Captain SAFFORD. And Jupiter, Fla., to guard the schedules and send them in.

[9761] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did they report they found it?

Captain SAFFORD. They were submitting some intercepts of those schedules as they got them. How many they sent I do not know because we didn't attempt to save any of the matter we were not interested in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you suggesting that maybe this message on the morning of December 4 came from either of those station?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't but I have a vague memory that we got a confirmation of it from some secondary station.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me make this suggestion:

Isn't all you know about this winds message, how it came in, the same vague memory?

Captain SAFFORD. It is not a vague memory.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 1:30. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request of the Navy liaison as to the monthly reports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, as to who was the custodian, where

these reports were made to, and whether or not they have been available since 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We have been trying to get them for 2 weeks.

[9762] The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn until 2 o'clock (Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee adjourned until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[9763]

AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything before resuming examination?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel is recognized.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, after you handed this message which Kramer gave to you to an officer whose name you can't be sure of, and which is understandable, to take to Admiral Noyes, you never saw that message again, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I never saw that particular message in that particular form.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, did you—well, wait a minute. What do you mean, you never saw that message in that particular form? Did you see that message in some other form?

Captain SAFFORD. I saw that message in the smooth write-up as a translation with the Japanese eliminated and merely the translation of the code part.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, then, the message that you gave [9764] to Kramer—that you gave to this officer to take up to Admiral Noyes was an approximately 200-word message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All in Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know whether Admiral Noyes could read Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Noyes could not read Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then all he had to go on was what you had to go on, the presence in the dispatch of these words that were set forth in 2353?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the writing of Kramer on the bottom?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, plus—

Mr. RICHARDSON. And—

Captain SAFFORD. May I finish my answer?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Noyes also had a card on his person on which was written the Japanese expressions and their meaning, their translation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that translation that he had on the card was the translation taken from the original winds code message 2353?

[9765] Captain SAFFORD. I presume so. I believe that Kramer prepared the card. I didn't—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I would like to have you, Captain, if you will oblige me, in answering these questions I am going to ask you, to confine yourself to what you know and not what anybody told you or what you have reason to infer.

We will go back to those others later.

Now, did Kramer hand you more than one paper copy of the message?

Captain SAFFORD. Not at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that one copy that he handed to you then was the precise copy which you gave to your officer to take up to Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you never saw that precise paper again?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you make your copies from then?

Captain SAFFORD. Everything that came in by the teletype was in duplicate. There was a whole paper in duplicate with a carbon behind it. The original remained in the role.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But the duplicate wouldn't have Kramer's writing on it, would it?

[9766] Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you made up your smooth copies, did you put on the bottom that Kramer translation?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer made up those smooth copies, not me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make up any copies of it?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. I made up no copies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know of your own knowledge when Kramer made up the copies? Did you see him make them up?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he deliver them to you or expose them to you after he had made them up?

Captain SAFFORD. I saw one copy about noon between 11 and 12 o'clock on the morning of the 4th of December 1941.

I took it for granted—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, wait a minute. Don't let's take anything for granted. You saw a copy?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, that copy that you saw, was it in Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. That was in English.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the copy that you saw was a translation of the whole message?

[9767] Captain SAFFORD. It was a translation of only the part that contained the warning, the hidden warning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did the rest of the 200 words, outside of these three set Japanese phrases, remain in Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. They were disregarded.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They didn't appear in the message you saw?

Captain SAFFORD. They did not appear in the message I saw at noon.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then all you saw in these copies that were circulated with the three code phrases HIGASHI NO KAZEAME—what is the rest of it?

Captain SAFFORD. I will have to look.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will get it. HIGASHI NO KAZEAME, KITANOKAZE KUMORI, and NISHI NO KAZE HARE.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were those three Japanese phrases all there was on the one message that you saw around noon on that day?

Captain SAFFORD. It was the translation—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just answer my question, please. Was there anything on the message that you saw around noon except those three phrases in Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes; there was.

[9768] Mr. RICHARDSON. What else was there?

Captain SAFFORD. There was the identification date of the intercepting station at the time and other things that were customarily put on messages.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I realize that. What, with reference to the substance of the message?

Captain SAFFORD. The translation as to what it meant.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, that translation was in type?

Captain SAFFORD. That was typed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You don't know of your own knowledge who typed it?

Captain SAFFORD. No; I didn't see it typed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did that typed translation say?

Captain SAFFORD. It said the same thing as was said in pencil at the bottom of the other message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it said that the words HIGASHI NO KAZEAME meant war with the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not believe that the words HIGASHI NO KAZEAME appeared. I believe only the translation of what it meant in English. Its meaning. Not the literal translation. The meaning was there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me reform our recollection. You just told me in detail that on the copy you saw were the [9769] three Japanese phrases to which we refer. Now am I to understand you were in error and that all there was on the copy that you saw were the three English phrases which you said were an interpretation of these Japanese phrases?

Captain SAFFORD. I am sorry, I did not understand your question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all right.

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese did not appear there. It merely would have had the expression in the upper left-hand corner in plain language, possibly the winds code, and then would have mention of these three code words; and it was the same wording that had been written in pencil on the bottom of the sheet that was sent up to Admiral Noyes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it is perfectly clear in your mind, is it, that there were no Japanese words on the message that you saw around noon?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the English words that were there were simply the definition of these Japanese phrases; and that definition was given, was it, the same as that written by Kramer on the bottom of the original message you saw?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then there was no part on this message in type with the phrase "War with the United States"?

[9770] Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That copy that you had was one of a number of copies that had been made for circulation?

Captain SAFFORD. It was a flimsy copy and presumably one of a book which had been typed at the same time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is, you mean, at the same time that the copies were prepared for distribution?

Captain SAFFORD. For distribution. We prepared 12 or 14 at one time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when they were distributed, where would they go in the ordinary practice?

Captain SAFFORD. Half would be sent over to the War Department and in the case of important messages they were sent immediately by special courier and the less important messages were sent over in a routine delivery trip which were two or three a day.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where would they go to in the War Department, what division?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe they were sent over to the Japanese section of the Signal Intelligence Service and they took off the file copy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Don't say what they did. They went to that office.

Captain SAFFORD. And they made subsequent delivery to [9771] Military Intelligence, who were responsible for the detailed distribution.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are getting into the realm of supposition. I only asked you where they would send the message. You said, it would go to the War Department. Now, I asked you what division of the War Department it would be; and that would be the Japanese section?

Captain SAFFORD. Of the Signal Intelligence Service. Office of the Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was in charge of that office at that time, if you know?

Captain SAFFORD. Major Doud was in charge of that office. D-o-u-d.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the other copies would be sent to the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. Were sent to the Navy Department. One copy was retained in Commander Kramer's own files, never left there; one copy was given to the naval aide to the President; one copy was given to the naval aide to the Secretary of the Navy; one copy was given to the Director of Naval Intelligence; one copy given or shown to the Director of War Plans, Admiral Turner; and one copy was given to the aide to the Chief of Naval Operations who showed it to both Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Stark. That is the best [9772] distribution that I can give you at the present time from memory. There are written notes to that effect.

[9773] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Captain, all of those officers, how many or few they were, would simply get a sheet of paper

that had on it the phrase, "War with the United States, War with Britain, No War with Russia", in English?

Captain SAFFORD. In English, that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There would be no Japanese words on that copy?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And no human way in which anybody could ascertain whether the interpretation was a correct one or not, would there?

Captain SAFFORD. By no means. Those were only sent up for distribution with translations of other—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, wait a minute, wait a minute. You have just taken a copy. Let us take a particular copy. You have just taken a copy of the message and delivered it to the President's aide, a sheet of paper on which there were three English phrases, one of which was "War with the United States," with no Japanese word on that copy.

Now, will you tell me how Beardall, the aide to the President, or the President could tell whether that language was a correct translation of something or not?

Captain SAFFORD. That sheet had other identifying data on it which I have previously referred to.

[9774] Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Captain SAFFORD. It was sent as one of several translations, all in the same folder. It was taken around by Kramer, who gave it to the naval aide to the President and he stood there to explain anything which was not immediately apparent to Admiral Beardall.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let me interrupt you without any desire to curtail you but to keep my own head clear on it. Was there more than one paper delivered to Beardall under that system?

Captain SAFFORD. All the translations made during the past 24 hours were delivered to him at the same time and all assembled in a folder.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, in what form was Kramer's translation—wait a minute. Was the Kramer translation on a separate sheet?

Captain SAFFORD. Each message was on its own separate sheet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. Well, now, as I understand you, in addition to getting the message there was in connection with it another sheet of paper that had a translation on it, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not understand you, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I don't understand you. Let us [9775] go back and start over. You understood that the message containing the English words we have referred to was delivered to Beardall?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any other paper delivered to Beardall in connection with that message?

Captain SAFFORD. Not in connection with the winds message—wait a minute, I beg your pardon. Do you want me to tell you what I know or what is first-hand evidence?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just what you know. We will get to the other eventually. If I can get clear on it, why, then I can follow you out into the bushes on the other evidence.

Captain SAFFORD. Whenever one message referred to another there was a footnote as to the message referenced and generally a copy of

that message was sent along with it so that they could compare the new and the old and see what was being talked about.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. You will find a consistent record of that in this Exhibit No. 1.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let us start again. Was there more than one sheet of paper with the so-called winds execute English words on it sent to Beardall under the regular practice? That can be answered "Yes" or "No."

[9776] Captain SAFFORD. Under the regular practice, there would be.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what would the extra paper be? Would it be a translation?

Captain SAFFORD. It would be our own copy of Tokyo's circular 2353 which had been previously distributed, or we might merely have a summary or a condensation of that as a footnote on the bottom of the original translation of the message and from my own personal memory I do not know which form Kramer used on that occasion.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then the idea would be that with this group of English words which would be Kramer's translation, something of 2353, either in form or substance, would be sent with that message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would be so that the man who got the message, the message of Kramer's language, could refer back to the original winds code?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct and he would know where he stood.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then I ask you again how could Beardall find out from the message that went to him with Kramer's language on it that it meant that it was an execute of circular 2353 which did not say one single word about war?

[9777] Captain SAFFORD. We were listening for the execute with the expectation of finding in it the Japanese Government's decision as to peace or war with the United States as well as with England and with Russia.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Wait a minute.

Captain SAFFORD. That was thoroughly understood.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, wait a minute, Captain. Will you turn your attention to circular 2353 again? It is in Exhibit 142.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 154 of Exhibit 1.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you tell me what there is in that dispatch which fixed the winds code, which you have testified was the dispatch and the code under which your winds execute message came—will you tell me what there is in that dispatch that entitles you to say you were waiting for a message that reported war with the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. There is nothing in the dispatch as written which specifically states "War with the United States."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there anything in it that implies war with the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. There certainly is.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What? What is it? What language implies war with the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. For one thing there is instruction to [9778] destroy all code papers. If that is regarded as synonymous with the outbreak of war, as I have heard testified before in this room, that by itself means something more than the wording in these three paragraphs above.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you had had a number of dispatches with reference to burning of codes and this Government, your own Government, had sent out a number of dispatches with reference to burning of codes before the morning of the 4th, hadn't they?

Captain SAFFORD. The warnings from—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now you can answer my question "Yes" or "No."

Captain SAFFORD. That question cannot be answered by a plain "Yes" or "No."

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, go ahead. I think it can; but I will take your explanation.

Captain SAFFORD. Tokyo had sent out instructions to various people telling them to burn their most important codes but to leave two codes open. One was the so-called PA-K2 code and the other was the LA code. Now, with those two exceptions all codes had been burnt, but this said, "Please destroy all code papers," and so forth. In other words, there were no exceptions in this one.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it is that phrase which led you to [9779] believe that when you got an execute message that said "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" you could safely interpret it as meaning "war with the United States"?

Captain SAFFORD. There was much beyond what appears in this paper that led to our interpretation of it in that way.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the men who were getting a copy of that dispatch with this dispatch wouldn't have your imagination as to what it meant. How would he find out what it meant?

Captain SAFFORD. The Navy Department had been very jittery about whether by any chance this winds execute might have been sent out before the 28th, when we began listening for it. I have been questioned on that repeatedly. They were also very much worried about the fear that with all the stations which were known to be listening for it, by some freak chance we might fail to catch it and the reason for that was everyone in authority from the President down believed that this would be the Japanese Government's decision as to peace or war announced to their own officials overseas and that was our chance of a tip-off, to gain the necessary time to prevent a surprise attack on our fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, did it ever occur to you that you are taking in an elastic authority when you quote what the President understood and and every other important official [9780] down? Was there any official in the Government, from the President down, that had any basis, sir, for the interpretation of this message 2353 except what the message 2353 said?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know the basis on which they made their evaluation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, will you take a look again at Exhibit 142 and turn over to the dispatch from the commander in chief of the Army forces in the Pacific under date of November 13, 1945? There seems to be no page number. It is under 4-A. Have you the one of November 13th?

Captain SAFFORD. I have BSG 196. Is that the one?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. Now, from your experience in this message and intelligence work wouldn't you construe that message from MacArthur as indicating that the Japanese never sent out an implementing message?

Captain SAFFORD. I would not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why not?

Captain SAFFORD. It says here:

Interrogation of authorities so far has resulted in absolute denial of transmission of such an implementing message and existence of any prearranged instructions which would permit transmission of such an implementing signal.

In other words, the Japanese authorities denied ever [9781] having sent Tokyo circular 2353 and 2354.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. You find from that, do you, evidence that they did send out the execute?

Captain SAFFORD. I find evidence from that that they had denied everything.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. And also that they burned all pertinent records prior to August 14, 1945.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right; we will take the Japanese at any sort of an estimate you want, but insofar as that message refers to an execute winds message they deny having sent it, don't they?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese deny having sent it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, turning over to the dispatch from MacArthur of November 21, how do you interpret the language used:

That signal implementing circular 2353 and 2354, was probably not transmitted prior to 8 December, Tokyo time, but was transmitted by radio voice broadcast at some hour after 0230, 8 December, Tokyo time. Exact hour unknown.

How would you interpret that language?

Captain SAFFORD. That they had not found anybody who knew it or admitted it but MacArthur was not certain and, [9782] therefore, he said "probably" "probably not then transmitted."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, we have got on the antiexecute side the word "probably," haven't we?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, lower in the message there is another reference there to information from another employee that he did hear an execute message under date of December 8.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, turn over to the dispatch of the 24th, the next following, the language reading:

Only use of Winds code (either voice or radio telegraph) shown here by available contemporaneous records is voice broadcast from Tokyo between 0902 and 0935 on 8 December.

That also indicates that the response from the Japanese records further was negative on this execute, doesn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not agree with that, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. What does it indicate?

Captain SAFFORD. That was from the War Department to General MacArthur.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That does not spoil it, does it?

Captain SAFFORD. And they were referring to the FCC monitoring records and the FCC were only monitoring voice, [9783] and the winds message intercepted by the Navy came in Morse code.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, it shows that there was a message, however, that was sent on December 8.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, go on over to the one of the 27th from MacArthur where he says that:

Persons who conducted interrogation had no knowledge that prior to interrogation United States had information establishing use of Winds code on 8 December Tokyo time.

Making it certain that the people who were doing the interrogating did not know what they did it for would be important, wouldn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, turn over now to the document entitled, "U. S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan," one or two pages following the one I just read from. Do you have that before you?

Captain SAFFORD. I have that before me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, look at the last paragraph on that page, where the person making the document says:

He stated that he would have known of it if a message such as that described as being broadcast December [9784] 4 had been transmitted and that he had no recollection at all of any "east wind rain" report or any similar phrase being broadcast prior to December 8.

That would also indicate that they did not know out there if this man was telling the truth that there had been any winds execute message until December 8, doesn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. I would not consider that conclusive.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is quite pertinently suggestive, though, isn't it, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. From one point of view; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, following 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4, when did you see McCollum?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot state any specific time that I saw McCollum in 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you go to him with a message that you had prepared suggestive of one that should be sent to the field?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had nothing to do then with a so-called McCollum message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct; except for seeing it.

[9785] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now Brotherhood was one of your watch officers?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If there was an execute message that came in on the morning of December 4, Brotherhood would naturally know about it, would not he?

Captain SAFFORD. Not in the morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Beg pardon?

Captain SAFFORD. Not in the morning of December 4.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would he naturally know about it during the day?

Captain SAFFORD. If it came in on his watch he would have known about it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, what was his watch?

Captain SAFFORD. He was on watch from 4 p. m. to midnight on the 3d and from 4 p. m. to midnight on the 4th of December 1941. That is established from an official record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now all of those watch officers were on edge to pick up this winds execute, weren't they?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that message coming in, as it did, at 8 o'clock, Captain, on the morning of December 4, was the most important piece of business transacted in that [9786] office that morning, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. I will go further and say it was the most important piece of business transacted up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Then don't you think it quite reasonable that as soon as Brotherhood came into the office at 4 o'clock for his watch, that someone there would tell him that the great day had come, that the execute was there and they all knew about it?

Captain SAFFORD. It has been my impression all along that Brotherhood did know it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. You know now, don't you, that he, under oath, testified that he never heard anything about the winds execute message in the office there on December 4?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you know also that on the evening of December 4 he, as one of your watch officers, was telephoning to the Federal Communications Commission to find out if they had located any piece of an execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. No, it was just the reverse.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. They phoned him?

Captain SAFFORD. And said they had one.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They knew that he was looking for one?

[9787] Captain SAFFORD. They had been requested if anything came in to call up certain telephone numbers, including the GY watch officer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, he certainly told them just as soon as they phoned him that the stuff was all off and you had the message?

Captain SAFFORD. We were telling the FCC nothing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was not because nothing had happened, was it, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. We did not tell the station at Cheltenham that we had intercepted anything we wanted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have before me, Captain, under Exhibit 142-A, a copy of the log, if you may call it that, of the FCC on the 4th day of December. Under item 6—

Captain SAFFORD. I haven't gotten to it yet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you got a copy that you can lay in front of the captain?

Captain SAFFORD. I have got it. What was that date?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will get it for you.

Captain SAFFORD. December 6?

Mr. RICHARDSON. December 4. Item 6, reading as follows:

9: 05 p. m. Lieutenant Brotherhood 20-G Watch Officer, Navy Department, telephoned to state that he was authorized [9788] to accept message in question. Gave Lieutenant Brotherhood the message from Mr. Carter.

Going back to No. 2 is a notation:

8: 12 p. m. received a message from Mr. Carter at Portland, Oregon.

Now you know, don't you, Captain, that the message that was received from Carter was one of these false winds messages?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, a true weather report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So Brotherhood was telephoning the Communications Commission about that message, wasn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. No, they told him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now just let us look—

Captain SAFFORD (interposing). Let me read 5 first, please.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

8: 45 p. m. called ONI Watch Officer at Navy Department to ascertain if he was permitted to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office. The officer in charge stated that he was not certain, but that he would inquire and call back.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Read the next one.

Captain SAFFORD. That was standard practice, to check up to be certain we did not get pulled in by some unauthorized [9789] person.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, read the next one.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

9: 05 p. m. Lieutenant Brotherhood 20-G Watch Officer, Navy Department, telephoned to state—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Telephoned whom?

Captain SAFFORD. He telephoned the FCC.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

—to state that he was authorized to accept message in question. Gave Lieutenant Brotherhood the message from Mr. Carter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now read No. 7.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

9: 32 p. m. Lieutenant Brotherhood called to inquire if any other reference to weather was made previously in program intercepted by Portland. Informed him no other reference was made.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would rather throw some light on your suggestion that Brotherhood did not telephone the FCC, wouldn't it, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. Brotherhood called back for a verification and check-up to see if he had the whole story; that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now if a copy of this alleged winds execute message that you said came in went to the War Department, you would expect that Colonel Bratton would see it, [9790] wouldn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I would expect they would all see it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You would expect Colonel Bratton, from his position as Chief of Staff, to see it, wouldn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I would.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then would it be a matter of surprise to you that Colonel Bratton was telephoning the FCC at 7:50 p. m. on the 5th day of December trying to find out if there had been any receipt of any winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. I would not expect such a thing as that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the only inference that you, with your experience, could draw from such a telephone, Captain, would be that Bratton did not know there had been any winds execute message received 56 hours before, or 36 hours before? That would be your inference, wouldn't it?

Let me turn it around. I don't want to confuse you. There would be no reason for Bratton telephoning to find out something that he already knew, would there?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

[9791] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, let us pursue this question of when this elusive document appeared a little further.

Did you testify, Captain, in the Hart hearing, at page 361, that the winds message was received while Lieutenant Brotherhood was on watch on December 3?

Captain SAFFORD. I did, and that statement was incorrect.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You did not correct it because you found out later that Lieutenant Brotherhood denied that he ever saw any such message, did you, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. I did that because that was the best information that was available to me at that time as to the exact time and date at which the winds message had been broadcast, which turned out to be incorrect.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, you were advised, after you testified in the Hart hearing, that Brotherhood did deny that any winds execute message ever came in to him, were you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Not as such. I was informed afterward, that what Brotherhood had seen was this so-called false winds message which had been telephoned over by the FCC.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Precisely, the only message that Brotherhood had any knowledge of, was one of these false winds code messages, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Apparently.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did it ever occur to you that that was the only message that ever came in there on the 4th, and that you were mistaken?

Captain SAFFORD. This is only about the 20th time such suggestion has been made to me, but I saw the winds message myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I understand that, but you first saw it on December 3, and then you saw it on December 4.

Captain SAFFORD. Oh, no.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Wait a minute. I believe you testified that it came in on Brotherhood's watch, and then you testified it did not come in on Brotherhood's watch, and then you said you did not know what station it had come in on, and then you testified it came in from the Cheltenham station, so consequently most of the things relating to the message, except the fact that it came in, are rather sadly messed, aren't they, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not consider it so at all. I thought my testimony was fairly consistent.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, let us go a little further with it. You testified, [9793] did you not, that when you went back to try and find out what the facts were, you found that these copies that should have been around in the various departments were all missing.

You did so find, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. We only expected one—we could only count on one department in all these departments for it to be in existence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And they were all missing, weren't they?

Captain SAFFORD. They were missing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Then you had a conversation, you testified, with Brotherhood in which you said that Brotherhood said, "I know what became of the copies, but I won't tell you," and then were not you pressed later in the Hewitt investigation, and did not you testify that Friedman, who had been a cryptologist, whom you knew, had told you that a Colonel Bissell had said to him, Friedman, that he had destroyed all of these copies under the direct order of Gen. George C. Marshall? Did not you so testify?

Captain SAFFORD. I would like that question repeated.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Read it to him, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain SAFFORD. May I be informed of the page that [9794] is on in the Hewitt report?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, let's see. It appears several times. You won't have any trouble finding it.

Mr. MURPHY. Page 114 of the Hewitt report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Look at page 114 of the Hewitt report, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. May I read from this report about half that page?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Beg pardon?

Captain SAFFORD. May I read from that report into this record?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

Admiral HEWITT. Then you have no information that the Army ever got copies of the winds message relating to the United States to which you testified?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no information which will be acceptable as evidence before this court. I heard the story, and I believe it true, but it is very third-hand.

Admiral HEWITT. The information that you have, even though second or third-hand, may be of assistance in furnishing a lead. Will you tell us your information?

It does not show in the record, but I believe I was asked that about three times before I made my answer.

[9795] Captain SAFFORD. The information that I got was that written copies of the winds message had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall.

Admiral HEWITT. You do not recall the direct source of that information?

Captain SAFFORD. I would prefer not to give the direct source, but I think it may be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the Army Investigation.

The question first asked me, the original question, with the statement that I had made charges against General Marshall, may I state

that I was testifying in secret before a Navy court, and the evidence was all marked "top secret," was not to be made public.

I was asked to give a lead to assist Admiral Hewitt. I was pressed for an answer, and I reluctantly gave it. I was not testifying in a public hearing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well now, Captain, let us orient this just a little. You did have a talk with Brotherhood about what had become of these copies, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. No; I wrote to him. He was out in—

Mr. RICHARDSON (interposing). Wait a minute. Before you wrote to him, you had a talk with him, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Not about the copies.

[9796] Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you write to him about the copies?

Captain SAFFORD. Brotherhood had told me it had come in on his watch. He verified that. Then I wrote him, "Do you know what became of the copies?"

Mr. RICHARDSON. Wait a minute, Captain. Did you ever testify in any hearing anywhere that Brotherhood told you that the winds execute message had come in on his watch? If so, give me the page where you so testified.

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that is in the Hart report on page 361, which you have just quoted from.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I was quoting from the Hewitt report.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

The winds message was received in the Navy Department during the night of December—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Wait a minute until I find it. Page 361?

Captain SAFFORD. Near the middle.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

The winds message was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Read the rest of it.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message meant, because it came [9797] in a different form from what was anticipated.

Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer who came down that evening and identified that message as the winds message we had been looking for.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Captain, it would be pretty hard for him to come down that evening when the message came in the next morning, would it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You refer to that as an error that you made in fixing the time about when the message came?

Captain SAFFORD. The time of the officer on watch when the message came in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you take that testimony there as the basis for your claim that Brotherhood told you a real, genuine execute message came in on his watch?

Captain SAFFORD. I never used such explicit terms with him. I merely said the winds message he told me had come in on his watch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, after that you had some talk with him about what became of these copies, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I wrote him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And he told you, as I recall the testimony—I can find it, but I haven't been able to [9798] just this minute—he told you that he knew but would not tell you?

Captain SAFFORD. That he would not tell me now.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Page 113 of the Hewitt report is what you are looking for.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me see it.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right in the middle of the page.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Oh, yes.

Now, let us take the exact language here on page 113 of the Hewitt report. You are right, Captain, when you say this:

I wrote him a letter about the thing because that was looked for throughout a period of six months repeatedly. Various people looked for it in the Army and finally couldn't find it, and I asked him if he knew anything about it. He said yes, but he did not care to tell me about it then; but when he came back to the States, I asked him about it and found out he hadn't understood. We were working at cross-purposes. I found out that he was referring to the false "winds" message, which we had thrown in the wastebasket.

[9799] Mr. RICHARDSON. So it was the false winds message that Brotherhood was talking about when he mentioned the winds execute message that came in on his watch?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes; but we only called it the winds message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now this story that you told in secret—and, Captain, I am not criticizing you for telling it in secret, because all of those hearings were secret and had to be—but the story you told here that Friedman had told you that the messages had been destroyed by Colonel Bissell under the direction of General Marshall—

Captain SAFFORD (interposing). That is the way I got the story and remembered it. I did not write it down.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you said you thought it was true?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, you know, later, do you not, Captain, that Mr. Friedman denied having made any such statement to either you or anybody else—you know that, don't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know that he denied it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you know that Colonel Bissell also, in sworn testimony, before Admiral Hewitt, or before Colonel Clarke in the Clarke investigation, denied having [9800] destroyed any records?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know that until this moment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean Clarke or Hart?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I mean Clarke.

Senator FERGUSON. General Clark?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel Clarke.

You don't now believe it, do you, Captain?

Senator LUCAS. What was the last question?

Mr. RICHARDSON. You don't now believe that Bissell destroyed any copies under the direction of General Marshall, do you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is another question which I prefer not to answer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, let me call your attention to page 114 of the Hewitt investigation, and let me ask you whether this question was asked you, Captain:

Admiral HEWITT. Then you have no information that the Army ever got copies of the winds message relating to the United States to which you testified?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no information which would be acceptable as evidence before this court. I heard the [9801] story and believe it true, but it is very third-hand.

Then followed the testimony:

The information that I got was that written copies of the winds message had been destroyed in the War Department by Colonel Bissell under the direct order of General Marshall.

That is what we have been talking about?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, there is another thing that I would like to have you explain, Captain.

On page 361 of the Hart testimony, you testified that the execute message came in full form of words in accord with the original winds message just as you testified. That is your recollection?

Captain SAFFORD. That is from my own recollection and nobody else.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, then, before the naval board, at page 746, you testified—did you not?—that the message came in in the Jap language and had a full translation on it into English when you first saw it. Now, by that you mean simply that those Japanese phrases had been translated into English?

Captain SAFFORD. May I see it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Page 746.

[9802] Captain SAFFORD. I meant by that, and I thought it was clear:

The translation consisted of the words which I quoted in my answer, namely, war with America; war with England, and peace with Russia, to the best of my recollection after almost three years.

The only part of that message which was translated was the winds code words. The rest was a pure Japanese broadcast of news of no importance at all to us.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you, Captain, familiar with the testimony of Lieutenant Kramer, or Commander Kramer, in the naval court of inquiry?

Captain SAFFORD. Only in a general way.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You know, do you not, Captain, that Kramer testified that he never would have gathered the winds execute message, if received, to mean war?

Captain SAFFORD. You were quoting from that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I give you pages 968 and 969 in Kramer's testimony before the naval court, and I am wondering whether you were familiar with the fact that Kramer took the position that the winds message, under code 2353, would not mean war, the winds execute message?

[9803] Captain SAFFORD. Kramer left the United States, I believe, in the spring of 1943, and did not return until, I believe, the spring of 1945, or possibly late in 1944; I am not certain. I had no idea what Kramer's answer had been, and I am giving the translation of the winds message from my memory and nobody else's.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Captain, you did get some command from Admiral Noyes, after you sent up the message to Noyes—you did get a report through Brotherhood, did you not, that Noyes complained that the message he got "showed the wind blowing from a strange direction"?

Captain SAFFORD. That was not sent up to Admiral Noyes. That was telephoned to him in the night.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He did not have the actual physical message before him then when he made that remark?

Captain SAFFORD. He received nothing but a phone call from Brotherhood, and he immediately spotted it was the wrong thing and made that remark; and I asked Brotherhood the next time I saw him, "Why did you call the admiral?"

And he said, "I had written orders; and remember what you told me when you first came to duty here—that no watch officer was ever given a court martial for calling the captain in the middle of the night," or words to that effect.

[9804] Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, Captain. Did you consider that a reasonable order?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not understand.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you read the captain's previous answer, Mr. Reporter?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Captain SAFFORD. What I meant was that Brotherhood knew it was a false alarm, but was taking no chances and was calling Admiral Noyes as per orders, and he did the correct thing, and I complimented him for it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, you have no doubt, have you, that all of these copies that were sent out to be distributed were distributed in the regular order to the people who should have received them?

Captain SAFFORD. I have not, or I had no reason for doubting it.

[9805] Mr. RICHARDSON. And there should be in the files of those respective departments the one copy of that message which they are supposed to keep?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when you investigated you found that none of the files had any copy?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Including your own files in your own office?

Captain SAFFORD. There was only one other file in which it could be expected and that was in the War Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, then, in order to completely erase that order from the entire Military Establishment in Washing-

ton, there would first have to be deleted from the file the copy that went to Beardall in the White House, would not there?

Captain SAFFORD. No, because that was taken back and destroyed as a matter of routine within probably 24 hours.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And nothing was left with him?

Captain SAFFORD. Nothing was left with him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. You would expect him to remember the message, would not you?

Captain SAFFORD. I would expect him to remember the message; yes.

[9806] Mr. RICHARDSON. So that if the message was destroyed he should remember that he saw it regardless of the destruction, should not he? Keep in mind, Captain, that this message, according to you, meant war. Can you think of anything that would fix a man's mind more than such a message as that?

Captain SAFFORD. He should have remembered it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the President should have been very interested in it, should not he?

Captain SAFFORD. He should have been. I think he was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, then, someone would have had to have gone into the office in the War Department and filched the copy there and destroyed it, would not he?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And someone would have to go in the Navy Department office where a file copy was kept and destroy the copy there?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And somebody must have gone into your office and destroyed the copy there?

Captain SAFFORD. I had no personal copy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was not there a copy kept in your section?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer was the sole custodian.

[9807] Mr. RICHARDSON. Where would he keep it? In his pocket?

Captain SAFFORD. In his safe.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then somebody would have to get into Kramer's safe to destroy his copy?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, who was in charge of the files in the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. These magic or intercepts, Kramer was in charge of them. I was indirectly responsible up to the 15th of February 1942. The actual custodian was Lieutenant Commander Harrison, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was that last statement?

Captain SAFFORD. The actual custodian was Lieutenant Commander Harrison, U. S. Naval Reserve. He had the physical custody.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, do you think that there was a general conspiracy running from the White House through the War Department and Navy Department and through Kramer's section to destroy these copies?

Captain SAFFORD. I have never indicated the White House at any time in my testimony.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, do you think there was an conspiracy between the Navy Department and War Department [9808] to destroy these copies?

Captain SAFFORD. There is an appearance of it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And whom do you suspect as individuals who took part in that conspiracy?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no first-hand knowledge.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All you have is a suspicion?

Captain SAFFORD. I have more than that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, let us have your knowledge, let us have you tell this committee in words of one syllable what evidence you have that any human being in Washington sought to destroy official copies in the military department.

Captain SAFFORD. Messages have been known to be mislaid, but we always, as a matter of policy from the very beginning, kept a file copy of the original incoming message, we kept a copy of all our codes and we could prepare a new message at will. When I began working on the winds message I was much more interested in the intercept form of it than I was in its translation. We were requested first and I think finally we were permitted to search ourselves through the files of intercepted messages in the custody of OP-20-GX, that is the intercepting direction finder station of the Navy Department, and not only was there no copy of the winds message but there was no copy of any intercepted messages from any of our east coast stations for the month [9809] of December 1941, and possibly other times. That search was made repeatedly. The men in charge did not know that these were missing, they had no record of it being missing, they had no authority for destruction and no record of destruction.

When that became known Capt. E. E. Stone, who was in charge of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit at that time and is now Rear Admiral Stone and Director of Naval Communications, immediately called for written statements from everybody concerned, to see what could be found out about it, and nothing showed up.

They had simply evaporated from the face of the earth. They were gone, and no records of them.

It was an unwritten law in that section that we retain the original intercept forever, because we could never tell when it would be useful or how many years we might want to go back to verify something. At the time I turned over the section some of our logs were running back, without missing, as far as 1925. Then we tried to find the orders which had gone out, and there was no trace of the original teletype orders to either Cheltenham or to Bainbridge Island, that we had ever told them to do anything about trying to monitor for the winds message.

[9810] They did find the reports as well as the intercepted messages from Bainbridge Island and that told us the whole story. They were intact and the monthly report acknowledged the orders to monitor the message and told exactly what they had done toward it, as appears in my written statement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But they didn't report at Bainbridge that they had any winds execute message, did they?

Captain SAFFORD. Because they did not know what they were looking for but their message reports, when we finally checked them over

in January 1946—I don't mean the messages—not only the messages but also in their reports it showed specifically that they had monitored every one of those schedules given them and had not been able to hear the message on December 4, or practically on any other day. They were listening for them but did not hear them. We got that distinct negative information. They attempted to hear the message but didn't get anything.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, I don't want to burden you any further—

Captain SAFFORD. May I add this—

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. Then I tried to find out what the Army had done in the line of monitoring for the winds message. [9811] Captain Schukraft at that time was in India—or abroad somewhere.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, just a moment. Are you under the impression that there is any doubt that the monitoring admonition went out? We were talking about whether the execute message came in. I am wondering what the connection is.

Captain SAFFORD. The Army tried to check through their records to see what kind of instructions had gone out and that was completely gone. There was no record in the War Department, in other words, except for the hazy memory of one or two individuals, that the Army had made an attempt to monitor the winds message at all anywhere, although later I believe Captain Schukraft did state they had monitored for it at San Francisco. I was trying to confirm the fact which is my memory after several years that the Army had made no attempt to listen for the winds message on the east coast of the United States. It was important to me where they had not monitored for it rather than where they did.

Those letters had disappeared without trace. It was not only the winds message itself; it was everything connected with the winds message which had disappeared.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, you commenced in the [9812] fall of 1943 to collect your thoughts and information on the subject of this wind execute message, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. And other matters associated with it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You have continued that down to the present time?

Captain SAFFORD. Intermittently; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You filed this written statement which you read to the committee on the subject, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, it is a fact, isn't it, Captain, that every single witness who has testified on the winds code, on the subject of having received or seen a wind execute message, testifies that they never saw one; isn't that a fact? Every single one of them.

Captain SAFFORD. Do you mean before this committee or other investigations?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I mean before any investigating committee, including this one.

Captain SAFFORD. I don't think it is as complete as "everyone."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you think of one individual today that has not under oath testified that he never saw a wind execute message with

the exception of the one that came in [9813] on the 7th or 8th which all agree upon?

Captain SAFFORD. I think that Admiral Ingersoll for one has testified that he saw the wind message and it meant war with the United States. I think he gave that testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Doesn't Admiral Ingersoll's testimony specifically say that he doesn't remember whether he saw a written execute message before December 7 or after; isn't that what he testified to?

Captain SAFFORD. He also testified to that. He wasn't certain as to the date but he saw it and it was in writing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, there was a wind execute message came in on the 8th?

Saptain SAFFORD. Yes; but it was not in writing in the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It eventually was in writing, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; in the summer of 1944.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We have it here in the exhibit in writing, don't we?

Captain SAFFORD. May I see it, please?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. I read it to you this morning and showed it to you. I refer to the message 3 (d) which I read this morning and which you identified this morning [9814] as having been the message of December 8 out of Tokyo.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Have I been asked a question, or what?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I asked you this morning to look at 3 (d) and called your attention to the form of that message.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To point out to you that that was a very different looking message from the one you described of December 4.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the admonition at the bottom discloses that was a message of December 8, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It meant war with England?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the point that I make with reference to it is that there was, and everybody admits there was and almost every station took it as it came in, an execute message on the 8th of December, so that when you say that Admiral Ingersoll admitted that he saw a wind execute message, I ask you whether he didn't testify that he didn't remember whether he saw one before or after December 7, so it may have been this message that he saw.

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Ingersoll could not possibly [9815] have seen that message on, before, or shortly after December 7, 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why not?

Captain SAFFORD. This page 3 which precedes—sheet 3 which precedes 3 (d), the certificate from the Federal Communications Commission dated August 18, 1944, and signed by T. J. Slowie, secretary, states in part:

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG-4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035

GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8:00 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission and I am the proper custodian of the same.

That was a telephoned message to the War Department and no written copy of this was received in the Navy Department prior to August 18, 1944.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in Exhibit 1 at page 251 it is shown dated December 7, translated by the Navy December 7:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

[9816] Captain SAFFORD. That is a different one.

Mr. MURPHY. There is an execute on the 7th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were there two executes on December—

Captain SAFFORD. That was in the so-called hidden word code.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Now, Captain, let me ask you this question: Why do you think anybody wanted to destroy the wind execute message that came in as you say on December 4?

Captain SAFFORD. Because that was the unheeded warning of war.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, everybody in the Military Establishment in Washington was looking for war, weren't they?

Captain SAFFORD. That question cannot be given a simple answer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you can't answer it simply, was there any doubt generally in the minds of the people, the heads, the high command and the Military Establishment, that we were heading for a war with Japan?

Captain SAFFORD. There was considerable doubt in the high command of the Navy Department, at least, that war with Japan would commence in early December 1941. Eventually, yes; but not at that particular time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. And nothing on earth was [9817] of more interest to them than to try and find out when that would be?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct. That is the reason we had all the pressure put on us to monitor, to intercept that wind message if it were humanly possible to get it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you believe, do you not, that everyone of the officers in a subordinate capacity and in the high command were anxious to find out when and where war would begin?

Captain SAFFORD. And also against whom.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

[9818] Now, why would anyone want to fail to make use of a wind execute message that meant war, just the minute it came in? What motive would they have in doing it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is a question that has puzzled me for 4 years. I have no logical answer to it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The reason that it wasn't used is because it is diametrically contrary to the theory you have got in your head that there was a winds execute message on December 4, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. By no means.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Don't you think, Captain, with your long experience in the Navy, that there were a hundred officers in the military

establishments that would be anxious to get their hands on a winds execute message that meant war on December 4?

Captain SAFFORD. I would doubt if more than 20 officers in both the Army and Navy ever knew about the winds message at the time it was sent or immediately thereafter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you think seriously, Captain, that any of those 20 would secrete, delete, purloin, destroy, cover up that message so that our people here and our people on the Pacific front wouldn't know that Japan was about to commence war; is that your belief?

[9819] Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, why would anybody want to press the veil of secrecy, destruction, on this wind execute message that you say came on the 4th of December, why would they?

Captain SAFFORD. It is human to try to cover up mistakes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, what was the mistake that was made with reference to that message?

Captain SAFFORD. The fact that no war warning was ever sent. The fact that an attempted war warning in the Navy Department was suppressed by higher authority and that the War Department didn't even attempt to get a war warning out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it is your idea that, with a message in the hands of the officers of the Navy, the officers of the Army, and the President of the United States, that everybody forgot that they were interested in the war and forgot to make use of this message?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know why the warning did not go out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I suggest, Captain, that the reason the warning didn't go out was because there never was a winds execute message on the 4th day of December. You disagree with that?

[9820] Captain SAFFORD. I disagree with that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask one question only at this time, because I have not been privileged to hear Captain Safford's testimony.

Captain, if there were any officers in the War or Navy Departments, who desired to cover up the fact that an execute message was received by destroying that execute message, why wouldn't they have gone all the way and destroyed all of the other messages that predicted that such a message was coming in, so there wouldn't be any evidence at all that anybody ever talked about it?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot account for other people's motives or actions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have stated here in answer to a question by counsel, that there was evidence to justify your suspicions that somebody had destroyed this message purposely for the purpose of covering up the record.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if they were seeking to destroy a record in order to cover up any mistake, why didn't they destroy the messages that were on file there predicting that there might be an execute message coming [9821] in shortly? They could have done that as well as destroying this execute message, couldn't they?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes; except that that information had been sent out to the Asiatic stations, to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet,

and also the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I think it would have been impossible to get all those things destroyed on that theory.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, one of the complaints made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short, was, as I recall, that they did not receive that information. That is one of the bills of particular against which they complain against the Departments here.

Captain SAFFORD. They received the message sent by the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, giving the so-called British or Singapore version, or translation of Tokyo's circulars 2353 and 2354, setting up the wind code. They immediately monitored for the wind message themselves at Pearl Harbor, but did not hear it.

Not hearing from the Navy Department, they naturally came to the conclusion that the wind message had never been sent. And when some of those officers came East I talked to them and told them that the winds message had been sent, and they were surprised, naturally, and wanted to know why no warning had been sent out.

[9822] The CHAIRMAN. Did those who you think destroyed this message in the War and Navy Departments, know that this Singapore intercept of the Japanese message had been forwarded to Oahu or Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't know whether they knew. Probably they didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably did not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If they did not know it then they would have had the same incentive to destroy that here in the Department as they did in the execute message that you say came in, so that there wouldn't be any message at all.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. I may want to ask some questions later. I did not have a chance to hear Captain Safford's entire testimony. I want to read it over the week end and may have some questions later.

Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain Safford, what is the important information that you are conveying to this committee about the so-called 14 parts message and the so-called winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. The 14-part message and my connection with it was introduced by the counsel, not by myself.

[9823-9824] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. I am asking you now. You are appearing as a witness. We appreciate your appearance and the information you have given us. I am just asking you if you can tell me what the important information is that you want to give us about the 14-part message and the winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. The 14-part message was another opportunity that the Office of Naval Operations and the General Staff had to get a warning out to Hawaii before the actual attack occurred.

Whether people believed the wind message or not, the 14-part message is a matter of record. It is also a matter of record, I believe, in our investigations that the first 13 parts had been distributed before midnight on Saturday, December 6, 1941, to all the important officials in the Navy Department who had cognizance of the matter.

That is, Admiral Wilkinson, who was the Director of Naval Intelligence, and who had authority to send out war warnings; to Admiral Turner, the Director of War Plans, with authority to send out war warnings, and to Admiral Ingersoll, who was the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and also had the authority to send out war warnings.

There is a question as to whether or not Admiral Stark was notified, and Admiral Stark did not see the [9825] message until about 9:30 the next morning.

In addition to these, the Secretary of the Navy saw it, though he would not initiate a war warning, he would do that through the Chief of Naval Operations, and the President of the United States saw it, but he would not initiate a war warning on his own accord, but go through the Secretary of the Navy.

In addition, General Miles, the Director of Military Intelligence, saw it at Admiral Wilkinson's home, and he had the right, at least I presume he had the right to send out a war warning, or call it to the attention of his superior officer, and he did nothing about it.

All this time, time was running out.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain—

Captain SAFFORD. May I go on, please?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; but I wanted to try to direct your attention more specifically to what I was asking you for.

Do you consider that you are giving the committee important information when you state that these responsible officials of the Government received the information about the 14-part message?

Captain SAFFORD. I do. I think that is highly important information.

[9826] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Don't you know we have received that information from a number of witnesses?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is it that you can give us about it here that we haven't already received from a number of witnesses?

Captain SAFFORD. I understand.

I can give you one thing in regard to some of the junior officers who handled it, if I may.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The 14-part?

Captain SAFFORD. The 14-part message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. I have no authority to issue war warnings, and could only pass it on to higher authority. Furthermore, as soon as the message had been decoded and was in Commander Kramer's hands, the responsibility belonged to Naval Intelligence and not to Naval Communications.

Kramer had no authority to issue war warnings, but he did notify his superior officer, Captain McCollum, as I believe testified by the captain here, and from that time on it was Captain McCollum's responsibility.

Furthermore, Kramer had the messages delivered to Admiral Wilkinson by around 10 o'clock, I believe, at [9827] the latest, and after that, it became Admiral Wilkinson's responsibility to take action of some kind. That automatically relieved Kramer and Captain McCollum of any further responsibility. So it passes up the line.

Once Admiral Turner knew about it, he was senior to Admiral Wilkinson, it was his responsibility.

The last man that we know definitely got it was Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and it was his responsibility to send out the war warning, or to get that message to the Chief of Naval Operations, or if he took no action he was responsible for the result.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, from a practical standpoint, as one member of this committee, I was just trying to find out from you what important information you were prepared to give us that you thought we ought to have about the 14-part message that we didn't already have.

[9828] The only thing about it was the receipt of it and the decoding and the transmitting of it to these officials whom you have named. That was the whole thing, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, of course, you know Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson, and Captain McCollum have all testified here. You know that General Mashall and General Miles and General Gerow have already testified here? You knew that, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; now, then with respect to this 14-part message, only the first 13 parts of it came in before the morning of December 7; that is true, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is true.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you testified that you left your office about 4:30 on Saturday afternoon, December 6?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that at that time the 13 parts had been received but in the decoding and translating it had been so garbled that it was thought that all ought to be discarded and the whole thing done over again; you said that, didn't you?

[9829] Captain SAFFORD. They had to correct the key set up on the machine so as to get out perfect copy instead of imperfect copy, which delayed it about 2 hours, so I was told.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, anyhow, at the time you left the office it had been decided that the whole thing should be done over again to get at absolutely right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you never did see it after it was fixed right until the following Monday, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, I am not quite clear on one other point in connection with that. I believe you testified that you had not even seen all of the 13 parts in the incorrect form up to the time you left at 4:30. Is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. About half of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About half of it; about five or six parts of it.

Captain SAFFORD. And then they stopped to straighten out the key before they went ahead again.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. As I remember you said about 5 or 6 parts of it. So that you did not at any time see the finished copy of the first 13 parts of that message until the following Monday?

Captain SAFFORD. Until the following Monday.

[9830] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you regarded that as highly important, you stated that here?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you stated that you considered the first 13 parts as important as the fourteenth part, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I did after I saw it afterwards, not at the time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After you saw it afterwards. Did you at the time you left your office at 4:30 on Saturday afternoon regard what you had seen and understood about it as highly important?

Captain SAFFORD. I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You stated that you were out late Saturday night.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would you mind telling us what kept you out late Saturday night?

(No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Nothing connected with your business or your office work?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

[9831] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you stated that you were in your pajamas and bath robe eating breakfast when the word came of the attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, you never had at any time from the time you left your office at 4:30 on Saturday with a highly important message coming in, you never at any time inquired about that message until after the attack, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. Not that I remember.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Not that you remember. You did not call your office to find out whether the other parts had come in or what they might say or what the meaning might be?

Captain SAFFORD. We thought we had the whole message there and more. There were about, roughly, 20 messages.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Never mind about "we." I am asking about you.

Captain SAFFORD. Well, I.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You thought you had what?

Captain SAFFORD. The full 14; we did not know. I mean the people on watch did not know until the last and everything on hand had been translated, if the fourteenth part had been made up. There were a lot of other messages in at the same time and I think they were fully taken up; we didn't know which was which.

[9832] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But of the first five or six parts which were not in complete form, that you did see at the time you left your office at 4:30, you considered it highly important?

Captain SAFFORD. Very important.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you did not make any effort to inquire from 3:30 in the afternoon on Saturday until after the attack as to whether the rest of the parts of the message had come in or what they said?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Now, you did see the full 14 parts of the message on Monday when you came to the office?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; now, then, I understood you to say you did not regard the fourteenth part of that message as any more important than the first 13 parts.

Captain SAFFORD. Than the first 13 combined.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The first 13 combined.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the opinion given to this committee, as I recall it, by everybody who has testified is to the effect that the fourteenth part was really the important part of the message and that the 13 parts were just a [9833] restatement of Japan's position and views and ideas that everybody had known about all along. Did anybody call that to your attention?

Captain SAFFORD. I have heard some of the witnesses state that and I have read it in the newspapers numerous times.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you do not agree with it?

Captain SAFFORD. That was not my impression at the time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You regarded the first 13 parts just as important as the 14th part?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, you have no personal knowledge as to what was done about that 14-part message or the first 13 parts of it on Saturday night or Sunday, no personal knowledge on your part?

Captain SAFFORD. Except as I have checked up all the written documents, what written documents were available to see, the times of intercept, and see if there were any unreasonable delays at any stage of the game.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you did not find any indication of any unreasonable delays; did you?

Captain SAFFORD. There was no indication of unreasonable delay.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; so that is all, really, that you know about the 14-part message then, is what [9834] you have told us?

Captain SAFFORD. I would like to make one statement which may or may not be important, that the Navy completed its distribution of that message, all 14 parts, plus the pilot message, about 3 hours before the Japanese Embassy in Washington called up the State Department and asked for a delay in their appointment with Secretary Hull because they were not ready.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Where did you get that information, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. That comes from one of the State Department white papers.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One of the State Department papers?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not deliver the message. Captain Kramer is the man who was charged with that responsibility; wasn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you did not know anything about it of your personal knowledge; did you?

Captain SAFFORD. Only now that it is a matter of record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you did not have any personal knowledge about it yourself?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

[9835] The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. I am only mentioning the fact that in connection with possible delays on the part of my people we handled it much more expeditiously than did the Japanese Embassy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; now, then, I would like to ask you a few questions, if I may. I do not want to dwell too long on that because I don't think there is any material dispute in the record or any variance from your testimony of any importance so far as this 14-part message is concerned.

Now, Admiral Noyes was the Chief of Naval Communications at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How far was his office from your office?

Captain SAFFORD. His was upstairs and almost directly over it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The next floor above you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In other words, just one floor above you and almost exactly over your office?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, you say that you had been [9836] looking for some time and had your whole organization on an intensive alert looking for this winds execute message; that is true, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the most highly important thing that you had in mind at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, you finally received the message?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why wasn't it important enough for you to take it yourself to Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not expect Admiral Noyes would be in his office and I thought it might take as long as a half an hour to find him. He was a very busy man serving on two or three selection boards and had told his office that they might have to chase him all over the Navy Department to find him. As soon as I could dispatch this by courier I immediately called in my other people and particularly the office in charge of the Register Publication Section and we began looking through everything to see what would have to be done to set our house in order for the immediate outbreak of war. I was actually working on it at that time when Admiral Noyes gave me the call and suggested that we tell Guam to [9837] destroy all their excess codes and ciphers.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I know, but going back to the great importance of this message that you had been looking for for days and exerting every effort to try to get it, then when it did come did it ever occur to you that that was so important that you ought to take it yourself to Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. It did not. I wished I had afterwards.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see, but it did not occur to you then?

Captain SAFFORD. The only thought was to get it up to Admiral Noyes as soon as I possibly could by a commissioned officer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you think anybody could take it to him faster than you could yourself?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, then, did this winds message say anything about when or where war with the United States would be?

Captain SAFFORD. There was no time or place. It merely gave this raw information, general information I might say.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then the immediate transmission of that message to Admiral Kimmel would not have given him any information about when or where the war would start, would it?

Captain SAFFORD. It would only give him the fact that the [9838] war was about to start and very definitely and that the United States was in it and not a spectator at the beginning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You stated in your testimony that if this message had been promptly transmitted to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet it would have saved the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Captain SAFFORD. I believe it would have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You believe it would have?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the main point stressed by Admiral Kimmel in his testimony before this committee was that he had not been given information as to just when or where the war would start, and this message would not have given him that information, would it?

Captain SAFFORD. I considered that the—as I have testified previously, that the winds message, the winds execute marked the outbreak of the war for Saturday, December 6th or Sunday, December 7th, for that week end, for that span of 48 hours, and we had it 48 or 72 hours in advance. It was no long range forecast. It was a short range forecast. It could have been a false alarm but it was an alarm.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I know, but, Captain, the fact is, as you have just stated, there wasn't anything in this winds [9839] execute message about the time or the place that the war would start.

Captain SAFFORD. There was nothing in that; no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; and Admiral Kimmel has told us that that was the most important thing of all to him, so this message if sent to him would not have given him that information, would it?

Captain SAFFORD. No the winds message of itself.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; now, then, all the winds message could have told Admiral Kimmel was that war was imminent between the United States and Japan, was it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. As well as war with England.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How?

Captain SAFFORD. As well as war with England.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That war was imminent between Japan and the United States and England?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, don't you know that on November 27, 1941, several days before you say you saw the winds message on December 4, that Admiral Kimmel had been sent the war warning message by the Chief of Naval Operations?

Captain SAFFORD. He had been sent a message in which the [9840] words appeared, "This is a war warning."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. This is the message appearing on page 36 of exhibit 37 of this hearing. I will only read you the first words. It is known by heart by everybody on the committee and everybody in this room I think. It has been put in the record a thousand times more or less, very few less, I believe.

Mr. KEEFE. 1001 now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But this message states in the opening words: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

That is all your winds message could have been, isn't it, a war warning?

Captain SAFFORD. This message of November 27 represented our estimate of what might happen. The winds message announced the intentions and decision of the Japanese Government. That was something very different.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, could anything in the winds message have conveyed more clearly to Admiral Kimmel a war warning than the plain bold words, "This message is to be considered a war warning"?

Captain SAFFORD. It is my opinion as a communication expert and not as a strategist or line officer—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are a communications expert?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[9841] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And are testifying as such here?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Captain SAFFORD (continuing). That the effect of this first sentence was largely nullified by what followed as regards any implication that the Navy Department expected Japan to suddenly declare war on the United States.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So then you discount the meaning of the words, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," as not amounting to much?

Captain SAFFORD. As not amounting to as much as it would if the words had stood alone or there had been less stress on the Far East and equal stress on the fact that Japan might deliberately start a war against the United States.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, who was there in the Pacific that the United States might be involved with in war except Japan?

Captain SAFFORD. Nobody as far as Japan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Nobody out there. We had no potential enemy of this country in the Pacific area except Japan, did we?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. And the fortress at Pearl Harbor had been built as a protection of this country against [9842] Japan, hadn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Everybody in the Navy knew that, didn't they?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, then, 3 days prior to November 27, or on November 24, a message was sent from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, known as the message of November 24, 1941. You are familiar with that, aren't you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In which it is stated:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.

That is a pretty fair war warning message, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It certainly relates to the very strained relations with Japan.

Captain SAFFORD. And may I comment that if those two messages had been sent in reverse order I think the effect would [9843] have been much better as regarding a warning of war against the United States and United States territory.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You think if the message of November 27 had been sent on November 24 and the message of November 24 had been sent on November 27, why, the situation would have been better?

Captain SAFFORD. I think it would have been much clearer in Admiral Kimmel's mind.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. In other words, then, as a communications experts you think if you had prepared these messages you could have done a better job than was done with these two?

Captain SAFFORD. As a communications expert I have seen a lot of confusion by messages which were not understood or, worse, which were misunderstood by the party that received them. The party that receives a message has no choice, he has to take it as it is. If he recognizes two meanings, he asks for clarification. If he only recognizes one meaning and it is the wrong one, it is too bad and it does happen from time to time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Tell me then: You think then as an expert communications officer you could have prepared better messages for Admiral Kimmel than these two to which I have referred?

[9844] Captain SAFFORD. I believe that if either or both messages had been shown to some disinterested party, possibly corresponding to General Grant's fabulous Colonel Smith, that they might have changed the wording out and got the meaning across a little more accurately to Admiral Kimmel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you mean to say then that you think you could have written better messages than these?

Captain SAFFORD. I think that anybody who tried to read those messages from the point of view, first, were they capable of misinterpretation would have suggested certain changes in them which would have clarified the situation to the man who received that, not only Admiral Kimmel but to Admiral Hart just as well.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, I want to be just as fair and reasonable with you as I know how. I am only seeking information. I am only trying to find the truth about this question that we are called upon to consider here. I have asked you twice. I will ask you the third time. Do you think you could have written better messages than these two?

Captain SAFFORD. I should have been able to write a better message but I might have done worse myself if I had been writing the message. If I had an important message I always left it to somebody else to see if he knew what I was talking about.

[9845] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, hindsight is always better than foresight anyhow, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But I think the testimony shows that Admiral Turner, the head of War Plans of the Navy Department, prepared these two messages. Now, was there any reason why Admiral Kimmel could not have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for clarification or an explanation of either one of these messages if he had thought it necessary?

Captain SAFFORD. There is no reason except there is always a natural hesitancy of a junior to request clarification from a senior. It generally works the other way around.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I know, but, Captain, Admiral Kimmel was in command of the Pacific Fleet of the United States Navy. That was the greatest possession that this Government owned, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he was responsible for that fleet as its commander in chief.

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If there had been any doubt in his mind as to the meaning of these messages wasn't it his plain duty to call for clarification or an explanation about it?

Captain SAFFORD. If there had been doubt—

[9846] The VICE CHAIRMAN. If there had been any doubt.

Captain SAFFORD (continuing). It was his duty.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, what was Captain McCol-
lum's position at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. He was Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was he superior to you?

Captain SAFFORD. He had a corresponding job to me. He was junior to me in rank.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was junior to you in rank?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were senior to him?

Captain SAFFORD. I was senior to him by 3 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In rank?

Captain SAFFORD. In rank.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, how did your respective jobs compare?

Captain SAFFORD. They were essentially on the same level of importance.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On the same level of importance?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But he was the man in charge of intelligence for the far eastern part of the world, wasn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

[9847] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, did you ever bring this winds message to his office?

Captain SAFFORD. Not as such.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He testified here that he had been anxiously looking and watching, exerting every effort to try to get it for days, and he never did see it; so you never did bring it to his attention?

Captain SAFFORD. The message that I saw in Admiral Wilkinson's hand at about 3 p. m. on the afternoon of December 4, 1941, which had been certainly prepared in Captain McCollum's section, it bore all the earmarks, no other section of Naval Intelligence could have prepared it, gave every indication to me that Captain McCollum had read the winds message, had appreciated its importance, and was trying to get an urgent war warning out to the Pacific Fleet.

Furthermore, I thought it had been sent and I just did not discuss it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did not what?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not discuss the message with McCollum.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Oh, you did not?

Captain SAFFORD. No. I took it for granted that it had been sent and I just merely shook hands with McCollum for doing such a splendid job and writing up such a comprehensive [9848] war warning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you did talk to him a long time ago?

Captain SAFFORD. I had talked to him on the phone the day before about getting out a war warning and at that time I understood from McCollum that he just could not get it out, that he was stuck.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. You talked to him on the third?

Captain SAFFORD. On the third.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you knew of his anxiety in the matter and how anxious he was to try to get out all the information that would help the fleet in the Pacific and then the following day you get this winds message and you did not say anything to him about it?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not mention it to him. Now, then——

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield there?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; I yield.

Senator LUCAS. Why was it you did not talk to McCollum about this message at the time?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, it just did not occur to me to mention it. Kramer had it; Kramer was McCollum's immediate [9849] subordinate. Kramer was up there every day and sometimes twice a day. We were sending a written copy around and I was busy. I could see no reason for bringing it up with him. I was going to anyway.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ask Kramer whether he showed that message to McCollum?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't believe I ever did. I cannot recall it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It did not occur to you to say to Kramer, "Why, McCollum and I were talking yesterday. I know he is exceedingly anxious about this thing. Did you show him that message?"

Didn't it occur to you to do that?

Captain SAFFORD. We did not discuss the winds message the other day. We had discussed other war warnings or warnings as to the approach of war, which had come in, particularly the message from Tokyo which had been sent on Monday to destroy the codes and here it was Wednesday and no notification of that had gone out from the Navy Department. I was trying to find out from McCollum why it had not gone out and what its prospect was.

When I found that McCollum could not get one out I wrote one myself and succeeded in getting it released, but I tried to convey a hint or an evaluation by means of sending that [9850] message out with an "urgent" precedence. "Urgent" was so important and so rarely used except to float, that there was no place on the Navy Department message blanks for "urgent" and it had to be typed in. I had the stenographer who prepared it type out the word "Priority," type out "Urgent" and put the X marks beside it.

I sent the message to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet and the commandant Sixteenth Naval District, who were apparently working on the purple system and drafted it in highly technical terms so they would know that the local purpose machines were being destroyed, there would be no more purpose traffic and they could turn their energies elsewhere. It was also sent "Priority" to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and the commandant Fourteenth Naval District for information.

This was the first time for a long time anything pertaining to diplomatic traffic had been sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, with the exception of a message released on the 1st by Admiral Noyes discussing the Japanese intrigue in Thailand and that was also sent "Urgent."

I sent that message up at noon and I initialed it, then Captain Redmond initialed it and he took it in to Admiral Noyes, found Admiral Noyes was out, so he signed it himself and released it, but Captain Redmond made one change. Knowing the tradition that we had not sent an urgent message from the [9851] Navy Department since 1918, with the exception of this one which had been released by Admiral Noyes personally, he erased the "Urgent" designation, replaced it with check marks in pencil beside "Priority" and it went out in that form.

The result was that the people at Pearl Harbor, Captain Layton, also Rochefort, could not read between the lines and missed the warning that I was trying to get out there. Captain Layton, I believe, has told me that he did discuss what was meant by the words "purple machine" with Lieutenant Coleman, who stood watch for 2 months in the Navy Department and was thoroughly familiar with it and Coleman more or less decrypted "machine" as being of no particular importance.

Admiral Hart did get the news as he told me in his investigation; and I sought, in other words, to just take——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, is all this you are telling us now in response to my question? I want to be highly respectful.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I just want to know. Is all this you are telling us now responsive to the question I asked you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is what I thought.

[9852] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I want you to be the judge, of course, but I just asked you if you did not think it was highly important that you tell McCollum about receiving this winds execute message.

Captain SAFFORD. I did not at the time or I would have done it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me see. You say you had a conversation with Captain McCollum on December 3.

Captain SAFFORD. On December 3.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you saw the winds execute message the following day, December 4.

Captain SAFFORD. December 4.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you did not at any time have any conversation with him about the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. Not that I can recall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I invite your attention to your testimony appearing at page 360 of the Hart investigation, and I will read you this from it and ask for your comment on it:

On the 4th of December 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the winds message.

Do you see that?

[9853] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You testified to that, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I testified to that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now you say you do not know whether McCollum ever knew anything about the winds message. Is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the reason I took for granted that McCollum had seen the winds message, because he used the same thought, if not the exact words of the winds message in his closing paragraph in his message before the final statement "War is imminent."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to tell me just a moment ago that you did not know McCollum ever saw the winds message or knew about it.

Captain SAFFORD. I believed at the time, and I still believe, that McCollum did get a copy of the winds message, was shown it, and that McCollum has not remembered it; but I have no first-hand information that he ever saw it. I did not give him a copy in person and I did not discuss it with him on the telephone or in person.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You haven't discussed it with him at all?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then how did you know, in this [9854] answer you gave here, that he used the winds message in this dispatch that he drafted?

Captain SAFFORD. The one thing above all I was interested in that message, that long message, was to see if it did bring in the winds message, or the information contained in the winds message. It did, and I took for granted that McCollum had seen the winds message and was quoting from it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say that you did not talk to McCollum about the winds message at all on December 4; that you had talked to him the day before, December 3.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So then when you state here:

On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the winds message—

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). If you did not even see him on the 4th of December how did you know about this?

Captain SAFFORD. I saw the message, I read the message; I was in Admiral Noyes' office when Captain Wilkinson brought it in, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and he gave it. [9855] to Admiral Noyes to read and Admiral Noyes read it page by page, and as Admiral Noyes finished the page he gave it to me and permitted me to read it for my information, too. So I saw the message; I read the whole message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I remember Captain McCollum said the whole message was about a half page, and he also stated that it had no reference to the winds message or winds code.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct. I heard Captain McCollum say that same thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You heard him testify, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He said that, did he not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There is a mistake somewhere, isn't there?

Captain SAFFORD. Mr. Cooper, I can only tell you things—that is one thing I do know from my own memory and that is I saw that message myself.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have said that, Captain, repeatedly.

Captain SAFFORD. And, furthermore, I described the message in detail to Admiral Hart, but he did not want the details, he wanted to keep the record just as short as he could.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As least you do not remember anything [9856] like Captain McCollum says he remembers, do you?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; and I testified in detail on that, I believe, in some of the other investigations, as I remember.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he testified several times too, did he not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I want to clear this one question up that he is now discussing.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Captain McCollum was head of the Intelligence Branch, Far Eastern Division?

Captain SAFFORD. He was the head of the Far Eastern Division Intelligence Branch.

Senator LUCAS. Now, wasn't it your duty to see that he got this winds message in order that he might make proper evaluations to the Chief of Naval Intelligence? Was not that the orderly way in which these messages went, as a general rule?

Captain SAFFORD. The messages were given to Commander Kramer, who was officially attached to McCollum's office, but looking down,

in space, to my office. As soon as the [9857] message in the decoded form was turned over to McCollum—I mean to Kramer—my responsibility ceased. It was Kramer's responsibility to complete them and to type them smooth and to make a distribution. Its distribution included McCollum.

Senator LUCAS. But in this particular case you directed a man in your office to take this particular message direct to Admiral Noyes.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Why was that done instead of giving it to McCollum?

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Noyes issued special instructions on the matter and I carried out the instructions of my commanding officer.

Senator LUCAS. I mean before.

Captain SAFFORD. Before.

Senator LUCAS. Before the so-called execute winds message.

Captain SAFFORD. At the time they set the watches on November 28, and I presume that Admiral Noyes had discussed the matter with Admiral Wilkinson and they were both in agreement on this method of doing business.

Senator LUCAS. You had specific instructions from Admiral Noyes to deliver any so-called winds message direct [9858] to him?

Captain SAFFORD. Direct to him if it came during office hours, and to telephone it to him if it came outside of office hours. That is the reason Brotherhood gave him that call on the message which Brotherhood knew we were looking for.

Senator LUCAS. Did McCollum know about this?

Captain SAFFORD. McCollum know about that; Kramer knew about that; and Admiral Wilkinson knew about that.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like for the committee to give consideration over the week-end to the possibility of meeting a little earlier and sitting a little longer as our present extension runs out on the 15th. I am not asking you to make any decision now, but it is a pleasant subject for you to be thinking about over the week-end.

We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., February 2, 1946, the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a. m., on Monday, February 4, 1946.)

[9859]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318) Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[9860] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Chairman Barkley was called to the White House for the usual Monday morning conference of the leaders and will be detained a little while and we will go ahead, without objection.

Does counsel have anything to present to the committee at this time before the examination of the witness is resumed?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, on page 9850 of our transcript, Captain Safford referred to a telegram which was sent on December 1, 1941, from Washington to Admiral Hart and the Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District, for the information also of Admiral Kimmel and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Inasmuch as that telegram or dispatch has not previously been made a part of this record we would like to have permission to have it copied into the transcript at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

Mr. MASTEN. It was distributed to the committee last Saturday.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The dispatch referred to is as follows:)

Naval Message

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Extension Number 2027

From: OPNAV

Urgent

[9861] Released by Adm L. Noyes

Cincaf
Com 16

Date: 1 December 1941

Priority

Com 14
CinCPac

Typed by: McClellan
011926

Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on 29th sent to Tokyo as number 872 the following "conferences now in progress in Bangkok considering plans aimed at forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora.

3674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

As counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bahru, since Thai intends to consider first invader as her enemy, Orange believes this landing in Malay would force British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa.

Thai would then declare war and request Orange help. This plan appears to have approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto.

Thai Government circles have been sharply divided between pro British and pro Orange until 25 November but now Wantto and Shin who favor joint military action with Orange, have silenced anti Orange group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision. Early and favorable [9862] developments are possible."

Certified to be a true copy of unencrypted version of original 011926 Dec 1941.
Decrypted from original code on 1/31/46

SECRET

/s/ V. H. COOK.
Comdr. USNR

011926.

Mr. MASTEN. We would also like to add to Exhibit 142, as Exhibit 142-B, the material which was distributed to the committee last Friday or Saturday, and which relates to Circular No. 2494 from Tokyo and is translated as follows:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.

That intercept appears at page 251 of Exhibit 1, and the four pages which have been distributed to the committee are further information in connection with that message, which is one of the so-called "hidden word" messages from Tokyo to Washington and other points. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 142-B.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142-B.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything else at this time?
[9863] Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, do you have anything you want to present to the committee before your examination is resumed?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask you just a few more questions, please, Captain.

I understood you to state to us Saturday that you would provide the committee a copy of the memorandum from you to Colonel West. Have you been able to locate that over the week end?

Captain SAFFORD. I have a copy; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, counsel had inquired about it. Does counsel desire to examine it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. You may proceed and I will look it over.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I will proceed to ask you a few more questions then, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, did you read to the committee from your memorandums or tell the committee everything [9864] you know about anybody trying to get you to change your testimony about the winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. I have. There is nothing to be added to that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. You gave us all the information either in your oral statements or the memorandums that you read to us bearing on that subject?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, I believe you stated that the copy of this winds execute message that should have been kept in the files of your division would have been in the safe of then Commander, now Captain, Kramer, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, and the personal or immediate custodian was Lieutenant Commander H. S. Harrison, U. S. Naval Reserve.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, who would have had access to Captain Kramer's safe?

Captain SAFFORD. Normally only the people on duty under Captain Kramer. That is, all the translators had access to those messages when necessary, though everything was normally cleared through Commander Harrison.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Commander Harrison was in immediate charge of the files in Captain Kramer's safe?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[9865] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And nobody would have had access to those files without the knowledge of Commander Harrison?

Captain SAFFORD. Except in Commander Harrison's absence.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, what was the situation there? If he wasn't there could anybody—

Captain SAFFORD. Commander Harrison left the office every day to go to lunch and occasionally he would make a messenger trip in place of Captain Kramer, but he was in the office almost all the time. Captain Kramer was absent from his office a good part of the time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, how many people do you think would have had access to Captain Kramer's safe, lunch time or any other time? How many people could have gone into Kramer's safe and had access to these secret files?

Captain SAFFORD. Not more than ten at the most.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So about ten people then would have had access to Kramer's secret files?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you said they were translators.

Captain SAFFORD. The translators and the yeomen on duty in Kramer's section and the head of the section could call for a file at any time. I could call for a file from Kramer, or the people that relieved me could have called for a file.

[9866] The VICE CHAIRMAN. People where?

Captain SAFFORD. The officer that relieved me could have called for the files or it is possible that the Director of Naval Intelligence might have wanted to see them. Any higher authority would have been given the file without question if he had requested it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand that, Captain. I assume Admiral Stark could ask for one of those files and it would be brought to him.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am trying to get down to the point of how many people had the combination to the safe or the key to the safe or could get in there?

Captain SAFFORD. To the best of my knowledge the combination to the safe was held by Kramer and Harrison alone. There was a copy of the combination in a sealed envelope in my safe. There was another copy of the combination in a sealed envelope in the safe of the Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations. That was required for all safes in naval operations, so in case of casualty to the man who regularly opened the safe the safe could be opened when we had to.

[9867] The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you ever use this secret combination that you had to Kramer's safe?

Captain SAFFORD. I never used it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any of these other people having the secret combination, in an envelope or otherwise, ever having used the combination to enter the safe?

Captain SAFFORD. I know of no occasion when we ever had to open those sealed envelopes, and enter the safe. I might add, whenever an officer was relieved, we changed the combination on his safe and substituted the new cards, and that was the only time we ever had to go into those envelopes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then is it your best judgment, Captain, that Captain Kramer and Commander Harrison were the only two people who were actually in control of this safe and the secret files in it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And anybody else going in there for any file that had been called for, or that was needed, would really have to go to Captain Kramer or Commander Harrison to do that?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

[9868] Now, this winds execute message that you have testified about was kept in the secret file in Captain Kramer's safe?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, I would like to ask you just one more question, I believe, Captain, and invite your attention to the last line of your written statement that you presented to the committee, in which statement, as you prepared it, and as it was distributed to the committee,—you wrote the statement yourself, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I wrote the statement myself.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. You used the words "Pearl Harbor"?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, when you read the statement to us, you said you wanted to change those words "Pearl Harbor" to "England and the United States."

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why was that change necessary?

Captain SAFFORD. I had used the words "Attack on Pearl Harbor" mentally as synonymous with the outbreak of the war. I realized, in my statement in the winds message there was nothing whatsoever which pointed at Pearl Harbor specifically.

[9869] The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you had just used the words "Pearl Harbor" inadvertently?

Captain SAFFORD. I used the words "Pearl Harbor" inadvertently, and I made that correction when I noticed it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You say here, "The War and Navy Department had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese themselves."

Well, that was not correct, was it?

Captain SAFFORD. That was not correct, and when I read it, I realized it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When you first wrote your statement, why did you use the words "Pearl Harbor" if that was not correct?

Captain SAFFORD. I wrote that statement, the final draft, on Thursday night, and the next night at 5:30 it had been presented to Commander Baecher for clearance to the committee counsel, and I had not had the opportunity to proof read it, to see exactly what impression I might be giving, or if I made a mistake inadvertently.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you did make a mistake when you used "Pearl Harbor" in that sentence?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you changed that to "England and the United States"?

[9870] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Because you realized that there was nothing in the winds execute message that related to Pearl Harbor at all?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

Senator George will inquire.

Senator GEORGE. Captain, you were aware of the constantly deteriorating relations between Japan and the United States for some 8 months at least; were you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Prior to Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You had known of the Secretary of State's statement made in the council to both the Secretary of Navy and Secretary of War in November, specifically about the 26th of November, that sets forth the safety and security and defense of the country was in the hands of the Army and Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. I knew nothing about that, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You had no information about that?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Well, you did know that practically the diplomatic relations had broken off; did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[9871] What I knew was entirely from my reading of the intercepted messages passing between Washington and Tokyo.

Senator GEORGE. You were familiar with the so-called war message, or "This is to be construed as a war message," that went to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet on the 27th of November?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; I had been permitted to read that.

Senator GEORGE. Therefore you knew that diplomatic relations had ended; that is, from all the information you had, you knew that conditions had progressed to the point where diplomatic relations had practically ended?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you testified, I believe, in your direct, that for 3 months you regarded war as inevitable with Japan—or did you use the word “inevitable”?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall making that statement, but I did regard war with Japan as just a matter of time.

Senator GEORGE. Just a matter of time?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. In other words, you regarded a war with Japan as certain within some reasonably early time, and for some 3 months you had had that view?

[9872] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Well, now, Captain, let me ask you, what was the special significance of the winds execute message of December 4—I believe you have identified that day—to you? What additional special information did it give to you, or convey to you?

Captain SAFFORD. It confirmed the suspicion that I and I believe most of the high ranking officers in the War and Navy Departments held, that Japan was intending to proceed with its program of conquest in the Far East, and that would include invasion of Thailand and the capture of Malaya and Netherlands East Indies, if and when Japan decided to make war on England.

The United States would not necessarily be involved. In fact, the whole tone and purpose of the diplomatic negotiations between Tokyo and Washington had been to isolate the Far East and to persuade the United States to give a free hand out there. So the winds message meant not only that Japan was about to declare war on England and attack foreign territory out in the Far East, it also meant that Japan realized that the United States would not yield, as a matter of principle, and that she had determined to bring the war to us rather than to start the war in the Far East with a neutral but hostile nation on the flank.

[9873] Senator GEORGE. Well, it was abundantly clear, was it not, after Secretary of State Hull’s message, or answer to the Japanese note, that the United States would not yield, and I believe you testified that the winds execute message did not designate any time or place where the war on the United States would begin, and therefore, I am asking you what additional significance did the winds execute message, conceding for the purpose of the question that it came through as you have testified, what additional significance it had to you, in view of the reply of the Secretary of State, in view of what had happened, in view of the message of November 27 of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in view of the Marshall message to General Short, the Military Commander of the Hawaiian Area?

Is the committee to understand that it only had the additional significance of confirming what you already believed, what you had already concluded?

Captain SAFFORD. My interpretation was that it gave a tip-off or preview of what Japan’s reply to Secretary Hull’s note of November 26 was going to be.

[9874] Senator GEORGE. Well, now, we come to the 14 parts message of December 6. I believe your testimony is that you left your office at about 4:30 on the afternoon of December 6, at which time some portions of the 14-part message had come in, but that you

had not carefully studied the portions that had been received; is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. And then you left your office and learned nothing more about the 14-parts message, or the message directing the delivery to Secretary Hull at 1 p. m., until you were advised over the radio on Sunday afternoon, after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You did not follow up, during Saturday evening or Saturday night, or early Sunday morning, the fourteenth part of the message?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not.

Senator GEORGE. Well, you did not think that there was anything especially significant about so much of the 14-parts message as you had seen before you left your office at 4:30, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I considered that as the confirmation of my evaluation of the winds message 48 hours earlier.

Senator GEORGE. You mean the first 13 parts or the [9875] 13 parts taken all together?

Captain SAFFORD. What I had seen, the five or six portions in their garbled form. They did not arrive in serial order, they were quite mixed up as we broke them down, but we could get the sense of the whole thing. The Japanese were rejecting the American proposal of November 26.

Senator GEORGE. And that reply was somewhat more abusive in tone, was it not, than the ordinary Japanese message?

Captain SAFFORD. The ordinary Japanese message had been very courteous in tone up to this particular message.

Senator GEORGE. Up to this particular message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. And did you take any steps to see that your evaluation of the 14-parts message was transmitted on Saturday afternoon or evening, or night, or early Sunday morning?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; I did not.

Senator GEORGE. There was nothing in the 14-parts message itself that indicated an attack at any particular place?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. If any particular place was indicated at all it was in the pilot message, the message we refer to [9876] here as the pilot message, the message directing the delivery to the Secretary of State Hull at a given hour?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt there?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe we agreed Saturday we would not have any interruptions.

Mr. KEEFE. I wanted to ask the Senator only a question, to clear this up.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are we going to have the rule lived up to?

Senator GEORGE. I have no objection, so far as I am concerned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. He is referring to the pilot message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you want the Senator to yield?

Mr. KEEFE. I ask the Senator if he will yield; yes.

Senator GEORGE. I will be glad to.

Mr. KEEFE. You referred to the pilot message as being the message which called for delivery at 1 o'clock. My understanding of the situation is that the pilot message, referred to as such, is the message that came in first indicating that the 14-part message would be received, and that the message, as heretofore referred to, the last message received was the 1 o'clock message. I am offering that [9877] so the record will not be mixed up.

Senator GEORGE. I think, Congressman, you are correct. I was referring to the 1 o'clock message, that is the message directing delivery of the 14-parts message to the Secretary of State.

You did not see that until the 8th?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not see that until the 8th.

Senator GEORGE. You did not know anything of it until the 8th?

Captain SAFFORD. It is possible that my people on watch telephoned it out, but I have forgotten it if they did.

Senator GEORGE. Well, Captain, you say that the winds execute message was seen by you under the circumstances detailed by you on the 4th of December?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That is your testimony, as I understand it.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That message contained the definite statement, along with others, of "west wind clear," did it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That included "west wind clear."

Senator GEORGE. Meaning war with England?

Captain SAFFORD. Meaning war with England and invasion of Thailand and attack or occupation of Malaya and the [9878] Netherlands East Indies.

Senator GEORGE. Well, Captain, can you give any reason why, on the afternoon of December 7, after the attack at Pearl Harbor, I believe, the message referring alone to England, using the same code words or same weather forecast terms "west wind clear" was sent out? If it had already been sent out on December 4, why was it again repeated on December 7?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know.

Senator GEORGE. Well, if your memory is not playing tricks with you and there really was, as you have testified, the winds execute message of December 4, which contained the same information, why was it again repeated, and your answer is that you are not able to say, is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. I never saw or heard of that FCC intercepted winds message which was broadcast about 6 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor until the summer of 1944.

Senator GEORGE. You haven't any reason to think it was not reported to the Navy Department on the afternoon of the 7th, have you?

Captain SAFFORD. The FCC document stated that that message was telephoned to Colonel Dusenbury, I believe, of the Army, and I think it was at his home. I have no personal knowledge and no record can be found that that message was [9879] delivered to the Navy Department either by telephone or in written form.

Senator GEORGE. I have no further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark, of North Carolina, will inquire, Captain.

Mr. CLARK. Captain, you understand that the intercepted messages have been referred to in this hearing as magic, do you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I believe General Marshall of the Army and Admiral Stark for the Navy established a rather particular method for the handling and distribution and final disposition of magic, did they not?

Captain SAFFORD. Are you referring to within the War and Navy Departments and in Washington? Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, on the Army side, copies of this magic were enclosed in a leather pouch which was locked and sent by messenger from person to person among those who were entitled under that plan to have access to magic?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And when that was presented to an officer he was permitted to read the message and then return it to the pouch to be carried on to the next person?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[9880] Mr. CLARK. And I believe Admiral Stark established in the Navy a very similar method except perhaps they did not use the leather pouch?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe we ended up by using leather pouches the same as the Army did.

Mr. CLARK. So that the system in the two Departments was practically the same?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, that having been established by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, no one would have the right to vary or change that method except with the knowledge and consent of General Marshall and Admiral Stark, would they?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes; or except in emergency, when the officer who made the change had to accept the responsibility for it if he guessed wrong.

Mr. CLARK. And that would have to be some high-ranking officer to assume that responsibility?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that Kramer made an emergency change on the evening of the 6th of December 1941.

Mr. CLARK. Was that for the purpose of expediting the delivery of magic?

Captain SAFFORD. That was for the purpose of expediting delivery.

[9881] Mr. CLARK. And it was supposed to be made available very promptly when it came in?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Am I right in thinking that this magic was distributed to the White House, to the Department of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, the War Plans Division, the head of Intelligence in the Army and the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And was there anyone else to whom it was accessible to your knowledge?

Captain SAFFORD. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations always saw it. I believe that the Naval Aide to the President always saw them and reviewed them, with Kramer, in the name and acting for the President.

Mr. CLARK. The offices I have named or people in those offices were trusted to see the magic?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. There was one more exception. Captain Schuirmann, who was the Navy liaison officer with the State Department, was sometimes shown them by the direct orders of Admiral Stark or Admiral Ingersoll. There was an exception made in his case in each individual instance.

Mr. CLARK. Now, aside from the ones you have mentioned [9882] do you know of anyone else who was entitled to examine this magic?

Captain SAFFORD. The Director of Naval Communications and the Chief Signal Officer of course were entitled to see it. And I was entitled to see it because my people were working with it. Everybody working with it. The heads of the Far Eastern Section of the Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence were, of course. We who were working with it had to see it in order to know what was going on.

Mr. CLARK. It was limited to a comparatively few people, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Just as few as we could and still have the proper people know it.

Mr. CLARKE. I see.

By whom was this distribution made in the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. The distribution was normally made by Captain Kramer.

Mr. CLARK. Do you know who did it in the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. Colonel Bratton.

Mr. CLARK. Now, do you think of anyone in that group who were entitled to examine magic that you would not classify as a highly intelligent and competently loyal American?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I presume that magic was limited to a comparatively few because of its very great significance and [9883] importance?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, and to minimize the chance of a leak and to enable us to place responsibility in case a leak should occur.

Mr. CLARK. I see. And, of course, a leak was to be avoided because of the great importance of magic?

Captain SAFFORD. We were afraid our source of information would dry up.

Mr. CLARK. I didn't quite get that.

Captain SAFFORD. We were afraid our source of information would dry up if there was a leak.

Mr. CLARK. You are familiar with the episode between General Marshall and Governor Dewey in which General Marshall went to some trouble to be sure that the Governor thoroughly appreciated the importance of keeping the magic secret?

Captain SAFFORD. I read about it in the newspapers.

Mr. CLARK. How is that?

Captain SAFFORD. I have read about it in the newspapers.

Mr. CLARK. Well, that indicated that General Marshall regarded magic as being highly important, did it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. After the original winds message which disclosed that weather forecasting language was to be used as a code there was a great interest in all the group who had [9884] access to magic to know whether and when the winds execute message might come, was there not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I believe you had your people on a 24-hour basis?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And you were, I think, as you have expressed it, straining every fiber to pick this winds execute message out of the air?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Can you think of anything that the War and Navy Departments in those days just before Pearl Harbor, when so many people thought we were on the brink of war with Japan, considered of more interest or considered of more importance than the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the most important message we had up to the time of the pilot message on December 6.

Mr. CLARK. And it was so considered by the group who had the right to read magic?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And they were expecting or at least they were anxious to know whether the message came and when?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And I believe you have testified that you [9885] received this message and immediately put it in the process of handling and distribution and disposal just as in the case of all other magic?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; and in addition it was telephoned around to various people by Admiral Noyes and so far as I know that was the first time that had ever been done.

Mr. CLARK. Now, you say it was telephoned around. What do you mean?

Captain SAFFORD. I am afraid I am possibly giving second-hand information, but if the committee wants to hear it I will answer the question.

Mr. CLARK. I am very much obliged to you, Captain, but so far as I am concerned we can leave it out.

You put this particular message in course of distribution on the 4th of December?

Captain SAFFORD. I sent it originally up to Admiral Noyes with the expectation and belief that he was going to telephone it to a selected list of the same officials who received all other magic. He would not give it to the Army distribution list. He would only give it to the Navy.

Mr. CLARK. I am very sorry, I am not hearing you, for some reason, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. I sent the first winds execute message to the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes. It [9886] was my expectation and my belief at the time that he telephoned the substance of that message to somebody in the War Department who

was authorized to receive it and also to the naval aide to the President and to the various officials in the Navy Department who were entitled to receive magic information.

Mr. CLARK. Do you know whether he did telephone it or not?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know of my own direct knowledge.

Mr. CLARK. Well, now, the question I asked you, was whether you filed this for distribution in the same manner as other magic.

Captain SAFFORD. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. CLARK. The question was whether or not on the 4th day of December you filed this particular message for distribution in the same manner as other magic.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; we did that also.

Mr. CLARK. That is what I was asking you.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. That, of course, was 3 days before Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Can you think of any reason at all why this important message, this message of such wide interest [9887] shouldn't be immediately handled and distributed and examined and disposed of in exactly the same manner as all other magic?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. So far as you know that was done?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And if it was done then that message went immediately to the group of people we have just referred to as being entitled to receive magic?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Captain, will you tell me, please, exactly why this message made such an impression on your mind?

Captain SAFFORD. Because I expected to see a very strongly worded war warning sent out to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel as the direct result of receiving this winds execute message.

Mr. CLARK. But I am asking you about the impression that the message made on your mind, not your impression of what some naval officer might have been going to do.

Captain SAFFORD. I understand.

To me that message meant that the war would commence within two or three days in all probability, possibly Saturday, December 6, possibly Sunday, December 7. That was the best estimate that could be made as to the timing [9888] implied by a message of that nature.

Mr. CLARK. Now, can you think of any reason why it wouldn't have made exactly the same or very similar impression upon the minds of the members of this group who were so interested in that very question, too?

Captain SAFFORD. I can see no reason why it did not make the same impression on their minds.

Mr. CLARK. Well, it was almost bound to make the same impression?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[9889] Mr. CLARK. As a matter of just plain common sense.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. So that if the members of that group later denied having ever seen that message that could not be explained upon any theory that

it was not important, or that they were not interested, or that it didn't mean anything to them?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And their statement that they hadn't seen it would have to be knowing and willful?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, you have referred in your testimony to the fact that the only theory upon which you can explain what has happened, is that this message was destroyed to cover up mistakes; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I have given that implication.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir. Of course, it wouldn't have done any good to have destroyed the message and all records about the message, in the War Department unless it was also done in the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And in the Secretary of—well, it wouldn't be there.

[9890] No one in the Navy below the rank of Admiral Stark would rest under any duty or obligation or have any right to send a warning message to the commander of the fleet in the Pacific, would he?

Captain SAFFORD. The director of naval intelligence had always the authority to send out what we might call enemy information.

Mr. CLARK. Yes; but I am not talking about that.

Captain SAFFORD. He could not direct action to be taken.

Mr. CLARK. Pardon me. You referred here to the kind of a warning message that would put the Navy on the alert and have it ready for imminent war. No one below Admiral Stark would have the right to send that message without his knowledge?

Captain SAFFORD. Without his knowledge, except in an emergency.

Mr. CLARK. Well, there wouldn't be an emergency of that kind if he was in Washington?

Captain SAFFORD. If Admiral Stark was available no one junior to him would take that step.

Mr. CLARK. And he was available at that time.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; he was in his own office, so far as I know.

[9891] Mr. CLARK. So then, it comes down to the proposition that nobody below him in rank would have any duty to cut loose and notify the commander of the Pacific fleet as to something about war breaking out, would he?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Therefore, nobody below him in rank would have any motive for covering up any mistakes, would they?

Captain SAFFORD. It would be the duty of somebody below Admiral Stark to prepare a message of warning and submit it to Admiral Stark for approval and release.

Mr. CLARK. But what I am asking you is this; if that authority and that responsibility rested upon Admiral Stark, it wouldn't be neglect of duty for some man below him in rank not to have sent out that kind of message?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Therefore, there would be no mistake to be covered up, would there? I am talking about below Admiral Stark.

Captain SAFFORD. That question goes beyond anything I want to answer.

Mr. CLARK. Well, Captain, you are dealing with a very serious situation here, and I am submitting to you a fair question.

Captain SAFFORD. It is possible that some subordinate [9892] might have given Admiral Stark some very bad advice at that particular time. I don't know. That is only—

Mr. CLARK. Pardon me, Captain. I am confining myself to the sending of a warning, the kind that you have been talking about, not advice.

Now, I am asking you if it is true that it wouldn't be a mistake or a breach of duty for any man in the Navy Department below Admiral Stark to have failed to send that kind of a warning message?

Captain SAFFORD. You are right.

Mr. CLARK. And the same would be true in the Army as to everybody below General Marshall, wouldn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. You are right.

Mr. CLARK. So that the neglect of duty if there was any rested in the realms of Admiral Stark and General Marshall.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Captain, did you know that it was then and is now, a violation of the criminal law of the United States to secrete or remove or deface or destroy a public record?

Captain SAFFORD. I knew that in a general way.

Mr. CLARK. To have cleaned the record of the winds execute message of all reference to it in the War and Navy Departments, General Marshall and Admiral Stark would have [9893] had to violate the law?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And destroy public records?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, do you charge that they did that?

Captain SAFFORD. I am merely stating that not only the translation of the winds message is missing, but the intercepted messages of that time which were also public records are also missing and unaccounted for. I cannot go beyond that statement.

Mr. CLARK. You don't mean to make that kind of a charge?

Captain SAFFORD. I will not make that charge and I am not denying that charge.

Mr. CLARK. I am not asking you about denying it, I am asking you if you make that charge.

Captain SAFFORD. I understand.

Mr. CLARK. I ask you again whether or not you make such a charge against General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Captain SAFFORD. Not personally.

Mr. CLARK. What is that?

Captain SAFFORD. Not against them personally.

Mr. CLARK. Well, if you made it at all against them it would be personally, wouldn't it?

[9894] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Do you make any assertion to that effect against General Marshall and Admiral Stark?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Do you make any suggestion to that effect against them?

Captain SAFFORD. I am not going to make any suggestions of any sort.

Mr. CLARK. I beg your pardon?

Captain SAFFORD. I am not making suggestions of any sort.

Mr. CLARK. And you don't make any suspicion of that character against them?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; there is a suspicion.

Mr. CLARK. Against them?

Captain SAFFORD. Against them.

Mr. CLARK. And you as a witness before this committee are suggesting this suspicion?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; I am answering a question.

Mr. CLARK. Well, my question was whether or not you did suggest a suspicion against them.

Captain, on yesterday, the press carried pretty well throughout the country and the world the news that there was a suspicion cast in that direction by your testimony [9895] here.

I want to know from you, please, sir, whether by your appearance and testimony before this committee, you mean even to create the suspicion in the minds of the committee or the public that either General Marshall or Admiral Stark violated the law of this Nation by destroying a public record in order to cover up a mistake?

Captain SAFFORD. In—

Mr. CLARK. Let me add, I think you owe it to them and to yourself and to the public to make a frank statement in response to that question.

Captain SAFFORD. In my own mind that suspicion does exist.

Mr. CLARK. Captain, I have been impressed by your testimony that you are a man of fine ability. I believe you have been diligent and interested in your work. I don't mean to ask you an unusual question, or one that would be embarrassing, but I am a little perplexed, and consequently I want to ask this final question:

You have testified here to the existence of the winds execute message and have referred to a certain memorandum that might have been made in connection with it, and you have testified both the winds execute message and interception memorandum have disappeared from the face of the earth, but [9896] it seems from this record and all of the witnesses we have heard and the records in previous examinations, that there isn't a line of written evidence to corroborate your statement, or support it in any respect, nor is there a word of oral evidence to corroborate or support your statement in any respect, and, in fact, all those who would have had access to this message had it been distributed in the regular course in which magic was distributed have denied that they ever saw it.

Now, can you suggest any theory to me as a member of committee under which I might consistently accept your statement as being correct?

If so, I would like to have it.

Captain SAFFORD. I realize that my statements are diametrically opposite to the testimony that you have quoted.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Captain.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, I should like to develop a thought or two advanced by the able Congressman from North Carolina.

You stated definitely that you thought the message that came in on the 6th and 7th, known as the 14-parts message was an extremely important one as far as the breaking of [9897] our relations with Japan at that time was concerned?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In fact, that was more important, was it not, than the execute winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. It was more important to the State Department and to the White House, but not to the Navy Department.

Senator LUCAS. Well, of course, the Navy and War Departments would know about the 14-parts message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And did know about it?

Captain SAFFORD. Did know about it.

Senator LUCAS. Now, can you tell this committee, in view of your statement of the importance of this 14-parts message, why it is you have labored so long on the execute winds message, and yet on the 6th of December you left at 4:30 and never took any more interest in the 14-parts message?

Captain SAFFORD. I regarded my work as completed when that 14-part message had been intercepted, relayed to the Navy Department, broken down enough to see that we did have the correct key, with a minor change in it to make smooth language, my best watch officer available to process it, and the officer who was charged with responsibility was there and assured me he would stay with it until the distribution [9898] had been completed. I figured I could do no more. It merely expresses my confidence in the people under me.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have that same confidence in your people with respect to the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator LUCAS. And still have?

Captain SAFFORD. And still have.

Senator LUCAS. The point I am trying to develop in order that I might weigh your relative comparison of the importance of the two messages deals with the fact that you were extremely interested in the winds execute message, and that you labored overtime in order to try to get that message, and you did a great number of things after the message came in, as I recall, in order to see that it was properly delivered, as you say—that is correct, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; and also to make the final arrangements to set my own house in order before the war hit us.

Senator LUCAS. What do you mean by setting your own house in order?

Captain SAFFORD. We had a few codes and secret papers exposed to danger of capture in outlying stations. Everything that we could think of had been taken care of prior to that, [9899] which came within my cognizance and responsibility, had been completed prior to 4 p. m. on Saturday, December 6.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have a copy of this winds execute message for your own files?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not have a personal file.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have a file over which you had control, to which you had access, in your department where this message was filed?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; in Captain Kramer's file.

Senator LUCAS. You had access to Captain Kramer's file where the winds execute message was filed?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How long did you have access to that file after the winds execute message came in on December 4?

Captain SAFFORD. Up until the 15th of February 1942.

Senator LUCAS. The 15th of February 1942?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, was there ever any discussion with you and anyone else in the Navy up to that time about this winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. There was not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever have occasion to go to that file and investigate up until the time you left to see whether it was there?

[9900] Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How was that?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; I never checked it one way or the other.

[9901] Senator LUCAS. You did not?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Didn't you say something in your original statement to the committee about examining that file in the presence of Ingersoll and some other men when they were getting ready to submit the file to the Roberts Commission?

Captain SAFFORD. About the 15th of December 1941 Captain Kramer brought in to me a special folder of messages leading up to Pearl Harbor which he was preparing to give, to show or give to Admiral Noyes, and as I understood it to be given or shown to the Roberts Commission. In fact, I think the order came down from Admiral Noyes to prepare this special folder. I checked it over with Kramer to see that it was reasonably complete, that we had the important messages there, and that we did not have a lot of unimportant messages there. I believe that I suggested no change. I approved what Kramer had and it was sent up to Admiral Noyes.

Senator LUCAS. Why would Kramer discuss that with you?

Captain SAFFORD. As verification of his own judgment before he gave it to Admiral Noyes because I was very familiar with events.

Senator LUCAS. And now you state that in your opinion this execute winds message was in this folder that Captain Kramer discussed with you?

[9902] Captain SAFFORD. In my opinion and to the best of my recollection the winds execute message was in that folder I have just described.

Senator LUCAS. What other messages were in that folder?

Captain SAFFORD. There was the pilot message, the 14-part message, the 1 p. m. message, there was this message from Tokyo to Berlin which had been introduced in testimony, every message that was in that folder, I believe, has been introduced as evidence.

Senator LUCAS. Did you personally examine each and every one of the messages?

Captain SAFFORD. I looked through each one to see if it read up and told a complete story.

Senator LUCAS. And again you saw the wind execute message, these same figures of speech, that you witnessed on the day the message came in?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. That is, the English. There was no Japanese there at all.

Senator LUCAS. That is your best recollection?

Captain SAFFORD. That is my best recollection.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, when you received this execute message you telephoned Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; I sent it up to him by an office messenger.

[9903] Senator LUCAS. Yes, and you do not recall what subordinate in your office took it?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall which particular subordinate took it up.

Senator LUCAS. What happened after that, Captain, with respect to that message?

Captain SAFFORD. The next thing with respect to the message, about an hour later Admiral Noyes called me on the office inter-phone, which did not go through a switchboard, and told me that we had better tell Guam to destroy all their excess codes and ciphers.

Senator LUCAS. Did he say anything about the execute message in that telephone conversation?

Captain SAFFORD. He did not specifically mention it.

Senator LUCAS. Wasn't that a little strange, for Admiral Noyes not to speak about this message in view of its importance?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not think it strange, no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, did you do any more with respect to that execute message after that?

Captain SAFFORD. When Kramer commenced his daily routine delivery at noon, he took in one folder, as had been his practice, to let me look at it and tell me the high lights of the news, and that message was present at that time.

Senator LUCAS. Did you make any further inquiry about it [9904] in view of the importance of it?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And no one ever talked to you about it after until these investigations started?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And it was how many years after you first saw the message until someone first started discussing it with you?

Captain SAFFORD. Approximately 2 years.

Senator LUCAS. Approximately 2 years?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. During that time you have been exceedingly busy in connection with the prosecution of the war, have you not?

Captain SAFFORD. I have been attending my duties in the prosecution of the war.

Senator LUCAS. Well, with whom did you first discuss it in 1943?

Captain SAFFORD. I probably first discussed it with Commander Lynn, who was serving in my office, and who had been on duty before Pearl Harbor and had been working with these magic messages.

Senator LUCAS. Did he recall it?

Captain SAFFORD. He thought he knew about it, but said [9905] he had never seen it.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, it was hearsay with him?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. He could have received that information from you because he was on duty there with you?

Captain SAFFORD. He could have received it from me at the time of Pearl Harbor, either before or afterward.

Senator LUCAS. Now, when did you next talk about this message and to whom?

Captain SAFFORD. Any time that I came in contact with anybody who had been on duty in the War and Navy Departments, prior to Pearl Harbor, and might have been expected to have first-hand knowledge of the winds message, I talked to them to see what they could remember. I remember I specifically talked to Colonel Rowlett.

Senator LUCAS. What did he say?

Captain SAFFORD. He said he knew about it in office gossip, but had not seen it himself.

Senator LUCAS. Would he be one of the individuals who should have seen it?

Captain SAFFORD. He normally would not have, because he was interested in decoding and breaking down the Japanese cipher systems.

[9906] Senator LUCAS. Why did you talk to him about it?

Captain SAFFORD. Because he was one of the officers who had more direct contact with all officers at that time. He had been serving throughout the war there. I knew him personally. And there was a chance he might have been shown it or knew something about it.

Senator LUCAS. Did you talk to Captain Kramer about it at that time? He was the individual who translated it. Did you talk to him?

Captain SAFFORD. Captain Kramer at that time was at Pearl Harbor, and later on he went to the South Pacific. He was not available to talk to.

Senator LUCAS. Did you communicate with Captain Kramer about this winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. I wrote him one letter asking him if he could recall anything about it, and, if so, please let me know.

Senator LUCAS. When was that, sir?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know. It was about December, I would say, 1943; possibly January 1944.

Senator LUCAS. Do you have a copy of that letter?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not have a copy of that letter.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know whether Captain Kramer has the original?

[9907] Captain SAFFORD. I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall what you said?

Captain SAFFORD. I asked him about the winds message and asked him if he could recall it because we were looking for it.

Senator LUCAS. Whatever you said in that letter, Captain, at that time, would probably be your best recollection of what happened in connection with the winds message, would it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Your memory would be better then than it is now, would it not?

Captain SAFFORD. As far as that aspect was concerned.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, whatever happened with respect to the winds message when you wrote to Captain Kramer, your memory would be more reflective to what actually hapened, than it would be now?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And if, in that letter you said the whole thing was somewhat vague and uncertain—I don't know whether it did or not, I haven't seen the letter, but maybe we can get it—that would be true, would it not?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I did not go into details at all.

[9908] Senator LUCAS. I see.

Captain SAFFORD. And I did not want to suggest anything to Kramer. I was trying to ask a question.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

Is Captain Kramer in the room?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Do you have that letter, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I do. I made it available to counsel, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. May I see it?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Baecher has a photostatic copy of it.

[9909] Senator LUCAS. Will counsel mark this as an exhibit and put it in the record? Or maybe read it into the record, that might be better. Submit it to the Captain and ask him about it.

(Document referred to handed to the witness.)

Senator LUCAS. Captain, have you seen this letter dated December 22, 1943?

Captain SAFFORD. I have, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Is that the letter you wrote Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the letter I wrote to Kramer.

Senator LUCAS. Did Kramer ever reply to that letter, do you know?

Captain SAFFORD. He gave me a reply.

Senator LUCAS. Do you have the reply?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not have the reply.

Senator LUCAS. How is that?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not.

Senator LUCAS. Why? Where is it, do you know?

Captain SAFFORD. That was destroyed some time ago, after I took the information out, what little he was able to give me.

Senator LUCAS. That is, you mean you destroyed the letter?

Captain SAFFORD. I destroyed the letter.

[9910] Senator LUCAS. Well, you say in this letter:

My dear Kramer-San.

What does the "San" mean?

Captain SAFFORD. That is Japanese for "envoy." "My dear Envoy Kramer."

Senator LUCAS. I see; that is the Japanese word for "envoy."

I am preparing a secret paper covering events which took place the early part of December 1941. I am getting all the help that I can from Linn and from such records as are still available.

Now, why were you preparing that record?

Captain SAFFORD. For one thing I had been ordered by the Director of Naval Communications to prepare a history of radio intelligence up to and including the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. Had anything been said to you at that time about the winds execute message or the 14-part message by any individuals who were your superiors in the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, the winds execute message was not a controversial matter at the time you wrote this letter?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

[9911] Senator LUCAS. You say:

I am getting all the help that I can from Linn and from such records as are still available. My memory is bad as to details.

Was that true of the winds execute message at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. That is true on the details. You will see I had not been able to establish the date at that time, the exact date. I knew it within 2 or 3 days.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the date is a detail but something else would be details, would it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

My memory is bad as to details, which is the reason for preparing this memorandum, and I have forgotten or am very vague as to certain things which I clearly recalled a year ago.

What do you mean by that?

Captain SAFFORD. That in the course of time I did not remember as well at that time at the end of 2 years after Pearl Harbor as at the end of 1 year after Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, when you wrote this letter you had no reason whatsoever for talking about the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. Only incidentally, as you will see [9912] later on the second page.

Senator LUCAS. But there was no controversy at that time as to whether or not a winds execute message was ever received or whether it was missing or anything of that kind?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. It could not be located but I was concerned mostly with the time of delivery of the 14-part message.

Senator LUCAS. And at that time, up to December 1943, which was 2 years after the war started, you had never discussed the execute winds message with anyone?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I had discussed that with Kramer 6 or 8 months previously, before he went to Pearl Harbor. We did not look for it. We just discussed the significance of general things. We discussed everything and I believe the winds message came up.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. I am talking about the details now of the winds execute message. You did not go into that, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. We did not go into the details particularly.

Senator LUCAS. You just talked about it in a general way?

Captain SAFFORD. In a general way.

Senator LUCAS. You further say:

[9913] I realize that your reply will have to be censored and therefore you must be guarded as to what you state. Also, I am phrasing my questions very carefully, in the event that my letter might fall into unauthorized hands.

What did you mean by "unauthorized hands"?

Captain SAFFORD. There is always danger of mail miscarrying, particularly in war.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

I am saving a copy of my letter so it will be merely necessary to give the question number and a brief answer, which should not disclose anything to an outsider.

Then you go ahead and ask a series of questions which apparently have nothing to do with the winds execute message at all.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Then on the second page you ask this question:

Did you ever tell Admiral W. what you told me?

Who was that, Admiral W.?

Captain SAFFORD. That was Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator LUCAS. What were you talking about there?

Captain SAFFORD. That had reference to informing Secretary Knox about the significance of the times; that 1 [9914] o'clock Washington time was approximately sunrise at Pearl Harbor and around the middle of the night in the Far East.

Senator LUCAS. That is, you were talking to Kramer about that in this message?

Captain SAFFORD. I was asking him—he had told me that some time before and I was asking him if he had told Admiral Wilkinson about that.

Senator LUCAS. What was his reply when he wrote you?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know for certain. I believe he said that he had.

Senator LUCAS. Why did you destroy that letter, Captain? You have been talking about a good many things that have been destroyed around here in the Navy and Army and I am anxious to know why you destroyed that letter?

Captain SAFFORD. That all went into my testimony before Admiral Hart. It became a matter of official record then.

Senator LUCAS. That is, the letter itself?

Captain SAFFORD. No, the facts of the statements in the answer.

Senator LUCAS. I know but that does not answer my question. I am asking you why you destroyed the letter in answer to these questions?

Captain SAFFORD. Because I had the evidence that I wanted and I could see no purpose in retaining it.

[9915] Senator LUCAS. I see. In other words, you obtained the evidence—

Captain SAFFORD. The information.

Senator LUCAS. How is that?

Captain SAFFORD. I obtained the information, such information as Kramer could give me.

Senator LUCAS. You obtained the information through other sources after that that you had requested Captain Kramer to send to you, is that it?

Captain SAFFORD. I beg your pardon?

Senator LUCAS. I was wondering whether you mean to tell the committee that you had obtained this same information you were requesting from Captain Kramer through other sources?

Captain SAFFORD. No. Some of these things Kramer was the only one who could possibly tell me, as to his movements on the night of the 6th of December.

Senator LUCAS. You asked him in question 17:

When did Admiral W. first see or learn about Part 14 and other papers?

18.

We can't find the original "Weather Report" (sent on Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?

What was that weather report?

Captain SAFFORD. That is what we now call the winds [9916] message.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

We can't find the original "Weather Report" (sent on Dec. 5th.) and its translation. What became of it?

What did he say when he wrote back?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer had that confused with the—I think it was with the hidden word message which was received on December 6th. Anyhow, he said it came in—on December 7th. He replied that it came in on the morning of December 7th after 10 o'clock and was given out on the delivery trip which ended up at Secretary Hull's office at 11 a. m. on Sunday.

Senator LUCAS. Why would Kramer be confused about this message? He was the fellow who translated it, wasn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. He had not seen it for a long time.

Senator LUCAS. Well, but you are asking Captain Kramer there in question 18 for information on the weather report which, as you say, was the winds execute message sent on December the 5th?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. And its translation, you asked what became of it and you say that he did not understand that question?

Captain SAFFORD. His answer was that it came in on the [9917] morning of December 7th and was distributed in the morning of December 7th.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, isn't that the false weather message that actually did come in at that time? ¹

Captain SAFFORD. The only thing of that nature which was distributed on the morning of December 7th was this hidden word code which said, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations," or something like that.

Senator LUCAS. That is the one that he was talking about. That is the one he was talking about when he replied to you.

Captain SAFFORD. When he replied to me.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, Now, certainly if there had been an important message, an important message that you claim came in on December 5th, which was known as the winds execute message, with all the furore that we now find about this winds execute message don't you think that Captain Kramer would have been able to reply direct to that question 18 and give you some definite information as to what happened to the so-called winds execute message as you designate here as the "weather report"?

Captain SAFFORD. Not necessarily.

¹ See memorandum from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5304.

Senator LUCAS. Was everybody out of step here but you, [9918]
Captain, in this matter?

Captain SAFFORD. I wrote to Captain Welker after VJ-day to see if he could recall anything about it. The letter apparently was lost in a typhoon. I wrote to him some time later and he replied that he not only could not remember it, that he had done nothing whatsoever about it. In other words, it was completely erased from his memory.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I cannot quite understand a number of these ciphers and letters that are in here. Did you have a sort of code between you and Captain Kramer that you were operating under?

Captain SAFFORD. May I see what you are referring to?

Senator LUCAS. Here is a memorandum that was prepared for Captain Safford by Commander Kramer or Captain Kramer in response to a letter written by Captain Safford in December 1943. You take a look at that, Captain, and see whether or not that is a true and correct copy of the letter you received from Captain Kramer.

Captain SAFFORD. That looks like it.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, look at the answer to question 18, Captain, and give the committee the information here as to what Captain Kramer meant by that answer.

Captain SAFFORD. May I see the original letter, please?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir. You want to see Captain [9919]
Kramer's letter?

Mr. KAUFMAN. His own letter.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; that is, your own letter you want to see.

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

The first one of the quotes was not as indicated in parentheses, but as indicated in Item 10-c above,

and that refers to messages which were delivered by Kramer on the morning of December 7, 1941.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Well, now, do you believe that Kramer's memory was as good as yours about this winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought it was or I would not have asked him.

Senator LUCAS. That is exactly what I thought. In other words, you were not certain of your own memory at that time with respect to what happened to the weather report which is known as the winds execute message and you were making inquiry from Kramer to see whether or not he knew anything about it and you were asking him for this information in order to rely upon it or to aid you in fixing a definite opinion as to what did happen to this message?

Captain SAFFORD. As to the disposition of it; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. As to the disposition of the message; [9920]
yes. Now, was there any man in the Navy Department more interested in the winds execute message than Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. That was myself and higher authority. I was responsible for its interception and if I had missed its interception and its interception would have been humanly possible I would have been held to blame. Kramer was only responsible for its brief translation, which took a matter of a minute or two and its subsequent distribution. He took no other personal action on it.

Senator LUCAS. I understand, but Captain Kramer was the individual who translated this message from Japanese into English?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Captain Kramer is the individual when he translated it would have known, if his position was the same as yours, that war was definite with Japan as a result of it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And is there any question in your mind that a message of that kind would make any lighter impression upon Kramer than it did upon you?

Captain SAFFORD. I discussed that matter with Kramer in the spring of 1943 before he left Washington to go to Hawaii and he recalled it and his impression or memory and mine agreed as to the fact of its interception, not the date. I do not [9921] think we said specifically what date. It was a few days before Pearl Harbor, I think that is as close as we came, but that we received it and what its significance was.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, and what its significance was, you discussed that?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. And notwithstanding that, later in the fall you are still asking him for information?

Captain SAFFORD. One question out of eighteen.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, but that is the big question, Captain, in this entire proceeding here right now. In one question out of eighteen you say but that is the only one that I am vitally interested in, sir.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And it goes without saying that you were still looking for some information about this message or you never would have written to Kramer, and the fact of the matter is at that time there was no execute winds message in controversy at all insofar as the Navy Department is concerned.

Captain SAFFORD. When I had talked about that message with Kramer in the spring of 1943 neither of us had the slightest knowledge that we would not find everything pertaining to that winds message in the files.

Senator LUCAS. Are you certain that when you talked to [9922] Kramer in the spring that you did not have in mind the same answer that he gave you in this letter, where he specifically refers to the message that came in on the 7th?

Captain SAFFORD. I am positive.

Senator LUCAS. Why would he put that in writing? Why would he answer about a completely different message than what you were inquiring about? Does his memory play him tricks, too?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot understand. I was very surprised when I received that answer because the other answers I got just as I expected.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, of all of the questions that you asked him here, which were nineteen in all, in your letter of December the 22d, the only answer that came back from Kramer which was wrong was No. 18, dealing with the implementing winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the only one in which I was disappointed.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the only one you were disappointed in?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. And it was at complete variance with the question, his answer was at complete variance with the question propounded by you?

[9923] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that those letters be incorporated in the record at this point?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I was going to suggest that they be copied by the reporter in full at this point in the record. It will be so ordered. Counsel will please supply the reporter with the two letters and they will be spread on the record in full at this point.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The offer will be a letter from Captain Safford to Captain Kramer dated the 22d of December 1943, a memorandum from Captain Kramer to Captain Safford dated 28 December 1943 and a letter from Captain Safford to Captain Kramer dated 22 January 1944.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; it will be so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 22 December 1943.

MY DEAR KRAMER-SAN: I am preparing a secret paper covering events which took place the early part of December, 1941. I am getting all the help that I can from Linn and from such records as are still [9924] available. My memory is bad as to details, which is the reason for preparing this memorandum, and I have forgotten or am very vague as to certain things which I clearly recalled a year ago. I am writing to you to ask you to help me as far as you may be able to do so.

I realize that your reply will have to be censored and therefore you must be guarded as to what you state. Also, I am phrasing my questions very carefully, in the event that my letter might fall into authorized hands. I am saving a copy of my letter so it will be merely necessary to give the question number and a brief answer, which should not disclose anything to an outsider.

With reference to events on December 6, 1941:

1. What time did you see Mr. R. that evening and show him the papers?
2. Was Mr. H. there or was he called in, or did you see him first and go over to Mr. R. with him?
3. What time did you see Admiral S. that evening and show him the papers?
4. If answer to 3 is negative, how and when was Admiral S. first informed?
5. How and when was Admiral W. first informed?
6. Linn remembers that you stayed till after 1 a. m. What time did you leave the Navy Building and go home?
- [9925] 7. What time did you get down to the Navy Building the next morning? (Brotherhood said it was sometime after 0700).
8. What time did you see Mr. R. that morning and show him the new papers?
9. Was Mr. H. there or was he called in?
10. My check shows you had Part 14 plus another paper setting the conference time at 1 p. m. Do you recall taking any other papers with you, and can you give me a hint as to their contents?
11. Were Mr. K. and Mr. S. called in that morning or were they notified in any way?
12. How long did you stay with Mr. R.?
13. When did you see Admiral S. that morning?
14. With reference to a certain conference held that morning, do you know who attended it and how long it lasted?

With regards to what happened afterwards:

15. Did you ever tell Admiral W. what you told me?
16. Or McCollum, or anyone else?
17. When did Admiral W. first see or learn about Part 14 and other papers?
18. We can't find the original "Weather Report" (sent Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?

19. Can you offer any pertinent remarks?

Things seem running better out at the Annex now that [9926] Wright is here. I think he has done a marvelous job of creating order out of chaos, but his task is by no means finished.

I hope you are enjoying the balmy climate of Hawaii. I certainly think that you, personally, have benefitted by the change of duty.

Please give my regards to Dyer, Huckins, Williams, and the others.

With best wishes for the Holidays,

Sincerely,

L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Commander A. D. KRAMER, U. S. N.,
Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER,
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,
COMMANDANT, NAVY 128,

% Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif., 28 December 1943.

Memorandum for Capt. Safford

1510 First indications of arrival

2100 Completed. Left after phoning to locate Adm B., Adm. T., Col. B. of M. I. D., Adm. W., etc.

1. Did not, personally, but left with one of Adm. B's [9927] ass'ts in the situation room on Penn Ave. with positive instructions re-urgency (to be delivered at once). He was entertaining at the time, but I learned later in the evening he had seen it.

2. No, on all counts. Army was taking care of that and I know only that he knew of it by 2230 (see item 9) and possibly had seen it % Col. B. by then.

3. Did not. (See items 4 and 5.)

4. Believe Item 5 phoned that eve (see next). Possibly Adm. T. did too. I know he saw it as soon as he reached office next A. M. (about 0900).

5. At 2105 by phone to his home where he was entertaining Adm. B and others, told him what I planned to do. His chief concern was getting it to Item 1 and 2, which are covered above. Arrived at his home at 2320 where he, and Adm. B. also, saw it and were informed re-others, particularly Item 1. I don't recall whether B then phoned re-Item 1 to check delivery or not. Believe at this time Item 5 phoned 3.

6. Left Item 5 place about 0030, stopped by, then proceeded.

7. About 0730.

8. Did not personally, but left first batch about 0945, 2nd about 1100 at Item 8 house, c/o Adm. B.

9. No.; at his office. Item 11 (first one) was shown it [9928] at his home about 2200 previous night and he made a number of phone calls including Item 2. Meeting was then arranged for Item 2, 11 (both) and others at Item 2 office at 10:00 A. M. where I was instructed to be with it and anything else. Meeting held at 1000 as scheduled and new items (1st batch) delivered together with old. Col. B. was on hand there too for Item 11 (second).

10. (a) I don't recall precisely how our friend's numbers ran in the hundreds (or thousands) but in units from about 02 to 09 or 10.

(b) The first few of these, NOT including first sentence last half this item, were on hand by 0900 and were completed and being delivered at 0945 (to Item 8) and 1000 (see Items 9 above). Item 5, 3, T, and others got them about 0930 at a meeting held in Item 3 office.

(c) On returning about 1020 from Item 9 office the remainder of #02-10 were arriving, including this item, i. e., 1st sentence last half, and also quotes in Item 18. These were delivered to all hands, including Items 11 (both) at Item 2 office by 1100 with my comments to Item 11 (first one) on how the hour tied with the sun, and moves in progress, elsewhere.

11. Yes. See 9 and 10 above.

12. Did not. See 8 above.

[9929] 13. About 0900 at his office with others, and left night before matters. 1st batch of new given about 0940, 2nd about 1045 (all this was not personal but via his senior aide because of meeting in progress. They were passed in to him promptly however.)

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14. There were 2 I know of, and I believe another c/o Col. B. The one in Item 9 above was at least 1½ hours. Another started about 0900 with 10, 11, 12, 16, 20, and others there, lasting to 1130 that I know of, and probably later.

15-16. Reference obscure. Would you clarify? If regeneral security (i. e. lack) late in spring, yes.

17. See Items 13 and 14 above.

18. The first one of the " " was not as indicated in parentheses, but as indicated in Item 10-c above. It went into Z files. GL should have it now unless it was among files turned over to Army.

19. For the most part covered above, until Item 15 (16) is clarified."

[9930]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 22 January 1944.

My dear KRAMER-SAN: Thanks for your very prompt reply. I did not receive your Dec. 28th letter until Jan. 17th, and had almost given up hopes. What a break for you, as well as the cause, to be ordered to Admiral Halsey's staff. I can see the hand of Providence in it.

I am sending by separate cover (air mail) a condensation code to use. If you want to add to it, use numbers #151-#200 inclusive. I would like to hold it down to a single sheet of paper. I am also sending by ordinary mail a copy of #35 and a clipping to give to #42 at some auspicious occasion. You will understand this letter better when they arrive.

With regard to taking #42 into confidence, wait patiently for the proper moment, and then shoot the works. Tell him everything he will listen to and show him whatever documentary proof you may have. Use your own judgment and don't force the issue. Do as good a job as you did on #136 and #137. In my opinion the proper moment for disclosure would be any of the following:

- [9931] (a) #42 is detached from Sopac
(b) #5 is detached from Sopac;
(c) #10 is detached from Sopac;
(d) #9 calls on #42 or #10;
(e) #18 calls on #42 or #10;
(f) #42 discusses #31 or attack on #92 in your presence;
(g) #42 asks you the reason for the alleged failure of 20-G to know what was going on;
(h) #137 (plus 3 years);
(i) #6 visits #42;
(j) #42 visits #6.

Be prudent and be patient. I am just beginning to get things lined up on this end. No one in #15 can be trusted. Premature action would only tip off the people who framed #31 and #32, and will also get #8 and #10 into very serious trouble. Yet we must have the backing, the rank, and the prestige afforded by #42. Tell #42 that I knew #31 was a scapegoat from the start, but I did not suspect that he was victim of a frame-up until about #114 (plus 2 years), could not confirm it until #132 (plus 2 years), and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1944. #8 has overwhelming proof of the guilt of #15 and #65 plus a list of about fifteen reliable witnesses.

[9932] Please answer the following questions by Item No.:

20. Re your Item #2, is Col. B. #59?

21. What or whose job in the Navy did Col. B.'s job correspond to?

22. Do you know what Army officers were notified or shown the papers by Col. B., and when?

In amplification of my Items #15 and #16:

I recall your telling me that you saw #2 about 0900 (EST) on #137.

He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God! This means War!"

You said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months."

#3 continued, "I must get word to #31", and picked up a message blank.

Then another idea entered his mind, and he said, "Does #53 know of this?"

You replied, "Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (#77) was sent over ten minutes ago and should be on the General's desk now."

#3 dropped the message blank and reached for the telephone.

(End of your tale.)

23. Can you verify or correct the foregoing?

24. Did #3 get #53 on the telephone and what did he [9933] say?
25. Were there any other witnesses; If so, who?
26. Did you tell #9 or #5, or anyone else?
(Be sure to tell Admiral Halsey—when the time comes.)
27. Re your Item #15 and #16. What do you mean by "general security" (i. e. lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway? Incidentally, tell the full story of this to #42 and explain that #5 tried to stop the prosecution and attending publicity but #24 insisted (to give Publicity to himself and to #25) and was backed up by #29 and #28.
28. Do you know if any of the following were called as witnesses by #36?
(a) #5
(b) #9
(c) #10
(d) #6
29. Were the JD files in GZ custody or any message from these files ever submitted to #36?
30. Were #5, #9, #10, or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of #136 and #137 or the investigations conducted by #36? In this connection, I am sending you #35 by ordinary ship's mail. [9934] I will comment on it in further correspondence.
31. Do you know when and how #53 first got the news of #75 and #76, and what action he took?
32. Same for #77 and #78.
33. Re my #14. I meant the conference on #137 between #3 and #53 which resulted in #89. I did not know of the other conferences and am delighted to learn of them. Can you add any names to those already given by you for:
34. The one in #2 office?
35. The one in #3 office?
36. The one "% Col. B."?
37. The one between #3 and #53?
38. How much does #9 know?
39. Will #9 come through willingly?
40. What is your estimate of #5 in this respect?
41. Will he talk for #42?
42. What about #6?

COMMENT

With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 and your Items 18 and 10 (c), you were describing #80, of which we have copies of the original and its translation in the GZ files. This was sent and received on #137. I was asking about #74 which was broadcast at 0430 (EST) on #134 or #135. (Not sure of exact date.) It was heard by "M" and "W" and sent in by [9935] teletype. It was unheard by "S", "H", and "C", who listened for it. (I have this from the Station "A" files, plus statements of #19 and #23.) This message (in Morse) included the words—"Higashi no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare. (Negative form of kita no kaze Kumori)" The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 or #73, but was a mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early and verified it. Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (?) were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, "Here it is!" We had been waiting for it and Station "S" had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype.

As a result of #74, #9 prepared #90—which was a very long message ending up with the translation and significance of the warning in #74. I read the message in #7's office and was witness to the discussion of it between #7 and #5. I took for granted that #90 would be sent and did not know otherwise until #132 (plus 2 years). I believe that I told you about this message and stated that it had been sent. Anyway, I was living in a fool's paradise from #134 to #137. I learned from #19 that #9 knew #90 had not been sent (#19 was informed by #9 at #92).

MORE QUESTIONS

43. Do you recall #74?
[9936]
44. Did you know any or all of the circumstances of #90, how much, and when did you learn it?

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45. When did #9 learn that #90 had not been released?

46. Do you know who blocked #90 or refused to release it? (#5 was pushing it but apparently did not feel he had the authority to release it himself.)

47. Can you throw any other light on the subject?

* * * * *

One final word—I do not know how well you knew #18. I have known him for 18 years. He can be trusted and will come through for us. Get in touch with him out there if you can.

Well, this is about enough for one installment. Please give my best regards to any of my friends that you may run into out there.

Sincerely,

/s/ L. F. Safford
L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Commander ALWIN D. KRAMER, U. S. N.,
COMSOPAC Staff, c/o F. P. O. San Francisco, Calif.

(NOTE.—Enclosed with the above letter dated January 22, 1944 were the following excerpts from an article in the Saturday Evening Post dated December 25, 1943.)

[9937]

Four-Star Sea Dog

By J. Bryan, III Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.

Cusser extraordinary, tattooed like any other gob, one-time owner of a parrot, bluff Buck Halsey, commander of our South Pacific Fleet, is the saltiest admiral of them all.

* * * * *

There is only one flaw in his role. When he retires, it won't be to the sailor's usual farm, but to Alexandria, Virginia. He bought a house there in 1939, but has never had time to live in it. His friends doubt his intentions "to play golf and do nothing else—nothing!" They believe that he will not relax until he has discharged a duty of his own assumption. They can cite the day, even the hour, when he assumed it—eight P. M. on December 8, 1941.

His flagship, the *Enterprise*, had reached Pearl Harbor that afternoon, and Halsey had stepped off his barge into a sucking undertow of accusations against Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, then commander in chief of the United States Fleet.

"Sound asleep," the murmurs said. "Criminal negligence—court-martial." Halsey's devotion to Kimmel, an Annapolis classmate, is almost religious. He was shocked to see him cast as a scapegoat. When the Roberts Committee of Investigation asked Halsey how he, almost alone, happened to be ready for the Japanese attack, his answer was, "Because of one man—Admiral Kimmel." It would surprise none of Halsey's friends if, on retirement, he applied himself to Kimmel's exoneration.

(The above article also included a photograph of Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., with the following caption: "Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr., who restored public confidence in the Navy and gave a fearful drubbing to the mushrooming myth of Japanese invincibility," beneath which appeared the following typewritten note:)

JANUARY 19, 1944.

MY DEAR KRAMER: When the proper time comes, show the above to Admiral Halsey as a sort of letter of introduction. Assure him that his ambition will come true. And it will not be necessary for him to wait until his retirement to see Admiral Kimmel completely exonerated. But we will need Admiral Halsey's help. Do not hesitate to tell him everything.

Sincerely,

(S) L. F. Safford
L. F. SAFFORD.

[9938].

SECRET

Air-mail code for personal correspondence, January 21, 1944

#1—Mr. Roosevelt
#2—Mr. Hull
#3—Ad. Stark
#4—Ad. Ingersoll
#5—Ad. Wilkinson
#6—Ad. T.
#7—Ad. N.
#8—Safford
#9—McCollum
#10—Kramer
#11—Mr. Knox (#11—first
#12—Linn
#13—
#14—
#15—Opnav
#16—Nav. Intell.
#17—Nav. Comm.
#18—Rochefort
#19—Wright
#20—Dyer
#21—Huckins
#22—Holtwick
#23—Mason
#24—Big JRR
#25—Little JRR
#26—Wenger
#27—Goggins
#28—Ad. King
#29—Ad. Horne
#30—Ad. Nimitz
#31—Ad. Kimmel
#32—Gen. Short
#33—Ad. Bloch
#34—Ad. Hart
#35—Roberts Report
#36—Roberts Commission
#37—Chief Justice Roberts
#38—Ad. Standley
#39—Ad. Reeves
#40—Gen. McCoy
#41—Gen. McNarney
#42—Admiral Halsey
#43—Ad. Beardall
#44—White House Aide
[9939] #45—Aide to CNO
#46—CincAF
#47—Com 16
#48—Comsopac
#49—Cincpac
#50—Com 14
#51—
#52—
#53—Gen. Marshall
#54—Deputy Chief of Staff
#55—D. M. I.
#56—D. W. P.
#57—C. S. O. (Gen. O.)
#58—Minckler
#59—Brattan (?)

#60—Dowd
#61—Mr. Stimson (#11 last)
#62—Rowlett
#63—Adjutant General
#64—Chief of Air Corps
#65—General Staff
#66—M. I. D.
#67—Signal Corps
#68—
#69—J-19
#70—Machine
#71—Minor System
#72—Circular #2353 (Sets up #74)
#73—Circular #2354 (Sets up #74)
#74—General Intelligence Broadcast
containing false "Weather
Report"
#75—Serial #901 (Sets up #902)
#76—Serial #902 (1-13) (The Works)
#77—Serial #902 (14) (The Finale)
#78—Serial #907 (1:00 p. m.)
#79—Circular #2409 (Sets up #80)
#80—Circular #2494 (PL code msg.)
#81—Tokyo Circular #
#82—Tokyo-Washington Serial #
#83—Washington-Tokyo Serial #
#84—Tokyo-Berlin Serial #
#85—Tokyo-Hsinking Serial #
#86—Hsinking-Hongkong Serial #
#87—Message sent on date indicated
#88—Message indicated by following
ref. No.

[9940] #89—*

#90—**
#91—Washington
#92—Pearl Harbor
#93—Guadalcanal
#94—London
#95—Corregidor
#96—Singapore
#97—Melbourne
#98—Tokyo
#99—Berlin
#100—Rome
#101—
#102—
#103—
#104—Nomura
#105—Kurusu
#106—Gen. Umedzu (Hsinking)
#107—Jap. Prime Minister
#108—Gaimudaljin
#109—The Son of Heaven
#110—
#111—Oct. 16, 1941
#112—Nov. 6, 1941
#113—Nov. 14, 1941
#114—Nov. 15, 1941
#115—Nov. 16, 1941

* Message described in par. 50 (Page 9—XI of #85).

** Message to #31 originated by #9 on #134 (or #135) but never released.

Air-mail code for personal correspondence, January 21, 1944—Continued

#116—Nov. 17, 1941
 #117—Nov. 18, 1941
 #118—Nov. 19, 1941
 #119—Nov. 20, 1941
 #120—Nov. 21, 1941
 #121—Nov. 22, 1941
 #122—Nov. 23, 1941
 #123—Nov. 24, 1941
 #124—Nov. 25, 1941
 #125—Nov. 26, 1941
 #126—Nov. 27, 1941
 #127—Nov. 28, 1941

#128—Nov. 29, 1941
 #129—Nov. 30, 1941
 #130—
 #131—Dec. 1, 1941
 #132—Dec. 2, 1941
 [9941] #133—Dec. 3, 1941
 #134—Dec. 4, 1941
 #135—Dec. 5, 1941
 #136—Dec. 6, 1941
 #137—Dec. 7, 1941
 #138—1325 (EST) Dec. 7, 1941

[9942] Senator LUCAS. Well, I am not going to direct any questions to the witness on this letter of January 22. It is at some length and I think perhaps counsel should make some study of it over the noon hour and see whether there are any questions in it that are material and pertinent to ascertain.

Captain, I want to examine you just a moment or two on the first statement that you made in your statement to his committee. You state: "There was a winds message, it meant war and we knew it meant war."

Who do you include in that word "we"?

Captain SAFFORD. The people who were working on magic and whom I was in close enough touch with to be able to know how they viewed it.

Senator LUCAS. Name those people, please.

Captain SAFFORD. That would be Kramer—myself first, Kramer, McCollum, Admiral Wilkinson, and possibly Admiral Noyes.

Senator LUCAS. Possibly Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Now, those are the five that you have named here when you give out this statement that goes to the press of the country and you want the people of this country to know that you claim that this message meant war, and by that you would have to imply at least that they received the message and that they knew about it at the time. Is that [9943] what you want to tell the committee?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Is that it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How can all these fellows be wrong, Captain, when they say they never saw this winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot explain other people.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you never had any trouble with Captain McCollum, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You were on good terms with him?

Captain SAFFORD. Very good terms.

Senator LUCAS. Was there any reason to believe that Captain McCollum would want to secrete or destroy this message?

Captain SAFFORD. To the best of my knowledge and recollection Captain McCollum tried to send out a war warning as a result of that message.

Senator LUCAS. Just answer my question now, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Repeat it for him, please.

(Question read.)

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Were you on friendly terms with Admiral Wilkinson?

[9944] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever have any trouble with him at any time before December 7, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. He never gave you any orders that you could not execute, I take it?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. I was not at all well acquainted with him. I had only known him for 10 weeks but we were on good terms.

Senator LUCAS. Well, do you know of any reason why Admiral Wilkinson, a man who went out and did what he did in this war, would want to secrete or destroy or disturb an important message of this kind?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

[9945] Senator LUCAS. Is that true of Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And Captain Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You were on good terms with him?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So there is no reason that you know of, of any kind, why these men, who all contend, as I understand from previous testimony, that they never saw the winds message, would want to do anything but what was the correct thing in order to prosecute the war successfully?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. They are loyal and highly patriotic Americans, all of them?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, all of them.

Senator LUCAS. Now let me ask you this, following Congressman Clark's questions: Do you have a suspicion that any of these men that you mentioned would destroy or secrete any of these messages?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. But you do have a suspicion toward Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

Captain SAFFORD. I presume I have no proper basis for suspicion. I have no proper basis for suspicion against any [9946] individual.

Senator LUCAS. Then you want to change your testimony that you gave awhile ago with respect to having that suspicion against Admiral Stark and General Marshall? I think I am correct in my understanding of your answer to Congressman Clark's question. If I am not, you may correct me.

Captain SAFFORD. I would like to change my answer to Congressman Clark's question, and in reply to yours, that I have no suspicion directed against any individual who can be named.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was that answer?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator LUCAS. We are now talking about the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. I am now talking about the winds execute message.

Senator LUCAS. Congressman Clark asked you a series of questions along that line.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You answered strictly in the negative until you got to the last question in regard to suspicion and your answer was in the affirmative, and you now desire to make a change in that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

[9947] Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I do not quite understand that kind of a reply, Captain. How can you suspect somebody that you cannot name?

Senator LUCAS. He is changing it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say you did not suspect anybody that you could name.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that?

Captain SAFFORD. Official records have disappeared from the files of the Navy Department, and that is a suspicious circumstance. I have no idea how they disappeared. It is a fact that they are not present and cannot be accounted for.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, do you have any suspicion against anybody?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no suspicion against any individual.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if these files had been destroyed and you cannot account for them, then some one of these individuals that you named would have to be responsible for the destruction of them, would they not?

Captain SAFFORD. Not necessarily.

Senator LUCAS. Well, name others that would have the custody of the files to the point where they could get in and [9948] fool around with them.

Captain SAFFORD. I can name nobody.

Senator LUCAS. I see. Now you said a moment ago that there was no record that the FCC had ever telephoned or sent a written order to the Navy Department with respect to the false winds message—on December 6, was it?

Captain SAFFORD. No; December 7, after the attack on Pearl Harbor. That is to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you have made an examination of that, I take it?

Captain SAFFORD. I have made an examination and I request to be furnished a written copy, if there was one, or a photograph. I requested that through Captain Walsh of the Navy Department several days ago, and there has been no reply.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in your testimony on Saturday you indicated that there was apparently a conspiracy to get rid of this message. Then you must include the FCC record on this, must you not?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, would not that be true by implication, in view of the question asked you by Senator George, as to why the Japanese

would want to send out a similar message on December 7, I think it was, or the 8th, which was practically [9949] the same message as the winds execute message, and then you said you made an examination of the FCC records and there was nothing there whatever to show that such a message was received?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What did you say?

Captain SAFFORD. I said that the Navy Department had received no notification of such a message either by telephone or in writing prior to the summer of 1944, to the best of my knowledge and belief, as far as I have been able to ascertain.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe the FCC received such a message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; but the Navy Department did not know about it at the time.

Senator LUCAS. And you do not believe that they telephoned?

Captain SAFFORD. They telephoned to somebody in the Army; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. But they did not telephone to the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not think that they telephoned to the Navy, and if they did there has been no record preserved of it and I never knew of it at that time.

Senator LUCAS. Was there a written record that they [9950] telephoned or sent a copy of this message to the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. There is in the files of the FCC.

Senator LUCAS. There is in the files of the FCC?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What about the Army files?

Captain SAFFORD. To the best of my knowledge they had no record of receiving this telephone call. I may be wrong.

Senator LUCAS. Receiving what?

Captain SAFFORD. To the best of my knowledge the War Department had no record of receiving this telephone call from the FCC.

Senator LUCAS. I am talking about whether or not there are any files in the Army that show that a report on the message had been received. You say there is not, to the best of your knowledge; is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. To the best of my knowledge. It was looked for, we will put it that way, a couple of years ago and nothing could be discovered.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask counsel to see if they can find the FCC report on the false winds message of December 8, I believe it was, and whether or not the Army or the Navy has a copy of it in its files. If it is not here I would like to have you make a search. It is very important.

[9951] The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now a little past 12. Do you want to complete, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. I have a few more questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now a little past twelve o'clock. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

Captain, please be back at that time.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[9952]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Does counsel have anything at this point before the examination is resumed?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't think so, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything you want to present, Captain, before your examination is resumed?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)

Senator LUCAS. I may want to return to the line of questioning that I was following just before lunch, but I would like to talk to you for just a moment about another matter.

In this statement that you read to the committee you state on page one that, "this message was intercepted by the United States Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Md., which serves the Navy Department.

When did you finally reach the conclusion, Captain, that this station was the one that did receive it?

Captain SAFFORD. That was a week ago, about, by the elimination of the other possibilities and by the confirmation of the fact by documentary evidence which I had just been [9953] able to see, that Cheltenham was in fact covering other messages broadcast from Tokyo, had received orders to monitor for the winds message, at least to guard specific Tokyo broadcasts and had reported in writing that it was receiving those broadcasts. I had had nothing as strongly confirmatory as that since 1941.

Senator LUCAS. What other stations could possibly have received this message?

Captain SAFFORD. I had thought at the time that Winter Harbor, Maine—

Senator LUCAS. I am not talking at the time. I am talking what you think today as a result of your latest investigation, what other stations do you believe, if there are any, that possibly could have received this?

Captain SAFFORD. There was a possibility that it could have been heard at Amagansett, Long Island, and at Jupiter, Fla. The monthly reports—

Senator LUCAS. I understand. Now, just a moment.

Captain SAFFORD. All right.

Senator LUCAS. Those two are the only two stations, you believe, in the world that were monitoring messages at that time, that could have possibly received it?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; those are the only ones in the United States Navy.

[9954] Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, what other stations that were operating at that time that you knew about had the opportunity or the possibility of receiving it, at least?

Captain SAFFORD. The British were operating a monitoring station at Halifax, which I was told about by a British officer who spent

about 2 weeks in my section in the spring of 1941. He was a liaison officer.

Senator LUCAS. Was that station capable of receiving a message of this character?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't know whether they had any—

Senator LUCAS. That is all I am interested in, just the stations that were capable of receiving a message of this kind throughout the world.

Captain SAFFORD. The capability of any station to receive that message would depend upon whether the operators were capable of copying the Japanese Morse code. That is something that I do not know for any station outside those the United States Navy controlled.

Senator LUCAS. From your previous experience in this particular department and from your careful investigation of the different messages that have come into these hearings from these various monitoring stations throughout the world do you know of any that were capable of deciphering the Morse code?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know what the qualifications of [9955] the operators at Halifax were or at other stations, outside of our own United States Navy controlled.

Senator LUCAS. So outside of the two stations in the United States you do not know of any others in the world that were capable of receiving this message?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot specifically name any.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. And the records of these two stations show that they did not, as I understand it, intercept a message of this kind on December the 5th?

Captain SAFFORD. The record of those two other stations cannot be located. It is missing even today.

Senator LUCAS. Well, are there are records of any kind, or from your investigation—as I understand it, you have pursued this rather vigorously—show that these stations ever received a message of that kind?

Captain SAFFORD. There are no records from those stations of any sort which could be located in 1943 or at the present time.

Senator LUCAS. What is the practice with respect to those records that come into these stations from time to time, about keeping them or destroying them? What do they do at these stations?

Captain SAFFORD. The monthly reports were supposed to be retained for a permanent record in the Navy Department. [9956] Messages were submitted in duplicate. One set of messages was broken up for immediate use at the time and their identity lost. The other set of messages was supposed to be retained for permanent record.

Senator LUCAS. Well, have you examined the various stations throughout the United States with respect to monthly reports?

Captain SAFFORD. I have requested them and I have been informed that those monthly reports for November and December 1941 for those two stations, as well as all their intercepted messages of any nature, could not be located.

Senator LUCAS. What about the other stations in the United States? What about their monthly reports?

Captain SAFFORD. The remaining station of Winter Harbor, Maine, the monthly reports were located or at least were made available to me 2 months ago—I mean 2 weeks ago although they could not be located 2 years ago. However, none of the intercepted messages from Winter Harbor for this period can be located now, or 2 years ago. We have one more station, which is Bainbridge Island near Bremerton, Wash., and we have both the monthly reports and the complete file of intercepted messages.

Senator LUCAS. Would there be any reason why these monthly reports, say, for November should not be sent in here [9957] to the Department?

Captain SAFFORD. They were sent in and receipt was given by the Department, receipt was acknowledged by the Department, and if by any chance it miscarried in the mail a duplicate would be sent in from the station. The station kept a duplicate report and also a third set of messages which they held until after they had heard, after they had received word from the Navy Department that the previous report and previous messages had been received.

Senator LUCAS. You have stated that the station at Singapore and the station at Australia, the station at Corregidor and the station at Java used both the voice and the Morse method in transmitting messages. Is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I said I was doubtful as to which series they had listened for and indicated that by a question mark.

Senator LUCAS. How about those at Corregidor? You just had Corregidor voice and Morse and the three remaining stations you do not know?

Captain SAFFORD. Corregidor had voice and Morse and Pearl Harbor for voice only and the others I do not know whether they listened for one or the other or both.

Senator LUCAS. Well, they could have received the message at Corregidor?

[9958] Captain SAFFORD. They could have received the message at Corregidor.

Senator LUCAS. And we were supposed to have the best men in the Pacific in every branch of the naval service there, were we not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

[9959] Senator LUCAS. On page 12 you said:

Kramer distinctly recalls that the winds message was shown to him by the GY watch officer after 8:30 a. m. on that date.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. You are sure that is not the false winds message that you are talking about here?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer told me that shortly before Christmas of 1945, either in his room or in the rotunda just outside of it.

Senator LUCAS. When was that? Just before Christmas?

Captain SAFFORD. Just before Christmas, during the early part of this investigation.

Senator LUCAS. And you were talking about the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. We were talking about the winds execute message.

Senator LUCAS. You are sure he knew what you were talking about?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. You fellows did not know what you were talking about when you wrote that letter in December, I think it was, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. We certainly knew what we were talking about this time.

[9960] Senator LUCAS. You say this is a tip-off which would prevent the United States Pacific Fleet being surprised at Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if it was simply a war message and did not give any place of attack, how did you figure that?

Captain SAFFORD. It gave a tip-off that we could expect war almost immediately.

Senator LUCAS. Everybody knew that. It was testified around here that they all knew the war was imminent, as the result of messages received. You make the statement here that this was a tip-off in the event the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. I would like to know what the basis of that was.

Captain SAFFORD. This was positive to me, it was positive evidence that Japan was going to reject our terms as presented in the note of November 26 and declare war on the United States.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you were very much excited about this message, too, were you not, when you got it?

Captain SAFFORD. My main excitement had been as to the question of—

Senator LUCAS. Well—

Captain SAFFORD. Yes; I was.

[9961] Senator LUCAS. I mean by that you were highly satisfied that you had received it?

Captain SAFFORD. Highly satisfied that I had received it.

Senator LUCAS. You knew war was imminent as the result of that message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You knew war was more imminent following the beginning of the receipt of the 14-part message, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Notwithstanding that you knew war was imminent when you received the winds message, and notwithstanding you knew war was imminent when you received the beginning of the 14-part message, you left on Saturday, December 6, at 4:30, when this message was coming in, and you never knew any more about the 14-part message until after the bombs struck Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You told Senator George that you knew war was imminent within 2 or 3 days after the receipt of this so-called winds message. Did you not believe that it was your duty to stay right around as close as it was possible from that time on, to see just what would happen?

Captain SAFFORD. I had done everything I could do by 4:30 p. m., on Saturday, December 6. [9962]

Senator LUCAS. You were not interested in whether they struck us or did not?

Captain SAFFORD. I was very interested, but there was nothing I could do to help.

Senator LUCAS. I only ask this question because under the heading "Distribution" you say:

I immediately sent the original of the winds message up to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track him down and not take "no" for an answer, and if he could not find him in a reasonable time to let me know.

You did not show the same concern about the 14-part message as you tell us you showed about this winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. We had orders—no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you did not tell those delivering the winds message to track anybody down, that if they could not find the fellow to be sure to report back to you?

Captain SAFFORD. Will you please repeat the question, sir?

Senator LUCAS. I say you did not show the same concern about this 14-part message, which was a message that brought us closer to the peril than the winds message. That is a [9963] little difficult for me to understand. You knew these messages were coming in; you knew the significance of the few that you read, and you did not take the same precaution with the 14-part message, with the messengers, your couriers, or whatever it was, as you did with the winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. It was not carrying out a precaution. We had direct orders from Admiral Noyes when the winds message came in to get it to him as soon as possible, to get it to him personally, and he was going to attend to the emergency distribution.

Senator LUCAS. And you had no such order on the 14-part message?

Captain SAFFORD. I had no such order on the 14-part. It was handled by Naval Intelligence in the customary manner.

Senator LUCAS. All right. You did not testify before the Roberts Commission?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not testify before the Roberts Commission.

Senator LUCAS. You heard Justice Roberts testify that there was no winds message delivered to the commission, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe him?

Captain SAFFORD. I will believe him, as far as the [9964] statement is concerned.

Senator LUCAS. What do you mean by that?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, it is possible that his memory was not of the best on this. That was only one of many top-secret matters which were discussed and not made a matter of official record at that time.

Senator LUCAS. You contended right along that this was probably the most important message you ever received. Don't you believe it would make an impression on Justice Roberts at that particular time and he would recall it?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought it would.

Senator LUCAS. You are not sure whether he saw it or whether he did not?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no idea what was shown to or discussed with Mr. Roberts, or any of the other members of the Roberts Commission.

[9965] Senator LUCAS. The only reason I ask this question, sir, is because you stated flatly that it was presented to the Roberts Commission, that it was being assembled by Admiral Noyes for being presented to the Roberts Commission, and that gives an indication, at least, that you believed this was presented to the Roberts Commission.

Captain SAFFORD. That is what I was informed at the time—that these papers were being assembled to be shown to the Roberts Commission.

Senator LUCAS. As far as you are concerned, you are not sure whether Roberts remembers whether it was in there or not?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no idea whether he remembers that or whether he was ever shown it.

Senator LUCAS. With respect to Captain McCollum, who was the head of the Intelligence Branch of the Far Eastern Division, and you were working very close to him, as I understand, you did not submit to him a copy of the so-called winds message at the time it came in?

Captain SAFFORD. Not to him personally from me. It was handled through our liaison officer, who was Captain Kramer.

Senator LUCAS. Do you now say Captain Kramer talked to McCollum about this so-called winds-execute message?

[9966] Captain SAFFORD. I do not know what Captain Kramer ever said to Captain McCollum on the subject.

Senator LUCAS. You sent the message direct to Noyes because he had requested you to do that?

Captain SAFFORD. He had directed that that be done. It was an order, not a request.

Senator LUCAS. Now, is that the only time that Noyes ever directed you, during the months of November and December, to send a special message of that kind to him?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the only time that I ever recall at any time.

Senator LUCAS. At any time? In the regular routine of affairs, McCollum would be the first fellow to get the message, would he not?

Captain SAFFORD. The first man assigned from Kramer who had any responsibility for it. Kramer usually showed me the message on the way up to McCollum as a matter of convenience, to keep me posted, and also to see if he could explain the circumstances and significance clearly, so then they could ask him questions and he would have a clearer story to tell the other officers that he showed the messages to.

Senator LUCAS. But you never talked to McCollum about this message at all?

[9967] Captain SAFFORD. I never talked to McCollum about this message at all.

Senator LUCAS. And McCollum was the man upon whom the Naval Intelligence depended for his proper evaluation of intelligence, as far as the Far East was concerned?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire, Captain.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Safford, I understand this morning you were shown a photostatic copy of a letter dated January 22, 1944, purporting to be signed by you, and, as I understand it you said you did sign that letter addressed "My dear Kramer-san."

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That letter was dated January 22, 1944, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I wish counsel would hand the witness a copy of the letter so I can go over it with him.

I would like to go over it with you, Captain. The letter which was shown to you this morning had certain omissions, did it not, certain blank spaces for certain numbers?

Captain SAFFORD. I was not shown this letter that [9968] I have here. I was shown the letter that was sent, I believe, December 22 or 23.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that during the noon hour, we took the original letter which refers to names by number and prepared a copy of it where we retained the number but added the name of the person, so the letter could be read intelligently. That is the copy handed the witness. We could furnish the original photostat.

Mr. MURPHY. I think that is important, in view of the testimony here, I think it is important to be shown the photostat. I would like to have him read the photostat.

Senator LUCAS. Is this the copy that I have?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think the reporter took the photostat with him. It is probably not available at this time.

Mr. MURPHY. It is important that we have it. In the meantime I am going to proceed with my examination.

Captain, as I understand it, you wrote a letter to Kramer, and then there was a separate code which you had with him whereby you had certain numbers and those numbers referred to certain individuals, and to certain incidents; that is right, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. I sent him such a letter; yes, sir.

[9969] Mr. MURPHY. Who prepared the secret code?

Captain SAFFORD. I did.

Mr. MURPHY. You did.

Now, then, that secret code that you supplied to Kramer was to refer to certain incidents by way of intercepts, and also to refer to certain individuals; that is right, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, as I understand you, you said that you began preparation in this case because you thought you would be called as a witness for the prosecution against Admiral Kimmel.

Was that an accurate statement?

Captain SAFFORD. Will you please repeat the question?

Mr. MURPHY. Read the question, Mr. Reporter, please.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain SAFFORD. That is a correct statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Was that before or after you read the Roberts report that you felt you would be a witness for the prosecution?

Captain SAFFORD. That was after I had read the Roberts report.

Mr. MURPHY. What was that, please?

[9970] Captain SAFFORD. It was after I had read the Roberts report.

Mr. MURPHY. You still felt you would be called as a witness for the prosecution? Would that be a correct statement?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you felt you were a prosecution witness?

Captain SAFFORD. I expected to be called as a prosecution witness.

Mr. MURPHY. And not a defense witness?

Captain SAFFORD. Not a defense witness.

Mr. MURPHY. And then you went about preparing the prosecution as against the defendant, isn't that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You sent a letter to Kramer and then, under separate enclosure, you sent the secret code, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. On January 22, 1944, you were preparing material as a prosecution witness. I repeat that because I want to emphasize it. Is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I was not preparing material as a prosecution witness in January 1944.

Mr. MURPHY. When did you shift? I want to be fair with [9971] you now.

Captain SAFFORD. I shifted at the time that I had definitely determined that the war warning message which I saw and read on the afternoon of December 4, 1941, at about 3 p. m., in Admiral Noyes office had not been sent out from the Navy Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you tell us when you shifted from a prosecution to a defense witness? Give us the date, please. Up to this moment you have held yourself up as preparing yourself as a witness for the prosecution, and now you have just shifted to the defense.

Tell us when you shifted from a prosecution witness to a defense witness.

Captain SAFFORD. About the middle of January 1944.

[9972] Mr. MURPHY. Now where were you on Saturday night the 6th of December 1941? You were asked that question before and did not answer it, but I feel this committee is entitled to an answer from you, sir. Where were you and what did you do?

Captain SAFFORD. I was out with my wife visiting friends, and I do not recall whom we saw that morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you do any drinking?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You were still in your pajamas the next afternoon at 2:20, having breakfast, on December 7, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. At 2:20 you were still in your pajamas having breakfast?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now the fact is that the 1 o'clock message was a very important tip-off, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And the fact is further, Captain, that the man under you had the 1 o'clock message translated at 5 o'clock in the morning, did he not? Did not Brotherhood know what was in that message at 5 o'clock in the morning of the 7th?

[9973] Captain SAFFORD. He knew what it meant before 7 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. Did not he know at 5 o'clock what was in it?

Captain SAFFORD. Not to my knowledge that early.

Mr. MURPHY. Did not it take about 2 minutes to translate it?

Captain SAFFORD. It took a little time to break it down into its Japanese.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not a fact that just shortly after 5 o'clock, of 7 hours before Pearl Harbor, in your department, while you were not in your department, they knew that the warning was given that 1 o'clock was the deadline? Isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Brotherhood did, that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Captain SAFFORD. Brotherhood did.

Mr. MURPHY. And Brotherhood was directly under you and you were responsible for your subordinate, weren't you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Where were you at 5 o'clock in the morning?

Captain SAFFORD. I was at home.

Mr. MURPHY. At home. The fact is further that the [9974] 7th was the Navy day for translating, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There was no interpreter who knew Japanese in your Department, was there?

Captain SAFFORD. There was not.

Mr. MURPHY. And you are over home at a time when you think war is coming, because you have told this committee that war was coming on Saturday or Sunday, you knew that there is going to be a time fixed which will fix the deadline and you leave on Saturday afternoon at 4:30, and you do not inquire as to anyone under you until after the war has started; that is right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. And if you had followed your subordinates at 5 o'clock in the morning we would have known that 1 o'clock was the deadline, wouldn't we?

Will you answer that, please?

Captain SAFFORD. My subordinate sent it over to the Army for translation. There had been a local arrangement made whereby the Army would provide a translator for the 7th because we had furnished the translations for the 6th, and that was sent over in accordance with those instructions from Kramer. Also Brotherhood called Kramer to tell him what was in and to be sure Kramer would come down.

[9975] Mr. MURPHY. We are talking about you, in charge of 200 men. You, the witness before the committee, accusing everybody else of having heard. We are now talking about you.

The fact is that in your Department at 5 o'clock in the morning of Pearl Harbor Day your subordinates knew that 1 o'clock was the time for the delivery of this fatal message, didn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. He thought, but he could not be sure. He was not a qualified Japanese translator.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he not say that he knew what was in that message but he was not sure; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't know what he said.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that you had no interpreter there on the day you expected the war to start, did you? Kramer was a subordinate of yours. You had no interpreter there, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. We had no interpreter there at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. The 7th was the Navy's day?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And it was the day that you expected war to start, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you are still in pajamas having breakfast [9976] at 2 o'clock?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have any sense of responsibility for the failure of this 1 o'clock message to get to the proper people in time? Do you feel responsible?

Captain SAFFORD. Not in the least.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you are not responsible for the failure of Brotherhood to do something about it when he knew it was 1 o'clock in the day at 5 o'clock in the morning and he knew the time of delivery? Why aren't you responsible? You are responsible for your subordinate aren't you?

Captain SAFFORD. Three official naval investigations have listened to all the facts and none of them found me responsible.

Mr. MURPHY. Not one of them have gone into this, have they? This is the first time you have been confronted with these questions, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't believe so.

Mr. MURPHY. Whoever asked you about your responsibility and failure to be there on Sunday, whoever asked you that question before?

Captain SAFFORD. That question was not specifically asked.

Mr. MURPHY. You believe that the best defense is an [9977] attack, don't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that the best defense is telling the truth.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Now, then, the fact is in all these investigations you have been talking about a so-called winds execute and nobody has questioned you as to your responsibility, since this 1 o'clock hour was known under you, directly under you, from 5 o'clock in the morning; isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Approximately 5 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. Everybody is asking how soon General Marshall got it, and as I understand it, it was around 11:30, and how soon Admiral Stark got it, which was somewhere after 9:30 to 10:30, and your subordinate knew it at 5 o'clock in the morning, didn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. Or maybe 6.

Mr. MURPHY. You weren't concerned about your Department then, you were taking some time off on the day the war was to start; isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I was taking time out.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt you had done all you could even though you knew that there was a definite time of delivering to be fixed when you left on that Saturday afternoon?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

[9978] Mr. MURPHY. Do you think if you had followed your Department or watched it closely on that dead-line day you wouldn't have seen there was somebody from 5 o'clock in the morning for 4 or 5 hours to translate it?

What do you say to that?

Captain SAFFORD. If I had seen that message at 5 or 6 a. m. on the 7th, all I could have done was put in a telephone call for Kramer to come down.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is you or somebody would have seen that 1 o'clock was significant because that was sunrise at Pearl Harbor, wasn't it? You knew that?

Captain SAFFORD. I knew that.

Mr. MURPHY. It was your department that had it from 5 o'clock until at least some time about 9:30 or 10:30 before it got to your people, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. We sent it over to the War Department about 7 o'clock for translation. They had from 7 o'clock until the translation was returned.

Mr. MURPHY. And your department, when you knew, and you say you knew 3 days before that war was coming on Sunday, your Department on the day that war was supposed to start has no interpreter on hand at all to handle the Navy's obligation, which was to translate the messages on Sunday, December 7? That is right, isn't it?

[9979] Captain SAFFORD. On a matter of technicalities naval intelligence was entirely responsible for translation. Not naval communications.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you please answer my question. Your department knew, did they not, and didn't you know, that there wasn't a translator on hand to translate anything in Japanese on the day that you knew the war going to start? You say you are the only one in Washington now that recognizes the—withdraw that. You are the one who says that you knew 3 days before that war would start on Sunday, and you are responsible for the communications, and you said you saw every translation. The fact is that in that department, sir, there wasn't a person on the day that you expected war to start to translate a word of Japanese, was there?

Captain SAFFORD. Not until Kramer came down about 8 a. m.

Mr. MURPHY. From 5 o'clock until 8 o'clock there was no one in your department on that day that war was going to start?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that is 3 hours, isn't it?

In other words, you blamed the Americans because you said the Japanese had given a certain notice, as I recall, but you didn't say anything about the 3 hours in your department [9980] did you?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Captain, let me go over this letter with you, if you will, please.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 22 January 1944.

And as soon as we come to anything that you feel is not correct, sir, please stop me.

MY DEAR KRAMER-SAN: Thanks for your very prompt reply. I did not receive your December 23 letter till January 17, and had almost given up hopes. What a break for you, as well as the cause, to be ordered to Admiral Halsey's staff. I can see the hand of Providence in it.

What cause? My question is, What cause? You say "as well as the cause."

What a break for you, as well as the cause.

What was the cause?

Captain SAFFORD. I didn't know if Kramer would understand that or not.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you please tell us, sir. They are your words. What cause, please?

[9981] Captain SAFFORD. I meant the cause of Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you were bending every effort to have Admiral Kimmel freed, weren't you?

Captain SAFFORD. At that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Now, after December 7, 1941, you did not remain in Washington, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I was attached to the Navy Department throughout that period.

Mr. MURPHY. Weren't you on the *New Mexico*?

Captain SAFFORD. I was on the *New Mexico* from about 1934 to 1936.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you have not left Washington from December 7, 1941, for official assignment until today?

Captain SAFFORD. Except on temporary duty.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate we proceed:

I am sending by separate cover (airmail) a condensation code to use. If you want to add to it, use Nos. 151-200, inclusive. I would like to hold it down to a single sheet of paper. I am also sending by ordinary mail a copy of #35—

which was the Roberts report, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

[9982] Mr. MURPHY. (reading):

And a clipping to give to #42—

What was Admiral Halsey, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

At some auspicious occasion. You will understand this letter better when they arrive.

What was the clipping?

Captain SAFFORD. That was a clipping from the Saturday Evening Post.

Mr. MURPHY. About what?

Captain SAFFORD. It was an article about Admiral Halsey which had been written by a Reserve officer who, I think, was on his staff.

Mr. MURPHY. In which you learned Admiral Halsey had said, sir, that he would devote his life after retirement to having Kimmel freed; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Right.

Mr. MURPHY. You wanted to send that clipping to him and have Kramer turn it over; right?

Captain SAFFORD. Right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the next paragraph:

With regard to taking #42 (Admiral Halsey) into confidence wait patiently for the proper moment, and then shoot the works. Tell him everything he will listen to, and show him whatever documentary proof you may have. Use [9983] your own judgment and don't force the issue. Do as good a job as you did on #136 (December 6, 1941)——

What job did he do on that?

Captain SAFFORD. The distribution of that message to the various people for whom the Navy Department was responsible.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. And it follows:

and #137 (December 7, 1941).

Captain SAFFORD. That is the same thing.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

In my opinion, the proper moment for disclosure would be any of the following:

(a) #42 (Admiral Halsey) is detached from Sopac——

That is the South Pacific?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

(b) #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) is detached from Sopac;

(c) #10 (Kramer) is detached from Sopac;

(d) #9 (McCollum) calls on #42 (Admiral Halsey) or #10 (Kramer);

(e) #18 (Rocheport) calls on #42 (Admiral Halsey) or #9 (Kramer)——

At that time you had become counsel for the defense, had you not, an advocate for the defense instead of a [9984] witness, hadn't you? Is that a fair statement?

Captain SAFFORD. That is a fair statement.

Mr. MURPHY. You were planning and plotting then different ways of getting evidence to prepare for a defense when the occasion arose; isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Next:

(f) #42 (Admiral Halsey) discusses #31 (Admiral Kimmel) on attack on #92 (Pearl Harbor) in your presence;

In other words, you were telling Kramer to wait for the auspicious moment when he might get Halsey's ear and then start to work together with Halsey; isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Next.

(g) #42 (Admiral Halsey) asks you the reasons for the alleged failure of 20-G to know what was going on——

That would be Kramer that you were suggesting?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

(h) #137 (December 7, 1941) (plus 3 years);

(i) #6 (Admiral Turner) visits #42 [9985] (Admiral Halsey);

(j) #42 (Admiral Halsey) visits #6 (Admiral Turner).

The next paragraph.

Be prudent and be patient. I am just beginning to get things lined up on this end.

By that you mean what?

Captain SAFFORD. By finding out what happened.

Mr. MURPHY. Finding out what happened, or lining up evidence?

Captain SAFFORD. Lining up evidence. Not witnesses.

Mr. MURPHY. Not necessarily what happened, but lining up evidence?

Captain SAFFORD. Evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. Not necessarily what actually happened, but evidence; isn't that right?

That is a keen question, now. Think before your answer it.

Captain SAFFORD. Evidence is the answer I want to make.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Captain SAFFORD. Evidence is the answer I want to make.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you understand the distinction between the two now? That is an important question. Do you understand the question?

[9986] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you want to make the answer "evidence"?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

No one in #15 (Opnav) can be trusted.

Will you give us who you felt was not worthy of trust in the Navy of the United States during the course of the war on January 22, 1944?

Captain SAFFORD. That is a rash statement; I will not expand it.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a rash statement, is it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

No one in #15 (Opnav) can be trusted, said you.

Did you mean also Admiral King, at that time? Wasn't he in Opnav?

Captain SAFFORD. No; he was commander in chief, U. S. Fleet and was not in Opnav.

Mr. MURPHY. Tell us who was in Opnav who could not be trusted, even though it is a rash statement? You made a lot of setatements here, sir. Let's find out who couldn't be trusted.

Please give us some names.

Who do you mean then couldn't be trusted on January 22, 1944?

[9987] Captain SAFFORD. I will not give any names.

Mr. MURPHY. You will not? You refuse? I ask you to tell us. You are now under oath. Please tell us, sir, who you say there cannot be trusted, because, sir, that is an important accusation. It is an accusation against one of the important departments of the United States Navy during the war.

You were making assertions. This is going into the papers of the country as well as are your other statements.

You say "they cannot be trusted." Who were you saying could not be trusted?

Names, please.

Who could not be trusted?

Senator LUCAS. He says all of them.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have names.

Here is a man making an accusation in writing. This is going to the papers.

You, sir, a captain in the United States Navy, say:

No one in No. 15 (Opnav) can be trusted.

Who did you mean?

I don't want any sweeping statement. We are going to get down to details. Who could not be trusted?

Names, please.

I am still waiting. Waiting. Will you please give [9988] us the names as to who could not be trusted in Opnav?

Please, sir.

What did you mean by saying no one in No. 15, Opnav, can be trusted?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to answer?

Captain SAFFORD. I would prefer not to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to refresh your recollection about the names?

Captain SAFFORD. I prefer not to answer.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I submit when an officer of the United States Navy, a captain, who has made some statements before the committee over the past 3 days, says "No one in Opnav can be trusted," in view of the statements of this morning, should be obliged to answer.

Senator LUCAS. This was made in January 1944?

Mr. MURPHY. 1944; during the course of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks you should answer if you can answer. We are trying to hold these hearings in public without concealing anything, and it occurs to the Chair that you have no more right to conceal anything than any other witness, or the committee itself has a right to conceal anything that is pertinent.

Captain SAFFORD. That was a private letter to Commander Kramer.

[9989] The CHAIRMAN. It was a private letter, but it pertained to public business, and a very pertinent inquiry which we are undertaking to go into. It raises the question of whether any letter of that sort can be regarded as privileged.

Mr. MURPHY. I think, Mr. Chairman, it is also pertinent, because it shows the state of mind of the witness.

You have made certain accusations against others. Now here is another one. You say they cannot be trusted.

You refuse to answer?

Captain SAFFORD. I would rather not mention any names.

Mr. MURPHY. But, sir, a statement is going out to the papers of the country. You said no one in Opnav could be trusted. That would include everybody in it. Do you mean that there wasn't one single person in Opnav? What did you mean by Opnav? What was Opnav?

Captain SAFFORD. Opnav is Naval Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, did you mean—I will try to help you—did you mean that there wasn't one person in Navy Operations on January 22, 1944, worthy of trust?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What did you mean? What did you mean?

Captain SAFFORD. I meant that there was no one that I knew of that I desired to confide this information to.

[9990] Mr. MURPHY. Who would work with you; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The next sentence:

Premature action would only tip off the people who framed #31 (Admiral Kimmel) and #32 (General Short) and will also get #8 (Safford) and #10 (Kramer) into very serious trouble.

What did you mean by that? How would it get Safford into trouble if he was doing the right thing?

Will you answer that, sir?

Still waiting.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. Answer if you can. You must have some sort of an answer to that.

Captain SAFFORD. What I meant was that nothing should be done in the way of making any statement or anything of that sort until the expected court martial, or the expected investigation at that time which had been directed by Congress had taken place, so I could come on the witness stand, or Kramer could come on the witness stand and present the facts.

Mr. MURPHY. And spring a surprise; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Not necessarily.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Captain SAFFORD. Not necessarily.

[9991] Mr. MURPHY. How would you get into trouble, what trouble could you get into for telling the truth, if you were telling the truth? Who would make trouble for you?

Captain SAFFORD. I was standing almost alone at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Who would make trouble for you, sir?

Captain SAFFORD. Anyone who doubted the accuracy of my statements.

Mr. MURPHY. You say:

Premature action would only tip off the people who framed Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Who did the framing of Admiral Kimmel and General Short?

Name names, please.

That also is a serious accusation.

Names.

Do you know that to frame anybody is one of the meanest and lowest crimes?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you say some people did frame these two people, Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Who framed them?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. Whom do you refer to and whom are you cautioning Kramer against?

[9992] Premature action would only tip off the people who framed Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Whom were you referring to?

Captain SAFFORD. I was referring to the War and Navy Departments in general, but not to any specific individual that I can identify.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, you wouldn't accuse the whole War and Navy Departments with the stigma of the vile crime of framing anybody? Can you narrow it down?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, I will narrow it down to the people concerned, the General Staff and officers.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you felt that the General Staff of the United States Army under General Marshall, and the General Staff of the Navy under Admiral Stark had framed Kimmel and Short; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I felt that way.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Would you include anybody else?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, what about Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves, both distinguished and able officers of the United States Navy with long and honored careers?

This is after you had read the Roberts report. Did you feel that they, too, were in on the framing?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. I had served under both of them.

[9993] Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. I had served under both of them.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you feel the Roberts report was a fair one, and an honest one?

Captain SAFFORD. From the testimony which I have read, and their interpretation as given by Justice Roberts, I do.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words—

The CHAIRMAN. You do what?

Captain SAFFORD. I feel that the Roberts report was a fair report.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. I go on.

Yet we must have the backing, the rank, and the prestige afforded by #42 (Admiral Halsey).

What did you mean by that, "We must have the backing, the rank, and prestige afforded by Admiral Halsey."

Captain SAFFORD. I meant Kramer and I could do nothing by ourselves.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Tell #42 (Admiral Halsey) that I knew #31 (Admiral Kimmel) was a scapegoat from the start, but I did not suspect that he was the victim of a frame-up until about #114 (November 15, 1941) plus 2 years—

In other words, you have just said you agreed with the [9994] Roberts report.

You now say, in this sentence, that you knew he was a scapegoat.

Do you think those two are consistent?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

[9995] Mr. MURPHY. You do?

Captain SAFFORD. I do.

Mr. MURPHY. And you repeat then that he is the victim of a frame-up and you found out he was a victim of a frame-up on November 15, 1941. What facts lead to that conclusion?

Captain SAFFORD. I said I did not even suspicion him until then.

Mr. MURPHY. What led to your suspicion?

Pardon me. There was something left out there:

until about #114 November 15, 1941 (plus 2 years)——

Did I read that?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought you did.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Will you tell us what led to your suspicion? What led to the suspicion at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the discovery that we could find no copy of the winds message or any intercepted messages from the East Coast intercept stations, and plus the fact that there was no mention in the Roberts report anywhere about the warning message which I saw on December 4 and described to this committee but did not get sent.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, the Roberts report apparently approached the proposition from this way, what did Admiral Kimmel and General Short do with the information they had. You understand?

[9996] Captain SAFFORD. I do.

Mr. MURPHY. And they concluded from what they actually had, certain things that followed. You said you thought that was a fair report; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you feel, I take it, that if certain information had been sent to them, added information, the result would have been different; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Is that right.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me go on with your next sentence. You say you had that suspicion in November 1941 plus 2 years. You say:

could not confirm it until #132 (December 2, 1941) (plus 2 years), and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1941. #8 (Safford) has overwhelming proof of the guilt of #15 (Opnav) and #65 (General Staff) plus a list of about 15 reliable witnesses.

Will you give this committee your evidence of the overwhelming proof of the guilt of Opnav and the General Staff?

Captain SAFFORD. I was referring to the winds execute which had been received and no action taken on it.

Mr. MURPHY. You said this morning, sir, right before the noon recess, and after this letter had been shown to you, [9997] as I recall it—you saw that letter earlier, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not see this particular letter. This had been introduced as evidence but I had not seen it.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. You didn't know we had that one, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I saw a letter introduced as evidence. I had not read it.

Mr. MURPHY. You didn't know the committee had this letter or that it was in existence, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I didn't know you had it before you.

Mr. MURPHY. You thought it was destroyed, didn't you? This letter?

Captain SAFFORD. My copy had been destroyed.

Mr. MURPHY. You never expected Kramer to produce it, did you? I mean this morning.

This morning, when you were testifying in answer to Judge Clark and Senator Lucas you didn't expect this letter would ever turn up, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know anything about this letter. In fact, I never thought about it.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the noon recess you said to Senator Lucas that you wanted to change your testimony, that you didn't want to say that you had a suspicion directed to Admiral Stark and General Marshall, and here you say you have [9998] absolute proof, overwhelming proof, you say "and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1944."

Then you have "overwhelming proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff."

What do you want to do with your statement just before the noon recess in view of that?

Which one do you stand on, your answer to Judge Clark or your answer to Senator Lucas?

Captain SAFFORD. I will stand on the answer to Senator Lucas.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you outline to this committee all of the evidence you have in the way of absolute proof and overwhelming proof of the guilt OpNav and the General Staff in addition to what you say is the failure to find a winds execute in the files?

Is that what you call absolute proof and overwhelming proof of the guilt of all of the members of the staff of the Army and the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. That plus the disappearance of official documents.

Mr. MURPHY. Which documents, outline them, please.

Captain SAFFORD. Which I have referred to.

Mr. MURPHY. In connection with this examination I would like to have you outline them, because I want to go to them.

[9999] Captain SAFFORD. There was the document JD-1 No. 7001.

Mr. MURPHY. What else?

Captain SAFFORD. And at that time there were no reports from any of the four East Coast intercept stations which could be located. Two are still missing. Two have subsequently made their appearance. And all the intercepted message files from those four stations were missing then and are still missing.

Mr. MURPHY. What does "S" mean? What station?

Captain SAFFORD. "S," Bainbridge Island, Washington.

Mr. MURPHY. What?

Captain SAFFORD. "S" stands for Bainbridge Island, Washington.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me go on a little bit and then I will come back:

Please answer the following questions by Item No.—

Senator LUCAS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Did the witness name the 15 witnesses?

Mr. MURPHY. I beg pardon. I want to go to that.

You say:

—plus a list of about 15 reliable witnesses.

Will you let the committee have what you are referring to there, that you told Kramer you had, so we might look them [10000] over.

Captain SAFFORD. These were all witnesses or people who had told me at this time, by that time, that they know of the receipt of the winds execute message.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you please give us the names?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot give them to you from memory but I did give them, I believe, in my testimony to Admiral Hart.

Mr. MURPHY. You gave Admiral Hart a list of 15 reliable witnesses; is that right? And the same ones who were referred to when you wrote Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe so.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know of one witness now who will corroborate you, one reliable witness?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know what any other witness will say.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you have the name of any single witness now, who is a reliable witness, who can give anything in the way of absolute proof or overwhelming proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff; one witness?

You said you had 15 of them. Give us one now.

Captain SAFFORD. I can't give you any specific name now other than those I have given in previous testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you still say those 15 will corroborate [10001] you and give proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff in the light of the evidence as of today, do you say they will corroborate you?

Captain SAFFORD. Some of them won't very definitely.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, will any of them, a single one of them?

Captain SAFFORD. I would rather not attempt to estimate what any other witness is going to say on the stand.

Mr. MURPHY. You say this is extremely important and you want the truth. You said you hoped this would be the last investigation. We want the truth. Why won't you give us the name of one witness that you say will corroborate you, if you know of one? All we are looking for is the truth. Let the chips fall where they may.

Do you understand my question now? You have been shown the Hart testimony and reference is made to page—

Captain SAFFORD. 362.

Mr. MURPHY. And my question is now: Can you give to the committee the name of a single witness out of the 15 whom you said were reliable on January 22, 1944 to furnish absolute proof or overwhelming proof or any proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff of the United States Army?

Have you some names?

[10002] Captain SAFFORD. I have names from the people who were listed in the testimony before Admiral Hart who I believe will give me some support if not complete support.

Mr. MURPHY. All right; those names.

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer, A. D. Kramer, United States Navy.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. Colonel Moses Pettigrew.

Mr. MURPHY. Pettigrew.

Captain SAFFORD. Colonel R. K. Sadtler.

Mr. MURPHY. Sadtler.

Captain SAFFORD. Colonel R. S. Bratton.

Mr. MURPHY. Anybody else?

These are witnesses who have proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff of the Army. Does that conclude the list?

Captain SAFFORD. That concludes all the list I can give you.

Mr. MURPHY. What happened to the other 11? Are they no longer reliable?

Captain SAFFORD. They no longer make the same statements they did two years ago.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, does Sadtler make the same statement that he—did he ever make a statement about the guilt of say General Marshall? Did Sadtler ever say anything to you [10003] that he felt General Marshall had violated the criminal laws of the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. Colonel Sadtler did not directly.

[10004] Mr. MURPHY. What did he say that would make you think that he believed General Marshall, General Gerow, and the other generals would commit crime by ordering the destruction of—withdraw that.

What did he say that would lead you to believe that those men were guilty of what you were referring to in this letter to Kramer? I am speaking of Sadtler.

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot estimate anything that Colonel Sadtler will say specifically.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, what do you have to offer to the committee by way of generalization as to what he might say that will prove the guilt of the General Staff of the Army? Have you any lead? Have you any suggestion? Have you any idea, that led you to believe that they will testify and support you and corroborate you as to the guilt of the General Staff of the Army?

Upon what do you base your statement here today that these men would corroborate you? This is going into the papers, the statement that you made that four men will corroborate you in these charges.

Captain SAFFORD. Colonel Sadtler knew of the winds execute.

Mr. MURPHY. What else? You say he would give us some evidence of guilt of the General Staff.

[10005] That is part of the picture. You say he knew of the execute.

Captain SAFFORD. That there had been an execute of the winds message in the middle of the week, that is, on the 4th or 5th of December 1941, and prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. What will he say about the guilt of General Marshall or anybody on the staff, if you know?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that Colonel Sadtler knows about the destruction of the official documents in the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever discuss that subject with him?

Captain SAFFORD. I never discussed it.

Mr. MURPHY. You are just imaging that, are you, that he knows that?

Have you any basis for it?

You say you believe he knows. What is the basis for your belief? He knows about the destruction of the records in the War Department.

Captain SAFFORD. Only what Mr. Friedman told me.

Mr. MURPHY. You are basing it all on Friedman?

Captain SAFFORD. What Friedman told me.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you seen the Clarke report?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

[10006] Mr. MURPHY. Have we the Clarke report?

I would like to call your attention to the testimony of Mr. Friedman, to whom you refer.

Haven't you learned that the Clarke report went into that whole matter and came to the conclusion that there was absolutely no foundation for that charge?

Captain SAFFORD. I never heard of the Clarke report until this present investigation. I have never known there was such a thing.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there has been a lot of testimony about it—a lot of questions asked about it.

Captain SAFFORD. I heard something about it here in this room.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask counsel to get that. I will come back to it, about Mr. Friedman, and show you exactly what he said.

What about Colonel Pettigrew, what evidence can he give, do you believe, as to the guilt of the General Staff?

Captain SAFFORD. Colonel Pettigrew, I believe, made an affidavit to Colonel Clausen that he saw a written copy of the winds execute which had come over from the Navy. This was about the 4th or 5th of December 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. What evidence can he give as to the guilt of the General Staff?

[10007] You see, there is quite a difference between the alleged or actual existence of a winds execute and the violation of the criminal laws of the country in destruction or pilferage, stealing from the files.

What evidence can he give on that subject? You say he is a reliable witness as to the guilt of the General Staff of the Army.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to object, but aren't Colonel Sadtler and Colonel Pettigrew and these other people going to be witnesses, and won't their testimony be the best that this committee can get as to what they are going to testify, instead of speculating as to what this witness may think they will say?

Mr. MURPHY. This man has made statements in the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair is of the opinion that the inquiry of Mr. Murphy is entirely proper.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you tell us?

Captain SAFFORD. What Colonel Pettigrew knows beyond the winds message, I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. What does Colonel Bratton know about the guilt of the General Staff?

Captain SAFFORD. Colonel Bratton knows about the receipt of the winds execute and about his attempts to get a warning sent out to General Short.

[10008] Mr. MURPHY. You say he knew about the execute, about the winds execute?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. On what day?

Captain SAFFORD. About the 4th or 5th of December 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. How do you explain the fact that General Miles sent a message, which we have before us, out to Hawaii to the G-2, on the

5th of December, asking them to inquire of Rochefort of the Navy if he knows anything about the weather business?

And may we have that exactly so we can put it before the witness?

I am speaking about the message of December 5 from General Miles to G-2 in Hawaii, asking him to look into the questions of the winds execute with reference to weather.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is not in Exhibit 1.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Masten, do you have the dispatch from Miles to G-2 in Hawaii on the 5th of December, the Rochefort message?

[10009] Mr. RICHARDSON. He has it.

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring now to—Exhibit 32, is it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Exhibit 32, page 20. [Reading:]

Sent No. 51, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,
*Headquarters, G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:*

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

MILES.

If there had been an execute on the 4th, as you say, and if Bratton knew about it, and this was certainly long before any destruction of papers, this was before anybody could possibly have slipped up, how do you account for this message?

Captain SAFFORD. Colonel Bratton indicated in his testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board investigation when questioned upon that point by General Grunert that that was the only way he could get word out to General Short that the winds execute had been sent.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know of any page where he said anything that would suggest that? You say he was sending [10010] this out to inform Hawaii that there had been a winds execute?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there anything that would lead you as a communications expert to even slightly indicate that or suggest it? How in heaven's name could anybody get that out of that message, will you tell us?

Captain SAFFORD. It is not in the message. He said he thought that Rochefort had it and that his man would get the news as soon as he contacted Rochefort.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have any idea where anything like that can be found, in what evidence, before what board?

Captain SAFFORD. The Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have Bratton's testimony? I have part of it here. I have just a part of it here. Will you give me the page—

Senator FERGUSON. I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. You have it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Here it is.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have any idea where anything like that can be found in that record? I have read quite a few pages out of it and I haven't found it. Have you found it, or do you know where it is?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe it is the last time Colonel [10011] Bratton testified. He appeared two or three times.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Masten, will you look through it in the meantime and I will go on?

Senator LUCAS. Before the Congressman goes on to the next question will you yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, surely.

Senator LUCAS. As I recall, the captain this morning told me that when he wrote the letter to Captain Kramer on December the 28, 1943, that at that time you had not considered the winds message, at all because it was not in controversy.

Captain SAFFORD. We expected that it would turn up. I merely asked him did he know what happened to it.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. The point I am making is you did not at any time discuss the winds message with anyone because it was not in controversy at that time. That is what you told me this morning, outside of the one at that time when you saw it in the files and it was being prepared by someone for the Roberts Commission; I think that is what you said.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. That is your testimony. Now, you say here that you did not have absolute proof of it until about January 18 and I think you told Congressman Murphy that was the winds execute message that you were talking about.

[10012] Captain SAFFORD. No; that was referring to this warning message, to this other warning message which I had seen and which was not sent; which I had seen and thought was sent but that had not been sent.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you were talking then, when you said you had no absolute proof of it about January 18, you were talking there about the memorandum that McCollum prepared for Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain SAFFORD. This was not a memorandum. This was a regular message on a regular message blank and only required the signature of someone in authority to be sent.

Senator LUCAS. That is, the McCollum message is what you were talking about?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I misunderstood you, sir. I thought you were talking about the winds execute.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you finished, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

[10013] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, this is a little irregular, but I wondered if anyone would have any objection? I refer to page 62 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Colonel Bratton testifying:

There were several codes sent out by the Japanese foreign office at about this time, to their diplomatic officials abroad, which they hoped to use in the case or in the event of a sudden rupture of communications. There were several versions of this wind and weather code sent out. I discussed these codes with my opposite number in the O. N. I., Commander McCollum, on a number of occasions. Learning from him that they were monitoring the Japanese communication system in Honolulu as a function of naval communications, and learning also from him that their expert there was a Commander Rochefort, who was thoroughly familiar with the whole matter, I deemed it advisable, on or about

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the 5th of December, to have our G-2 in Honolulu contact Commander Rochefort, with the end in view that the latter could explain to G-2 what it was we were waiting for, and could explain to him orally, with complete security, the significance of the message. G-2 did send a message.

Now, then, I am going to page 284, Top Secret Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume D.

[10014] I discovered from Commander McCollum that their S. I. S. man in Honolulu, a Commander Rochefort, knew everything that we did about this, had all the information that we had, and was listening for this Japanese winds-weather broadcast. He suggested that as a way out of our difficulty I instructed our G-2 in Hawaii to go to Rochefort at once and have a talk with him, as in a short period of time Rochefort could tell Colonel Fielder, our G-2, exactly what was going on and what we knew.

Do you take it from that that Bratton felt there was a winds execute and that was his indirect way of telling Hawaii?

Captain SAFFORD. There is more than that in the record.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, what do you refer to, I mean anything in particular?

Captain SAFFORD. General Grunert, I believe, asked him why he sent the second Miles' message and there was about a half a page of testimony from that point.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, will counsel look for that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He said about a half a page further on.

Mr. MURPHY. Oh, half a page from this point. I thought it was somewhere else.

Captain SAFFORD. About a half a page of testimony trying to get the second Mile message.

[10015] Mr. MURPHY. Let me read on:

I managed to get General Miles to O. K. this message to G-2 in Hawaii because he and I both thought that we could get that message out without violating any of the policies that were then in effect about getting concurrences from OPD.

I also had a message sent to the Canal Zone on the night of the 5th, to the G-2 out there. I had forgotten about this message until I found it in the file this morning. The document that I lay before you now is in the files of G-2. It is a paraphrase of an outgoing message, No. 512, sent December 5, 1941, to G-2, Panama Canal Department. It reads as follows:

"(Message dated December 5, 1941, to G-2, Panama Canal Department, is as follows:) "In the event severance of diplomatic relations is near, this office will notify you. Japanese-U. S. relations are now very difficult."

Signed "Miles." Would that make you think that on the 5th he knew there was a winds execute in view of that dispatch to Panama?

Captain SAFFORD. That is not what I was referring to. There is more beyond that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let me ask you about that. Here is a [10016] message on the 5th of December to Panama, which says:

In the event severance of diplomatic relations is near, this office will notify you. Japanese-U. S. relations are now very difficult.

Signed "Miles". Would you think that General Miles or Colonel Bratton had any information about there being an execute when they sent that out on the 5th?

Captain SAFFORD. That message is not consistent with what he had told me.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, would you think that a man who was in his sound senses—and I assume you felt General Miles and Colonel Bratton were in their sound senses, do you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Would you think that if there had been an execute they would send a message like that on the 5th to Panama?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know anything about it.

Mr. MURPHY (reading from p. 286) :

General RUSSELL. Colonel, this action on the 5th, the message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, and the message to the Panama Canal Zone, resulted from the code destruction message of December 3, and the conversations about the "wind" implementing message of December 5, is that true?

[10017] Colonel BRATTON. To the best of my recollection and belief they were the results of my receipt of this order to the Japanese Ambassador to destroy his code and his machine.

General RUSSELL. In your message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department you make a reference to a "weather" reference—"broadcast reference weather"?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. So apparently, when you said that, you had in mind not only the destruction of the machines in Washington but also the possibility of the implementing "weather" messages, is that true?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. As you see, I had been told by Commander McCullum that Commander Rochefort had the same intercepts that we had, and this was just a device on my part to bring Fielder and Rochefort together.

General FRANK. After you had been prevented from sending a warning message, by Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON. I couldn't get it out any other way.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, I want to clarify another message of his.

Now, would that be the part you mean?

[10018] Captain SAFFORD. That, I believe, is the part I refer to.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, don't you know that Colonel Bratton also testified that he called Admiral Noyes on the phone and Admiral Noyes would not give him the kind of information he wanted, that Admiral Noyes hung up rather briefly and that it was only trying to find out what Hawaii might know when he could not get it from Noyes that prompted him to telegraph? Didn't you hear that kind of testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not hear that testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will go into that later. I think you will find it directly. Now, let me go on with your letter [reading].

Please answer the following questions by Item No.

I am reading from page 2.

No. 20. Re your Item #2, is Col. B. #59? Bratton.

21. What or whose job in the Navy did Col. B.'s job correspond to?

22. Do you know what Army officers were notified or shown the papers by Col. B., and when?

In amplification of my Items #15 and #16:

I recall your telling me that you saw #3 about 0900 (EST) on #137. December 7, 1941.

We looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God: [10019] This means war."

Captain SAFFORD. That should be "He," not "We".

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Captain SAFFORD. That should be "He," not "We".

Mr. MURPHY. It should be "He".

He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God; This means War."

Now, you are talking to Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. No, it is Kramer.

Mr. MURPHY. This is you talking about Kramer, repeating his words that he heard Stark say, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, how do you reconcile the fact that if he saw that on December 7 and he said "My God, this means war," how do you reconcile that with having seen the winds execute on the 4th of December when you said that "it was war"?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot explain that.

Mr. MURPHY. They are a little inconsistent, aren't they, if he said, "My God, this means war" on the 7th?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, it seemed very strange.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, at least that. Now, then, I will go on further:

He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God, this [10020] means war."

You said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months."

This is Kramer talking. How would Kramer say that if he knew of a winds execute on the 4th? That is inconsistent, too, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not try to explain why Kramer said anything. That is what he had told me in a previous conversation and I was trying to check up to see was it true, would he stand behind it or not.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, you wanted to know if he would stand behind this that you had typed up here?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. MURPHY. This was going to be his testimony when you went in before some court martial; isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, let me read the next sentence:

#3 continued: "I must get word to #31" (Admiral Kimmel) and picked up a message blank.

Then another idea entered his mind and he said, "Does #53 (General Marshall) know of this?"

You replied, "Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (#77) (Serial 902 (14) (The Finale) was sent over ten minutes ago and [10021] should be on the General's desk by now."

#8 (Admiral Stark) dropped the message blank and reached for the telephone.

And then you say, "End of your tale." What did you mean by that?

Captain SAFFORD. I meant that was the end of what he had told me on this previous occasion.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you were preparing a brief then and that would be the tale he would tell, is that right, Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. No; that was the end of what he told me.

Mr. MURPHY. You say the "end of your tale." You were referring to the part you recalled him telling you, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. All right (reading):

23. Can you verify or correct the foregoing?

24. Did #3 (Admiral Stark) get #53 (General Marshall) on the telephone and what did he say?

By the way, you were away from the winds execute then. You were counsel for the defense at this time, weren't you, the advocate preparing a defense for Kimmel, isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And going beyond the scope of anything dreamt [10022] of in Navy regulations whatsoever for your office down there, isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. For my office?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes—beyond.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

25. Were there any other witnesses? If so, who?

26. Did you tell #9 (McCollum) or #5 (Admiral Wilkinson), or anyone else? (Be sure to tell Admiral Halsey—when the time comes.)

Now, then, I wish you would notice closely No. 27 because I think it is highly important.

27. Re your Item #15 and #16. What do you mean by "general security" (i. e. lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?

Is that what you were referring about, to the leak you told us about 2 days ago?

Captain SAFFORD. No, that was another one. That was within the State Department.

Mr. MURPHY. What did you mean by that?

Captain SAFFORD. That was a lost magic translation that was lost in the State Department. The Army had sent it to them and it never came back.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it? Will you read to the witness [10023] exactly what he said and see if he means it?

(Answer read.)

Mr. MURPHY. Is that what you mean? Are you referring now to the Chicago Tribune incident or referring to another leak?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought I was answering your question. May I have the question over again to be certain?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let us not get it mixed. There were two leaks, then, as I understand it. There was one of something that was lost in the State Department?

Captain SAFFORD. In 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. In 1941. And then you speak of another. What do you mean by "General security (i. e.) lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?"

Well, that Chicago Tribune incident was some time after Pearl Harbor, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That was 1942.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Was the Chicago Tribune business late in the spring or was that the State Department one that you are referring to here?

Captain SAFFORD. The State Department, I think, occurred in March and the Chicago Tribune in June.

Mr. MURPHY. That was a case of a story in the Chicago Tribune as to the number and the names of the Japanese vessels [10024] that were at Midway at the time we took them by surprise, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. And there was quite some disturbance about publishing in Chicago or in any paper in America the names of the Japanese ships because that might have shown to the Japanese that we had broken their code, isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. There was a possibility of that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there was a very definite possibility, wasn't there? If they had in a Chicago paper the names of all of the Japanese ships taking part in the Battle of Midway wouldn't it be a pretty

good indication to the Japanese that somebody had broken their code or that we had advance knowledge, since that story came out immediately after the Battle of Midway?

Captain SAFFORD. Mr. Murphy, I do not want to dodge that question, but my orders, which are in accordance with the Presidential directive, forbid any reference to things of that kind.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, we will pass that one and we will come to the leak you are talking about. You say to him, "What do you mean by 'general security' (that is, lack) late in spring?" What did he mean?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know which has was referring [10025] to. I was trying to find out.

Mr. MURPHY. What Presidential directive are you referring to that stops you from giving answers to questions in this inquiry? Is there any Presidential directive that stops you from answering this inquiry? What do you understand it to be?

Captain SAFFORD. I understood that I was not permitted to discuss any magic messages or anything of that nature after December 7, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. May I inject there. You haven't any information or knowledge concerning any Presidential directive looking toward the testimony before this committee that limits you in any way, have you?

Captain SAFFORD. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I say, the President has issued no Executive order limiting you in your testimony before this committee?

Captain SAFFORD. That may have been an interpretation which I received in writing from Commander Baecher, who is here—or through Commander Baecher. It was not his signature.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if any commander or any other officer has advised you to that effect I think that they are in error. The President has issued no order of any sort affecting the nature of any of the testimony here or restricting any witness in answering questions that may be asked of him by this committee. [10026]

Mr. MURPHY. In addition to that—

The CHAIRMAN. If you have been informed to that effect, why whoever gave you that opinion is in error.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is we have been talking about magic after December 7, haven't we? Haven't we had some messages after December 7?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that they were all transmitted prior to December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. You think then that the reason you cannot discuss that is because of your interpretation of something that you got about magic after December 7; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. It is not my interpretation and I will abide by instructions of the chairman of this investigating committee.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask this question: You say:

What do you mean by "general security" (i. e. lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?

Now, what were you speaking about and what answer did Kramer make to the question? What leak was it?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer never answered the question.

[10027] Mr. MURPHY. Well, what did you think it was?

Captain SAFFORD. I was referring not only to the Chicago Tribune story but to the subsequent grand jury investigation which had great publicity.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you had much publicity before this report of it?

Captain SAFFORD. None whatsoever before this report.

Mr. MURPHY. No. And you say the Chicago Tribune item did have great publicity?

Captain SAFFORD. It did.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, why did you mention it here? What were you talking about? What were you referring to it for? You asked him: "Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?" What were you talking about in connection with the Pearl Harbor investigation?

Captain SAFFORD. He made a statement relative to the general security and I did not know at the time what he was talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you say there:

Incidentally, tell the full story of this to #42 (Admiral Halsey) and explain that #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) tried to stop the prosecution and attending publicity but #24 (Big JRR) insisted (to give publicity to himself)——

[10028] Who was giving publicity to himself? Who did you mean there, somebody looking for head lines and, if so, who was it? Whom did you mean?

Captain SAFFORD. J. R. R. stood for Joseph R. Redman.

Mr. MURPHY. Who?

Captain SAFFORD. Joseph R. Redman, Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. MURPHY. Was he your superior?

Captain SAFFORD. He was my superior.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, let me read the whole sentence:

Incidentally, tell the full story of this to Admiral Halsey.

What did you mean by that, "Tell the full story to Admiral Halsey? About the leak or what?

Captain SAFFORD. About the attempts to keep that out of the newspapers and not let the Japanese know that we had solved their code.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you were planning your attack in case there was a hearing and you were wondering about the publicity they got in Chicago and were wondering what publicity you would get, or what?

Captain SAFFORD. I was not thinking about publicity.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, what were you thinking about? That is what I am puzzled on. I am not clear on it yet. You [10029] wanted Admiral Halsey to know about all the publicity they got in Chicago about that incident, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. It may not be clear.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, you explain it. I do not want to confuse you. What did you mean by that sentence—it is your sentence—in that paragraph?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese had taken the precaution of changing their code about a week before Midway and putting a new one in. The Chicago Tribune's story was promptly noticed by the Navy Department censors and killed.

Mr. MURPHY. What was that?

Captain SAFFORD. And killed. It was not repeated, that Stanley Johnston story.

Mr. MURPHY. What story again?

Captain SAFFORD. The story made out by Stanley Johnston.

Mr. MURPHY. Stanley Johnston?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Oh, he was the managing editor or assistant editor of the Chicago Tribune, was he, or a reporter?

Captain SAFFORD. He was a reporter.

Mr. MURPHY. A reporter, I should say.

Captain SAFFORD. When the question of a prosecution came up both Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum did their best to stop it because they knew that would have great pub- [10030] licity and tip off the Japanese.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't they have a very proper purpose for stopping it and wasn't it because they did not want to let the Japs know that we had cracked their code? Wasn't that their reason?

Captain SAFFORD. The publicity did tell the Japs that we had cracked their codes and a few days after the Grand Jury they did change their code again. It set us back.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is that Admiral Wilkinson, you say, tried to stop the prosecution and publicity and wasn't his reason and don't you know that his reason for not wanting to go through with the trial was that we would have to spread on the court records at Chicago the fact that we had broken the code and the mechanics of it in order to have any jury convict? Isn't that so, or do you know that?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know. I was not in on all the details.

Mr. MURPHY. You had been writing a——

Captain SAFFORD. I do know he had been trying to stop it.

Mr. MURPHY. You had been writing a history, you said, of that period and as one who was writing a history you would know some details on it, wouldn't you? Do you know why it was stopped?

Captain SAFFORD. It was not stopped. They went on with it.

[10031] Mr. MURPHY. Well, they went on with it but they did not disclose evidence about the codes, did they?

Captain SAFFORD. But the Japs changed their codes just the same.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, to go on with your letter. You say:

Admiral Wilkinson tried to stop the prosecution and attending publicity but #24 (Big JRR) insisted (to give publicity to himself and to #25 (Little JRR) and was backed up by #29 (Admiral Horne) and #28 (Admiral King).

In other words, do you think those four were all trying to get publicity out of it?

Captain SAFFORD. Not Admiral Horne and Admiral King.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, who is "Little JRR"?

Captain SAFFORD. That was Admiral Redman's younger brother.

Mr. MURPHY. Who?

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Redman's younger brother.

Mr. MURPHY. And you felt then that your superior, Admiral Redman, and his younger brother were trying to have this trial in Chicago so that they would get publicity, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I did.

[10032] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

28. Do you know if any of the following were called as witnesses by #36 (Roberts Commission)?

- (a) #5 (Admiral Wilkinson)
- (b) #9 (McCollum)
- (c) #10 (Kramer)
- (d) #6 (Admiral Turner)

29. Were the JD files in GZ custody or any messages from these files ever submitted to #36 (Roberts Commission)?

What answer did he make to that?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer never replied to that letter at all.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you ever talk to him about that?

Captain SAFFORD. I have never talked to him.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand you to say, sir, that Captain Kramer never replied to this letter?

Captain SAFFORD. I have never received a reply of any sort from Captain Kramer.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

[10033] 30. Were #5, (Admiral Wilkinson), #9 (McCollum), #10 (Kramer), or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of #136 (December 6, 1941) and #137 (December 7, 1941) or the investigations conducted by #36 (Roberts Commission)? In this connection, I am sending you #35 (Roberts Report) by ordinary ship's mail. I will comment on it in further correspondence.

What did you mean by that? Were they instructed not to mention the events of December 6 and 7?

Captain SAFFORD. I was just asking for information.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you suppose they had been stopped discussing the events of December 6 and 7?

Captain SAFFORD. I was wondering if they had the facts.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Captain SAFFORD. I was wondering if they had the facts and was asking for information.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, sir, McCollum was under Admiral Noyes, was he not?

Captain SAFFORD. McCollum was under Admiral Wilkinson and so was Kramer.

Mr. MURPHY. And you told us here that you remembered distinctly that meeting of January 14 and 15 at which Wilkinson and McCollum were present. Did not you tell us about a meeting on January 15? I beg your pardon. I withdraw that.

[10034] There was Redman Noyes, you and some others.

Captain SAFFORD. This was in Naval Communications.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Wilkinson and McCollum were not there, is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. Wilkinson and McCollum were not there.

Mr. MURPHY. You did say the order came down from Admiral Stark, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. As I understood, or from Admiral Ingersoll, I do not know which.

Mr. MURPHY. When you made that statement did you mean to imply or to infer that there was anything improper about what you were told to do at that meeting?

Captain SAFFORD. Which do you mean, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. I am speaking of the meeting where you said you were told to destroy certain notes and you were told to stop the whispering campaign against Kimmel, and you were told to stop rumors. You have been asked questions about that.

At one time you said you did not see anything wrong with it or you would not have done it, and at another time you said you did not see anything wrong with it at the time.

The papers in the country carrying that story had drawn something sinister from it. Did you mean to imply that these were the men that had to destroy official papers? Did you mean anything like that?

Captain SAFFORD. Not official papers.

[10035] What I was trying to find out—

I did not mean anything wrong, I thought it mean it would all be done openly.

I was trying to check it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time for recess has arrived.

The Chair would like the committee to remain for a few minutes in executive session.

We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., February 4, 1946, the committee recessed to 10 o'clock of the following day, Tuesday, February 5, 1946.)

[10036]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[10037] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Is there something counsel wishes to put in the record?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we received yesterday, from the State Department, a letter dated February 4, 1946, enclosing paraphrases of three telegrams, two of which were received from London and one of which was received from The Hague, with further reference to the inquiry made as to whether any of the monitoring stations maintained by those governments had ever picked up the execute of the winds code. The response has been negative in each case.

We would like to add these documents, mimeographed copies of which have been distributed to the committee, as a part of the general exhibit relating to the winds message and mark them as "Exhibit 142-C."

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 142-C.")

Mr. MASTEN. That is all we have.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, you may proceed.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, is it not your understanding that the Japanese were very security-minded, very secretive about their proceedings?

[10038] Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese were secretive, but they had a very erroneous impression or evaluation of the security of the cipher systems which they were using for highly important secret messages.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, they did everything they could, did they not, to protect their secret?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And reading the correspondence of Nomura in Washington to Japan, were you of the opinion that Nomura knew that war was coming?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that Nomura knew that war was coming, but not just exactly when.

Mr. MURPHY. Why would the Japanese want to tell London 3 days before and give them a signal of when they were going to start war, why would they be broadcasting that all over the earth 3 days ahead?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know why the Japanese did that.

Mr. MURPHY. Rather unusual if they did? Don't you think so, in the light of your experience and your study of the Japanese that that would be most unusual?

Captain SAFFORD. Not for the Japanese.

Mr. MURPHY. That they would broadcast a message 3 days before as to what they were going to do?

[10039] Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese frequently did things in their communications that seemed foolish to us.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you expect the Japanese would be broadcasting the fact that war was going to start definitely in 3 days?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is they did broadcast on Sunday as to the English, didn't they, but after the attack was made at Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. After the attack at Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to come back with you to your letter, if I may.

As I recall, the last thing we went over yesterday would bring us down to question 29. Question 29:

Were the JD files in the GZ custody or any message from these files ever submitted to #36 (Roberts Commission)?

In that connection I would like to ask you, what is the GY log?

Captain SAFFORD. That was a log kept by the watch officer. We had four officers standing 24-hour watches on the incoming messages particularly in purple which were given priority handling in the section.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it covered, did it not, or purported to cover, all important incoming messages?

[10040] Captain SAFFORD. All important messages in the purple system which were of particular importance to the White House and to the State Department. Occasionally they would include other systems which were done by the man on watch in slack time.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you still have the GY log, do you not?

Captain SAFFORD. It is still in existence but not in my custody.

Mr. MURPHY. I mean, the GY log covering December 4 is available, is it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Shouldn't it show what messages came in on that day if it is still in existence?

Captain SAFFORD. That does not show incoming messages. It only shows decodes that were made by the GY officer on watch and his yeoman.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, don't you think that if you had everybody in the naval service and in the Army service and Communications looking for some special message that there would be something in the

GY log about it if it came in? Wouldn't you expect that, as head of Communications?

Captain SAFFORD. Not unless it was personally handled and decoded by that officer or his yeoman.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, somebody under you did just that, [10041] didn't they, one of your men? You were in charge of all of them. One of your men did that, didn't they?

Captain SAFFORD. The man on watch kept the log.

Mr. MURPHY. It was one of your men, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you ever ascertained whether or not there is an entry that would support you in any way, about this so-called winds execute?

Captain SAFFORD. There is no entry in that log which would support me.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there any other entry of any kind missing from the GY log?

Captain SAFFORD. There is a very similar entry which is missing on December 7. That is in regard to the so-called hidden word code and the message in it. We have the message. I believe it has been introduced as evidence. But there is no mention of this particular message in the GY code.

Mr. MURPHY. And you made a study of that, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was the officer then that failed to make an entry, who was on watch? You made an inquiry. What are the circumstances? The details, please?

Captain SAFFORD. The inquiry was not made for more than 2 years after the event. No action was taken by me.

[10042] Mr. MURPHY. Give us the details, please. Who failed to note what?

Captain SAFFORD. Nobody failed to note anything.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you have just told us that there was something not noted in the GY log and you made an inquiry. What were the circumstances and who was involved? This is one more person now. Who is the person this time? Who is it?

Captain SAFFORD. The officer who was on watch at that time on the morning of December 7. I cannot tell you from memory.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you know it was Brotherhood, don't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought it was Parren.

Mr. MURPHY. Don't you know Brotherhood saw at 5 a. m. the 1 p. m. message?

Captain SAFFORD. This message I am referring to came in somewhere around 10 o'clock and I believe that Parren was on watch. I think he followed Brotherhood.

Mr. MURPHY. Didn't you make an inquiry? This is something immediately under you and your supervision. You say that there is an entry not in there on the 7th. I am going to go back with you to the 4th pretty soon, but I would like to clear up the 7th first.

Now, who was the person and is there anything sinister about that one?

[10043] Captain SAFFORD. There is nothing sinister about that

at all. It simply was not recorded.

Mr. MURPHY. Who failed to record it, if you know?

Captain SAFFORD. Parren was on watch, I believe, at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the best you can give us?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the best I can give you.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. We come to question 30.

Before I go to that, the 4th was the Army day for translating, wasn't it? That was an even day.

Captain SAFFORD. The 4th was an Army day for translating.

Mr. MURPHY. Why didn't they translate on the 4th? That was their day.

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know why the Army did not translate that day.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you had an arrangement whereby the 4th was the Army day, the 5th was the Navy day, the 6th was the Army day, and the 7th was the Navy day. I asked you yesterday about the failure to have a translator in the Navy. I am going to come back to the 4th. Why, if there had been a message come in, would it not be translated by the Army because it was their day?

Captain SAFFORD. It would in the normal course of events.

[10044] Mr. MURPHY. Well, what was there out of normal on December 4 and why wouldn't the Army handle it? You say this thing happened that day. Ordinarily the Army would handle it. Why didn't they? Can you tell us any reason why?

Captain SAFFORD. Only because the Navy had started to handle it through Admiral Noyes telephoning it direct.

Mr. MURPHY. On the night before?

Captain SAFFORD. At the time.

Mr. MURPHY. What time?

Captain SAFFORD. Approximately 9 o'clock in the morning of December 4, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, how would it get to Admiral Noyes if it was the Army day? Why wouldn't the Army get the message to translate?

Captain SAFFORD. The original message was sent directly to Admiral Noyes by me in accordance with his orders.

Mr. MURPHY. At what time on what day?

Captain SAFFORD. About 9 a. m. on December 4, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, how did you get it then if it was the Army day?

Captain SAFFORD. It was intercepted by a Navy station, came in on the teletype to my office, and was delivered to me by hand.

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't that be unusual, since the [10045] interpreter knew that the Army was to handle messages on that day? Why would it go to the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. The interpreter knew nothing about those arrangements. We sent everything to the Navy Department. We sorted it out ourselves.

Mr. MURPHY. You yourself before you knew what the message was and before you understood it decided that you were going to do some translating that day, I take it; is that right? Here is a message that comes in, here it is the Army's day to get those things to translate them, and here you are, according to yourself, and you were having these translations made when you don't know what is coming at all, on the day the Army is supposed to do it. How do you explain that?

Captain SAFFORD. I was carrying out the instructions of my superior officer.

Mr. MURPHY. What were those instructions? To disregard the arrangement you had made?

Captain SAFFORD. As soon as that message came in to notify him immediately.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there is a question more fundamental than that. Did you disregard the arrangements you had made with the Army that they would translate on one day and you on the other because you didn't know until it was translated [10046] that that was the Army day to translate? What is your answer to that?

Captain SAFFORD. It had already been translated when I saw it.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean it was translated before you saw it. Who in the Navy was it that decided not to follow the rules and have the Army translate that day? Who did, before you saw it?

Captain SAFFORD. The translation had been made by Kramer.

Mr. MURPHY. But you can't explain to us why the regular procedure wasn't followed out on the 4th? If you know.

Captain SAFFORD. On listening for the winds message the Navy translated everything that came in in plain language Japanese to see whether or not the winds message was there. The Army did the same thing on their circuits. We had been standing watches for about 7 days by that time. We were receiving a great many plain language and press broadcasts which we were looking over and every one but this particular message had had nothing in it and had been discarded. Kramer could not tell whether to discard or not until he had translated. It was all done at the same time.

Mr. MURPHY. You decided not to follow the regular procedure but to stay at it entirely yourself; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

[10047] Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield so I may ask a question for clarification?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. You are not a translator, you are not a Japanese language expert, are you?

Captain SAFFORD. I am not a translator, and I had no responsibility whatsoever over the translation section. My only authority rested in matters pertaining to my section.

If there was any arrangement to be worked out or any disagreement between GY, which is the decoding section, and GZ, which was the translation, I would be called in to settle it.

[10048] Mr. KEEFE. You couldn't translate; you personally did not translate?

Captain SAFFORD. I personally translated nothing.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you told us that 2 days ago, you didn't translate. One of your men told us that the 13 parts were garbled, that they had to get a new key, that there were many lines missing from it. But you were able to tell what were in those parts, weren't you, the parts you saw?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right. But that was in English.

Mr. MURPHY. You also told us time after time after time, that Kramer was under you; that is right, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. He occupied space under me.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you not tell us three or four or five or ten times in this record that Kramer was under you? Wasn't that the arrangement? Not in this hearing, but didn't you say so in the other hearings?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought that was clear. Kramer was attached to the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, and they made out his fitness reports. For example, he was listed in the Naval Directory under them. I was senior to him and to a certain extent Kramer had two bosses, an unfortunate arrangement, but as far as responsibility for any translation or distribution of material, that [10049] was the responsibility of Captain McCollum as Kramer's commanding officer, and not mine.

Mr. MURPHY. So he went to you first and you were the one that wanted McCollum notified, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I was shown these things as a matter of courtesy.

Mr. MURPHY. You were the one that wanted McCollum, his boss, notified?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not say that.

Mr. MURPHY. What did you say?

Well, I won't press that. I think I understand it clearly.

Now, here is Saturday, the day the war is going to start, according to you. You say the Army and Navy know it is going to start.

How do you account for the fact that the Army is quitting on Saturday noon on the day the war is going to start? You said everybody knew it.

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot account for that.

Mr. MURPHY. How can you account for the fact that your people are not working on Sunday, the next day, when the war is going to start?

Captain SAFFORD. My own people were on a 24-hour basis, and had been for months.

[10050] Mr. MURPHY. There was not one translator in the Navy that day, was there, outside of Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot answer for the translators.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you weren't so concerned about getting the message translated?

Captain SAFFORD. It was not my responsibility, and I had no responsibility to issue any orders about translators.

Mr. MURPHY. Weren't you interested in protecting the American Navy? You said war was going to start that day. Do I understand you to say you were not responsible for anything at all that might help with winning the war?

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that the answer bears any such interpretation. I think it is an unfair question. The witness didn't testify to any such thing. The witness is entitled to some degree of fairness and fair play.

Mr. MURPHY. I expected Mr. Keefe to be concerned, and I expect he will have more trouble all day. What is the objection?

Mr. KEEFE. I object because the witness has testified that under the set-up he had no responsibility for translators. You are trying to make it appear that he did have and had no interest in protecting the welfare of the Nation.

[10051] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. That applies to the guests.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I have sat here all during this hearing without hardly opening my mouth. I think it is unfair on the part of the Congressman to say he expects to be interrupted by me all the time. But there is a limit to fairness even with this witness.

Mr. MURPHY. I think I understand what is happening, and I am not going to be taken off the track by either certain people in the audience or by the objection. I will proceed. I will get the facts regardless of any hindrances, sir.

The fact is, sir, that you were head of communications, and you felt war was going to start on Sunday. The fact is also, is it not, that there was not one translator in your section, or in the Navy Department, who understood a word of Japanese on Sunday, December 7, on the day that you felt the war was going to start, were certain it was going to start?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot answer for Captain Kramer or Captain McCollum, on what arrangements they had made to handle Sunday. They will have to speak for themselves, and I believe they will have an adequate answer.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is you weren't concerned, were [10052] you? Answer that question "yes" or "no," please. You showed no concern, did you, about this message that would tell, in effect, the time the war was going to start?

Captain SAFFORD. I felt that message would be decoded and handled promptly, and in my opinion it was.

Mr. MURPHY. You left at 4:30 on Saturday, and at least you never inquired as to what time this message would come in, or what it said, did you? You have told us you didn't. That is true, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is true.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I come to question No. 30:

"Were #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) #9 (McCollum) #10 (Kramer) or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of #136—"

I believe I have covered this question, but I will read it:

not to ever mention the events of #136 (December 6, 1941) and #137 (December 7, 1941) of the investigations conducted by #36 (Roberts Commission)? In this connection I am sending you #35 (Roberts Report) by ordinary ships mail. I will comment on it in further correspondence.

I believe I talked to you about that yesterday.

Now, I come to #31.

Do you know when and how #53 first got the news of [10053] #75 (Serial No. 901) (sets up No. 902) and No. 76 (Serial No. 902) (1-13) (the works), and what action he took.

I understand there you were talking about the 13 parts; is that right?

[10054] Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. That is what you refer to as "the works"?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there any significance in that description?

Captain SAFFORD. That meant the bulk of the message and what we had up to midnight on the 6th.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you called it "the works". There is a slang expression. "The works" means the real paper, the important paper, the important thing. Where was there anything there? You said

your so-called winds execute was the works, as I understand it, or the tip-off.

Captain SAFFORD. The winds message was the tip-off.

Mr. MURPHY. You do not put any particular significance on "the works"?

Captain SAFFORD. It was the bulk and contained the intent of the fourteenth part message and the first 13 parts.

Mr. MURPHY. I say you don't put any significance on the title? There is nothing unusual about the words "the works"?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Then the next question: "(Sets up #902) and #76 (Serial #902 (1-13))"—you have it repeated there. That would be the fourteen-part [10055] message?

Captain SAFFORD. That would be the fourteen-part message.

Mr. MURPHY. (Reading.)

No. 82. Same for #77 (Serial #902 (14) (The Finale)) and #78 (Serial #907 1 P. M.)

As I understand it, you were questioning Kramer then about these two particular messages, the fourteen-part message and the 1 p. m. message?

Captain SAFFORD. What he knew about the delivery, not as to their significance.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. (Reading.)

83. Re my #14—I meant the conference on #137 (Dec. 7, 1941) between #3 (Admiral Stark) and #53 (General Marshall) which resulted in #89. I did not know of the other conferences and am delighted to learn of them.

What conferences were you delighted to learn of?

Captain SAFFORD. These were conferences that Kramer made some reference to in his letter earlier probably.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, why were you so delighted about that? I mean what brought delight to you?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought it would bring information out.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you been in conference with anybody [10056] about your work in this case prior to sending this letter to Kramer? Had you conferred with certain people?

Captain SAFFORD. Only to ask them questions.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, will you tell us who you conferred with on your work?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not confer with anybody on my work. I was doing that single-handed.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you confer with anybody who was writing articles in order to get particular publicity for the cause?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you do anything for cause except what you have told us here? What other letters did you write?

Captain SAFFORD. I did nothing toward writing except this one letter and another one which was sent about the same date to Kramer and Kramer did not reply to either.

Mr. MURPHY. What was the other letter, the letter to Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. That is one to Kramer enclosing the magazine clipping and suggesting he see Admiral Halsey.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that all?

Captain SAFFORD. That has been introduced in evidence. That is all that I know of.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

[10057] Captain SAFFORD. That is all that I know of.

Mr. MURPHY. You wrote other letters, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. Not that I know of.

Mr. MURPHY. How about Brotherhood? You wrote to him, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not ask Brotherhood to do anything. I merely asked him to give me some information.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you have a copy of that letter or did you destroy it?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't think I have a copy of any of my letters.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you destroy the copy or did you make a copy? You did write to Brotherhood, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I wrote to Brotherhood.

Mr. MURPHY. Who else?

Captain SAFFORD. And I mentioned that in my testimony at the previous investigations.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right, that is why I know it, I read your testimony. Who else did you write to, if anyone?

Captain SAFFORD. I wrote to Welker, Captain Welker, after VJ-day.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right; that is in your other testimony, too, isn't it, about Welker?

Captain SAFFORD. I mentioned him but I had not written [10058] to him before VJ-day.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. What did you write to Welker about?

Captain SAFFORD. To ask him then if he could recall anything concerning the winds message.

Mr. MURPHY. What else?

Captain SAFFORD. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Who else did you write to?

Captain SAFFORD. I also wrote to ship's clerk H. L. Bryant who had served as Commander Kramer's confidential yeoman at the time. I wrote to him after VJ-day.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have a copy of that letter?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know whether I have or not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, will you produce the copies of the letters you have, sir, so the committee can see them, the copies of the letters you wrote on this question?

Captain SAFFORD. I will make search and produce those letters, what I have, at the first opportunity.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. In the meantime I will go on. Then there is a parentheses:

Message described in paragraph 50 (Page 9-XI) of #35 (Roberts Commission).

Now, what were you referring to there, if you know?

Captain SAFFORD. I haven't a copy of that report handy.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

[10059] Captain SAFFORD. I do not have a copy of that report handy.

Mr. MURPHY. Gentlemen, do you have a copy?

Captain SAFFORD. No, I haven't.

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Mr. MURPHY. I am sorry, sir. I withdraw that. What happened to the copy you had yesterday? Did counsel take it back?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not bring that with me. Of the Roberts report?

Mr. MURPHY. Oh, no. Is it the Roberts report you want or is it the copy of the letter? You do have a copy of the letter here right before you, do you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Oh, yes; I have that.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, but you do not have a copy of the Roberts report, do you?

Captain SAFFORD. Of the Roberts report.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you get that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel is working on it.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. While they are getting that I will go on. (Reading:)

No. 34. The one #2 (Mr. Hull) office.

What concern did your department have with that? How did that affect Communications?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer made the delivery at that time [10060] and what time he made the delivery is information.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, was what time Kramer made delivery of concern to your office?

Captain SAFFORD. Not officially, not to me.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it, please? You said that was of concern to your office, what Kramer did?

Captain SAFFORD. That was curiosity on my part.

Mr. MURPHY. For what purpose?

Captain SAFFORD. For knowing what happened.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, for what purpose? You wanted to know for what purpose? You wanted to do something with the information, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. For possible use as evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. By you?

Captain SAFFORD. By me, if acceptable.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, number 35. (Reading:)

35. The one in #3 (Admiral Stark) office?

36. The one "c/o Col. B."

What did you mean by that?

Captain SAFFORD. I think it meant care of Colonel Bratton.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

37. The one between #3 (Admiral Stark) and #53 (General Marshall)?

[10061] What concern of yours could that have? I mean why would you want that, a meeting between the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations. Why would you over in Communications want that? Did it have anything at all to do with your work for the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. That was beyond anything under my authority.

Mr. MURPHY. For what purpose?

Captain SAFFORD. For possible use as evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, surely Admiral Kimmel did not know you were doing all this, did he?

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Kimmel did not know I was doing this.
Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever contact him, good, bad or indifferent, since Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. I contacted Admiral Kimmel —

Mr. MURPHY. When?

Captain SAFFORD (continuing). About a month after this letter was written.

Mr. MURPHY. When? Now, that would be in February of 1944, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. On the 21st of February 1944.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have a copy of that letter?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not write a letter.

[10062] Mr. MURPHY. How did you do it?

Captain SAFFORD. I was in New York and I went to his office and saw him personally.

Mr. MURPHY. Who else did you see at that time—his counsel?

Captain SAFFORD. His counsel was not there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, who else was there?

Captain SAFFORD. Just Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever talk to his counsel?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not talk to Admiral Kimmel's counsel until after the Navy investigation.

Mr. MURPHY. When did you first talk to his counsel—Mr. Rugg I mean? I don't mean any sinister inference. I just want to know when you talked to him.

Captain SAFFORD. After the Navy investigation was completed.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, about when? About when, just your best judgment.

Captain SAFFORD. I believe it was August or possibly September 1944.

Mr. MURPHY. August or September of 1944?

Captain SAFFORD. 1944.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you make a special trip to New York to go to Admiral Kimmel's office in New York?

[10063] Captain SAFFORD. No. I was up there with my wife.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Captain SAFFORD. I was up there on a little leave.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, was that your reason for going to New York?

Captain SAFFORD. I took advantage of the trip to see—to look up Admiral Kimmel and see if he was in and would wish to talk to me. I took the initiative, not Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I mean is that why you went to New York or was that a thought after you got there? Do you understand me? I don't want to—

Captain SAFFORD. I went up on personal reasons with Mrs. Safford who wanted to go, wanted to take me up, and as long as I was up there I thought I would go in and see Admiral Kimmel if I could locate him in his office.

Mr. MURPHY. And you then told him what you were doing, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. No; I did not tell him what I was doing—or everything I was doing.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you tell him about the letters you were writing?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you tell him about this plan that you had sent to Kramer about how he was going to arrange things?

[10064] Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you talk to anybody else in New York State—

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. MURPHY (continuing). Or give them any information?

Captain SAFFORD. Nobody.

Mr. MURPHY. You are sure, no one else in New York State?

Captain SAFFORD. Positive.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I come to No. 38:

How much does #9 (McCollum) know?

What did you mean there? Know about what?

Captain SAFFORD. About one of these details.

Mr. MURPHY. Details? Which one? I mean what particular subject?

Captain SAFFORD. With—

Mr. MURPHY. On any particular item? And if so, which one?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot remember just what I meant by something I wrote 2 years ago.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. And then the next one:

Will #9 (McCollum) come through willingly?

What did you mean by "come through"?

Captain SAFFORD. Testify.

[10065] Mr. MURPHY. You mean take your side, the side you were taking, or what?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Just testify?

Captain SAFFORD. Just testify willingly.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you had some doubt about whether he would testify as to the truth under oath, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. Not that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, what did you have in mind, whether he would have a good memory or a bad memory? You say "come through willingly."

Captain SAFFORD. Whether he would be hesitant or not.

Mr. MURPHY. Hesitant about telling the truth?

Captain SAFFORD. About volunteering.

Senator LUCAS. What was the last answer, please?

(Answer read.)

Mr. MURPHY. Then I come to No. 40:

What is your estimate of #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) in this respect?

And you were then wondering from Kramer whether he would come through, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

No. 41. Will he talk for #42? (Admiral Halsey)

[10066] You meant if Admiral Halsey were to question him would he answer questions, is that it?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

No. 42. What about #6 (Admiral Turner)?

Captain SAFFORD. The same thing.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't you feel that Admiral Turner was involved in these charges that you had made about a conspiracy? Wasn't he on Admiral Stark's staff?

Captain SAFFORD. He was.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, haven't you charged him with being one of the group that framed Kimmel—Admiral Turner? He is one of the staff. Isn't he within the group that you charged with framing Kimmel?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know that Admiral Turner had anything to do with this at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, wasn't Kelly Turner Chief of War Plans and wasn't Kelly Turner the one who would not send the message after McCollum and Wilkinson discussed it and you looked it over?

Captain SAFFORD. I knew nothing about that whatsoever, about Admiral Turner ever having seen that message.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, wasn't Admiral Turner the head of War Plans on Admiral Stark's staff?

[10067] Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Turner was the head of War Plans.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And haven't you charged the whole staff and didn't you think you had overwhelming evidence against them? Let me not misquote you. Let me get your exact words:

Having overwhelming proof of the guilt of OPNAV.

Now, the fellow who is head of War Plans is a pretty important fellow on OPNAV, isn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. He is.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, how do you square this about? You have overwhelming proof of the guilt of OPNAV and here you are trying to get a conference and apparently feeling that was all right with the Chief of War Plans of OPNAV. Are those two inconsistent?

Captain SAFFORD. They are inconsistent.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you include Kelly Turner and the Chief in your charge of frameup?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, who did you charge then? Now, he is one of OPNAV that is out. Who do you include?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know where it lay.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know where it lay.

[10068] Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, you said 2 days ago that you felt that Sonnett was counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox who was then dead when you wrote that letter, wasn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, what in the world did Secretary Knox do that he needed counsel for the defense?

Captain SAFFORD. Nothing.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, why did you originate it? It has gone out to the papers of the country that you said that you felt that Sonnett was counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox who was then dead. That has been in all the papers, I suppose, in the country, and you said it.

Captain SAFFORD. That was the man I gathered at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. What basis was there for such a statement, for Frank Knox needing counsel for the defense after he has gone beyond? What did you mean by that? There has been a lot of talk about a smear campaign in one or two witnesses' testimony here and I am wondering what you mean now by referring to Secretary Knox in that way? You felt Sonnett was counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox. Sonnett is a fellow officer in the Navy, isn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. He is.

Mr. MURPHY. An officer of the United States Navy, isn't he, Sir? [10069]

Captain SAFFORD. He is.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Now, what did you mean by saying that an officer of the United States Navy was counsel for the Secretary of the Navy who had previously died, counsel for the defense?

Captain SAFFORD. It had seemed he had conducted a long unofficial examination in conversations with me and my impression was that he seemed more interested in protecting—in looking after anything which might tend to be prejudicial to Secretary Knox rather than to get at the meat of things.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at that time and up to that time did anybody ever accuse Secretary Knox of anything?

Captain SAFFORD. He had never been.

Mr. MURPHY. But you felt that he needed a defense, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. No, but the defense was working.

Mr. MURPHY. For Knox. Sonnett was working a defense for Knox. Why did he have to be defended? What did he do?

Captain SAFFORD. Nothing.

Mr. MURPHY. But you felt that it was the right thing to do, to write in your letter, in your memoranda that if Sonnett was counsel for one other—the one other I will come to later—was counsel for Secretary Knox, you felt that was the [10070] important thing, did you not, that was the important thing to do?

Captain SAFFORD. I wrote it.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Now, then, did you and Admiral Stark ever have any trouble?

Captain SAFFORD. Never.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, when was it you first turned against him? You have turned against him, haven't you? You feel he is guilty of a crime, don't you? You said he could not be trusted, didn't you? You said he was guilty of a frame-up.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, there are three questions now.

Mr. KEEFE. There are four questions.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to have one at a time, so far as I am concerned.

Mr. MURPHY. I will ask one question then. Strike out the other three.

You felt that Secretary Knox—rather, that Admiral Stark was guilty of a frame-up of Admiral Kimmel, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. I said that in a private letter.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Captain SAFFORD. I said that in a private letter.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, sir, you always speak the truth privately or publicly, don't you? [10071]

Captain SAFFORD. You try to.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Captain SAFFORD. You try to.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Well, now, was it or was it not your feeling when you said that you felt that Admiral Stark was guilty of a frame-up?

Captain SAFFORD. May I have the question again to be certain I have got it straight?

(Question read.)

Mr. MURPHY. Will you answer the question, sir?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Your answer is "Yes," Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. No. I said I would answer the question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. I beg your pardon; I am sorry.

Mr. MURPHY. Take your time. I will wait.

Captain SAFFORD. I want a chance to get that straight.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't want to ask you these questions but my job here is to get the facts. I don't want to embarrass you at all, I would rather not be here, but being here I am obliged to get the facts.

Captain SAFFORD. It was not my feeling at the time and if I wronged Admiral Stark I regret it.

[10072] Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you now feel that he cannot be trusted? You so stated in your letter. Now, has there been anything since the time you wrote the letter and now to change your opinion?

Captain SAFFORD. That question of trust, may I explain, I meant by that that I thought everybody was so prejudiced against Admiral Kimmel at that time that they would not do things fairly. That was with the exception of a few, I might say, close friends of Admiral Kimmel's. It did not mean trust in the ordinary sense of the word.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you did state as an officer of the United States Navy that the leading officers, the commanding officers of the Navy were guilty of a frame-up and that, in your judgment, a frame-up is about as vile and low a thing as can be done to a human being, isn't it, or by a human being?

Captain SAFFORD. It is.

Mr. MURPHY. And do you feel now, sir, today, that Admiral Stark and the members of his staff did bring about a frame-up of Admiral Kimmel?

(No response.)

Mr. MURPHY. I won't press you upon that point.

Captain SAFFORD. All right, thank you.

Mr. MURPHY. You have answered a good many others.

[10073] Now, I would like to come to the next question under "Comment." [Reading:]

With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 and 10 (c), you were describing #80 (Circular #2494 (PL code mag.) of which we have copies of the original and its translation in the GZ files. This was sent and received on #137. (Dec. 7, 1941).

Now, as I understand it there you make the statement in your letter that the message of December 7, 1941, referred by inference to Circular No. 2494. Is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought that he was describing that message.
Mr. MURPHY. You say:

I was asking about #74 (General Intelligence Broadcast containing false "Weather Report") which was broadcast at 0430 (EST) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941). (Not sure of exact date.)

Now, up to that minute in that paragraph you are talking about a false weather broadcast, isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. A false weather report.

Mr. MURPHY. A false weather report?

Captain SAFFORD. In a general intelligence broadcast.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. [Reading:]

It was unheard by "S," "H," and "C," who listened [10074] for it. (I have this from the Station "S" files, plus statements of #19 (Wright) and #23 (Mason).) This message (in Morse) included the words "Higashi no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare. (Negative form of kita no kaze Kumori.)" The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 (Circular #2353 (Sets up #74) or #73 (Circular 2354 (Sets up #74), but was a mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early and verified it. Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (71) were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, "Here it is." We had been waiting a week for it and Station "S" had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype.

Captain SAFFORD. That is what I thought.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, from whom? Teletype from whom?

Captain SAFFORD. Station "M." from station "M" which is Cheltenham and station "W" which is Winter Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. So that at that time you did know that there was a message came in, a false weather report from either Cheltenham or Winter Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And that is what you were talking about?

Captain SAFFORD. That is what we were talking about.

[10075] Mr. MURPHY. "It was unheard by 'S'." That would be Bainbridge Island station, wouldn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. "H". What would "H" be?

Captain SAFFORD. Heeia, or Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. And "C" Corregidor?

Captain SAFFORD. Corregidor.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Who listened for it. (I have this from the Station "S" files.)

Now, if you had Station S's files, that was Bainbridge Island, did you at that time try to get the other stations' files?

Captain SAFFORD. We asked for the other stations' files at the same time.

Mr. MURPHY. And the inference here from your own testimony was that you felt those files had been improperly destroyed?

Captain SAFFORD. That those files could not be located.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, what was your testimony on that before? You gave a very good reason for that before, didn't you? I am referring to your testimony before the Hewitt Board where you explained the reason for certain records of Cheltenham and Winter Harbor being missing.

[10076] Will you get that testimony if you have it there?

Captain SAFFORD. On what page, please.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you talked three different times. I will get it for you in a minute. You told Admiral Hewitt the reason for both of those not being located. The Cheltenham station was moved from Cheltenham up to Massachusetts, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. On what page is that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not come to it yet but I am asking you now wasn't the Cheltenham station moved to Massachusetts?

Captain SAFFORD. The regular receiving activity took over the whole station and the rest, the intelligence unit was moved over to Chatham, Mass.

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring to page 120. I will come back to that; that is another thing. That is about Cheltenham but that is not what we are looking for. Page 122:

Captain SAFFORD. This search was made in November or December 1943 and again in the spring of 1944. I cannot place that any closer. After we got notice that Admiral Hart would conduct his investigation the logs of Winter Harbor, Maine were destroyed in the spring of 1943 simply to make room. They destroyed everything for about six months back. Cheltenham's logs were destroyed when the intercept unit left Cheltenham and moved [10077] up to Chatham, Massachusetts, which was some time earlier than that. I cannot say offhand what happened to the logs of the other two stations, but I can produce nothing.

At that time you felt there was nothing sinister or improper, didn't you, about Cheltenham?

Captain SAFFORD. May I comment on that?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. I did not verify my testimony and there was one word left out, I know, which changes the sense of things because it is not true.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that word?

Captain SAFFORD. There is an "except." The logs of Winter Harbor were destroyed in the spring of 1943 simply to make room. They destroyed everything except for about 6 months back."

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, what word do you insert there?

Captain SAFFORD. "Except".

Mr. MURPHY. They destroyed everything except for about 6 months back?

Captain SAFFORD. You said "For about 6 months back."

Mr. MURPHY. I see. Well, at that time did you feel that it was as a result of the conspiracy by people in the Navy to get the records destroyed?

[10078] Captain SAFFORD. I am not referring there to the logs of the stations. The third copy which the station itself kept. We had finally asked about that just to see if they could throw any light on the thing.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, would they possibly, since the station did not know what you were looking for and since you had about 20 to 25 messages in there, I suppose, each day, from Cheltenham, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. We had everything intercepted by it arranged in chronological order, the time of intercept.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean they kept copies of these messages at these outlying radio stations of things that we were trying so hard to protect, they kept copies of them?

Captain SAFFORD. They kept copies.

Mr. MURPHY. And if another government wanted to get a copy of magic at any time all they would have to do is find out what was being done and go into one of these outlying radio stations and they could find a complete file, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. They only had a copy of the message that went through the air.

Mr. MURPHY. But they did keep a complete file of everything they ever received, a record? Did they or not?

Captain SAFFORD. They were required by our instructions [10079] to retain their third copy until the Navy Department had acknowledged receipts of the other two copies. Then they had permission to burn or retain for a short time at discretion. They often found the backlog there useful in helping them with their work, research, and so forth.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you now feel that anyone at Cheltenham participated in this plan that you speak of to destroy the copy of the alleged winds code about which you speak?

Captain SAFFORD. No one at the stations. I was merely trying to show when it was brought up the effort that we had made to run down, to see if there was any copy in existence.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let us proceed (reading):

I have this from the Station "S" files, plus statements #19 (Wright).

Now, who would Wright be?

Captain SAFFORD. He is now a Captain; W. A. Wright.

Mr. MURPHY. What statement did you have from him?

Captain SAFFORD. He told me that they had listened for the winds message at Heeia.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

And #23 (Mason).

That would be at Corregidor?

Captain SAFFORD. He had listened at Corregidor and I thought he had listened personally there and had not heard it.

[10080] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

This message (in Morse) included the words—

by the way, a false weather broadcast now, according to this, was Morse telegraph, wasn't it, or Morse code?

Captain SAFFORD. I always said it was Morse.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Captain SAFFORD. I always said it was Morse.

Mr. MURPHY. I thought you said the other day that the only place—or in your statement don't you say something about that was the only station they could get Morse and the others were listening for voice? Now, if I am wrong in that I suggest that we get your statement. Will counsel find that particular part there where he is discussing the Morse code there? I will come back to that, Captain, when we find it.

This message (in Morse) included the words "Higashi no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare. (Negative form of Kita no kaze Kumori.)" The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 (Circular 2353).

Now, when Mr. Richardson was questioning you the other day you said this alleged intercept that you were speaking about did not follow

the regular manner, didn't you, that you saw the words in the middle, or did you say that it had words in the middle and at the end?

Captain SAFFORD. I said that I saw the words in the [10081] middle and could not say whether or not they also appeared at the end.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you say:

The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 (Circular 2353 (Sets up #74) or #73 (Circular #2354 (Sets up #74), but was a mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you—

By "you" meaning he called Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer.

Mr. MURPHY. (reading):

and you came in early and verified it. Murray recalls it, so do I.

So that you do recall the false weather report, do you?

Captain SAFFORD. I recall the false weather report in a general intelligence broadcast.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, and at what time? On the night of December 3d or the early morning of December 4, isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. It was the early morning of December 4 that I saw it.

Mr. MURPHY. Right [reading]:

Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, "Here it is."

[10082] Now, this is the morning of December 4 you are speaking about in your letter and before this committee? On the morning of December 4 you saw the real intercept, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. I am talking about the real intercept.

Mr. MURPHY. You are talking about the real intercept here?

Captain SAFFORD. We are talking about the same thing.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, here you call it a false weather broadcast.

Captain SAFFORD. The true winds message was a false weather broadcast in the middle of a general intelligence bulletin and possibly repeated at the end.

Mr. MURPHY. Sir, all through these hearings a certain false weather broadcast had been referred to as meaning the one that came in and Kramer threw in a waste basket.

Captain SAFFORD. That was always referred to as the "false winds" message, which was a true weather broadcast.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let me go on. I think that will come out in a line or two [reading]:

Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, "Here it is."

Now, then, if you are speaking about the real bona fide intercept that is what you are speaking about here, isn't it?

[10083] Captain SAFFORD. That is what I am speaking about now.

Mr. MURPHY. That would mean that Brotherhood should know about it, that you did know about it and that Murray knew about it, isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is what I thought and I had so understood at the time I wrote this letter.

Mr. MURPHY. You know that they both have testified that they know nothing about any such things?

Captain SAFFORD. I understand they have since testified to the contrary.

Mr. MURPHY. To the contrary? Did they ever testify as you say they would? They testified contrary, you mean, to what you thought they would?

Captain SAFFORD. To what I thought.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

We had been waiting a week for it and Station "S" had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype.

Captain SAFFORD. That is for the long messages.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, reading on:

As a result of #74 (General Intelligence Broadcast containing false "Weather Report") #9 (McCollum) prepared #90 (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) (or #135) (Dec. 5, 1941), but never released)—which was a very long mes- [10084] sage ending up with the translation and significance of the warning in #74 (General Intelligence Broadcast containing false "Weather Report"). I read the message in #7's (Admiral Noyes) office and was witness to the discussion of it between #7 (Admiral Noyes) and #5 (Admiral Wilkinson).

Now, you say then that this so-called winds intercept would be there before the three of you, wouldn't it, at that time? I mean the winds intercept that you are speaking of here, that was there before you at that time, wasn't it, that intercept?

Captain SAFFORD. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MURPHY. The intercept of the winds message which you testified about in your statement, which you said came in on December 4, if it existed was in the room then with you when you were talking to Wilkinson and Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. It was not.

Mr. MURPHY. Where was it?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you think they knew about it at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. I did.

Mr. MURPHY. You know they both testified they did not, don't you?

[10085] Captain SAFFORD. I believe so.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Now, then (reading):

I took for granted that #90—

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield for a moment before he gets away from this last point?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand, Captain, now you are talking, under the heading "Comment" you are talking all the way through to what you point as the intercepted winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. The intercepted winds message. That other message, the false one, had completely gone from my memory at that time. I had no recollection that we had ever received anything but our winds message.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Now, that statement that the Congressman just read, which says, "I read the message in seven's office," is that partment censors and killed.

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Noyes.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me just ask one question there. Captain, you now say that the false winds message was the true winds message, is that what you say? It was the one that you were expecting to come by broadcast? I so understood you. Now, I don't want to confuse you. You go ahead and clear it up.

[10086] Captain SAFFORD. What I have later termed the true winds message was a false weather report included in and as part of a general intelligence broadcast or Japanese language, where a Japanese language broadcast was made, or a general intelligence broadcast, however you want to phrase that one.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand. Excuse me, Senator. Go ahead.

Senator LUCAS. And the words:

I read the message in #7's (Admiral Noyes) office and was witness to the discussion of it between #7 (Admiral Noyes) and #5 (Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum)

As I recall, on yesterday when I examined you on that point I thought you told me that you sent the message direct to Admiral Noyes and that you did not see the message any more until sometime when you were investigating with Kramer in going over the files for Admiral Noyes. Am I wrong in that? If I am, you correct me.

Captain SAFFORD. The original message, the original intercept with the translation in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom was sent up to Admiral Noyes' office immediately and I never saw that message again ever.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, what message are you talking about here in your letter to Kramer when you said, "I read the message in seven's office"? What message is that you are talking about?

[10087] Captain SAFFORD. I am referring to another message of warning to Admiral Kimmel and I believe there are other addressees who are not important and which Admiral Wilkinson took in with him and showed to Admiral Noyes on that occasion. This is about 3, very close to 3 p. m. on the afternoon of December 4, 1941, and I was permitted to read the message a page at a time. After Admiral Noyes had finished reading a page he would give it to me. I read the whole message once.

Senator LUCAS. That is correct. I am wrong and you are right. That was the message that McCollum prepared?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, ostensibly—I mean which indicated by telephone number or something, as well as subject, that it had been originated in the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligence. McCollum was not there. It was just the three of us, Admiral Wilkinson, or Captain then, Admiral Noyes and myself, in Admiral Noyes' office.

Senator LUCAS. That is correct. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, going on (reading):

I took for granted that #90 (Message to #81 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) (or #135) (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released) would be sent and did not know otherwise until #132 (Dec. 2, 1941) (plus 2 years). I believe that I told you about this message and stated that it had been [10088] sent. Anyway, I was living in a fool's paradise from #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) to #137 (Dec. 7, 1941).

In other words, you were living during that time feeling that the McCollum dispatch had been sent out?

Captain SAFFORD. Had been sent; that is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, did you know that there was some conversation subsequent to your departure when the person who wanted the message sent was shown the "This is a war warning"? You did not know about that conversation?

Captain SAFFORD. I knew nothing about that whatsoever.

Mr. MURPHY. And the fact that there had been a war warning message sent out on the 27th of November, you did not know that?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I had seen—I had been permitted to see the "This is a war warning" message of November 27 by the Navy Department in the code room. I believe Admiral Noyes authorized me to go in and look at that message.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

I learned from #19 (Wright) that #9 (McCollum) knew #90 (Message to #31 originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) (or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released) had not been sent #19 (Wright) was informed by #9 (McCollum) at #92 (Pearl Harbor).

What do you mean by that, that Wright was informed?

[10089] That it was never sent, is that what you mean?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Some "More Questions":

Do you recall #74? (General Intelligence Broadcast containing false "Weather Report").

Now, do I understand that you are both telling Kramer what he should recall and then you ask him if he does recall it, is that it?

Captain SAFFORD. I was describing it and asked him if he recalled what I described.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

No. 44. Did you know any or all of the circumstances of #90. (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released). How much, and when did you learn it?

You are asking him then if he recalls what you told him up above, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I am asking him if it is correct that I had told him about that message. I thought I had but I was not certain of it.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

45. When did #9 (McCollum) learn that #90 (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) [10090] #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released) had not been released?

You are asking Kramer what he knew about McCollum's knowledge there is, is that it, or were you asking him to ask McCollum?

Captain SAFFORD. I was asking what he knew. He saw McCollum every day and he might have known something.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Captain SAFFORD. I asked him what he knew.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

46. Do you know who blocked #90 (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released) Or refused to release it? (#5 (Admiral Wilkinson) was pushing it but apparently did not feel he had the authority to release it himself.)

47. Can you throw any other light on the subject?

One final word—I do not know how well you know #18 (Rochefort). I have known him for 18 years. He can be trusted and will come through for us.

Now, what could he come through with you?

[10091] Captain SAFFORD. He had served out there, and I had known him for a long time and knew that he was not prejudiced against Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. When you said, "He can be trusted and will come through for us," you meant you and Kimmel at that time, or did you mean you and Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not refer to Admiral Kimmel at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. You said, "Can be trusted, and will come through for us." You meant you and Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. Me and Kramer.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now what could he come through with? Don't you know that Rochefort testified he never heard of a winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. I knew that he had not.

Mr. MURPHY. Then what could you expect him to come through with, if you knew he had not heard of it? When did you find out he had not heard of the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. We knew by inference on the 4th of December that they had not heard it because we received no report from either Pearl Harbor or from Corregidor, that they had heard it. We had every reason to believe if they had heard it, they would send it in to us, but they did [10092] not.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew on the 4th of December that they did not hear it at Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. We knew on the 4th that they did not report it.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Captain SAFFORD. And by inference that they had not heard it.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Captain SAFFORD. But we did not get a specific report from them, which I could recall, that they had monitored for the message. We took for granted that they had. It was probably submitted and not recalled by me. But I did not know for certain until 2 years later, until about the time Wright came and told me they had listened for it, but had not heard it.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew on the 4th of December, didn't you, or felt certain that Rochefort had not heard it, because of the way you said it came over?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Why would this telegram go out? You remember I asked you about the one going out in the 5th asking them to get information from Rochefort. My understanding was that they sent to Hawaii to find out if they had heard any- [10093] thing because they had not heard anything in Washington, and I understood you to say yesterday they had tried to find the details from Rochefort after you had it already in. How did you explain that?

Captain SAFFORD. I would rather let the people who sent the telegram explain that rather than myself.

Mr. MURPHY. That is a rather puzzling circumstance, isn't it, that on December 5 a message was going to Hawaii to Rochefort, or to G-2 there, asking him to contact Rochefort, apparently to find out what he knew about the weather broadcast 24 hours at least, or close thereto, after you say it had already been in Washington; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, who was it that ever decided, if there ever had been an execute message, that war would come 2 days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday? Where does that come up? Is that good Navy strategy, or is that your own plan, or what is it? You say in your statement, "Two days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday."

I am only a layman. I do not understand those things. What do you mean by that?

Captain SAFFORD. It had been generally believed for a long time that if Japan did declare war without previous [10094] warning, it would come on a week end or national holiday. A warning message to that effect had been sent out several months before.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know Admiral Kimmel testified he never heard of such a warning?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know that.

Mr. MURPHY. He said he never heard of it, because it went back to Admiral Bloch. That was back in April, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That was back in April.

Mr. MURPHY. In February or March there was that Peruvian message about the attack on Pearl Harbor, wasn't there? Did you hear of it?

Captain SAFFORD. I never heard of it.

Mr. MURPHY. You never heard of it, not until now?

Captain SAFFORD. Not up until this time that I recall.

Mr. MURPHY. There was a message sent to Pearl Harbor that came from Tokyo, from Ambassador Grew, that someone had heard the Peruvian Minister to say there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor. You never heard of that?

Captain SAFFORD. No; I never heard of that.

Mr. MURPHY. How did you arrive at this week-end business? Was that inference, was it the feeling generally in the Navy that the attack would come on Saturday or Sunday, [10095] or on a holiday?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that any time there was a discussion of war, the feeling was expressed by officers who were experienced that the Japanese would probably begin their war the way Hitler had begun his war in Europe over a week end so as to take the maximum advantage of the disorganization of the Government they were attacking by having their offices closed, and taking some time to get back into stride again.

Mr. MURPHY. You feel, do you not, that General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, General Gerow, and General Smith of the Army, all knew, after they got this so-called message of Thursday, that war was coming Saturday or Sunday, did you feel that?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought they did at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. And you felt it too?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought so too.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I would like to go to your message to the committee, and you have on the back page a chart. Who drew that chart?

Captain SAFFORD. That chart was drawn in my office.

Mr. MURPHY. By whom?

Captain SAFFORD. By Lieutenant Stenback and myself. The actual drawing was done by Lieutenant Stenback, who is [10096] in the room assisting me. I am responsible for the date supplies.

Mr. MURPHY. That was done by Admiral Stenback?

Captain SAFFORD. Lieutenant Stenback.

Mr. MURPHY. Lieutenant Stenback who is in the room with you, and just to the rear, at the table, with another lieutenant from the Navy who was also, I assume, assisting you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. He drew this chart?

Captain SAFFORD. He drew this chart.

Mr. MURPHY. What was the basis for it? I see noted on here "prepared January 25, 1946." I see here "Attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7," and some other things.

What is it meant to convey?

Captain SAFFORD. It is trying to put down in one place all data concerning distances, day and night, which has a great effect on receivability conditions of short-wave radio, time of the day, and anything which was on record and available which would plot in the receivability conditions of Bainbridge Island, and also the FCC station at Portland, Oreg., from a few odds and ends of information we had, and Cheltenham, Md., with particular reference to the JAP 1330 GCT schedule on the 4th of [10097] December 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. Are the FCC intercepts on here?

Captain SAFFORD. The only ones that I have any personal knowledge of.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the FCC intercepts that we have in evidence here aren't on here, are they?

Captain SAFFORD. They are on there; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Where? Where do you see the one that turned out to be the false weather report?

Captain SAFFORD. There [indicating].

Mr. MURPHY. I show you the exhibit which is attached to your statement.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And I ask you if you will mark with an "X" the FCC intercept which is shown on page 3 (b) of Exhibit 142.

Captain SAFFORD. May I see that?

Mr. MURPHY. This one here [indicating].

That says it is a weather message from Station JVW3, transmitted approximately 2200 G. m. t., December 4, 1941.

Captain SAFFORD. There is an "X."

Mr. MURPHY. All right. The witness makes an "X" in pencil.

Now, then, I show you page 3 (c), a weather message from [10098] the Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 G. m. t., December 5, 1941, and ask you if you will put an "X" on your chart to show that one.

Captain SAFFORD. Here is a second one right here [indicating]. We will make a small "x."

Mr. MURPHY. You mean it was received on the same day at the same time?

Captain SAFFORD. It was received on the 5th. This one [indicating] is an hour earlier in time. This chart here, in order to get

enough data, was made during the entire period. We monitored all of these intercepts that we have any record on. This is Greenwich time.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there anything in any chart before us that would indicate to anyone that these two messages are in it until you now put on "X" in there?

Captain SAFFORD. The FCC intercepts are indicated with an "X" and the dates were noted, and they were correctly plotted as to time and frequency.

Mr. MURPHY. Where do you find the dates noted?

Captain SAFFORD. With a small letter "x."

Mr. MURPHY. I see. December 4?

Captain SAFFORD. December 4 and December 5.

Mr. MURPHY. The "December" is obliterated.

Captain SAFFORD. December 5 and December 4 are marked [10099] there [indicating].

Mr. KEEFE. Is it there, Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. I do not know, but I am assured it is.

Captain SAFFORD. It is there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is there.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; it is "December 5" and "December 4" with two small "x's."

Captain SAFFORD. I just wanted this unobliterated.

[10100] Mr. MURPHY. You better get a copy so you can have it marked.

As I understand it, sir; where you have put the two x's on there, very small.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes; already plotted.

Mr. MURPHY. Now there was a message which Captain Kramer was supposed to have thrown in the waste basket. Is that on there, and the time that that was received, the one they thought was a proper message and then he threw it in the waste basket? Which one would it be? Will you mark that one with an "A"?

Captain SAFFORD. It would be one of these probably indicated by the little bits of dots here, but I could not specify which one. Those were all press broadcasts and it could be any one of those which came in the night.

Mr. MURPHY. Now is the intercept of December 7, relations with England being strained, on that chart?

Captain SAFFORD. That would be shown in one of these long spaces here [indicating].

Mr. MURPHY. Is it indicated by you in any way so anyone examining that chart would ever find it? Is there any notation or any reference to it?

Captain SAFFORD. That message was not specifically noted.

[10104] Mr. MURPHY. Right. Is there anything on that chart that would show the hidden words messages and their receipt?

Captain SAFFORD. Not specifically.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there anything at all that anyone would find if they were to read that chart, without your explanation or without something added to it, about hidden words?

Captain SAFFORD. It included all the other Tokyo transmissions which could be heard at Bainbridge Island in this range of frequencies.

Mr. MURPHY. What station was radio station JVW-3? Where was that located?

Captain SAFFORD. That was in Japan.

Mr. MURPHY. JVW-3 was in Japan?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes. That is in Japan, near Tokyo.

Mr. MURPHY. And JVW-3 on the second one would be the same one?

Captain SAFFORD. Would be the same one.

Mr. MURPHY. That would be at Tokyo. Then there is nothing on here to show what station received those messages in America, is there, on these exhibits 3 (b) and 3 (c)?

Captain SAFFORD. They were received from the FCC monitoring station at Portland, Oregon. It is not on this, but it is on the letter of transmittal, and I have it here, the FCC intercept, Portland, Oregon.

[10102] Mr. MURPHY. All right, thank you. Now I just want to clear one thing up and I am through with the letter.

You referred in that letter to paragraph 50, as I remember it, in the Roberts report. Do you have a copy of it there now?

Captain SAFFORD. I have the report.

Mr. MURPHY. Was that paragraph 50 you spoke of, the message described in paragraph 50, pages IX—XI?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That reads as follows:

About noon Eastern Standard Time, 6:30 a. m., Honolulu time, December 7, an additional warning message indicating an almost immediate breaking of relations between the United States and Japan was discussed by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief of Naval Operations for the information of responsible Army and Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

Now, as I understand it, you were asked what you knew about that particular transaction.

Captain SAFFORD. I believe so. What is the question number, please, that they referred to.

[10103] Mr. MURPHY. It is that little asterisk under 33, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. I think it is clear. It is clear to me what you mean. You understood what you meant, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, I promised yesterday that I would get the Clarke report. The Clarke report is here. I am not going to question you in detail about it, but I think you will find in the Clarke report that is before you that this Friedman about whom you spoke yesterday denied there was any basis whatever for any allegation about General Marshall ordering certain papers destroyed.

With that I am finished, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster would be next. He is not present.

Congressman Gearhart of California will inquire, Captain.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, the methods of transmittal that were used in the 14-parts message was that code or cipher?

Captain SAFFORD. That would technically be called a cipher, but we use the word "code" loosely to mean both.

[10104] Mr. GEARHART. But, technically speaking, the method they used was the cipher method in transmitting that long 14-parts message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, a cipher can be analyzed and broken down by expert study, a study by experts?

Captain SAFFORD. In some cases.

Mr. GEARHART. That is, if it is not too good a cipher?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, in this instance the 14 parts comprised a very long document, did they not?

Captain SAFFORD. Very long, indeed.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, if we had a very long document in a cipher and were immediately thereafter supplied with its translation into English, and it was a cipher, the probabilities are that cipher experts would break down that cipher and be able to interpret future messages very quickly?

Captain SAFFORD. That all depends upon the system used.

Mr. GEARHART. Some are harder than others, but if you have a long cipher extending over pages and then you have its translation into plain, simple English, and you lay them down side by side, that is a pretty good lead to an expert in breaking that cipher, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. It is a help, on the ciphers that can [10105] be broken, but it is no help on the ciphers that cannot be broken.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, I still have a little trouble hearing you.

Captain SAFFORD. I am sorry, Senator.

Mr. GEARHART. The point I was leading up to, I got the impression that the Japanese changed that cipher immediately afterward. Is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. After when?

Mr. GEARHART. After December 7, or after the message was delivered, I guess that was on December 7, at 1 o'clock, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. The cipher key was changed every day at midnight, Tokyo time, as a matter of routine, or standard practice, but that cipher system remained in effect long after December 7, 1941. I do not know just how long.

Mr. GEARHART. Was not that a very strange thing, in view of the fact they had delivered a message when they knew we had intercepted their cipher as well, or were reasonably certain of it?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese on previous occasions had given the United States Government numerous notes in English which had to be translated to our Government, and they kept on using the same old machine. I cannot speak for the Japanese, [10106] but it was apparent to us that they thought their cipher was as secure as the United States high-grade cipher actually was.

Mr. GEARHART. There were so many very strange performances on the part of the Japanese it is kind of hard for us to decide what is rational and what is not.

For instance, the gentleman from Pennsylvania became very excited about the fact that they had sent, as you contended, on December 4 a message that said they were contemplating military action in two or three days. Why would they send a war warning to any place?

Well, if that were foolish, absurd, out-of-line, then how ridiculous becomes the sending of the winds execute on the 7th or 8th? As between the two which is the more absurd?

Captain SAFFORD. We did not understand it. It was just a fact.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, sending the winds execute on the 7th or 8th, after it had already been on all the civilian radios, and after it had been in the newspapers, makes that action still more absurd, does it not, than anything they could have done in the way of advanced warning theretofore?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you have testified, haven't you, that the message of the 4th was sent in Morse code, that is [10107] by the dot and dash method?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You also testified you are convinced that that was a directional broadcast?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese told us it was going to be a directional broadcast, or supposed to survey certain area where they would use the frequency suited to reach that area at that time of day and season of the year.

Mr. GEARHART. And being a directional broadcast directed towards Europe, because of climatic conditions and other scientific phenomenon that message could also be received on the east coast of the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And being directed to Europe and being directed to the east coast, the same scientific phenomenon caused it not to be heard on the west coast of the United States, is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Now about the interpretation. Technically speaking, the literal translation would indicate that relations with the United States were dangerous, is that not correct?

Captain SAFFORD. That is a literal translation of that part referring to the United States.

[10108] Mr. GEARHART. It was understood by you, and by the other officers with whom you immediately discussed it, as indicating relations with the United States meant war, that "dangerous" meant war?

Captain SAFFORD. The importance given to that message before we intercepted it by my superior officers, and also the senior officers in the War Department and their worry for fear it might have been sent out before the 20th of November when we started to listen for it, or the fear we might have failed to catch it, made me believe that it meant much more than the mere diplomatic relations becoming serious.

[10109] Mr. GEARHART. And when it did arrive, you naturally interpreted it in the light of other information that you had already had called to your attention?

Captain SAFFORD. There was considerable information available at that time, and immediately prior thereto, which indicated that Japan was considering war against England and against America, and was definitely maintaining peaceful relations with Russia, as a matter of policy.

There was other information which indicated that the actual outbreak of war was going to occur in the rather near future. But this had seemed more important than any of those other messages individually, because this seemed to be a commitment of the Japanese Government to some course of action, whereas the other messages were more hints, or you might say statements of intent.

Mr. GEARHART. The very fact that the Japanese Government considered it important to notify all of its nationals all over the world, that were in the diplomatic and military activities, that they would convey to him in a false weather report, a pronounced deterioration of relations, indicated that they would not do so unless there was a very important idea to convey?

Captain SAFFORD. Unless there was compelling reason.

Mr. GEARHART. Some compelling reason.

[10110] Then, when you interpreted this winds warning, and the giving of the code to the Japanese nationals as important, you had to interpret the deadline message which had passed over your desk as adding importance to that fact? Is that not true?

Captain SAFFORD. The importance of the winds message built up to the point of its actual receipt.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right. The importance of the winds message was built up by other messages which were going over your desk, with which you were familiar?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. One of those was the so-called deadline message advising you that on the 29th something automatically would begin to happen, you did not mean that they were not to do something of no consequence, but something of very great consequence, following the 29th day of November 1941, isn't that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. That was very definitely implied.

Mr. GEARHART. Then another series of messages had a very emphatic impression upon you, and those were the messages that had to do with the instructions to the Japanese nationals beyond the borders of Japan, to destroy their codes; is that not correct?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, but that did not seem anywhere [10111] near as important as the winds message, although it came in 2 or 3 days earlier. It was one of the things that built up the winds message in importance.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right. That is what I am trying to bring out, that these other messages built up the importance of the winds message, and winds execute, that you were waiting for?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And also in addition to that, you knew that other persons were impressed by this series of messages that were coming in, because it was brought to your attention, was it not, that the United States directed her consular agents and embassies in the Far East to destroy their codes?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So there was only one interpretation that you could possibly give to the Japanese phrase "Relations with the United States dangerous," that that would mean when you received it, that relations with the United States had resulted in war?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. GEARHART. And you have testified that when you were finally allowed to search the records, if you ever were, you found that all records, and reference to this [10112] code had been destroyed, or had disappeared from the files?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you been permitted the privilege of looking at file 7001 since you left the office that you were then connected with?

Captain SAFFORD. I was loaned that file in 1944, and permitted to look myself. I also questioned Harrison who had been the custodian at that time in December 1941, and he said he knew nothing whatsoever about it at all.

Mr. GEARHART. You know the members of this committee have been denied the right to look at that 7001 file, so you aren't the only one who has been denied the privilege.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I challenge that statement.

Mr. GEARHART. The Senator hasn't forgotten the motion that was made?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I challenge that statement. I will go down with the Congressman this afternoon if he wants to look at 7001. The committee has the right to appoint a subcommittee to go down and look at that file.

Senator FERGUSON. It seems that the memory of the Senator is very short. You made a motion to that effect, and the [10113] vote was 6 to 4 denying us the right to go down and look at the file.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, that was to prevent individual members from snooping and sniping and going on a fishing expedition into all of the files down there.

Mr. GEARHART. I might say that the Senator from Illinois has indicated that he is willing to go snooping and sniping with me this afternoon in violation of the motion.

Senator LUCAS. The motion that prevailed was that a subcommittee could go down and look at the files and the chairman appointed that subcommittee. If the Congressman from California is not satisfied as to what counsel has told him, and what the Navy Department has told him about 7001, I will be delighted as a member of the subcommittee to go and look at that file.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Can't we get along with the witness and decide these matters later? This witness doesn't know anything about what the committee has done. I hope we can proceed with the Captain. We have detained him here for a long time. Let's get along with his testimony. He couldn't know about what the committee has decided to do or not to do.

[10114] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, just one thing—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the Chairman that the witness does not know what the committee did, but I now ask that 7001 of the Navy be brought here in open session so that we can question this witness about it and all data relating to that file.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will observe that request.¹

Senator FERGUSON. I want to have it when I examine the witness.

Mr. GEARHART. And I would like to have 7000 and 7002 also brought, so that we can have some idea of the sequence.

¹ See p. 3800, *infra*.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is a photostatic copy available of the file.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to see that now.

Mr. MASTEN. That is all part of Exhibit 142.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that Exhibit 142 shows all of these numbers, and it has been in the committee's hands, each individual, for about 1 week.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I want to make one further statement. If the photostatic copies are not sufficient, in the opinion of the Senator from Michigan and the [10115] Congressman from California, I will be delighted to go down and have them look at the originals. If they cannot trust the Navy Department to give us true photostatic copies of what is in 7001, then I am willing, as a member of the subcommittee, to go into the Navy Department files and take a look.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I know of no subcommittee being appointed, but I want to call attention to what has been handed to me as a photostatic copy of the file.

This is one sheet. At the top in red stamp is TOP SECRET—ULTRA. Then in pencil in parentheses, the letters Y-P-E-D. Then there is typewritten JD-1:7001. Typewritten number canceled.

Now, at the bottom in writing, in ink, 7001; in stamp TOP SECRET—ULTRA.

Now that is the thing that is given to the committee as the file. I would take it that merely indicates that there is no evidence now in the Navy Department that there is a file 7001, but that the number for that file is canceled.

That is what I am handed. Is that correct, counsel?

Mr. KAUFMAN. I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Then will you explain that sheet of [10116] paper? I assumed there was a file with that number on it, and nothing in it.

Now, what is that sheet?

Mr. KAUFMAN. I think that is one of the binding sheets, and it is part of the rest of the exhibit, and the photostats. It is part of that volume of file.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand all the other papers in this binder is the file 7001 JD-1? Is that right, Commander Baecher?

Commander BAECHEER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is right then, that just the number is canceled and there is no file down there?

Commander BAECHEER. That is a sheet of paper in the file such as any other sheet on which would be written the message with the number.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is there a file?

Commander BAECHEER. There is.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The file is the sheet of paper—or it is bound sheets of paper—that cover a long period of time. This is one sheet of paper in the file. We have offered in one of our exhibits here all of the sheets of paper which precede that sheet, and all of the sheets of paper which follow that sheet, for the purpose of showing the nature of the whole file. If you go down to look at [10117] this specific file, you will just get a blank sheet of paper which says on it "File canceled."

Senator FERGUSON. Just what I read?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just what you read, that is right.

The question here, Mr. Chairman, is, as I understand it, that that sheet of paper is in effect a substitute for a true sheet of paper which might have contained the winds execute message that this witness is talking about.

Of course, we know nothing about it except that sheet of paper. We have offered Exhibit 142, all of the preceding sheets, and what they are about, which are on the 2d of December and the 3d day of December, in this file, in this bound volume of sheets of paper, as I understand it.

Then we have shown that in the next page, which would be 7002, we again pick up the 2d and 3d of December, for the purpose of indicating, at least by analysis, that a sheet of paper in the place where this 7001 cancellation is, couldn't have referred to a document on December 4, because you don't reach December 4 until further pages in advance.

Then we have also in Exhibit No. 142, submitted the subject matter that is involved in the earlier sheets and in the later sheets, to show the subject matter had no relation whatever to the subject of the winds code.

[10118] Now, then, that is purely a mechanical method of recital in order to see if there can be spelled out what 7001 originally was.

We also show in Exhibit 142 a number of other messages other sheets of paper, which appear in this general compilation, that are marked canceled at different portions of the year, to show that a cancellation of a sheet is not an unheard of proceeding.

[10119] Now, that is all physically that you could see if you went and looked at this file, and whatever inference the Senator or the committee may draw from that constituted the only answer that can be made to the fact that in that file is a blank sheet 7001 that is marked canceled.

Senator LUCAS. What date was that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would be in a group of sheets that run on December 2 and December 3.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, I would like to call attention to some of these others as being canceled. I have examined this and have read it carefully, and I think that every one of them that are canceled, every number that is canceled is initialed and the date is put on when it is initialed as being canceled by a person, he initials the cancellation, but on this particular one "No. canceled" there is nothing on it except what I have read.

Now, I would like to have the file brought to this committee room so that the witness may be examined in relation to what other papers there are and so that the committee may see once and for all this file and that we can settle this matter of a number.¹

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit me to inquire of counsel, is there any reason why the responsible official of the Navy Department who is the custodian of this file could not [10120] appear here with the file with the understanding that it will be examined here and returned to him and taken back to the Navy Department?

Commander BEACHER. May I discuss that with counsel, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Discuss that with counsel and we will get a report on it.

¹ See p. 3800, *infra*.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I will not yield further. I have only a few more questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, this file 7001 was succeeded by a file of 7002, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Can you explain to us what the system is in giving numbers to files of this kind? Do they represent subjects or do they represent chronological successions in respect to time transactions?

Captain SAFFORD. Approximately chronological but the dates have often got mixed up. You will find many places in the file where messages were inserted out of turn, out of their order of translation. I think Captain Kramer can give a better answer to that than myself because his office actually filed and put the numbers on them.

Mr. GEARHART. Generally speaking they are chronological [10121] in respect to time?

Captain SAFFORD. Generally.

Mr. GEARHART. But because some papers are retained on the desks of different officers a day or so sometimes papers get into the file that are subsequent in point of time of action, that occasionally happened?

Captain SAFFORD. May I explain it this way—

Mr. GEARHART. Will you please explain it.

Captain SAFFORD. The least important messages in the minor systems often were out of turn, delayed 2 or 3 days behind the more important messages. I think that is most likely the reason for the mix-up.

Mr. GEARHART. In whose charge were these files?

Captain SAFFORD. They were in Captain Kramer's.

Mr. GEARHART. Was this a file of Captain Kramer's office or was it a file of the Navy Department, generally speaking?

Captain SAFFORD. It was entirely separate from any Navy Department files. These translations of intercepts were not permitted in the Navy Department files. This is a special file kept in—all the files were in Captain Kramer's safe.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the file itself was in use for some time if the numbers had gotten as high as 7,000. Did they start from 1?

[10122] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; they started from 1 at the beginning of the calendar year 1941 and worked up a little above 8,000 by the 31st of December 1941.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, from your observation of the file was the file 7,001 in a proper position to have contained the messages you have described?

Captain SAFFORD. There was this, you might call it guide card, or dummy, between 7,000 and 7,002. All the papers were in proper chronological order. In fact, I went through the whole month of December to be certain that that particular message might not be correctly numbered but inserted out of turn and it was not there. I did not look outside of the month of December 1941 for it.

Mr. GEARHART. Then 7,001 is a file that might have contained the message you have testified to, the winds execute?

Captain SAFFORD. It could have.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire, Captain.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain, I wish you would look at this paper. It was handed to me as this canceled file. I want to call your attention to it. The page before. This is at the bottom of the page. Translated 12-3-41. In [10123] parenthesis 5. That is at the bottom of the page. That is the message before. And on the page following it is "Translated 12-3-41." In parenthesis "A." Now, if those two papers when that file arrives here are in that file would that indicate that messages coming in or translated on the 3d would be in that file or could be in that file? Will you look at just what I am talking about, please.

(A document was handed to Captain Safford.)

Senator FERGUSON. Look at the bottom of the two pages, the one in front of it and the one in back of it.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes. Now will you repeat the question.

Senator FERGUSON. The question is, The page before this canceled number and the page after being dated as translated the 3d of December would that indicate that this so-called winds message that you are talking about could have been in that JD-1:7001 file?

Captain SAFFORD. It could be because there was only 1 day out.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in your department—yours was the Communications Section, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that a file and a file number in the Communications Section or in what section was this file?

[10124] Captain SAFFORD. It was in a file of the Translation Section which was a part of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence which had office space immediately adjacent to the rooms occupied by the section under my command and for which I was entirely and fully responsible.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that the Communications Section itself did not have files, they relied upon the Intelligence Section which had the office next door and the Translation Section for their filing; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Not in the case of these diplomatic messages. We had no files whatsoever of our own with the exception that we did have a complete file of the intercepted messages as they came in. Not the translations.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the one that is missing, is that the file 7001 that is missing or canceled—it doesn't appear to be missing, it is just marked on that "canceled."

Captain SAFFORD. That belonged to Commander Kramer's file or the Naval Intelligence file.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of your own knowledge who had the right to cancel a file and not to initial it?

Captain SAFFORD. To my knowledge nobody had that right.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first look for file 7001—do I have to use the JD, is that part of that number?

Captain SAFFORD. J is "Jap-Dip", and "1" means 1941.

[10125] Senator FERGUSON. Then I should refer to that?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever look for that file?

Captain SAFFORD. I looked throughout all of the messages for the month of December 1941 personally. It had been looked for before and then I asked permission to make a personal search. It was not there.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did you do that personal search of yours?

Captain SAFFORD. Before I testified before Admiral Hart. I cannot recall the date. I had known it couldn't be located, the guide card, for a long time, but the personal search to see that it might not be mislaid in the wrong order was made just before I testified I believe before Admiral Hart.

Senator FERGUSON. Who had custody of and who was in charge of files which included JD-1: 7001? Who would be the custodian and in charge of files that contained that number?

Captain SAFFORD. In December 1941?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. The individual custodian was Lt. Comdr. H. S. Harrison, United States Naval Reserve.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was in what section?

Captain SAFFORD. He was attached, we might call it on [10126] temporary duty, in Opnav 20-GZ, under Commander Kramer, assisting him. He was not a language officer.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who followed Kramer and Harrison to your knowledge?

Captain SAFFORD. There was a general change of organization in early 1942 and I am not familiar with the details of it.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with that?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you keep your position that you had on the 7th?

Captain SAFFORD. Until the 15th of February 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any charges ever placed against you in the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you removed from that position for any reason that you know of?

Captain SAFFORD. For no reason that was ever explained to me. They split the organization up into several component parts and I was given the part which was considered by Admiral Noyes, I believe, to be the most important, our own codes and ciphers, because we were better off at that time, for 2 or 3 months, in the solution of foreign codes and ciphers, than we were in the production of our own. [10127] We had just made it and we were on the ragged edge as regards distribution and production for the increasing demands of war.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the fact that you left your position in February of 1942 was due to a change in the organization set-up, and you went to a position in the same organization excepting one part of it, is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. The organization under me from 1936 until 1941 had included the design and production of our own codes and ciphers. That was another subsection, which has never been mentioned here

because it has nothing to do with this investigation. I took that over when it was split up. There were further changes made at some unknown time and a lot of responsibilities which had been under Naval Intelligence at that time were transferred to Naval Communications and I am not close enough to it to possibly speak with any degree of accuracy.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you remain in a very responsible position in relation to codes, ciphers, and messages as far as our war effort was concerned?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how long did you remain in that highly responsible position?

Captain SAFFORD. There was a further subdivision [10128] about, I believe, September 1942 whereby the production was separated from the pure research and development of new and superior systems, and I took the research over at that time. I think it was generally conceded I was the best officer qualified in the Navy to do that particular type of work. And another officer who served under me took over the production.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was that a highly important position in our war effort?

Captain SAFFORD. It was highly important and highly specialized.

Senator FERGUSON. And how long did you remain in that position?

Captain SAFFORD. I am still in that position.

Senator FERGUSON. You are still in that position?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, has anyone brought any charges in any way against you in relation to your neglect up to and including the 7th of December 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been charged with any neglect or, let's say, malfeasance and nonfeasance?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or misfeasance?

[10129] Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there ever an investigation made as to your office as to why you didn't get that 1 o'clock message which came in and was known from 5 to 6 o'clock to the White House, to General Marshall or Admiral Stark?

Captain SAFFORD. The nearest thing to that came in a statement from Admiral Noyes. He said the Roberts Commission "has given your outfit a clean bill of health."

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only thing?

Captain SAFFORD. Or words to that effect. That is the only thing that remotely relates to an investigation.

[10130] Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it you never received any criticism for not being down on Sunday morning?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your day off, as we call it? When was your leave day, as you call it in the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. Sunday was my regular day off.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your regular day off?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your office alerted to war on Saturday and Sunday?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why? Did you ever make an investigation as to why this message of one o'clock delivery and the 14 part—the 14th part of the 14-part message was not decoded and translated—as I understand it it was in English so it didn't need translation—but polished up and taken to the respective men prior to the time it was taken?

Captain SAFFORD. That particular 1 o'clock message turned out to be Japanese when it was decoded. I made an investigation. I asked the officers concerned. Brotherhood knew what it meant, or thought he knew what it meant, and he called Kramer on the telephone, and then he sent the message over to the Army to be translated.

[10131] Senator FERGUSON. I didn't get the name of the man who was telephoned.

Captain SAFFORD. Captain Kramer.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is what I am trying to get at.

If you were on a war basis, if you were fully alerted, you anticipated trouble that morning, why didn't we get more speed in your office and every other office in Washington, as far as you were concerned? Why did we have these lapses of time when we were all alerted to war?

Captain SAFFORD. The message was decoded very promptly.

Sunday, December 7, was one of those days on which we were fortunate enough to acquire the key to the purple machine before it became effective and was ever used. The same thing had been true of the day before, for the 6th. We had acquired the key in advance. I believe we sent one of those—I am speaking by guesswork now——

Senator FERGUSON. I don't want you to guess. We can't act up here on guesses, and we want to keep guesses out.

Captain SAFFORD. We had sent those keys out more than 28 hours in advance. We had believed we furnished them to the Army. I am not positive of that. The Army had them anyhow, and therefore we were in a position to read those messages off, or we thought we were just as fast as the Japanese could do it, except for the question of translation [10132] afterwards.

Now, on the key for the 6th there had been apparently some mistake in transcription. Two of the letters got mixed up in the order. That caused trouble. Both were garbled and the officer who came in took time out to correct that before we made the delivery.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think you are quite answering my question. What I am trying to get at is this—I will put it in a little different way:

How far was the Army translation department from your office?

Captain SAFFORD. It was about 5 minutes walk.

Senator FERGUSON. Five minutes walk? What I am getting at is why didn't you have a runner outside. You were anticipating, you were alerted fully to war; why didn't you have a runner standing by for that matter so that he could go immediately at 5 o'clock, or whatever time it was, when that message was delivered in your department or in the Intelligence Section—or wasn't the Army office open?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know whether the Army office was open or not. We had a runner available. We had an officer and an enlisted man on watch at the time. We had two men at all times on watch which always gave us a courier [10133] available for any immediate trips.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had the men, then?

Captain SAFFORD. I had the men, but we didn't have the translators.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose duty was it to send this message when it came in there at 5 o'clock over to the Army translators? Let's get down to who is responsible for these delays.

Captain SAFFORD. It was the responsibility of the officer on watch.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would that be that morning?

Captain SAFFORD. That was Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, we can ask him about that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. Would it be convenient for you to suspend now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will take a recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 1:30 p. m., the same day.)

[10134]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we would like to read into the record at this time two short memoranda which deal generally with this winds-message problem.

One is a memorandum for Mr. Richardson from Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe, dated January 26, 1946, which reads as follows:

Pursuant to the request of former counsel to the committee, a comparison was made of the intercepted messages in the Army Signal Intelligence Service file which had been translated on 2, 3, and 4 December 1941 and those in the Navy file translated on the same dates. The purpose of the comparison was to ascertain whether the Army file contained a message not in the Navy file. The comparison, which was jointly made by the Army and the Navy, showed that each message in the Army file was also in the Navy file.

The results of the comparison were reported orally [10135] to the former counsel to the Committee at the time the comparison was completed.

[s] HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lieut. Colonel, GSC.

The second memorandum has to do with item 1 (e) of exhibit 142, and is from Lieutenant Commander Baecher to Mr. Richardson, under date of February 1, 1946.

It reads as follows:

With reference to ALUSNA Batavia dispatch 031030 December 1941, please be advised that the time of receipt of this dispatch in the Navy Department was 0621 GCT 4 December 1941, which corresponds to 1:21 am 4 December 1941, Eastern Standard Time. This message was transmitted from Radio Honolulu as deferred precedence.

[s] John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHEER,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.

We would also like to add, as another letter number to Exhibit 142, the photostat which has just been distributed, and which consists of a photostat of a letter dated November 7, 1945, to Mr. George E. Sterling, Chief of Radio Intelligence Division, Federal Communications Commission, and certain enclosures, all of which had to do with the true winds execute which was received by the Federal Communications Commission on the afternoon of December 7, 1941. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 142-D.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 142-D, and all the memoranda read by counsel will be transcribed on the record. (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142-D".)

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire, what is meant by the "true"? You have used the expression "the true winds execute." What do you mean by that?

Mr. MASTEN. Senator, I was referring to the voice broadcast, which is included as item 4 in the Federal Communications material included in Exhibit 142.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did counsel describe it as "true"?

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is an actual message in the winds code. All other messages are in dispute here. That is the reason, Senator.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have something else?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Richardson would like to have this memorandum read into the record at this time. It is a memorandum dated December 6, 1941, which reads as follows:

Memorandum for Colonel Holbrook:

Word has just been received from ONI by telephone [10137] to the effect that the Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. C., was reliably reported to have burned its Code Book and Ciphers last night.

[s] James F. Perry,
JAMES F. PERRY,
1st Lt., Military Intelligence
Evaluation Subsection.

The memorandum is on the stationery of the War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete the exhibits?

Mr. MASTEN. That is all, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I had intended to inject a couple of short witnesses here who had to leave town, but I think in my error, I told them to come at 2 o'clock, so I think we can proceed with the captain until 2 o'clock, and when they come, we can pause and take their testimony.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done. Senator Ferguson will examine you, Captain.

[10138] **TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD,
UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)**

Senator FERGUSON. This last exhibit that was read into the record, the memorandum for Colonel Holbrook, do you know a Colonel Holbrook? Did you ever have any dealings with him? ¹

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It says, "Word has just been received from ONI"—what is the ONI?

¹ See Mr. Masten's statement in hearings, Part 10, p. 5147.

Captain SAFFORD. The Office of Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the office over you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

by telephone to the effect that the Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. C., was reliably reported to have burned its Code Book and Ciphers last night.

This is dated December 6, 1941.

Have you ever heard of that before?

Captain SAFFORD. I had not heard of that before.

Senator FERGUSON. And this is signed "James F. Perry, First Lieutenant, Military Intelligence, Evaluation Subsection."

This is in the War Department.

Did you know Perry?

[10139] Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if that kind of a message had come in, should not Communications have received it first? Or did Intelligence get things from Communications by telephone, that did not go through your department?

Captain SAFFORD. That apparently bypassed me entirely.

Senator FERGUSON. How is that?

Captain SAFFORD. Apparently that one bypassed me. I do not remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a rather significant message, is it not?

Captain SAFFORD. It is.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who would know whether that was distributed to the White House, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of State, and the various others? Would you have anything to do with the distribution?

Captain SAFFORD. It is not in my knowledge, and I had nothing to do with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever distributed out of Washington? This information? Was it ever sent to Kimmel or Short, or to the Philippines?

Captain SAFFORD. Not to my knowledge.

[10140] Senator FERGUSON. You had charge of a department that not only received messages, but sent messages, did you not? Communications?

Captain SAFFORD. The Communications Center.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you also send messages, as well as receive them in your department?

Captain SAFFORD. My department only sent technical messages pertaining to the work and methods of the work. Intelligence was handled by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Information such as you describe would be the function of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am getting at, what department would send the message of November 24 to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain SAFFORD. That was actually handled by Naval Communications.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your department, is it not?

Captain SAFFORD. I was not in charge of it. I was only a subordinate officer.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Noyes was in charge of it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the top of the section handle all messages being sent out as so-called not information but direction orders?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct. I did.

[10141] Senator FERGUSON. You handled those, or did Noyes handle them personally?

Captain SAFFORD. I prepared the messages and the admiral released them when available.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you never heard of this information in ONI that "last night" which would be on the 5th "it was reliably reported to have burned its code books and ciphers last night"? That is the Japanese Embassy. You never heard of that before today?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that there had been instructions to the Embassy here, that is, through intercepted codes, that they were to burn their ciphers and so forth, and their codes?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is shown on page 215 of Exhibit 1, from Tokyo (Togo) to Washington, December 2, 1941. Will you look at that to see whether or not that is what we are talking about, exhibit 1, page 215?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the one.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

[10142] Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you familiar with the fact that our Embassy in Tokyo was advised to destroy its codes?

Captain SAFFORD. I had no information about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

Captain SAFFORD. I had no information about the Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. The military attaché or the naval attaché?

Captain SAFFORD. The naval attaché, yes; the military attaché, no.

Senator FERGUSON. You had it as far as the naval attaché was concerned?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. On what date was that message sent? It was sent, I believe, on the 5th, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that was on the 3d.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you check that? It is important after we get this message of the 6th.

Captain SAFFORD. That message appears on page 42 of Exhibit No. 37. It was sent on the 4th Greenwich time, but on the 3d Washington time.

Senator FERGUSON. So the instrument that we have just now read into the record would not be the foundation of sending that?

[10143] Captain SAFFORD. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the foundation, if you know, for sending that?

Captain SAFFORD. The foundation for that was the message on page 215 of Exhibit 1, which you have just referred to, plus another message on page 209 of Exhibit 1, which may be identified as JD-1: 6984.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 209? Can you help me again?

Captain SAFFORD. Page 209. It is the first complete message.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately?

That is a London message.

Captain SAFFORD. This was to Washington, No. 2444, just above it.

Senator FERGUSON. The one above it:

The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my circular message No. 2447, the U. S. (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

Please relay to France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey from Switzerland; and to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico [10144] from Washington.

Captain SAFFORD. That is the one.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes. The other one was not translated until the 5th. We did not have it at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you go to page 245 of Exhibit No. 1, the message from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, No. 904, "Re my #902,"—902 was the 14-parts message was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. (reading):

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoir be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Now that is the end of that message. Did you know that message came in?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know that message came in until Monday morning.

[10145] Senator FERGUSON. Now here is what you have: You have, first, the pilot message saying there is going to be a time of delivery and "we are going to send 901," which is the pilot message, and that told us,

the Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

So that tells us the number of the message and it tells us it is going to be in English, so in intercepting it we would know immediately by the number 902 that we are getting a part of the 14-part message, would we not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So if we wanted to make haste we would have the information all in advance, as soon as we received the message? That is one of the first things that came in?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it would not be a difficult thing to decipher and decode that number 902, would it?

Captain SAFFORD. Except that was in Japanese and the Army translated it, not the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the Army as good or not as good in translating? Do you make a distinction there by saying [10146] that the Army had it instead of the Navy? Do I understand now if one word in this message, for instance, this part about 901 or 902,

happened to be in Japanese and the other part of the message was in English that you would have to send it over to the Army to have translated No. 902?

Captain SAFFORD. 904, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No. The long 14-parts message was 902.

Captain SAFFORD. I am sorry, sir, I did not understand.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not understand?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not understand you, then. You said that if this part 901 and 902, or whatever the number of the message was, was in Japanese it, therefore, had to be sent over to the Army. Is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. This particular message we are talking about, which is No. 904——

Senator FERGUSON. No, I am back now to the pilot message.

Captain SAFFORD. The pilot message was in English.

Senator FERGUSON. The pilot message gave you the number of the 14-part message, didn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, No. 902.

Senator FERGUSON. So if you knew that number you would know immediately that that was what you wanted to work on [10147] at once, is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the number of the pilot message and the number of the 14-part message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not that what you were looking for that day?

Captain SAFFORD. We were giving precedence to No. 902.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, they not only told you that they are going to describe the time of delivery of the message and give you the number of parts, they say, "I will send it in 14 parts," and they tell you they will give a time of delivery on it, but they sent another message which you intercept on the same day, telling them not even to use a typist on it. What would that indicate to you?

Captain SAFFORD. That that message was most important to the Japanese Government to keep secret until the No. 902 had been delivered to the United States Government.

Senator FERGUSON. So that was further evidence that this 14-parts message was a very very important message, and they wanted it secret until it was delivered, they did not want even any Japanese typists working on it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was known to us here in Washington?

[10148] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now there has been considerable said or questions asked about your absence on Sunday, and you told me it was your day off.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there sufficient personnel in that office to intercept these messages and deliver them to the proper translation people?

Captain SAFFORD. There were.

Senator FERGUSON. Now coming back to this delay again, did you know of any other delays in delivery of these 14 parts of the message, or that No. 904 that said "Don't use a typist"?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or the 1 o'clock message?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for those messages not being translated and delivered to the proper parties?

Captain SAFFORD. We did not have enough translators to maintain a 24-hour watch with them.

Senator FERGUSON. How many translators had they in the Army and Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot give you those exact figures. We had very few.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you did not have to translate [10149] the 14 parts?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now the only one that you had to translate was the short one that I just read, and the one about the delivery, isn't that true?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many translators would it take to translate those, and in how long a time? They are very short, aren't they?

Captain SAFFORD. They are very short.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you had found the key so you knew how to do it that day.

Captain SAFFORD. We knew how to do it that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Now take that message I just read to you, No. 904, how long should it take to translate that? It is on page 245.

Captain SAFFORD. That should take 5 to 10 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. Five to ten minutes. By how many translators?

Captain SAFFORD. One.

Senator FERGUSON. Now let us go to the 1 o'clock message. Have you got the number of it there?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the page number?

[10150] Captain SAFFORD. Page 248.

Senator FERGUSON. That is another three-line message, and it starts out "Re my #902," which is the fourteenth part, so there would be another tip at least that it belonged to that series of messages, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how long would it take to translate that message?

Captain SAFFORD. Five to ten minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. Five to ten minutes, so at the most we have 20 minutes to translate those two messages?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now let us go to the fourteenth part of the message. You will note at the top of it it has got the note:

In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT."

So you have standing out on the fourteenth part of the 14-parts message in plain English to the broadcasting station so that everyone receiving it in communications, or anyone else, would not have to use Japanese translation or anything else, they could see "very important," and it was No. 902?

Captain SAFFORD. There was no delay on any of those messages, on any of the processes for which I was responsible. [10151] They were intercepted promptly, correctly, they were forwarded almost immediately by teletype from the west coast, and were decoded promptly.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I direct you to page 245, at the top of the page, to the plain English phrase "very important," and that was to the radio station. That would not be in Japanese, would it?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir, that was in English.

Senator FERGUSON. That was in English and it did not have to be decoded?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So whoever received that message would have the flag "very important" right at the top of it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In English?

Captain SAFFORD. In English.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any idea how long it would take to translate that fourteenth part? You told us they had the key.

Captain SAFFORD. That would be roughly a half hour.

Senator FERGUSON. A half hour?

Captain SAFFORD. A half hour, and possibly a few minutes longer.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we are going to another subject.

[10152] Among these papers that you read from the other day—

It has been suggested by counsel that he had other witnesses here at 2 o'clock, so I would suggest that we take those other two witnesses and stop here, because I was going to another subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, you may stand aside for a few minutes, until a couple of other witnesses are examined who must leave the city.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I assume you want to direct the reporter to place the testimony of these two witnesses following the completion of Captain Safford?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The testimony of the two witnesses that will come on now will be placed after the conclusion of Captain Safford's testimony.

(The testimony of witnesses Beatty and Dillon, taken at this point, will be found following the testimony of Captain Safford.)

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain, you had in your possession and gave to the committee a certain exhibit, dated May 14, 1945. It was attached to a memorandum that you read into the record that you said you made up in 1945. On that exhibit I see that on May 18, 1945, you have got in pen

delivered to Lieutenant Commander Sonnett by Lieutenant [10153] Commander Linn about ten hundred May 15, 1945. Com-

Will you explain that?

Captain SAFFORD. I was asked for that and I sent over by Commander Linn and he made a note at the time and delivered it.

Senator FERGUSON. On the end of this instrument you have this:

9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the winds "execute" message may exist—the record of proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the winds "execute" did not slip into the record. First they said I didn't know what was going on around me; now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity, as well as my intelligence and my veracity.

You delivered this message to Sonnett?

Captain SAFFORD. One of my officers did.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but that was in it at the time that you delivered it to Sonnett?

Captain SAFFORD. That was in it at the time I mailed it to Sonnett.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that because of what Sonnett [10154] had said to you or did anybody else question your sanity or your intelligence or your veracity?

Captain SAFFORD. No. He had repeatedly told me that he thought my memory was playing me tricks and maybe I was suffering from hallucinations.

Senator FERGUSON. So then you put it in writing and delivered it to him with this part that I have read to you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; that was in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have—this is in red pencil "see testimony of Colonel Fielder and Colonel Bicknell December 24, 1941." Was that on at the time it was delivered?

Captain SAFFORD. That was put on afterwards, in December 1945, shortly before Christmas, after I had been permitted at length to read the testimony given before the Roberts Commission.

[10155] Senator FERGUSON. Now, did Sonnett ever call you up or question that part of the memo that you had delivered to him, number 9?

Captain SAFFORD. He never discussed that specifically with me after that. The next time I came over he made some remark that he did not want to give that to Admiral Hewitt, though he would if I insisted. I told him I was only trying to assist and I was not trying to run that investigation. He gave it back to me and I made a notation as soon as I got back to the office of the date at which it was returned. Admiral Hewitt never did see that memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, you have written across the face of it:

Withdrawn on May 18, 1945 at the suggestion of Lieutenant Commander Sonnett. Returned for possible use at the next (?) investigation Pearl Harbor, L. F. Safford.

Captain SAFFORD. That was "retained", sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Captain SAFFORD. That was "retained."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, do I understand then that this did not reach the possession of Sonnett or did he have it to read it?

Captain SAFFORD. He did have that about 3 days and read it and then suggested that I withdraw it, though if I insisted he would give

it to Admiral Hewitt. I withdrew it. [10156] He had read it.

Senator FERGUSON. So he had it from the 15th to the 18th?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the only conversation you had about it was what you relate now?

Captain SAFFORD. And the other conversation was that I would not be permitted to inspect the records of the Roberts investigation; that was out.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read that, please?

(Answer read.)

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you have any conversation with Sonnett about inspecting the records of the Roberts investigation?

Captain SAFFORD. None other than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Just that part?

Captain SAFFORD. I had requested it in writing and he said it could not be done.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you request it in writing?

Captain SAFFORD. In my last paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, in this instrument?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. That was the only time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say anything to you in any of the conversations about the wind execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. We would discuss other matters and [10157] always get around to that question.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean "get around to it"?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, I believe he would lead up to it or something. It kept cropping up in the conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you why the Navy were making the Hewitt investigation?

Captain SAFFORD. To see if they could reconcile conflicting testimony and to examine witnesses who had not been available before, particularly Captain McCollum and Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss what the reconciling testimony was that you did want to reconcile?

Captain SAFFORD. It was largely in regard to the winds message. There were other matters which did not particularly concern me. All of these things on which I presented memorandums were not clear in his mind, at least, what the significance was, and I spent a lot of time preparing those to do my best to straighten them out from my point of view and from what I knew.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he mention to you who had testified that there was no wind message?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that he told me that I was the only person who had any recollection of the winds message.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, that was on May 18, 1945. [10158] Did he tell you or mention to you that on the 6th of June 1944 that Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, United States Navy, an admiral, had been asked this question:

68. Q. During November or December, 1941, were you cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements, by means of a partial weather report?

A. Yes, I do recall such messages.

Q. 69. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?

A. Yes.

70. Q. Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain is imminent.

Did Sonnett ever call that to your attention, that [10159] Admiral Ingersoll had said that?

Captain SAFFORD. He did not.

Senator FERGUSON. I am reading that which is in the Hart report. Now, were you told that by Mr. Sonnett?

Captain SAFFORD. I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Admiral Ingersoll could be talking about there other than the wind code intercept execute?

Captain SAFFORD. Nothing else at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I am going to read you Admiral Ingersoll's testimony from another hearing, not the Hart hearing at all, and I would like to have the original so that we can get the date. This is the Navy. I want to find out the date he testified. I cannot find it but I will put it in the record later, when he is testifying before the Pearl Harbor Navy Board of Inquiry. It is a different investigation. The one I read from to you was the Hart investigation and this is in the first Navy. It is after Hart.

Q. Can you remember under those circumstances what this doubt was—

I think I will go back far enough to clear up that question.

Can you state whether or not this information was discussed by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Ad- [10160] miral Stark?

Going back to 35.

A. I don't remember whether it was discussed with Admiral Stark or not.

36. Q. Did you take any action yourself as a result of the information that was contained in this document 15?

A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that time, because, as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt in the minds of the translators as to just what the translation should be.

37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was?

A. No, I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to whether they had an exact translation—a difference of opinion among the translators as to what the Japanese words meant.

38. Q. Can you recall whether this difference of opinion related to the subject of a declaration of war or whether it related to severance of negotiations, or what the discussion was about—can you remember that?

A. No, I don't remember that point now.

39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941 did you [10161] receive any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the so-called "winds" message?

A. Yes.

40. Q. Will you state the circumstances?

A. I recall that some time I did see the messages which were supposed to put this "winds" message, translated on the 28th, into effect. I do not recall whether I saw them prior to December 7 or afterward. If I saw them prior to December 7 I am quite sure that would have been considered confirmation of the information which had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet

on December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of codes at London, Washington, Manila and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941 any action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a result of the information contained in this execution of the "winds" code which you state you saw?

A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. If it was after December [10162] 7 there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the "winds" code?

A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December 1941.

[10163] Now, that was the testimony given on August the 31st, 1944. Did Mr. Sonnett call that to your attention?

Captain SAFFORD. He did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, he said he did not see any of these messages after December 1941. Now, let us take the message in Exhibit 1, the so-called regular message of the weather. Do you know what I am talking about? The one that they had some trouble about translating.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is on page—

Captain SAFFORD. 154 and 155.

Senator FERGUSON. No; that is circular 2353.

Captain SAFFORD. Isn't that what you have reference to?

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about the one that came in on the 7th or 8th. They thought it was a wind execute. It is on page 251, the top of the page. It is dated the 7th of December 1941 [reading]:

(Plain Japanese language using code names)

Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

Captain SAFFORD. That was not the winds message. That was in the hidden word code.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but didn't some people think that [10164] that was a wind message?

Captain SAFFORD. There has been some confusion over that.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Captain SAFFORD. There has been some confusion over that.

Senator FERGUSON. Over that. Well, now, when did that come in to the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. That was received a little after 10 a. m. and had been distributed to everybody in the Navy at least and to the White House and State Department by 11 a. m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. What was wrong with that translation? Wasn't there some trouble over the translation?

Captain SAFFORD. The translation was hurriedly made and the word "United States" or "U. S." should have been included in it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did they make a correction of that?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is the language "not in accordance with expectaotions," is that not a correct interpretation?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the translation given by the Navy for the so-called hidden word code, which was the vehicle for sending this information. At a later date it was [10165] pointed out to me—this is 1944—that the Army translation of that was somewhat stronger, but that stronger translation was never distributed.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you know of this message, circular No. 2494?

Captain SAFFORD. I had known about that since the 8th of December 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. And where was it kept?

Captain SAFFORD. That was kept in the file along with the other translations of intercepted diplomatic messages which came in code.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you made a statement yesterday or the day before that they could not have been talking about this message because it was not in the Navy Department. What message were you talking about? I thought you were talking about this message that I am now showing you on page 251.

Captain SAFFORD. I was not talking about this message at all.

Senator FERGUSON. What message were you talking about? You made an answer that indicated that the message was not in the file, it was not in the Navy Department until 1944. What message were you talking about?

Captain SAFFORD. I am talking about a translation or a possible translation which somebody in the Army pointed out [10166] to me in 1944. It was not an official translation because it had never been distributed.

Senator FERGUSON. What message is that that was never distributed?

Captain SAFFORD. This same message. It was simply an independent translation made at some later date.

Senator FERGUSON. So Admiral Ingersoll could not have seen a code, a winds code execute message with the "United States" on in the Navy Department in December 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Because they never had one that contained the "United States" until 1944 as far as circular No. 2494, December the 7th, 1941, was concerned?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that is clear.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you have been asked many questions on the subject of whether or not you saw this execute message. Now, at this late time in your examination are you positive that you did see such a message?

Captain SAFFORD. I am positive, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything that you want to add to any of your testimony or subtract from in relation to the fact that you positively and without any doubt in your mind [10167] saw the execute message on or about the 4th of December 1941 and prior to the time of the 14 part message and the attack?

Captain SAFFORD. That is exactly correct as you have stated it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt, then, in your mind?

Captain SAFFORD. There is no doubt.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with a man by the name of Pettigrew, Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know him personally.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I want to read you something from an affidavit of his, and he made this affidavit on the 13th day of February 1945 [reading]:

That someone whom affiant does not now recall showed affiant on or about the 5th of December 1941 an implementation intercept which had been received from the Navy and which indicated that Japan-U. S. relations were in danger. That in view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the implementation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had prepared that dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he does not now recall, a secret cablegram, a copy of which is attached.

[10168] Now, what could Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, M. I. S., be talking about there if it was not the intercept message that you claim you saw?

Captain SAFFORD. It was the same intercept winds message.

Senator FERGUSON. And attached to that is this: The exhibit attached is the Rochefort message:

This is sent on No. 519 12-5.

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,

*Headquarters G-2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.*

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Commandant 14th Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. Miles.

Now, that is what he attaches to his affidavit and that is in the Army. Now, could they have been talking about the message on page 251 of exhibit 1 that came in on the 7th, because the Rochefort message is going out on the 5th?

Captain SAFFORD. They could not possibly.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know of any other message that Pettigrew could be talking about in that affidavit?

Captain SAFFORD. I have never heard of any other message that Colonel Pettigrew could have been talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. And I want to read you "Top Secret [10169] Navy," of Admiral Turner, question 86:

Q. Referring to this so-called "Winds" message, are we correct in understanding that you had no knowledge of any execute of that message designating the objective of Japan?

A. I will correct my previous answer on that. Admiral Noyes called me up on the telephone. What day or time of day I don't recall. I think it was on December 6. He said something like this: "The Winds message came in," or something of that sort.

87. Q. Did he report to you what the "Winds" message meant and what it was interpreted as?

A. Yes.

88. Q. Was the Chief of Naval Operations aware of that, either from information from you or otherwise?

A. Not from me. I believe Admiral Noyes informed him.

89. Q. Was any discussion had as to the importance of sending that reply to the Commander in Chief, Pacific?

A. Not so far as I know. I did not participate in any such discussion. I assumed that the Commander in Chief had that.

Now, I want to read a couple more answers.

[10170] Cross examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

93. Q. Admiral, referring again to document 15 of Exhibit 63, which is the message which set up the so-called Winds code, do you recall whether or not you had any feeling that the execute of the Winds code meant that war would necessarily follow between the United States and Japan or whether the execute of the Winds message merely meant a break in diplomatic relations or a strain in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan?

A. My impression was that it was at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war.

Reexamined by the court:

94. Q. When you heard the news from Admiral Noyes that an execute of the message had been received, did you consider that it was of such high significance that action should be taken immediately to transmit that information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. No, I assumed that he had it. On Friday there was a discussion between Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and me on the general situation.

95. Q. Friday, December 5?

A. There was a discussion among the three of us, [10171] and we all felt all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary.

Then this is: Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy (Retired.)

96. Q. In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the execution signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding that it referred to United States-Japanese relations?

A. Yes.

97. Q. Was it at any time before the 7th of December that you received information that the Commander-in-Chief was not receiving this decrypted, intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic, or was it after December 7, 1941, that you received that information?

A. I have never received such information. I have never been informed that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was not decrypting the diplomatic dispatches.

And then he is reexamined by the court.

Now, did Mr. Sonnett ever tell you or relate that kind of testimony to you?

Captain SAFFORD. I was never told that at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know of that testimony before I read it to you?

[10172] Captain SAFFORD. After this investigation commenced the 15th of December 1945 or later and also in January of this year I was permitted to examine the records of those previous Pearl Harbor investigations. That was the first time I knew what other witnesses said and was the first time that I did not know that I was standing alone against the world in my testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Admiral Turner appeared before this committee and on page 5384 he testified:

Admiral TURNER.

I have to go back a question so that we get the run of this. This is on the bottom of page 5383 [reading].

Senator BREWSTER. On the Winds message, I wanted to clear up a little of your testimony from your former statement.

At that time you said in your examination, Admiral Turner, if I may quote from the questions which were asked you on page 1006:

"In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the scout's signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding it referred to United States-Japanese relations?"

Your answer at that time was, "Yes".

As I understand now, you feel you got it somewhat [10173] clearer?

Admiral TURNER. Was that before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Senator?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct, because up until the time I returned to San Francisco about two months ago I thought the entire thing in that Wind message was authentic and that they had merely made a mistake about that "North Wind so and so."

On talking to some of the officers who had gone into it in San Francisco, why, they said it had been found out later that that was a false broadcast picked out of the ordinary news, but it was news to me at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The question was asked of the witness whether or not Mr. Sonnett had informed him about the Admiral Turner testimony. The fact is that on page 96 of the appendix, which is the Hewitt report, they cited the Turner testimony but nevertheless found there was no winds execute.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we have Admiral Turner's testimony here as well. I want to give you that in relation [10174] to the other.

Now, did you or did you not read the Admiral Turner testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall reading any of the testimony before this committee except what appeared in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you here when Justice Roberts was on the witness stand?

Captain SAFFORD. I was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You heard the two questions read to him in relation to this code message; did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I heard them but I do not recall what they were.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall them?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, I—

Senator FERGUSON. What do you want to say? Do you want to answer it?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; I cannot answer it.

Senator FERGUSON. You just did not hear?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall specifically what they were. There were questions asked and he answered them.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will get this clear, so that there can be no mistake on what code message you were talking about or what the people were talking about in it. [Reading from Roberts Commission transcript, page 290, examination of Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder:]

[10175] The CHAIRMAN. It has been reported to me that about ten days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found out it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

Now, do you know of any other three words prior to the 7th, not including this one of the 7th but prior to the 7th, of any three-word message other than the wind code message?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You know of none?

Captain SAFFORD. I know of none.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. What about the "hattori" and "minami" and the other one? Weren't those three words? "Minami" was the United States and "hattori" and one other one.

Senator FERGUSON. Congressman, are you asking him a question? [10176]

Mr. MURPHY. No, no. I was just suggesting the three words. There was one, "minami"——

Senator FERGUSON. I mean do you still want the answers to it?

Mr. MURPHY. No; I am not asking the witness. I am just suggesting it to you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. MURPHY. Go ahead, Senator.

Captain SAFFORD. Excuse me, Senator. I thought I was asked the question.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought there was a question pending?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; and I was looking up the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Congressman, have you got a question?

Mr. MURPHY. I will hold it.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, you will pursue it later?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He will get to it later and present it and clear the thing up.

How many times since Pearl Harbor have you contacted General Short?

[10177] Captain SAFFORD. I have never seen General Short except in this room. I have never talked to him and have never written to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been in contact with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain SAFFORD. I have seen Admiral Kimmel, as I previously testified, on the 21st of February 1944. Then I saw him next when I went in and took the witness stand as a witness before the Navy Court of Inquiry.

Senator FERGUSON. Had that been the first time after Pearl Harbor that you saw him?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how many times since that have you seen him?

Captain SAFFORD. I have probably seen him half a dozen times in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you had any conversations with him about this trial?

Captain SAFFORD. In a general way.

Senator FERGUSON. As to what your testimony would be?

Captain SAFFORD. As to the fact that my testimony was just what I had given before; I was not making any changes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the substance of your conversation?

[10178] Captain SAFFORD. That was the substance of our conversations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you mentioned a long—you described it as long, or it has been described as a long message drawn up by McCollum.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read that message?

Captain SAFFORD. I read it page by page.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell me what was said which would indicate why somebody in the Intelligence Department like McCollum was wanting to get other than information out, wanting to get an order out to the Fleet?

Captain SAFFORD. This was information of developments running back at least a month, probably more. It was very complete and very well thought out. After all this time I cannot give many of the details except the very last end, which is the part that interested me most, because the very last, you might call it, paragraph, there was a sentence there, was what appeared to me the same information that had been put on as the translation of the winds code. That is, we were to have—Japan was about to declare war on the United States, about to declare war on England, including the Netherlands East Indies, and so forth, and would maintain peace with Russia, and the last sentence, as I recall it [10179] added the forecast or evaluation “war is imminent.” Everything up to that last sentence had been pure information. The only piece of evaluation was the very last sentence, “War is imminent.” There was no order or directive to do anything.

Senator FERGUSON. It was information then?

Captain SAFFORD. Information, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, can you give us the substance of the other part of the message, what was he conveying?

Captain SAFFORD. Information showing the progressive deterioration of relations between the United States and Japan and of the sure indications, such as the withdrawal of merchant ships. I believe Captain McCollum has testified about other things. I cannot go into detail, Senator; it is too long ago.

Senator FERGUSON. I just asked you the substance. Will you look at page 204 of Exhibit 1? There is a message there from Tokyo to Berlin dated November the 30th in three parts. It shows that you only intercepted two parts, 1 and 3. The third part indicates that there was something in between and was missed by someone. [Reading]:

If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the [10180] Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south, and so forth.

Doesn't that indicate that you are going to have war with the United States and not with Russia unless Russia comes in?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. That puts Russia out of the war with Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, that being true—that was translated the 1st of December. That was received on the 30th of Novem-

ber. Hadn't you all the knowledge that came in the so-called execute wind message? Why did you want to wait and if you had that information and which is set up in the first part. [Reading:]

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Didn't that give you warning that there was going to be war between the United States and Japan and Britain and Japan [10181] and not Russia unless Russia came in?

Captain SAFFORD. That gave a warning also.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was that last answer?

(Answer read.)

Senator FERGUSON. But didn't it give you everything that you got in the code? Now, I am not saying anything about what the embassies were going to get, other embassies, but didn't they give to the United States here in Washington the whole answer?

Captain SAFFORD. It gave a complete verification or proof of the winds message—of its evaluation I mean.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what happened to part 2 there? That would be a very important message, would it not? And what did you do to try to find it?

Captain SAFFORD. We received parts 1 and 3 from Corregidor for forwarding. While we were working on them we received a message from London which said, "We are forwarding parts 1 and 3 of Tokyo to Berlin, Serial No. 985. Have you got part 2?" And the answer was sent back to the effect that we were sorry, that we did not have part 2. That was our lack of—

Senator FERGUSON. What message did you read me there? What page is it on? Did you read a message there?

Captain SAFFORD. I am telling you the substance of a [10182] message that was received from London.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh.

Captain SAFFORD. It was relative to this Tokyo to Berlin No. 985.

Senator FERGUSON. You were looking at a paper and I thought you were reading it out of a book.

Captain SAFFORD. I was checking the number to see that I did not make a mistake.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you inquire from England again to see about that, as to whether or not they got that part 2?

Captain SAFFORD. England had already asked us for it and we told them we did not have it. If they had had part 2 they would have sent it along with parts 1 and 3. We made a very careful check of the incoming traffic from all our stations and part 2 simply, we had failed to get it, the same as England had.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that happen often, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. It happened often enough to be very distressing. It was not at all uncommon to have a hole in messages, incomplete parts, sometimes it was the first part missing, sometimes it was the last. It was usually at one end or the other rather than the middle.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for that? Was it [10183] radio reception?

Captain SAFFORD. Radio reception, interference and sometimes they were allowed to send one part of a message over one circuit and another part of a message would go over another circuit and due to some combination we could get the one and not the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Then in effect you did not purport to be absolutely certain that you were getting all of the Jap messages?

Captain SAFFORD. We could not, sir, and we kept on telling our stations to that effect. We were endeavoring to get as much as we could but we could not guarantee a hundred percent performance.

Senator FERGUSON. And when you would deliver these raw messages to the various offices you were only trying to deliver those that seemed important to you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not deliver all that you intercepted but you delivered all that seemed important?

Captain SAFFORD. And particularly those that seemed important to the White House and to the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. And is there any doubt but some of these messages in No. 1, diplomatic, and also in No. 2, the ship movements, is there any doubt that all those [10184] messages were translated, as translated were sent to the White House and State Department? Do you know what Exhibit 1 is?

Captain SAFFORD. I have Exhibit 1 here.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. I feel certain that everything in Exhibit 1 was sent to the White House and the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what exhibit—

Captain SAFFORD. Wait a minute. What is Exhibit 2?

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 2 is the large yellow one. It is ship movements. It is Japanese messages concerning military installations, ship movements, and so forth.

Captain SAFFORD. A large part of Exhibit 2 probably was not sent to the White House or the State Department as they were not interested. They were sent up to Naval Intelligence and they determined the subsequent distribution of them.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I will show you some and see whether or not they were sent. On page 12. Can you answer that?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't the State Department and the White House concerned with where war would come as well as when war would come?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; but I cannot tell you this from memory.

[10185] Senator FERGUSON. I see. And you know of no records in your department which would indicate, or any department to your knowledge—and I only want your knowledge on this—that would indicate which one of these messages did go or did not go?

Captain SAFFORD. There may have been or there should have been a record in Naval Intelligence or in Captain Kramer's portion of the far eastern section of Naval Intelligence, but I do not have any personal knowledge, or did not have.

Senator FERGUSON. How far away from your desk was Captain Kramer's desk?

Captain SAFFORD. At that time he was about halfway down the corridor from me, in the Navy Building.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look on page 22? That is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo December 3, 1941. I believe that was picked up by the Army at some station here in Virginia, but was sent to the Navy for translation. Did you ever see that?

Captain SAFFORD. I had seen that before. Kramer called it to my attention on Monday, December 8, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. He called it to your attention on the 8th?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had seen it prior to that?

[10186] Captain SAFFORD. I had not seen it prior to that.

Senator FERGUSON. You had not seen it prior to that?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversation as to whether or not that was translated in the rough by Mrs. Edgars and put on his desk on Saturday the 6th?

Captain SAFFORD. Just what we said about that at the time I do not recall. That question of Mrs. Edgars came up about 2 years later, when I checked up on it, but he did say, "Here is this thing; it is too late. What should I do with it?" He said, "It is in a bad shape, we cannot handle it now." And I said, "Well, you finish it anyhow and turn it into the file for purposes of record; it might be important." Then after it was smoothed up it did appear to be very important.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that about all that you remember that he said in relation to that particular message?

Captain SAFFORD. He asked me furthermore—he told me that he had received it in imperfect form on Saturday afternoon around 3 o'clock and that it was a question of working on that or working on the highly important 14 parter and, therefore, he let this thing go to be finished when time was available.

Senator FERGUSON. Were all of the interpreters in the [10187] Army and Navy sections busy on Saturday translating?

Captain SAFFORD. Not in the Army, sir. I believe they all went home at about 1 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. They all went home in the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, couldn't Kramer have gotten someone in the Army or someone in the Navy to translate this message on page 22 of Exhibit 2? I understood you were alerted for war.

Captain SAFFORD. Mr. Ferguson, it was my understanding that this was much more than a mere translation. This is a very badly garbled message, which had to be thought out and I believe this has been in the testimony of other witnesses before other investigations. All I know about it is quite second-handed and I would rather not discuss it.

Senator FERGUSON. You know it second-handed. You mean you got it by hearsay from Kramer.

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer said it was not a question of translating it. It was a question of taking away people off the purple system onto this.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was given as the reason for not decoding this message other than in the rough as indicated?

Captain SAFFORD. Taking it back. I would rather let [10188] Kramer describe that message than myself.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. And possibly Captain Rochefort if he is to be called as a witness can also describe it.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask counsel or the naval attaché here if you know whether or not they are going to produce file 7001?

Commander BAECHER. We have it here, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have it?

Commander BAECHER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see it?

Commander BAECHER. It is not in a file, sir. It is in a book.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the committee would be interested in knowing what is meant by a file.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We made the name "file." The Navy does not.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the Navy does not make the name "file"?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get it straightened out. Is this officer the custodian?

Commander BAECHER. He is the present custodian.

Senator FERGUSON. Maybe he can help us.

[10189] Commander BAECHER. Captain Kramer can explain it better than anyone else.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then I will wait until Kramer comes on. I don't want to waste any time.

Now, there has just been placed on my table here a message. Will you show the witness this message? It is one you described the other day, that it went to CINCAF urgent and CINCPAC, which is Kimmel, priority, but it went to Hart urgent. How do you account for that? How do you account for the change? It was all marked "Urgent" you said.

Captain SAFFORD. The action addressees were "urgent" out in the Asiatic station. The information addressees, that is CINCAP and COM 14 were only priority, but it was all in one message blank.

Senator FERGUSON. One is marked "urgent" at the top and the other one is marked "priority."

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But the one for information was only marked "priority."

Captain SAFFORD. Priority.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that message was an intercepted Japanese message, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then it was sent out on December [10190] the 1st, 1941, in this form to both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel; is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that if you could send this kind of an intercepted message do you know any reason, as the head or one of the officers in the communications section, that you would be risking any more to send that kind of a message out over the wires than you would to alert Hawaii on the morning of the 7th?

Captain SAFFORD. None at all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am asking you as a communications officer.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; and I am speaking as a cipher expert with years of experience behind it. There was no danger whatsoever in using our top grade ciphers for any kind of information.

Senator FERGUSON. And there was no more danger of sending out that particular dispatch by McCollum and released by Admiral L. Noyes on December the 1st, 1941? You understood my question?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And your answer is as an expert in this field?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[10191] Senator FERGUSON. Now, so that there is no mistake on this record, when you were referring to a false weather report, an executed message, you are talking about the method that it was to translate or execute these three words relating to America, England, and so forth; the message would be a false weather report, not a correct weather report but a false one?

Captain SAFFORD. A false weather report, correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that when in any of your statements or your language you are talking about a false weather report, that does not indicate, does it, that you never saw the report, or does it indicate that?

Captain SAFFORD. That indicates to what I have called the winds message in other testimony, to what I did see.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is the execute part of the winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But it is false as far as the weather is concerned in Japan, is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. Or anywhere else, because the actual language that came over said, "North wind, south wind, and west wind"—I mean "North wind, east wind, west wind," all in the same manner and no places or direct name. It was obviously a false weather report which no one could mistake.

[10192] Senator FERGUSON. Now, that is what is known as a word-cipher-word, is it not?

Captain SAFFORD. It is often—

Senator FERGUSON. A code word?

Captain SAFFORD. This is in hidden word, yes, sir; or hidden word.

Senator FERGUSON. Hidden words?

Captain SAFFORD. Or open code it is sometimes called because it appears disguised in an apparently innocent message.

Senator FERGUSON. But a hidden word can be sent in Morse code, Japanese Morse code, or international code or by voice, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Any way they want. There was no restriction. The message which set it up simply said "Japanese language broadcast," and that could have been in the form of Japanese, written, yes, sir, as well as voice, but it could not have been in English or any other foreign language.

Senator FERGUSON. It had to be in Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. It had to be in Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know of any other messages in the same way that were transmitted and known as code word messages? Was that a customary way to send messages?

[10193] Captain SAFFORD. That was only done in an emergency.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was it your understanding that the various Japanese embassies had short-wave radio and picked these messages up, or how did the Japanese embassies get these messages?

Captain SAFFORD. Japan sent a series of broadcasts on short wave to their embassies overseas. They were mostly in Japanese and I think some of the broadcasts were in voice, but the important ones were in Morse code and they had radio receiving apparatus at each embassy and they had an operator who could take them in and they would change their schedules from time to time, discuss it in plain language. There was nothing secret about this arrangement. It was done openly and above-board.

Senator FERGUSON. But did the Japanese embassies receive it on their own receiving sets?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese embassies received it on their own receiving sets, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And not on some commercial set?

Captain SAFFORD. And not on some commercial set.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was going directly to the various embassies?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was short-wave radio?

[10194] Captain SAFFORD. Short-wave receiving sets. If they wanted to send anything back they could not.

Senator FERGUSON. And did we have short-wave receivers at Tokyo so far as the Navy was concerned?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot say for Tokyo but we did in most of the capitals of the world. We had to get diplomatic clearance in every case.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how would an embassy, let us assume that this kind of a message was received here on Massachusetts Avenue, where their embassy was, and they would decode back a message that they had received. How would they send their message back?

Captain SAFFORD. This was normally used just for sending out press, for just information as it calls it, the general intelligence broadcasts and the news broadcasts.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but how would the Japanese embassy get back a message to Tokyo?

Captain SAFFORD. Through commercial radio.

Senator FERGUSON. Through commercial radio?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is when you were able to pick up that commercial radio, because they did use the commercial radio?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[10195] Senator FERGUSON. It was not cabled; it was radioed?

Captain SAFFORD. It was practically 100 percent radio.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain, where were you born?

Captain SAFFORD. I was born in Massachusetts.

Mr. KEEFE. I believe you have testified that you have had 32 years of service in the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. Going on 34.

Mr. KEEFE. The statement has been made quite repeatedly, especially by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who cross-examined you at length, that you stand alone in your testimony with respect to this winds message.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, regardless of that, Captain Safford, is the testimony which you have given to this committee what you believe to be the truth?

Captain SAFFORD. It is.

Mr. KEEFE. You testified that you have thought that your testimony would be supported by certain witnesses whom you named. I take it the four in number were the names you gave us yesterday?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[10196] Mr. KEEFE. Men who are expected to be witnesses before this committee following your testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were intimate with Captain Kramer, were you not?

Captain SAFFORD. I served with him for two years and saw him every day.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you hear Captain Kramer's testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you read it since this hearing began?

Captain SAFFORD. I have read it since this hearing began.

Mr. KEEFE. From that testimony did you obtain the impression that Captain Kramer would support the testimony which you have given here?

Captain SAFFORD. I did from that testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. And from statements which he had previously made to you?

Captain SAFFORD. And from statements he had previously made to me.

Mr. KEEFE. Reference has been made by the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson, to the testimony that has heretofore been given by Admiral Ingersoll, that has been read into the record.

[10197] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Also some testimony previously given by Admiral Turner with respect to his knowledge of the existence of the winds execute message.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You have referred to your belief that Captain Sadtler also has knowledge of the existence of this winds execute message on or about the 4th of December 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Sadtler has also testified—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel Sadtler.

Mr. KEEFE. Colonel Sadtler I believe it is, yes.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't want to demote him.

You were familiar with the testimony that Colonel Sadtler had given before the Army Board?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; I read that within the 2 months—within the past 2 months also.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, from the reading of the testimony of these witnesses and from your knowledge of the facts as you have testified to them yourself, was that the basis of the statement which you made in response to Mr. Murphy's questions yesterday that you expected some of these witnesses to justify the position which you have assumed before this inquiry?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct. It was not from their own mouths.

[10198] Mr. KEEFE. Now, in order that the record may be clear at this time, in view of your previous cross-examination, I call your attention to the testimony of Capt. Alwin D. Kramer before the naval court of inquiry, volume 5, pages 956 and 957, where he was asked question No. 30:

Q. Commander, I am going to show you some documents and ask you if you saw them on or before the 7th of December, 1941. The first one I shall show you is Document 15 from Exhibit 63.

Now Document 15 was the original set up of the winds message, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. I am sorry, I cannot answer that.

Mr. KEEFE. I think it will appear later on.

A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by my section.

Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it?

A. The fact that the date "28 November" is on here would indicate that I saw it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the first time. Also, there is an indication at the bottom that it was received by teletype, which would indicate it was handled promptly after received.

Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to intercepting any communications which would have executed the phrases of this code?

Obviously he was referring to this Document 15 being [10199] the original set-up of the winds message.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is clear, is it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then Captain Kramer answers:

On receipt of this particular message, on instructions of the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some cards, about 6 as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes.

Now, stopping his answer right there, I want to ask you did you have knowledge of the fact that Captain Kramer had prepared these cards on the instructions of Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. KEEFE. And those cards were turned over to Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. They were turned over.

Mr. KEEFE. Going on with the quote from Kramer's testimony:

He indicated that his purpose in getting these cards was to leave them with certain senior officers of the Navy Department and I do know that he arranged with Captain Safford, the head of Op-20-G, the section of Communications that handled this material, to have any message in this phraseology handled promptly by watch officers, not only [10200] in Op-20-G but through the regular watch officers of the Communications section of the Navy Department, to those people who had the cards. These cards had on them the expressions contained in this exhibit,

referring to Exhibit 15—

and the meaning. Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of December,

I repeat that quote—

Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of December, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the third or fourth.

Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in Document 15; is that correct?

[10201] A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.

Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese language words you received?

A. Higashi No Kazeame, I am quite certain. The literal meaning of Higashi No Kazeame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.

Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, Higashi No Kazeame?

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.

Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you saw it?

A. I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, however, the GY watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down current systems that were being read.

Q. Can you indicate or state the source of the information that was contained in this communication?

A. No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is that it came in on teletype would indicate [10202] that it was a U. S. Navy intercept station.

Do you remember discussing, in your discussions with Kramer, that he had given you that information as to what his knowledge was on this situation prior to the time that you testified before either the Army Board or Naval Court or Hewitt examination?

Captain SAFFORD. I discussed that with Kramer before he left Washington to go to Honolulu. I believe it was late in 1942 or early in 1943. I have not discussed it with him since.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Captain Safford, I want to get perfectly clear, in my mind at least, this set-up on the operation of this teletype device. That hasn't anything to do with cryptology?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or anything secret at all. Teletypes are used all over the country.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as I understand it, you had direct wires to your intercept stations on the east coast and the west coast; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. It was just like a long-distance telephone circuit. It went through switchboards. You rang the numbers and got your connections, but instead of talking [10203] the messages are typed and automatically printed at the other end.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the way all these messages came in?

Captain SAFFORD. At that time, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. At that time?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. We did not have leased lines at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. So you had the regular teletype machine such as they have in a newspaper office or any other offices?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. There is a double roll, as I understand it, of the receiving paper.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. On which the words are printed?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So you would have an original and a copy?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was a regular yellow sheet, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, a standard copy.

Mr. KEEFE. A standard yellow sheet copy, the first sheet and then a carbon for the copy, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And these messages would come in and the watch officer would take them off the teletype as they would [10204] come in, and I suppose they would be handed over to the translators as to anything that might be considered to be important?

Captain SAFFORD. They would have to be decoded first generally, and then the translator got them.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now Kramer, in his testimony before the Navy court which I have indicated, states with positiveness that the watch officer on the 4th of December took a message off the teletype embodying three of these words, "Higashi No Kazeame."

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he states positively that the watch officer brought that before him and he walked down with the watch officer. Do you recall that incident?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, I recall that incident.

Mr. KEEFE. Now let us read on further:

Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge of what disposition was made of the communication after you saw it; is that correct?

A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simply be inference.

Q. Have you seen that communication since?

A. I have had no occasion to; no, sir.

Q. The question was, have you seen it since?

[10205] A. I have not, no, sir. I have not because I have had no occasion to.

Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar with the original winds message, wherein they designated at some future date in a weather report, if they gave execute and used certain words; it meant certain things?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message? Did you consider it important enough that when that message was received it would be a most important message in reply. In other words, were you on the lookout for that answer?

A. I am not sure what you mean by "answer".

Q. Well, the execute of the message.

A. Yes, sir, not only myself but all that Op-20-G organization were much much on the qui vive looking for that. I prefer to refer to that as a warning.

Q. When this execute came in, did you receive it?

A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch officer who receives the information off the teletype.

Q. Were you the officer who went to the communications officer and said, "Here it is".

A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to Commander Safford's office.

[10206] Q. You had that information then?

A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the meaning well in mind.

Q. About what was the time and date when you got that?

A. I am not certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December. It may have been the 3rd.

Q. What did you do with it?

A. As I indicated before, I did not handle it from there on at all.

Q. Who handled it?

A. I left Commander Safford's office as soon as I knew he had the picture and knew what the message was, and I believe he at once went to Admiral Noyes' office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was highly interested in that particularly plain language code because of his previous instruction to me to make out these cards so that he could leave it with certain high officers and the Secretary, all with the view of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it was any time of the day or night.

Q. When the original winds message was received, was that to your knowledge sent to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in [10207] to Captain Safford, and, I believe said, "Here it is," did you mean by that exclamation, "Here it is," that this was the execution of the Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further discussion with Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was the message which executed the Japanese War Plan?

A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the message myself. I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to Commander Safford's office, and the expression "Here it is" simply meant that finally a message in this plain language code had come through—a message which we had been looking for many days and that we had made special provisions to handle for many days.

Q. To your mind that was of no more significance than "here is the message which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan and the United States"?

A. It meant more than that. This plain language code did not refer specifically to the United States-Japanese negotiations. It referred to the general diplomatic relations between the nations concerned and therefore meant a critical stage in the negotiations or relations which could very well involve a break.

[10208] Now, thus Captain Kramer testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As I have indicated?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. From that testimony, and from the other testimony, is that the reason why you testified yesterday that you had reason to believe that these witnesses would substantiate the story which you have told to this committee?

Captain SAFFORD. It was.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had reason to believe that you would not be coming before this committee standing alone, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I shall not take the time to read at this time the testimony of Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler. Those witnesses will be here to testify. But from the whole picture as you had it from the testimony that these people gave under oath and from the information which they gave you in the talks you had with them subsequently, were you of the opinion that your position would be corroborated by these witnesses when they came here to testify?

Captain SAFFORD. I believed that they would support me in general.

[10209] Mr. KEEFE. Now, the thing that has puzzled me, and I assume that it must be puzzling to other members of this com-

mittee, and I speak with utter and complete frankness, Captain Safford, I am unable to understand any possible interest, personal interest, that you might have in this controversy, and if you have any such personal interest, I would like to have you state it.

Captain SAFFORD. I have no personal interest, except I started it and I have got to see it through.

The CHAIRMAN. The guests of the committee will be in order.

Mr. KEEFE. You realize, of course, that in view of the implications that have been stated in the cross-examination of you, especially by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that you have made some rather strong charges?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That may well militate against your career as a naval officer. Did you realize that when you came here as a witness?

Captain SAFFORD. I realized that every time I have testified.

Mr. KEEFE. And despite the fact that you have nothing personally to gain, and everything to lose, you have persisted in this story every time you have testified?

[10210] Captain SAFFORD. I have.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you have testified that from information which you subsequently obtained, Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, who was standing watch at 5 a. m. on the morning of the 7th, had this final fourteenth part of the 14-part message plus the short message of instructions for its delivery to Secretary Hull at 1 o'clock?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I take it that that testimony means, and you will correct me if I am in error, that the message was received, but not yet decoded or translated?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I am a little confused about the character in which this fourteenth-part message and the short message came in? Did it come in in Japanese or English or what?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, after decoding, after taking it out of the purple machine, one of the messages, the fourteenth part was in what you might call a modified sort of English, and the other was in a modified form of Japanese.

There were a great many conventional symbols used also in combination which had to be broken down into numbers, capitals, punctuation points, all manner of things like that. So then the message had to be completely retyped [10211] from that and in the case of the Japanese, of course, it had to be translated into English. So it was not quite as rapid a job to process them as would be in our own systems where it comes out straight.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you have no knowledge, personal knowledge, because you weren't there, as to what Brotherhood did with this message, have you?

Captain SAFFORD. Brotherhood told me that——

Mr. KEEFE. I don't care what he told you.

Captain SAFFORD. I have no personal knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, we will get that from Brotherhood at the proper time. I don't want you to testify to a lot of hearsay evidence. I want your own knowledge. You know nothing about what transpired as to the decoding or translating, or writing of the fourteenth-part message and the short message because you were not there?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Any knowledge which you might have on that has been gained as a result of conversations with those who were there?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you were rather bitterly assailed yesterday because you were home eating your breakfast in your pajamas on a Sunday, something which I personally do [10212] almost every Sunday, but you were assailed as though you had a direct responsibility to do something about this situation on Sunday, and failed to do it, although you are not here on trial. No charge has ever been made by anyone against you.

Now, when you were at home on Sunday, was there anything that you could have done had you been in your office to have accomplished more than what was done in your absence?

Captain SAFFORD. Not one thing, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You are not a translator, are you?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had to rely upon other Army or Navy translators?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And on this particular Sunday there weren't any Navy translators there?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had an arrangement, as I understand it, that the Army was to do translations on that Sunday?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer had made that arrangement himself.

Mr. KEEFE. Previously entered into?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Although it was the Navy's day to do it, [10213] you had done it, as I understood, for the Army on Saturday, and the Army was taking over your duties on Sunday; is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that if you had been there at 5 o'clock or 6 o'clock or any other time, you wouldn't have known any more about what was in that message than Brotherhood, would you?

Captain SAFFORD. Less.

Mr. KEEFE. Less.

Now, when you left your office at 4:30 or thereabouts, on Saturday, were you violating any order or directive, or regulation of the Navy in so doing?

Captain SAFFORD. On the contrary sir, I believe the official closing hours were 1 o'clock, but military personnel were supposed to stay on until 4:30. All the civil-service employees went home at 1 o'clock that day in the Navy as well as the War Department.

Mr. KEEFE. We had gone on a 40-hour week?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe it was a 40-hour week then, I am not certain.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, counsel has asked you for your beliefs, asked you for conclusions repeatedly as to certain things. You expressed some hesitancy from time to time in [10214] expressing those conclusions.

In the cross-examination it developed that you at least had a suspicion that there was some attempt in high places, in Opnav and

the General Staff, to cover up and to make Kimmel and Short the goats in this transaction.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. May I have that last question read?

(The question referred to, as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. KEEFE. I didn't mean counsel. I meant Mr. Murphy.

You meant that did you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was that suspicion, as I believe you testified by the fact of the change in front in certain quarters with respect to this so-called winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. It was increased and strengthened by that.

Mr. KEEFE. And the disappearance, as you have related of the files relating to the so-called winds execute and certain other intercepts relating to it; is that the way I am to understand your testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you have testified and Kramer testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that this winds execute message that was received on the 4th was sent right up to Admiral Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. After Admiral Noyes got that message and the same afternoon were messages prepared and sent out to Guam and our outlying possessions to destroy their codes and confidential papers?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, they were.

Mr. KEEFE. Who drew those messages?

Captain SAFFORD. I did myself personally.

Mr. KEEFE. And were they sent out?

Captain SAFFORD. They were all sent out.

Mr. KEEFE. And did those messages follow in immediate sequence to the receipt of this so-called winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. I began working on them, checking up to see what we had to go, immediately after the receipt of the message.

Mr. KEEFE. And were those messages prompted entirely by the receipt of this winds execute message, so far as you were concerned?

Captain SAFFORD. So far as I was concerned, they were.

Mr. KEEFE. And did Admiral Noyes approve the sending [10216] of those messages for the destruction of codes and confidential papers?

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Noyes did.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, there is something a little peculiar.

As I have been reading this testimony, I am impressed that some of these messages did not get out.

For instance, the message to Guam didn't get out.

No, I think that message did get out.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; Guam destroyed everything before they were captured.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes. That message got out. I think I was referring, perhaps to the McCollum situation.

When was the McCollum message drawn? I want to get that clear in my mind. In relation to the winds message, if it had any relation to it at all.

Captain SAFFORD. It had apparently been drawn that day. McCollum had sent a message the day before, which Admiral Wilkinson had approved, had released, in fact, and the winds message came in quite early in the morning, about 9 o'clock, and I saw the message all typed smooth on the pages, no changes or interlining, or anything like that, requiring only a signature, and depositing in the Naval Communications office to be on its way. I saw that message approximately 3 p. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941.

[10217] Mr. KEEFE. You drew a message?

Captain SAFFORD. The messages which I had drawn were up in Admiral Noyes' for discussion with him and his approval at the same time that I saw McCollum's message.

Mr. KEEFE. Did the drafting of the McCollum message follow as a result of the receipt of this winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. It did.

Mr. KEEFE. The messages which you drew to send out after the receipt of the winds execute message to destroy codes, were sent?

Captain SAFFORD. They were.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, what happened to the McCollum message?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, did you talk with McCollum about drafting this message and getting this warning out?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not talk to McCollum about that message and I did not talk to him about the messages that I was preparing myself that I have any recollection of. We simply got the same signal, and we proceeded to carry out our duties.

Mr. KEEFE. You saw the McCollum message that afternoon in Admiral Noyes' office?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[10218] Mr. KEEFE. When it was discussed with Admiral Turner, I believe?

Captain SAFFORD. No, it was discussed between Admiral Noyes and Admiral Wilkinson.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes; Wilkinson, and they let you read it?

Captain SAFFORD. And they let me read it.

Mr. KEEFE. And you are of the opinion that that long message which you read which had been drawn by McCollum in the last few sentences contained specific reference to the winds message—the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. Or the same information so that I took for granted it was a quotation of the winds message or a paraphrase of the winds message.

Mr. KEEFE. You never testified before the Roberts Commission, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You mean by that, you were not asked to?

Captain SAFFORD. I was not requested to; I did not refuse.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't understand.

Captain SAFFORD. I said I was not requested.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, let me ask you a question.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[10219] The CHAIRMAN. Captain McCollum testified before this committee that he never saw the winds execute and that the message he did prepare was in no way related to it or based upon it. Notwithstanding that, you insist on saying that he did see it and that the message he prepared was based on it.

Captain SAFFORD. That his Section had prepared it and I took for granted that he had prepared it personally or had O. K.'d it.

The CHAIRMAN. But a little while ago you said that both he and you based the messages that you wrote on the winds execute. Do you modify that now by saying that you took it for granted?

Captain SAFFORD. I took it for granted that McCollum initialled and approved all the messages released from the Far Eastern Section.

The CHAIRMAN. He testified that he never saw any winds execute message, that his message, the message he prepared, which was never sent, was not in any way related to or based upon it. If he testified to that, would you accept his statement on it?

Captain SAFFORD. I would think that there must be two messages, not one. That shorter message which he described, which I heard him describe, and the longer message, [10220] which I saw myself, and which I saw Admiral Wilkinson leave Admiral Noyes shortly after three, a few minutes after three, with in his hand, and he turned around and made the statement "I am going to send this message if I can get the front office to release it."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are talking now about the message that he said he wrote out which was never sent?

Captain SAFFORD. I am talking about the long message which was never sent. When Admiral Wilkinson took it around.

The CHAIRMAN. These messages that you say you prepared, under whose name were they sent?

Captain SAFFORD. There were five altogether. One I released myself during the noon hour, because it was a rush job, and not particularly important. One of them Admiral Noyes released. The other three involved more than the destruction of codes, but also destruction of other confidential papers and Admiral Noyes started to release them himself and then he made some remark to the effect, "Well, this goes a little bit beyond the cognizance of Naval Communications and I guess I better take it around and have Admiral Ingersoll release it." That was done. They were all released.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't sign any of them yourself?

Captain SAFFORD. Only one.

[10221] The CHAIRMAN. Which one was that?

Captain SAFFORD. I have a copy for the record. I can identify it.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom was it sent?

I believe you say that was not particularly important?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We won't pursue it.

Captain SAFFORD. I only released it to save time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I waive that.

Now, awhile ago in response to a question by Mr. Keefe you stated that you started out with this story, about which he was asking, and you had to stick to it, go through with it or stick to it, which ever expression you used.

Are you testifying now before this committee because you started out that way—

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir, not on the story.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he was talking about, I think he used the word "story," maybe not, but that is the impression I got, that your version of this thing, you were still sticking to it. I am wondering whether you mean to create the impression that because you started out with it you are going to stick to it?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. If the chairman will give me the opportunity—I thought that he referred to what might [10222] be termed my unsolicited support for Admiral Kimmel.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when you were asked if you had any personal interest in this matter you said you had not. Did you disassociate any personal interest you might have in it with your interest in vindicating Admiral Kimmel to which you testified yesterday or the day before?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no personal interest. I have never considered myself as anything except distantly acquainted with Admiral Kimmel. He knew who I was, that was about all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator LUCAS.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one or two questions along that particular line.

Captain, you say you were only slightly acquainted with Admiral Kimmel before the Pearl Harbor disaster?

Captain SAFFORD. In a personal manner. Officially I had served under him, but not directly under him, on several occasions.

[10223] Senator LUCAS. Did you have an intimate acquaintance-ship with him, or was it a mere passing one?

Captain SAFFORD. Not at all, sir. It was quite distant.

Senator LUCAS. Quite a distant relationship?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, when you wrote the letter to Captain Kramer back in 1943—is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. There was one in December 1943.

Senator LUCAS. No one at that time had—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask the members of the committee if there is any chance of finishing with the captain today. If not, we might as well suspend here.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to say that there was a request made that the captain produce the letters he had written to other people. They have not yet been produced.

Captain SAFFORD. I will get those at the first opportunity.

Mr. MURPHY. A request was made that the captain produce the material which he said was denied to him for four years, and which he only got two weeks ago. That has not been produced. There are certain other questions still open and not answered.

I am sorry that I am the one to ask these questions; [10224] somebody, if they want the truth, will have to ask them, and I propose to get the whole truth.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we go over until morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, we can't finish with the Captain, and we will suspend until 10 o'clock in the morning.¹

¹ Capt. Safford's testimony is resumed on p. 3842, infra.

(At the direction of the chairman, the testimony of Witnesses Beatty and Dillon, previously taken, is inserted at this point:)

[10225] Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like to present, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Beatty.

The CHAIRMAN. Will Admiral Beatty come around?

Admiral, you will be sworn, please.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. FRANK E. BEATTY, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, will you state your full name?

Admiral BEATTY. Frank Edmund Beatty, rear admiral, United States Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy?

Admiral BEATTY. Since June 1912.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where are you stationed now?

Admiral BEATTY. I am now commander, destroyers, Atlantic Fleet, with my flagship at Portland, Maine.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your engagement in the Navy during the year 1941?

Admiral BEATTY. I became aide to Secretary Knox early in 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did that position continue?

Admiral BEATTY. Until March 1943.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that you accompanied Secretary Knox on his trip to Honolulu following [10226] the Pearl Harbor attack?

Admiral BEATTY. It is.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were your relations with Knox close and intimate?

Admiral BEATTY. Extremely so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How were you connected with his office in the Navy Department?

Admiral BEATTY. I was his naval aide.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was your office in connection with his?

Admiral BEATTY. Very close to it; one room removed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When he was on duty in the Navy Department, were you required to be on duty also?

Admiral BEATTY. I would not say I was required, but I was normally there whenever he was in the office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did your connection with Secretary Knox put you in the position where you had definite knowledge of specific documents of importance with which he was concerned in the war effort?

Admiral BEATTY. I would say most of them, but not necessarily all of them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When he went to Hawaii with you did you travel on the same plane?

Admiral BEATTY. We did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Had frequent conversations with him?

[10227] Admiral BEATTY. Many conversations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you present at some of his conferences in Honolulu with Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral BEATTY. I was present at, I would say, most of them, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, there has appeared in the testimony here a report, I think coming from Admiral Kimmel, that upon meeting Secretary Knox in Honolulu, upon the Secretary's visit there, Secretary Knox asked Admiral Kimmel whether Kimmel had received his message, which apparently had been sent by Knox to Kimmel Saturday night before Pearl Harbor, and that Kimmel replied, "No, I never received the message."

Now keeping that incident in your mind, I want to ask you whether you have any information or knowledge or recollection or memory of any message that Secretary Knox sent, or said that he sent, or announced that he thought he sent to Admiral Kimmel on the Saturday before Pearl Harbor, and particularly in connection with the receipt of the 13 or 14 parts message that came in on the night of the 6th and morning of the 7th?

Admiral BEATTY. I believe I understand the entire question. I have definitely no knowledge of any message being sent by Secretary Knox at that time.

[10228] Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection of his ever having mentioned such a message to you?

Admiral BEATTY. I have not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was any such message, or copy of any such message, returned to his office file, so far as you know?

Admiral BEATTY. No, not so far as I know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did Secretary Knox at any time mention to you any inference on his part that he had either prepared or authorized such a message?

Admiral BEATTY. Not to the best of my recollection.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In the ordinary routine of messages would a message from the Secretary of the Navy proceed directly to a field officer?

Admiral BEATTY. I would say normally no. Before sending any message which would have been as vital as such a message would have been he would have taken it up with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So have you any other information, Admiral, on this point, which would throw any light upon that transaction?

Admiral BEATTY. Only this: At the time—I better amplify this—when I speak of the message now I speak of the message sent by General Marshall and agreed upon by Admiral Stark, sent over Army circuits or other circuits [10229] to Pearl Harbor as a final warning, and addressed, I believe, to General Short, to be delivered by him to Admiral Kimmel.

At the time the message was sent I did not know it was going out. It was a matter directly, apparently, between the Secretary and Admiral Stark. When I left Washington with the Secretary several days later I knew about the message, but I had apparently the misconceived idea that the message was sent on Saturday.

I came back from Pearl Harbor with that same idea, and endeavored out there to try to pick up at that end what became of the message at that end.

As I remember, we talked to General Short and Admiral Kimmel about it and found out the time of the receipt of the message in the Hawaiian Islands, the time it was decoded and the time it was delivered to those commanders. But there is nothing now that I can tie to

that shows me that my recollection that the message was sent on Saturday is at all correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was only one message in any case?

Admiral BEATTY. Only one message, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the message which you thought went on Saturday was the Marshall message?

Admiral BEATTY. Was the Marshall-Stark message, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And is the message which is referred to [10230] in Secretary Knox's report to the President?

Admiral BEATTY. It must have been, yes, sir. I presume it was. I saw his report to the President and I do not recollect the reference, but I presume it was the same message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Beatty, I understand Captain Safford said that he thought that Lieutenant Commander Kramer was acting as counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox. Do you know of anything that Secretary Knox did in regard to the war effort that needed any defense?

Admiral BEATTY. Absolutely nothing.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know, or did you ever hear of any such thing as a winds intercept having arrived in Washington [10231] on December 4?

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MURPHY (continuing). Did you ever hear or do you know of it being brought to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy, which would show that the Japanese had announced that there would be war with England and war with the United States?

Mr. KEEFE. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. I do not know whether we have any rules at all here governing the admission of evidence, but I understood that Admiral Beatty was being called here for just one specific thing.

If we are going to open up this cross-examination into a general cross-examination of Admiral Beatty on all things connected with this I assure you he will not be here for just a few minutes. I did not understand that that is what he was being called here for, and under any ordinary rules of cross-examination, nothing has been asked about the winds message, and he was not brought here to testify on that subject.

If we are going into it, then let it be understood that each member of the committee will be privileged to cross-examine the witness on any subject relating to this whole controversy.

[10232] Mr. MURPHY. I understand, Mr. Chairman, that this is not a cross-examination; this is an examination of the naval aide to

the Secretary of the Navy, who said he was very intimate with him, after we have evidence from the gentleman preceding him that he needed a defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Beatty was brought here as a witness by counsel to discuss a certain matter, but that places no limitation on the members of the committee as to what questions they might ask him.

Go ahead.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I was about to ask you, and I will repeat the question, Admiral, there has been testimony placed before the committee to the effect that on December 4, 1941, there was received in the Navy Department what was known as a winds intercept message, and which, in effect, told us—told the Navy and Army, the high officials, that the Japs had announced to London war with England, including some of the far eastern possessions, and war with the United States, and that that copy of the magic had been delivered to Secretary Knox.

Did you ever hear of any such thing while you were aide to Secretary Knox?

Admiral BEATTY. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know of any conduct on the part of Secretary Knox whereby his failure to get in touch with [10233] Hawaii, would be such as to have him participate in any plan for the destruction of naval files?

Admiral BEATTY. Destruction of what, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Navy files.

Admiral BEATTY. Oh, definitely not.

Mr. MURPHY. There has been evidence placed before us by Captain Safford to the effect that the Navy files on this so-called very important intercept are missing.

Did you have anything to do with that?

Admiral BEATTY. Absolutely not.

Mr. MURPHY. And you certainly do not think the late Secretary Knox would be a party to such thing, do you?

Admiral BEATTY. I do not.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster being absent, Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it now, Admiral Beatty, this is where you think the confusion was: That it was your understanding that the message that was sent at noon on Sunday had been sent on Saturday night?

Admiral BEATTY. That was the confusion in my mind. I do not know who else had that difficulty.

[10234] Senator FERGUSON. Now, I notice when the Secretary Knox report was put in evidence it indicated the same thing, that a message was sent on—I think it used the expression Sunday night before, meaning at midnight on Sunday, or on Saturday night. So that wrong impression that you have was carried on through even in the report?

Admiral BEATTY. Well, I cannot—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). I will read you part of it.

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 6223 of our record:

A general warning had been sent out by the Navy Department on November 27 to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight before the attack failed to reach him until 4 or 5 hours after the attack had been made.

So you were under the impression that there had been a warning message sent sometime on Saturday?

Admiral BEATTY. No, sir; I had never thought of but the one message to which I referred, the one war warning from General Marshall and Admiral Stark. I have never thought of the existence of any other messages.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that.

[10235] Admiral BEATTY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think there were two messages, one on Saturday and one on Sunday?

Admiral BEATTY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you thought that the message that was sent on Sunday was actually sent on Saturday?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir; I thought that for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not Secretary Knox was under the same impression?

Admiral BEATTY. I have no way of knowing, sir. It would be—well, I will not go into that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he discuss it with you?

Admiral BEATTY. I do not remember discussing it with him, but, as I say, I saw that report as he wrote it out in the rough on the plane on the way back, and if his recollection had been different than mine, we might have discussed it.

Senator FERGUSON. But on the way out you understood this Marshall message had been sent on Saturday?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss that with the Secretary?

Admiral BEATTY. I do not remember discussing it with [10236] him.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that impression? What day did you leave for Hawaii?

Admiral BEATTY. We left on Tuesday morning, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. The Tuesday following?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss with anyone this message that was sent by General Marshall?

Admiral BEATTY. Frankly, I do not recall discussing it, but there must have been something to tie it up in my mind at the time, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you discuss it with anyone other than Secretary Knox?

Admiral BEATTY. I do not believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not your impression about this Marshall message came from Secretary Knox?

Admiral BEATTY. I do not believe it did.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom else did you discuss that message with besides the Secretary?

Admiral BEATTY. I am trying to recall whether the message would come back in the returned messages, or the returned copies of the outgoing messages. It might have done [10237] that, but even so, there would have been no question of the time group on it from later evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was your office alerted to war on the 6th and 7th?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were your hours of watch?

Admiral BEATTY. My hours?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, on Saturday?

Admiral BEATTY. On Saturday I stayed at the office until, as I recall, roughly, 6 o'clock in the evening, I went home and stayed near the phone all evening.

I was in my office at 8 o'clock, or shortly thereafter, on Sunday morning.

[10238] Senator FERGUSON. Was the office closed when you went home at 6 o'clock and on the next morning?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now how could you have been reached? Who would know where you were?

Admiral BEATTY. Well, the duty officer in the Navy Department had my phone number. I was very frequently called when messages would come in. My number was always available down there in the Navy Department by the operations duty officer.

Senator FERGUSON. When you got there on the morning of the 7th, about 8-something, or 8:30, was it?

Admiral BEATTY. I would say so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Secretary come in that morning?

Admiral BEATTY. As I recall, he came in for a short while and went out again.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what hour he came in?

Admiral BEATTY. My guess would be between 9:15 and 9:30.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anyone with him?

Admiral BEATTY. I do not believe so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what hour he returned to his office prior to the attack?

[10239] Admiral BEATTY. I would say around 11:30, but that is again vague.

Senator FERGUSON. You were his aide, were you not?

Admiral BEATTY. I was; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ask you to go with him that morning when he left the office?

Admiral BEATTY. No; I never went on those conferences.

Senator FERGUSON. You never went on those conferences?

Admiral BEATTY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear where he had gone? To what conference?

Admiral BEATTY. I knew he was going to the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Now he had a confidential secretary, did he not?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And who was his confidential secretary?

Admiral BEATTY. Mr. Dillon.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a commander?

Admiral BEATTY. Captain Dillon, Marine Corps.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he there that Sunday morning?

Admiral BEATTY. He came in a bit later. It was an agreement between us that I would come in first, and he came in I think around 11 o'clock or so.

[10240] Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember of Admiral Stark coming to that office that morning before the attack?

Admiral BEATTY. I am pretty sure he was in there possibly once or twice, but I would not be able to say the times.

Senator FERGUSON. I will try to refresh your memory. Do you remember of the message on the attack coming in?

Admiral BEATTY. I was not in the office at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not in the office at the time?

Admiral BEATTY. I was out at lunch at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. But your best knowledge is now that Admiral Stark visited Secretary Knox a couple of times, once or twice prior to the attack on Sunday morning?

Admiral BEATTY. That is my best recollection, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. As his aide did you get magic notes?

Admiral BEATTY. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get the ones on Saturday?

Admiral BEATTY. Not the Saturday night.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what ones were delivered on Saturday to you for Colonel Knox?

Admiral BEATTY. At what time Saturday do you mean, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, up to the time you left.

[10241] Admiral BEATTY. No, sir, just the regular daily ones, as far as I remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any knowledge, as indicated here by ONI, on December 6 that on the evening of the 5th the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D. C., had burned its code books and ciphers?

Admiral BEATTY. If I had such knowledge I do not recollect.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that come to you on Saturday?

Admiral BEATTY. I really could not say, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall any such occurrence?

Admiral BEATTY. I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BEATTY. Completely.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not anticipate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BEATTY. I definitely did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised at an attack on Sunday?

Admiral BEATTY. An attack on the United States?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, an attack on the United States.

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, an attack on any United States possessions, I was very much surprised.

[10242] Senator FERGUSON. You would not have been surprised at an attack on the Kra Peninsula or the British possessions or Dutch possessions on Sunday?

Admiral BEATTY. I believe, as I recall, I would have been surprised at an attack on the Dutch possessions, but not definitely on the Kra Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. You had knowledge then, as aide to Secretary Knox, that there would be an attack on the Kra Peninsula on Saturday, or on Sunday?

Admiral BEATTY. I do not know how specific the knowledge was, but I am sure we had knowledge that the Japs would attack somewhere down in that direction on the Saturday. Whether it was specifically—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). You mean on Saturday or on Sunday?

Admiral BEATTY. On Sunday. I beg your pardon.

Senator FERGUSON. On Sunday. So that your office knew or were expecting an attack on the British, or on the Kra Peninsula, or that district by the Japanese on Sunday, but you were completely surprised at an attack on any American possessions?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, to this extent, that when I speak for my office I speak for myself.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand you are only speaking [10243] for yourself.

Admiral BEATTY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But your knowledge was obtained while you were the aide of the Secretary?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you know what the Secretary had in mind about an attack? Did you discuss with him as to whether or not he was surprised by the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BEATTY. I am certain from just the reactions that he was surprised, but I do not remember personally discussing it with him. He would have talked on a higher level. He probably discussed it with Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. But from his actions on that day you deduct that he was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BEATTY. I think that was definitely obvious, yes, sir.

[10244] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any conversations, did you hear any conversations he might have had with Admiral Stark, or the President, or the Secretary of War, or anyone that day?

Admiral BEATTY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your rank at that time?

Admiral BEATTY. I was a captain.

Senator FERGUSON. You were a captain?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Where did you get the information that indicated to you that the war warning message had been sent at all? How did you get that information?

Admiral BEATTY. By that, sir, do you refer to the message that we sent out?

Mr. KEEFE. I am referring to the message which you have referred to, namely, the one sent by General Marshall, with the concurrence, as you said, of Admiral Stark?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you get the information that such a message had been sent at all?

Admiral BEATTY. As I said, I got it after it was sent, and I think it developed in the afternoon after Pearl [10245] Harbor, that the message had gone out. That such a message had gone out.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, if I understand it, the message was actually sent Sunday morning sometime shortly before noon on that day?

Admiral BEATTY. I got that from the newspapers.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, I am thinking of what information you had on the 7th day of December as to that message having been sent, if any.

Admiral BEATTY. My best recollection is that Sunday afternoon after Pearl Harbor I heard about the message having been sent.

Mr. KEEFE. And you got the impression from the source from which you obtained that information that it had been sent the night before, on Saturday night?

Admiral BEATTY. Somewhere I got that impression definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. And the Secretary had that impression too, didn't he?

Admiral BEATTY. I can only say "apparently."

Mr. KEEFE. Just apparently?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Because when you went out to Hawaii on Tuesday following, you stated to us that you tried to [10246] pick up the loose ends, as I understood from your testimony.

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And find out why that message wasn't received. Did I correctly interpret your statements?

Admiral BEATTY. Not a question of why it wasn't received, as to the time of its receipt. Why it hadn't gotten through before the attack. That was the idea.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, you were under the impression that a message had been sent on Saturday evening to General Short from General Marshall?

Admiral BEATTY. That was my impression; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He had been given instructions to give that information to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So when you went to Hawaii, you didn't understand why it was that Short hadn't received that message and given the information to Kimmel, and you were seeking to find out the facts about it?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

Admiral BEATTY. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Then it would be perfectly natural, would it not, for Secretary Knox, if he was similarly minded, to have asked Admiral Kimmel the question "Did you [10247] receive the message that was sent to you last night?"

Admiral BEATTY. Perfectly, in my opinion.

Mr. KEEFE. That would be a perfectly natural question for him to ask, wouldn't it?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And as Admiral Kimmel has testified, he did ask it. You don't mean to say that that question wasn't asked by Secretary Knox of Admiral Kimmel, do you?

Admiral BEATTY. I don't think I have made such a statement.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking you, you do not intend to make such a statement; do you?

Admiral BEATTY. Oh, no; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In fact, it would be the most natural thing for Secretary Knox to ask, in view of the confusion?

Admiral BEATTY. If he had the confusion in his mind that I did, it would be the most natural thing.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ask that same question of anybody out there?

Admiral BEATTY. I believe I did.

Mr. KEEFE. How many did you ask it of?

Admiral BEATTY. I think I asked among the lower echelons of the two commands, "What time did that message get here?"

[10248] Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Then you found out afterward that the message had not been sent until about noon; is that right?

Admiral BEATTY. I didn't find that out until I read about it, sir, a few months ago.

Mr. KEEFE. You were also under the impression that that message had gone out there the night before; is that right?

Admiral BEATTY. Up until a few months ago, yes, sir, and then something came out that seemed to show me entirely wrong.

Mr. KEEFE. Well now, you were at the office of Secretary Knox on Sunday morning, December 7, and Secretary Knox came into the office?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You have further testified that you were usually given copies of intercept messages to appraise?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did Secretary Knox hand you that morning the first 13 parts of the 14-part message?

Admiral BEATTY. As I recall he did not.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he tell you that Kramer had delivered to him and permitted him to read the 13 parts of the 14-part message the night before?

[10249] Admiral BEATTY. Not that I recall.

Mr. KEEFE. Evidence in previous hearings indicate that Captain Safford delivered the first 13 parts of the 14-part message to Secretary Knox at his apartment out at the Wardman Park—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Kramer?

Mr. KEEFE. I mean Kramer.

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that Secretary Knox made some telephone calls and then instructed him to be at the State Department at 10 o'clock the following morning.

Now, at 10 o'clock the following morning, or before 10 o'clock, Secretary Knox left your office, as you understood to keep that appointment, did you not?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But he didn't tell you anything about the 13-part message that he had seen the night before?

Admiral BEATTY. Not that I recall at all, sir. I don't recall any conversation. As I remember it, he came in, was busy, went right over to the State Department.

Mr. KEEFE. Did Secretary Knox write his report on the way back on the plane?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir, he did.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he write two reports, or one?

[10250] Admiral BEATTY. He wrote one report. He wrote it in long-hand on the flight over the ocean. It was then revised. Just corrected. He passed it around to the three of us who were with him, to read. It was typewritten on the next plane, after we departed from San Diego, and while the plane was grounded in Midlands.

The typewriting was completed by the time the plane landed in Anacostia, and it went directly by Secretary Knox to the White House.

Mr. KEEFE. It appears that the report which was given to the public, and it is perfectly reasonable that it should be, I am not critical of it, was quite different than the report which was made to the President. You are aware of that now?

Admiral BEATTY. I am aware of it, yes, sir. I knew it at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he write the report that was given to the public, or was that a press release gotten out by the Navy Department?

Admiral BEATTY. No, sir. This is just as I recall it: I believe we got back Sunday night. He had a conference on Monday morning at the White House, and I think he came back with the verbatim wording of it, of that release.

I believe that release was made up at the White House. [10251]
That is my opinion.

Mr. KEEFE. The report which he actually wrote on the plane coming back and which was passed over to you, and two others on the plane who had accompanied him, which was passed over to you to look over, was delivered verbatim to the White House immediately upon your arrival back from Pearl Harbor; was it?

Admiral BEATTY. I feel definitely certain that it was.

Mr. KEEFE. And your impression is that the news release that went to the public came from the White House?

Admiral BEATTY. That is my impression.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir. May I amplify that?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral BEATTY. Came from the White House after the conference.

Mr. KEEFE. After the conference with Secretary Knox?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir; in which I believe the Secretary of War participated, and the Secretary of State also.

Mr. KEEFE. Was General Marshall there at the conference, or Admiral Stark?

Admiral BEATTY. Well, I didn't think they were, but [10252]
they may have been. I wasn't there.

Mr. KEEFE. You didn't go there?

Admiral BEATTY. Oh, no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did the Secretary call you on Saturday evening?

Admiral BEATTY. He did not.

Mr. KEEFE. So that you had no knowledge on Sunday morning of the receipt of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message?

Admiral BEATTY. As I recall, I had none, although there is a possibility that I heard before I left the office on Saturday that such a message was coming in, and that was before it was broken.

Mr. KEEFE. You were at the office of the Secretary at about 8 o'clock as I understand it, on Sunday morning?

Admiral BEATTY. Between 8 and 8:30.

Mr. KEEFE. Was the 14-part message and the short message of instruction to the Japanese Ambassador delivered to the Secretary's office that morning?

Admiral BEATTY. If so, I don't believe it was through me.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not see those two messages either; did you, the morning of the 7th?

Admiral BEATTY. As I recall, when I went to lunch, I [10253] did not know of the 14th part or the time of appointment.

Mr. KEEFE. What time did Secretary Knox come back to his office from the State Department that morning?

Admiral BEATTY. To the best of my recollection, between 11 and 11:30.

[10254] Mr. KEEFE. Do you know whether or not, can you state with certainty whether or not Admiral Stark was in the Secretary's office during the time that the Secretary was over at the Secretary of State's office?

Admiral BEATTY. Not with certainty.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any present recollection that Admiral Stark was in the Secretary's office Sunday morning at all?

Admiral BEATTY. I am under the impression that he was in there some time during the morning once or twice, but it is not a definite recollection.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it at a time when Secretary Knox was present or absent?

Admiral BEATTY. If he was there it would be during Secretary Knox's presence. He very seldom came up during the Secretary's absence and generally inquired before he came up whether the Secretary was there or not.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I have one question in view of what was brought out by Senator Ferguson.

You said you expected an attack on Sunday on the Kra Peninsula. The basis of that was some other dispatch, I take [10255] it, other than some winds intercept message?

Admiral BEATTY. Yes, sir. The winds intercept message had nothing to do with it.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Safford said the Navy had 3 days' notice of the attack on the United States on Sunday. Did you ever hear of such a thing?

Admiral BEATTY. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you help to prepare the exhibits for the Roberts Commission or did you know anything about that?

Admiral BEATTY. The only thing I had to do with the Roberts Commission was I talked with Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves before the Commission was formed up. I had nothing to do with the Commission itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have anything to do with preparing exhibits for them?

Admiral BEATTY. Nothing.

Senator FERGUSON. Or did you see any exhibits?

Admiral BEATTY. I don't know what you mean, sir, but I had nothing to do with it that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you check any papers in connection with getting the file ready?

[10256] Admiral BEATTY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. After it was over do you know whether or not a copy of the report, a copy of the testimony, and a copy of the exhibits came to the Secretary's office?

Admiral BEATTY. I remember that one came. I can't say when and I don't believe I saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that such a thing was delivered back to his office after it was over?

Admiral BEATTY. That is my definite recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see it?

Admiral BEATTY. No, sir; I have never seen it to the best of my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't do any stenographic work?

Admiral BEATTY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you weren't in any way in charge of the files so that you would see those things?

Admiral BEATTY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral, for your cooperation, and I hope that the committee hasn't inconvenienced you too much.

Admiral BEATTY. Not at all.

(The witness was excused.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I now present, Mr. Chairman, [10257] Major Dillon.

The CHAIRMAN. Major Dillon, will you come around, please.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JOHN H. DILLON, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Mr. RICHARDSON. Major, will you state your full name for the record, please?

Major DILLON. Maj. John Herman Dillon.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you in the naval service during the war?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir. I came in the Marine Corps Reserve on April 10, 1942.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you connected with the office of Secretary Knox, Secretary of the Navy?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your position there?

Major DILLON. I was confidential assistant and later Marine aide to the Secretary.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long a period did that work last?

Major DILLON. From the time he took office until he died.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How closely were you associated with him in that occupation?

Major DILLON. I would say very closely.

[10258] Mr. RICHARDSON. Were your offices adjacent?

Major DILLON. Right next door.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the nature of the work that you performed in connection with Secretary Knox's activities?

Major DILLON. I handled all of the Marine work dealing with the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were not with him when he went to Hawaii?

Major DILLON. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you on duty on the 6th and 7th of December?

Major DILLON. I was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You heard the inquiry that I made of Admiral Beatty as to the incident concerning a message supposed to have been sent by Secretary Knox to Hawaii?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any knowledge of any such message or communication on the part of Secretary Knox?

Major DILLON. I recall that on Sunday morning there was some mention of a message. When it was sent I can't say. It could have very likely been the message referred to by Admiral Beatty.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall any statement by Secretary Knox on Saturday December 6 with reference to any [10259] message?

Major DILLON. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know what message was referred to in the discussion which you heard on December 7?

Major DILLON. I don't know which message it could have been. Very likely was the Marshall message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you hear about more than one message?

Major DILLON. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever see more than one message in any of Secretary Knox' papers?

Major DILLON. I didn't even see the Marshall message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no message there at all?

Major DILLON. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know whether Secretary Knox issued orders or sent messages to commanders in the field direct?

Major DILLON. That was not the usual practice.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know of his having done it at any time?

Major DILLON. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where were you on Sunday morning?

Major DILLON. As I recall I got to the office about 9:30, somewhere around 9:30.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was the Secretary there when you arrived?

[10260] Major DILLON. He was there for a few minutes and left practically immediately.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had nothing to do with him on that morning in connection with his activities?

¹ Before being commissioned in the Marine Corps, Major Dillon was a civilian aide to Secretary Knox.

Major DILLON. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You didn't attend any of his meetings?

Major DILLON. No, sir. He came back from the State Department, as I recall, about 11:30, possibly a little later. He had a meeting in his office with Admiral Stark and I think Captain Turner, now Admiral Turner. I was not present. And that lasted possibly an hour. He was about ready to leave the office, as I recall, about 1:30, and was actually standing in my room, in the presence of Admiral Stark and Captain Turner, when the message from Pearl Harbor came in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. About the attack?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, you can't throw any light here at all from your best recollection as to any messages in which Secretary Knox was interested in connection with communications with Pearl Harbor prior to that attack?

Major DILLON. No, sir; I cannot.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

[10261] The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster is not here. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Major, you say that Colonel Knox, Admiral Stark, Captain Turner, were coming out of the Secretary's office when the message came in that there was an attack?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir. They were standing at my desk.

Senator FERGUSON. Standing at your desk. And how long would you say they had been in Secretary Knox' office?

Major DILLON. Well, I would say possibly an hour, maybe longer. I can't say during that period whether Admiral Stark went out and came back in but I would say an hour possibly.

[10262] Senator FERGUSON. Had Admiral Stark been in to see Secretary Knox prior to the time the Secretary came back from the Secretary of State's office?

Major DILLON. I think the Secretary came back from the State Department and immediately sent for Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. And then there was the conference with Admiral Stark?

Major DILLON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were not invited in?

Major DILLON. I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have the message of the attack in your possession at the time they came out of the office?

Major DILLON. No, sir. They were standing at my desk when the message was brought in the door.

Senator FERGUSON. And to whom was the message shown?

Major DILLON. It was handed to the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. And did he make any remark?

Major DILLON. As I recall, his remark was, "My God, this can't be true, this must mean the Philippines."

Senator FERGUSON. And what was said by Stark or Turner?

Major DILLON. As I recall Admiral Stark said, "No, sir; this is Pearl."

Senator FERGUSON. Did Turner say anything?

[10263] Major DILLON. I can't recall that he did; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that was your first knowledge and apparently from what you told us Secretary Knox' first knowledge of the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you help to make up any file of exhibits for the Roberts Commission?

Major DILLON. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see the report of the Roberts Commission that was delivered to Secretary Knox, the report, the testimony and any exhibits?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir; I did. It was turned over to the Secretary and he in turn gave it to me to place in his safe which was in his immediate office.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you place it in his safe?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When was it that the Secretary died?

Major DILLON. He died April 28, 1944, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not that report and testimony and exhibits remained in his safe until after the Secretary's death?

Major DILLON. No, sir; it did not. It remained in the safe until December 9, 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. December 9, 1943, it was taken from his safe?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

[10264] Senator FERGUSON. And by whom was it taken from his safe?

Major DILLON. At his direction I turned it over to the Judge Advocate General and it was signed for by Lieutenant Commander Johnson, commander, United States Navy, retired.

Senator FERGUSON. He gave you a receipt for it?

Major DILLON. He gave me a receipt, which is this [indicating].

Senator FERGUSON. You have the receipt. Could I just see it?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

(The receipt referred to was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Senator FERGUSON. This starts out—it is on the stationery of the Navy Department, December 9, 1943, and it starts out:

The following listed correspondence has this date been received from Major JOHN H. DILLON, U. S. M. C., Marine Aide to the Secretary, for use in the Office of the Judge Advocate General:

Item No. 1. Subject:

Report of the Secretary of the Navy to the President—No date Re Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu, on December 7.

[10265] 2. Sixteen volumes Transcript of Testimony before Commission Investigating Attack on Hawaii, December 7, 1941, plus I Annex of Amended Testimony.

Now, the first does not show a report of the Roberts Commission, does it? It shows a report of the Secretary of the Navy to the President?

Major DILLON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And the next is the 16 volumes. That is the Roberts testimony?

Major DILLON. That is the Roberts testimony.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

No. 3. Minutes of Commission to Ascertain and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces Upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

That also related to the Roberts Commission?

Major DILLON. Yes. I think that was the report of the reporter, after the time.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

No. 4. A list showing the documents furnished the Secretary of the Navy.

Now, what are those documents, a list showing the documents furnished the Secretary of the Navy?

Major DILLON. At the time the Roberts report was turned over to the Secretary, there was a listing of the Roberts report. That is what that is. It was listed by [10266] volumes, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it include the exhibits?

Major DILLON. I think it did, sir. I think it was a complete report.

Senator FERGUSON. A complete report of all the exhibits that they had had?

Major DILLON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. No. 5 :

A list showing the documents that were furnished the Secretary of War.

Major DILLON. That is the same thing, you see, except War and Navy each got a copy.

Senator FERGUSON. Each got a complete copy?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

Packet No. 1.

Documents in the possession of the Commission on January 24, 1942, received by it from sources other than military or naval officers or their agencies, and to be delivered to the Secretary of the Navy.

Those were other exhibits?

Major DILLON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, there are 51 items that were turned over, and I don't know as I will want to [10267] examine this witness to the extent of examining him on each one of these 51 items.

You were satisfied that you were turning over what the description called for?

Major DILLON. Very definitely. I think you will notice some pencil check marks there which were made at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Each of the 51 are checked with pencil indicating that you made an examination of the documents?

Major DILLON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And knew that this was a good description of the instruments that were being turned over?

Major DILLON. I think it was a description, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You are here in the city now?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not on any leave?

Major DILLON. I am on terminal leave, but I am employed in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Secretary of Navy's office?

Major DILLON. In the executive office of the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this be spread upon the minutes as showing what was turned over and then we will have time to examine this, and if it is [10268] necessary to ask the witness to come back, that can be done.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This is your receipt, is it, Major?

Major DILLON. It is my receipt for the report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you want to keep that, I assume?

Major DILLON. I would certainly like to, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any objection to the stenographer copying it?

Major DILLON. No, sir; I have none. That was titled as a secret document, and it was secret at that time, but there is no need of it being secret now.

The CHAIRMAN. You would like to have it back?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir; I would.

The CHAIRMAN. There being no objection to spreading it on the minutes, it is so ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

(The receipt referred to follows:)

[10269]

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, Dec. 9, 1943.

The following listed correspondence has this date been received from Major JOHN H. DILLON, U. S. M. C., Marine Aide to the Secretary, for use in the Office of the Judge Advocate General:

Item No.

Subject

1. Report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President—No date Re Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th.
2. Sixteen volumes Transcript of Testimony before Commission Investigating Attack on Hawaii, December 7, 1941, plus I Annex of Amended Testimony.
3. Minutes of Commission to Ascertain and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces Upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.
4. A list showing the documents furnished the Secretary of the Navy.
5. A list showing the documents that were furnished the Secretary of War.

PACKET NO. 1

Documents in the possession of the Commission [10270] on January 24, 1942, received by it from sources other than military or naval officers or their agencies, and to be delivered to the Secretary of the Navy

1. Two copies of letter dated December 10, 1941, from A. A. Buta, Chief Inspector of Customs, and John D. Williams, Inspector of Customs, to Collector of Customs, Federal Building, Honolulu, T. H., giving the writers' version of the airplane attack on Pearl Harbor.

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2. Letter dated Dec. 30, 1941, Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Commission, concerning warnings of attack conveyed by the Secretary to the Department of War and Navy in the period between November 1 and Dec. 7, 1941.
3. Letter dated Jan. 16, 1942, William L. Langer, Director of Research, Coordinator of Information, to General Frank McCoy, transmitting résumé of public opinion about the Commission, together with the résumé mentioned in said letter.
4. Letter dated Jan. 3, 1942, Paul B. Waterhouse, President, and Chris J. Benny, Executive Secretary. The Temperance League of Hawaii, to the Chairman of the Commission, charging lack of sobriety on the part of the army and navy personnel, and urging [10271] that alcoholic liquor be barred from the service; also copy of letter dated Jan. 4 '42 by the Recorder of the Commission, inviting Mr. Waterhouse and Mr. Benny to appear before the Commission.
5. Certified copy of Executive Order appointing the Commission.
6. Copy of Joint Resolution authorizing the Commission to compel attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents.
7. Memorandum dated Jan. 9, '42, R. L. Shivers, Special Agent in Charge, FBI, Honolulu, to Mr. Justice Roberts, conveying certain items of information pertinent to the Commission's investigation.
8. Correspondence with and report by W. A. Gabrielson, Chief of Police, Honolulu, concerning complaints and reports received by his department of Dec. 6 '41, relative to Army and Navy personnel.
9. Tabulation of population estimates of the Territory of Hawaii as of July 1, 1940, and July 1, 1941.
10. Copy of "The Honolulu Advertiser" of December 16, 1941, containing account of killing of Japanese pilot on Island of Niiahu.
11. Outline of plan for protective measures for civilian population of Oahu in case of bombardment, dated March 25, 1941.
- [10272] 12. Letter dated December 22, 1941, from Hawaiian business and social organizations to The President, commending General Short.
13. Precis of testimony before the Commission prior to its departure for Honolulu, given by Admiral Stark, Rear Admiral Turner, and Captain Wilkinson.
15. FBI graphs showing racial composition of Territory of Hawaii & c.
14. Memorandum dated 1/5/42, Myron Gurnea, Inspector FBI, to the Chairman re available radio facilities for transmitting airplane bearings.

PACKET NO. 2

Documents in the possession of the Commission on January 24, 1942, received by it from Navy Officers or agencies, and to be delivered to The Secretary of the Navy

1. Map of Oahu showing main military and naval establishments.
2. Map of Hawaiian Islands.
3. Copy of letter of 1/24/41, Sec. Navy to Sec. War, re security of U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself.
4. Summary of reports and messages sent to CNO since attack on Pearl Harbor (three copies).
- [10273] 5. Six copies Memorandum 2/17/41 CNO to sundry Commandants of Naval Districts—Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
6. Five copies Memorandum 12/19/41, P. N. L. Bellinger, Rear Admiral U. S. N., Commander Patrol Wing Two, to Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N., re availability and disposition of patrol planes on morning of 7 December, 1941.
7. Six copies "Summary of Reports and Messages" 8 Dec. 0427 to 17 December 0028.
8. Seven copies Messages and orders from Hq. C. in C. Pacific Fleet Dec. 7, 1941.
9. Copy of Survey of Conditions in Pacific Fleet, dated 5/26/41, from C. in C. U. S. Pacific Fleet to CNO.

10. Four copies Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) dated Pearl Harbor T. H. 10/14/41, from C. in C. U. S. Pacific Fleet to Pacific Fleet—Subject: "Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating areas."
11. Memorandum, Edwin Thomas Layton, Lt. Comdr. U. S. Navy, Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Commission, dated 5 Jan. '42, summarizing frequency of occurrence of periods when information was lacking in regard to location or activity of a group, type or unit of Japanese Fleet during last six months of 1941.
12. List of Damage control officers of ships present [10274] 7 Dec. 1941.
13. Memo. (copy) dated 12/26/41, Commander Scouting Force (Administration) to Commandant Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, subject Navy Yard Pearl Harbor Priority List.
14. Memo. (copy) dated 12/26/41, Commandant 14 Nav. Dist. to Chief Bu. Yards and Docks, subject: Construction Program on Oahu—Prosecution of, under war conditions.
15. Copy of Memo. dated 1/16/41 from Comdr. Patwing Two to CNO, subject: Readiness of Patrol Wing Two.
16. Memorandum dated 1/1/42, by Admiral Halsey, subject: "Summary of Action 7 December 1941"—Planes available *Enterprise* Dawn Dec. 7, and losses.
17. Memo. dated 2 Jan. 1942, Admiral Halsey to Admiral Standley, subject: "Liberty—Hawaiian Area."
18. Memo. dated 1 Jan. 1942, P. N. L. Bellinger, Comdr. Patrol Wing Two to Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of Dec. 7, 1941, transmitting 6 copies of report of Army-Navy Board of 31 Oct. 1941, and specifying dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held between 24 April 1941 and 12 Nov. 1941.
19. Typical operations program of Commander Task Force.
20. Three copies Memo. of 12/22/41, W. E. G. Taylor, Lt. Cdr. USNR to Aide to The Commandant 14th Navl. Dist., outlining the Commander's assignments and duties.
21. Memo. dated 1/2/42, Captain Mayfield to the Commission, [10275] subject: long coded message regarding arrangements for display of signals at Lanikai, Kalawa and on Island of Maui.
22. Memo. (undated) P. S. Crosley, Flag Secty. to Lieut-Comdr. Covington, forwarding copies of operation orders for combined inter task force tactical exercise held during second quarter of fiscal year (Sept. 24, 1941, to Nov. 25, 1941), and specifying areas where exercises were held. Copies of the orders are attached to the memorandum.
23. Memo. 7 Jan. 1942, Dist. Intelligence Officer to President's investigating committee, enclosing 5 copies excerpts from letter from CNO dated 15 March 1941 to Commandants of all Naval Districts, the Governor of Guam and the Governor of Samoa, and 5 copies of report dated 16 Dec. 1941 on subject of enemy plane that crashed on Niihau. There is attached to this memorandum one copy of the Niihau report.
24. Memo. dated 5 Jan. 1942, E. T. Layton, Lt. Comdr. U. S. N. Intelligence Officer U. S. Pac. Fleet, for the Commission, re fuze settings used by vessels at Pearl Harbor Dec. 1941; with appended photographs showing bomber formations and illustrating "shorts" and altitude of attack.
25. Letter 1 Jan. 1942, Admiral Bloch to Walter Bruce How, Recorder of the Commission, suggesting revision of [10276] of the Admiral's testimony concerning the opening of anti-torpedo net.
26. Three copies of Memo. of Jan. 1, 1942, concerning status of defense battalions, Fleet Marine Force, assigned to 14th Naval District.
27. Three copies of History of Action occurring at Palmyra Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 31, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence.
28. Three copies of History of Action occurring at Johnston Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 31, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence.
29. Three copies of History of Action occurring at Wake Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 22, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence.
30. Three copies of report on conditions at Wake Island, from C. O. NAS Wake to Comdt. 14th N. D., dated Dec. 20, 1941.
31. Three copies of report of action at Palmyra Island 24 Dec. 1941 from C. O. U. S. Naval Air Station, Palmyra Island, to C. O. 14 N. D., (undated).
32. Three copies of report dated Dec. 19 '41 concerning attack on Johnston Island; from C. O. U. S. Naval Station (Air), Johnston Island, to Commandant 14th Nav. District.

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33. Security orders, instructions and arrangements issued since Dec. 7 '41 by units of fleet and 14th Nav. Dist., [10277] pertaining to security of Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Fleet.
34. Five copies of history of action occurring at Midway Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 31, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence.
35. Undated report of damage caused by action of 7 Dec. 1941 at Midway Island, from C. O. that Island to C. in C. U. S. Pac. Fleet.
36. Report dated 12/12/41, C. O. Defense Garrison at Midway Islands to Comdt. 14th Nav. Dist., concerning action on 7 Dec. 1941.
37. Report dated 17 Dec. 1941, from resident officer in charge public works at Midway Island, containing "Miscellaneous comments covering period 1 December 1941 to 17 December 1941" concerning work progress and effects of attack thereon.
38. Report of Army-Navy Board 31 October, 1941.
39. Report of Action of 7 December 1941, dated Dec. 21, 1941, from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel USN to Sec. Navy.
40. Location of regularly assigned commanding officers of ships present during Japanese attack of 7 December 1941.
41. Shore Patrol reports 6, 7, 8 Dec. (enlisted personnel).
42. List of shore patrol reports of offenses committed by commissioned officer personnel of the Fleet 1 April-18 December 1941.
- [10278] 43. Copies of Radar plots furnished by Admiral Bellinger.
44. Photographs taken during attack at Kaneohe Bay and thereafter, indicating damage done at the field, etc.
45. Copy of Naval Base Defense Officers' Operation Plan dated 7 March 1941.
46. Copy of memorandum concerning coordination of FBI, ONI and MID.
47. 14th Naval District Control Post Watch Officer's Log War Diary Reg. No. 2.
48. Chart of Pearl Harbor showing location of various units of Fleet.
49. Copy of report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President.
50. Copy of excerpts from CNO's letter dated March 15, 1941 to Commandants of all naval districts, Governor of Guam, and Governor of Samoa, re investigation of Japanese Espionage, Counter-Espionage, Sabotage, and Subversive Activities.
51. Letter dated Jan. 5, '42, from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy to the Commission, recommending revision of transcript of Rear Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the Commission on December 27 and 29.

/s/ L. H. C. JOHNSON,
Commander, U. S. Navy (Ret.) Rm. 2342.

[10279] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. There are one or two things that I would like to get clear, Major, in my mind.

You fix the time quite definitely at approximately 1:30 when the Secretary, Admiral Stark, and others with Admiral Stark, I believe you said Admiral Turner, were going out the door when a message came in announcing the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Major DILLON. Well, if I fixed it quite definitely, I probably was in error. To the best of my memory it was around that time. It may have been earlier.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was the individual that brought that message?

Major DILLON. I think it was Commander Fernald.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he come from the Navy Department, Navy Signal Corps?

Major DILLON. Communications, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Navy Communications?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So this message had been sent from Hawaii through Navy Communications?

Major DILLON. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Announcing the attack at approximately 1 o'clock Washington time, 7:55 Hawaiian time, that day?

[10280] The CHAIRMAN. 1:30 approximately, you said, didn't you?

Major DILLON. Approximately 1:30.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was received here about 1:30; is that right?

Major DILLON. I wouldn't like to say that definitely. It could have been 1:15 that Commander Fernald came into the office. I don't remember the exact time.

Mr. KEEFE. The time shown on that message—have we got that message in evidence?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't know anything about the message or the time of its receipt.

Major DILLON. It should be a matter of record.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think there is a word in the record about it.

Mr. KEEFE. Can we get that message and have it brought here?

The CHAIRMAN. There has been no message filed with the committee in these hearings such as the major refers to announcing an attack on Pearl Harbor. It has been talked about, but I don't think the message was ever filed.

Major DILLON. It was a one-line message in clear language, as I recall.

[10281] The CHAIRMAN. Who sent it?

Major DILLON. As I recall, it came from CINCPAC.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that?

Major DILLON. CINCPAC, which, of course, would be Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. KEEFE. Your recollection is that it came directly through Naval Communications?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir. It is quite possible that the message could have been an intercept on the part of Naval Communications. As I recall, the message read something like "We are being attacked. This is no drill."

That is about all it said. "We are being attacked. This is no drill."

Mr. KEEFE. "We are being attacked. This is no drill"?

Major DILLON. I think that is approximately what it said.

Mr. KEEFE. That is a message that went out and was caught by Admiral Halsey's fleet from Pearl Harbor.

Major DILLON. It could have been the same message.

Mr. KEEFE. It might have been the same message. Is that right?

Major DILLON. It could have been; yes, sir. And it could have been intercepted here in Washington and transmitted from the Signal Corps and delivered over to the [10282] Secretary's office, sometime between 1:15 and 1:30?

That was the first we knew about it, and that was the message which told us that Pearl Harbor was being attacked.

Mr. KEEFE. That could be an intercept of a radio communication issued out of Pearl Harbor?

Major DILLON. Very likely; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to get that message to settle this question, if we can, counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will see if they can locate it, and if so will bring it to the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you have stated to us that as soon as the Secretary saw the—well, a message has been shown to me. The message which has been shown to me is quite a long message from Admiral Kimmel telling about the damage and that sort of thing. That is not the message you have reference to, Major, is it?

Major DILLON. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You think that the message you saw was a simple one-line message?

Major DILLON. As I recall, it was one line; yes, sir. I saw the message at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. That is perhaps Admiral Kimmel's first [10283] report, which is shown here in the Navy report. I don't think that is the message you have referred to.

At least, when this message came and the Secretary saw it, his first exclamation was, "My God! This can't be true. It must mean the Philippines."

Major DILLON. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Was there pretty general agreement, as you understood it, in the Secretary's office, that if any attack took place by the Japanese, it would take place out in the Far East?

Major DILLON. In the Far East; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There was never any thought, so far as you could ascertain it from your own contact in the Secretary's office, that there would be any attack at Pearl Harbor?

Major DILLON. None whatsoever.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, my interest in inquiring about the receipt of this message is to determine the speed with which the announcement of the attack was issued out of Pearl Harbor, either by radio or by direct message, and its receipt here, causing me to wonder why the same speed wasn't used in sending the warning message out to Pearl Harbor. That is clear to you, is it not?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

[10284] Mr. KEEFE. The purpose of my question.

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 640 of the Navy narrative, to which the gentleman from Wisconsin referred, I find the following: "Dispatch 072244, from Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, advising of the Japanese attack," stated that it commenced at 0750 Pearl Harbor time, which was 2:20 Washington time.

Now, apparently that report—

Major DILLON. That is not the message.

Mr. MURPHY. No; but the advice from Admiral Kimmel was that it started at 7:50 Hawaiian time or 2:20 Washington time. You say we had word here between 1 and 1:30 of the attack.

Major DILLON. Well, 7:50 Honolulu time would have been 5½ hours' difference, I think, between the time—

Mr. MURPHY. I am just wondering if the naval narrative is in error here.

Mr. KEEFE. Not only in that respect but in many others.

[10285] Mr. MURPHY. Please. I haven't yielded.

Do you know whether or not it was between 1 and 1:30 or whether or not this is in error, whether Admiral Kimmel was in error?

Major DILLON. Well, the message that I referred to is a message that I thought was around 1:15 to 1:30. It could have been 1:40.

Mr. MURPHY. You have no definite recollection of the exact time?

Major DILLON. Not of the exact time.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us after the message was received by Secretary Knox, did he go back into his office for a conference?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Who went back with him?

Major DILLON. As I recall, Admiral Stark and Captain Turner and I think they sent for one or two others. I don't recall their names.

Senator FERGUSON. And how long did they remain in the office, roughly?

Major DILLON. I would say 45 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Admiral Ingersoll?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

[10286] Senator FERGUSON. Did he come and go into the office?

Major DILLON. I don't remember that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any conversation between the Secretary and the White House that morning up until the time of the attack?

Major DILLON. Up until the time of the attack?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Major DILLON. No, sir; I know of none.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any immediately following the attack?

Major DILLON. No. The minute the Secretary received this message from Commander Fernald he immediately called on the White House phone and spoke to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that you didn't hear the conversation?

Major DILLON. I heard the one end, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what the Secretary said?

Major DILLON. He simply stated what was in the message, said that we had no further details but that he would be kept advised.

Senator FERGUSON. Anything else?

Major DILLON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any telephone calls while the Secretary was over at the Secretary of State's office [10287] from Admiral Stark or anyone else in the Navy that you recall that morning?

Major DILLON. As I recall, I think Admiral Stark asked to be informed when the Secretary returned.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you inform him?

Major DILLON. I am sure I did; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anyone else call for him?

Major DILLON. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall anybody else except Admiral Stark?

Major DILLON. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any knowledge as to whether or not the Secretary was consulted about the so-called Marshall message? You know what I am talking about?

Major DILLON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That went out at noon. Do you know whether or not he was consulted about that?

Major DILLON. I don't know that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no knowledge?

Major DILLON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank, you Major.

(The witness was excused.)

(Whereupon, at 5:03 p. m., February 5, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Wednesday, February 6, 1946.)

[10288]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman) Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[10289] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel has some documents he wishes to put into the record.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, last Saturday, I think it was, we distributed a collection of documents, mimeographed copies of documents, consisting of four pages, the first of which is a note on the stationery of the White House from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, undated but attached to a letter dated October 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to President Roosevelt.

These documents are with further reference to material which has been included in Exhibits 16 and 47, having to do with the joint recommendation of November 5, 1941, from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President, and also with the message dated November 2, 1941, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the President and the President's reply of November 14, 1941.

We have just received these from the State Department, and would like to add them as Exhibit 16-A to Exhibit 16, to complete the record as far as we now have it in those connections.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 16-A.")

[10290] Mr. MASTEN. At pages 1860 to 1863 of the committee's transcript, Congressman Keefe requested that a search be made for communications between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, either directly or through intermediaries, during the period November 24 to December 7, 1941. That request was transmitted to the War, Navy, and State Departments and to Miss Tully. We have received communications from the War Department and the Navy Department, with the certificates requested by Congressman Keefe, which we would like to have spread on the record at this point. These communications

indicate that neither the War nor the Navy Department has found any communications of the nature requested by the Congressman.

Also, it is our understanding that at a conference which Congressman Keefe had with Mr. Richardson and Under Secretary Acheson of the State Department at his request, such communications as had been found in the State Department files were shown to him at that time, but that it was his conclusion that they had no relevance to this proceeding.

As far as Miss Tully is concerned, Mr. Mitchell covered that in his memorandum to the committee, and it is our understanding that if she is called as a witness the question will be considered with her at that time.

I request permission to have these spread on the transcript at this point.

[10291] The CHAIRMAN. That will be done at this point.
(The communications referred to follow:)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 13 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

At pp. 1860-63 of the transcript, Congressman Keefe requested that a search be made for any communications in the War Department files between the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period 24 November-7 December 1941. Careful searches of the War Department files have disclosed no such communications. Certificates to that effect, as requested by Congressman Keefe, are inclosed herewith.

/s/ Harmon Duncombe,
HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

Incls.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, 3 December 1945.

[10292] I hereby certify that the War Department files in the possession of The Adjutant General's Office contain no record of communications between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period 24 November through 7 December 1941.

/s/ Edward F. Witsell,
EDWARD F. WITSELL,
Major General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 11 December 1945.

The undersigned was Officer in Charge of the War Department Signal Center and War Department Code Room from September 1939 until May 1945.

This is to certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that at no time prior to 7 December 1941, did either the War Department Code Room or War Department Signal Center handle any messages from or to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of England, sent either directly or through an intermediary. The War Department Code Room and War Department Signal Center were not in the normal channel for handling messages between the President and the Prime Minister. Had any message been so routed, it [10293] would have been brought to my attention as being most unusual.

/s/ Edward F. French,
EDWARD F. FRENCH,
Colonel, Signal Corps.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington 25, D. C., 11 December 1945.

The Staff Communications Branch, Office Chief of Staff, was established 1 April 1942. At that time a fragmentary file of messages transmitted during the period prior to 8 December 1941 was turned over to the Staff Communications Branch. That entire file was microfilmed and the microfilm remains in the possession of the Staff Communications Branch. I hereby certify that the microfilm contains no communications between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period 24 November through 7 December 1941.

/s/ C. E. Tenneson, Jr.,
O. E. TENNESSON, Jr.,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Chief, Staff Communications Branch.

13 DECEMBER 1945.

[10294] All personnel immediately available who would be likely to have knowledge of any messages between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of England transmitted, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period 24 November through 7 December 1941 via the War Department Signal Center have been questioned, and have expressed the belief that there were no such messages.

Under Army Regulations 105-25, 12 February 1945, paragraph 3b, Signal Centers will not be used as offices of record. That same provision was in effect during and since 1941. Accordingly, the War Department Signal Center's microfilm records covering messages transmitted during 1941, 1942 and the first six months of 1943 are no longer in existence.

/s/ P. C. Maynard,
P. C. MAYNARD,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Chief, Traffic Operations Branch.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 21 January 1946.

[10295]

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. In respect of the memorandum of Mr. William D. Mitchell dated 28 November 1945 enclosing a copy of a request made that day by Congressman Keefe, which was transcribed at Page 1861 of the Report of Proceedings, for the production from the files of the Navy Department of all communications from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister or to any intermediary of the British Prime Minister, such as the British Admiralty, from the period of November 24, 1941 to and including December 7, 1941, together with a certificate as indicated, this will advise that a careful search of the pertinent files of the Navy Department have disclosed no such communications. As requested by Congressman Keefe a copy of a certificate by Rear Admiral Redman, Chief of Naval Communications, dated 21 January 1946, is forwarded herewith.

/S/ John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHEER,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

3842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[10296] OP-20-4-blp
Serial 0003008P20
(SC) A17-24(1)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington 25, D. C., 21 January 1946.

Top Secret

From: Chief of Naval Communications.

To: Rear Admiral O. S. Colclough, USN, Judge Advocate General.

Subj: Dispatch communications via Naval Communications Service between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill between 24 November 1941 and 7 December 1941, inclusive.

1. All appropriate files of the Naval Communication Service have been searched for any dispatch communications from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill or any of his subordinates, or from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt or any of subordinates between 24 November 1941 and 7 December 1941, inclusive. This will certify that no such dispatches are contained in those files.

JOSEPH R. REDMAN.

JANUARY 22, 1946.

Memorandum for Congressman Keefe.

With reference to your request for any communications in the State, War, and Navy Department files between the [10297] President of the United States and the British Prime Minister, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period November 24-December 7, 1941, there are enclosed copies of memoranda dated December 13, 1945, and January 21, 1946, which we have received from the liaison officers of the War and Navy Departments, together with copies of the certificates enclosed therewith.

It is our understanding that a complete response to your request was made by Mr. Acheson for the State Department during our conference with him on January 21.

/s/ Seth W. Richardson
SETH W. RICHARDSON.

Encs.

[10298] Mr. MASTEN. Finally, I would like to refer to the request made by Congressman Gearhart originally at page 5458 of the transcript relating to certain of the Japanese intercepts in Exhibits 1 and 2 bearing date of December 6, 1941.

At pages 5511 to 5518 of the transcript, there was placed in the record additional information regarding the times of receipt of certain of those intercepts, and following renewal of Congressman Gearhart's request at page 7689 of the transcript, the papers requested were delivered to Congressman Gearhart on the following Tuesday, I believe it was. We would like to have that noted in the record, as showing the delivery of those papers.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be noted.

Mr. MASTEN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES
NAVY—(Resumed)

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, will you now produce the several letters—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair was confused. Senator Lucas was examining.

Mr. MURPHY. I beg your pardon.

[10299] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas was examining.
Senator LUCAS. I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I just wanted to make a request that we have produced the four letters and the station records.¹

Captain SAFFORD. I have not the station records. They are not in my custody. Counsel will have to get them from the Navy Department.

I have here copies, extracts made from those station records, by one of my assistants and this is all I had to work with, these papers I have here.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the four letters.

Captain SAFFORD. The only letter that I have and can find is a letter from Commander Welker that is dated January 15, postmarked January 16, 1946.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't have your letter to Welker or your letter to Brotherhood?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot find them.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't have your letter to Welker, your letter to Brotherhood, or your letter to Bryant?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not have them.

Mr. MURPHY. You cannot produce them?

Captain SAFFORD. I can't produce them.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, in the statement you furnished [10300] to the committee, on page 1, you state, "The broadcast was probably in Japanese Morse code."

You were there speaking about the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. The winds execute message.

Senator LUCAS. Now, as you go through your statement, and as I have understood the testimony from time to time, you have almost taken a clear position that it was broadcast in the Morse code, and I would like to have you explain what you mean by "probably" because it seems to me to be somewhat important.

Captain SAFFORD. There are two forms of Morse code. The International Morse code, which has an alphabet of 26 characters, and the Japanese Morse code which has an alphabet of approximately 45 characters. Not being able to locate any copies of the JAP broadcasts of that time, it is not quite definite what was used. The best reference we can have is the station report from Cheltenham, which said they monitored all these schedules and found they were all in English and Kana, which means Japanese Morse code. So there is a very strong presumption that it was in the Japanese Morse code and not in the International Morse code. But in either event, it was not in voice. It was not [10301] the spoken word.

Senator LUCAS. I still don't quite understand when you say it was "probably" in Japanese Morse code. Are there two Morse codes?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; the Japanese Morse code of approximately 45 characters, and the English Morse code of 26 characters.

Senator LUCAS. Were you intercepting both codes?

Captain SAFFORD. We were intercepting both codes from time to time. At that time we had approximately 110 radio operators in the United States Navy who were proficient on the Japanese Morse code.

Senator LUCAS. One of these codes is easier to intercept; is that it?

Captain SAFFORD. Any trained operator can intercept the Inter-

¹ See p. 3887 et seq., *infra*. See also Hearings, Part 9, p. 4009.

national Morse code. The Japanese Morse code requires special training.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, any station in the country could intercept the International Morse code?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. While it would take a trained operator to intercept the Japanese Morse code?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you are not positive; you say there [10302] is a slight possibility that it would have been in the International Morse code?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; because we can't produce any message sent around that time sent from Station JAP. I have requested them, and none can be furnished.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Captain, leaving that subject for a moment, I want to turn to your testimony on page 9911 of the record.

When I was reading to you the letter that you had written to Captain Kramer, I read the following:

I am getting all the help that I can from Linn, and from such records as are still available. My memory is bad as to details.

And I asked you this question:

Was that true of the winds execute message at that time?

And you answered:

That is true on the details. You will see I had not been able to establish the date at that time, the exact date. I knew it within two or three days.

Now, bear in mind this letter was written in December 1943, two years and a few days after the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Reading this statement over last evening, I notice you [10303] still tell the committee that the exact date of this so-called winds execute message was not definitely fixed in your mind when you wrote Captain Kramer, and you say in answer to me that you knew that it was within 2 or 3 days.

Now, my query is, What documentary proof, what evidence, is there in this record that shows definitely that this message did come in on the date of December 4, as is alleged throughout in your statement?

Captain SAFFORD. The messages referred to in my testimony which were filed for transmittal between 3 p. m. and 3:20 p. m. on the afternoon of the 4th of December 1941.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, you knew, of course, when you wrote that letter to Kramer, you knew exactly the circumstances at the time; did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. I knew that the messages had been, that these messages, I knew approximately what they said, who they were to, but I did not know the date of those things.

I found that out shortly after I had written Kramer.

Senator LUCAS. You testified yesterday, Captain, that this one message that you sent to Guam—and that is the one we are talking about now—

Captain SAFFORD. That was one of them.

Senator LUCAS. You testified yesterday that that [10304] message was the only message that you sent over your name in that crisis and that—am I right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is slightly out, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you correct me.

Captain SAFFORD. I released one message personally at noon. It was not introduced as evidence. It was not very important.

Senator LUCAS. That is correct.

Captain SAFFORD. That was over my signature. The message to Guam, one message to Guam went out over the signature of Admiral Noyes. The others went out over the signature of Admiral Ingersoll. But all bore the notation that OP-20-G was the originator.

Senator LUCAS. You are correct about that. There was one message that you said was of little or no importance.

Captain SAFFORD. It was merely a correction to a previous message.

Senator LUCAS. But the only message that you sent during this crisis was the one you sent to the communications officer in Guam requesting the burning of all the papers and codes there; am I right?

Captain SAFFORD. The more important message was the one which I originated and Admiral Noyes released.

Senator LUCAS. I am not talking about that. I am talking [10305] about this one message that you sent. That is the one you did send, according to your testimony yesterday, as far as being important is concerned, you only sent one message say from December 3 to the 7th; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. There was a second message which was sent on the 6th also which was originated by me.

Senator LUCAS. It was originated by you, but did you sign it, send it over your name?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that is all I am asking you about, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. I am sorry.

Senator LUCAS. I asked you the question twice. Perhaps the construction of my question was a little poor and maybe you didn't understand me. All I was trying to get you to corroborate was the statement you made yesterday that you sent out two messages, one not so important, but the second one, which went out over your name, had to do with the burning of the codes in Guam and other papers.

Captain SAFFORD. That was not sent out over my name; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What message was sent out over your name, if any?

Captain SAFFORD. Just this one message, which I referred [10306] to, which was a correction to a previous message.

Senator LUCAS. That is the only one that was sent out over your name?

Captain SAFFORD. Over my name to those stations.

Senator LUCAS. Then I am wrong about that. I thought there were two messages. I was sure that you testified yesterday you did send out two messages. Anyhow, you distinctly recall the sending out of the message to Guam because you had prepared it, and you testified that on the basis of that message those in Guam representing the Navy there did follow out those instructions?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[10307] Senator LUCAS. And you now tell the committee that you did not know the date that you prepared that message, which was so important as far as Guam was concerned, when you wrote this letter to Captain Kramer in December 1943?

Captain SAFFORD. I knew it was the same date that we had received the winds message but I could not tell exactly what that date was. As soon as I established the date, the filing time of that message, I had fixed my date for the winds message.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. And when you wrote Captain Kramer that letter and he replied to you in his reply to your eighteenth question, he did not have the same date as you did in that letter?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. He said it was the 3d or 4th, I believe.

Senator LUCAS. No, he did not say that, Captain, I don't believe. I want to check that now with you.

Now, I call to your attention page 9916. I asked you to look at that statement which said,—I mean that part of your statement which reads as follows:

We can't find the original "Weather Report" (sent on Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?

And I say:

What did he say when he wrote back

Your answer is:

[10308] Kramer had that confused with the—I think it was with the hidden word message which was received on December 6th. Anyhow, he said it came in—or December 7th. He replied that it came in on the morning of December 7th after ten o'clock and was given out on the delivery trip which ended up at Secretary Hull's office at eleven A. M. on Sunday.

And didn't I ask you to look at his answer?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Captain SAFFORD. My memory was off.

Senator LUCAS. I thought I was correct in that because I requested you to look at his answer and that was the reply that you gave me from the answer to the letter, or from the letter itself.

Now, as I listen to this testimony it seems to me that this question of a date becomes more and more important all of the time, and you are asking Captain Kramer in December 1943 to fix the date of this so-called winds execute message which you have told the committee from circumstantial evidence you believe was on December the 4th, but the first word that you get in reply to that query comes from the man who translated the message, who said directly to you that in his opinion that message came in on the 7th, that is correct?

[10309] Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. And your position is that Kramer was confused with another message; that is as I understand it.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. But, nevertheless, of the 19 questions that you asked Kramer in this letter, the other 18 replies were satisfactory to your queries but the nineteenth one, which dealt with the winds message on the question of time, alone was not in accord with what you believed to be the fact?

Captain SAFFORD. From memory. It did not agree with my memory.

Senator LUCAS. Your memory at that time was not infallible on this question of date?

Captain SAFFORD. Not as to the day.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. And had it been, you would not have written Captain Kramer or any other individuals with respect to the date, would you?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is to say, if you had documentary proof, if you had the file or anything to have shown the date that this so-called winds execute message came in, you would not have started this series of letter writing around to individuals who were interested in this to try to ascertain and [10310] fix the proper date?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, sir. Now, you notice on page 9918 of the transcript, in answer to a question propounded by me, you said:

I wrote to Captain Welker after V-J Day to see if he could recall anything about it.

Now, VJ-day was last August, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

The letter apparently was lost in a typhoon. I wrote to him some time later and he replied that he not only could remember it, that he had done nothing whatsoever about it. In other words, it was completely erased from his memory.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, even after VJ-day you were still seeking to determine from someone to corroborate your memory upon the question of this date?

Captain SAFFORD. Not upon the date, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did you ask him about the date in that letter?

Captain SAFFORD. I did ask the date but I asked him his part of it, if he remembered what orders we had sent out, be- [10311] cause at that time I had no written record of the fact that orders had been sent to Cheltenham. I only had that in my memory. I asked him if he remembered his conference with Captain Schukraft in the Army about that. I asked him if he remembered about the Army requesting the FCC to get it, and I asked him if there was anything else of that nature which he knew. Also I asked him if he personally recalled the receipt of the winds message. I was not concerned with the date of it then.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I am not so much interested in what you asked him, other than this one point that I am trying to develop. You have no copy of the letter that you sent to Captain Welker?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no copy of the letter. I have his reply.

Senator LUCAS. Did you say anything to him in there about the question of the date, as to whether or not he remembered the date that this so-called implementing message came in?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I told him that was the date.

Senator LUCAS. Well, how did you know at that time if it is still a question here? Was that your best judgment on it?

Captain SAFFORD. That was my best judgment of the time [10312] from this other circumstantial documentary evidence of the period.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, one other statement that I want to read upon this point in answer to my question of yesterday at page 9920 of the record:

Senator LUCAS. And is there any question in your mind that a message of that kind would make any lighter impression upon Kramer than it did upon you?

Your answer is:

I discussed that matter with Kramer in the spring of 1943 before he left Washington to go to Hawaii and he recalled it and his impression or memory and mine agreed as to the fact of its interception, not the date.

Is that correct? Now, this is your own statement of yesterday.

Captain SAFFORD. May I correct that statement a little?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir; you may.

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall any direct reference to the date other than 2 or 3 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. We were not in disagreement on the date. The exact mention of date did not come up.

Senator LUCAS. I see. All right, sir.

May I have Circulars 2353 and 2354? I now direct your attention, Captain, just for a moment or two, to Circulars 2353 [10313] and 2354, with which you are familiar, of course.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, I should like also to direct your attention to the second letter that you wrote to Captain Kramer, which is in evidence, to the statement found on page 9935 of the transcript. You stated as follows:

I have this from the Station "A" files, plus statements of #19 and #23. This message (in Morse) included the words—"Higashi no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare. (Negative form of kita no kaze Kumori)."

Now, you state:

The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 or #73, but was a mixture.

Will you explain that to the committee, please?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. We expected at the time, both Army and Navy, that the reason for possibly having these two different set-ups was that instructions on the warning which was contained in Circular 2353 would be used on the voice broadcast from Tokyo and that the words appearing in 2354 would be used on the Morse code broadcast from Tokyo.

Therefore, I was quite astonished when I found words which I expected would come by voice only, appearing in the Morse code broadcast.

Senator LUCAS. Can you explain that?

[10314] Captain SAFFORD. It was our failure, the Army and Navy, to understand exactly what distinction the Japanese themselves did make between the two forms which they had provided in these two messages. If I may —

Senator LUCAS. Pardon me, sir.

Captain SAFFORD. If I may continue, please.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Captain SAFFORD. 2353 simply said, "Daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast," and that in the broad sense and maybe the proper sense could apply to any form of Japanese, whether written

or spoken. We possibly jumped at conclusions. I know that the FCC were given those words and they were told it would come by voice; the Army did that.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in this same statement you follow up by saying: .

The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 or #73, but was a mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early and verified it.

Now you are talking to Kramer. In other words, when this mixture message came in there wasn't anybody that was certain as to whether or not this was it or not; that is correct, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is what appeared at the time, [10315] though—

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, I am just talking about that time.

Captain SAFFORD. That was my belief at the time.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir; that was your belief at the time and you so stated to Kramer 2 years afterward or more, that when this message came in, it was a mixture between these two circulars that had been sent out by Japan, and there wasn't anybody at that time that thoroughly understood what this message was; that is correct, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Because it was—

Senator LUCAS. Now, just wait a minute. Not "because." Is that true or not? I am just taking your own words here to Kramer and you can qualify it later on, but I am just asking a simple question as to whether or not when this message came in, that you men there who saw it first and before Kramer got them did not believe that it was a mixture between the two messages and you did not know what it meant.

Captain SAFFORD. The watch officer that received it was not certain if it was what we were looking for or not.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. Well, counsel calls my attention and Senator Ferguson from Michigan, and they are correct; you were not there when it came in at all?

Captain SAFFORD. I was not there when it came in myself [10316] personally. I did not see it until Kramer took it in and showed it to me.

Senator LUCAS. And after Kramer came, then you had the talk with him about the message—I mean after you came in you had the talk with him about the message?

Captain SAFFORD. A very short talk and summed it up.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. How long was it after this mixture message was received until you arrived, if you recall?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know. That statement was made from a witness who has later denied he ever saw the winds message, so it does not amount to anything.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it does amount to a good deal, Captain, as far as I am concerned, and I am the one that has to—one of the men that has to pass finally on this question. This winds message is probably the most important, one of the most important things in this examination, and I am trying now to ascertain your state of mind at that particular time, as a result of this very interesting letter that you wrote to Captain Kramer.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read that question and answer? I would like to hear that last question and answer.

(The last question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Senator LUCAS. Are you talking now about the statement [10317] which you prepared for Kramer that it was a mixture, that that was given to you by another witness who now says he never saw the winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. No; that was from my own memory.

Senator LUCAS. That was from your own memory?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Now, what did you mean by that last answer? Read that question again and let the witness answer it. I am sure I do not understand it.

Senator FERGUSON. He said it did not amount to anything; that was the answer.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. What did you mean by that?

Captain SAFFORD. May I go back there for a few questions to get this straight in my mind?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, we will be glad to have you do that, Captain.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Captain SAFFORD. I should have said I did not know then when the winds message was received. I believe I told Kramer I thought it came in at 4:30 a. m. Washington time, because I think this time of arrival was given me by a witness who later has stated that he never saw the winds message. That was what I had reference to.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

[10318] Captain SAFFORD. I am sorry I was not clear.

Senator LUCAS. Now, when you came in that morning, where did you find Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. When I think about that afterward I cannot remember anything about that particular day prior to seeing Kramer and holding up a sheet of paper and saying, "Here it is" or "This is it." It was a very simple statement which contained the word "it," "it" referring to the winds message.

[10319] Senator LUCAS. Well, now, that is practically all you remember with respect to this message known as the winds execute message? You talked to Kramer about it and he held it up and you saw these three words written on it, and he said, "This is it," and that is the last time you ever saw the message?

Captain SAFFORD. I read it over. He explained it was the genuine execute of the winds code. I saw the writing, and it was sent up to Admiral Noyes immediately and never sent back to my section.

Senator LUCAS. Now how do you account for the Japanese not going through, word by word, with their circulars, either 2353 or 2354, on an important message of this kind? If you fellows had it mixed up, would not the Japs have it mixed up also?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese had both forms, and so did we, so whatever we received we could understand.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you did not understand it, the watch officer did not understand it when it came in, and you were, 2 years later, asking Kramer for information about this very thing.

Captain SAFFORD. The watch officer had been informed that if it came by voice, it would be in the form given in circular 2353, and if it came in the Morse code, it would be [10320] in the form given in Circular 2354. The watch officer was not a Japanese translator and therefore he was confused, because he recognized the words, but he was still uncertain because it did not come in in the form he expected it.

I think it was sent out the way the Japanese intended to send it, but it did not come in in the form in which we expected to receive it.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, Circular 2353 is clear and free from ambiguity, is it not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And so is Circular 2354?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. The winds execute message following this circular was probably the most important message that Japan sent, unless it was the 14 parts message?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, isn't it a fair assumption to believe that, in view of the fact that Japan was sending this implementing message, they would either send it as set forth in Circular 2353 or as set forth in Circular 2354, so that the Japanese nationals throughout the world would not be confused about it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Well, they did not do that, did they, [10321] according to what you saw on this sheet?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; they did, according to what I saw on the sheet.

Senator LUCAS. Now I will take Circular 2353 that you are talking about. It says, "In the case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.

Then it says:

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice.

Did you see that on that teletype message?

Captain SAFFORD. I saw it in the middle.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Did you see it on the end?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot say now whether it was on the end or not.

Senator LUCAS. You never testified that it was on the end, have you, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not believe so.

Senator LUCAS. You always testified that it was in the [10322] middle and it was there just in three words?

Captain SAFFORD. Three phrases.

Senator LUCAS. Three phrases, yes. And it says:

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice.

Was that done?

Captain SAFFORD. I could not testify from my own memory at the present time whether each sentence was repeated twice or not.

Senator LUCAS. You considered this an important injunction on the part of the Japanese Government to its nationals throughout the world?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You do not believe they would comply with that word for word in the event they were sending the implementing message if it meant war with the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. They could be expected to send it that way.

Senator LUCAS. They did not do that, as far as you know?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot prove they did from my memory at the present time.

Senator LUCAS. Your memory up to this point, Captain, has been consistent on one thing, and that is that you saw these three words, or these three phrases, in the middle of the [10323] message. That is correct, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. And immediately adjacent to each other.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. But you have never testified that you saw these three phrases at the end of the message, on this teletype message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. And you never testified at any time that when Kramer talked with you about it and you read this message over, as you just told me you did, and understood it, you never testified that each sentence was repeated twice on this teletype message?

Captain SAFFORD. I have never testified that.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. And the reason that you have not, is because you only saw, as I understand it, these three phrases in the middle of the message?

Captain SAFFORD. The reason I did not is because it did not stick out in my memory or did not strike me as particularly important, so it would be something that would stay in my memory.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, you could not say that this would not be important, could you? Here you are looking now for the implementing message, and you know exactly what this circular says that the Jap Government has to do in order to make this a really genuine implementing message.

[10324] In other words, they use these phrases in the middle, they use them at the end, and they repeat the sentence twice. Here is a serious situation. Here is Japan getting ready to go to war with the United States upon this kind of an implementing message, and certainly it must have been important to you or you would not be before this hearing now.

Captain SAFFORD. The significant part of the winds message; that is, the code words comprising the winds message, in this broadcast were underscored and Kramer and I at that time were both thoroughly sure that this was the genuine execute of the winds message.

Senator LUCAS. Well, Captain, how could you be? How could you and Kramer be certain of that, if you believed that the Japanese were going to follow out what they said in Circular 2353?

Captain SAFFORD. Because I, at least, considered that the repetition at the end, either in the case of this message or the other message, was just as a safe precaution to insure that the highly important words were received in case there was difficulty in receiving at the time.

Senator LUCAS. When did you think about that?

Captain SAFFORD. At the time.

Senator LUCAS. I see. In other words, you did not think that it was important to have these three phrases at [10325] the end, or that they be repeated twice. You thought any place that you saw them, either in the center of the message or at the end of the message was sufficient to tell you that there was war with the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. It was where the words appeared together in a contradictory sense and making no possible weather forecast, but in the middle of the Japanese language short wave news broadcast as set out herein. That was the all-important thing.

Senator LUCAS. You can reach that conclusion, Captain, but as one member of the committee, where a nation is sending out an implementing message of this kind which means war, it seems to me, in order that they might notify their nationals, without any question they would follow that message to the letter. They had some reason to send this type of a message in the beginning. It was either the making or breaking of Japan, that is how important it was. And you, 2 years later, Captain, were still thinking about the mixed message that came in at that time when you wrote to Kramer.

Captain SAFFORD. What I meant by "mixture" was what we considered the voice form being sent in Morse code. That was the only mixture I had reference to.

Senator LUCAS. "The warning was not sent in the manner [10326] prescribed by 72 or 73." That is what we are talking about right here, 72 and 73, these two circulars, and you did state, "It was not sent in the manner prescribed by 72 or 73 but was a mixture." That is what you are talking about.

Captain SAFFORD. That was a very vague statement given to Kramer.

Senator LUCAS. Very vague, but it becomes a very important statement, as far as the Senator from Illinois is concerned, because we are right down now, as I see it, to the real point and real meat of the whole situation as far as this winds message is concerned.

Captain SAFFORD, this may be repetition and, Mr. Chairman, you will pardon me if I deal with it just a little.

On December 7, 1941, what was your exact position in the Navy at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. I was the head of the Communications Security Section and Communications Division of the Office of Naval Operations.

Senator LUCAS. You were at the head of it at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. I was at the head of it.

Senator LUCAS. What was your rank at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. I was Commander.

Senator LUCAS. And since that time you have been promoted?

[10327] Captain SAFFORD. I was promoted to Captain on the 1st of January 1942.

Senator LUCAS. 1942 in January. All right. Now who were your superiors on December 7, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. 1941.

Senator LUCAS. I mean 1941.

Captain SAFFORD. Capt. Joseph R. Redman was Assistant to the Director of Naval Communications; Admiral Noyes was Director of

Naval Communications, and then over them came Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator LUCAS. Redman and Noyes were your two immediate superiors?

Captain SAFFORD. Two immediate superiors.

Senator LUCAS. What happened to Redman after December 7, 1941? Was he promoted?

Captain SAFFORD. He was promoted subsequently to rear admiral, and has recently retired.

Senator LUCAS. Recently retired. What happened to Noyes?

Captain SAFFORD. He went to sea in the middle of February about February 15, 1942.

Senator LUCAS. Was he promoted, too?

Captain SAFFORD. He was not promoted. He was already [10328] rear admiral and later he had a carrier task force in the Pacific Ocean.

Senator LUCAS. You had been in this department since what year?

Captain SAFFORD. Since 1936.

Senator LUCAS. You had been at the head of this communications department?

Captain SAFFORD. In this position.

Senator LUCAS. When did Redman come in?

Captain SAFFORD. His last tour of duty as Assistant Director of Naval Communications, he came about January 1941.

Senator LUCAS. January 1941. And when did Admiral Noyes come in?

Captain SAFFORD. I think that Admiral Noyes came there about September or August of 1939.

Senator LUCAS. August 1939?

Captain SAFFORD. That is as I remember it.

Senator LUCAS. In that same position?

Captain SAFFORD. In that same position.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, were you on friendly terms with Redman?

Captain SAFFORD. Reasonably; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How is that?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[10329] Senator LUCAS. Did you ever have any trouble with Redman at all?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. At no time?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever have any trouble with Noyes at any time?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have any feeling against either one of those officers?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. None whatever?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Your department was split up? I think you told that to Senator Ferguson yesterday.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Did you lose any authority or power as the result of splitting up that department?

Captain SAFFORD. Why, yes; I lost authority over the intelligence portion of it.

Senator LUCAS. When was that?

Captain SAFFORD. That took place in a reorganization within the Navy Department which was effected the same day that Admiral Noyes left the department.

[10330] Senator LUCAS. What date was that?

Captain SAFFORD. That was about the 15th of February, 1942.

Senator LUCAS. February 15, 1942?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes. May I add, Senator, for the record, that about a month before that Admiral Noyes called me up and notified me of the prospective change, and Admiral Noyes said he thought the job was too much for one man to handle, and I told him I thought I needed rest personally at that time.

Senator LUCAS. That is when they split the Division?

Captain SAFFORD. That is when they split the department.

Senator LUCAS. You said yesterday that you went to New York and talked to Admiral Kimmel some time in 1945, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; 1944.

Senator LUCAS. 1944. And you also said you talked to his attorney, Mr. Rugg?

Captain SAFFORD. Not at that time.

Senator LUCAS. When did you talk to Rugg?

Captain SAFFORD. Not until after I had testified before both the Hart investigation and Navy investigation.

Senator LUCAS. Did you look him up or did he seek you? I am referring to the attorney, Rugg.

[10331] Captain SAFFORD. I don't remember. I think that he asked me to see him when he came to Washington in connection with something to do with any further investigation.

Senator LUCAS. What date do you say that was?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall.

Senator LUCAS. Well, give us your best judgment, Captain. Was it 1944, 1945, or 1946?

Captain SAFFORD. I would say it was about the time of the Hewitt investigation.

[10332] Senator LUCAS. What date was that? I don't remember when the Hewitt investigation was.

Captain SAFFORD. I think that was in—

Mr. MURPHY. 1945.

Captain SAFFORD. About July 1945 or thereabouts.

Mr. MURPHY. It started on the 14th of May and ended on the 12th of July.

Senator LUCAS. What year?

Mr. MURPHY. 1945.

Senator LUCAS. Did you talk to Mr. Rugg more than once?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That can't be so. It must be in 1944.

Mr. MURPHY. It says 1945.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Isn't it the Navy investigation you are talking about?

Mr. MURPHY. No; the Hewitt investigation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes; that is 1945.

Senator LUCAS. Did you talk to Mr. Rugg more than once about this matter?

Captain SAFFORD. Oh, I talked to him a half dozen times altogether.

Senator LUCAS. Did you talk to him about the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. I have talked about the winds execute message.

[10333] Senator LUCAS. Well, that winds execute message was magic, was it not?

Mr. KEEFE. What is that question; I did not get it?

Senator LUCAS. Was magic?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering when it was you borrowed the entire file on magic.

Captain SAFFORD. I did not borrow the entire file. I only borrowed a portion of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you borrowed some magic, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you took it with you. Where did you take it?

Captain SAFFORD. It never left my office.

Mr. MURPHY. You borrowed it from whoever had it in the safe; they turned the file on magic over to you, didn't they—some magic?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Quite a lot of it, wasn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you show anybody that magic then?

[10334] Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Senator LUCAS. Well, when you were talking to Attorney Rugg about the implementing winds message, Admiral Kimmel was not charged with anything at that time, was he?

Captain SAFFORD. No; except by the Roberts Commission.

Senator LUCAS. Now the Roberts Commission found him guilty of some negligence, as I recall, but he was under no trial; he was not up for court martial or trial, or anything of that kind at that time, was he?

Captain SAFFORD. Only investigation.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Notwithstanding that, Captain, you gave to his attorney all you knew about the winds message, which was supposed to be highly confidential at a time when we were in war, is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. His attorney had already had all of this information given in the testimony in the Navy court of inquiry.

Senator LUCAS. Well, he had gotten that testimony, you say, in the Navy inquiry?

Captain SAFFORD. He was present as Admiral Kimmel's counsel in the Navy court of inquiry, and he had all of that.

Senator LUCAS. And you testified there?

[10335] Captain SAFFORD. I testified there.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did you see Rugg, or Kimmel before the Navy court of inquiry at any time?

Captain SAFFORD. I saw Admiral Kimmel once, as I have testified, on the 21st of February 1944.

Senator LUCAS. Did you talk to any other public official or lawyer, or anyone else, aside from your immediate family, about the winds execute message?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; and my own immediate family never heard about the winds execute message until they saw it in the newspapers.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

Now, your acquaintance with Admiral Kimmel was very slight?

Captain SAFFORD. Very slight.

Senator LUCAS. You never visited him at any time in his home?

Captain SAFFORD. I never visited him at any time.

Senator LUCAS. Never served under his command at any place?

Captain SAFFORD. Not directly, at all.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever talk to any newspapermen or magazine writers about this?

Captain SAFFORD. No.

[10336] Senator LUCAS. Now, when you started to prepare the secret paper covering events which took place early in December 1941, as outlined in your statement to Kramer, those secret papers in reality were dealing with the defense of Kimmel at that time, were they not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The answer was "yes, sir"?

Captain SAFFORD. The answer was "yes, sir."

Senator LUCAS. And in your second letter to Kramer, you went into great detail and elaborated considerably upon what you thought ought to be done in his behalf?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. For instance, on page 9931 of the transcript of yesterday, you stated:

Tell #42 that I knew #31 was a scapegoat from the start.

Now, #42 was Kimmel, was it?

The CHAIRMAN. #42 was Halsey.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Tell Halsey that I knew #31 was a scapegoat from the start, but I did not suspect that he was victim of a frame-up until about #114 (plus 2 years)—and that would be November 15, 1943.

So on November 15, 1943, from the information you received you made up your mind that there was something [10337] wrong?

Captain SAFFORD. I began to—not know, but suspect. I had no suspicions up until that time.

Senator LUCAS. On November 15, 1943, you state here in this letter, "I did not suspect that he was victim of a frame-up until November 15, 1943."

Then it was following that that you wrote the first letter to Kramer in December of that same year, and you said you could not confirm this until December 2, 1943, and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1944.

Captain, the defense of Admiral Kimmel by yourself rather puzzled me.

I have gone over these letters. I have listened to your testimony. I have observed how much time the preparation must have taken,

even to get out this letter that you wrote to Kramer in January 1944, with an air mail code for personal correspondence, with numbers from 1 to 138, inclusive.

In that code, you set up a number for the Roberts report, a number for Admiral Hart, a number for the Roberts Commission, a number for Justice Roberts, a number for Roosevelt, a number for Hull, a number for Stark, McCoy, General McNarney, Admiral Halsey, the White House [10338] aides and then numbers for the various important messages, numbers for Washington, Guadalcanal, Corregidor, Singapore, Kurusu, Nomura, General Umedzu—what would he know about the Pearl Harbor business, General Umedzu in Hsin-kiang?

Captain SAFFORD. He sent some very important messages early in November which were given to Mr. Kurusu, the Japanese delegate who was on his way here.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in the case of practically every one of these code numbers you had a particular reason for giving it, or otherwise you would not give it. You had a particular reason for giving it to Kramer or otherwise you would not give it to him?

Captain SAFFORD. Or the possibility it might be used.

Senator LUCAS. No. 109, "The Son of Heaven." What did you have in mind about "The Son of Heaven"?

Captain SAFFORD. Nothing at that time. He was just the Emperor and he might come in, I did not know.

Senator LUCAS. I see. You might have had to use him before you got through with the defense of Kimmel, is that it?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know.

Senator LUCAS. Well, of course, you knew, Captain, when you were sending this code to Kramer that you were [10339] doing something that was wrong, and were violating naval regulations; did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I cannot understand, Captain Safford, how a man who is as intelligent as you are, and who is such a brilliant officer as you have appeared before this committee, would take a chance on the violation of naval regulations in order to help a man that you never saw to know intimately, in order to help Admiral Kimmel, an individual whom you never served under, that you slightly knew, but you did all of this taking a chance of ruining your own career to help a man that you hardly knew.

Can you explain that to me?

Captain SAFFORD. Mr. Lucas, I had been very bitter against Admiral Kimmel.

Senator LUCAS. You had been what?

Captain SAFFORD. Very bitter.

Senator LUCAS. Very bitter?

Captain SAFFORD. Very bitter.

Senator LUCAS. Against Admiral Kimmel?

Captain SAFFORD. Against Admiral Kimmel up to that time. I had not indulged in spreading gossip about him, but my experience about him, when it happened to come up to my immediate friends had not been at all complimentary [10340] to the admiral.

This was true particularly in the case of Captain Welker who had served——

Senator LUCAS. I did not quite get that.

Captain SAFFORD. We had many discussions about the Pearl Harbor case with Captain Welker, who had served in Admiral Kimmel's staff, and he considered him a very, very capable and outstanding officer, and when I discovered what had happened, or what I thought had happened, I thought I had to do something to make amends.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if I understand your answer correctly, then, you, in the first instance, became very bitter at Admiral Kimmel as the result of what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you did not hesitate to comment to your friends about that situation?

Captain SAFFORD. When it came up.

Senator LUCAS. And then, as time went on, you felt that you had done Admiral Kimmel an injustice?

Captain SAFFORD. I thought that this warning message which I have described, which I saw on the 4th of December, had gone out, and I could not understand how anybody, with the receipt of that information, could not have been completely [10341] ready for the attack on Pearl Harbor, in fact with his fleet at sea, and Pearl Harbor just an empty nest.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

So your bitterness toward Kimmel after you learned the facts changed to bitterness toward the men here in the Navy Department whom you thought in error?

Captain SAFFORD. Bitterness to them and to myself.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

You were a little bitter at yourself then as the result of this whole transaction?

Captain SAFFORD. I was.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is certainly most unfortunate, Captain; I will say that.

Well, now, of course, in your defense of Admiral Halsey as the result of your change of front against him——

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel.

Senator LUCAS. I mean Admiral Kimmel, as the result of your change of front, you then felt it your duty to go all out and do everything you could for him?

Captain SAFFORD. I did.

Senator LUCAS. And in so doing you realized that Captain Kramer was probably the most valuable man you could get on your team in the defense of Kimmel?

[10342] Captain SAFFORD. Yes; that is, if Kramer was so disposed.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. But Kramer was the most valuable man in the whole United States that knew anything about these transactions that would be in a position to help you in your desire to right the wrong that you felt at least that you had done to Kimmel?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Kimmel, of course, did not know anything about this purported wrong that you had done to him up to that time, did he?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was just within yourself?

Captain SAFFORD. That was within myself.

Senator LUCAS. Now, if Kramer had answered your second letter wherein you used this code against Navy regulations, Kramer would have been in the same position as you are with respect to the violation of Navy regulations; would he not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, Kramer would have had to have gone along with you on all of your testimony in connection with this hearing, if you fellows had had this secret code between you, and both of you knowing that you [10343] were violating Navy regulations to the extent that you might be court-martialed for it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. Kramer used better judgment on that occasion than I did.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. The point I am making is, though, if Kramer had answered this important second letter that you wrote, then Kramer would have been just as guilty of violating regulations as you, and you and Kramer, in defense of yourselves, would have had to have stuck together, and this second letter that I am reading from, and the first letter you wrote to Kramer, would have never been before this committee?

That is probably true, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. So, if Kramer had answered the letter you had him in your lap to the extent he would have had pretty clearly to have gone along with you?

Captain SAFFORD. Mr. Lucas, no such thought was in my mind.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that. I don't charge you with anything against Kramer, but as the result of circumstances, Kramer would have been compelled to go along with you had he answered these queries, and he would have been in the same boat that you are in, as far as the code [10344] is concerned. Isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer has always been a free agent, as far as I am concerned.

Senator LUCAS. How is that?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer has always been a free agent, as far as I am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. He said Kramer had always been a free agent, as far as he was concerned.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. He has always been a free agent, but he took care of himself in failing to answer the second letter, or he would not be a free agent in this case, but right before this committee, and it would have been a difficult story to break down with you and Kramer both sticking to it.

I do not want to infer that you haven't given us probably your best understanding of this whole transaction, but there is a lot of testimony here against you on this winds message, and if Captain Kramer had been with you on this completely from beginning to end—which

he would have had to have done, if he had answered the second letter—this committee would have had a pretty difficult time making any determination upon that question.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUCAS. I will withdraw it, if the Senator [10345] objects to it. Please don't take it, you men, for the newspapers. I will withdraw the whole thing. I do not want to get into any argument with the Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. I quite appreciate your request to the newspapers, but I am afraid it will be difficult for them to completely disregard it.

I think any suggestion that you have been very fair to Captain Safford in implying any plot on his part—you did use the word "net" which I believe you agree was perhaps unfortunate—that he was laying a net for Captain Kramer and also the fact if Kramer had responded to his letter, then Captain Safford would have had him at his mercy, certainly those things imply that Captain Safford was plotting in this situation, and I understand you do not mean any such insinuation.

If Captain Kramer had innocently and not evilly answered Captain Safford, that would not imply anything at all, that Captain Safford would have blackmailed Captain Kramer, or that Captain Kramer would have yielded to Captain Safford.

I think all of those implications are unwarranted and unfair.

Senator LUCAS. I did not yield to the Senator from Maine.

[Applause.]

[10346] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair desires to say to the guests that this is not a political convention, and any further outbreaks in the midst of this testimony will be dealt with accordingly, no matter in whose behalf they are or in response to whose questions.

I hope the audience, who are guests of this committee, will keep that in mind.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, do I understand when the witness has completed his testimony, it is permissible for the audience to express themselves as they have on every previous occasion?

I simply want to be clear about that.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has made no objection to demonstrations on the part of the audience when the witness has concluded his testimony.

That was true in regard to Secretary Hull, General Marshall, and the others, but the audience has repeatedly broken into the testimony of the present witness to make demonstrations.

If they want to applaud when he finishes, that is their business.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to whether or not these remarks of Senator Lucas are still in this record?

[10347] Senator LUCAS. You can leave them on or take them off, it does not make any difference to me. I was trying to accommodate the Senator from Maine. It does not make any difference to me, and the remarks can stay on the record. I will not take them off as the result of that last query.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed with the examination of the witness.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, as far as my attempting to lay a net around the captain is concerned, I will leave that to the committee to test it from his own testimony.

I do not take back anything I said. What I do say with respect to the second letter that the captain wrote, if Captain Kramer had been foolish enough to answer that letter, and it had become known to the public, Captain Kramer would have been in the same position as Captain Safford, and certainly Captain Safford was the moving spirit in this attempt to salve his conscience because he had done Admiral Kimmel what he thought was a wrong, and he went a long way, it seems to me.

If anybody wants to take exception to that remark, I will listen to it.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take any exception toward the remark of the gentleman from Illinois, [10348] but I do not want the record to show that the innuendos contained in this remark, or the previous remark, are to be intended as indicating the conclusions of the committee itself.

Senator LUCAS. I leave that to the gentleman from Wisconsin. He has his own opinions and they are pretty good. I appreciate that.

I like to hear him examine witnesses and I like to hear him in executive committee sessions. He is usually pretty sound.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "sound"?

Senator LUCAS. We won't go into that.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, if this hearing is going to get through by the 15th of February, I suggest that we go ahead with this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair make this observation: No member of the committee, nor is the committee itself, bound by any statements or innuendos that may be incorporated in the record by any other member of the committee.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. If that would be true the committee would have bound itself long ago.

Senator LUCAS. That is exactly what I was going to say. [10349] Mr. Chairman, as far as innuendos and implications are concerned, the Senator from Maine has made implications of that kind to the press, and on the floor of the Senate, long before the case started.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us get on with this witness. The Chair would like to express the hope that we finish with him by the 15th of February, even if we do not finish with the whole testimony.

[10350] Senator LUCAS. I won't detain these boys very long, Mr. Chairman. It usually hurts a little when you make a point or two against somebody.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not recognize the Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. It depends on whether you can give it or take it.

Senator LUCAS. I can do both.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes nobody else except the Senator from Illinois. Let him proceed.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all. I think it is a good place to quit, right here.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, this letter which you sent to Captain Kramer and the secret code which you sent to him, by what means of transportation was that conveyed?

Captain SAFFORD. They were sent by air mail on different days, I think about a week apart, so that in case anything miscarried on one it would not miscarry on the other. The main purpose of the code was to cover this letter.

Mr. MURPHY. It was sent to Hawaii, was it not? Was that [10351] where the captain was at the time?

Captain SAFFORD. Wherever the captain was. I think he was still in Hawaii; I don't think he left for his new assignment.

Mr. MURPHY. Assuming a Japanese spy were to get your letter and read it, would it not be quite apparent to them that we had broken their code? You talk about the winds intercept and the false weather broadcast, and every Japanese agent in the world, as I understand it, had been notified to be on the lookout, and at least all stations on our side were on the lookout for it? Is it not true that any Japanese spy, or any Japanese national, or anyone friendly to Japan, if they intercepted your letter, which was sent air mail, would have known that we had broken the Japanese code?

I am referring particularly, Captain, to the part where you talk about the false weather broadcast, and what time we received it, and the part I read here the other day.

Would not any person who could understand the English language and who knew anything about the Japanese situation know that we had broken their code if they got your letter?

Captain SAFFORD. Not anybody who would pick up the letter. If it got back to Tokyo and was studied carefully they might reach that conclusion.

Mr. MURPHY. After we had taken the precaution to lock these papers in safes so that only six or seven persons in [10352] the naval branch and six or seven persons in the military branch or the Army branch could get them, you did, by air mail, send from America to Hawaii what, if intercepted by the Japanese, would have shown we broke their code, did you not?

Let me make it quite positive to you.

Captain SAFFORD. You are correct.

[10353] Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I would like to talk a little bit about national security.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I—

Mr. MURPHY. I do not yield.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you allow me to just say this: As I understand it, this is the second round?

Mr. MURPHY. I do not yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might say that during the first round the Senator from Maine was absent. We are now on the second round.

Senator BREWSTER. I heard Mr. Keefe finish. At that time I didn't realize that we were going to start over again. I have just one question that I wish to ask. I do feel that I have certain rights.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to observe all rights.

When we had finished yesterday, the Chair asked if there were any further questions. The Senator from Illinois, Mr. Lucas, and the Congressman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy, asked for recognition simultaneously, and the Chair recognized the Senator from

Illinois, Mr. Lucas, and felt that under the circumstances that he should recognize Mr. Murphy when Senator Lucas had finished, as a matter of courtesy.

The Chair did not understand that the Senator from Maine was seeking recognition.

[10354] Senator BREWSTER. I was. I was a little more remote. I didn't realize just what the procedure was.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's rights will be protected in the matter.

Senator BREWSTER. I have to go to a conference at 11:30. There is only one question that I have, and I am sure it will not take more than a minute.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot compel a member to yield to another. It looks as though the witness will be on the stand most of the day and the Senator from Maine will be recognized.

Senator BREWSTER. I shall be back as quickly as I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Proceed.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, as I understand it from your statement, you said the Army did not know where you were intercepting, and you did not know where the Army was intercepting, for this all-important message?

Captain SAFFORD. I said that there had been a conference, according to my recollection, between Captain Welker and Colonel Schukraft about it on the afternoon of November 28, 1941, and that that conference was held before we sent out our own instructions.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you, or did you not, know where [10355] the Army was attempting to intercept?

Captain SAFFORD. I did at the time, definitely.

Mr. MURPHY. You did?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't it the fact that you said in this hearing that you never heard of the FCC intercepts until this hearing, or until later?

What is your testimony on that?

Captain SAFFORD. I said that this specific FCC intercept which had been forwarded, I had never heard of except those specific intercepts.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you any knowledge of any intercepts by the Army in regard to the winds message, or the hidden word message?

Captain SAFFORD. The Army had sent us over no information at all as to anything coming in.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, then, you, as head of Communications up to December 7, had no word from the Army as to whether they intercepted or not anything through the medium of FCC; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I checked with them daily and they checked with us to see if it had come in, and the answer from the Army was always negative.

Mr. MURPHY. And did you check on the 5th and 6th and [10356] the 7th of December?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not check after we got it.

Mr. MURPHY. You stopped checking on what day?

Captain SAFFORD. On the 4th.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I refer particularly to your statement at page 14, your own statement, where you say:

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the winds message to the War Department.

What was the source of the information on that item?

Captain SAFFORD. It was just an impression that I had.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you are now stating categorically under oath something as being true—it is your recollection, at any rate?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And it is only based on an impression?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you say that your impression is that there was a call to the six receivers of the magic in the Navy and to the President. That is based on an impression?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And "for that reason no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the winds message was made in the Navy Department."

[10357] Then you say:

The 6 or 7 copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible.

What is the source of your information on that?

Captain SAFFORD. Just my recollection that it had been done.

Mr. MURPHY. Can you give us any idea who did it? What is it based on?

Captain SAFFORD. We had an arrangement whereby anything of routine importance was exchanged about twice a day with the Army and anything of special importance was sent over immediately. We took a division of responsibility on that and when anything came up, the watch officer would lift up his phone which had a trunk line to the other department, and they would call for a message or send it over themselves, according to whose turn it was.

Mr. MURPHY. Then this statement, which is a categorical statement, "The six or seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible," you don't know whether they were or not but you assume they were because they ordinarily were?

Captain SAFFORD. We had the facilities for doing it, and it was my impression throughout the time that that was done.

[10358] Mr. MURPHY. Well, before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, you said that if Colonel Bratton were called that he would corroborate you, and on page 7 of the top-secret report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board they say Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in relations shown by the winds message prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G-2 received any such information.

Did you know that?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know that at the time I made that statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you said that he would support you and here is his statement, and you say here that six copies were sent over to the Army and Colonel Bratton was the one to deliver them.

Do you still say there were six copies sent over to the Army, or do you know?

Captain SAFFORD. I still think there were.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, on what basis? I mean, do you know, or does anybody know? Can you help us?

Captain SAFFORD. I can't give you any more than what I have said.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have any personal knowledge on the matter? [10359] Captain SAFFORD. I have no personal knowledge. I did not take them myself.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

The individual smooth translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with the standard operating procedure.

Do you know that? You state here categorically that it was done.

Captain SAFFORD. I saw one of them.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether this is true, what you say here, do you know that they were distributed, or is it just a hunch or an impression? Do you understand me?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. Specific definitions.

Mr. MURPHY. You say it was done. I mean, how do you know that? Who told you, or do you know anything about it?

Captain SAFFORD. I saw one of them in one of the books at the time that Kramer started his regular noon delivery, and I simply had to take it for granted that the same copy was in the other book.

Mr. MURPHY. You say you saw one in a book with Kramer and that is the basis then for your statement here that they were delivered?

Captain SAFFORD. The others were.

Mr. MURPHY. And that they were delivered to the White House, just because you saw one paper in a book? [10360]

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. When you saw that one in a book, how long was it, how long was this message that had the winds intercept in it that you speak about?

Captain SAFFORD. Just three lines.

Mr. MURPHY. Three lines.

I now refer you to your testimony before Admiral Hewitt. Before Admiral Hewitt, you said:

The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid when they tried to condense them someone would change the meaning.

How do you reconcile that with your saying it was only three lines?

Captain SAFFORD. Up until sometime in the fall, I can't say the exact date, the messages used to be paraphrased and cut down and then prefixed by a summary or evaluation of them. It wasn't given the literal translation of the Japanese message into English. At that time the President and Secretary Hull became of the opinion that the meaning might be altered in the evaluation or paraphrase, and that something important might be left out. So he requested that the original be sent over to him and that was done.

We never gave the original Japanese to the White House or these other people. It wouldn't do them any good. [10361]

Mr. MURPHY. But you said it was three lines, as I understand it, and I understood it was quite a lengthy message, something of about two or three hundred words. You said that, didn't you?

Captain SAFFORD. That was in Japanese.

Mr. MURPHY. You say here:

The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid when they tried to condense them someone would change the meaning.

You did so testify before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Can you reconcile that with your two or three lines?

Captain SAFFORD. The rest of that broadcast was ordinary Japanese that nobody had any interest in, and it was never translated. They only translated the three significant phrases which have been previously described.

Mr. MURPHY. You think the President was satisfied in not seeing the original message in this case, but only that which you thought was important?

Captain SAFFORD. I think he was perfectly satisfied.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I would like to review with you, sir, if you will go to page 5 of the exhibit on the [10362] winds code.

It is a little difficult to find. It is marked "Winds Code." "Material Relating to the Winds Code." It is marked, page 5.

I agree you will find it difficult to find.

Captain SAFFORD. I think I have it.

[10363] Mr. MURPHY. It has a list of pages under committee exhibit 1, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there have been placed in the record by that exhibit various page references which you see outlined, from 208 to 249.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to direct your attention to page 224 of exhibit 1.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 244, at the top of the page, I find:

From: Canton.

To: Tokyo.

December 2, 1941.

If hostilities are to begin we here are all prepared. The Army has completed all preparations to move immediately upon Thai. Should the British resist to the bitter end, it is understood that the Army is prepared to go so far as to militarily occupy the country.

Now, then, will you go to page 226, the middle of the page, from Tokyo to "Circular."

[10364] What would "Circular" mean?

Captain SAFFORD. That meant all their stations who received these circulars.

Mr. MURPHY. Don't you think that would include London?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; it would include London.

Mr. MURPHY. On December 3 here is a message then to London as well as all the other stations:

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE) (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.

By that Tokyo is asking them to keep the code in regard to broadcasts; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The next one, from Tokyo to Vancouver, on December 3, 1941:

Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment. If you have already destroyed them, advise and we will retransmit them.

I direct your attention to page 227:

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

[10365] 3 December 1941.

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

Now, will you go to page 233. This is on December 4, 1941, from Tokyo. In the first paragraph:

Until a state of war develops between Japan and the Netherlands, the Netherlands Government will be considered a quasi-enemy power.

Then beginning with paragraph 2:

In the event the Netherlands declares war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands.

That is sent on the same day, is it not, Captain, on the 4th, on the day on which you say they sent the winds execute?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, they say "In the event the Netherlands declares war", and you say on that very day Japan sent out word that they were declaring war on the Netherlands.

Captain SAFFORD. They were intending to or committed to.

[10366] Mr. MURPHY. They were what?

Captain SAFFORD. They were committed to the occupation or the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies.

Mr. MURPHY. Didn't you believe, when you got that, that that meant war within 2 or 3 days?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now, then, I read further:

In the event that a state of war exists between our country and the Netherlands before the Netherlands has actually made a declaration of war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands.

Now, go to page 234. This is on December 4 from Tokyo to Hsin-king. They say there:

On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon the steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my #873 our policy was changed as follows:

Then they commence the next paragraph:

When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate.

Now, then, on the same date, from Berlin to Tokyo, and this is on the day you say the winds execute was sent, from [10367] Berlin to Tokyo, December 4, 1941:

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have——

Then he refers to certain officials.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I ask, are you taking into consideration the difference in date?

Mr. MURPHY. No; I will come to that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. I am going to follow through.

Now, I come to December 5, and that would be the 4th in Washington, wouldn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. That would be the 4th in Washington.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. From Tokyo to Washington:

Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days.

Now, I come to page 236, December 5, from Washington to Tokyo, the second paragraph:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

I ask that that be stricken out because that is already referred to. It is 2361 in this schedule.

Now, I go to page 246, Captain. This is dated from [10368] Tokyo to Berlin, December 6, 1941. That would be December 5 in Tokyo, would it not?

Captain SAFFORD. December 5 our time.

Mr. MURPHY. In Tokyo.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 246, at the top of the page it says:

—and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia.

As I understand it, you say on the 4th the winds execute had already gone out, and on the 5th I find Tokyo saying that "in case we start our war with the United States" we will do so and so. Would that be consistent with the winds execute on the 4th?

Captain SAFFORD. It is not inconsistent.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Now, I come to page 247, the top of the page. I have had some trouble with this one. Maybe you can help me. It is from Tokyo to Bangkok, December 6, 1941:

The (——)

And they say in the footnote "proclamation or declaration."

The (——)° day (X° day) decided by the ——

Then referring down to the footnote:

[10369] "Ambassadorial" or "China".

—liaison conference on the 6th (?)° is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be given is the 7th (?) (Sunday). As soon as you have received this message, please reply to that effect.

What does that mean to you?

Captain SAFFORD. It means to me that on the 6th Tokyo time, which is the 5th Washington time, they sent a message to their Ambassador at Bangkok on the purple machine which Bangkok—I don't know

what system that was, whatever system it was—that X day would be the 8th Tokyo time or the 7th Washington time and we would have to infer what X day was, except by the time we had translated that, which was the 8th Washington time, we already knew that X day was the date of the outbreak of war, the Japanese attack.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate Tokyo is saying on the 6th that there was a meeting on the 6th, aren't they, and that is when they decided they will do certain things?

Captain SAFFORD. There was a question mark after that "6th."

Mr. MURPHY. I know. It says on the bottom, in the footnote, that they don't know what it means, it could be either the 6th or the word "November." If it read "November" it would read "liaison conference on the November." That wouldn't make much sense, would it?

[10370] Captain SAFFORD. I believe there is other testimony, maybe it is not submitted in evidence in this investigation, that the Japs made up their mind in late November and that the Imperial rescript was actually signed on the first day of December, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you think that is a wrong translation then by the Navy, do you, the 6th?

Captain SAFFORD. That was an Army translation and the 6th apparently is inconsistent with what we have learned long afterward.

Mr. MURPHY. You think the Army is wrong in the translation, the 6th?

Captain SAFFORD. They knew it wasn't a good translation themselves, they called our attention to the thing.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. I come to page 251. I find:

From: Tokyo

To: (Circular telegram)

7 December 1941

(Plain Japanese language using code names)

Circular #2494.

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

What particular code was used there? Was that the hidden word?

[10371] Captain SAFFORD. That was the hidden word code.

Mr. MURPHY. I go back with you to page 226. You say they used the hidden word code on 251 and on page 226 they tell London to keep that so they will be able to get a hidden word code, don't they?

Captain SAFFORD. London could not have read this Tokyo circular 2461 because it had received orders 2 days earlier to destroy the purple machine.

Mr. MURPHY. I thought you told me before that Tokyo circular said that it was sent to London, just a few minutes ago?

Captain SAFFORD. London would be included in the list of addressees, but London couldn't read it. London had no machine to decode it with.

Mr. MURPHY. How about Vancouver?

Captain SAFFORD. Vancouver never read that message.

Mr. MURPHY. Vancouver couldn't read it?

Captain SAFFORD. No; never had the purple machine.

Mr. MURPHY. Referring to page 226, why are they sending the message to Vancouver?

Captain SAFFORD. I beg your pardon.

Mr. MURPHY. There is a message right there to Vancouver,

Captain SAFFORD. I presume Vancouver had sent them some message of which we know nothing asking for instructions.

[10372] Mr. MURPHY. Vancouver is told:

Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They had something that they could read.

Captain SAFFORD. That was sent in another system. That was not sent in the same system in which they talked to Washington and London.

Mr. MURPHY. Where do you have evidence that London destroyed the system that Vancouver had, what evidence do you have of that, that London didn't have what Vancouver had. Will you point to anything in the record that indicates that, except your inference?

Captain SAFFORD. That will take a little time.

Mr. MURPHY. What basis is there to show you that London did not have such a machine as Vancouver had, when they are telling everybody else, you say they told the whole circular, and you said first it was sent to London, and they say:

If by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify of this fact immediately.

At that time all kinds of communications were open to London, weren't they? I mean normal communications, peacetime communications?

[10373] Captain SAFFORD. The circuits were, yes, sir; the regular circuits.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. They could have gotten London by commercial telegraph if they wanted to, couldn't they?

Captain SAFFORD. They could have.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I interrupt?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Maybe it will help. Look at page 209 and see whether the second and third messages, Circulars 2443 and 2444, won't help you any.

Mr. MURPHY. 209. It says the four offices have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them.

Would that be the answer to the question?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the answer to the question, and also the next message.

Mr. MURPHY. The next one, December 1, 1941:

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

Is that the part you are looking for?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I thought you said they didn't have a purple machine at Vancouver but another means to get the purple machine broadcasts. What is there that helps your [10374] situation?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't understand.

Mr. MURPHY. I am saying this: On page 226 they say:

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE) (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment—

As I understand it you say the winds intercept—that that came over a broadcast?

Captain SAFFORD. Over a radio broadcast, correct.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking about the hidden-word code which they had. You know what the hidden-word code was?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. That has been introduced.

Mr. MURPHY. There they say:

Please keep the code list (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.

You say that was sent to London; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't know that that was sent to London.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now, I show you the original photostat of this particular one to show that that was sent in PA-K2. Did London have facilities for PA-K2?

Captain SAFFORD. London, so far as we know, had facilities for PA-K2 at that particular time. Which message [10375] is that, may I ask?

Mr. MURPHY. All right. I show you—

Captain SAFFORD. Which message is that?

Mr. MURPHY. I am speaking of the one on page 226.

Captain SAFFORD. Page 226.

Mr. MURPHY. About the radio broadcasts. I am going to show you the photostatic copy of the message on page 226.

[10376] Will you take it, Captain, please?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The message from Tokyo to circular. That was sent, was it not, by PA-K2?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the message to Vancouver on December 3 was sent by PA-K2, was it not? It is the following page, I think, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. That was sent in the same system, PA-K2.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. That did not show in exhibit 1 and I had no way of estimating what system had been used.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand, Captain, the reason why the code designations were not all in the papers in Exhibit 1 was they were all left out of the exhibit at the time it was printed.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Captain SAFFORD. None of them are in there.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, isn't it fair then to say, Captain, from that that you have no information whatsoever and never did have that the London facilities for receiving PA-K2 were ever destroyed?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no direct information at all [10377] concerning the destruction of PA-K2 at London.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, so far as you know you don't know whether London had them or did not have them?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know. London did have them but I do not know on what date London destroyed them.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. But you have no message before you that would show any direction to London to destroy the PA-K2 facilities, do you?

Captain SAFFORD. To the best of my knowledge there is nothing in exhibit 1 or anywhere else which directed London to destroy PA-K2.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now, then, these two messages that are set up on page 226, where they are both asked to retain the material in connection with radio broadcasts and in the Vancouver message to retain the hidden-meaning codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment, you do not know—I withdraw that.

These two messages that are here, which refer to radio broadcasts—they refer to radio broadcasts and to the hidden meaning words, do they not, or the hidden meaning message?

Captain SAFFORD. They referred to the codes to be used by radio broadcasts, which refers to the codes which are set up on page 154 and 155 of Exhibit No. 1.

Mr. MURPHY. 154 and 155 are the hidden-meaning words?

[10378] Captain SAFFORD. No; they are the codes to be used in radio broadcasts and it so specifies.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, on page 251, then, there is a broadcast to England—a broadcast to circular telegram, Tokyo to circular telegram:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations—isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, does that change your statement any where you say that London could not have received any message from Tokyo and, therefore, that is the only one they were directing this winds intercept to? For instance, in your statement, your prepared statement for this committee, you say that the only place they were directing this message to on the 4th was London, because London's facilities had already been destroyed. Isn't that what you said?

Captain SAFFORD. That London's facilities had been destroyed.

Mr. MURPHY. Had been destroyed and that, therefore, they were doing that in that manner to get word to London and they did not care about any other destination, isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, isn't it a fact from these telegrams [10379] here, isn't it obvious that London still had PA-K2 up to the end and could have received the message directed to London on the 7th?

Captain SAFFORD. I would like to correct that, what I said.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you get at exactly what you are going to correct?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. What page?

Captain SAFFORD. I just want—

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, I just want the reference to the part you want corrected.

Captain SAFFORD. Which page is that, please?

Mr. MURPHY. The part about London?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I will get it for you. It is on page 11. On page 11 you say:

It was sent on the so-called "European Schedule" of Tokyo's big foreign broadcasting station "J-A-P" and was intended for London. We knew that the Japanese Ambassador in London had destroyed his secret codes three days

previously; this was the only way that Tokyo could get news to him secretly. Reception or nonreception at other points was irrelevant.

[10380] Now, what do you want to change there?

Captain SAFFORD. I will have to correct that to read:

This was the only way other than the so-called hidden word code, which was another emergency system for transmitting information. We knew that Tokyo could get the news through secretly.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, does that change your statement considerably or not in view of the fact that you say it was only intended for London and now we have the situation where London could have, and the other one which would have told them that relations were strained or that war would break out or anything they wanted to tell them—wouldn't that change your statement considerably as to why it was being beamed only for London and as to all other places being irrelevant?

Captain SAFFORD. Not as to the rest of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I am sorry to take so much time, Captain, but you see the fact is that we have charges against the staff at the time war broke out and charges against the staff in 1944 and charges against Mr. Sonnett and charges against Secretary Knox and I now want to come to Secretary Forrestal and before I finish I would like to cover Admiral Hewitt.

What did you think of Admiral Hewitt? Was he honest?

Captain SAFFORD. He certainly was, and I so stated in [10381] writing.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Hewitt gave you a fair hearing; did he not?

Captain SAFFORD. He certainly did.

Mr. MURPHY. And you had an opportunity to say everything you wanted to say before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Hewitt found there was no winds execute; did he not?

Captain SAFFORD. He did later.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Captain SAFFORD. So it developed later.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, in his report he enters—and he starts at page 94 of the appendix which has been furnished to us and he speaks of the wind code and the alleged winds message. And then he reviews the investigation of the naval court of inquiry, he reviews the Army Pearl Harbor Board, he discusses the basis of the previous findings that there was a winds execute message prior to the attack. Then he goes on and discusses the evidence obtained in this investigation concerning the winds message, the testimony of Captain Safford, Captain Kramer, Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, Lieutenant Commander Linn, Lieutenant Commander Pering, Lieutenant Commander Murray, Lieutenant Freeman's testimony, Captain McCollum, [10382] Admiral Wilkinson, Captain Mason, Commander Fabian, Captain Layton and Captain Safford recalled, Mr. Friedman, Captain Rochefort and after hearing all of those witnesses he came to the conclusion that there was no winds intercept; did he not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Winds execute message. Now, have you any criticism of Admiral Hewitt?

Captain SAFFORD. None at all.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, Mr. Sonnett, whom you accused of doing things which you said were possibly illegal, was an officer designated by Secretary Forrestal to assist Admiral Hewitt in this investigation; was he not?

Captain SAFFORD. He was.

Mr. MURPHY. And as I understand it he told you that there was no previous intercept or execute; he told you that, did he not?

Captain SAFFORD. He told me that there was no evidence as to a previous execute.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. He also makes certain accusations about your physical condition which I do not care to discuss; did he not?

Captain SAFFORD. Thank you. No; he only suggested repeatedly that I had hallucinations and that I was out of step with the rest of the world.

[10383] Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate you felt then that he was deliberately trying to get you—or to commit what they call in the law subornation of perjury. He wanted you to lie, didn't he, instead of telling the truth?

Captain SAFFORD. He wanted me to testify that there had been no—or apparently—it was never outright—but the thought that he expressed was that I should change my testimony and wind the whole thing up.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you feel that he wanted you to tell other than what you felt was the truth; isn't that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the way I felt. That is the reason I wrote that statement out.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, one of the big papers of the country said yesterday that—

Captain Safford has testified in two investigations that the Navy intercepted the Japanese East wind-rain message which meant war with the United States, on December 4, 1941.

Now, then, they go on to say:

Although Sonnett was nominally the legal adviser to Admiral Hewitt, he ran Forrestal's investigation, incidentally, treating his superior, Admiral Hewitt, much as if he was an errand boy.

You would not join in that accusation, in an accusation of that kind, would you?

[10384] Captain SAFFORD. I never made any such statement.

Mr. MURPHY. No; I know you did not. I say one of the big papers in the country did. I am quoting now from an editorial of Tuesday, February 5, 1946, in the Chicago Herald-Tribune, but you never meant to go that far?

The CHAIRMAN. Not Herald. The Tribune.

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The Chicago Tribune.

Captain SAFFORD. May I state for the record again that every time that I had a conference with Lieutenant Commander Sonnet it was in Admiral Hewitt's absence and as I believed at the time that Admiral Hewitt was on his way to Washington and had not yet arrived.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate you feel that Admiral Hewitt conducted a fair investigation?

Captain SAFFORD. Absolutely, and I tried to emphasize that in my own words.

Mr. MURPHY. I know you did, Captain. I am just talking about the inferences that were drawn. I don't think you ever meant anything like that, did you? Certainly not.

Captain SAFFORD. Absolutely not.

Mr. MURPHY. No. I want to be fair with you about this. This is in one of the big papers of the country, I said.

Mr. KEEFE. Are we going to try all the newspapers too, [10385] before we get through?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not yield, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, please.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I would like to take one more part of your statement, Captain. You quote from the messages from the Dutch. Will you get that? It is on page 19. You quote the messages from the Dutch but you do not have all of it in there, do you, all of that dispatch?

Captain SAFFORD. I left out certain parts. I said, "From which I quote."

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let me show you what you left out. You say that this message from the Dutch had a great influence on you in deciding that it was war instead of rupture of relations; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now I direct your attention to page 1-d of the winds intercept exhibit. Do you have it?

Captain SAFFORD. I have got it.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it you were talking to Mr. Foote some time later than the date referred to in this exhibit.

Captain SAFFORD. I talked to him shortly before I was questioned by Admiral Hewitt. He was in Washington at the time. He went out to the Far East a little later.

[10386] Mr. MURPHY. You consider him a man of integrity?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I notice on the bottom of his message in regard to his statement which you say influenced you greatly in deciding that they meant war rather than a rupture of relations:

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

That is what Foote said of that message.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you take that into consideration when you were giving it its importance and that it varied the other three messages?

Captain SAFFORD. May I make myself very clear on that?

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. He regarded the whole thing as possibly a fake. What we were interested in, we had one translation from the British which varied somewhat with the current translation of the United States. The Dutch translation agreed with the British translation. It was just a question of translation of messages which we knew existed, not of whether the message itself was authentic or not.

[10387] Mr. MURPHY. Now, I have just one other thing and then I am through, Captain. Will you refer to the part of your testimony where you say you borrowed the files of the intercepts? That is not in the statement. Do you remember where you said that? You

did testify in one of the hearings that you borrowed a copy of the file which had the intercepts in it. Do you remember that?

Captain SAFFORD. That is substantially correct. I do not remember the exact words.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you tell us the circumstances under which you got this file of intercepts, why you got it and what you did with it?

Captain SAFFORD. I would like to have something more specific about that statement I made before I try to explain it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let me put it this way: It is a fact, sir, that you did borrow the intercepts from their proper place in the Navy Department; did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. I borrowed them on custody receipt. I looked through for the information I was looking for and I returned it.

Mr. MURPHY. Who did you borrow that from? That would be the file that would have 7001 in it, wouldn't it, this particular intercept if it existed?

Captain SAFFORD. It was borrowed for the specific purpose of looking through it. That refreshes my memory now as to the information you want. So that I could look through the file to see if by any chance that message had been misplaced and was in there later. [10388]

Mr. MURPHY. I understand, Captain, you looked through that one and then you looked at a file, a rather complete file of intercepts, ones you examined, not the one looking for a missing intercept. You looked at that one, you looked at that one personally, but you also had a file of papers that you borrowed, do you remember?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, what was that and why did you have it?

Captain SAFFORD. So as to refresh my memory on things which I had known of about previously and particularly to establish dates.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was it that let you have that file of intercepts?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you sure?

Captain SAFFORD. I am positive.

Mr. MURPHY. When did you get the file of the intercepts?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that I got that file of intercepts around October or September 1943. It was considerably [10389] in advance of November.

Mr. MURPHY. It was when you were shifted from the—

Captain SAFFORD. It was before. I was simply expecting that I would be a key witness, that I was in Washington available and—

Mr. MURPHY. Key witness for whom?

Captain SAFFORD. That I would be called by the Navy Department as a key witness to establish what had happened.

Mr. MURPHY. You were borrowing the file then at the time when you were going to be a prosecution witness?

Captain SAFFORD. I had not been so notified, but I was expecting to be.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you sure that is the reason?

Captain SAFFORD. I am positive.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will get to that testimony a little later. Now, then, one other question. You say that before you made this change of heart you had spread rumors about Admiral Kimmel. Is that true; what you said?

Captain SAFFORD. No; I had not spread rumors but——

Mr. MURPHY. What did you do?

Captain SAFFORD. Because that was what everybody was trying to spread.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, what did you do that you felt guilty about? You were told on December the 15th not to spread any [10390] rumors and apparently you obeyed the order; you said you did.

Captain SAFFORD. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. And then in the fall of that year you say your conscience is troubling you for what you did and you had to justify yourself. Now, what did you do that was wrong, if anything?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, later on whenever there was any discussion about the matter I was quite condemnatory in my attitude toward Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you know of any single thing you did you felt was wrong up to the time you took this change of heart? Why would you be blaming yourself? Did you do this in order to harm him in any way?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, I ran him down, if that is what you mean. I did not spread any rumors about what he had done, except I could not see how anybody that had the information he had could be caught the way the Pacific Fleet had been. That was the general gist.

Mr. MURPHY. The one thing that changed your mind then—and this is my last question—is the fact that we were supposed to have got the winds intercept which said:

War with England, including the Kra Peninsula and the Dutch N. E. I. and war with the United States—

the fact that we got that and we did not send a message on the 4th of December, is what changed [10391] your whole opinion; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. The fact that I had also seen the long warning message going out covering very completely Japan's preparations and intentions for war and coming with increasing tempo, that when Admiral Wilkinson left Admiral Noyes' office he made the definite statement to Admiral Noyes in my presence, and I heard it. He said:

I am going to send this message if I can get it released by the front office.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you based it on two things: One would be that there was a long warning going out written by McCollum that should have gone out in your judgment and did not; that is No. 1; right?

Captain SAFFORD. Right.

Mr. MURPHY. No. 2 is that nothing was done about that so-called winds intercept when it came in; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That is No. 2.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now, what could they have told Admiral Kimmel after receiving this winds intercept:

War with England, including the Dutch and the Kra Peninsula and war with the United States—

that he had not already been told?

Captain SAFFORD. The fact that war was so close.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he was told on the 27th that it was a war warning and then on the 3d there was a code message sent out about destruction of codes, code information, and [10392] then on the 4th you prepared a message for him—did you not—about codes at Guam?

Captain SAFFORD. May I refer to this, please?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. I am speaking about the one to Guam that you said you prepared, the message to Guam about the destruction of codes and papers. You did send that or you prepared it; did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. I prepared it.

Mr. MURPHY. And the purpose of that was to have them destroy the codes because you felt that war was coming on Saturday or Sunday; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. That war was coming on Saturday or Sunday.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Captain SAFFORD. The best estimate of the time I could give.

Mr. MURPHY. And the reason for that—the significance of that you would say was that anyone who received it would know that war was coming, wouldn't they, and would have time then to destroy their codes?

Captain SAFFORD. Not necessarily.

Mr. MURPHY. But code destruction is pretty strong evidence of war, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. It is a very strong way of hinting [10393] that war was about to break.

Mr. MURPHY. And Admiral Kimmel got the hint that you prepared, didn't he? He received that dispatch; he said he did.

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Kimmel got that hint.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain, you wrote a letter on the 22d of December 1943 to Kramer, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you used some code in it. You used initials and things as a code?

Captain SAFFORD. That was merely to disguise identities.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And Captain Kramer replied in code?

Captain SAFFORD. He replied going even more so, because he referred to the numbered paragraphs, and so forth, in the first letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what difference would it make, as Senator Lucas was trying to bring out, whether the answer was in code, whether he answered your next letter in code or not? He had already answered your letter in code.

Captain SAFFORD. He had already answered that. If [10394] Kramer would have answered, the reply would have meant nothing to anybody.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

Captain SAFFORD. If Kramer had answered my second letter and if it had gone astray, the answer would have meant nothing to anybody because it was all in code.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And there was the first letter that he answered, he answered that in code?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer's answer to that would have meant nothing to anybody.

Senator FERGUSON. So that if they are both in code it would have no difference?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what regulation did you have in the Navy that you could not write a letter from one man to another in the Navy in code?

Captain SAFFORD. There is no regulation as to that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Senator Lucas talking about with you about it being a crime for you to write these letters?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know of any specific regulation against it but I did not want to enter any categorical denials on something that I might be found wrong on.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you don't know that?

[10395] Captain SAFFORD. I don't know of anything that I violated.

Senator FERGUSON. But it would not make any difference whether he wrote to anybody in code or one or both of them in code; I don't know of any law or regulation that says you can do it once.

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you get instructions from—I will read you this from your answer. This is on page 10025 of the transcript:

Captain SAFFORD. That may have been an interpretation which I received in writing from Commander Baecher, who is here—or through Commander Baecher. It was not his signature.

Did you get instructions as to what you should testify to here, that is, regulating your testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have it?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I have. I will look.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you get it so that we can get it in evidence?

Captain SAFFORD. If I haven't it here I can get it [10396] during the noon hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you bring it in at 1:30 then?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to ask you another question. Did you know of anyone in the Navy who questioned the code message received on the 4th—as you say the 3d or the 4th, the so-called implementing code message, that it was not in the proper form?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; nobody questioned it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know why they would not keep what you saw even though it came in only repeated once or twice and was not in exact regulation?

Captain SAFFORD. No reason at all. They relied upon my professional experience and judgment and upon Kramer's professional experience and judgment, and if they had had any doubts they would have requested verification on the spot.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did anyone every question that what you saw was not in correct compliance with these two previous messages?

Captain SAFFORD. Never.

Mr. MURPHY. May I have that last question and answer read?
(Record read.)

Captain SAFFORD. May I say that—may I change that? [10397]
Not prior to this investigation.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment.

Mr. MURPHY. This is extremely important.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you understand my question?

Captain SAFFORD. Please ask it again then.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, I will put it in another form.

Did anyone question the fact that what you were talking about as an implementing message, that it was only repeated once and it was not at the end or that it did not comply with the previous message that had been sent out giving these code words?

Captain SAFFORD. Not prior to this investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you talk about "this investigation" you mean this congressional investigation?

Captain SAFFORD. This congressional investigation before which I now appear as a witness.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, is it true that the questionable or the doubtful message was the one in exhibit 1 on page 251 that some time later, in 1944, someone discovered that there was a word left out of that message, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations"; that the word "United States" was left out of that [10398] message in some way?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was that question raised or did you ever hear of it prior to 1944?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, one more line. On this Friedman message, this Friedman story; did you read the Clarke report?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir, I did not. I would like to have that, if it is going to be discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if we are going to discuss it very much we will have a recess.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I just wanted him to read it over the noon hour, I only have several questions on it, whether or not he ever denied that someone had told him that story.

Captain SAFFORD. I would like a chance to familiarize myself with this, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Captain SAFFORD. I would like to defer this until we meet again.

Senator FERGUSON. Until we meet again?

Captain SAFFORD. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, I have no objection but I don't want to keep you any longer than necessary, so will you [10399] read it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, I will.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:32 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[10400]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.
 Senator FERGUSON will resume his inquiry.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES
 NAVY—(Resumed)**

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Safford, were you able to get the memorandum that was given to you by the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; I have it here.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you let me see it, please?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

(A paper was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Senator FERGUSON. When was that given to you?

Captain SAFFORD. That was given to me in January shortly before I appeared as a witness here.

Senator FERGUSON. What was said when it was given to you?

Captain SAFFORD. It was explained that this was a duplicate of an earlier paper which had been furnished me on the 15th of December 1945, except they were adding excerpts on the flimsy copy from a memorandum by Admiral Edwards concerning the fact that our testimony could not [10401] cover cryptanalytic successes after Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether witnesses that were not in your department were given this same kind of a memorandum?

Captain SAFFORD. It is my understanding that all witnesses were given the same sort of memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether in your department or not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your understanding?

Captain SAFFORD. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not a similar paper was issued to any Army witnesses?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this be put in the record at this point. It explains his testimony yesterday.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator describe what it is?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. The first part reads:

Receipt of a pamphlet entitled "Presidential Directives for Witnesses Appearing Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack," containing CNO Memorandum Op211/Bbb Serial 226P21 dated 15 November 1945, and CNO Memorandum Op216/Hbb Serial 218P21 dated 5 November 1945, which quote the Presidential Memoranda dated 7 November [10402] 1945, 9 November 1945, 23 October 1945, and 28 August 1945, is acknowledged. Also of excerpts from a memorandum of Admiral R. S. Edwards.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Might I suggest for the record at this point that with the exception of a short memorandum from Edwards, all there is in this are the various announcements made by the President with reference to witnesses, so that there is nothing in this of any specific direction emanating from the Navy Department itself.

It consists of copies of directives received from the President which had been changed from time to time with reference to this committee, except there is in one place a memorandum from Edwards, in which

he deduces for some reason that witnesses shall not testify with reference to cryptographic successes subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. I could put those two in. I don't care to put the last part in.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me inquire, Mr. Masten can probably tell us, and I am sure the other counsel are familiar with it, too—

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think counsel knew of it before yesterday.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When the hearing began, Mr. Mitchell presented for the record all of these documents, didn't he? [10403]
Executive orders from the President, all those things?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but this first part is not in.

I will ask the witness to read the two parts up to the Presidential directives. One is dated the 13th of December 1945 and the other is without a date.

Then we will have the complete thing in the record. I think the record ought to show what the instructions to the witnesses were.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I will ask counsel to check the reading so that if the Captain begins to read—he is not familiar with our record in the beginning of this hearing—if he starts to read something that is already in the record, why, stop him.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think these two are in the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. (reading):

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D. C., 13 December 1945.

Memorandum.

To: Captain L. S. Safford, USN.

[10404] Subject: Pearl Harbor Congressional Investigation.

Refs:

(a) CNO Memorandum Op21B/1bb Serial 226P21 dated 15 November 1945.

(b) CNO Memorandum Op216/Hbb Serial 218P21 dated November 6 1945.

Encls:

(A) Copy of Reference (a).

(B) Copy of Reference (b).

(C) Copy of excerpt of Memo of Admiral Edwards.

1. Admiral Colclough wants to be sure that each witness, and each prospective witness, before the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor Attack, has a copy of the Presidential Directives concerning testimony before the Committee.

2. In order to comply with Admiral Colclough's desire, there is enclosed herewith for your retention a pamphlet entitled "Presidential Directives for Witnesses Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack", containing References (a) and (b), which quote the Presidential Memoranda dated 7 November 1945, 9 November 1945, 23 October 1945, and 28 August 1945, and also of excerpts from a memorandum of Admiral R. S. Edwards.

3. Please acknowledge receipt of this pamphlet, using the attached form, and return the receipt to Room 1083A in the enclosed envelope.

[10405]

s/ JOHN FORD BAECHE,
Lieut. Comdr., USNR.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete the reading?

Captain SAFFORD. That completes the reading of the original directive.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, attached is a memorandum. It mentions Admiral Edwards' memorandum, does it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read that memorandum?

Captain SAFFORD (reading):

Excerpt from Memorandum of Admiral R. S. Edwards.

Subject:

Presidential Security Directive Regarding Cryptanalytic discussions.

1. The Presidential Security Directive prohibits release to the public of information regarding any specific results or degree of success attained by any cryptanalytic unit.

2. The President modified his original directive to allow any witness to testify and give information regarding cryptanalytic activities which had to do with the investigation of the Pearl Harbor Incident. This specific exception to his original security directive did not, however, authorize witnesses to introduce discussions of cryptanalytic successes, subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete the reading of it?

Captain SAFFORD. That completes the reading.

[10407] The CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to ask you at this point, Captain, if in your testimony you have revealed anything with respect to the cryptanalytical successes since Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. Only in the one case where I pointed this directive out to the committee and the chairman decided that what I had to testify to would not be in violation of the Presidential directive, and I said in view of his instruction I would continue my testimony.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And otherwise you have complied with those instructions?

Captain SAFFORD. Otherwise I have complied with these instructions implicitly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Admiral R. S. Edwards?

Captain SAFFORD. He was the Deputy Chief of Staff at the time that Admiral King was—Admiral Edwards was Chief of Staff at the time Admiral King was known as commander in chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. I cannot recall immediately what Admiral Edwards' present capacity is.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that signed by Admiral Edwards?

Captain SAFFORD. There is no signature on this paper.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no signature?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. The only signature I had to [10408] go on is that of John Ford Baeher, lieutenant commander, USNR.

Senator FERGUSON. You have stated that except in one case you have tried to live up to that restriction?

Captain SAFFORD. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any other restrictions issued prior to this in any other hearings on your testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This was the only memorandum that you ever had, or the only restriction that was ever placed upon you?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the various parties to these hearings, to your knowledge, have lawyers representing them, some in the Navy and some outside of the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. Only in the case of the Navy Court of Inquiry in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you know, of your own knowledge, that the lawyers were privileged to papers, and so forth, and the knowledge that you had, was that the purpose of having lawyers?

Captain SAFFORD. They were at that investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Pearl Harbor Navy inquiry?

Captain SAFFORD. In the Navy Pearl Harbor inquiry which [10409] Admiral Murfin was the senior member of or president.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I asked you to read the Clarke report insofar as it related to the Friedman statement. I just want to get this clear on the record.

As I understand you claim that this statement was a hearsay statement; you knew it was a hearsay statement?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was more than one removed a hearsay statement?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in that Clarke report does Friedman deny that he repeated part of this to you?

Captain SAFFORD. In the Clarke investigation Mr. Friedman acknowledged this conversation with me and stated far more detail than I had ever given Admiral Hewitt.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say that in his testimony he is more in detail than what he told you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he state to you where he got the story?

Captain SAFFORD. He stated that he got the story from Colonel Sadtler.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you that?

Captain SAFFORD. He told me that.

[10410] Senator FERGUSON. So that he related where the hearsay came from?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he trace it back any further than Sadtler?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; Sadtler was as far as I knew anything about.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not Friedman testified before the Hewitt investigation somewhat the same as he did before the Clark investigation?

Captain SAFFORD. I know that Friedman was call because he came out of Admiral Hewitt's office just as I was going in on a recall. I have read his testimony subsequently in the past 2 months and he told Admiral Hewitt a little but not very much.

Senator FERGUSON. Not as much as he did Clarke?

Captain SAFFORD. Nowhere near as much as he told Colonel Clarke.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that the Clarke and Hewitt reports are going into evidence, so I am not going to ask you to read this report. I merely wanted to know whether or not the fact was in there that he had repeated it and didn't deny that he had told you part of that story.

Captain SAFFORD. He admitted telling me the story.

[10411] Senator FERGUSON. When you read over that did it cause you to want to change your testimony in any way about this Friedman case, about the disappearance of the winds code and the implementing message?

Captain SAFFORD. I consider that the information which I have read this noon in the Clarke report strongly supports my statements in regard to the disappearance of official documents pertaining to the winds code and the winds implementing message.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Inasmuch as the witness has been asked and has given conclusions from certain words which appear before him which are not made known to the public, I ask unanimous consent now that the Clarke report be made a matter of record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection. I just wanted to save time. I would be glad to have him read now what he says here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I understood that all of these reports commencing with the Roberts report are to be developed in your hearing. There would be no need for any expeditious action with reference to the Clarke report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what I would think.

[10412] Mr. MURPHY. Instead of spreading it in the record I ask that it be made an exhibit and made available as soon as possible so that the papers can have the benefit of what is in the Clarke report.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection to that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have any comment on that request?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. If the committee thinks that these copies should be made someone else will have to make them so I have no reluctance with reference to it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection the request will be granted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It will all be printed in a very short time and then be issued to the papers, but, as Congressman Murphy now suggests, if it could be made an exhibit expeditiously and go to the press now it might get to the press when the subject is a little hotter than it would be later.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection the request is granted.

Senator FERGUSON. I think under those circumstances that the testimony of Friedman in the Hewitt report should be made an exhibit and released at the same time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

The Chair would like to know the numbers to be given the [10413] two exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. All of the Friedman testimony will be made an exhibit out of the Hewitt report.

It is understood, Captain, that you were only testifying from hearsay, so that there can't be any mistake about this?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; that was thoroughly understood.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Senator. I thought we should have the numbers of these two exhibits.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The next exhibit number would be 143.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No. 143, for the first of the two exhibits here offered?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. Then you can make the Hewitt copy 143-A.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is better.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be done.¹ All right, Senator, you may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

¹Subsequently modified; see Hearings, Part 9, p. 3929.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, over the noon hour you had a conversation with Lieutenant Bryant, did you not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

[10414] Mr. MURPHY. I asked you to produce the letters which you had written to Lieutenant Bryant and his answers thereto, and did I understand you to say that you destroyed his answers?

Captain SAFFORD. I have not got them. I destroyed them when they came in and I found out that he couldn't remember anything which would help me.

Mr. MURPHY. Which would help you?

Captain SAFFORD. I mean throw light on the subject.

Mr. MURPHY. Throw light on the subject?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you feel that the reply of Lieutenant Bryant to you did not throw considerable light on the subject of the truth as to whether or not there was a winds intercept?

Captain SAFFORD. I think it indicated confusion in his mind and I let it go at that.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you destroyed his answer?

Captain SAFFORD. I destroyed his answer.

Mr. MURPHY. I now show you two letters. I show you first the letter dated September 10, 1945, purporting to be signed by L. F. Safford. Is that your signature?

Captain SAFFORD. That is my signature and I sent this letter.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there is an envelope there attached to [10415] the letter and I ask whether or not your signature appears on the envelope.

Captain SAFFORD. My signature appears on the envelope.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask you to examine the answer of Lieutenant Bryant and ask whether or not that is the answer you received to your first inquiry or your first letter?

Captain SAFFORD. It was.

Mr. MURPHY. I now show you a letter dated September 14, 1945, purporting to be signed by L. F. Safford, and ask you if that is your signature.

Captain SAFFORD. I wrote the letter and signed it.

Mr. MURPHY. I show you in addition thereto a paper attached thereto and ask you if that is the answer you received from Lieutenant Bryant?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. I now show you an envelope bearing the name of L. F. Safford on the front and ask you if this is the envelope in which you sent the letter?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the envelope.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Counsel has called attention to the fact with respect to those two exhibits that the committee only has one copy of one of those records and two copies of the other record. Obviously the committee will have to continue to use those copies during the further [10416] hearings here. So without objection the Chair will hold that these exhibits be made available when released by counsel. Is there objection? The Chair hears none. So ordered.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, I would like to read for you and into the record your first letter to Lieutenant Bryant, and in order to identify Lieutenant Bryant his name was Chief Ship's Clerk Harold L. Bryant, United States Navy, Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Chincoteague, Va., was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. And he in December of 1941 was the stenographer or typist for Captain Kramer, was he not?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And he is the one whose duty it was to type the papers which were presented to Captain Kramer; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, he did.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, on September 10, 1945, you wrote on stationery carrying the letterhead of the Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington 25, D. C.:

MY DEAR BRYANT. Now that the war is over and the reports of the Pearl Harbor Investigations have been made public, I feel free to write to you concerning events in early December, 1941.

Do you recall the "winds message", or do these words [10417] mean anything to you? According to my memory, it was intercepted during the night of 3-4 December 1941, and sent in by teletype.

- (1) Did you type its translation for Commander Kramer?
- (2) Or did you see this message?
- (3) Or did Commander Kramer tell you about it?
- (4) Do you recall what it said or what it meant?
- (5) Can you throw any light on the subsequent disposition of this message?
- (6) Have you any other pertinent information?

I appreciate that nearly four years have elapsed since the event in question and that only unusual circumstances would make you remember it all this time. So I will not be too disappointed if your memory is a complete blank. However, the information is very important to me, personally, and I would appreciate an immediate reply. It goes without saying that this inquiry must be regarded as secret.

Thanking you in advance for the favor requested,

Sincerely,

L. F. SAFFORD.

And then typed, "L. F. Safford," the first one being in ink written by you, Captain, "U. S. N."

[10418] The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that letter?

Mr. MURPHY. September 10, 1945.

Under date of September 12, 1945:

DEAR CAPTAIN SAFFORD: I have just received your letter of 10 September 1945, and I will reply to the questions you asked as well as I can with due regard to the necessity for secrecy.

I do recall the message you mentioned.

Your other questions I will answer by the numbers you assigned them—

1. I probably did.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't get that.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read the question and answer.

Your question was:

- (1) Did you type its translation for Commander Kramer?

And the answer is:

1. I probably did.
- (2) Or did you see this message?

Answer to No. 2:

- (2) I did.
- (3) Or did Commander Kramer tell you about it?

Answer to No. 3:

(3) I probably saw it before he did.

Question 4:

[10419] (4) Do you recall what it said or what it meant?

Answer to No. 4:

(4) I believe I have an idea of what it said, although at the time it was a matter of conjecture as to what it meant.

Question No. 5:

(5) Can you throw any light on the subsequent disposition of this message?

Answer:

(5) It was, I believe, filed in its proper place.

Question 6:

(6) Have you any other pertinent information?

Answer:

(6) None regarding this particular message.

Paragraph:

Although, as you say, nearly four years have elapsed, I am still unable to forget many of the events in GZ and at times the events of the week preceding are brought back to me with considerable force.

Respectfully yours,

HAROLD L. BRYANT,
Chief Ships Clerk, U. S. N.

Then there followed your letter of September 14, 1945:

[10420]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR BRYANT: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 12 September, and thank you for your very prompt reply.

There is just one thing more I would like from you at the present time.

Please send me from memory what this "winds message" said or the significant words in it. Also give me as good a description as you can in regard to length, language used, whether in Kana, International Morse, or voice, and any further particulars which would help identify this message. Also station at which intercepted if you know or have any idea, time it was intercepted, time and date it was received in Op-20-G, what officer was on watch.

I do not want to influence your answer in any way or to attempt to prompt your memory, or to suggest the probable contents of this message to you, and therefore will not give you any further description.

The fact that you state that you probably saw this message before Commander Kramer, led me to believe that you know more about this message than I had realized. I certainly appreciate the information that you have given me and you cannot realize how important it is to many of us.

Sincerely,

L. F. Safford

— In ink, and typed:

L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. N.

I now read the answer of Lieutenant Bryant, dated September 16, 1945:

MY DEAR SAFFORD: I have just received your letter of 14 September.

Perhaps I have given you the wrong impression regarding this particular message. Frankly, I had not given it a thought until I received your first letter. When I said I probably saw it before Commander Kramer did, that statement would apply equally to any messages we received, simply because the channels

through which they passed made it so. That is, they passed through me for typing and thence to him for evaluation and distribution.

I hesitate to elaborate on these matters because I am not unmindful of the obligations placed on me by my association with the unit, and I do not know to what extent the security has been relaxed.

I do not know any of the details of the message you [10422] mention as to length, language, code, method of transmission, origin, or date. It was interpreted at the time, as I recall it, to provide code words for movements in force in certain directions and significantly for us, towards Malaya and the Dutch Indies. If there was any other direction indicated, we missed it.

If I can be of any further service in this or any other matter, please call on me.

Very respectfully,

HAROLD L. BRYANT,
Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. N.

Now, as I understand it, Captain, when you got this letter from the person who said he had typed papers for Captain Kramer, and when he said if there was any other direction indicated, "we missed it—" having that paper from the typist you destroyed the answer, did you?

Captain SAFFORD. I destroyed the papers subsequently.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one or two further questions.

Captain SAFFORD, I gather that there either was, or there was not, a winds execute message received on or about the 4th day of December?

[10423] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You say there was?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; I say there was.

Mr. KEEFE. Others claim there was not.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The letters just read would indicate that there was some kind of a message received that day?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So far as the records in the Navy Department are concerned, all the messages of that character are absent, are they not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. KEEFE. There isn't any message in the files showing any type of code words, is there?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Whether the code words were in the middle or at the end, or whether repeated two or three times or not, there is no message of any kind or character involving those code words received on the 4th that you have been able to find?

Captain SAFFORD. No message whatsoever, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So we are face to face with the determination of the question as to whether or not there was a message of some kind that was intercepted and delivered to you by Kramer that night?

Mr. KEEFE. If there was any kind of a message of any kind or character, regardless of what was in it, that message should be in the file, shouldn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it is not there in the files?

Captain SAFFORD. Very definitely not.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever have a conversation with Admiral Hart about the winds message?

Captain SAFFORD. I had a very long conversation with Admiral Hart off the record before I gave my sworn testimony, because in the sworn testimony he wanted to keep the record just as short as he possibly could and avoid any references to our sources of information, because he hoped that he could avoid all the extrasecurity precautions in his report which had to be taken in some of the later reports.

After this long off-the-record conversation, he gave me a list of questions he was going to ask, allowed me about a week to prepare the answers for them, taking great care not to make frequent references to sources of material, he said all he wanted to know was what we knew and the date, and Admiral Hart himself having had access to all this intercepted top secret magic information when Commander [10425] in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet during this period, he knew exactly what I was talking about and where my information was coming from.

After I had prepared my paper, I went back to his office under the date set. He read the questions to me, and I read the answers from my prepared paper, which was turned over to him for use in verifying my testimony.

Later I was permitted to return to his office and verify my testimony, all of which shows in the record of the proceedings of the Hart investigation.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I have, some place in my mind, in connection with this testimony that there was some conversation between you and Admiral Hart with reference to the winds execute message, and that in connection with that testimony Admiral Hart made certain statements to you.

The reason I have gone into is because the Senator from Maine wanted to inquire about, and I didn't know whether he would get here. I see he is here now.

Let me finish one or two questions, and then you can go into that Hart situation, Senator.

I will withdraw the last question that I asked of the witness. Let the Senator from Maine inquire with reference to it.

Now, you have been shown or read, or there has been [10426] read into the record by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy, two letters written by you to Chief Ship's Clerk Harold L. Bryant, and Bryant's answers thereto.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, these letters were written in September 1945?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That was after you had testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Captain SAFFORD. After I had testified.

Mr. KEEFE. After you had testified before the Hewitt board?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And was it after you had testified before Hart?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; and after I had testified before the Army board also.

Mr. KEEFE. So you had already given your testimony before all of these courts of inquiry and it expressed your knowledge as to what you knew about this winds execute before you even wrote these letters to Mr. Bryant?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Might I ask you this question:

[10427] Did that letter, the first letter you wrote to Mr. Bryant, have any relationship to the passage of the joint resolution under which this committee is holding this inquiry, that joint resolution having been passed on the 6th of September, and your first letter being dated the 10th?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that it did, sir. That and VJ-day. I had not attempted to communicate with Bryant before VJ-day, but I think it was that relationship that prompted it.

The CHAIRMAN. You took it for granted that, this resolution having been passed, you would be called upon to testify again?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Captain SAFFORD. In view of my previous testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were seeking corroboration from Mr. Bryant of your viewpoint?

Captain SAFFORD. Or get what information he could throw on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. But you had in your mind the possibility of corroboration on his part?

Captain SAFFORD. I expected that anybody who could remember the incident would corroborate me.

[10428] The CHAIRMAN. I understand, but I am talking about these letters; not somebody else.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your answer to that question "Yes"?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Captain, I want to speak about this Hart incident, which has come to my attention, and in that connection will read the testimony which you gave before the Army Board at pages 172, 173, and 174:

Captain SAFFORD. There is a possibility that the original distribution copy of that message is in existence in the Navy Department in the hands or in the safe of some high official, probably the Vice Chief of Naval Operations if it is in existence, possibly the Secretary of the Navy. Admiral Hart made a statement to me which implied that he had sighted it and that I was not justified in the statement that all copies of the "winds" message had been destroyed, or all the Navy Department copies had been destroyed.

Major CLAUSEN. In connection with the answer that you just gave to General Russell you stated that Admiral Hart informed you he had cited a distribution list. Do you recall that?

[10429] Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. That he had sighted the actual "winds" message.

Major CLAUSEN. That he had cited the message in a written report that he rendered?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. He said to me, "I have just come from the front office, and I have seen your 'winds' message. Now, don't make statements that you can't verify." This is of the time I came in to verify my testimony, so I withdrew from my testimony any statement to the effect relative then to other copies having been destroyed, because I didn't know where I stood then.

That is the end of the quotation of the testimony.

Now, do you recall the statement of Admiral Hart to you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That is substantially correct, as you testified?

Captain SAFFORD. It is substantially correct.

Senator BREWSTER. And that was at the time you were going to verify your testimony before Admiral Hart when he cautioned you to be careful about any statement that the winds message had been destroyed because you understood him to say he had seen a copy just before that?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; immediately before that.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

[10430] The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Captain, I suppose it might be said that the committee has kept you much longer than it anticipated, and I suppose much longer than you had anticipated. We appreciate your patience and your willingness to come and help as best you can to clear up this whole problem.

You are now excused.

Captain SAFFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The witness was excused.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to present Captain Kramer.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain Kramer, come around, please.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN DALTON KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If the Chair permits I shall follow the same course of conduct with Captain Kramer that I did with Captain Safford because Captain Kramer's testimony, like that of Captain Safford, applies to two main evidentiary issues in this hearing, first with reference to the 14-part message, with which he was intimately connected, and second with reference to the asserted winds execute message which has been recently discussed with Captain Safford.

[10431] Captain, will you give your name in full to the reporter?

Captain KRAMER. Captain Alwin Dalton Kramer, United States Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How old are you?

Captain KRAMER. I was born September 5, 1903.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. I entered the Naval Academy in June of 1921; graduated in June 1925.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you detail in a general way what your assignments in the Navy have been from then until now?

Captain KRAMER. On graduation I was ordered to the United States Naval Rifle Team Training in Annapolis, Md., an organization which is primarily a small-arms school for the Navy. This training culminates in matches which were held in those days annually at Camp Perry, Ohio, in which the United States Navy entered a team. I was similarly detailed to that team in 1929, 1930, and 1931 as a firing member of the United States Navy team.

After completion of that summer's training in 1925 I was ordered to the U. S. S. *Tennessee*, where I remained until the end of 1946. My next assignment—

Mr. KEEFE. 1946?

Captain KRAMER. 1926, I am sorry.

My next assignment was the U. S. S. *Rochester* which I [10432] joined in the early spring of 1927 and remained aboard her operating in Central American waters, Panama Canal Zone, in both the Atlantic and Caribbean, until June of 1929.

At that time I was again ordered to the rifle team on completion of which assignment I was ordered to the U. S. S. *Detroit*, a light cruiser. I joined the *Detroit* in the fall of 1929, remained assigned to her as "spot one and gunnery duties" until June of 1931, with a short period, 4 months period in the summer of 1930 detached on temporary duty to the rifle team.

On completion of the rifle team assignment in 1931 I was ordered to Tokyo, Japan, as a language officer, where I remained until the fall of 1934.

On returning to this country, after leave, I reported to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Far East Section, of the Division of Naval Intelligence through the spring of 1935 after which I was ordered to destroyers in the Pacific, operating chiefly in San Diego, in 1936, and then for the subsequent 2 years in Hawaiian waters out of Pearl Harbor.

In June of 1938 I was ordered to the Navy Department, Washington, and assigned to the Far East Section of the Division of Intelligence. For the next approximate year and a half I had the Japanese desk in the Far East Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence. Part of that time I [10433] was assigned to the Communications Security Group under then Commander Safford.

In June of 1940 I was assigned to that section of Commander Safford's office on a full-time basis and remained on that duty until June of 1943.

I was then ordered to COM-14, the Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor, as an activity operationally under Admiral Nimitz, CincPac.

I remained attached thereto through the fall of 1943 with the exception of 1 month temporary duty in the South Pacific.

In January 1944 I was ordered to the South Pacific and joined Admiral Halsey's staff. I remained there until Admiral Halsey's detachment in the middle of June 1944 and continued attached to the South Pacific Force and area through the summer of 1944, at the end of which I again was ordered north to the Hawaiian Islands.

My transfer at that time, I learned on arrival in Hawaii, was for the purpose of testifying before the naval court of inquiry then meeting at Pearl Harbor. I remained there attached to the Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor until ordered to the United States early last year.

Since the spring of 1945 I have been attached to the Division of Intelligence of the Office of the Chief of Naval [10434] Operations, until I was transferred, detached, rather, temporarily to the hospital for treatment, or observation initially in August and treatment from September. I am still attached by permanent Bureau of Personnel orders to Naval Operations and temporarily detached to the Naval Hospital undergoing treatment.

[10435] Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, you are a married man?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. From what State were you appointed?

Captain KRAMER. Massachusetts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What family have you?

Captain KRAMER. I have a wife and two children, boys.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you speak Japanese?

Captain KRAMER. I do, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Fluently?

Captain KRAMER. I will leave that to my betters to judge.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you supposed to be a fluent Japanese linguist?

Captain KRAMER. I presume I was supposed to be.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What were your duties, Captain, during the months of November and December 1941 in a detailed way, if you will describe them to us?

Captain KRAMER. I was in charge of a section in the Division of Naval Communications which was a subsection under then Commander Safford, known as OP-20-GZ, OP-20 being the designation of the then Commander Safford, known as the Communications Security Group.

GZ was the subsection concerned with the translation of decrypted ciphers and the recovery of Japanese codes. My permanent assignment was to the Far East section of the Division [10436] of Naval Intelligence. My status was a loan status to OP-20-GZ.

As a subordinate of the Director of Naval Intelligence I was given the further duty of disseminating at the direction of the Director of Naval Intelligence or my immediate superior, the head of the Far East section, translations produced in my section.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What were your customary office hours at that period?

Captain KRAMER. That is a difficult question to answer, counselor. The regular working hours in those days was from 8 o'clock in the morning until 4:30 in the afternoon, except Saturday, when closing hours were, I believe, at a quarter of 1. However, not only myself but translators and yeomen were all considered on duty, especially during the latter part of 1941, on a 24-hour basis. There were numerous occasions when we worked until 9, 10, or 11 in the evening. There were a number of occasions when I was called down to the office during the course of the night and when I phoned for certain translators to come down to help out.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. RICHARDSON. If messages came into your unit by whom were they received?

Captain KRAMER. By "my unit" you refer to Section GZ, [10437] I take it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Captain KRAMER. Normally they went to then Chief Yeoman Bryant, who passed them to translators.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Right at that point, how did they come in mechanically?

Captain KRAMER. By hand from the GY watch officer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And where were those watch officers located and how many were there?

Captain KRAMER. I believe there were four, with the most experienced one, a fifth one, in general charge, keeping the office hours which he saw fit or which was required by the situation at the time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, my recollection is that at this particular time Ramsay, Linn, Pering and Brotherhood were the watch officers.

Captain KRAMER. Linn, Pering, and Brotherhood I recall. I do not recollect Ramsay. There was one other whom I distinctly recall, named Murray.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. They, as I understand it, Captain, would take the messages mechanically in the first instance. Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what would they take it from?

[10438] Captain KRAMER. From whatever source it arrived in Section GY from. There were many sources.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Illustrate the sources that would bring a message into GY?

Captain KRAMER. In 1940 and early 1941 the primary source was mail, air mail from the intercept stations. At some date during 1941, I am uncertain as to the exact date, teletype transmission of that traffic was instituted from shore stations within the United States proper. Furthermore, I know that some time during 1941 stations in outlying possessions were directed to encode in United States naval systems traffic on certain channels we were intercepting. One I recall distinctly is the Tokyo-Berlin channel. We had other sources than I have given.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. When these messages would come in they would be in the precise language of the message as it was delivered to GY?

Captain KRAMER. Do you mean when they came into GZ?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Into GZ, yes.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What change would occur in the message after it was received in process of handling it?

Captain KRAMER. GY was a subsection of this Communications Security Group, responsible for the attack on, the break-down, and the decryption or decoding of recovered systems.

[10439] Mr. RICHARDSON. Including translation?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; by "break-down" I mean cryptanalytical break-down.

Mr. RICHARDSON. After that stage had been passed through what was the next stage into which a message would pass?

Captain KRAMER. The text broken down into the Japanese text which we had recovered was sent to my section from that point. That applies primarily to ciphers, of course. In the case of codes most of the recovery work, at least after the initial breaks into a new code were made, were done by my section. It was primarily a language problem.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And about how many people did you have there in late November and early December assisting in the translation of such messages?

Captain KRAMER. We had three linguists whom I would characterize as the most highly skilled occidentals in the Japanese language

in the world. We had three others that we had acquired, I believe the first one in 1940 and the second two in the fall of 1941, who were less skilled in the work of our office. The two last ones I mentioned above were in more or less of a training status at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, when the message had been put into the Japanese language was there anyone that assigned a particular message to a particular linguist?

[10440] Captain KRAMER. Not a particular message, no, sir. However, I made general assignments of what translators would handle what type of traffic. I will amplify that, if you desire, by stating that the most important circuits, two of which at that time were the Tokyo-Washington circuit and the Tokyo-Berlin circuit, were for the most part in a system which was the best the Japanese had, namely, the so-called purple machine.

The Berlin circuit, of course, was concerned with the war in Europe and negotiations with reference to the Tri-Partite Pact. The Washington circuit primarily was concerned with the Japanese-American negotiations.

Certain minor circuits, for example, what we termed the "China net," I assigned to one of the less skilled translators who did most of the work on that traffic. That was not an ironclad assignment by any means. If a translator finished important traffic he was handling he dug into whatever remaining traffic was untranslated in the section.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, Captain, until someone in your immediate section translated the message that came in, no one in the Navy Department beyond you would know what that message meant?

Captain KRAMER. In general that is correct, sir. However, it should be modified to this extent. It is of some assistance [10441] to crypt-analysts to have at least a slight knowledge of the language with which they are working, the language in the crypts they are working with. For that reason there had been periodic lecture courses given to the crypt-analysts, not only the top crypt-analysts but those in training, by my predecessor Captain Mason, I believe by my immediate predecessor now Captain Carlson, and by myself, so that the GY watch officers and a number of the crypt-analytical clerks had a certain familiarity with the Japanese language.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But the information which they might get, be it little or be it much, would not pass out for use by the Navy Department except out of your section after the message had been adequately interpreted?

Captain KRAMER. With one exception which I have in mind that is precisely correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is the one exception you mean?

Captain KRAMER. The one exception is this winds message, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right; now, were you on duty on your assignment on the 6th day of December 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it essential and was it necessarily a result of your handling of these various messages that you were familiar with the status of the diplomatic arrangements [10442] and intercourse between this country and Japan, particularly as evidenced by the dispatches which came through your office?

Captain KRAMER. It was not essential for the activities of my section that I be so familiar with the negotiations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But were you so familiar?

Captain KRAMER. Primarily from the intercepts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Captain KRAMER. I saw very little extraneous to those intercepts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, do you recall the fact of what has been referred to here as the incident relating to the so-called 14-part message?

Captain KRAMER. I am not certain what incident you refer to, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I mean the entire incident of there having been a 14-part message.

Captain KRAMER. I believe I am thoroughly familiar; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when was the first thing that brought into existence in your mind what later turned out to be this incident that I refer to?

Captain KRAMER. I am as certain as I can be, sir, that the first knowledge I had that the Japanese note was being sent to the United States was around 3 or shortly after [10443] 3 p. m. Saturday, December 6, 1941.

The issue of that time arose from this circumstance: Because of traffic on hand at noontime on Saturday, December 6, I requested certain of the translators to remain on past the regular working hours, about a quarter of 1, to clean it up. They were still there at about 3 p. m. Before releasing them for the afternoon I made a final check with the teletype and the GY watch officer to see if anything were coming in on the Tokyo-to-Washington circuit, in other words, dispatches originating in Tokyo addressed to Washington, which might by any chance either be such a note in reply to Secretary Hull's note of November 26 or which might bear on these negotiations.

When I made that check there was something coming in on the teletype so addressed. I therefore requested the translators to hold on for a while longer, until we broke down that message coming in.

Within, I recollect, one-half hour or less the first part of a message which we broke down was broken to the extent of reading the first few lines of the text of the message, specifically the first part of the first line, which is an internal indicator of how many parts there are to that message. That was standard Japanese practice and procedure.

The first part we broke down I rather distinctly recollect was part 8 of a 14-part message. [10444] After about the third line, as I recollect, it went into English text with many insertions of three-letter code groups, indicating statements of various kinds.

Does that answer your question, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Proceed and carry through what happened with reference to that message during the afternoon while you were there.

Captain KRAMER. Well, then—

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask before counsel starts on this line, whether or not the 3 or 3:15 message refers to the pilot message or the first 13 parts?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there, Captain, what may be called a preliminary pilot message a part of this incident?

Captain KRAMER. I believe, Mr. Counsellor, that you are referring to Tokyo Serial 901 on page 238 of Exhibit 1. I have no recollection of seeing that message until later in the afternoon, although it is possible that the Army delivered it to my section earlier in the afternoon.

I would like to invite your attention to the fact that at the foot of that message there is indicated as a file number, "J. D. 7149"; that at the foot of each of the parts of the 14-part note is "File No. 7143," six numbers earlier. I stated that I was uncertain whether that came in [10445] earlier in the afternoon or not. In any case, it was not stamped with a file number until approximately 8:30 that evening for dissemination.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When had the first 13 parts finished coming in?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is that the last of the first 13 parts was coming in about 7:30 that evening.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make a more or less detailed examination of those 13 parts?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. From your experience in the matter and your familiarity with other dispatches, particularly the intercepts between Tokyo and the United States, were you impressed with anything unusual about these 13 parts as you read them?

Captain KRAMER. I have stated that the first part I recollect seeing is part 8. If you will refer to that you will see that there is nothing in that part—in fact, the last half of that part quotes the United States note—that was materially different than the general tenor of previous notes back and forth between the United States and Japan.

When the first 13 parts were complete I did, however, have that distinct impression, that this note was far and appreciably stronger language than earlier notes had been [10446] and that it indicated a strong probability that the Japanese were concluding any further negotiations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was the impression you had?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, was the message translated and in shape for delivery further into the Navy Department by 7:30 in the evening.

Captain KRAMER. It was not; no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When, as near as you can recall—and bear in mind, Captain, that everyone here recognizes that recollections are only recollections.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. About what time do you think this 13-part message was ready for delivery?

Captain KRAMER. I am quite certain regarding my times that that was ready for delivery. Briefly it is as follows:

The folders for delivery to the usual recipients of this traffic were in process of preparation about between 8:30 and a quarter of 9 Saturday evening. At about a quarter of 9 I commenced my usual practice of phoning to the probable locations of these usual recipients.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And who would those recipients normally be?

Captain KRAMER. The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox; [10447] Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, or his flag secretary, then Commander Welborn; Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson; the head of the Far East section of the Division of Naval Intelligence, then Commander McCollum; the Director of the War Plans Division, Admiral Turner; and either the White House directly or the naval aide to the President, then Captain Beardall.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would there be any distribution made to the Army?

Captain KRAMER. Distribution was automatically made to the Army of all messages typed by my section. Within a matter of minutes or at the most a couple of hours after they were typed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And to whom would they go as representing the Army?

Captain KRAMER. To the parallel section to mine in the Signal Intelligence section of the Army.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was in charge of that, if you recall?

Captain KRAMER. I believe then Captain Doud, or Major Doud, was in charge of that section.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you had no further duty with respect to dissemination of any such message within the Army beyond the delivery to the Doud section?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

[10448] Mr. RICHARDSON. But it was your duty, as I understand your testimony, to arrange for the delivery of the message to the individuals connected with the naval establishment whom you have just identified in your testimony?

Captain KRAMER. In general, that is correct, sir. My responsibility in that regard was as a subordinate of the Director of Naval Intelligence. In carrying out those responsibilities I was acting for him. I could, and on a number of occasions did, make special deliveries on his direction.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you physically make any deliveries yourself of such messages?

Captain KRAMER. In most cases I physically made the deliveries myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, when the first 13 parts of this message we are talking about had been completed and had been translated and was in shape to be delivered, did you deliver it?

Captain KRAMER. I began to describe what I was doing at a quarter of 9. If I may continue I think it will answer your question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead..

Captain KRAMER. I phoned the usual recipients I have already named at their offices or homes in order to locate them. As I have indicated, that was my usual practice day or night.

[10449] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, you will pardon me if I interrupt you as you go along, because I have to get it into my head my way. When you telephoned a recipient would you give that recipient over the telephone any information as to why you were telephoning him and what you proposed to tell to him?

Captain KRAMER. In cryptic language, yes. Generally it was in such terms as, "I have something important that I believe you should see at once," or something of that nature.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, go ahead with your narration as to what occurred on Saturday night.

Captain KRAMER. I phoned the quarters of Admiral Stark on Observatory Circle on Massachusetts Avenue, but could not reach him. He was apparently not at home. I similarly phoned Admiral Turner's home. I phoned the situation room at the White House.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by the "situation room"?

Captain KRAMER. It was a room on the ground floor, south side, in the center of the White House which the naval aide, Captain Beardall, had set up a month or two before, equipped with maps to follow the war in Europe and to assist, presumably, the President with those maps and to have a center to handle any messages or traffic of intelligence from the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was Beardall?

[10450] Captain KRAMER. Naval aide to the President.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And who was under him in that work at the White House?

Captain KRAMER. When that room was set up my recollection is that there was initially one Army and one Navy junior officer as assistants. Other assistants were brought in later. I believe at about the time of Pearl Harbor a classmate of mine at the Naval Academy, then Lieutenant Commander Leahy, was put in charge of those assistants to the situation room.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now proceed with what you did by way of handling this message, the 13 parts of this message.

Captain KRAMER. I further phoned then Commander McCollum at his home in Alexandria, indicating what had come in in cryptic terms on the phone, and after completing these various phone calls then phoned Admiral Wilkinson at his home in Arlington to inform him of whom I had been able to contact.

First I informed him of the nature of what I had that I felt should be delivered at once, and further informed him what I proposed to do in the way of delivery. He approved my proposals, which consisted of delivery to the White House, to Mr. Knox, who, incidentally, I had also phoned, and then to his home.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whose home?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Wilkinson's home.

[10451] Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. Well, about what time did you start out to make these deliveries?

Captain KRAMER. There was one other phone call I made and that was to my own home, to my wife, asking her to be my chauffeur.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I thought, Captain, you were going to ask permission. Proceed.

Captain KRAMER. She very graciously complied and did act as my chauffeur during the evening.

We reached the White House, I should say, about 9:15, where, as I recollect it, one of these junior aides to Captain Beardall was on duty. I do not recall whether it was the Army or the naval aide; in fact, they may both have been there. I left rather categorical instructions with him to get that folder to the President as quickly as possible.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you mind telling us the exact language as near as you can remember it?

Captain KRAMER. I said in approximately these terms that "there was something in this folder"—which, incidentally was inside a locked pouch—"that the President should see as quickly as possible." I was given to understand that the President was entertaining at the moment. I learned only within the last couple of months that Mrs. Roosevelt was entertaining rather than the President. I learned only the [10452] last few days who was being entertained, when Captain Safford testified—and told him that when I had phoned

Admiral Wilkinson I was informed that the naval aide, Captain Beardall, was at dinner at Admiral Wilkinson's home. I therefore told this assistant of Captain Beardall's that I would show it to him, that I would show it to the aide when I reached Admiral Wilkinson's home and that very likely he would get in touch with him at that time to find out whether Mr. Roosevelt had seen this traffic. From there—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you said that this message was in a locked pouch. Was it customary when you delivered messages that they be kept in a locked pouch?

Captain KRAMER. Invariably; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who had the key to the pouch?

Captain KRAMER. The recipients and my section only.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The pouch then, as I take it, was not opened until you reached the recipient who was to receive the message?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When a copy was delivered on such an occasion did it remain with the recipient?

Captain KRAMER. It remained for a period normally of 1 or 2 or 3 days. In some cases, specifically the State Department, where I had delivery responsibilities [10453] earlier in 1941, they at times retained them for as much as 1 or 2 weeks and occasionally called for earlier ones that had been returned. The only exception to that general statement is that in the Far East Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence there was normally a back file kept running for several weeks to a month.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the file check would show whether a copy had been returned by a particular recipient or not?

Captain KRAMER. Such a file check was kept in my office; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And ultimately it was expected that that file list would check out by an ultimate return of the dispatch originally delivered?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you deliver a copy of this 13-part section to the aide in charge at the White House on this evening around 9:15?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And where did you go after leaving the White House?

Captain KRAMER. To the Wardman Park Hotel on Connecticut Avenue.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whom did you see there?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Knox, the Secretary of the Navy.

[10454] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any conversation with the Secretary?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the nature of it?

Captain KRAMER. The first 20 minutes or so of my presence in his apartment, where there were also incidentally Mrs. Knox and a civilian business associate of Mr. Knox, I believe acting manager of the Chicago Daily News, whom I had seen on frequent occasions in his outer office in the Navy Department—Mr. Knox read the dispatches for the first 20 minutes or so. During that time there was very little said. During that time I sat near him in a corner of the

room part of the time, the rest of the time engaged in general conversation with the other two people present.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said after the Secretary completed his examination of the document?

Captain KRAMER. Not specifically bearing on this traffic in the folder he was reading. Mr. Knox was very security-minded and had been since he was indoctrinated, if I may use that term, into the security features and identified in handling this traffic and I do not believe customarily discussed this decrypted traffic with either his wife or his business associates.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said by the Secretary [10455] with respect to taking any action on the message which he had read?

Captain KRAMER. There was not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, about what time do you think you left the Wardman Park?

Captain KRAMER. Between 9:45 and a quarter of 10 I should say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whither did you go?

Captain KRAMER. To Arlington, Va., the home of Admiral Wilkinson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when you arrived at the home of Admiral Wilkinson who in respect to the members of the Naval Establishment did you find there?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Wilkinson was present, also Captain Beardall. I have had my memory refreshed only quite recently to the effect that General Miles was also present.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was Admiral Wilkinson there?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Wilkinson was there; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom did you make delivery at the Wilkinson home?

Captain KRAMER. To Admiral Wilkinson in the first instance. Captain Beardall also read the traffic from an extra folder I had. General Miles also perused it.

[10456] Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion of it while they were perusing it or following the perusal?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; there was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you give us the general nature of it?

Captain KRAMER. The general nature of it was to the effect that it certainly looked as though the Japanese were terminating negotiations with the United States. Other than that I can recall no specific phraseology used.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said in that conversation by any of them with respect to sending any message or taking any action based on this traffic?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; there was not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. About what time do you think you left the Wilkinson home?

Captain KRAMER. It was about 12:30; after midnight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And did you attempt to make any further deliveries that night?

Captain KRAMER. I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You went home, I presume, from the Wilkinson home?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. I never took these folders with encrypted traffic to my home. They were returned—speaking specifically of the copies shown Mr. Knox and Admiral Wilkinson and the extra copy I had—to my safe in [10457] section GZ in the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then when you returned to your office where your safe was, were all of the copies of this message that you had started out to deliver returned to your safe or did certain copies remain with certain recipients?

Captain KRAMER. The only copy that remained out that I recollect was the one left in the situation room at the White House in a locked pouch.

[10458] Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did you remain in your office upon your return there when you put these documents in your safe?

Captain KRAMER. Probably 10 or 15 minutes, checking with the GY watch officer to see if anything new of interest or importance had come in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have reason to believe at that time that there was still another part of this message to come in?

Captain KRAMER. I had positive knowledge that there was another part. There were 14 parts indicated as the number of parts of this message, and we still had only 13 parts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you inquire from your staff there as to whether the fourteenth part had come in?

Captain KRAMER. That was one of the things I specifically inquired about.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you ascertained what as to that fact?

Captain KRAMER. There was still no fourteenth part, or anything that looked as though it might be the fourteenth part.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then sometime between half-past 12 and 1 you left your office and returned home?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

[10459] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, how early did you go to the office the next morning?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is it was very shortly after 7:30 that I arrived at my office the following morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your customary hour of arrival in your office?

Captain KRAMER. The normal office hours commenced at 8 o'clock. I customarily arrived about that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection, Captain, that you went to your office earlier the next morning than usual?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection of having any reason for going there earlier than usual?

Captain KRAMER. Aside from the fourteenth part, there were other messages of a minor nature that had come in before I left the office the previous night, and I further wanted to be at the office earlier that morning than usual because of the likelihood that I would have to make earlier disseminations that morning than usual.

By that I mean that normally the folders during the course of 1941 were disseminated in the latter part of the morning and another dissemination was frequently made in the afternoon, and others at other

odd times. I had a [10460] specific appointment to be at the State Department by 10 that morning, on instructions from Secretary Knox. I gathered from conversation with Admiral Wilkinson that Admiral Stark would very likely be in Sunday morning, which was not a usual practice.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, let me get these threads together.

Captain KRAMER. Those are various reasons influencing my arriving earlier that morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And those reasons were connected with the dispatch of business that was waiting for you in your office?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Among which would be matters that might be involved in the receipt of the fourteenth part of this message?

Captain KRAMER. Aside from the fourteenth part, probably my principal objective in arriving early was to make sure that anything that might have come in in the early morning would be in shape for delivery for Mr. Knox or for Admiral Stark.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any arrangement, Captain, in connection with your conversation at Admiral Wilkinson's house on late Saturday night, with reference to having a [10461] conference the next morning?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; there was not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They did not then speak of having a conference or of arranging one, that you can recall?

Captain KRAMER. There is not only no recollection of a conference mentioned but it was an unusual thing for Admiral Stark to be there on Sunday morning. On a number of occasions that fall on Sunday morning I had delivered folders to his home and had been received in his study on the second deck, he being in pajamas and dressing gown on one occasion having breakfast. I recollect that because I was offered some coffee.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, having reference, Captain, to Wilkinson, and Turner, and Beardall in the Wilkinson home, there was nothing said there about having an early Sunday morning meeting?

Captain KRAMER. Not a conference; no, sir. My recollection is that Admiral Wilkinson had indicated that Admiral Stark would probably be in the office early the next morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now you got in your office around 7 o'clock on Sunday morning?

Captain KRAMER. Shortly after 7:30, is my best recollection.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you got there did you find that the fourteenth part of the message had come in?

[10462] Captain KRAMER. I do not distinctly recollect in what shape it was then. By that I mean whether it was still being broken down or had been broken down, or was being translated, but my recollection is that the fourteenth part was there shortly after I got in that morning, or possibly when I got in that morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anyone there who could translate such a message from Japanese into English?

Captain KRAMER. Not in my office; no, sir. That interpretation "no one there" should be modified, I feel, by stating, as I have previously indicated, that I was on a 24-hour basis, and my translators were also. I had on at least two dozen occasions, during the course

of 1941, been called to my office at odd hours of the night, sometimes 2 and 3 in the morning. I had standing instructions with the GY watch officer to call me any time they felt a translator was required.

On a number of occasions that general instruction was emphasized with specific instructions before I left my office in the evening to call me if anything on a particular circuit came in. I was the nearest translator to my office, only 5 minutes away in Arlington, my home being near Fort Myer, I therefore put myself in the status of being the first one called rather than one of the translators whose homes [10463] were in outlying districts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know who received the fourteenth part from the wire?

Captain KRAMER. From first-hand knowledge I do not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who translated it? The fourteenth part, I mean now.

Captain KRAMER. At the foot of the fourteenth part, before the expression "Navy translation," is the parenthetical letter (M). That means me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Your answer would be then that you translated the fourteenth part?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection, but by looking at this part of the message on page 245 of Exhibit 1 it would indicate I was the translator.

[10464] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when that message was translated, was it put in the shape of a separate dispatch by itself?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; it was. That, however, was contrary to the usual practice in my section. It was done because the evening before one of the various other parts of this note were coming in, and we called on the Army at about 6 o'clock, as I recall it—

Mr. RICHARDSON. P. m.?

Captain KRAMER. Six p. m.—for assistance, primarily the assistance of their purple machine in breaking down these parts which were beginning to pile up on our machine.

It was almost invariably the practice in my section to include all parts of a multipart message under one heading 1 and 2, to assign the same file number to all those parts, but that was contrary to the Army practice which assigned a separate file number to each part of multipart messages.

The exception to our usual practice was made in the case of this code, because we proceeded to type up each part as they were finished in rough form.

Some of those parts were finished in rough form, long hand, by Army and sent over to us. They were all [10465] typed in my section in finished form.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, was a delivery made on Sunday morning of the fourteenth part?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, it was; in its proper place, accompanying the first 13 parts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When the delivery was made on Sunday morning then the entire 14-part message was delivered as one message.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that there would have been, in effect, a duplication in delivery, so far as the first 13 parts were concerned?

Captain KRAMER. That was frequently the case.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make delivery Sunday morning?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, will you tell the committee just what you did, whom you saw, how you made delivery, and what time it was?

Captain KRAMER. Some details of delivery between 8 and 9 o'clock I have only in the last month or so had my memory refreshed on, in conversations with other officers.

The first delivery, to my present best recollection, was made to Commander McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence.

[10466] Mr. RICHARDSON. Where and at about what time?

Captain KRAMER. It was probably about 8 or a few minutes after.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At his office in the Navy Building?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, proceed.

Captain KRAMER. Another delivery was made, I believe, about a quarter of 9 to Captain McCollum, also, or Commander McCollum then, when I was informed that Admiral Wilkinson had arrived at his office, and I therefore automatically delivered another copy to Admiral Wilkinson. It was about that time, or shortly afterward, that another copy was delivered to Admiral Stark's office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, at the time of delivery to Admiral Stark's office, who delivered it? Did you?

Captain KRAMER. That first delivery to Admiral Stark's office, I believe, was done by either Admiral Wilkinson or Captain McCollum.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you see that delivery made?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is not positive in that regard. If it was made by Admiral Wilkinson or Captain McCollum, I would not have seen it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How early was the first time you saw Admiral Stark on Sunday morning, as nearly as you can recall?

[10467] Captain KRAMER. My first positive recollection of seeing Admiral Stark is when I was on my way to the State Department to keep my 10 o'clock appointment when I left a copy of some of the other traffic that had come in in Admiral Stark's outer office. That was probably 9:30 or 9:40.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said at that time by you to Admiral Stark with reference to this 14-part message?

Captain KRAMER. There was not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was this 10 o'clock appointment you had with the State Department?

Captain KRAMER. The previous evening when I was in Secretary Knox's apartment, after he had read the folder of traffic, he directed me to be at the State Department at 10 o'clock the following morning where there would be a meeting between he, Mr. Hull, and, I gathered, Mr. Stimson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you attend such a meeting?

Captain KRAMER. I did not attend such a meeting.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make any delivery to the State Department on Sunday morning of the whole 14-part message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I was at the State Department almost exactly 10 minutes of 10.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And to whom did you make delivery [10468] actually?

Captain KRAMER. Actually to Mr. Knox directly. He came in, as I recollect, about 5 minutes of 10, a few minutes after I got there, and went into the conference room, Mr. Hull's office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any discussion on the matter with Secretary Knox?

Captain KRAMER. Only to the extent of pointing out what new traffic was in the folder which he had not seen the night before.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But nothing with reference to the details of the 14-part message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long were you at the State Department making your delivery?

Captain KRAMER. There was a brief discussion between myself, the Army courier, and Mr. Hull's private secretary in Mr. Hull's outer office. It lasted probably not more than 3 or 4 minutes, and then I headed back for the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What time did you return to the Navy Department?

Captain KRAMER. My best recollection is about 10:20.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection as to what [10469] you did upon your return there at 10:20?

Captain KRAMER. On my arrival there at 10:20, the most striking recollection I have is the first sighting of that message from Tokyo directing the delivery of this note from Tokyo at 1 o'clock p. m., December 7, Washington time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, that was in a separate dispatch, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It came in separately?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it in the same character of code transmission that the fourteenth part had been?

Captain KRAMER. The same general character; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It had come in by the time you returned from the State Department?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, when you came to your office at 7:30 that morning, who was in your office carrying on business there?

Captain KRAMER. My only positive recollection is that the then Chief Yeoman Bryant was there. I have a somewhat vaguer recollection that two of the translators were also there. There may only have been one.

[10470] Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was at your office, if you can recall, when you returned from the State Department and found the 1 o'clock section of the message?

Captain KRAMER. It was probably Dr. Hoffman, one of my chief translators.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you do, if anything, with this 1 o'clock section?

Captain KRAMER. I immediately instructed my chief yeoman to prepare another set of folders so I could make immediate delivery of them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He did so?

Captain KRAMER. In the course of 5 minutes or so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what did you do then with respect to delivering that section?

Captain KRAMER. In that folder I mentioned, there were several other short messages, some of which appear in Exhibit 1. Just as I was about to leave the office, a plain language Japanese message was sent in to my office by the GY watch officer that carried, I believe, the so-called hidden word message on page 251 of Exhibit 1. I recognized it as such from an external indicator, namely, the word "Stop" at the end, and recognized the first word as being one of the code words referring to England. In scanning the [10471] rest of the message, as I recollect, the sixth or seventh word had another code word, which, incidentally, were all proper names. The word was "Hattori" which, although I recognized as a code word, I did not immediately recall the meaning of, and hastily referred to the list of such code words, which appears in this Exhibit 1, referring—or rather, interpreted as "relations between Japan and (blank) country," to be inserted, was not in accordance with expectations.

I dictated to my chief yeoman the sense of that message, which now appears in Exhibit 1.

I took time to insert those in the folders that were made up and was on my way.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did you go?

Captain KRAMER. I stopped off at Admiral Stark's office, and then hurried first to the State Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you find Stark there?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Stark was in his office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom did you make delivery?

Captain KRAMER. The office door was closed when I arrived at his outer office. Word was sent in with one of the people there—I do not recollect who it was—that I had something for him.

My impressions earlier have been that it was his Flag [10472] Secretary, then Commander Wellborn. That has only quite recently been corrected on that score since I am informed that Wellborn was not there that morning at all. My recollections were fully refreshed in a conversation only in the last few days with Captain McCollum to the effect that he was the one who came to the door.

I distinctly recollect that now.

I further recollect pointing out to Captain McCollum the tie-up of the time, 1 o'clock Washington, with the scheme that had been developing for the past week or so in the Southwest Pacific with reference to Malaya and the Kra Peninsula.

Captain McCollum reacted instantaneously to my pointing that out. His reactions, I believe, were identical with mine. I do not believe our conversation lasted more than 10 seconds or so, and then I headed for the State Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, at what time do you think it was that delivery was made at Stark's office, as you have testified?

Captain KRAMER. I should say it was between 10:30 and 10:35.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you able to state, Captain, when the 1 o'clock message was ready for delivery out of your office?

[10473] Captain KRAMER. It was ready for delivery when I returned to my office about 10:20, to the extent of its being completely translated.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what time did you arrive at the State Department?

Captain KRAMER. Within probably 10 minutes after I left Admiral Stark's office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom did you make delivery there?

Captain KRAMER. To one of the private secretaries of Mr. Hull, who was the normal recipient for Mr. Hull.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did anything else transpire there after you made the delivery?

Captain KRAMER. Before that folder was taken in to Mr. Hull, there was a brief conversation of the identical nature that I had had with Captain McCollum at Admiral Stark's door, pointing out the tie-up of the time 1 o'clock Washington, with the situation in the Southwest Pacific.

Mr. RICHARDSON. One o'clock Washington meant dawn in Hawaii, did it not?

Captain KRAMER. It was 7:30 in Hawaii, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And was that fact pointed out in your conversations with McCollum, and at the State Department?

Captain KRAMER. It was mentioned in passing, yes, sir.

[10474] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, proceed.

Captain KRAMER. I should like to amplify that further, since such an issue has been made of that.

I earlier indicated, in outlining my naval career, that for about 2 years I was operating out of Pearl Harbor. I was executive officer and navigator of a destroyer based at the submarine base at Pearl Harbor.

I had had earlier experience as a navigator, namely, in Central America, in fact navigation was a hobby of mine.

Pearl Harbor uses a time zone which is rather unusual in the Navy in that it is not an even time zone, but is time zone 10½.

It is customary for navigators to draw time circles in working out navigation problems. I had made such a time circle in the few minutes I was in the Navy Department between 10:20 and 10:30 that morning, to get a picture of how this 1 o'clock Washington tied up with the movement of the big Japanese convoy down on the coast of French Indochina; in other words, to get an idea of whether it was evening or midnight or early in the morning around Kota Bharu.

Incidentally, in drawing that time circle, that is figuring out roughly those times, I did not take the time to check to see what the actual time zone was. The 10½ [10475] time zone at Pearl Harbor was part of that time circle.

Furthermore, 7:30 Sunday morning at Pearl Harbor, at the time I was out there, and at other times during fleet problems, was probably the quietest time of the week aboard ship at Pearl Harbor.

I am not presuming to state what the situation was in 1941—7:30 is the normal time for the piping of the crew to breakfast.

There would, therefore, normally be only top side out of the living quarters, only those men on watch.

Furthermore, it was customary over week ends when I was serving out there for a larger percentage of the crew to be ashore on Sunday than other days of the week when ships were in port.

Those were all factors bearing on this idea of mine that 7:30 Sunday morning was a quiet time of the week.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What would be the significance of that to you as a Navy man?

Captain KRAMER. Nothing more than I have already indicated, that it would probably be the time of the week when there would be the fewest people aboard ship, when there would be less ship's work going on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you got to the State Department did you see Secretary Knox?

[10476] Captain KRAMER. I did not see him myself, except when the door was open to the conference room, Mr. Hull's office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no communication then between you and Secretary Knox in any way?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now after you made delivery at the State Department, where did you go then?

Captain KRAMER. I went to the White House to deliver that same set of traffic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom did you deliver at the White House?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall the individual, but the delivery was made, to the best of my recollection—in fact I can state rather unequivocally I cannot conceive I would have delivered to any other place than the room I had previously described.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What time?

Captain KRAMER. Within 10 minutes of the time I left the State Department.

[10477] Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did you go from the White House?

Captain KRAMER. Back to the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With whom did you come in contact when you got back to the Navy Department?

Captain KRAMER. The people in my office, plus the watch officers and other people in the adjacent office, section GY. I believe I also saw some time before noon Captain McCollum again.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you were at the State Department, you said when the door opened, you saw Knox. You did not send him a note, or have any intercourse with him at all that morning?

Captain KRAMER. Most emphatically not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have a note that rather indicated to me that there was an explanation of the 1 o'clock message sent by you to Knox on this theory of yours as to what was meant.

Captain KRAMER. There was only the verbal explanation, which I may not have fully explained due to interruptions with the foreign-service officer, Mr. Hull's private secretary.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was that?

Captain KRAMER. The identical tenor and nature that I described in the case of Captain McCollum.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The significance of the 1 o'clock [10478] date?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, I really would like to have you, since you discussed it with McCollum, and you discussed it with the private secretary of the Secretary of State—

Captain KRAMER (interposing). There was also a conversation with the Army courier who was there at the same time with the same set of traffic for Mr. Stimson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now then, give the committee as detailed an account as you can of just what that conversation was and what its significance was, what you were talking about, what you had in mind, and what you feared, or expected, or anticipated, as the result of that 1 o'clock date.

Captain KRAMER. The primary point of that was the conviction, at least in my mind, that the Japanese intended to carry out their plans against Kota Bharu, with the intention and purpose of forcing the hand of the Thai Premier, Pibul, who had been maintaining, for some time past, the position that his country was neutral, that any foreign nation that invaded his quarters would be considered an enemy, and that the moment such an invasion took place he would call on the other party for assistance. By "other party" I refer to Japan or to Britain.

[10479] Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion that the 1 o'clock date had any significance in connection with any attack at Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. Absolutely none, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was not in your mind primarily in connection with this 1 o'clock date at all?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; it was not. It was mentioned only in passing; it was incidental to our general conversation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when you got back to the Navy Department—by the way, did you see General Marshall that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any contact with any of the Army people other than the courier that morning?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the name of the courier, do you recall?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection has been, and I am still of the conviction, it was Colonel Bratton. He, however, has indicated to me in private conversations that he did not make those courier trips, in which case it must have been one of his subordinates.

I might further amplify possibly my reasons for thinking it was Colonel Bratton by stating it had always been Colonel [10480] Bratton in the past, and when I testified for the first time before the court of inquiry of Admiral Murphy at Pearl Harbor, that was my impression at the time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you see Admiral Stark again that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew nothing about any of the contacts he might have had with Marshall, in connection with sending any message to Hawaii?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have anything whatever to do with, or any knowledge of the sending of, the message that was later sent to Hawaii?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir. I first heard of it after the hearings before the Roberts Commission.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, when you returned to the Navy Department, did your connection with the 14-part message then end?

Captain KRAMER. Except for again collecting those copies, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you collect them? The same day?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. It was in the course of the next few days; I do not recollect exactly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was simply the ministerial act [10481] of going and getting the copies and getting them back in the file in the regular order?

Captain KRAMER. Or their destruction, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had nothing more to do with the receipt of the message, or its explanation, or its delivery?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, now, Captain, so much for the 14-parts message and your connection with it.

Now let me open up the interesting subject of the winds message with you, Captain. I assume, Captain, that you were familiar with the two original winds messages that appear in exhibit 142 here, I think, as 2353 and 2354.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I am familiar with the original set-up of the messages on that winds system.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was your attention called to those messages when they came in?

Captain KRAMER. I would not use the expression "called to my attention." They were handled by my office, so, of course, they got my attention.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I beg your pardon. What was that answer?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did they pass through your hands?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; they did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have anything to do thereafter [10482] with monitoring the stations for an execute on either of those messages?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir; with the possible exception that, as was my practice, these two messages, as well as any message bearing on the technicalities of the operations of Commander Safford's section, were promptly called to his attention.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You understood, did you not, Captain, that stations generally that we were in contact with were monitoring for an execute on those messages?

Captain KRAMER. I understood that Commander Safford took such action; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you were in a position, or you were in an expectant condition in your office with respect to intercepting an execute on those messages?

Captain KRAMER. Very much so; yes, sir.

[10483] Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Do you recall, Captain, any message purporting to move under either of the winds-code messages to which I have called your attention coming into your office prior to December 7?

Captain KRAMER. None came into my office, to be precise in that regard. My attention was, however, called to a message which was of this character.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who called your attention to it?

Captain KRAMER. The GY watch officer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you remember his name?

Captain KRAMER. My best recollection on that is that it was Lieutenant Murray, but I am uncertain.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What time of day was it, if you can recall?

Captain KRAMER. My best recollection on that is that it was shortly after normal office hours; I believe about 8:30 in the morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What day?

Captain KRAMER. That day is something that only in the past week and a half, since Exhibit 142 was prepared, I have completely refreshed my memory on. My present recollection, in the light of that refreshment, was that it was on Friday, the 5th of December.

[10484] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, you made mention in your testimony a moment ago to an intercept which appears in the exhibit before you, which you characterize as the hidden word message.

Now, that appears on page what of Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. Page 251.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the indication there is as to it being received when?

Captain KRAMER. There is no indication as to the date of receipt. The date at the foot of the message is December 7, indicating only the date of translation. That, however, as I have previously indicated, was first brought into my section about 10:30 Sunday morning, December 7.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what, in general language, so that your testimony may be easily read, was the hidden-word message? What was the scheme of it?

Captain KRAMER. It was a message first set up by Tokyo Circular 2409 which appears on page 186 of Exhibit 1. There were supplements to that, four or five in number, I believe.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was a similarity in the purpose of that message, and the purpose of the other messages, 2353 and 2354, was there not?

Captain KRAMER. A similarity to an extent; yes, sir.

[10485] But the so-called winds message covered only one phase of international relations of which this other serial, circular 2409 covered dozens of situations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the hidden word message was a broader scheme than the winds message?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, it has been testified here, Captain, that about 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4, 1941, you brought a message in Japanese to Captain Safford, on which you had written certain words, among which were the words "War with the United States," and said to Captain Safford, "This is it."

Do you recall any incident about that time with reference to your delivery to Captain Safford of any message which had any relation to the winds code?

Captain KRAMER. The message I just referred to as being shown to me by the GY watch officer, which my current best understanding is, was on December 5, not December 4, was shown to me by the GY watch officer only to confirm his interpretation of the Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by that?

Captain KRAMER. I mean by that the following:

When this winds system had been set up, a week or 10 days previously, there was considerable interest in it by [10486] all the usual recipients of this daily traffic. Special provisions had been made to monitor it not only within the United States, but outside the United States. A day or so after that was disseminated, Admiral Noyes instructed me to prepare a half dozen or so cards, and as I recall they were 3 by 5 cards, which I prepared, having on them the English translation of the terms given in this winds set-up.

Mr. RICHARDSON. On those cards, did the Japanese words themselves appear?

Captain KRAMER. They did not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what definition of the words, the Japanese words which we reidentified in the winds-code messages, was put on these cards by you?

Captain KRAMER. To use your term "definition," the only additional thing besides the English translation of these Japanese terms was the countries to which they referred.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Turning to 1-A in Exhibit 142, which is Circular 2353, you will note in that circular opposite the notations 1, 2, and 3, certain Japanese word phrases.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Under (1) it reads:

In case of a Japan-U. S. relation in danger. HIGASHI [10487] NO KAZEAME.

Captain KRAMER. May I correct counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Don't dare do it—yes, go ahead.

Captain KRAMER. In the pronunciation of the Japanese it is four words, not three. It is probably better rendered HIGASHI NO KAZE AME.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, you now compel me to reform my entire Japanese repertoire.

As I get you, these cards that you made out under the direction of Admiral Noyes contained the definition of these so-called four Japanese words, that you have just interpreted?

Captain KRAMER. To use your term again of "definition" it consisted only of the countries to which those translations of these phrases referred.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know what became of those cards?

Captain KRAMER. From first-hand knowledge, I do not. From implication, deduction perhaps, of Admiral Noyes' conversation, I gathered that he intended that they go by himself to the usual recipients of this daily traffic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, do you remember, Captain, what definition, in connection with the United States, you put on those cards?

[10488] Captain KRAMER. No definition whatever. I have already completely covered what appeared on those cards.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, tell me in letters, or groups of words, if you can, what was on the card as you made it up for Admiral Noyes.

Captain KRAMER (reading):

East wind rain; United States. North wind cloudy; Russian. West wind clear, England.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was all there was on the cards?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was nothing about war?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Or guns?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Or pistols?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Or navies?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Or surprise attacks?

Captain KRAMER. Nothing more, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, pick up the incident that I called to your attention with respect to a message coming in, that was called to your attention by one of the watch officers, that you [10489] think occurred on the 5th day of December 1941.

Captain KRAMER. I can further substantiate that date later on, perhaps.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Don't forget to do it, because I would like to have some one thing substantiated in connection with it.

Now, Captain, you do not recall who actually delivered this message to you?

Captain KRAMER. I am not positive who the watch officer was. To the best of my recollection it was someone about my height, because I accompanied him through the corridor to Captain Safford's office. I believe it was Lieutenant Murray.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall why, or was there any statement made as to why, it was brought to you?

Captain KRAMER. It was brought to me to the extent of calling me to my door. It was never brought into my office. It was brought to me by this GY watch officer, who was on his way to Captain Safford's office. He and all the watch officers had been given a translation of these phrases. At least a week before, perhaps 10 days before, there was executed about the same time a full coverage of all the plain language broadcasts by then Commander Safford, as part of the attempt to get this thing. The watch officers were instructed in case anything with this phraseology came in—that is incidental, what I am testifying to now is what I was told, is not first-hand instructions of my own, but it was my general understanding of the instructions then in effect.

[10490] Mr. RICHARDSON. That was the reason which was in your mind as to why the watch officer came to your door?

Captain KRAMER. Came to my door. He need not have come to my door.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Captain KRAMER. But on his way to Captain Safford's office he saw that I was in my office and called me to my door to check his interpretation of the phraseology.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you saw a message at that time?

Captain KRAMER. I did; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you describe what it looked like as you saw it at that time?

Captain KRAMER. It was a piece of teletype paper, to my best recollection. I am not certain of its color. There were two colors in vogue, both red and yellow. It was not more than 3 or 4 inches in length, torn at the top and bottom as though it had been torn off of a long strip of teletype coming out of a machine.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How wide was the strip?

Captain KRAMER. Approximately 8 or 10 inches wide.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How high?

Captain KRAMER. Three or four inches high, to my recollection.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it in English or Japanese?

[10491] Captain KRAMER. Plain language Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many words would you say there were in that message as you saw it?

Captain KRAMER. My only recollection of the size of the actual text was it was not more than a line or two. It may possibly have been even three lines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection of seeing a message that morning that contained approximately 200 words?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would 200 words be a fairly large message?

Captain KRAMER. I should say it would be something about 10 or 12 inches long.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now was the message handed to you by the watch officer?

Captain KRAMER. While I was perusing it at my door, it was; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you write anything on it?

Captain KRAMER. I would not be positive of that, sir. I have no recollection of writing on it. My rather vague recollection is that the interpretation had already been written on it by the GY watch officer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you read the message?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

[10492] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you agree with whatever interpretation was written on the message?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is that I did, sir. I confirmed his interpretation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. You proceeded then with the watch officer?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did you go?

Captain KRAMER. Down the corridor past about 8 or 10 offices to Captain Safford's office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now it is testified here that you came into Captain Safford's office with the watch officer and that you said, "Here it is," and handed to Captain Safford a message on yellow teletype paper in Japanese, about 200 words, with English writing on the bottom part of it, with the words, "War with United States."

Captain KRAMER. If I had written anything on that piece of teletype paper I would most positively have not used the word "war."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you examined the winds code messages 2353 and 2354?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I have them in front of me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you, as an interpreter of messages, find in either of those messages any interpretation basis [10493] for using the term "war"?

Captain KRAMER. Not the slightest, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything in any message that might have been shown to you on this morning when this message was taken to Captain Safford that would indicate to you that it meant war with the United States?

Captain KRAMER. The only interpretation I could possibly put on it is what the Japanese said it meant in this Circular 2353 and also 2354.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would necessarily be true, would it not, Captain, in view of the fact that the dispatch creating the code gave the definition of what the words were supposed to mean?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. I might further amplify our discussion at this point, sir. While the set-up of the messages themselves was primarily presumably as a means of communication by a news broadcast in case of cutting off of communications, there might, of course, be deduced from that implications of imminent war. Other than that, the question of war is purely one's personal deduction and presumption.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It would be precisely the same thing that everyone in the Navy Department was deducing from the strained relations existing between Japan and the United States [10494] for days?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What became of that message?

Captain KRAMER. When the watch officer and myself entered Captain Safford's office my recollection is that we met him in the middle of his office, and I may have said—I am not certain—"Here it is", as I walked in. The conversation that took place there was very limited. I do not believe that I stayed there more than 15 or 20 seconds, possibly half a minute. There was little need for conversation.

My recollection is then that the watch officer and myself returned to our offices at the same time that Captain Safford left that office heading for Admiral Noyes' office. At least that was my presumption, that he was heading for Admiral Noyes' office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You, of course, do not know whether he went there or not?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is based on the further recollection that he indicated he was heading for Admiral Noyes' office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever see that message again?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have anything to do with the [10495] preparation of files and documents that were to be turned over to the Roberts Commission?

Captain KRAMER. None, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were any shown to you?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was any such file made up for delivery to the Roberts Commission shown to you?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; there was not. I can be quite certain on that point because I recollect now that during the course of the Roberts hearings I asked Captain McCollum whether this decrypted traffic was being introduced into the Roberts hearings. I distinctly recollect that request for information of McCollum. I was never called before the Roberts hearings.

In my general interest in the maintenance of security of this traffic I was curious on that point.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It has been testified here that a file was made up, examined by you and examined by Captain Safford, each checking the other to be sure that all the necessary papers were in the file. Do you ever recall of such incident?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection whatsoever of such an incident, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever see this message that [10496] we have been talking about in connection with any file that was to be presented to the Roberts Commission?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I did not. I might further state that there was no winds message, during the week December 1-7, 1941, ever written up by section GZ of which I had charge.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know of any winds execute message applying to Circular 2353 that came into that department through your watch officers during the period December 1-7, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. I did not get that question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Read it, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain KRAMER. I am uncertain as to what you mean by "department," Counselor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I mean the section that you were in, where you had the watch officers that took the messages off the wire and brought them into your section for translation and then passed them on to Safford.

Captain KRAMER. No winds message during the week that you describe was ever brought into my section. The closest a message of that character came to my section was the office door of my section as I have previously outlined.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, can you tell us what was on the [10497] message that you saw on December 5?

Captain KRAMER. I have had, for the past several years, no positive recollection of what was on that piece of teletype. My present conclusions on it are based on a study of some of these documents which I have first seen in the last several weeks. At no time prior to the last several weeks have I seen any of these documents since the time involved, namely, December 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May it be said, Captain, that you have a very definite present recollection that the message that you saw was a short message of not to exceed three lines?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that that message was entirely in Japanese?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that you did not write on that message the phrase "War with United States"?

Captain KRAMER. I may not have given a full answer to that. I do not want to imply that I may not have written on that message to the extent of correcting the GY watch officer's interpretation. I most positively state, however, that I would not have used the word "war" in any such correction or writing I may have made.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you recollect definitely that you [10498] did not assist in the preparation of a record containing that message designed for the use of the Roberts Commission?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now did you ever tell Mr. Safford, or Captain Safford, Captain Kramer, at any time that you showed this winds execute message to Secretary Forrestal and discussed it with him?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot be positive what I told Captain Safford on the extremely few occasions that we had contacts throughout 1942 and the spring of 1943. I think we probably saw each other three or four times. We were in separate buildings during most of that period. As I have indicated in reply to an earlier question, I prepared nothing in my section for the Roberts Commission. I did, however, prepare a folder, I believe the day or the day after Secretary Knox left Washington for Pearl Harbor for Mr. Forrestal in which were included a fairly bulky file of the traffic of the previous few weeks.

Among the items appearing in that folder were this hidden word message December 7 on page 251 of exhibit 1.

[10499] At the time that was shown to Mr. Forrestal, it was pointed out to him by me, I believe in the presence of Captain McCollum, who was also there, that the "United States" was omitted from that translation erroneously and should have been included.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, my redoubtable associate calls my attention to Document No. 3, which appears in exhibit 142, following the document identified as 3 (b), the document entitled "Document No. 3" being the letter message from Tokyo dated December 5, 1941.

Have you that before you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, are you able to state, Captain, whether it is your belief that that is the message that you saw on this morning about which you have been testifying?

Captain KRAMER. I am almost positive that it could not have been, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why not?

Captain KRAMER. In the first place, there are no communications systems in effect between the Federal Communications Commission the Navy Department GY watch officer by teletype that I am aware of, or was aware of.

[10500] In the second place, to the best of my understanding which is still my understanding, the Federal Communications Commission was primarily monitoring for voice traffic.

My distinct understanding of the apparent winds message that I saw was that it had been received in Morse by one of our intercept stations and sent by teletype in the usual manner.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You have examined, have you not, Captain, the various messages which are set forth in Exhibit 142?

Captain KRAMER. I have glanced through that; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are there any messages in there, that you can identify in any way, as having been the message that you saw this morning, as being the message that was taken into Captain Safford, which he later took to Noyes?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; there is not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When this message was presented to you by the watch officer at your door, preparatory to taking it to Captain Safford, did you then read and translate the Japanese words in that message?

Captain KRAMER. I read them, certainly translated them in my mind, and may have corrected the GY watch officer's handwritten translation on it.

[10501] Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall that the Japanese phrases in that message were those Japanese phrases which are identified in Circular 2353?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection, when I testified before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry, and my recollection now is that only one country was involved, but I cannot be positive of that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What country do you recall, if you do recall, was involved, in the one you recall?

Captain KRAMER. To the best of my belief it was England.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, was your interest in the subject of a winds execute message sufficiently acute so that you would have been interested in a reference in that message to the United States?

Captain KRAMER. Certainly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any other country that you were as interested in as the United States at that time?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were there any Japanese words in any message in connection with the winds code that would bring the matter as sharply to your mind as Japanese words in connection with the definition that meant relations to the United States?

[10502] Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there anything, Captain, in addition to this subject of a winds code execute message being received that you are able to tell the committee now that you have not testified concerning?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; there is.

May I have counsel's assistance on finding certain things? I want specifically those series of messages that were sent to our outposts in the Far East on the destruction of our codes, and so forth.

It is briefly, as follows, sir:

The directives from Onnav to our outposts in the Far East, including attachés in Japan and China, and our island possessions in the western Pacific, were drafted by Admiral Noyes at the time he was shown the Japanese directives to diplomatic posts in the Western Hemisphere to destroy part of their systems.

That was on Thursday, if I am correct. In any case, December 4.

In the routine delivery of these decryption folders, when the folder containing this Japanese directive dated December 3 was shown to Admiral Noyes, it was shortly after lunch.

He read through all the other traffic in the folder.

[10503] I was standing by, as was my usual practice, while he read them.

He came back to this Japanese directive, remarked something along the lines, "I think we had better send something to our own diplomatic posts that are in areas under Japanese jurisdiction, or might be endangered by Japanese activity to destroy their systems."

He commenced the draft of such messages in long hand.

My recollection is that two were drafted while I was there. Certainly one was. While he was drafting, certainly one of them, that one being to Tokyo and posts in China, in fact, I had advised him on where some of the assistant attachés were in China. He called Captain Safford on the phone for the purpose of identifying the systems held by those outposts.

[10504] I left a few minutes later, after Captain Safford arrived in Admiral Noyes' office, continuing on my routine delivery of this material in the folders. My presumption was that Captain Safford and Admiral Noyes between them would continue the draft of these dispatches, which apparently became four or five in number. My first-hand knowledge of them is only one, or possibly two.

I can most positively assert that the drafting of those dispatches to our outposts was the result of Admiral Noyes seeing the directives from Japan to diplomatic posts of the Japanese in the Western Hemisphere to destroy some of their systems. There was nothing "winds" whatsoever involved in the drafting of those dispatches.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you anything further, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. That is in brief the summary of my recent refreshing of memory on this winds problem.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It appears here, captain, that in the Navy file of messages file No. 7001 is marked "Canceled." It so appears in the group of dispatches contained in the Navy Department. Now, was that file, so-called, under your care?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you anything to advise the committee with respect to the presence in that file of 7001 marked [10505] "canceled"?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I can, sir. As I have previously indicated, I saw none of this material, either decryptions or dispatches connected with all this matter, prior to a few weeks ago, with the exception of what was shown me during the course of the two previous hearings at which I testified.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, right there: What hearings have you testified in, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. Before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry meeting at Pearl Harbor and last summer before Admiral Hewitt's Board of Investigation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, proceed.

Captain KRAMER. In connection with the cancellation of file No. 7001 I should like to state first that it was not at all an unusual thing to have a canceled file number in that file. There had been frequent previous occasions of such cancellation of file numbers, a number of which appear as a part of this exhibit, I believe 142.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any way you can identify file 7001 as having been connected with any missing winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. Absolutely none, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any significance in connection [10506] with those files with respect to the dates of the files preceding 7001 and the files subsequent to 7001?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, there is. Turning to the part of Exhibit 142 headed "Study of JD-1 #'s to determine relationship between date of message, date of translation, and JD-1 #", there is this listed in sequence: File Nos. 6975 through 7125.

It was the practice in my office commencing, I believe, some time early in 1941 not to stamp file numbers on the messages until just before we were to make delivery in these folders I have described. Before numbers were stamped on these translations all messages were arranged chronologically.

The primary purpose of that chronological arrangement was the fact that oftentimes in the same folder there would appear messages which were referenced in other messages in that folder. It was primarily to facilitate locating in that file those messages that this arrangement was instituted.

At one time earlier, when we were in the habit of assigning a file number as soon as a translation was completed, we added to the folder on the gists which were for many months in use a serial number of that folder, one to the highest numbered messages in that folder, to facilitate precisely that same cross referencing. This numbering of translations just prior to dissemination eliminated that necessity.

[10507] You will note, I think, that in every one of those sequence all numbers which have been blocked out by the office that prepared this study are in chronological order, with the exception occasionally of one or two at the end of that sequence. Because of that chronological arrangement and because, further, of the fact that there was an understanding in effect for a year or more between the Army and Navy on allocation by dates of effort on this material, all the even numbers, with few exceptions, are Army translations, all the odd numbers are Navy translations. They so appear blocked together.

Turning to 7001 that blank file appears as the second number in a block of six other messages—correction, five other messages—dated November 28, Army translation date. From that point alone I am thoroughly convinced that by no stretch of the imagination could that blank 7001 possibly have been any message of December 3, 4, 5, or 6, winds message or not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is the significance, Captain, of the absence on 7001 as it appears there of any initials?

Captain KRAMER. The initial would appear only if there were a translation. The initial merely means who translated the message identified in this exhibit by date and file number.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The initials, therefore, would give no [10508] information as to whether or not the particular paper in a particular file was a genuine paper; it would be simply a question—

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir; no, sir. It would be purely an indication in which office, of which office translated that message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, was it your understanding, Captain, that there was in a particular office of the War Department a precise opposite, if I may call it such, of all of the documents that appear in such a file in the Navy offices?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is, if there was a document that originally was 7001 that was abstracted from the Navy file, there would still be in the Army at a proper place as an opposite the true 7001 dispatch?

Captain KRAMER. If there were a 7001 file number translation it should have been in the Signal Intelligence Section numerical files; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then if one wanted to delete for any purpose one of these files of a particular number, in order to make the deletion complete there would have to be a corresponding deletion from the Army files?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain. one or two further questions. [10509] You testified that when this message came on this morning when it was taken to Captain Safford were you asked to deliver any message—deliver that message anywhere that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I most certainly was not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If that had been an execute winds code message as has been contended, would it have been your duty at a proper time during that day to have distributed that message to the proper recipients?

Captain KRAMER. If such a message came into my section, it would in the normal routine have been translated, typed in two sets of typing, two books, one for Navy and one for Army, and given the usual distribution; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Should there have been in the office a true copy of the message as it was shown to you?

Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily, sir; not at all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How would a record of such a message have been kept?

Captain KRAMER. I doubt very much—I think other people more directly connected with it can give first hand and therefore better, testimony in that regard—that any record was kept of these plain-language intercepts. These plain-language intercepts were instituted on a large scale only after the Japanese set up that system, approximately the end [10510] of November. Those intercepts took an appreciable amount of time, not only of the GY watch officers but of my translators and myself. They were coming in, in yards and yards. I would estimate that the total length of those teletypes that came in during that period may have been a quarter of a mile in length or more. In general, they were destroyed after scanning for anything of this winds execute nature.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, if it had been a real winds-execute message would it have been preserved in any way in the ordinary course of the operation of the office?

Captain KRAMER. Every paper that came into my section, GZ, from the GY for translation or code recovery was preserved. Every paper that was translated and disseminated had on the thing that was turned over to my section an indication by my chief yeoman, "Translated date" and my recollection is normally the file number on the smooth translation file.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever take from or delete from any file or record there any messages of any kind, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know of anyone else doing it?

Captain KRAMER. I not only know of no one else doing it, I cannot conceive of any of the people working in my office having done so.

[10511] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever hear at any time that you had to do with the operation of that office that it was claimed that there had been any abstraction of records from the office?

Captain KRAMER. Only during this past year, sir, from newspapers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In connection with this proceeding?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The preliminaries to this proceeding.

Captain, there never was the slightest doubt, was there, in the minds of anyone connected with the Navy Department, that every effort was being made to monitor as many stations as possible for the purpose, if possible, of getting an execute on some of these winds codes, or secret word codes or the like?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely my understanding, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So can you conceive of any reason why anyone would want to abstract the notices to the stations to monitor for an execute message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I cannot. In that regard, however, I must add that I have no first hand knowledge of what instructions were sent to our monitoring stations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, one of the things, Captain, in connection with this file that I discussed with you a moment ago which has interested us is the fact that as we examine [10512] this file, we find on some of them the word "Canceled" with a date and with initials, which would seem to indicate the date and person who canceled that particular sheet, whereas on this sheet which is JD-1-7001, no such initialing appears at all. Is there any further explanation for that except the one that you have given, that a translator's initials were placed—were supposed to appear upon a sheet where there had been a translation?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I have not given a full explanation of the reasons for canceling file numbers. There are a number of reasons, the two principal ones of which would be a duplication of a message that had been previously translated, that duplication not being noted at the time the subsequent translation was made, presumably intercepted by a separate station and a full check was not made when the message was processed for translation. That was one of the primary reasons. There are a number of messages—there are a number of examples of that, I believe, in this thing.

Another principal reason would be for the reasons I have previously outlined, namely, my system of file numbers.

In the case of multipart messages it was our practice to assign the same file number to all parts. There were frequent occasions when we initially got one part of, for example, a three-part message. We might get part 3 first. [10513] Two or three days later we might get part 1; perhaps a week later we might get part 2, or we might not get part 2. Normally, and in most instances, a check was made before these translations were typed to see whether we had previous parts of that same Tokyo serial. If we did, the same number as had been previously assigned was given to that subsequent part.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In your opinion, might that explain the fact that 7001 in this file is not initialed?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; that does not explain that point.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any other explanation you have to offer for the absence of initials?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. I can finish with my answer. I have not finished with my answer yet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain KRAMER. As I recollect, the early part of 1941—it may have been the end of 1940—due to the work load and the fact I had only one yeoman, at my request, Captain Safford furnished me with a young Reserve officer, Lieutenant Harrison, as an assistant to me. He at times made certain deliveries of these folders on my instructions. He, after a period of several months indoctrination in the general files of the section, procedure, and so forth, was given responsibility for preparing a daily gist of files which previously [10514] I had done myself, usually dictating to my yeoman while going through that file before delivering it. Turning that job over to him relieved me of 1 to 2 hours' tie-up in that purely clerical work daily to devote to other matters.

Lieutenant Harrison, in the process of preparing these gists, sometimes noted these duplications of file numbers as I have already outlined. While he was preparing these gists also he normally had the numerical file at his desk for reference, all the frequent references appearing in the Japanese dispatches. In that respect he had custody of these files, he had a combination to the safe in which those files were kept; my chief yeoman did also.

When he noted such duplication he would make the correction to the files by removing the duplicate translation of a previous one, or bringing together a later part of a multipart message that had already been assigned a file number, thus canceling the number appearing in the file.

Some time during 1941, I do not recall the exact date, which can be determined, we acquired additional office assistance in the form of a young seaman who was in training for the rating of yeoman. He was already a fairly competent typist. He was given general custody of those files in the latter part of 1941. It would be the most natural thing in the world for him to have typed, as 7001 is, a notation about the [10515] cancellation of a file number.

I would like to point out specifically one other point in connection with this blank file No. 7001. That is that all the legends appearing on that blank sheet are not typed. Down in the lower left-hand corner there is a notation in handwriting "7001", which I identify, and I am confident that Chief Ship's Clerk Bryant will so identify, as his handwriting. He normally assigned these file numbers to all translations. I think that covers what I have to say on this.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, one further question, Captain. You stated that this message that was taken by Captain Safford and as far as you know was to go to Admiral Noyes—had there been any instructions or arrangements or directions given by Admiral Noyes that any message coming as a possible execute on the winds message was to be delivered to him only, so far as you know.

Captain KRAMER. That is not my understanding of the instructions. They were not given to me first-hand. My knowledge of that is from my general knowledge of the instructions in effect for the purpose of monitoring this message and the instructions in effect for the purpose of delivering this message by the GY watch officer if it came in.

Those instructions included instructions to the Navy Department communications office and their watch officers that [10516] when the GY watch officer delivered phraseology of the character I have indicated as appearing on those cards to him, without questioning the watch officer on the character of the thing or what it meant the Navy Department communications officers were to deliver, I presume, to the usual recipients of this traffic, presumably the holders of these cards, the English text "East wind-rain" or "West wind-snow," whatever it was, and that was all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you know of no instruction that required that those messages go to Admiral Noyes personally with the idea that Admiral Noyes would thereafter take care of distributing them?

Captain KRAMER. The primary purpose of those instructions, as I understand them, were to take care of this winds system at night, to insure prompt delivery to the usual recipients of these decryptions. In the daytime there was no special provision but presumably the GY watch officer was carrying out those identical instructions at the time he and I went to Captain Safford's office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there anything further that you would like to tell the committee, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. I think it has been fairly thoroughly covered, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

[10517] The CHAIRMAN. It is now time to recess, and we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. You will be here, Captain, and resume in the morning.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.¹

(Whereupon, at 5:02 p. m., February 6, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, February 7, 1946.)

¹ Capt. Kramer's testimony is resumed in Hearings, Part 9, p. 3930.

Part 9—February 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946—follows.

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